RRO aM " WEAPONS OF : THE THIRD REICH cele Research In World War II a] 3 LESLIE E. SIMON a _) Major General, U.S. Army, RetiredPrice — $8.95 SECRET WEAPONS OF THE THIRD REICH German Research In World War II by Major General Leslie E. Simon, U. S. Army (Ret'd) Even at the end of the fighting, like at the beginning of the Third Reich, Germany was experimenting with a wide variety of Secret Military Weapons. Just before the German surrender, the author was sent to Europe to go to German scientific establishments as soon as possible after their capture, and to question personnel, to examine data and equipment. General Simon, was then the Director of the U. S. Army Ordnance Ballistic Research Laboratories. This book is a history into German Research and an analysis of the conduct of research by the Germans under the Speer Ministry. In the chapters you will find data on weapons that would come out of the space age. Here is a sample of types of weapons in operation at the many re- search centers—Rockets, Jet, Turbo-Jet, and Athodyd Motors, Aircraft, Aircraft Armament, the Wind Gun, Sound Weapon, Explosive Powered Vortices, Tanks, Self-Propelled Ar- tillery, Antitank Weapons and Mines, Arrow Projectiles, The German Super Gun, X-Rays, Unique Small Arms made from Press Stamp- ings and Dies, Super Wind Tunnels for Test- ing, Weapons that shoot around corners and many more Secret Weapons. All this data compiled from official German Ordnance data records. Over 150 photographs, charts, and line drawings, with concise specifications. This book is the most accurate and comprehensive study devoted to the SECRET WEAPONS OF THE THIRD REICH. For the first time, this FAN- TASTIC story of German Secret Weapons is written into focus for the layman, scientists, and historian. 6x9, 258 pages; WE, INC., Publishers OLD GREENWICH, CONNECTICUT 06870 U.S.A.GERMAN RESEARCH In WORLD WAR IISECRET WEAPONS OF THE THIRD REICH German Research In World War II by LESLIE E. SIMON Major General, Ordnance Department US. Army, Retired Former Director, the Ballistic Research Laboratories WE, INC., Publishers OLD GREENWICH, CONNECTICUT 06870 U.S.A.First published under the title German Research In World War II. Copyright 1971 by WE, INC., Old Greenwich, Conn., U.S.A. Second Edition. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief passages in connection with a review written for inclusion in a magazine, newspaper or broadcast PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICADEDICATION To the ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, United States Army, through whose forward-looking attitude and solicitude for the proper kind of research to give the armed forces the best possible weapons the material for this book was made available, to the junior officers who served with me in interviewing German scientists and in gathering research informa- tion, and to the American men of science who have unstintingly devoted themselves to war research at the Ballistic Research Laboratory and thus acted as my teachers, this book is gratefully dedicated.WE une. BOX 131 Old Greenwich Connecticut 06870 The present book encompassed much of history of German Secret Weapons of World War II and the conduct of their research. Out of print for twenty- four years, no other history on the subject before or since has equalled it as a foundation for the study of the developments of the Secret Weapons of The Third Reich. The Editors wish to thank, Major General Simon for giving us permission to reprint this tremendous book.FOREWORD Just before the German surrender, the author, among others, was sent to Europe to go to German scientific establishments as soon as possible after their capture, and to question personnel, to examine apparatus and equipment, and to obtain (1) information of use to the Allies in the remainder of the war, (2) matériel of use in the war, (3) information of general value, and (4) maté- riel of general value. The assignment was a most welcome one, as the author had been the Director of the Ordnance Department’s Ballistic Re- search Laboratory during the entire war and had been Assistant Director for four years before the war, and had wished very much to know how and in just what way the Germans seemed to get the product of their research swiftly into practical use. By what organization and by what mechanism did they bridge the gap be- tween research and production? How extensive was their re- search, and to what extent was it especially organized for war work? How did they define basic research, technical research, engineering design, development, and production? The concrete information sought was obtained without great difficulty, owing principally to three conditions: (1) the Germans are a conquered people and could not be too refractory, (2) there is a natural human tendency to boast of work well done, and (3) it was found possible to convince many of the leading scientists that their careers in war research were at an end, and that their best recourse for preserving their work to science consisted of passing it over to a scientific institution which was above plagiarism, that would further develop their ideas and that would give them proper credit. General information about such things as organization and definitions of terms was not as directly available, but it could be deduced without much trouble from an abundance of clews. The yield of specific technical information is recorded in a viiviii FOREWORD 200-page government report.* It is not of interest except to those who require such information in furtherance of specific scientific work. Only generalizations of this information and case histories which are permissible from the viewpoint of military security are given here. The general information which was obtained is of interest to many more people and is of broader application as it is relevant to all research and development. Certainly we in the United States might examine our own research or that of our Allies for general information. However, it is as difficult to view objectively that in which one has an interest as it is to make a clinical case of oneself or to doctor oneself. Only men with a background in sci- ence could undertake the task, and it would be difficult for them to avoid bias, or the accusation of bias, in presenting work for examination in which they, their colleagues, or competitors par- ticipated. German weapons research, on the other hand, is a com- pleted experiment. One can judge coldly to what extent it suc- ceeded and failed, criticize its methodology, and draw valuable deductions. Of course, the information is of special value to war research, but it is not limited in application to war research. An attempt is made here to present German weapons research as a laboratory ex- periment for examination by those who have an interest in the fundamentals which underlie the scientific method and affect the progress and fruitfulness of research and its practical applications, to draw some deductions and inferences, but not too many infer- ences. The views presented here are the author’s only and have the official sanction of no government agency. ABERDEEN Provinc Grounp, Mp. August 15, 1945 * Report on German Scientific Establishments, by Colonel Leslie E. Simon A declassified form of the original report with the same title is available from the Office of Technical Services, United States Department of Commerce.CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 IL ql Iv A Brier View or German Researcu at THE END oF THE WAR Outline of Presentation. Conjectures Regarding German Research. The Unique Value of Examination of German Research and Develop- ment. Conditions under Which the Investigation Took Place. The Manner of Conducting the German Investigation. Distinctions be- tween United States and German War Agencies. The Air Force Re- search Establishment Near Braunschweig. Research Facilities at LF. Materials and Supplies for Research. Buildings at LFA. Special Acrodynamics Work at LFA. The Airforce Research Establishment Near Stuttgart. Some Special Facilities at LGZ. The Ingenious Use of Wind Tunnels at LGZ. The Artillery Proving Ground. Army Long-Range Rocket Research. The Technical Academy of the Luft- waffe. Ballistics at TAL. Some FunpAMEN ‘AL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING RESEARCH Popular Appeal of Research. The Impending Shortage of Scientific Men. Research Programs. Definitions. Distinction between Scien- tist and Engineer. Backcrounp or GERMAN WEAPONS RESEARCH German Respect for Education. German Excellence in Mechanical Things. German Discipline. The Influence of Munitions Makers on Research, Influence of German Propaganda on Research. The Attitude of the Hitler Government. The Attitude of Science toward War Research. Tue Wartime Bumpine or Researcir Laggardness of the Ground Forces. The Forward-Looking Attitude of the Air Forces. The Institute as the Autonomous Research Unit Recognition Accorded the Scientist. Congenial Conditions for Re- search, Scientific Intercourse and Exchange of Ideas. The Gen- eral Treatment of Science. Tue German Researcu AND DevELOPMENT ORGANIZATION Reasons for the Large and Ill-Coordinated Research Organization. The Position of Research in the War Agencies. The German Air Forces. Air Forces Research. Explanatory Notes to the Chart of German Research and Development Organization Relative to the Air Forces. Explanatory Notes to the Chart on German Scientific Organization for the Army. Explanatory Notes on the Chart on German Scientific Organization in the Navy. Organization of the Army Weapons Office. ix PAGE 39 48, 54 63x CHAPTER CONTENTS VI Tue Functionrnc or German Research anp DeveLtopMENT Prewar Research and Development. Research Due to Commercial Competition. German Development Procedure. Deficiencies in Re- search and Development Attributable to Technical Competence. Effectiveness of Air Forces Research. The Era of Good Feeling in Germany. Events Leading to Criticism of German Research and Development. The Introduction of the Speer Ministry. Sources of Information. Early Attempts at Industrial Mobilization, Post-1941 Industrial Mobilization. The Speer System of Research and In- dustrial Mobilization. Failure of Speer to Improve Research and Development. The Effect of Speer on Research and Development. The Ineffectiveness of the Reichsforschungsrat. Measures taken by Osenberg to Strengthen the RFR. A RFR Plan for Effective Re- search, Discussion of RFR’s Final Plan, Summary. VII Summary or More Important Researcy iN InTERIOR BALLISTICS AND TerMinaL BALLIstics Introduction. Pressure-Time Studies. Combustion of Propelling Charge. Bore Temperature-Time Measurements. Measurements of Bore Friction, Measurement of Pressure Travel. Camera Tech- niques. Armor Penetration and Projectile Impact. Fragmentation Studies. Blast and Shock-Wave Studies. Research in Shaped-Explo- sive Charges. VIII Summary or More Important Researcn 1N EXTERIOR BALLISTICS AND Fire Contror Introduction, Theoretical Exterior Ballistics. Bomb Ballistics. Bombsights and Pursuit Curves. Theoretical Ballistics of Bullets from Aircraft. Rockets Fired from Aircraft. Exterior Ballistics of Long-Range Rockets. Experimental Exterior Ballistics. Basic De- sign Data for Missiles. Basic Design Data for Fire Control. Ballistic Computing Methods. IX Summary or More Important Work IN AERODYNAMICS Fluid Dynamics. Jet, Turbo-Jet, and Athodyd Motors. Jet-Motor Research. Supersonic Wind Tunnels. The Kochel Wind Tunnel. Pitot Tubes for Pressure Distribution. The Interferometer Tech- nique. Use of Density Measurement Techniques. The X-Ray Densi- tometer. The Mach Number 10 Wind Tunnel. The Otztal Tunnel. X Summary or More Important Instruments anp MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES The Importance of Measurements. German Instrumentation, Rea- sons for the German Laggardness in Instrument Design. Proving- Ground Instruments. Wind-Tunnel Instruments, Rocket-Flight In- struments, Auxiliary and Miscellaneous Instruments. PAGE 90 108 121 136 156CONTENTS xi PAGE XI Summary or More Important DevetopMent WorK = 17s CHAPTER Methods of Development. Aircraft and Aircraft Armament. The Wind Gun. Sound As a Weapon. Explosive Powered Vortices. Tanks and Tank Destroyers. Self-Propelled Artillery. Tank Ac- cessories, . Antitank Weapons and Mines. Ersatz Developments. De- velopment of Heavy Mortars. Arrow Projectiles. The German Super Gun. XII Comments anp Crrricisms Appiicasre To RESEARCH IN GENERAL 194 New Articles without Orderly Research. Flow of Contributions to a New Article. A Scheme of Origin of New Articles. Origin of New Articles in German Research and Development. The Design of New Articles. Development of a New Article. The Service Test. Sum- mary of German Conduct of Research and Development. The Im- portance of Research in Peace. Summary of Conditions to Foster Research. Inpex . ws. 213UND 1osuIDHUY WuI-gg UDWIEDCHAPTER I INTRODUCTION A BRIEF VIEW OF GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION In the attempt to present a view of German research and development in World War II, without bias and in sufficient detail to form a basis for critical examination, some difficulties arose which are not ordinarily present in technical and scientific writing. First, various factors or influences which had important effects on research such as quantity and quality of apparatus and equip- ment, character of research staff, degree of independence of re- search, and extent of non-scientific direction are important both because the research work can be judged only in the light of the conditions under which it took place and because the effects of important influences on German research may well serve as a guide in the future organization and operation of research else- where. However, the factors are not mutually independent, and consequently it is difficult to treat one of them and its effects without concurrent consideration of the operation of others. Thus, one is faced with the problem of wishing to tell the reader every- thing, before he tells him anything. An attempt has been made to circumvent this difficulty by what might be called a circular approach; i.e., various influences are described briefly and with- out great emphasis on any one of them, and subsequently any or all of them may be described in further detail when need arises for a more careful consideration of the effects of the respective factors, influences, or conditions. Second, the terminology of research is currently ill-defined, and words which have one meaning in a strictly industrial re- search laboratory may have quite a different meaning in the uni- 12 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR versity. With respect to research, there are too many people who like Humpty Dumpty insist that their words mean what they intend them to mean. An attempt has been made in the present discussion to use a defined and consistent terminology. Third, research is very sensitive to its environment, and con- sequently it is necessary to introduce not only descriptions of laboratories and their surroundings but also concepts of psycho- logical influences and opinions and feelings of people about re- search problems. Fourth, something must be said of the conditions which pre- vailed in the German war ministries before the war, the steps which the ministries took by way of scientific preparation for the emergency, and how almost all research grew into the war research organization of World War II. With the four essentially preparatory chapters as a back- ground, a brief description of the German research organization and its functioning, a condensed version of its accomplished re- search, and a basis for analysis and criticism of the whole pattern of the German scientific effort can be presented. Some narrative and descriptive matter is introduced, not just to ease the prepara- tory stages, but because these too contribute to a realization of the conditions which prevailed and affected research work toward the end of the war. ConyJEcTURES REGARDING GERMAN RESEARCH Those who have followed the changes in arms during the re- cent war have frequently seen new arms brought to the battle- field by the Germans and have wondered through just what chan- nels the new ideas passed before they became actualities. The rapidity with which they brought out new things, especially dur- ing the middle stages of the war, led many technicians to believe that the Germans had little difficulty in bringing their new things to trial. It was suspected that in their totalitarian form of govern- ment, and in their well-disciplined military establishments, there was little opportunity for unwarranted opposition to a plausible and logically valid idea. It was suspected that those in authority said simply that such and such an idea was to be exploited to its fullest extent and that there was no tolerance of opposition or ofEXAMINATION OF GERMAN RESEARCH 3 impediments to progress. Subsequent investigations which were made as the German research and development establishments fell into Allied hands proved that many of such conclusions regarding the easy path of German research and development were invalid. In some respects German progress through the successive stages: research, design, development, and production, was simpler and easier than that in the United States but also in some respects it was severely handicapped. It is believed that many persons will be interested in how such a vitally important process as the evolu- tion of new weapons progressed in a country in which the military was almost completely dominant. THE UNIQUE VALUE OF EXAMINATION OF GERMAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT The actual accomplishments and failures of German war re- search are interesting and well worth recording, but a knowledge of them is not the most important thing that can be obtained from its study. The study can be of greater value as a guide in the solution of many difficult problems that will arise in the reorgan- ization of American research for peace and in organizations of research which will be initiated in the future. Its unique value inheres in the fact that it can be regarded as the study of a com- pleted laboratory experiment in which causes and their effects can be studied in a purely objective manner. Research and development were never as important as they are today. The way in which they should be conducted, the extent to which energy should be devoted to them, and the latitude to be given to research workers comprise a series of problems to which one can get all sorts of contradictory answers which are all too often more subjective than objective. The past is one of the best guides to the future, but it is difficult to examine the very recent past without bias, and the greater part of research and development history not only lies within the very recent past but also is closely associated with the recent efforts of the very men who are called upon to render judgments. But German weapons research in World War II constitutes a completed ex- periment. One can view its progress, failures, and accomplish- ments with less bias than the record of one’s own work and4 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR without the influence of wishful thinking. Admittedly such an analysis is of most immediate application to future research and development in ordnance. However, the lessons drawn with re- spect to ordnance are less applicable in degree only to other fields of human endeavor. A study of German research offers an op- portunity for drawing many valuable deductions with respect to industrial research conducted by corporations and to basic re- search and its subsequent application which is of interest to many educational institutions and foundations. Therefore, every effort will be made to avoid military bias in presenting the Ger- man experiment to the reader. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE INVESTIGATION Took PLACE As soon as German establishments began to be overrun by the Allied armies, teams of specialists were sent into the field to follow the conquering army as closely as possible in order to ex- amine equipment and documents before the Germans could ac- complish too much destruction or concealment. These investi- gations were conducted with considerable difficulty. In the first place the Germans destroyed considerable equipment and docu- ments before the Allies occupied the ground. Not only were in- structions issued to establishments to destroy their documents and principal apparatus or to conceal them, but in many instances SS men were sent to carry out the actual destruction. The scene of any great activity was also the location of a considerable num- ber of slave laborers, otherwise known as displaced persons (D.P.’s). Immediately upon liberation the D.P.’s indulged in an orgy of destruction and looting. When the Allied troops arrived they too caused considerable destruction. Their primary duty w: s to take the place, not to seek to preserve enemy apparatus. Not only were many places shot up, but in addition it was rather natural for the front-line soldiers to remove lenses and other in- teresting parts from scientific apparatus. The German scientists were well aware of the torrent of destruction which follows in the wake of invasion, since Germany had experienced similar conditions in the countries which it had conquered, and conse- quently much of the more valuable equipment and many docu-CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH INVESTIGATION TOOK PLACE 5 Fis. 1. DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT BY GERMANS.6 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR Fic. 2, SLAVE LABOR CAMP (D.P. Camp) outside the Messerschmitt experimental plant, Oberammergau, Germany. Fic. 3. DESTRUCTION AND LOOTING OF OFFICES BY D.P.’S.CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH INVESTIGATION TOOK PLACE 7 Fic. 4. DESTRUCTION OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT BY GER- MANS OR D.P.’S.8 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR ments were removed by the German scientists themselves and concealed in homes or buried. Thus, when investigators came upon a German establishment, it was more likely than not to look as if it had recently been struck by a cyclone. Apparatus was smashed, equipment was scattered over the floors, and every- thing was in such a complete state of disorder that sometimes one could scarcely judge the nature of the work which had been con- ducted in the laboratory. The situation with respect to personnel was almost as con- fusing. In some instances the workers were directly or indirectly connected with the army or even with the SS. They either had fled or had been put into prison camps. As soon as the war was over many of them went to remote localities where their families or homes were located or succeeded in getting permission to travel to some other location for some apparently valid reason. Conse- quently the interrogation of personnel often involved several days of seeking key scientists in order to bring them back to the place of their former work, and sometimes it took weeks to gather parts and reassemble equipment in order to understand thoroughly how it worked and its relation to accomplished research. THE MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE GERMAN INVESTIGATION There were four objectives of the investigation: (1) to get information that would be of value in the remainder of the war against Japan, (2) to get matériel that would be of value in the war against Japan, (3) to get information that would be of general scientific value to the United States, and (4) to get matériel that would be of general value to the United States. Of these four objectives, manifestly the most important are those regarding in- formation, and the best way to get information is to question the scientist in the presence of his scientific reports and in his ac- customed environment. If any one of the three elements, the scientist, the reports, or the apparatus, is missing, the investigation suffers. Consequently upon arrival at an establishment the pro- cedure consisted (1) of getting in touch with some of the key scientists, (2) discussing with them the kind of work done and the research staff who did the work, (3) sending out messengers to find the missing scientists and bring them back to the estab-MANNER OF CONDUCTING GERMAN INVESTIGATION 9 lishment, (4) assembling the key members of the staff with all literature obtainable, and (5) proceeding with a detailed ex- amination of work accomplished during the war. By this time- consuming and painstaking process, which was repeated at suc- cessive places of investigation, many research problems were / i ne Fic. 5. PROFESSOR W. HERMANN, DIRECTOR OF THE TECHNICAL ACADEMY OF THE LUFTWAFFE with some of his staff, and some of Colonel Simon’s investigators standing in front of the Academy’s temporary quarters in Badblankenburg. identified as being integral parts of a broad research program, as being parallel lines of investigation, or as being successive prob- lems in a research project. The intended end of much of the German research and development could not otherwise have been discovered, because the German military security was so rigorous and the knowledge of the individual so limited to what was essen- tial to his specific task that most of the scientists, no matter how cooperative, could explain but little of the broad plan of a re- search project. It was necessary to correlate the information10 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR gained at one place with that obtained at others, for the more important research and development projects were divided into PAU e EE Se Fic. 62. TROOP-CARRYING GLIDERS on the field at the German Re- search Establishment for Sail Planes (DFS) at Ainring near Salzburg. Fic, 66, WRECKED AIRPLANES AND GLIDERS ON THE FIELD AT DFS. problems that were assigned to various institutes. Often the prob- lem assignment was in the form of a hypothetical question so that the research workers were completely unaware of the nature ofUNITED STATES AND GERMAN WAR AGENCIES u the end product to which they were contributing. For example, a partial assignment of work on the flak rocket Wasserfall was as follows: the aerodynamics work was done and the basic design data for the body were accumulated by a wind-tunnel group at Kochel; the ballistics and telemetering were the responsibility of two groups at Garmisch (these groups were formerly at Peene- miinde); a fire-control device for the rocket was made by the Glider Research Establishment (DFS) at Ainring near Salzburg; and the most promising homing device for guiding the missile Rotating disc Left Down Photocell Ld Right From target Up Direction of rocket flight Fic. 7. INFRA-RED HOMING DEVICE. on the last part of its trajectory was made by a small institute near Lofer. Probably the systematic investigation has made it possible to present here a more comprehensive knowledge of German re- search and development and the methods and organization asso- ciated therewith than was possessed by any except one or two Germans at the top of the organization. DIstTINCTIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMAN WAR AGENCIES A clear picture of the physical plants, apparatus, and persons involved is an important adjunct to judging the German experi- ment. Without a knowledge of the nature and extent of the Ger- man establishments, a study of the German organization, its aims and purposes, would lack concreteness; therefore, a few of the establishments of the air forces and also some of those of the army will be described. The German Air Force differed from the air forces of the United States in that it included, in addition to the combat air12 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR arm, the antiaircraft artillery, and the signal control and com- munication equipment which go with them, and it was charged with all phases of the supply of its equipment. One might say, in other words, that the German Air Force included its own ord- nance and the antiaircraft artillery as well. Thus German Army Ordnance (Waffenamt, or literally Weapons Office) had a lesser scope than United States Army Ordnance in that it supplied weapons only to the ground forces. On the other hand it supplied signal and engineer equipment, a responsibility not charged to the United States Army Ordnance. Consequently there were weapons research and development conducted for the Luftwaffe under the Air Ministry and weapons research and development for the Wehrmacht under the Army Weapons Office, and in both these programs weapons research was closely allied with research in radio, radar, aircraft, and other fields. These assignments of responsibilities had an important bearing on the German research organization, and they make it necessary, at least in the beginning, to discuss air force and army activities alternately. Tue Arr Force RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT NEAR BRAUNSCHWEIG The research establishments of the German Air Forces were the most magnificent, carefully planned, and fully equipped that the world has ever seen. A typical example is the Luftfahrtfor- schungsanstalt Hermann Goring near Braunschweig. This name may be freely translated as the Hermann Goring Research Estab- lishment and will be referred to hereafter by the abbreviation LFA. Most of the LFA was located in a pine forest, and it occupied an area of about 214 square miles. The buildings were spaced well apart, and the camouflage was almost perfect. None of LFA’s buildings that were in the woods extended above the treetops, and most of them were well below the trees. The few buildings that were in the open were disguised as farm buildings. Owing to the excellence of the camouflage, only two bombs had fallen on LFA, whereas the near-by city of Braun- schweig had been bombed heavily and repeatedly. There were over seventy important laboratory buildings in the establishment, approximately forty of which pertained to the Weapons (Ord-Messerschmitt ME210 is notable for its unique side mounted remote controlled 13mm cannons. The observer directed the guns through a 360° arc of fire with the aid of a clever sighting system. In order to make better use of obsolete aircraft, the Hs129 was fitted with a powerful 30mm cannon. This flying ‘‘can opener” as it was called became an effective flying anti-tank gun.7 LAGEPLAN STRASSEN Office &.lob for weaoons research. ‘research 4 =esearch Siperione win fone Reception ard | regivation_| MOTE All "W" buildings not iabwied are + assigned fo weapons research 2. THE LARGE AREA IN THE CENTER , INCLUDED IN THE TRIANGLE BUILDING LETTERING CODE | LETTER TYPE OF BUILDING w WEAPONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE s [STATIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE (STRENGTH OF MATERIALS, AIRPLANE STRUCTURES, ETC.), EXCEPT THAT 6L06.5-¢ was nor starics "| BUT INSTEAD HOUSED THE THEORETICAL BALLISTICS INSTITUTE AND WORK ON ACOUSTICAL FUZES “ MOTOR RESEARCH INSTITUTE a AERODYNAMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE V.P,8 SERVICE BUILDINGS NOTES THE SOLID HEAVY LINE ON THE LEFT ENGLOSES THE REGION DEVOTED TO WEAPONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE ACTIVITIES, 27 EAST, WEST, AND SOUTH, IS AN AIRFIELD. AT EACH W27 LOCATION WAS A GINETHEOOOLITE , WHIGH WAS USED IN CONNECTION WITH FIRE CONTROL ACTIVITIES OF THE ‘WEAPONS INSTITUTE, 3. THE GRID SOUARES ARE 200 METERS ON A SIDE THE LUFTFAHRT FORSCHUNGSANSTALT, HERMANN GORING, BRAUNSCHWEIG.Mechanical devices fascinated the Germans. Although this little combination car and tracked vehicle worked well, it was an expensive toy. In order to prevent magnetic mines from sticking to the tanks steel hull, German tanks were covered with an asphalt type material called “zimmitt”. The coating prevented magnetic mines with shaped charges from sticking to its sides or bottom.AIR FORCE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT 13 Fic: 9. TYPICAL RESEARCH BUILDINGS AT LFA. Note structures kept well below the treetops.14 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR Fic. 10, A GROUP OF LABORATORY BUILDINGS IN THE WOODS AT LFA. Fic. 11, DEEP NATURAL CAMOUFLAGE OF LABORATORY BUILD- INGS AT LFA.AIR FORCE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT 15 Fic, 12, CHAMBER FOR TESTING THE FRAGMENTATION OF SHELLS is housed in square tower and extends 20 feet below ground level. Facility at LFA. 33 r BE Ae Fic. 13. LABORATORY FOR RESEARCH IN FIRE CONTROL AT LFA.16 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR nance) Institute. A whole area was devoted to an institute for research on airplane engines. Another large area was devoted to aerodynamics and contained five major wind tunnels: a 2.5- meter-diameter subsonic wind tunnel, an 8-meter-diameter low- speed airplane wind tunnel, a 2.8-meter-diameter high-speed (sub- sonic) airplane wind tunnel, a small supersonic wind tunnel which would go to Mach number 1.8 (1.8 times the velocity of sound), and a still smaller supersonic wind tunnel which would go to Mach number 4. The last two wind tunnels had been used not at all for ballistics and not extensively in airplane research. ResearcH Faciities at LFA The Weapons Institute was an extensive series of laboratories. It had a group of firing ranges for studies in exterior ballistics and ordnance engineering. The largest of the firing ranges was called Fic. 14. THE HIGH-ALTITUDE FIRING RANGE, CROSS-WIND RANGE, AND SUPERSONIC WIND TUNNEL (UNDER CONSTRUC- TION) WERE SO HOUSED AS TO LOOK LIKE TYPICAL FARM BUILDINGS. The major range extended 480 yards underground from the main building. The roof of the building in the left foreground could be mechanically translated to the supports to the left of the building to expose the intake ducts to the wind tunnel.RESEARCH FACILITIES AT LFA 17 the Héhenkanal, or high-altitude firing range. It consisted of an underground firing range approximately 1440 feet long, cylindrical in cross section, and about 25 feet in diameter. The whole range, including the firing point, could be evacuated to 0.02 atmosphere to simulate fire from aircraft at very high altitude. Along the Fic, 15, A 20-MM. TRACER BULLET FIRED IN THE HOHENKANAL SHOWING THE BLITZGEBER IN ACTION. range at equal intervals of distance there were alcoves for spark- photography apparatus. The purpose of the spark apparatus, or Blitzgebers, was to furnish the brilliant and brief illumination necessary for taking pictures of the projectile as it was fired down the range. Two ordinary plate cameras (one horizontal and the other vertical) were set opposite each Blitzgeber with opened shutters in the darkened range for the purpose of taking the pictures when the Blitzgebers functioned. Actually the Blitzgeber at each station sparked three times at approximately 1-millisecond intervals so that there were three images on each photographic plate. The18 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR projectile triggered its own pictures by making the contact be- tween two sheets of tin foil just as it approached each respective spark station. The times of the sparks were recorded on a cathode-ray oscillograph. Thus the position of the projectile both in space and in time was recorded and its motion along its trajec- tory revealed. The primary purpose of the range was the study of the stability of the missiles, but the data which it yielded could have been used for other scientific purposes as well. This range had cost the Germans approximately 4 million marks, and its elaborateness and completeness were very impres- sive. The description has been given more to illustrate the exten- siveness of the German facilities and the thoroughness of their at- tack on fundamental problems than to show any superiority to corresponding work done in the United States. Although much constructive work was accomplished with this aerodynamics range, it can be readily shown that the costly and highly prized system of evacuation was a mistake because it artificially lessened the effects of instability and consequently rendered measurement all the more difficult. In a complete vacuum, there would be no aerodynamic pressure and no effects to measure. Furthermore, with myopic concentration on a single end, they failed to utilize the apparatus and data which it produced in the solution of other urgent ballis- tics problems, even when the priceless data were available as a by- product of the stability studies. Similar work has been done more intelligently, economically, and effectively in this country. Another firing range was so equipped that a huge chamber could be evacuated, the seal suddenly broken, and a cross wind sucked at right angles to the axis of the range and the trajectory of the bullet, thereby giving the effect of bullets fired sidewise from bombers. Excellent work was done in the facility, but similar, if not superior, work has been done in this country on the effect of airplane speed on sidewise fire from aircraft by means of specially devised photographic techniques which recorded the actual shots from bombers in flight. A host of similar and equally elaborate facilities existed throughout the institute. Some of these and the work done in them are described in the chapters on more important research in interior ballistics, exterior ballistics, and ordnance engineering.RESEARCH FACILITIES AT LFA 19 Fic. 164. CENTRIFUGAL MACHINE AT LFA CAPABLE OF TEN TIMES THE FORCE OF GRAVITY FOR T! ING THE EFFECT OF TIC WEAPONS. Fic. 166. ADAPTER END OF CENTRIFUGAL MACHINE WHERE WEAPONS COULD BE MOUNTED IN VARIOUS ORIENTATIONS.20 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR Fic. 17. BUILDING AT LFA FOR RESEARCH ON PRIMERS AND DETONATORS. NOTE EXPENDABLE GLASS WALLS. MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES FOR RESEARCH The principal laboratories of the Weapons Institute were or- ganized on a vertical basis. Each had its own stockroom for bar stock: round, square, or other shapes of steel, brass, and aluminum; stockrooms for standard hardware, for standard elec- trical parts, and for other supplies. Each had its own me- chanical facilities or machine shop, photographic supplies, dark- rooms, and enlarging and printing apparatus. Although the shortage of materials in Germany was acute, there was no ap- parent shortage in the research establishments. Ordinary items, such as standard electrical parts, drills, reamers, and saws, ap- peared to be requisitioned not by the dozen or gross, but by some very much larger unit. It would appear that the supplies could not have been exhausted even if the war had continued for a very long time. Burtpincs at LFA There were no temporary buildings at LFA. In fact, tempo- rary buildings existed at only one of the considerable number of large research and development establishments visited. In gen-BUILDINGS AT LFA 21 eral the buildings were of brick and hollow-tile construction and were built not only for efficiency and convenience, but with no small amount of attention to appearance and decorative effect. Stair rails were of polished aluminum; even hat racks, coat hangers, and window hardware were of functional and tasteful Fic. 18. A ROAD BETWEEN BUILDINGS AT LFA SHOWING TYPI- CAL CONCEALMENT OF ACTIVITIES. design. Appropriate rooms or offices for records, the reading of reports, duplicating machines, and libraries were provided in many buildings, even though like facilities sometimes existed in an ad- jacent building. The leader of the ‘institute was furnished with a separate building, resembling a large bungalow, which contained a study for his convenience and bedrooms for his use or for guests when it was desirable to remain over night. It was fully apparent that every practical measure had been taken to avoid any condi- tions that might interrupt scientific thought or inconvenience the accomplishment of experimental work.22 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR The LFA was neither the largest nor the smallest of the air force establishments. It employed about 1200 persons, whereas the other seven major establishments of the air forces ranged from 200 to 3000 persons. The staff included a large number of Germany’s best scientists, and very advanced work was done in almost all phases of ballistics and in aerodynamics. The major shortage at LFA was in subprofessional persons and technicians. The establishment was definitely undermanned, but not necessarily understaffed with scientists. The shortage of technicians forced scientists to perform many routine duties and constituted the largest single cause of wasted effort observed at that establish- ment. The wide dispersion of buildings, although wise from the viewpoint of camouflage and of minimizing the effect of bombing, made it difficult to get about, especially in the later stages of the war when the gasoline shortage was acute. Special AERODYNAMICS Work AT LFA One of the most remarkable scientific accomplishments was the use of interferometers on an airplane wind tunnel for measur- ing the pressure distribution around air foils under dynamic con- ditions. This process, worked out by Dr. Zobel and a competent staff, aroused the admiration of leading American aerodynamicists. A high-speed moving-picture record was obtained wherein each frame was a dual photograph; one photograph (or interferogram) showed lines of equal density (or the equivalent in other forms) and the other photograph showed the Schlieren picture taken at the same time. Since it is now generally admitted that the Schlieren technique is not quantitative, the development of a really precise method of measurement of pressure distribution about air foils in a wind tunnel represents a much-needed advance at a time when airplanes are approaching sonic velocity and consequently giving rise to many difficult questions in aerodynamics. A considerable amount of work was done at LFA on the class of weapons generally known as guided missiles, i.e., bombs, rockets, or small aircraft whose course is set at the will of some operator or by some mechanism, or by a homing device which guides them to the target. Work was done both on the aerodynamics of guided missiles and on the motors that propelled them, as well as on or-SPECIAL AERODYNAMICS WORK AT LFA 23 l Fic. 19. THE FEUERLILIE 55 FLAK ROCKET. The small heavy motor is in the foreground. The outside booster is next to the motor. The fuel system was light. Fie. 20. “LAL, “BUDY, AND FORWARD ASSEMBLY OF A FLAK ROCKET, TOGETHER WITH TWO WIND-TUNNEL MODELS OF THE SAME ROCKET.24 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR dinary rocket motors, ram jets, and athodyds. The intensive Allied bombings lent no small stimulus to this work, and Dr. Busemann, under whose supervision a considerable amount of the work came, was led to remark that everybody in Germany was working on homing missiles and nobody got anywhere. Buse- mann’s statement is not quite true, as subsequent investigations showed that the Germans had made quite substantial advances in this field and that, given a few more months of the war and no advances in offensive air techniques, Allied bombing would prob- ably have become extremely hazardous. The rigorous security system which effectively prevented one group from knowing what another was doing probably accounts for Busemann’s false im- pression. The considerable contributions of this establishment to science were recorded in carefully written scientific reports and published papers, and copies of most of the German research re- ports are now available in various departments of the United States Government. Tue Arr Force RESEARCH EsTaBLISHMENT NEAR STUTTGART The Luftfarhtforschungsangstalt Graf Zeppelin, known as LGZ, is a good example of an air force research establishment of quite a different sort. The name Graf Zeppelin is purely com- memorative; the establishment did not work on lighter-than-air craft. The research facility resulted from an expansion of Pro- fessor Madelung’s Aerodynamics Institute of the Stuttgart Techni- cal College when the German Air Forces were effecting their great scientific expansion in 1935-1940. In the process of ex- pansion a huge facility was built about eight miles outside of Stutt- gart at Ruit. LGZ contained six wind tunnels and in addition had the use of the original wind tunnel at the old institute which was a part of the new establishment. LGZ’s work had to do, for the greater part, with ballistics at subsonic velocities and included research in parachutes, bomb ballistics, accoustical proximity fuzes, and underwater detonation phenomena. Ordinarily it worked with wooden bomb models about 6 inches in diameter, but it also used smaller ones made of aluminum as well as ones of wood and metal. An enormous number of these models were on hand, Through the efforts of LGZ the problem of penetrationon te tan [ea Fic. 21. THE STUTTGART HOME OF GEORG MADELUNG, DIREC- TOR OF LGZ. The conspicuous house number, 50, saved the investigating party further search. Fic, 22, THE STUTTGART TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE in which Professor Madelung taught. It furnished the nucleus for LFG and was still connected with it during the war. 28GERMAN RESE. H AT THE END OF THE ELECTED BOMB MODELS used in the subsonic ballistic tunnels of the Luftfahrtforschungs-Anstalt Graf Zeppelin (FGZ).AIR FORCE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT NEAR STUTTGART 27 a CELT eet Fic. 23. Continued.28 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR of water by bombs was satisfactorily solved so that bombs could be relied upon for use against underwater targets such as sub- marines. Many problems in stabilizing missiles of unusual shapes along bomb trajectories had been solved by unusual means such as alteration of the shape of the forward section of the body, i a a hea 4d LE Fic. 24. A FIRE BOMB showing unusual stabilizing fin and the way in which two bombs fit completely together. Dr. Heindrich of FGZ and Colonel Simon. introduction of grooves in the cylindrical section of the body, and use of asymmetrical fins. Its work in parachute research was most remarkable. Parachutes for persons were a minor considera- tion. The problem of parachutes was studied from the viewpoint of fundamentals, and bombs were stabilized by parachutes which were small, effective, and which packed into a smaller space than that ordinarily occupied by the tail of a bomb. The scientists at LGZ said that this type of stabilization has exceptional ad- vantages for aircraft-launched torpedoes. They studied not only the entry of the missiles into water but also their motion underSOME SPECIAL FACILITIES AT LGZ 29 water. The experimental work was done with special facilities which consisted of long tanks of water around which were cata- pulting devices for launching missiles and appropriate instruments for tracking their progress and photographing their paths. Some Sprciat Facriitres ar LGZ The work of LGZ in bomb ballistics led to considerable study of the aerodynamic characteristics of wind tunnels, and this estab- lishment probably had the highest skill in Germany in the de- sign and use of small subsonic wind tunnels. One of the tunnels, the Kurtz Zeit Kanal, was particularly interesting because of its power supply. The tunnel was altered frequently to meet the needs of problems, but it is fair to regard it as a tunnel with a working section 1 meter square, open-air exhaust, and a maximum velocity of 600 feet per second. By changes in throat connections, the working section could be made as large as 1,meter by 2 meters with concomitant loss in maximum velocity. The air was sup- plied to the tunnel by a huge one-stroke pump, similar to an ordinary pump for inflating tires. It consisted of a vertical con- crete cylinder about 25 feet in diameter and about 60 feet high. A piston fitted loosely in the cylinder. The piston was so designed that its upper portion was a water tank. The piston was held at the top of the cylinder and pumped full of water. When the piston was released, it dropped through the cylinder and pushed the air through the wind tunnel. The time for measurements in the Kurtz Zeit Kanal was small (of the order of 10 seconds), but yet it was sufficient for the measurement of at least one component (drag, lift, or overturning moment); and, although some patience was required, an entirely satisfactory analysis of bomb models and parachutes could be made. It was used to a large extent for studies of the deceleration of bombs by parachutes and of the parachute stabilization of bombs. The open-air arrangement of the tunnel made it particu- larly adaptable to the studies of the release of projectiles from airplanes; for example, at one time considerable difficulty was experienced from the dispersion of bombs because of irregular currents of air which swept through the bomb bay of a certain30 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR model of airplane and imparted different degrees of initial yaw to the various bombs as they were released. A scale model of the bomb bay was erected at the top of the air channel of the wind tunnel. Models of bombs were released and high-speed moving pictures taken. The behavior of the bombs was ascertained so well from this study that it was possible to correct the trouble with little difficulty. Tue INGENIOUS UsE or Winp TUNNELS at LGZ All other wind tunnels at LGZ were of conventional types, fan driven by electric motors. None were larger than 2 meters by 2 meters. However, the erection and construction of these tunnels showed graphically the ingenious and effective research facilities which could be constructed economically from materials on hand. The scientists at this establishment appeared to think nothing of constructing a special wind tunnel for a special purpose out of motors, fans, and plywood. They had barely started one on the day that the author arrived, and they had almost completed it four days later. It was constructed to test a model of a parachute for aircraft personnel because a medical officer who was on duty with the American Air Forces that were occupying the establish- ment had expressed an interest in the test. When one sees such speed and ingenuity, one wonders why establishments often wait so long for wind-tunnel facilities. It is true that the design and construction of large and precise tunnels are complicated, ex- pensive, and time-consuming projects, but on the other hand a very great deal of useful work can be done with simple low-speed tunnels. The Germans must certainly be credited with ingenuity and practicality in this regard. On the other hand they tolerated a most inconvenient situation in that all missiles on which measure- ments were required at supersonic velocities had to be shipped to the wind tunnel at Gottingen. A great deal of time might have been saved by having facilities for tests at both subsonic and supersonic velocities at one or both places. Their incon- venient method was an established practice sanctioned by the Air Ministry, and there seemed to be no tendency to question estab- lished practices.THE ARTILLERY PROVING GROUND 3h THE ARTILLERY PRoviNG GROUND It will be shown subsequently that the research of the army could be compared only most unfavorably in quality and scope with that of the air forces and that neither ministry had an ade- quate development echelon. However, the army had the finest proving grounds in the world as far as mere testing facilities go. The artillery proving ground at Hillersleben (about 70 miles west of Berlin) was as completely equipped as one could possibly imagine. The whole establishment was planned with utmost thor- oughness and detail. It had a firing range across almost level country, approximately 20 miles long, served by both a concrete road and a railroad along the entire length. At each end of the range there were elaborate firing facilities: 75-ton traveling cranes for emplacing large pieces of artillery and heavy equipment, mobile towers which were self-propelled along tracks and carried chronograph apparatus, and stations for plugging in electric lines from the various types of measuring instruments. The stations were connected by underground conduits to build- ings specially constructed and equipped for recording the measure- ments. These facilities were at both ends of the range so that weapons could be fired simultaneously in both directions in order to minimize the effect of wind and other meteorological condi- tions. Along the sides of the 20-mile range there were elaborately constructed proving fields for various kinds of experiments, such as studies of the demolition of concrete fortifications, blast and fragmentation studies, fields for the recovery of projectiles in or- der to examine them after they were fired, and fields for the study of crater effect. Behind the main firing line there were all types of service shops: machine shops, woodworking shops, and sheet metal and welding shops. To one side, but immediately adjacent to the main firing line, were small plants for loading various types of explosives into projectiles, for making small experimental lots of projectiles, and for all types of propellant loading. In fact, it was almost pos- sible to make up experimental weapons on the spot.32 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR In the direction away from the experimental plants there were a series of buildings for the more highly technical work of the proving ground. These buildings were equipped with finely made instruments in a profusion which approached vulgarity. Instru- ments from all over the proving ground could be connected by wire to measurement buildings in which the measurements were Fic. 25. A TYPICAL INSTRUMENT LABORATORY AT THE ARTIL- LERY PROVING GROUND, HILLERSLEBEN, GERMANY. recorded. The instrumentation included unusual types of Bou- lengé chronographs, photoelectric cells (sometimes known as sky screens) for recording the travel of projectiles, cinétheodolites, and phototheodolites. There also were buildings for making ord- nance engineering measurements, such as measurement of the pressure in recoil cylinders and of the rate of fire of automatic weapons, and the usual types of physical measurements associated with strength of materials. It should be remarked, however, that whereas the instruments were finely made, perhaps the best made in the world, they were in general of obsolescent or obsolete de- sign. The proving ground was marked by a dearth of modern electronic instruments which are essential to swift and precise measurement of ballistic phenomena.ARMY LONG-RANGE ROCKET RESEARCH 33 It should be remarked also that the personnel of the proving ground carried out orders as contrasted with assuming the responsibility for development work. The German practice consisted of writing a test program and of sending one or more officers from the headquarters of the development division in Berlin to supervise the test. The data were taken back to Berlin and analyzed, not only in a location remote from the actual test, but certainly to a large extent by people who had not wit- nessed the test. The chain of circumstances which led to such a condition will become evident as the evolution of the organiza- tion of German research and development is presented. Army Lonc-RANGE Rocker RESEARCH The rocket research and development division was the really bright spot in the army establishment. The work on long-range rockets got a good start under Major General Dérnberger in about 1932. At the beginning of the war he succeeded in assembling a very large group of the brightest young men in Germany for the purpose of research and development in what are now known as the V-2 weapons and flak rockets as distinguished from (1) the ordinary artillery-type rockets and (2) missiles with wings, such as the V-1. The principal center for this work was Peene- miinde on the Baltic Sea until the drastic bombing by the British. This establishment cost 300 million Reichsmarks (120 million dollars), and at the height of its activity employed 2200 scientists and technicians, exclusive of clerical and subprofessional person- nel. It is extremely difficult to comprehend the enormous amount of research and development done by the Germans on the V-2 rocket. After Peenemiinde was bombed, the wind tunnel and aero- dynamics work was moved to Kochel, about 25 miles south of Munich (this section was given the camouflage name Wasserbau- Versuchsanstalt Kochelsee, known as WVA), and the theoretical sections were moved to the vicinity of Garmisch-Partenkirchen. The manufacturing and development work was moved to Nord- hausen and Bleicherode. The work at Kochel is typified by its systematic and scientific approach to the long-range rocket prob- lem. The principal research facility at WVA was a supersonic34 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR wind tunnel capable of going to 4.4 Mach number (4.4 times the velocity of sound). The tunnel was of a convenient size for super- ae = Fic. 26. AN ALMOST COMPLETELY ASSEMBLED V-2 ROCKET IN THE UNDERGROUND MANUFACTURING PLANT AT NORDHAUS- SEN. sonic work in the ballistics of missiles and had a working section of approximately 16 inches by 16 inches. Of course, such a tun- nel would require an enormous power plant for continuous opera- tion (about 10,000 kva), but the Germans circumvented thisARMY LONG-RANGE ROCKET RESEARCH 35 difficulty and used only an 800-kva plant by evacuating a large steel cylinder of approximately 1000 cubic meters’ capacity, open- ing a valve quickly, and then permitting nature to push the air through the tunnel. There are many disadvantages with such a mode of operation, such as a very short and intermittent operat- ing time and a fictitiously low atmospheric pressure in the working section. By dint of patience and perseverance the Germans did a great deal of useful work in this tunnel. The weapon popularly known as the V-2 really went through a very long series of models which were officially designated as the Al, A2--+A16, and there were as many as twelve submodels under the respective model modifications. The A4 was the model placed in quantity produc- tion. All the aerodynamic work on the various models of the V-2 was done in the Kochel tunnel as well as all the work on the best antiaircraft rocket produced in Germany (the Wasserfall) and the work on a large number of fin-stabilized and spin-stabilized artillery projectiles, including a 28-cm projectile of later design than the well-known Anzio Express which wrought considerable havoc on the American Fifth Army in Italy. The tunnel was used exclusively for the ballistics of missiles. The patience and skill of the scientists at WVA are well illustrated by the fact that by pure empiricism they succeeded in making an aerodynamic shape for the Wasserfall in which the center of pressure shifted only one-quarter of a caliber in a range of more than three Mach numbers, al- though they had no adequate theory by which to explain their success. They were highly skilled in methods of placing pitot tubes over all the surfaces of a model for measuring the variations in pressure on the surface at various simulated air speeds. There were even groups of specialists for fixing in the pitot tubes in the tabs of the fin, specialists for installing the tubes on the fins of the models, and specialists for installing the tubes on the model body, As many as 121 of the tubes would be brought out _through the support of the model and attached to a battery of manometers. More than 180 high-grade research reports were written by this group during World War II.36 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR THE TECHNICAL ACADEMY OF THE LUFTWAFFE Any comment on the German research program would be incomplete without a mention of the Technical Academy of the Luftwaffe (Technische Akademie der Luftwaffe, Berlin-Gatow, known as TAL). The TAL probably did the most advanced scientific research in Germany. An investigation showed that the fundamental work was done at TAL for much of the technical research and development carried on elsewhere. In addition to fundamental research the TAL performed a great deal of technical research which led to basic design data for weapons and also much of the scientific and technical work required by large industrial corporations. Its field was very broad, its approach to its prob- lems intelligent and objective, and its work scientifically excellent and practically sound. Its principal work for the army can be placed in four categories: (1) ballistics and shock waves, (2) ord- nance engineering and measurements, (3) shaped-charge and de- tonation phenomena, and (4) armor penetration. It also did a great deal of work for the navy and produced excellent design data for guided torpedoes, submarine mines launched from aircraft, combustion motors for underwater work which recirculated their gases, and other naval equipment. It did extensive work associ- ated with aircraft: research on the air foils of best shape, very ex- tensive studies of aircraft models, and made contributions to the electrical phases of aircraft (such as improved electrical contacts for circuits in military aircraft). The TAL’s organization consisted of thirteen institutes: mathe- matics and mechanics, physics, chemistry, materials, mechanisms, electricity, communications, flight mechanics, motors, aircraft de- vices, high-pressure work, measurements, and ballistics. It was headed by a director who was elected annually from among the leaders of the member institutes, similar to the academic practice at the universities where the rector was elected annually. The TAL was subject to three controls—the Ministry of Education, the Air Ministry, and military control to the extent of having a military commander of the Akademie (Oberkommando der Kriegsakademie) for its academic work. The principal con- trol was the Air Ministry, but it received income from the AirBALLISTICS AT TAL 37 Ministry, the Ministry of Education, and many laboratories and industrial firms for which it did special research. In respect to its service work, it functioned somewhat as the United States National Bureau of Standards. It gave magnificent support in basic research to the many organizations that were engaged in technical research and development work. Batuistics at TAL The Ballistic Institute of the TAL, under the famous ballis- tician Schardin, former student and collaborator of Carl Cranz, formed fully half of the Akademie and conducted extensive ex- perimental and good theoretical research in shaped-charge phe- nomena, detonation, shock waves, and blast measurements. Its research work was of first rank and a delight to the heart of the scientist. It is amazing to discover that even while shut off from practically all the rest of the world for the entire war period the work of the TAL closely paralleled that done by the Allies in the large variety of institutions under their control. The facilities and equipment of the TAL are judged in large part from its scientific reports (all of which were available) and from conversations with its staff. The entire Akademie was moved from Berlin in February, 1945, and a large portion of the equipment was left behind and said to have been destroyed in the Russian advance. However, on the basis of the evidence of the reports and that part of the equipment which was available, it is certain that the TAL was not only well equipped but per- haps better equipped with modern instruments than any other research establishment in Germany. In particular, its flash radio- graphic apparatus (R6ntgenblitz) which took high-speed X-rays of shaped charges during detonation, its Cranz-Schardin cameras which took twenty-four pictures at the rate of several million per second, and its Kerr-cell cameras which took four pictures at the rate of 8 million per second were superb pieces of apparatus. The work of the Ballistic Institute has the same high standard as that formerly done by Cranz, who is sometimes called the father of ballistics. With no intention of drawing detailed comparisons, it should be remarked, to avoid the implication of German su- periority in ballistics, that nothing of significance was found in38 GERMAN RESEARCH AT THE END OF THE WAR the Ballistic Institute of the TAL which had not been effectively explored by the Ballistic Research Laboratories of the Ordnance Department at Aberdeen Proving Ground. A description of all the research and development facilities in Germany would prove most tedious. Their extensiveness but not their detail is shown in the chapter on organization. It may be remarked at this time that the air forces possessed eight major research establishments, similar to LFA and LGZ, in addition to the TAL, and had contracts with a large portion of the two hun- dred institutes which were under the eleven German technische Hochschulen and with many of the laboratories of the great Ger- man firms like the Bell Telephone Laboratories in the United States. i 8250 Standrohn flr | “Flacheisenrost _ Wassenspitl > a Setonplatte by -Flacheisenrost Ptlastersteine b-grober Schotter Finkanc WaseentaieCHAPTER IL SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING RESEARCH PoPpULAR APPEAL OF RESEARCH It is indeed an anomaly that research, which is necessarily an esoteric endeavor, should enjoy the popularity that it does today. At the turn of the century the general public scarcely attached a meaning to the word. Although the potentialities of research were recognized even to the extent of government spon- sorship of the National Academy of Sciences at the time of the Civil War, nevertheless the rapid growth of research began only perhaps in the 1920’s. It was particularly in the decade preceding World War II that the public began to realize that scientific re- search was in no small measure responsible for the technological advancement * which has contributed much to the high level of the American standard of living. Along with this realization, re- search began to have a romantic appeal. In the lay mind it is quite confused with development and invention, but nevertheless all sorts of persons not only feel that they favor it but are more than anxious to be associated either directly or indirectly with research activities. During the war federally financed research increased enormously. Dr. Bush has called science the endless frontier, and perhaps research and invention are in part a sub- stitute for the romantic stimulus formerly supplied by the frontier of the West. In the fiscal year 1944 } approximately $700,000,000 was spent by the federal government for research and develop- * Industrial Research, F. Russel Bichowsky, Chemical Publishing Co., Brooklyn, N. Y., 1942 +The Government's Wartime Research and Development, 79th Congress, Ist Session, Senate, Document 92, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washing- ton, D. C., 1945. From the context of the document, it is obvious that the figures do not include the expenses incident to the atomic bomb, which was, of course, a secret project. 3940 SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS ment, half of which was for work in industrial laboratories, $200,- 000,000 of which was for work in government laboratories, and $150,000,000 of which was spent for work in research facilities such as those of the universities and research foundations. Tue IMPENDING SHORTAGE oF ScrENTIFIC MEN With the end of the war the industrial laboratories will cer- tainly be anxious to use all their facilities for their own benefit. The economic soundness of industrial research has been well demonstrated by the success of those large American corporations that financed research liberally and acquired unchallenged leader- ship in their fields. In like manner, the universities are anxious not only to resume their fundamental research, which is such a powerful stimulus to their academic wellbeing, but also to re- place on their teaching staffs many of their professors who have been on loan to various institutions for war research. These moves, if accomplished, would leave no scientists for government work, and it is certain that the government itself will be bidding for the services of scientists in order to provide most wisely for national defense. Thus a state of affairs can be predicted in which industry will want more scientists than ever before, universities will want at least the scientists whom they had before, and the government will want scientists for a field in which very few were employed before the war. At the same time, it should be realized that the supply of scientists is at low ebb. Almost no doctorates have been awarded during the past four years; in fact, the awards of all degrees have been exceedingly few. A severe shortage of scientific men is impending. This problem was dis- cussed in several issues of the Scientific Monthly of the American Association for the Advancement of Science during the latter part of the war. RESEARCH PROGRAMS There is a real requirement for a clear understanding of re- search in all its aspects, not only for the purpose of planning research activities economically, but also for the purpose of or- ganizing research efficiently, so as to tax the sources of scientific talent no more than necessary. Much has been said about theDEFINITIONS 41 government’s wartime research and development and about the postwar rule of government research. A number of reports of subcommittees of the Congress presented studies of past research and proposed programs for future research, and Dr. Vannevar Bush rendered a Report to the President on a Program for Post- war Scientific Research in July, 1945. Among such considerations some attention should be given to what the German Government had done in the way of organized wartime research and develop- ment, now that the surrender of Germany has made such a study possible. Germany’s prewar leadership in scientific affairs, especially in applied science, is rather well recognized. Some evidence of this is seen in the pending prosecutions of a large number of American corporations by the Attorney General for their alleged part in German cartels. The excellence of German research and de- velopment in chemistry, electricity, and medicine is particularly well recognized. Certainly, it was to be expected that the Ger- mans would attack the problem of wartime research in a sys- tematic and thorough manner. With the German surrender it became possible to examine the wartime activities of that government systematically and in de- tail. Such an examination presents an opportunity to study re- search and development critically and for even the layman to un- derstand better the importance of each step in the evolution of the new, to strip research of the romanticism which may blur the keenness of vision, and to criticize without bias the successes and failures of a completed experiment. DEFINITIONS In order that the study may proceed smoothly and without avoidable misunderstandings, it is necessary to adopt a few defi- nitions with regard to research and development. Many people mean by research all the processes whereby a new thing is con- ceived and carried to a point where it can be turned over to production. This view is especially likely to exist in connection with industrial research. However, much more precise definition is necessary in order to examine a research pattern critically and to express concisely the distinction between various steps in the42 SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS evolution of new knowledge or new articles. That these defini- tions are not the only valid ones and that they reflect the academic more than the industrial viewpoint are admitted. Nevertheless it is believed that they form a logical and homogeneous set and that they reflect the meaning generally associated with the terms by leading men of science. Basic research or fundamental research is the seeking after new knowledge of a broad and general character. It may be the seeking after fundamentally new principles or laws of nature such as Newton’s laws of motion, but it does not have to attain such exceptional heights provided that it retains the distinction of principles of broad application rather than the narrowness of the specific. Fundamental research attracts the highest type of scientific mind. It is the irresistible force which impels genius to persevering application for the satisfaction of scientific curiosity and not for the sake of any material gain. It is work, the reward for which consists for the greater part in a knowledge of work well done, perhaps in recognition by one’s colleagues, but seldom in appropriate monetary remuneration. Technical research or engineering research is the application of new knowledge or previously existing knowledge to a new thing. It is less general than basic research, not deeply concerned with fundamentals, and yet not limited in vision to the mere improve- ment or alteration of an existing thing. It is distinguished from basic research in particular by the fact that it is specific whereas basic research is general. For example, basic research may seek to find and understand the many ways in which energy can be transmitted by electromagnetic radiation, whereas technical re- search would seek to find a way in which signals could be trans- mitted from the ground to a missile at high velocity by means of electromagnetic radiation. Technical research may present basic design data in textual, tabular, or graphical form, but it should stop short of actual working design. Basic and technical research seldom carry the idea to a point where it would be ac- cepted for a patent. Design is the next step in the evolution of a new thing; not development. Without design there can be no development. De- sign is essentially an engineering process and has to do withDEFINITIONS 43 drawings, tolerances, mechanics, strength of materials, and chemis- try; if the new article is intended for mass production design may include considerations of production engineering such as manu- facturing methods, economic choice of materials, adaptation of machines, and many other thoroughly practical matters. Design is generally composed of two stages: prototype design and design for production. The first design should be tentative and pertain only to the models that are to be a basis for development. The desirable changes brought out by development should be incor- porated in the design before final drawings are made. In general, design is done best by corporations which have good engineering staffs. Research workers are likely to be poor designers; and, besides, it is a disastrous prostitution of research talent to divert it to design work. Development is the enhancement of design by the addition of practicality. It is again an engineering process but from a view- point somewhat different from that of the design engineer. It consists of thorough testing, subjection of the new design to proof procedures, the discovery of omissions and deficiencies, their cor- rection or recommendations for effecting their correction. Like research, it calls for unusual powers on the part of the individual, un je ne sais quoi, which is more likely a thing with which one is born than something that one acquires. From the practical view- point, it is tantamount in importance to research, for, without development, basic and technical (but not pure) research is sterile: it lacks the stimulus of seeing its product come to useful fruition. In like manner, without research there can be no development. Invention is a term that is not essential to this discussion, and it is mentioned only for the sake of completeness. The four orderly steps defined above often lead to patentable inventions. In fact, this orderly process of basic research, technical research, design, and development, or approximately this process, as con- ducted in organized laboratories has become so powerful that the individual inventor is practically a thing of the past. In the popu- lar mind, invention is often confused with research and develop- ment. In point of time, it was the forerunner of research in popu- lar appeal. The government grants patents for inventions and does not discriminate with regard to how the invention came44 SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS about. It is true that even an ignorant person may sometimes strike upon a totally new idea just as the old prospector some- times stumbled upon a nugget. However, just as the old pros- pector has become obsolete, so has haphazard invention. It is not an economical way of doing things. The vast majority of new things today come from organized scientific effort, not from a single inventor. Consequently, invention is not considered to have a place in a critical examination of German research and development. Two other terms connected with research are often used quite loosely. They are pure research and applied research. Defini- tions of these terms may not reflect such a consensus of opinion as those previously offered because many of the persons who use them have not themselves framed clear definitions. However, the general intent of the terms can be deduced and definitions given which are not inconsistent with those of basic research, technical research, design, and development given above. By pure research one generally means a seeking after new knowledge which is motivated exclusively by scientific curiosity and independent of any idea of material gain. It means research in which the scientist follows his own natural aptitudes for ex- ercising his peculiar qualifications for seeking out new knowledge for science’s sake. This type of research is often deprecated by practical men, and not without reason, but at the same time practical men often impugn basic research by failure to discrimi- nate between the two. Basic research is the fountainhead of knowledge that leads to technical research, and the successful application of research to practical affairs is often attributable in large part to basic research. On the other hand, pure research does not concern itself with practical ends, and, whereas some of the knowledge gained by pure research may, from time to time, find application in practical fields, application is incidental rather than a matter of plan or intent. The investigations of Volta, Faraday, Maxwell, Hertz, and Richardson were pure re- search, since no idea of possible application existed at the time of their work. Yet, without their investigations, much research in electricity which may well be regarded as basic could not have been begun. Similarly, there was no research more pure or im-DEFINITIONS 45 practical in the decade of the 1930’s than that in nuclear physics. It led to basic and technical research only after 1940, and to the development of the atomic bomb in 1945, Despite its unpro- fessed practical aspects, the utilitarian sequel of pure research is too general in character and not sufficiently proximate in time to merit any considerable exploitation by profit-making institutions. One could scarcely expect an industrial laboratory to be so philan- thropic as to support pure research merely because an increase in fundamental knowledge improves the wellbeing of mankind. However, from the viewpoint of economic self-interest, a large lab- oratory should support some basic research in chosen and clearly designated fields not only for the value of the ideas obtained thereby but also for the very valuable stimulus it supplies to technical research and development. From the discussion so far it is apparent that both basic re- search and technical research fall within the domain of applied research, although their actual application inheres for the greater part in the design and development stages of the evolution of the new. Thus it appears that pure research is something which must look for support from universities, foundations, and philan- thropic institutions and which in all probability never will have a place in hard practical affairs. Basic research may be just as generalized as pure research, but it is susceptible of direction with regard to field and scope and should be warmly supported by laboratories which are engaged in applied research. The im- portance of these fundamental considerations is well illustrated by the following incident. In the New York Times of August 25, 1945, a very clear letter by Dr. Oliver E. Buckley, Director of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, explained how pure research must look to universities and similar institutions for support and could not be supported even by large industrial laboratories such as his own. His letter was so misunderstood even by the staff of the New Vork Times that on the same page of the paper they pub- lished an editorial, at least partially in refutation of Dr. Buckley’s views, which called attention to basic research done in the General Electric, du Pont, and other industrial laboratories. Although Dr. Buckley’s letter was clear enough, it might be said in defense46 SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS of the Times that the phrase “pure and basic research” was used once in a way that could be easily misinterpreted. DISTINCTION BETWEEN SCIENTIST AND ENGINEER In lieu of definitions, a distinction should be made between the scientist and the engineer. Engineers often engage in research, and scientists are sometimes called upon to do development work. The distinction is one of degree, and it must be admitted at the outset that the fields overlap. Nevertheless, it is clear that the scientist is more closely associated with basic research, and the engineer is more closely associated with design and development. Both the engineer and the scientist are well qualified for technical research, although one might say that technical research calls for the higher-grade engineer and perhaps has less appeal to the high- est type of scientist. Scientists and engineers differ markedly in their attitudes toward their work. One can hire an engineer to build a bridge or to undertake some other task. He is likely to do so with almost equal cheerfulness irrespective of whether or not he has a personal interest in the desired end. One can see his progress, judge when he has completed his work, and make a fair estimate of what he has done. The scientist, on the other hand, works for himself only. He does not feel keenly the obliga- tion of employee to employer. One may finance his work and exercise some influence over its general direction. Nevertheless, his product is his and contained within his own mind. He can re- veal just so much of it as he chooses. He is independent of many of the controls ordinarily recognized in the employer-employee relationship and does not hesitate to exercise his independence. In considering a program of research and development, in the organization of research and development, and in the examination of the German experiment, the broad definition of research should be avoided. The view that research embraces all the activities that lead to a new thing would obscure a critical examination of just what the Germans did. In a research and development pro- gram it would do a grave injustice to the important contribution made to every new and successful article by the ingenious and persevering application of the specialists who are engaged in de- velopment work. It is important to grant recognition to research