Massacre at Pilkhana Mutiny of The Bangladesh Rifles

1 Massacre at Pilkhana: Mutiny of the Bangladesh Rifles
Massacre at Pilkhana
Mutiny of the Bangladesh Rifles
Omar Zahid
Massacre at Pilkhana
Mutiny of the Bangladesh Rifles
Abstract .....................................................................................................................3
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................4
Bangladesh Rifles: A Colourful History ............................................................5

BDR Grievances ..............................................................................................7
Background Events to the Mutiny ....................................................................8
II. RECONSTRUCTING THE EPISODE .....................................................................9
The end of an Ordeal .....................................................................................15

Media and the Mutiny .....................................................................................15
III. FINDING THE PERPETRATORS .......................................................................17
Intelligence Failure .........................................................................................19

IV. INVESTIGATING THE MUTINY .........................................................................20
Destabilisation Theory ...................................................................................22
Jihadist Involvement ......................................................................................23

Foreign Influence and External Actors ...........................................................26
AL Involvement ............................................................................................29
Criminal Elements ..........................................................................................29
V. RELATIONS WITH INDIA ....................................................................................30
VI. BDR TRIAL .........................................................................................................30
Criticism of Verdict .........................................................................................33

VII. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................35
Abstract
Bangladesh has a history of coups and counter-coups that have resulted in prolonged
periods of military rule. During 25-26 February 2009, the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) mutinied
at their headquarters at Pilkhana. The mutiny came two months after the restoration of a
democratically elected government which ended the two-year rule of the military backed
caretaker government. The crisis turned out to be an early test for Sheikh Hasina’s
government during the country’s transition back to democracy. Not only did the mutiny
threaten to destabilise the new government, but it almost put the army against the BDR in a
standoff. With so many army officers killed in the mutiny many questions were raised, above
all with regard to both the brutality and the motive of the mutineers. What could have
provoked the mutineers to react in this way? What was the purpose of such savage killing?
Was there a conspiracy that led to the mutiny? At the same time many questions were
raised with regard to the intelligence failure by various agencies to detect the escalating
frustration within the BDR. Even though both the army and the government launched
separate investigations to uncover the causes and motives behind the mutiny, to date, what
and who provoked the mutiny still remains a mystery at large.
I. INTRODUCTION
Popularly referred to as the BDR Mutiny, on the morning of 25 February 2009, Bangladesh
witnessed one of its bloodiest military coups since its independence from Pakistan in 1971.
Soldiers from the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) mutinied against their commanding
officers at the BDR headquarters in Pilkhana, Dhaka. For the next 33 hours mutineers took
control of the headquarters and took scores of officers and civilians’ hostage. Although the
mutiny and killings were confined to Pilkhana, acts of disobedience and violence spread to
twelve other BDR outposts. By the time the mutiny ended 74 people had lost their lives and
many more were injured. Among the dead were 57 army officers that included; 1 Major
General, 2 Brigadier Generals, 16 Colonels, 10 Lieutenant Colonels, 23 Majors, 2 Captains
and 3 Medical Corp Officers. Other fatalities included the wives of two army officers, a retired
army officer, nine BDR soldiers, three pedestrians, an army soldier and a police constable1.
The mutiny sent shockwaves all over Bangladesh which prompted the government to later
constitute an entirely new force of Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB).
From the outset army officers publicly contested Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s
decision to settle the mutiny through political rather than military means. The army regarded
the mutiny as a law and order issue even though it was of significant proportions. Since the
BDR did not signify any kind of political force or agenda its actions were purely criminal.
Anguished and enraged army personnel were repeatedly urged to demonstrate restraint,
particularly after General Moeen Uddin Ahmed (Chief of Army Staff) had declared the army
would be ‘loyal to democracy’ and would remain ‘subservient to the government’. On the
surface the government approach appeared suitable for dealing with an industrial dispute
that involved an unarmed discontented workforce and not a mutiny involving a significant
number of armed mutineers. PM Sheikh Hasina’s approach was contrary to how the Mumbai
Terror Attacks (2008), Beslan Hostage Crisis (2004) and the Moscow Theatre Siege (2002)
were all dealt with. These cases highlighted how governments generally do not politically
negotiate with hostage takers.
In the beginning PM Sheikh Hasina allowed the army to take position around
Pilkhana, but did not order the army to storm the barracks. The army declared they should
have been allowed to ‘crush’ the mutiny which would have been over within half an hour and
many precious lives could have been saved2. The army has 155,000 soldiers, of which
25,000 are stationed in Dhaka giving a ratio of around 1:4 between the BDR and the army. If
the army moved in after arriving at 11:30 am on the first day it would have caught the
mutineers by surprise as they were not well organised in the early stages of the mutiny and
had no central leadership giving orders. This could have lead to a possible surrender of the
mutineers inside Pilkhana.
The Pilkhana barracks is located in an urban residential area confined within a
perimeter wall. The government claimed a military operation could have resulted in more
deaths of hostages and of civilians in densely populated neighbourhoods. On the morning of
the mutiny many of the confused and panicked-stricken local residents had already began to
leave the area fearing a confrontation between the mutineers and the security forces. If
required the security forces could have evacuated the remaining local populace out of
harm’s way. The claim that news of a military operation against the mutineers would have
escalated into a civil war between the army and 46 BDR battalions scattered across
Bangladesh was challenged mainly by those in the army3. Although the BDR frequently
exchange fire with the Border Security Force (BSF) of India, they are essentially a
paramilitary force which lacks the training, tactics, equipment and weapons of the army.
1
Anis Ahmed, ‘Scenarios-uncertainty lingers in Bangladesh despite mutiny end,’ Reuters, (1 March 2009).
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSDHA391723
2
Rahnuma Ahmed, ‘The BDR rebellion in Bangladesh: Prevailing uncertainties,’ The New Internationalist, No.
420 (17 March 2009). http://newint.org/features/special/2009/03/17/the-bdr-rebellion-in-bangladesh/
3
Brigadier General Sharif Aziz (retd), ‘Could a military operation have saved the day?’ Dhaka Tribune, (31
October 2013).
http://www.dhakatribune.com/long-form/2013/oct/30/could-military-operation-have-saved-day
Many analysts and commentators viewed the civilian governments handling of the crisis as
an eagerness to avoid bloodshed and a lack of experience in crisis management.
Furthermore, the PM’s insecure grip on power and her deep distrust of the army following
two years of emergency rule could have played a part in why things were handled the way
they were during the crisis.
Shortly after the mutiny two committees were set up to investigate the causes and
motives behind the incident, one by the Home Ministry and the other by the army4. The army
investigation committee submitted a 311-page report to CAS General Moeen which faulted
the government for not allowing the security forces to use force and rejected the notion of a
failure of intelligence. This report is yet to be made public5. On 21 May 2009, the probe
committee headed by former bureaucrat Anisuzzaman Khan submitted the 309-page report
to the Home Minister. The report faulted the intelligence services for not knowing about the
mutiny in advance, especially as growing dissension in BDR ranks was known to the army
and intelligence services prior to the civilian government taking power. The Home Ministry
distributed a seven-page summary of the report to journalists at a press briefing at the
ministry. Most Bangladeshis to date remain sceptical about the official version and doubt
whether the actual truth will be uncovered, revealed, or if the full reports will ever be made
public.
Both committees stated that influence from outside the BDR exploited the grievances
of soldiers to carry out the massacre, and that this aspect of the investigation needed further
exploration in order to try and discover the real masterminds. What provoked the massacre
still remains a mystery. This is because Sheikh Hasina’s government did not have it within
the scope of any investigation committee to exhaustively look into the issue over the past
five years. One thing certain is that the scale of the mutiny and the brutality employed by its
perpetrators were excessively violent than rationally required to bring forward simple
economic demands. If pay was an issue of contention then the BDR could have resorted to
the threat of strikes or refuse to take orders from their superiors. Grievances portrayed by
the BDR did not get accumulated to such an extent that it inspired them to take up arms
against their officers and massacre the entire hierarchy when they could have taken them as
hostages.
Unfortunately the masterminds behind the mutiny are yet to be identified let alone be
punished. Could the brutality demonstrated simply occur as a result of working conditions?
Was there a conspiracy that led to the mutiny? If so, what was the purpose of this
conspiracy? Which interest groups had the means, motive and opportunity to execute such a
conspiracy? Which groups would have benefitted from a clash between the BDR and the
army? These are just some of the questions that will have to be investigated thoroughly and
answered comprehensively. Otherwise the ghost of the massacre will continue to haunt
Bangladesh for the foreseeable future. It may be easy to demonise the BDR as a whole, but
many BDR soldiers risked their lives and some even died in the process to save several
army officers during the mutiny. It is therefore of enormous national interest that the criminal
masterminds who conspired against the BDR are found, brought to book and exemplarily
punished if there is to be closure on the matter.
Bangladesh Rifles: A Colourful History

BDR together with the Bangladesh Army are one of the most important components of
Bangladesh’s security structure. BDR a paramilitary force known by Bangladeshi’s as ‘The
Vigilant Sentinels of Our National Frontier’ and has approximately 67,000 soldiers stationed
at 42 camps throughout the country, including 40,000 on the borders6. BDR is organised into
4
‘Finding out plotters of Pilkhana carnage a national interest,’ New Age, (27 February 2013).
http://newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2013-02-27&nid=41229#.Ue1TatJ7cUg
5
‘100 more suspected BDR mutineers held,’ The Daily Star, (14 May 2009).
http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=88144
6
Subir Bhaumik, ‘Bangladesh's first line of defence,’ BBC Online, (25 February 2009).
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7909596.stm
battalions similar to that of the army. Essentially the force is the first line of defence for
Bangladesh in the event of war and during peace time its primary objective is to secure and
protect the 4,427 km international border. Its key duties are to safeguard the border against
the movement of terrorists, armed ethnic groups, smuggling of narcotics and small arms,
and human trafficking. During times of conflict or national emergencies the force can provide
support to the army, assist the police in tackling domestic disturbances, distribute food,
oversee security for elections, help victims of natural disasters, and come under the authority
of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
With a glorious military history going back 218 years the BDR is the oldest uniformed
military institution in South Asia. It was constituted by the East India Company as the
Frontier Protection Force and was later changed to the Ramgarh Local Battalion (1795-
1861). It started off with 486 personnel recruited primarily from the native population and in
1799 the force established its camp in Pilkhana area of Dhaka where the headquarters
remain to this day. The camp unit at that time was known as the ‘Special Reserve
Company’. In subsequent years the force took different names and uniforms in accordance
with the demands of the time. The battalion was succeeded by the Frontier Guards (1861-
1891). Following its reorganisation the force became the Bengal Military Police (1891-1919).
In undivided India the force was once again reorganised into the Eastern Frontier Rifles
(1920-1947). The East Pakistan Rifles (EPR, 1947-1971) in undivided Pakistan was last in
this series of changes after which the force was renamed BDR in 1972 in independent
Bangladesh. During the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh, the BDR demonstrated superior
fighting skills and valour and suffered 817 casualties. It was honoured posthumously with
Bangladesh’s highest military award Bir Sreshto for Munshi Abdur Rouf (Lance Nayak) and
Nur Mohammad Sheikh (Lance Nayak), 8 Bir Uttam, 40 Bir Bikram and 91 Bir Patik for
services in the Liberation War7. In Bangladesh the BDR are regarded as a nationalistic force
which was one of the first to rebel against the Pakistani Army in 1971.
After the independence of Bangladesh the BDR force was made up of 9,000 soldiers,
primarily deserters from the EPR during the Liberation War. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman wanted
to merge BDR with the national militia Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini, but the BDR strongly opposed
the merger. This was the first occasion the BDR was involved in a situation close to mutiny.
On 7 November 1972, BDR mutinied under the banner of the ‘Sepoy-Janata Revolution’
which ended in the killing of 25 army officers. By 1973 BDR ranks enlarged to 20,000
personnel. During the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) rule from 1991-1996 the lower tier
of BDR staged mutinies on 1 and 3 December 1991 at Naogaon and Pilkhana respectively.
Although BDR soldiers attacked numerous establishments, houses and offices, the mutinies
did not involve any bloodshed. These mutinies highlighted that previous long-pending
grievances were not resolved and remained outstanding. Limitations of BDR law such as the
maximum of seven years imprisonment for mutiny of lower rank soldiers and the dismissal of
administrative officers meant that the government of the day were unable, or in some cases
unwilling to punish the mutineers, change the law or launch proper investigations. It is for
these reasons that earlier incidents failed to discourage BDR soldiers from carrying out
future mutinies8. PM Sheikh Hasina claimed that many of the BDR soldiers that took part in
the 1991 mutiny led the February 25-26 mutiny in 2009, ‘I think the gruesome mutiny in 2009
could have been avoided had proper action been taken against the mutineers of 1991’9.
7
Khaled IqAL Chowdhury, ‘BDR mutiny: Security implications for Bangladesh and the region,’ Special Report,
Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies.
http://www.bipss.org.bd/pdf/BIPSS%20special%20report%20on%20BDR%20mutiny.pdf
8
‘A summary of the national probe report on the BDR mutiny,’ The Daily Star, (29 May 2009).
9
‘Root for constitution,’ The Daily Star, (29 March 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/root-for-constitution/
BDR Grievances
On the surface the most logical explanation for the mutiny would be the genuine discontent
of BDR soldiers. This would explain the numerous demands put forward by the mutineers
during negotiations. Key grievances were low pay, non-payment of promised daily
allowances for extra duties rendered, less annual leave compared to the army, and a denial
of UN peacekeeping services10. The only exception was in 2006 when an entire BDR
platoon worked with the Bangladesh Police in a UN mission, however, any opportunity to
work with the UN in the future was terminated by the army which had a negative effect with
BDR soldiers11. Ration entitlement was another issue that caused resentment, in particular
as the BDR only had three months entitlement compared to the twelve months of the army.
What appeared to infuriate BDR soldiers the most was army control. The entire officer corps
is on deputation from the army, whereas independent BDR recruitment is only done at the
non-commissioned officer (NCO) level in administrative posts with no possibility of
promotion.
Reports have indicated that there was a dispute between the seconded BDR officer
corps and NCOs over the sharing of profits of illicit activities carried out by the paramilitary
force. This fuelled speculation that behind the scene factors for the mutiny involved
corruption in the BDR which itself is an endemic problem within the rest of Bangladesh. The
BDR are often accused of being involved in the illicit trafficking of men and materials across
the international border. This would only be possible if BDR soldiers in collusion with their
junior officers work hand in glove with the smugglers. Rationalising the mutiny over
corruption and illegal practices in the Dal-Bhaat programme would be severely problematic
to say the least.
In 2007 the Caretaker Government (CTG) launched ‘Operation Dal-Bhaat’ in an effort
to curtail high food prices. The BDR sold essential food items at fair prices and kept the
profit12. From the beginning of the programme on average 100,000 city dwellers were served
on a daily basis13. Approximately 130,000 tonnes of rice, 2,000 tonnes of pulses and 3,500
tonnes of edible oil worth around Tk. 400 crore were sold at outlets throughout Bangladesh.
Dal-Bhaat ran for about a year and a half before it was wrapped up in September 2008. By
late 2008 majority of BDR soldiers came to believe that their superiors had deprived them of
their right to a share of the profit. Furthermore, according to a mutineer who confided to the
media during the crisis, what further angered BDR soldiers was that they had come to know
that Major General Shakil Ahmed (Director General BDR) had embezzled Tk. 7 crore from
election duty which was supposed to be paid to BDR soldiers14.
However, it is highly unlikely that a mutiny of this magnitude and barbarity of this
nature was carried out simply as a result of long-standing demands and grievances. Was it
the case that BDR soldiers were so deprived of their rights that they had to resort to killing
their senior officers? If the BDR had long standing economic grievances then why did they
not attempt a mutiny when the Bangladesh Army was running the country? Choosing to
conspire against a newly elected civilian government under a secular and liberal leader was
an indication that an elaborate conspiracy was behind their actions. Many former BDR
officers claimed that necessary measures were taken to improve working conditions and
BDR soldiers were better off under the current arrangements than during the days of the
EPR. While experts agree the key conspirators remain at large, they are unanimous about
the involvement of a bigger player than just the BDR. On 1 March 2009, a few days after the
BDR mutiny, the Bangladeshi police forces were given 100 per cent ration entitlement, which
10
Rahnuma Ahmed, ‘The BDR rebellion in Bangladesh: Prevailing uncertainties,’ (Note 2).
11
Though unclear, motives many,’ The Daily Star, (6 November 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/though-unclear-motives-many/
12
Julfikar Ali Manik & Sharier Khan, ‘Mutiny, bloodshed at BDR HQ,’ The Daily Star, (26 February 2009).
13
Shariful Islam & Sharier Khan, ‘Tragedy sowed by Operation Dal-Bhat,’ The Daily Star, (6 November 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/tragedy-sowed-by-operation-dal-bhat/
14
‘Demands they put forward,’ The Daily Star, (26 March 2009).
was one of the 22 demands of the BDR. The reason behind the decision remains unclear. It
may have been that there was intelligence to suggest that a similar threat had been posed
by the police force.
Background Events to the Mutiny

Two months before the mutiny members of BDR representing rank and file had been in
discussions with political figures from the Awami League (AL), Fazle Noor Taposh (PMs
nephew) and Sheikh Fazlul Karim Selim (PMs cousin)15. This was revealed at a press
briefing by Anisuzzaman Khan, chairman of the investigating committee into the BDR
mutiny. It remains unclear exactly as to who was acting on behalf of the government, and if
so, what authority did they have? Prior to Taposh getting elected as an MP his associate
Torab Ali (former BDR NCO) AL president of Hazaribagh (Ward 48, Dhaka-12) arranged a
meeting between him and BDR members; Sergeant Monir, Soldier Tareq, Soldier Ayub, 26
soldiers and Zakir Hossain, son of Kanchan Ali (former BDR NCO)16. Allegedly the BDR men
proposed to get Taposh elected as an MP and he in return would forward their longstanding
demands to the new government. Taposh was assured electoral success during the meeting
by the BDR men who had 5,000 of their members registered as voters in Dhaka-12
constituency who would vote for him.
Taposh a novice AL candidate was up against renowned lawyer and high profile
incumbent MP Khandkar Mahbubuddin. At that point in the election campaign, Khaleda Zia
was attracting far greater numbers at political rallies compared to Sheikh Hasina, therefore
5,000 votes was a potential game changer. Regardless, Taposh won by a huge margin
(126,780 to 69,494) which meant he did not need the 5,000 BDR votes he was allegedly
given. After the election some BDR members went to MP Taposh’s residence in Dhanmondi.
They wanted to know how the new government would resolve their long-standing demands.
Taposh told them nothing other than the demand related to ration can be considered17. In
the middle of February 2009, BDR members along with Zakir met with MP Sheikh Selim at
his residence. Sheikh Selim told the BDR men that their demands had to be raised with the
Home Ministry in writing.
Frustrated and restless after failing to get the expected response from the politicians
they had approached, the BDR men were mislead and instigated to lead a mutiny. The idea
was put forward that by detaining a number of hostages, the BDR men would have leverage
against the government and could possibly get their longstanding demands sanctioned. The
main culprits pushing the idea of a mutiny were Torab Ali and his notorious criminal son
Harunur Rashid (aka Leather Liton), formerly an AL student wing leader as well as the main
accused in the killing of film star Shohel Chowdhury and Dr Milon18. Liton had been in prison
for the last seven years and with the help of his father’s associate MP Taposh was bailed on
31 January 2009. During investigations information came to light that Liton was an arms
dealer. His motive to provide financial and logistical support for the mutiny would result in
him acquiring illicit arms, especially since a huge cache was looted19. BDR men held a
number of secret meetings at different places with the aim of taking direct action in relation
to their demands. They planned to hold army officers including DG Ahmed hostage in Darbar
Hall on 25 February 2009. A leading BDR soldier in a meeting on 16 February commented
that, ‘We will not be benefited by such demands; we will have to extract the demands by
15
‘Mutiny followed failure in getting political response,’ The Daily Star, (28 May 2009).
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=90162
16
‘Revolt at the BDR headquarters situated at Pilkhana,’ Report of the Investigating Committee, (21 May
2009), p. 5. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Investigation%20Report%20-
%20Government%20Inquiry_0.pdf
17
Ibid, p. 6.
18
Bangladesh BDR mutiny, Army Investigation, p. 3.
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Bangladesh%20BDR%20Mutiny%20%20Army%20
Investigation_1.pdf
19
Ibid.
keeping Officers as hostage’20. To implement the plan they decided to loot the armoury and
take control of different important installations including the various entrances to the BDR
headquarters.
On 18 February a meeting took place between different groups of BDR men. This
was followed by the printing of a draft leaflet (21 February) which illustrated the demands of
the BDR. The leaflet was allegedly distributed by Rifle Battalion 44 to Rifles Security Unit
(RSU) and all the other battalions at Pilkhana21. Lt. Colonel Enshad Ibn Amin (Commanding
Officer RSU), who would later be killed, came across the leaflet sometime on the morning of
21 February. He immediately brought it to the attention of DG Ahmed who told him to
circulate a counter leaflet since the BDR leaflet equated to sedition22. On 23 February it was
discovered that three sub-machine guns had gone missing from the armoury at Pilkhana. As
a result BDR officers were put on guard duty at the armoury. By Tuesday 24 February angry
soldiers printed a leaflet headlined, 'Save BDR! Save the country! Save the Nation: why are
45,000 BDR personnel subservient today? The BDR is alien in its own home. Take a look,
honourable prime minister, thinkers of the country' 23. The leaflet criticised DG Ahmed, his
wife and a host of other army officers and was circulated inside and outside of Pilkhana.
Although higher BDR authorities managed to stop the wide circulation of the leaflet, civilian
intelligence agencies failed to realise the potential threat and dismissed it as merely
periodical agitation by the BDR24. A number of meetings took place between BDR members
and Torab Ali. The final meeting before the mutiny was allegedly held at Torab Ali’s house
on the evening of 24 February where 20-25 conspirators took an oath to execute the plans
the following day.
II. RECONSTRUCTING THE EPISODE

Exactly what happened at BDR headquarters on 25-26 February 2009 may never be known.
Witness interviews, government reports and numerous published accounts have been
consulted in an effort to piece together an accurate account as possible. Accounts vary in
relation to exactly what happened and in what sequence. These variations only add further
complexity to already difficult circumstances. What is known is that the 33-hour-long mutiny
started on the morning of 25 February at Darbar Hall inside Pilkhana barracks, which is
located in the city centre and covers an area of over 3 square kilometres. Around 3,000 BDR
soldiers from battalions of BDR – 13, 24, 36 and 44 as well as 150 BDR officers came to
Pilkhana for the occasion of ‘Bangladesh Rifles Week 2009’ celebrations joining the 3,000
plus BDR soldiers stationed there25. Overall, it is estimated that there were around 9,000
people including civilians inside the barracks when BDR soldiers mutinied26.
PM Sheikh Hasina visited Pilkhana on 24 February to inaugurate ‘Bangladesh Rifles
Week 2009’, an event that was suspended during the tenure of the CTG. Lt. Colonel Shams
(Captain, Rifle Battalion 44), appointed Chief Security Officer was responsible for all
administrative and security arrangements, which also included the Darbar on 25 February.
Security responsibility was given to Rifle Battalion 4427. Despite three sub-machine guns
having earlier been reported missing from the armoury and subversive leaflets having been
discovered circulating inside Pilkhana, PM Sheikh Hasina’s visit nonetheless went ahead as
scheduled. So why did the intelligence agencies not consider agitation by BDR soldiers a
threat to the PMs visit? Confusion still remains as to why the PM cancelled her attendance
20
Army Investigation, (Note 18), p. 5.
21
Government Investigation, (Note 16), p. 22.
22
23
Hana Shams Ahmed, ‘Who will speak for the BDR?’ Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4 (April 2004).
http://archive.thedailystar.net/forum/2009/april/speak.htm
24
‘A summary of the national probe report on the BDR mutiny,’ (Note 8).
25
Rahnuma Ahmed, ‘The BDR rebellion in Bangladesh: Prevailing uncertainties,’ (Note 2).
26
Sandeep Bhardwaj, ‘Bangladesh: The BDR mutiny,’ Special Report No. 70, Institute of Peace and Conflict
Studies (April 2009), p. 1. http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR70-Final.pdf
27
for an evening meal on 26 February at Pilkhana, two days before the schedule. Army officers
thought that the PM refused to attend as she had some idea that a mutiny would take place.
However, it is not clear if the cancellation was due to any prior intelligence warning of a
specific imminent threat.
In her speech at Pilkhana the PM reiterated her government’s desire to rid the BDR
and the armed forces of corruption and urged the BDR to become ‘more disciplined and
remain ready to guard the country’s frontiers’28. She went on to say national development
was a key feature of her government’s economic policies and stressed Bangladesh should
not be used as a ‘spring board’ for terrorism against any other country, especially since her
government wished to have friendlier relations with neighbouring countries. Prior to her
speech, a delegation of BDR rank and file had requested DG Ahmed to allow them to meet
with the PM separately after the inaugural function so they could express their grievances
directly to her, but this request was turned down. When PM Sheikh Hasina came to know of
the BDR soldiers’ request she insisted that the meeting go ahead but was advised not to by
DG Ahmed, and as a result the meeting never took place.
According to witness reports the mutiny stated at around 9:30 am on the morning of
25 February 2009 as DG Ahmed was addressing 2,483 BDR soldiers and 165 officers in
Darbar Hall. On this survivors agree, but from there on versions vary. The Darbar is an open
forum from colonial times where commanding officers listen to questions and grievances
from rank and file soldiers. Weapons are not allowed in the Darbar ceremony, but many
BDR soldiers managed to enter the building heavily armed on the morning of 25 February.
DG Ahmed opened the Darbar and briefed the soldiers on Operation Dal-Bhaat. He told
them many people had immensely benefitted from it and the share of the profit was
deposited waiting to be processed. He then asked, ‘Are you all happy with the Dal-Bhaat
programme?’29 However, he did not get a response from any of the soldiers present. An
angry soldier stood up and began demanding to know if DG Ahmed raised the 22 demands
of BDR with PM Sheikh Hasina on the previous day. Some soldiers started to question the
DG about the profit made from Operation Dal-Bhaat of which they received no bonuses even
though signatures were put on money receipts. Soon after a group of soldiers became
disruptive and created a commotion.
In other accounts a soldier raised his weapon and pointed it at the senior army
officers. Survivor Lt. Colonel Shams corroborates that the soldier ran toward the stage and
tried to put a weapon to DG Ahmed’s head, however, he fainted as a result of fear and was
overpowered by the officers. After this DG Ahmed said to Lt. Colonel Shams, ‘Shams, this
gun is from your battalion!’30 At that time shots were fired but there is confusion about how
many and who fired them, but at this cue other armed mutineers inside Darbar Hall shouted
‘awake’ and stood up, while another group of armed mutineers entered from outside. DG
Ahmed told everyone to calm down and ordered Colonel Mojibul Haque (Dhaka Sector
Commander), Lt. Colonel Enayetul Haque (Captain, Rifle Battalion 36), Lt. Colonel Badrul
Huda (Captain, Rifle Battalion 13) and other Pilkhana officers to go to their units and ‘Go and
control your troops’31. In the ensuing panic and confusion many soldiers inside Darbar Hall
fled the scene.
One thing evident from all the versions is that the mutineers were made up of
privates and NCOs who deliberately targeted their commanding officers. Not all BDR
soldiers took part. Many tried to save the army officers while others who did not initially
participate in the mutiny willingly obtained weapons from the armoury and joined the
mutineers; others were forced to join in, some hid and some absconded when the killing of
officers started. In the mêlée that ensued around 40 army officers got stranded inside Darbar
28
‘Reports: Border guards launch mutiny in Dhaka,’ The Jakarta Post, (25 February 2009).
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/25/reports-border-guards-launch-mutiny-dhaka.html
29
Shariful Islam & Sharier Khan,’ Tragedy sowed by Operation Dal-Bhat,’ The Daily Star, (6 November 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/tragedy-sowed-by-operation-dal-bhat/
30
31
Ibid, p. 9.
Hall while some managed to flee. Some officers along with their families were detained after
being rounded up from their homes inside the residential complex. By 9:40 am the entire
situation had completely gone out of control. Thousands of rounds of ammunition had been
fired indiscriminately. Gunfire and grenade explosions were heard several blocks away32.
Mutineers started shooting outside of the barracks which injured many pedestrians and led
to the death of three civilians33. They fired mortar rounds and shot at army helicopters that
came to investigate distress calls made by stranded officers34.
At 10:10 am around 350 Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) troops took positions at three
of the five gates of the Pilkhana barracks35. RAB-10 was first to arrive and was later joined
by RAB-2, RAB-3 and Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP). After initial reconnaissance officers
of RAB-10 concluded Gate 5 with its low perimeter wall would be the most suitable entrance
to storm the barracks. Officers on the ground asked permission to carry out an operation, but
their request was denied by Colonel Rezanur (Additional DG, RAB) who ordered RAB units
to move out to Beribadh, around 3km away from Pilkhana. By then RAB had lost the
opportunity to suppress the mutineers before they could organise themselves. By 11:30 am
the Plkhana barracks were surrounded by the Bangladesh Army. PM Sheikh Hasina ordered
the security forces to stand down and not enter the barracks as her government preferred to
negotiate despite the ongoing killings taking place inside the barracks. Many argued the
BDR should have been dealt like the Ansar when they mutinied at Shafipur and Khilgaon in
1994, ironically, with the aid of BDR forces. It was alleged that 30 Ansar’s were killed and
3,500 lost their jobs in that episode. Political and defence analyst, Major General Syed
Muhammad Ibrahim (retd) on 1 April 2009, commented that military action would have surely
saved lives and honour of many army officers and their family members. According to a
source close to the army:
If they had gone in with tanks, its true there would have been more deaths, but they
would have been BDR deaths. It is possible that they will continue to ask for
concessions, because they believe they suffered needless casualties. They will want
36
something in return .
Quite a few witness accounts claimed that within ten minutes after the shooting had
started in Darbar Hall, several officers from the top hierarchy of BDR were gunned down and
brutally killed37. Some officers were tortured, hanged, mutilated and bayoneted before being
shot. After the mutiny had started, Major Zayedi Ahsan Habib38 from inside Darbar Hall
called Major General Tarique Siddik (retd), the PMs Security Advisor and described the
scene. DG Ahmed also managed to speak twice to PM Sheikh Hasina from Pilkhana39. In
one of the phone calls he mentioned that ‘Rifle Battalion 44 has mutinied’ and he feared for
the safety of his officers40. This was confirmed by PM Sheikh Hasina in a session in
parliament where she stated that DG Ahmed phoned at 9:30 am as soon as the mutiny had
started. Two BDR officers rescued from inside Pilkhana barracks on 26 February told
reporters that they witnessed the murder of DG Ahmed and other officers inside Darbar Hall.
32
Julfikar Ali Manik, ‘How it began,’ (Note 23).
33
Ibid.
34
Inam Ahmed & Rashidul Hasan, ‘Bullets buzz in the air,’ The Daily Star, (26 February 2009).
35
36
Fariha Karim, ‘Sliding into reverse gear,’ Tehelka Magazine, Vol. 6, No. 10 (14 March 2009).
http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main41.asp?filename=Ne140309sliding_in.asp
37
38
‘Wounded officer tells of ordeals in confinement,’ The Daily Star, (7 September 2010).
39
Subir Bhaumik, ‘Clear and present danger,’ Times of India, (10 March 2009).
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-03-10/edit-page/28002573_1_sheikh-hasina-wajed-
bangladesh-nationalist-party-indian-army
40
They also said DG Ahmed phoned the PM and sought her help. During a meeting with
newspaper editors PM Sheikh Hasina claimed she called DG Ahmed and enquired about the
situation inside Pilkhana and said, ‘DG told me there was a minor problem and it has been
resolved’. It may be questioned as to why DG Ahmed gave the wrong information to the PM
saying the problem had been resolved, given that he and his officer’s lives were in
immediate danger. Rescued officer Colonel Kamruzzaman repeatedly told reporters that DG
Ahmed called the PM as soon as the trouble began and urgently requested for her to resolve
the crisis in order to avoid bloodshed. The contradictory version of who was first to make the
phone call, DG Ahmed or the PM, can only be resolved if the Bangladeshi intelligence
agencies recover the recorded conversation of the PM and DG Ahmed on 25 February 2009,
from where only the fact can be revealed and awkward questions put to rest.
It is still unclear as to how and when DG Ahmed was killed. According to one version
he was shot dead inside the Darbar Hall itself at around 10:30 am on 25 February.
According to the other version he and other officers managed to escape from the hall and
fled to various offices and residences inside the barracks. He was shot along with his wife
inside their residence, although the time of their deaths have still not been verified. From
details available it is possible to suggest that DG Ahmed and his wife were extremely
unpopular with BDR soldiers who accused both of them of being corrupt. Allegedly they both
misused and embezzled funds meant to provide relief to families of poor BDR soldiers. That
would explain the brutality of their deaths and how their bodies were mutilated to try and
conceal their identities. DG Ahmed’s residence was ransacked where blood, furniture and
shattered glass covered the floor. Yet in all the chaos a five-foot glass cabinet containing
heirloom crystal was left completely untouched. According to Major Shumon Ahmed who led
reporters around the ransacked home it was because the mutineers ‘didn’t want antiques’41.
Or was it the case that the residencies were deliberately ransacked after the event to make
the BDR attack appear more vicious than it actually was? After all, if BDR soldiers plundered
valuables and destroyed various residencies, why would they specifically leave untouched
glass ornaments? In addition it is suspected that the scenes of the mutiny and the accounts
of what happened were manipulated.
Similar accusations of corruption were made about Colonel Mojibul Haque who was
the Dhaka Zone Operation Officer of the Dhal-Bhaat programme. He was killed and his
house was set on fire42. Of the 57 army officers, 52 were killed either inside Darbar Hall and
its surrounding area while 5 others were killed elsewhere inside Pilkhana. Lt. Colonel Syed
Kamruzzaman (Communication Officer) who was shot at seven times and managed to
survive43 (as did all the officers under his command) later claimed that most of the army
officers were killed by 11 am on 25 February44. Indian news channel Chabbish Ghanta (24
Hours) broadcasting in Bangla reported DG Ahmed and his wife’s death in its news
summary scroll at 11:00 am. Another Indian news channel NDTV also displayed the same
information in its news summary scroll at 12:00 pm and later broadcasted it in its news
bulletin at 12:15 pm. For some reason this news item was not broadcasted in Bangladesh
until the evening of 26 February, but nonetheless it was the talk of the town as many
watched this at home on the two satellite channels.
As breaking news was filtering onto the airwaves about the killing spree, bodies of
Colonel Mojibul Haque and Lt. Colonel Enayetul Haque were discovered near the
Nababganj drainage canals at approximately 2:30 pm on 25 February. It has also been
established that Colonel Emdadul Islam (Khulna Sector Commander) talked to his wife on
his mobile from his hiding place. Colonel Aftabul Islam (Rangpur Sector Commander) sent
41
Fariha Karim, ‘Sliding into reverse gear,’ (Note 36).
42
Julfikar Ali Manik & Sharier Khan, ‘Mutiny, bloodshed at BDR HQ,’ (Note 12).
43
Dean Nelson, ‘Mass graves found after Bangladesh security force mutiny,’ The Telegraph, (27 February
2009). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/bangladesh/4862871/Mass-graves-found-after-
Bangladesh-security-force-mutiny.html
44
‘BDR chief killed in hail of bullets: Survivors of mutiny speak of horror,’ The Daily Star, (27 February 2009).
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=77698
three SMS texts to his colleagues, a Brigadier and two Colonels at 4:30 pm stating, ‘I’m alive
in darbar hall, pls rescue us’45. Major Quazi Mosaddek Hossain died from severe bleeding at
around 5:30 pm despite making earlier calls for help which never came. It has also been
reported that Colonel Rezaul Kabir and Colonel Elahi Shafique were killed after midnight on
the first day of the mutiny. It has to be noted that the time of death have not been
established for all the victims which remains the main point of contention. How many army
officers were killed before and after negotiations began? The government report narrates
most of the officers were killed within the first few hours of the mutiny; however, these claims
have yet to be substantiated.
Three attempts were made by the government to negotiate a truce. In the first round
PM Sheikh Hasina sent Jahangir Kabir Nanak (Minister for Cooperatives) and Mirza Azam
(Jatiya Sangsad Whip) to Pilkhana. Why did the PM assign two inexperienced MPs for
negotiations instead of the Home Minister or other senior cabinet ministers? Particularly
since Nanak and Azam have a dirty track record in politics which include among other
things, arson and murder. Mutineers inside Pilkhana demanded a general amnesty before
Nanak even took a delegation of fourteen BDR men to PM Sheikh Hasina’s official residence
Jamuna at 3:30 pm for negotiations. No list of names of the fourteen people was provided to
either the government or army investigating committees46. The meeting lasted for
approximately 150 minutes during which the mutineers petitioned for their amnesty to be
passed in parliament and gazetted47. What was discussed during the course of the meeting
is yet to be established. It is not clear as to whether the PM enquired about the safety of the
officers, their families, or the civilians caught up in the mutiny at Pilkhana. Even if the PM
was told that no hostages were killed including DG Ahmed, why was this not independently
authenticated?
It was reported that the National Monitoring Cell listened in on the conversations
between the mutineers and individuals on the outside in relation to what was going on inside
Pilkhana. Despite the scale of the killings the PM announced a general amnesty for the
mutineers on 25 February together with an assurance of favourably looking at their
demands48. But this did not make the mutineers lay down their weapons, nor did they
surrender. To provide amnesty to mutineers who had committed the most heinous crimes is
a bad idea to say the least. Essentially the same government by no means would award
amnesty to the killers Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, because premeditated murder under any
circumstances has to be punished for the interests of law, order and justice. BNP leader
Begum Khaleda Zia later criticised the PMs offer of amnesty and said, ‘This gave them more
time to kill more people and conceal their brutality’ 49. So why did the mutineers deceive the
government during the negotiations? The obvious reason would be to buy time so they could
plan their escape after they had committed the brutal massacre. Following the conclusion of
the meeting between the BDR delegation and the PM, BDR delegate Muhammad Towhidul
Islam (Deputy Assistant Director) along with the government spokesman Nanak jointly
addressed the press despite Sahara Khatun (Home Minister) being present. Nanak told the
press, ‘the BDR delegation has expressed their feelings and complaints with the honourable
Prime Minister in an emotional manner’.
45
46
Ibid, p. 11.
47
Major-General M.A. Halim (retd), ‘The BDR carnage and intelligence failure,’ The Daily Star, (18 April 2009).
48
Initial amnesty offered by the PM was on the basis the BDR mutineers would accept a ceasefire, surrender
weapons and free all hostages. It was a verAL amnesty without official or legal underpinning. Later an
explanation was circulated on behalf of the PM that specified any amnesty would immediately exclude any
active participants of the revolt.
49
Dean Nelson, ‘Pakistan in the frame over Bangladesh uprising,’ The Telegraph, (1 March 2009).
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/4902794/Pakistan-in-the-frame-over-
Bangladesh-uprising.html
The second round of negotiations took place on the evening of the first day of the
mutiny. At 9:40 pm Taposh and Sahara Khatun accompanied Nanak and Azam to Rifles
Square at Pilkhana barracks. Sahara and Nanak entered the barracks at 12:25 am on 26
February in complete darkness. According to some reports it was Nanak that ordered the
power to be cut off inside Pilkhana. Another explanation is that the main lights inside the
barracks as well as the perimeter street lighting are not on a timer switch and have to be
switched on manually by an electrician. Because of the mutiny there was no electrician
inside the barracks to do this. Nevertheless, government negotiators could have easily
arranged for electricians to come inside the barracks and restore the lights so the security
forces could observe activities from outside. Why did the Home Ministry not make provisions
to arrange for floodlights? At the very least by turning on the headlights of all security forces
vehicles would have provided some light. Complete darkness worked in favour of the
mutineers. It concealed their crimes such as the mass shallow graves and allowed for a
huge number of them to escape under the cover of darkness through the Azimpur and
Hazaribagh gates. Sahara visited families of the officers but did not meet with any officers.
However, through intense negotiations the government succeeded in releasing 29 army
officers: two colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, 21 majors and one captain.
Meanwhile the mutiny spread on the second day to other parts of Bangladesh. It was
reported that general acts of indiscipline and disobedience took place at BDR outposts in
Chapainawabganj, Chittagong, Jessore, Rangpur and Satkhira. Numerous BDR bases
reported shooting in the air which led to three injuries. Barriers were put up on several major
highways by BDR soldiers who fled their barracks in anticipation of an attack by the army. In
Satkhira two army officers were taken hostage in a village50. The Border Security Force
(BSF) of India reported that during the mutiny the BDR were not operating many of its border
checkpoints51. According to another report the mutiny spread to some 12 cities and towns
around Bangladesh52 although no deaths occurred outside of Pilkhana.
The final round of negotiations took place on the second day of the mutiny at Hotel
AmALa Inn between Motia Chowdhury (Minister for Agriculture) and a BDR delegation.
Mutineers told negotiators they would disarm and surrender to DAD Towhidul Islam only if
there was a complete withdrawal of all security forces from around Pilkhana. That afternoon
CAS General Moeen held another emergency meeting with the PM. As a result political
envoys were sent to Pilkhana in a last ditch effort to convince the mutineers to surrender.
The envoys warned the mutineers of PM Sheikh Hasina’s intention to take a hard line if they
did not surrender immediately. To demonstrate that the government were serious to follow
through with their threat, residents living within a three kilometre radius of Pilkhana were
asked to evacuate the area. On 26 February at 2:30 pm, PM Sheikh Hasina in a televised
address to the nation appealed to BDR soldiers to lay down their weapons immediately and
return to their barracks; otherwise she would be compelled to take robust action to break the
standoff. According to Lt. Colonel Shams, the calm and strong response from the PM is
credited to being the turning point in the crisis.
On hearing PM Sheikh Hasina’s address a group of BDR soldiers began to surrender
their weapons. Nevertheless, it remains an open question as to how a few thousand
mutineers from an estimated 8,000 BDR soldiers escaped from Pilkhana, given that security
forces had ‘surrounded’ the barracks shortly after the mutiny had broken out. But as it was
discovered afterwards the vast majority escaped the previous night facilitated by the
electricity blackout leaving behind a horrific scene of utter carnage. How many mutineers
actively took part is anyone’s guess. What became apparent was that the armoury was
stripped of a large quantity of automatic weapons, ammunition and explosives which
included grenades.
50
‘Calm across country after chaos, revolt,’ The Daily Star, (27 February 2009).
51
‘BDR personnel missing from Indo-Bangla border posts,’ The Economic Times, (28 Feb 2009).
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/PoliticsNation/BDR-personnel-missing-from-Indo-
Banglaborder-posts/articleshow/4204714.cms
52
Khaled IqAL Chowdhury, ‘BDR mutiny: Security implications for Bangladesh and the region,’ (Note 7).
Meanwhile Sahara Khatun continued negotiations with the mutineers in relation to

their surrender and the release of the remaining hostages. Eventually all the captive women
and children along with the remaining army officers were freed. On the evening of 26
February a convoy of tanks and armoured vehicles from the Army’s 9th Division of Savar and
the 46th Brigade of Dhaka moved down toward Pilkhana and surrounded it. In addition, the
arrival of army commandos apparently intimidated the mutineers into hoisting a white flag on
the main gate of Pilkhana at around 6:00 pm. Only a small number, just over 200 mutineers
were inside Pilkhana at the final stages of the mutiny. At long last a crisis which lasted 33
hours was finally brought to an end at 7:00 pm when DMP Commissioner entered the
barracks. Pilkhana looked like a battlefield as hundreds of thousands of empty shells,
several hundred pairs of boots and helmets were littered throughout the compound.
The end of an Ordeal

The immediate reaction of the general public as well as the government was one of relief as
a major catastrophic crisis was largely averted. However, this did not reduce the confusion
which followed. For instance, the authorities were unable to account for the number of
mutineers that escaped during and after the mutiny. It was also not possible to identify how
many mutineers participated since records and other sensitive documents were destroyed.
Due to a lack of crisis management it took the authorities some days to release a credible
death toll. Similarly it took a few days for the army to access the BDR database in order to
try and identify the perpetrators.
When the bodies of BDR officers dumped in sewage canals began to surface;
shallow graves containing mutilated, bayoneted, eyes gouged out and decomposed bodies
of DG Ahmed and other senior officers were discovered, the general public were shocked at
the brutal manner in which 57 BDR officers had lost their lives. The sheer scale of the
savagery left the nation numb with grief. After nine months of fighting during the 1971
Liberation War a total of 47 army officers had lost their lives. In comparison the Pilkhana
massacre was the highest death toll of officers in the history of Bangladesh. Many of the
high-ranking BDR officers that got killed including DG Ahmed were CAS General Moeen’s
appointees. Public sympathy and interest into the reasons for the mutiny receded into the
background.
Media and the Mutiny

The role of the media in the BDR mutiny was one in which the media impacted the crisis and
the crisis affected the media. To date the Bangladeshi media has been highly criticised
during and after the mutiny. According to the National Probe Report into the BDR mutiny the
role of the media was criticised as being negative:
From the start of the incident, private TV channels spread the news of the mutiny at
home and abroad through live telecasts. In doing so, they gave preference to the
commercial aspects of the situation over the national security. Where different
intelligence agencies, the army and the government itself could not get details from
inside Pilkhana, mutineers in Dhaka and outside of Dhaka were able to get detailed
news regarding the position of the army and other on goings inside Pilkhana, thanks to
the media. In general, the media encouraged the mutineers by publicising the news
about the mutiny, and talk shows which created a sentiment against the government
and the army among the people. From the start of the BDR mutiny, it was seen that the
media’s uncontrolled, irresponsible and biased transmission and the easy availability of
53
contact over mobile phones caused tension in BDR units outside Dhaka .
On the first day of the mutiny the Bangladeshi media reported on BDR frustration and
resentment in relation to unfulfilled demands. The first interview with mutineers was
conducted by Munni Shaha for private television channel ATN Bangla close to an entrance
of Pilkhana barracks. His faced covered, a mutineer spoke from behind a window and
53
asserted that BDR personnel wanted to speak to the PM who would have to declare an
amnesty and meet their demands. ‘Otherwise we will not stop the war!’ he declared. Clearly
the agitated mutineers were eager to talk and did so uninterrupted for more than four
minutes and twenty seconds. Although Saha asked questions in relation to casualties and
the whereabouts of army officers, the mutineers did not respond to her. Furthermore, this
highlighted that the mutineers took the opportunity to portray their demands and complaints
to the nation as well as to other BDR outposts around Bangladesh.
A mutineer told private television channel Bangla Vision that they would be open to
talks with government negotiators. Another mutineer was interviewed from inside Pilkhana
via telephone by Bangla Vision during which he expressed his grievances of which the most
frustrating thing was the army’s control over the BDR54. In the words of a mutineer, ‘We are
not against the nation, or the Government. We want that the BDR should belong to the
BDR’55. However, on the first day of the mutiny private television channels did not interview
any army spokesperson and therefore, failed to provide an objective, impartial and
responsible report and inadvertently propagated the mutineer’s narrative. Interviews with the
mutineers became instrumental in shaping favourable public opinion toward the BDR while
at the same time it demolished the image of army officers. In retrospect, ATN Bangla
interviews were the most criticised, primarily as media coverage of the mutiny during the first
day most certainly added fuel to the fire.
Private television channels to a large degree were used to send live messages to the
public and politicians during the initial phase of the mutiny. Attention was given to the
disparities between BDR personnel and their commanding army officers. Mutineers claimed
that the mutiny occurred due to longstanding grievances which centred on matters of life and
death. Their main demands were, appointment of BDR commissioned officers, 100 per cent
ration allowance, restructure pay more in line with the army and authorisation to participate
in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Mutineers claimed discredited army officers were
often seconded to the BDR as a ‘punishment posting’ and frequently exploited BDR soldiers
for their personal smuggling operations56. BDR personnel accused the officers of corruption,
exploitation, treason and were dissatisfied with the Dal-Bhaat programme, corporal
punishment, lack of transparency in running BDR businesses and schools and resented the
luxurious lifestyles of their commanding officers.
Various television channels transmitted real-time phenomena for the purposes of
informing the public. All the latest developments of the incident were provided through news
bulletins, phone interviews and continuous news scrolls. Due to ‘zero access’ to Pilkhana the
mutineers were the primary source of information for the media, particularly on why the
mutiny had started and what was happening inside the barracks. The reasons given
received coverage in many national dailies that sympathised with the ‘causes’ of the mutiny.
Due to a lack of sources the media were vulnerable to propagate misinformation. This
situation was exploited by the mutineers who spread their version of events in order to
persuade public opinion in their favour. Several Bangladeshi journalists risked their lives in
an attempt to report the latest and most updated news.
In Bangladesh televised talk shows are extremely popular and on 25 February 2009,
various television channels organised talk shows on the BDR mutiny and invited guests from
civil society and politics to discuss the crisis. Some of the guests blamed each other’s
political party as being the masterminds behind the mutiny; however, one thing they
unanimously agreed upon was support for the mutineers. Talk shows played a significant
role in shaping public opinion during the crisis, even though it was later found out that the
mutineers lied about the well being of the officers to cover their crimes. As a result, the
media, government and the general public were deceived by the fabricated accounts.
54
Wasim Bin Habib, ‘2009 tragedy back in mind,’ The Daily Star, (31 October 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/verdict-in-bdr-carnage-case-now-on-nov-5/
55
Bangla Vision, 25 February 2009.
56
Dean Nelson, ‘Pakistan in the frame over Bangladesh uprising,’ (Note 49).
As soon as the dead bodies of army officers were discovered the television channels
immediately shifted the focus onto rescue activities. Newspapers followed their lead from
initially being supportive toward the mutineers to revising their position in light of the actual
truth. Television channels and newspapers57 disclosed explicit footage and photographs to
the general public. This coverage had an enormous impact on the public and also raised
huge questions in regard to media ethics, public interest, taste and decency and what the
probable consequences of any disclosure might be. Journalists were also criticised for being
more interested in getting the scoop by neglecting the privacy and security of the hostages.
For instance, even though journalists were on hand to interview freed hostages while they
came out of Pilkhana, distressed interviewees were reluctant to talk and covered their faces
as they were worried about other members of their family still being held hostage. This
reinforced the view that there was a need for journalists to be aware of conflict sensitive
journalism, a serious lack of which was exhibited on the first day of the mutiny by the private
television channels which were busy castigating army officers.
Social media such as Twitter, Facebook and various blogs played a significant role in
disseminating information during the mutiny. Several bloggers posted pictures, reports and
comments about the incident. Real-time broadcasts from news channels not only fed the
public appetite to obtain the latest news on the crisis, but also served a constructive purpose
because television footage was used to identify some of the mutineers. Voices were
examined in order to put an identity to some of the masked mutineers that gave television
and phone interviews. Moreover, video footage is an important tool to examine the
vulnerability in which reporters performed their duties so future risks can be minimised.
Following the end of the mutiny, several media outlets released interviews with survivors and
the families of deceased officers. These interviews highlighted the suffering the people had
gone through, as well as attempted to initialise state support for the victims.
III. FINDING THE PERPETRATORS

PM Sheikh Hasina issued an ultimatum to all absconding BDR soldiers to return to their
posts within 24 hours. Approximately 5,000 BDR soldiers reported back to duty, however,
they were confined to their barracks under close supervision of the army and their heavy
weapons like mortars and machine guns were confiscated58. The government in relation to
its first offer of general amnesty clarified its position by arguing it did not include those
accused of committing offences during the mutiny. On her return from consoling the families
of dead BDR officers at Mirpur barracks, PM Sheikh Hasina told reporters, ‘It seems a
certain group staged the incident. It must also be inquired if any quarter provoked this
incident. We must see whether there was any plan to use this incident for a different
purpose’59. On 28 February 2009, the government hurried to setup a special tribunal for the
quick prosecution of all of those involved. On the same day Brigadier-General Mahmud
Hossain (Director, Military Intelligence) told a press conference in Dhaka that the army was
ready to storm Pilkhana soon after the mutiny started, but were prevented by PM Sheikh
Hasina who opted to resolve the crisis politically. ‘The Prime Minister directed that the crisis
should be solved politically and it has been resolved in that manner’. He described the
events as ‘possibly the worst massacre of army officers in Bangladesh's history’ and
remarked that anger among the armed forces was ‘very natural’60.
The National Standing Committee of the BNP in a statement on 28 February alleged
that the ‘action and reaction’ to the mutiny demonstrated the government’s total failure to
57
BDR rebellion was covered by three-leading English language newspapers: The Daily Star, the New Age and
www.bdnews24.com
58
‘BDR men seen with rifles, not heavy weapons,’ The Hindu, (3 March 2009).
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/002200903031869.htm
59
‘Back to 1971 war: Hand of Pak friends seen in mutiny,’ The Telegraph, Kolkata, (28 February 2009).
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090228/jsp/frontpage/story_10604594.jsp
60
Bahukutumbi Raman, ‘Carnage of Bangladesh Army officers’.
http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009/03/carnage-of-bd-army-officers.html
resolve the crisis. It’s ‘narrow mentality and controversial steps and statements of the
government made the situation more complex’. It added:
The Government could not take timely steps to prevent the killing of army officers and
their family members, and torture on women and children. The Prime Minister, who is
also the Defence Minister, cannot avoid responsibility for the failure to take effective
61
measures to protect arms and ammunition, and prevent escape of criminals’ .
Under severe pressure from the opposition parties, on 2 March the government
formally filed charges of mutiny, killings, arson and looting of armouries against more than a
thousand BDR soldiers. Initially 236 BDR soldiers were arrested; six were named, including
the suspected ringleader DAD Towhidul Islam62. On the same day the government launched
‘Operation Rebel Hunt’ to capture fugitive BDR men and recover stolen weapons and
ammunition. However, the remit of the operation however did not include the arrest of any
civilians who might have colluded or aided the mutineers. In addition, police arrested a
number of individuals who in the confusion tried to enter the Pilkhana barracks to steal
weapons. As part of the investigation process authorities in Bangladesh tried to ascertain the
exact number of weapons, explosives and ammunition stolen, however, to date the full
recovery of stolen weapons by the army and law enforcement agencies have not been
successful.
A six-member probe committee was formed by the Home Minister to find the causes
and motives behind the mutiny. The army simultaneously initiated its own probe into the
killing of the officers. This demonstrated the lack of confidence on the part of the army in the
thoroughness of any government constituted investigation. For the government investigation
to remain strictly apolitical the Home Minister and the State Minister for Law were excluded
from it shortly afterwards63. Neutrality of the investigation was projected in an effort to
appease significant political opposition the government faced over the mutiny. The
government requested the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and British Scotland Yard to
assist in its investigation. The army focused its enquiries on those who had a meeting with
the Home Minister before talks broke down. This included four DADs; Towhidul Islam,
Nasiruddin Khan, Mirza Habibur Rahman, Abdul Jalil, and Private Mohammad Selim and
Abdur Rahim (rank unknown).
On 1 March 2009, PM Sheikh Hasina held a meeting with the survivors of the mutiny
at Senakunja in Dhaka barracks. In the closed door meeting which lasted nearly three hours,
surviving BDR officers berated the PM for not allowing the army to take charge from the
beginning and crush the mutiny in its infancy. Furthermore, they criticised the government for
granting amnesty to the mutineers. Some of the officers went even further and viciously
attacked the government and the army top brass of being corrupt and negligent. The audio
recording of the emotionally charged meeting was leaked and released on the internet64.
Consequently on 7 March the Bangladesh government blocked websites such as YouTube
and eSnips in Bangladesh without giving any explanation as to the reasons why. Many
sources alleged the ban was imposed because the government wanted to suppress the
leaked audio which portrayed them negatively. Remarkably the private media outlets did not
report the website censorship story even though the ban lasted for five days and was later
lifted on 12 March65.
61
‘BNP demands broad-based probe body,’ The Daily Star, (1 March 2009).
62
‘Over a thousand BDR men sued for mutiny,’ The Daily Star, (2 March 2009).
63
‘Govt probe body recast: Ex-sec Anisuzzaman replaces Sahara,’ The Daily Star, (3 March 2009).
64
Part 1 of 4 of the audio recording at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wpmr4gKFHww
The audio is in Bangla and includes several detailed witness accounts of surviving BDR officers.
65
‘Bangladesh Lifts YouTube Ban Over Mutiny Row,’ AFP (12 March 2009).
The significance of the exchange between the PM and the survivors demonstrated
how the government was heavily criticised over its handling of the mutiny. The message
carried back by the PM to her inner circle was that she could no longer trust the Bangladesh
Army. She has every reason to fear the army as her government came to power after two
years of a military-backed CTG which had tried its best to sideline her and political arch rival
Khaleda Zia by arresting them on charges of corruption. However, the leaked audio did not
provide any obvious incriminating evidence that it had to be suppressed to such an extent.
Such a no-holds barred confrontation between professional uniformed officers and the PM
confirmed that she was unable to earn their respect, which shocked the general Bangladeshi
public.
Intelligence Failure
Bangladeshi intelligence came under the spotlight with serious questions raised about the
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and the National Security Intelligence
(NSI), both of which were unable to provide any warning of the mutiny. Survivor Lt. Colonel
Kamruzzaman claimed complicity of intelligence agencies in the mutiny. ‘Field agents of
intelligence agencies were involved. They knew everything’66. PM Sheikh Hasina also made
intelligence failure liable for her government's delay in taking any action. Just over a month
after the Pilkhana massacre PM Sheikh Hasina held a meeting with editors of newspapers
and TV channels. At the meeting she reiterated the failure of intelligence agencies to provide
credible intelligence ahead of the mutiny made it very unlikely that the crisis could have been
prevented. However, this claim was contradictory because two days after the massacre the
PM told parliament she received an intelligence report at 8:30 am on the morning of 25
February 2009, in relation to possible seditious activities taking place at BDR headquarters.
She went onto tell the editors that as soon as the mutiny started she consulted with CAS
General Moeen on a possible military operation to rescue officers and their families, but was
told by him that the army required two hours for such an operation. Yet If the PM made such
a request at 9:30 am, then why were the security forces told to move 3km away from
Pilkhana at 11:30 am? Why did the PM suddenly opt for political negotiations with the
mutineers instead?
PM Sheikh Hasina faced mounting pressure to hold the intelligence agencies to
account, particularly the intelligence wing of the Bangladesh Police and the army-dominated
DGFI. It is alleged that the mutiny had taken the DGFI and the NSI by surprise; hence due to
the huge intelligence failure some of the leadership of the intelligence agencies were
changed67. Similarly the role of the RSU, the BDR’s own detective unit came under question,
particularly its role in the mutiny. How much did the members of the RSU know about what
was to take place and what was their association with it? Why did they not sufficiently alert
their higher authorities?68 Failure to gather intelligence is not a new phenomenon, especially
if the agencies are ill-equipped and ill-organised. 11 September 2001, grenade attacks in
August 2004, bomb blasts across Bangladesh in 2005 and the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks of
2008 are all cases of intelligence failure. It cannot be ascertained for sure whether this whole
episode was an intelligence failure or a command failure. Nonetheless, intelligence agencies
do not have any excuse for their failure to identify the actual masterminds of the mutiny, or
what the actual motive was behind it. Even if the theory of connivance between the
intelligence agencies and the masterminds behind the BDR massacre is not proven,
significant questions remain over such a huge failure of intelligence.
66
67
Bahukutumbi Raman, ‘Bangladesh: A Bengali Abbasi lurking somewhere?’
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper232
68
IV. INVESTIGATING THE MUTINY

Several theories have been put forward to explain the mutiny which almost destabilised the
newly elected government. At the start of the mutiny the general public had empathy with the
mutineers, partly owing to their socio-economic background, but mainly due to their stories
of deprivation presented on the media. Public solidarity was expressed with the mutineers
who are regarded as a patriotic force and some even went further and called the crisis a
‘class revolt’. However, perceptions radically changed once the full horrors of mutiny became
apparent as mass graves were discovered and the brutal nature of the mutiny came to light.
A shocked public slowly began to accept that what they initially thought was a mutiny was in
actual fact a massacre69.
Many security analysts, including former generals declined to call the massacre at
Pilkhana ‘a mere mutiny,’ hence giving support to a conspiracy. It was suggested that a
particular group were motivated to kill senior army officers serving in the BDR at the forces
headquarters while they celebrated Bangladesh Rifles Week70. Some survivors stated it was
a ‘planned killing’ intended at ‘crippling’ the army and the BDR. Others like army doctor Lt.
Colonel Abdus Salam claimed that only a minority of mutineers were actually involved in the
killings. This was also suggested by the national probe which stated that only a core faction
of BDR soldiers were aware of the plans to kill officers, whereas the rest of the mutineers
thought the officers would be used as leverage in negotiations with the government71. Lt.
Colonel Shams, a survivor of the massacre described how he witnessed weapons being
unloaded from a grey pick-up truck while he was hiding inside Pilkhana. Several other
sources indicated that many unidentified assailants wearing BDR uniforms were present
inside the barracks during the massacre.
As critics had pointed out the probe began in unpromising circumstances. Darbar
Hall where the massacre allegedly started was cleaned up, blood stains had been washed
away and the chairs were neatly stacked by the evening of 27 February72. This was an
example of the wilful destruction of crucial forensic evidence. In addition, the probe revealed
several anomalies that did not correspond with the mutiny. Surveillance video footage
showed unknown personnel in BDR uniforms inside Pilkhana during the mutiny73. Who were
these unidentified people? The army, navy and fire service recovered a huge cache of
firearms including; light-machine guns, sub-machine guns (including belts), rifles, pistols,
ammunition, 24 grenades, 16 walky-talkies and 2 binoculars. On this discovery Major Awal
stated, ‘The two binoculars recovered in a search really confused us as these are used by
neither the army, BDR and police nor any other government agencies in the country’. He
further added, ‘The SMGs recovered are used by BDR but the belts are not, which is another
mystery to us’74. What also puzzled investigators was the mysterious appearance of two
Chinese nationals, Tang Yunpeng, 30, and Xang Zhaoua, 28, who were rescued from
Pilkhana just before the mutiny ended75. The reason to their presence inside Pilkhana has
yet to be established.
The government investigation committee claimed that many of the key players that
had a direct role in the initial planning stage of the BDR mutiny were members of Rifle
Battalion 44. Mutineers from Rifle Battalion 44 captured the Central Quarter Guard at 8.30
69
Syeed Ahmed, ‘Chronicle of tragedy and the pendulum of sentiment,’ Forum, The Daily Star, Vol. 4, No. 4
(April 2009). http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=82576
70
‘Hasina seeks US help to probe BDR conspiracy,’ The Hindu, (2 March 2009).
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-03-02/india/28049672_1_bdr-soldiers-bdr-men-bdr-
headquarters
71
72
73
‘Video footage shows outsiders in uniform,’ The Daily Star, (4 March 2009).
74
Kailash Sarkar & Shaheen Mollah, ‘Some seizures puzzle army,’ The Daily Star, (3 March 2009).
75
Ibid.
am on the first day of the mutiny76. It went onto mention that four officers of Rifle Battalion
44, including Major Mahbub, Major Ishtiaq and Lt. Colonel Shams survived the mutiny, which
could have been coincidental, but required further investigation to establish if this was
connected to the mutiny77. It is also important to note that all of the offices and private
vehicles of the BDR officers were ransacked except for Rifle Battalion 44. Furthermore, Lt.
Colonel Shams was the only officer of Rifle Battalion 44 who was taken into custody by the
mutineers and remained unharmed while detained at Subedar Siraz’s house for two days.
The role of Rifle Battalion 44 including that of its captain in the mutiny was suspicious to say
the least and required further investigation.
Thousands of mutineers managed to flee the barracks and took with them a large
cache of automatic weapons, ammunition and explosives which may never be recovered.
This happened on the first night of the mutiny under the cover of darkness despite the
barracks being cordoned off by RAB and DMP. In the great scheme of things this has to go
down as the second major failure after the intelligence debacle. Inside the barracks the
mutineers destroyed a large number of classified documents of national security importance.
Likewise they attempted to access information stored on BDR computers which lead to the
suspicion that external interest groups had a role in the mutiny78. Taking into account some
of the suspicious discoveries at the Pilkhana barracks, there was enough evidence to
suggest outside involvement.
The government brought former policeman Abdul Kahhar Akhand out of retirement
and assigned him as the principal Investigation Officer (IO) of the BDR Massacre Case
lodged at Lalbagh Police Station79. During the previous tenure of the AL government (1996-
2001), Kahhar Akhand was Assistant Superintendent of Criminal Investigations Department
(CID) and was the IO for the Bangabandhu Murder Case and the Prison Killing Case. From
start to finish the trial of the Prison Killing Case was completed after 282 working days. Of
the accused, three junior officers were given the death sentence while 11 of 12 officers (who
are absconding) were given life sentences. However, it is significant to note that 11 of the
accused in the Prison Killing Case had already been given the death penalty for killing
Mujubur Rahman and his family in the Bangabandu Murder Case. While giving his verdict,
Justice Motiur Rahman criticised the IO for conducting a faulty, incompetent and negligent
investigation. For these reasons Justice Rahman could not award capital punishment to the
killers of the four national leaders.
During the investigation the original charge sheet was lost. Prison officers and other
security personnel who were on duty at the time of the killings were not listed as witnesses.
Due to delay, key witness Saifuddin Ahmed could not attend court because of his paralysis.
Commenting on the IOs role in the Prison Killing Case, The Daily Star stated, ‘Investigation
officer Abdul Kahar Akhand blackened the profession of the police by committing crucial and
dangerous flaws in the investigation. All killers in the case could not be tried due to his
farcical investigation into the incident’80. Justice Rahman stated that the IOs flawed
investigation and lack of evidence for the role played by Riasaldar Moslehuddin Khan (who
allegedly led the killing squad) or the identity of the other killers had not been presented to
the court, which meant that the judiciary were denied the opportunity to exemplary punish
the perpetrators. According to the statement of a prison officer, nine army personnel entered
the prison without hindrance. Security personnel stood idle as the murders took place which
suggested the complicity of the prison authorities. However, this aspect of the incident was
76
Ibid.
77
78
Shafqat Munir, ‘The Bangladesh Rifles mutiny,’ Asian Conflicts Reports, Issue 4 (April 2009), Council for
Asian Terrorism Research.
http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/RegionalAnalysis/SouthAsia/AsianConflictsReports.pdf
79
Wasim Bin Habib, ‘2009 tragedy back in mind,’ (Note 54).
80
‘Judge finds no good in AL leaders' depositions,’ The Daily Star, (21 October 2004).
http://archive.thedailystar.net/2004/10/21/d41021011111.htm
not part of the investigation and the judge commented the IO failed to produce both the real
killers and the people who assisted them inside the prison.
It seemed unusual that the government would appoint such a controversial and
incompetent police officer as Kahhar Akhand for the sensitive and highly significant BDR
Massacre Case, especially since he had already been questioned in relation to his efficiency
and expertise by the higher judiciary of Bangladesh. Experts and critics have commented
that the appointment of Kahhar Akhand was an intentional move by certain government
policymakers who have the ulterior motive of suppressing the entire issue. They also believe
the government will try its utmost to interfere and misdirect the investigation as well as insist
on a report that is in line with its narrative. For Kahhar Akhand, as a ‘yes’ man he is taking
the opportunity to lobby for a promotion in the near future. Criminal experts opine that a high
powered investigation committee should have been formed with Noor Mohammed (Inspector
General of Police) who lost his only son-in-law Captain Mazharul Islam in the massacre.
Mohammad would have been far better to be the IO instead of Kahhar Akhand who should
have been removed immediately. With so many inconsistencies and the probe investigations
not wielding any significant results, several conspiracy theories began to take shape.
Rumours as well as speculation fuelled the most popular theories which are:
It was an attempt by anti-AL forces, with or without the help of foreign elements to
destabilise the country by putting the BDR against the army to create a civil war
situation81;
It was an incident that happened with approval from PM Sheikh Hasina to strengthen
her position;
It was a premeditated mutiny financed by terrorist groups and criminal factions,
because their activities were being shut down by the new civilian government82.
Destabilisation theory
Foremost among the leading theories is the theory of destabilisation. Incorporated into this
theory is the suggestion that elements opposed to the AL government were the principal
masterminds that incited the mutiny. By engineering the mutiny the mastermind’s long-term
aim was to create a civil war atmosphere between the army and the BDR in order to cripple
Bangladesh’s defence capabilities and render the country unstable. Several statements
made by government sources suspected the involvement of sinister elements. PM Sheikh
Hasina also subscribed to this view. During an AL meeting in Dhaka she stated:
The aim of the conspirators, who had staged the bloody incidents at BDR headquarters
killing scores of brilliant army officers, was to trigger anarchy and push the country to
the brink of a civil war ... They (mutiny masterminds) still want to set off a civil war83.
PM Sheikh Hasina urged those present at the meeting to remain alert and steadfast
against the perpetrators plot to destroy the country’s democracy, which was only restored
after her party won a landmark general election following two years of state of emergency.
She also renewed her earlier promise to bring the ‘conspirators and killers’ to account even if
it meant the enacting of new law84.
81
Pranab Dhal Samanta, ‘Dhaka mutineers reveal plot to provoke army, topple govt,’ Indian Express, (1 March
2009).
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/dhaka-mutineers-reveal-plot-to-provoke-army-topple-govt/429347/
82
Bhaskar Roy, ‘Bangladesh: Return of the razakaars?’ South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 3080 (3 Mar
2009). http://bangladeshwatchdog.blogspot.co.uk/2009/03/bangladesh-return-of-razakars.html
83
‘BDR mutiny's masterminds wanted to set off civil war,’ Zee News, (8 March 2009).
http://zeenews.india.com/South-Asia/2009-03-08/513484news.html
84
Julfikar Ali Manik & Somini Sengupta, ‘Guard mutiny in Bangladesh ends,’ The New York Times (26 February
2009). http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/world/asia/27bangla.html?ref=sominisengupta&_r=0
Jihadist Involvement
In November 2008, Sheikh Hasina’s son and AL advisor Sajeeb Wazed Joy and Carl
Ciovacco authored a paper titled, ‘Stemming the Rise of Islamic Extremism in Bangladesh,’
published in the Harvard International Review85. In the article Joy argued Bangladesh was
established on secular principles embodied by the AL, and Islamism which was politically
represented by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) and patronised by its senior coalition partner the
BNP was in direct confrontation with secularism. According to Joy, ‘The alliance of anti-
liberationists, JEI, and the BNP has also had direct and indirect involvement with Islamic
fundamentalist groups that masterminded 500 coordinated bombings across Bangladesh in
2005’. Joy accused the Bangladesh Army and paramilitary forces of recruiting thousands of
Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. ‘Islamic extremism is also on the rise in Bangladesh
because of the growing numbers of Islamists in the military’. He further claimed that, ‘By
2006, at the end of the BNP’s reign, madrasas supplied nearly 35 percent of the Army
recruits’. Islamic educational institutions were breeding grounds of terrorism and the security
forces were increasingly being infiltrated by Islamists. In order to stop Bangladesh from
becoming a terrorist haven, both madrasas and recruits from them going into the army had
to be severely restricted. The hypothesis found acceptance with senior AL leaders and
became the AL narrative before the national elections.
Even though the government investigation was supposed to be apolitical, Commerce
Minister, Lt. Colonel Faruk Khan (retd) was tasked to coordinate the probe as its sole political
member. On 13 March Khan issued a statement that ‘Not all BDR men were involved... and
some JMB links have been found’86. The claim pointed towards the possible involvement by
the banned jihadist groups Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-
Islam Bangladesh (HuJI-B). Khan echoed Sajeeb Wazed Joy’s earlier narrative but later
retracted his statements declaring that it was not based on any information from
investigators, but were his personal views. However, this did not stop numerous media
reports and security experts who during and after the mutiny propagated the same narrative.
One security expert suggested the possibility of a terrorist link by saying:
These symbols — the red headscarves the BDR snipers wore, the bayoneting, the
three bullets in the neck, the gouging out of eyes — are not coincidental. They are used
by specific groups87.
In an interview after the 25-26 February mutiny, PM Sheikh Hasina called the mutiny
‘a big conspiracy’ against her agenda to establish a secular democracy in Muslim majority
Bangladesh. She pointed out that among those killed were army officers who led a
crackdown against jihadist groups (JMB and HuJI-B) in Bangladesh. ‘There are many
elements. These terrorist groups are very much active,’ she warned. ‘This incident gives us a
lesson. It can happen again. The conspiracy hasn’t stopped’88. The accusation of JMB and
HuJI-B involvement led to several other rumours as well as finger pointing across the political
divide. It stirred controversy in Bangladesh, especially since it lacked any credible evidence
and many felt it would damage the interests of the Bangladesh Army who are a major
beneficiary of lucrative UN peacekeeping operations. For that reason an attempt was made
to downplay the role of jihadists as the links were not only premature, but also unwise. It was
generally believed that the mutiny was orchestrated by a shadowy group for other reasons
than those put forward by the mutineers.
85
S. Wazed Joy and Carl Ciovacco, ‘Stemming the rise of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh,’ Harvard
International Review, (19 November 2008).
86
‘Bangladesh suspects JMB links to BDR mutiny,’ The Indian Express, (13 March 2009).
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/bangladesh-suspects-jmb-links-to-bdr-mutiny/433798/
87
88
Somini Sengupta, ‘Bangladesh premier faces a grim crucible,’ The New York Times, (13 March 2009).
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/world/asia/14bangla.html?ref=sominisengupta
Acts of violence are not mutually exclusive to Jihadist organisations. In many

incidents the perpetrators belong to mainstream political parties. A case in point is the pre-
hartal (shutdown) violence on 4 June 2004, in which activists of the Jubo League (youth
wing) of the AL set fire to a state run double-decker bus near the Sheraton Hotel burning 11
people alive and seriously injuring many others89. In what was described as the worst ever
pre-hartal violence in Bangladesh the bus arson attack took political violence to a whole new
level. At the time of the incident Jahangir Kabir Nanak was the president of the Jubo League
and Mirza Azam was its general secretary. Throughout the emergency rule period from
2007-08 leading politicians from all parties were taken in for questioning on charges relating
to corruption and illegal activities. Sheikh Selim was taken into RAB custody and was
interrogated by Colonel Gulzar Uddin Ahmed who extracted a detailed confession from him
on the bus arson attack which implicated Kabir Nanak, Mirza Azam and others90. Four years
later on 31 December 2008, police pressed charges against 18 accused which included
Nanak and Azam in relation to the 2004 bus arson attack91. The case was revived in July
2010 after police had appealed to the courts for a reinvestigation. On 8 December 2013, a
Dhaka court cleared Nanak and Azam and 16 other accused of all charges. This in effect
closed the case denying justice for the 11 victims92. According to some sources Colonel
Gulzar would later experience the personal vendetta of Nanak and Azam for implicating them
in the 2004 bus arson attack.
This is not to say jihadist groups have not previously posed a security challenge to the
Bangladesh government. Sheikh Hasina’s most dangerous enemies have been the jihadists,
in particular HuJI-B which has been implicated in at least three assassination attempts on her
life. In May 2004 an assassination attempt was made on Anwar Choudhury (British High
Commissioner in Bangladesh) as he left a holy shrine in the town of Sylhet. On 21 August
2004, Sheikh Hasina narrowly escaped with her life when assassin’s hurled 13 grenades at a
political rally of the AL which killed 24 leaders and activists and injured up to a further 300
people. In January 2005, senior AL politician Shah A.M.S. Kibria and three others were killed
in a grenade attack after Kibria finished addressing a political rally in Sylhet Division. On 17
August 2005, around 500 small home-made bombs scattered over 300 locations in 63 out of
64 districts detonated between 10:30 am and 11:30 am local time, that caused two fatalities
and 50 injuries. On 14 November 2005, two senior assistant judges, Sohel Ahmed and
Jagannath Pandey of Jhalakathi were killed by a member of JMB suicide squad. In the same
month suicide bombers carried out bomb attacks at the district bar library in Gazipur and
Chittagong that left 13 people dead93. Another suicide attack on 1 December 2005 killed one
man and injured 20 people in front of a government office in Gazipur. On 8 December a
suicide attack in front of a cultural organisation office in Netrakona killed 8 people and injured
many more. The bomber rammed his bicycle into a crowd and detonated the bomb.
Several JMB jihadists detained in the aftermath of the bomb blasts of 17 August 2005
confessed to their membership of the Shahid Nasrullah Arafat Brigade,94 a combination of
89
‘25 BRTC buses damaged during alliance rule,’ The Daily Star, (8 June 2004).
http://archive.thedailystar.net/2004/06/08/d40608012020.htm
90
Sheikh Selim confesses setting fire on bus - part 1. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wOnOgnO-NAI
91
‘2004 bus arson attack: CID to launch reinvestigation’.
http://news.priyo.com/story/2010/sep/25/7228-2004-bus-arson-attack-cid-launch-reinvestigation
92
See, ‘Nanak, Azam cleared of 2004 arson charges,’ The Daily Star, (8 December 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/nanak-azam-cleared-of-2004-arson-charges/
‘AL's Nanak, Azam cleared of arson,’ bdnews24.com, (9 December 2013).
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/12/09/al-s-nanak-azam-cleared-of-arson
‘Justice denied to 11 victims,’ The Daily Star, (9 December 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/justice-denied-to-11-victims/
93
Yasinur Rahman, ‘Seven killed in Netrokona in suicide bomb attack, 8 JMB arrest, 4th ld,’ bdnews24.com, (7
December 2005). http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2005/12/07/seven-killed-in-netrokona-in-suicide-
bomb-attack-8-jmb-arrest-4th-ld
94
‘Bomber admits to Aug 17 role,’ The Daily Star, (5 October 2005).
members of JMB and its splinter group Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)95. This
group within the JMB undertakes high risk bomb making operations used in improvised
explosive device attacks and suicide attacks96. Although JMJB took responsibility of the 2005
multiple bombings, on 1 October 2005, Mufti Abdul Hannan (HuJI-B operations commander)
was arrested in Dhaka initially over a case related to the explosion at the Mohakhali bus
terminal on 17 August 2005. However, he was also suspected of facilitating the deadly
grenade attack on the AL rally in 2004 which killed Ivy Rahman - the wife of the late
president of Bangladesh, Zillur Rahman. In 2007 Hannan confessed to his own involvement
in the conspiracy and implicated several senior BNP figures including ministers Altaf Hossain
Choudhury and Ruhul Quddus Talukdar Dulu. In 2011 Mufti Hannan claimed his earlier
confession was in fact extracted under torture and therefore should be invalid in the case
against him97. Hannan has remained in custody since his arrest and is currently on trial for
murder and attempted murder.
Shaykh Abdur Rahman, spiritual and ideological leader of the JMB and JMJB and
brother-in-law of Mirza Azam was a wanted man by the authorities in relation to 20 cases
filed against him and his alleged involvement in 30 deaths. In 2007 Colonel Gulzar served as
Additional Director General of RAB (Intelligence Wing) and was pivotal in the capture Shaykh
Abdur Rahman from a house in Sylhet rented by an AL activist. Gulzar commanded the
operation that had led to the capture of JMJB operations commander Siddiqul Islam, alias
Bangla Bhai. On 30 March 2007, six members of the JMB’s Majlish-e-Shura (highest
decision-making body) were executed by the government. It included its ‘supreme
commander’ Shaykh Abdur Rahman (hanged in Comilla prison) and his second-in-command,
Siddiqul Islam (hanged in Kashimpur prison). The other shura members were; Abdul Awal,
Khaled Saifullah and Ataur Rahman Sunny and suicide squad member Iftekhar Hasan Al-
Mamun. All of them had been found guilty as charged by the Supreme Court of involvement
in the killing of two judges in Jhalakhati in November 2005. A few weeks before their
execution, President Iajuddin Ahmed had rejected the clemency petitions filed by the
convicted jihadists. In February 2009 several JMB jihadists were captured in the town of
Tongi near Dhaka and were paraded in front of the media cameras along with their seized
weapons. One of the arrested individuals, JMB activist Mamunur Rashid picked up a
grenade, pulled out the pin and threw it into a room full of journalists, security personnel, as
well as his fellow activists98. No one was killed but 13 people sustained injuries. However, the
incident highlighted the suicidal tendencies of JMB.
According to reports, some mutineers were looking for Colonel Gulzar and shouted
‘Where is Gulzar99’? Colonel Gulzar had been deputed from RAB in the second week of
February 2009 as the commander of Sylhet sector. It was his first posting in the BDR100.
Colonel Gulzar’s killers possibly tortured him, bayoneted him while alive and in the end
gouged out his eyes and broke his body. Some sources say his horrific death was a result of
his interrogation of Sheikh Selim who came clean on the Jubo League leaders for their role in
the bus arson attack as well as revenge for the execution of Mirza Azam’s brother-in-law,
Shaykh Abdur Rahman. Whatever the truth may be, the loss of counter-terrorism expert
Colonel Gulzar has been a severe setback in the fight against militancy and terrorism in
Bangladesh, particularly as he participated actively against jihadists. Despite the fact that the
95
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) is a sister organization of JMB. Led by Siddiqul Islam (also known
as Bangla Bhai) who was executed in 2007
96
‘MB suicide squads mounted attacks on courts,’ The Independent, Dhaka, (3 October 2005).
97
Chaitanya Chandra Halder, ‘August 21 case: Trial hamstrung,’ The Daily Star, (21 August 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/trial-hamstrung/
98
Kailash Sarkar, ‘Handcuffed JMB man blasts grenade at press meet,’ The Daily Star, (21 February 2009).
99
Md. Asadullah Khan, ‘Mutiny or conspiracy?’ The Daily Star, (7 March 2009).
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=78697
100
Shariful Islam, ‘A vacation never came true,’ The Daily Star, (25 February 2010).
BDR were not directly involved in counter-terrorism drives, it played an important role in
deterring terrorist groups from entering Bangladesh when it was not taking bribes. During the
mutiny when the BDR and the Bangladeshi border were in a state of disarray, terrorist
groups could have taken the opportunity to strengthen their organisations.
In examining the possibility that the mutiny was orchestrated by a jihadist organisation
that infiltrated a paramilitary force to initiate an insurrection raises serious question about the
state of Bangladesh’s national security. If jihadist organisations have the ability to coordinate
such considerable action, then recent assessments have underestimated their capabilities in
Bangladesh. While groups like JMB and JMJB have carried out numerous attacks in the
past, none of those attacks have resulted in so many deaths from a single incident.
Furthermore, previous attacks have not been able to target a security institution like the BDR.
Foreign Influence and External Actors

Foreign involvement was suspected in the Pilkhana massacre, particularly by the ISI (Inter-
Services Intelligence) and the Pakistan government over its reluctance to see war criminals
tried over their alleged role in the 1971 Liberation War. Theories emerged from sections of
the Indian media such as the New Delhi based news agency CNN-IBN that the ISI in
collaboration with certain opposition political parties including the JEI were behind the
mutiny. Similar ‘stories’ were also run on the pro-Hindu nationalist Bangla daily Ananda
Bazar Patrika based in Kolkata. The main objective of the mutiny was to upstage the AL
government and destroy internal security and stability of Bangladesh.
Sheikh Hasina’s government arrested leading arms dealer Hafizur Rahman in
connection with the Chittagong Arms Haul Case. Following his arrest, Hafizur Rahman
confessed to his involvement in the arms smuggling case of April 2004 and pointed the
finger at several BNP and Jamaat leaders. On 2 April 2004, police seized ten trucks loaded
with arms at the secured jetty of Chittagong Urea Fertiliser Ltd. The consignment from China
included a wide range of sophisticated firearms including; 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket
launchers, 300 rocket launcher accessories, 2,000 grenade-launching tubes, 6,392
magazines and 1,140,520 rounds of ammunition101. Two cases, one for smuggling firearms
and the other under the Arms Act were filed the following day102. Allegedly the arms seized
were being smuggled for the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) under the direct
supervision of its military commander Paresh Barua who was residing in Dhaka at the time.
In late 2005 the BNP-led coalition government appointed a five member inquiry committee
headed by Omar Farooque (Home Minister) and included, Major General Rezzakul Haider
Chowdhury, Brigadier General Enamur Rahman Chowdhury, Shamsul Islam (Special
Branch), and Faruque Ahmed (CID) to probe the incident. However, the committee findings
were never made public103.
In 2009 two former DGs of the NSI, Major General Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury and
Brigadier General Abdur Rahim were put under house arrest and questioned by CID for their
alleged role in the 2004 Chittagong Arms Haul Case104. According to prosecutors,
Chowdhury and Rahim were complicit in the attempt to smuggle ten truck-loads of arms to
the ULFA. Rahim was the then DG of the NSI while Chowdhury was in charge of counter-
intelligence at the DGFI. Rahim came out of retirement and was appointed to the top NSI
position by the BNP-led coalition government - Chowdhury succeeded him but was
immediately removed once the army introduced emergency rule on 11 January 2007, and
101
‘Unravelling Chittagong arms haul mystery,’ (1 October 2010).
http://policyresearchgroup.com/regional_weekly/hot_topics/unravelling_chittagong_arms_haul_mystery.
html
102
‘Ctg arms haul cases: Cross-examinations of PWs end,’ The Daily Star, (11 October 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/cross-examinations-of-pws-end/
103
Abdullah Al Mahmud, ‘Ctg arms haul: 4-party bigwigs were in plot, accused say,’ The Daily Star, (5 March
2009). http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=78433
104
‘Two former NSI DGs held over 10-truck arms haul,’ The Financial Express, Dhaka, (17 May 2009).
was later sent into retirement from the army105. The number of accused put on trial in two
cases is 50 for smuggling firearms and 52 for violating the Arms Act106. On 30 January 2014,
a Chittagong court handed the death penalty to 14 accused, including former ministers
Lutfozzaman Babar and Motiur Rahman Nizami and former senior intelligence officials for
their role in the 2004 Chittagong Arms Haul Case. Absconding ULFA military commander
Paresh Barua is also among those condemned to death107.
A confidential report prepared by South Block claims shipping magnate and six-time
MP and BNP leader Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury played a central role in aiding and
abetting BDR mutineers. Chowdhury is alleged to have provided funds to the tune of several
millions of taka108. He is suspected to have paid Tk. 40 crore to Major General Fazlur
Rahman (former DG of BDR) and employed him as a front man to instigate BDR soldiers.
Rahman in turn is said to have paid Tk. 5 crore to four DADs of BDR. While 400 rank and file
were paid Tk. 5 lakh and the key among them were paid Tk. 50 lakh each109. It was also
claimed that funds and weapons had come from outside well before the mutiny actually
started. The report further claims:
both Indian and some international intelligence agencies have received indisputable
proof of the involvement of Salahuddin Chowdhury—an influential BNP MP and a long
standing Inter-Services Intelligence agent of influence in Bangladesh with a strong
110
criminal mafia nexus—in the entire episode .
Chowdhury has always denied all alleged charges of his involvement in the
Chittagong Arms Haul Case. However, he was arrested on 16 December 2010, in
connection with his alleged involvement in torching a car earlier on 26 June which caused
the death of one person111. On 19 December following a warrant issued by Tribunal-1 of the
International Crimes Tribunals (ICT), Chowdhury was arrested in connection with crimes
against humanity. He was indicted on 4 April 2012, on 23 charges including genocide,
abduction, confinement, torture, looting and setting fire to houses he allegedly committed
during the 1971 Liberation War at different locations in Chittagong112. On 1 October 2013,
Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury was found guilty on 9 of the 23 charges brought against him
at the ICT and was given the death sentence in controversial circumstances as a draft copy
of the verdict circulated on the internet prior to the judgement. As a result his defence team
and family claimed his trial had been politically motivated by the AL-led government.
Before coming to power, the AL-led Grand Alliance in its election manifesto promised
to establish the ICT to prosecute war criminals responsible for the torture and murder of
hundreds of thousands of Bengali’s during 1971. Once in power the AL government
implemented its manifesto promise and passed a unanimous resolution in parliament for the
proposed trial of ‘war criminals’ which happened to include leading JEI leaders as well as a
105
Ashfaq Wares Khan, ‘B’desh arrests 2 former intelligence chiefs,’ The Tribune, (17 May 2009).
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090517/world.htm#5
106
‘Babar, four others protest innocence,’ The Daily Star, (31 October 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/babar-four-others-protest-innocence/
107
M. Abul Kalam Azad, Dwaipayan Barua & Tuhin Shubhra Adhikary, ‘Gallows for 14,’ The Daily Star, (31
January 2014). http://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/gallows-for-14-9213
108
Sumit Sen, ‘Jittery Pak instigated Bangla mutiny?’ The Times of India, (16 March 2009).
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/South-Asia/Jittery-Pak-instigated-Bangla-
mutiny/articleshow/4269149.cms
109
Saurabh Shukla, ‘More than a mutiny: ISI plot suspected,’ India Today, (5 March 2009).
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/content_mail.php?option=com_content&name=print&id=31397
110
Ibid.
111
Udisa Islam, ‘Salman, Justice Hasnain SQ Chy witness list,’ (28 June 2013).
http://www.dhakatribune.com/law-amp-rights/2013/jun/28/salman-justice-hasnain-sq-chy-witness-list
112
Udisa Islam, ‘SQ Chy claims he was active in anti-Ayub movement,’ (1 July 2013).
http://www.dhakatribune.com/law-amp-rights/2013/jul/01/sq-chy-claims-he-was-active-anti-ayub-
movement
few from the BNP. Nine days prior to the mutiny Pakistan president Asif Ali Zardari sent
Special Envoy Zia Ispahani to Dhaka in an effort to appeal to PM Sheikh Hasina and Dipu
Moni (Foreign Minister) not to open war crimes cases. As expected the request did not find
much favour with the Bangladesh PM113. Ispahani made it clear to the PM that any attempt
to reopen war crimes cases would negatively impact relations between the two countries. He
said, ‘Pakistan wants to help Bangladesh now, so they should not go ahead with their
resolution’114. A day later Ispahani met with Khaleda Zia and allegedly advised her to stay
away from her barracks residence during 25-26 February. It was also reported that JEI
leaders Motiur Rahman Nizami and Ali Ahsan Mojaheed were also missing from their
residences on both of those days.
War crimes are a highly emotional issue for Bangladeshi’s; hence it was strange that
the Pakistan government sent a Special Envoy to intercede in an internal matter of a
sovereign nation. More to the point Zardari had far more important issues to deal with such
as Afghanistan; terrorism, US drone strikes in Pakistan and the Mumbai terrorist attacks.
Given that Zardari had his hands full at the time, the groups most likely to have an interest in
the ICT would be the ISI and the Pakistan Army. This is because after the end of the
Liberation War, Sector Commanders Forum prepared a list of 195 Pakistan Army officers
directly involved in the murder and rape of civilians in 1971. Although no Pakistani military
personnel were ever prosecuted for war crimes, if the ICT convicted alleged war criminals
that collaborated with the Pakistan Army as well as the killers of Sheikh Mujib, then anti-
Pakistan sentiments could intensify throughout Bangladesh. If human rights abuses of 1971
came to the forefront then it could seriously impact the prestige of the Pakistan Army.
Furthermore, conviction of war criminals would severely impact alleged ISI ‘allies’ like the
BNP and JEI.
On the other hand counter claims were made by Islamist party JEI which alleged that
the mutiny was orchestrated by India. During a party programme JEI leader Motiur Rahman
Nizami asked, ‘How come the Indian media channel Chabbish Ganta (24 Hours) ran the
news of the BDR carnage citing their intelligence sources before the local TV stations could
cover it?’ He claimed the ‘killing mission’ was executed from the ‘intelligence headquarters’
which was ‘closely monitoring’ events on the ground. According to Nizami the entire motive
of the mutiny was to destroy the border guards as a force and significantly weaken the army
by killing a huge number of its seconded officers, seriously impacting national security and
defence. He added, ‘It needs to be seen whose interest could be behind the incident’. He
criticised how the government handled the entire crisis and claimed the massacre ‘could
have been averted without firing a single shot if the Artillery Brigade was given the
responsibility’115. JEI leader Abdur Razzak echoed similar claims that the mutiny was a
conspiracy designed to ‘weaken the army, to weaken the state ... The government was not in
charge ... This was an army problem. The army should have solved it in their wisdom’. JEI
propagated the narrative that the most likely perpetrators behind the chaos were a faction
that had it in their interest to make Bangladesh a client state of India116. JEI demanded the
government form an investigation committee with representatives from law enforcement
agencies, defence, the judiciary and all parliamentary parties in order to conduct an objective
inquiry to unearth the real causes behind the BDR mutiny117.
113
Sumit Sen, ‘Jittery Pak instigated Bangla mutiny?’ (Note 108).
114
‘Back to 1971 war: Hand of Pak friends seen in mutiny,’ The Telegraph, Kolkata, (28 February 2009).
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090228/jsp/frontpage/story_10604594.jsp
115
‘India carried mutiny mayhem: Nizami’ (8 March 2009). http://www.independent-
bangladesh.com/2009030810661/country/india-carried-mutiny-mayhem-nizami.html
Also see: ‘Islamists blame India on Bangladesh mutiny,’ Zee News, (9 March 2009).
http://zeenews.india.com/South-Asia/2009-03-09/513607news.html
116
‘Forces want to turn Bangladesh a vassal state: Says Jamaat,’ The Daily Star, (1 March 2009).
http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/cache/cached-news-details-77956.html
117
‘Current probe body not acceptable: Nizami’ (2 March 2009).
http://www.snnbd.com/newsdetails.php?cat_id=0.03&id=12029#.UeaAqNJ7cUg
Examining the possibility that the mutiny was orchestrated by external actors, in
particular the ISI has many arguments against it. If the mutiny was directed against Sheikh
Hasina and CAS General Moeen, then it seems bizarre it did not take place half a day earlier
when the PM was at Pilkhana barracks on a scheduled visit for the BDR parade. Indian
media claimed the plan was unsuccessful because due to a lack of coordination. The
conspirators were unable to smuggle the necessary ammunition into Pilkhana in time for the
PM’s visit on 24 February. The obvious question to ask is why would the ISI plot to
destabilise the Bangladesh government? Indian allegations centre on claims that Pakistan
takes any opportunity to support anti-Indian insurgent and terrorist groups in order to create
instability in Indian territory, hence ISI involvement in the Chittagong Arms Haul Case.
Pakistan also favours a BNP-led government compared to an AL government which is more
moderate in outlook and has less tolerance toward jihadist groups118. According to Indian
claims the ISI exploited the grievances of BDR and exacerbated the conspiracy as it feared
that many of its key assets in Bangladesh could be compromised if tried for war crimes
committed in 1971.
AL Involvement
The theory that the mutiny was a political stunt carried out by the AL to strengthen its
political position on the surface sounds too farfetched. Firstly, accepting the fact that the AL
was evil and conniving enough to orchestrate such a sadistic massacre simply for political
gains doesn’t make sense, particularly since there is no need for it to do so. Secondly, the
AL came into government only two months before the mutiny with the largest majority in the
history of Bangladesh. Moreover, during the mutiny there was no political opposition
mounted against the government by other political parties and in a rare display of solidarity,
rival political parties offered support to the government. Thirdly, to arrange such an elaborate
mutiny would require significant resources, influence, as well as time, which is something the
AL-led government did not have as the CTG rule lasted up until December 2008.
Criminal Elements
Groups such as criminal organisations orchestrating the mutiny in order to trigger off a civil
war seem entirely implausible. Taking into consideration that law and order has actually
deteriorated under the AL-led government, the CTG was far more efficient in maintaining law
and order and keeping crime levels down because of its emergency powers. Moreover, a
potential civil war would have definitely been short-lived since the Bangladesh Army is far
superior in strength, equipment and capabilities to crush any kind of mutiny. Considering the
mutiny was against BDR officers, if the aim was to win in a civil war and take over the
country, then the mutineers would have no chance of success as they would have no
officers to lead them and were only confined inside Pilkhana.
V. RELATIONS WITH INDIA

The Indian government position on the mutiny was that it was entirely an internal matter
which required no interference from India. According to Sreeradha Datta, from the Institute of
Defence Studies and Analysis, ‘India doesn’t want to meddle in Bangladesh’s internal affairs,
though it risks being affected by them’. Furthermore, ‘while India may be sympathetic to what
is happening with Bangladesh’s internal crisis, it will not be dictated (to on) what action it
should be taking’119. At the request of the Bangladesh government the Indian government
prevented fleeing BDR mutineers from crossing into its territory. It was important that the
Indian government cooperated since it is well documented that the Indo-Bangladesh border
is permeable and is frequently crossed at will by arms and narcotics smugglers, terrorist and
insurgency groups as well as illegal immigrants. During the BDR mutiny security of the
international border of Bangladesh with its neighbours India and Myanmar was
118
Saurabh Shukla, ‘More than a mutiny: ISI plot suspected,’ (Note 109).
119
Sujon Dutta, ‘Dhaka disarm request to Delhi: Eyes on mutineers on the run,’ The Telegraph, Kolkata (1
March 2009). http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090301/jsp/frontpage/story_10608500.jsp
compromised. The BDR was only partially functioning at the time and did not have the
capacity to check all inbound and outbound infiltration through the Bangladesh border. For a
short period of time the unguarded border was potentially at the mercy of jihadists and
armed ethnic insurgent groups.
In recent times the Indian armed forces have accused the Bangladesh military of
having links with anti-Indian insurgents and terrorists groups like ULFA, HUJI and Al Qaeda.
Further accusations have been made linking high-ranking army officers, intelligence officials
and politicians that patronise anti-Indian groups in an effort to destabilise territory inside
India. Counter claims have been made by the Bangladesh Army that the Indian government
sponsors and harbours insurgents in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, particularly in the
Khagarchari area which has approximately 23 Shanti Bahini training camps. Historically
there has been no love lost between the Bangladesh government and the Indian intelligence
agencies, especially since the latter has always wanted the CHT to be annexed with Tripura;
however this feat never materialised even though India helped Bangladesh attain her
freedom. The animosity between the two armed forces manifested itself in April 2001 when
the two forces clashed over a border dispute in Padua and Roumari which left 16 BSF and 3
BDR personnel dead. In relation to the incident, Bangladesh Foreign Secretary, Syed
Muazzem Ali stated:
The border force has standing responsibility of protecting the frontier from any external
attacks. BDR are there to repulse any attack on the country’s frontier. There are some
situations when decisions are taken instantly. It does not require to send file to Dhaka,
get order and then start firing. It is the charter duty of BDR to protect our frontier from
any attack on our border. If question of war comes, then the orders from top level may
come120.
Even though the primary concern for India after the mutiny was border security, given
the enmity between the BSF and BDR, the lack of cooperation and interdependence
between the two forces, a partially functional BDR did not significantly affect Indian border
security.
VI. BDR TRIAL

Nearly five years after the Pilkhana massacre, Bangladesh’s biggest ever criminal trial which
lasted approximately 26 months came to an end. On 5 November 2013, a trial court
delivered its verdict for 846 accused who were prosecuted for killing 74 people. 151 former
BDR soldiers, of which 12 are still on the run and one civilian, Zakir Hossain son of Kanchan
Ali were handed the death penalty for their role in the massacre. Legal experts commented
that the sentencing was unprecedented in the recent history of South Asia. ‘After the sepoy
revolution in 1857, a few thousand sepoys were hanged for mutiny during the British period.
Since then such sentencing has not been seen in this subcontinent,’ said noted jurist
Shahdeen Malik121. A further 161 people including ex-BNP MP Nasiruddin Ahmed Pintu and
ward-level AL leader Torab Ali were sentenced to life imprisonment for their involvement in
the carnage. The court acquitted the remaining 277 of the accused; however, none of them,
except for one civilian will be released from prison as they are also accused in another case
filed under the Explosive Substances Act in connection with the mutiny. The number of
accused in that case is 808.
A criminal case was filed after the 2009 mutiny at Lalbagh Police Station for murder,
looting, arson and sedition which was later transferred to New Market Police Station122.
During primary investigations CID arrested a total of 2,307 people in connection with the
120
Bahukutumbi Raman, ‘Carnage of Bangladesh Army officers’ (Note 60).
121
Shariful Islam, Chaitanya Chandra Haldar & Wasim Bin Habib, ‘152 to walk gallows,’ The Daily Star, (6
November 2013). http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/152-to-walk-gallows/
122
‘BDR carnage verdict Oct 30,’ The Daily Star, (20 October 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/bdr-carnage-verdict-oct-30/
mutiny. 2,282 were taken into custody from which 543 gave confessional statements. Initially
there was pressure from the army to try the perpetrators of the crime under the Army Act-
1952. However, BDR mutineers could not be tried under the Army Act because clause 2
clearly defined who could be brought to trial under this act. This did not include the BDR
which are a paramilitary force. The scope of the act under clause 5 cannot have any
retrospect application but could be extended through an amendment. Under the Bangladesh
Rifles Order-1972 the minimum penalty for mutiny was 4 months in prison and a maximum
penalty of seven years. This law primarily dealt with issues such as disobeying orders,
unlawful possession of firearms or the failure to report to duty. However, in 2010 the
government passed the Border Guard Bangladesh Act-2010 which set death as the
maximum penalty for mutiny.
On 5 January 2011, the court took into cognisance the charges of the killing case and
on 10 August framed charges against 850 accused which included the 4 that have died in
custody, 23 civilians and 20 who are on the run123. The government favoured a two pronged
approach that was principally put forward by the chief prosecutor to try the mutiny under the
Bangladesh Rifles Order-1972 and to try the murders and other serious crimes separately in
civilian courts under Penal Code-1860. Given the go ahead by the Supreme Court trial
proceedings commenced on 24 August 2011. The proposed trial raised many questions
regarding its fairness. At the time there was a sense of injustice among the family members
of the accused. During the trials the prosecution charged the accused of conspiring to stage
the mutiny. They disobeyed orders of the then DG following a gunshot from outside and fled
the Darbar Hall leaving the officers at the mercy of the mutineers. The accused were either
complicit in the mutiny or assisted the mutineers to execute their plans while some were just
onlookers as mutineers rampaged through the barracks, killing, burning and looting.
Many of the accused were not even aware of the exact charges or evidence against
them. Some did not even hire a lawyer and were not aware this could be done at the
government’s expense. From their arrest in February 2009 up until December 2010, the
accused in the mutiny cases were not allowed any legal consultations124. The verdict for
17,306 soldiers, majority of them rank and file accused of lesser crimes were handed down
by 11 special courts and 60 summary trial courts lead by commanding officers from various
BGB units. ‘Of the convicts, 9,019 were either dismissed or sent on forced retirement’, stated
Major General Aziz Ahmed (Director General BGB) in a recent interview125. The remaining
8,287 convicts were either sentenced to various jail terms, demoted, or were withheld from
promotion, but most of them, however, retained their jobs. The reason behind the huge
number of convictions was because all the soldiers from any given unit were tried together;
this was regardless of how many were actually accused from a particular unit.
Not only have human rights groups expressed concern over the government’s
passing of the Border Guard Bangladesh Act-2010 which sets death as the maximum
penalty for mutiny, but also over the deaths of at least 78 BDR soldiers accused of mutiny.
To date these deaths remain a mystery as explanations given are either ‘heart attack’ or
suicide, despite multiple physical injury marks on the bodies126. Allegations were rife that
detained suspects were brutally tortured during interrogation. Some suspects were the victim
of custodial killing that involved the army, RAB and various government agency
personnel127. Torture is routinely used by security forces in Bangladesh,128 in particular by
123
‘Verdict Oct 30,’ The Daily Star, (21 October 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/verdict-oct-30/
‘The fear never leaves me,’ torture, custodial deaths, and unfair trials after the 2009 mutiny of the
Bangladesh Rifles, Human Rights Watch, (4 July 2012), pp. 7-8.
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh0712ForUpload.pdf
125
Shariful Islam, ‘Virtual death of a force,’ The Daily Star, (6 November 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/virtual-death-of-a-force/
126
M. Rahman, ‘78 deaths in detention shrouded in questions,’ The Daily Star, (6 November 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/78-deaths-in-detention-shrouded-in-questions/
127
‘The fear never leaves me,’ Human Rights Watch, (4 July 2012), p. 6.
RAB and DGFI, even though Bangladesh is a state party to the UN Convention Against
Torture. Despite widespread controversy and repeated demands from human rights bodies
for the government to conduct proper investigations into the deaths, the government settled
the matter by issuing death certificates for BDR suspects129. According to the Home
Secretary CQK Mustaq Ahmed, jail authorities had completed the investigation, hence the
ministry did not have to investigate the incidents or initiate further probes.
According to human rights watchdog, Ain O Sailish Kendra, among the 78 dead, 51
died in 2009, 20 in 2010 and 7 in 2011 at different jails or while on duty. It was reported at
least 10 had committed suicide during that period; however, most of the dead included those
that were accused in the BDR mutiny cases. As early as March 2009 a significant number of
bodies of those that died in custody had injury marks, verified by police inquest reports,
doctors and morgue sources that spoke in anonymity as well as the accounts given by family
members130. For instance, DAD Mohammad Abdul Rahim was arrested straight after he left
PM Sheikh Hasina’s residence following negotiations on the first day of the mutiny in 2009.
His family allege he was tortured in custody by security forces. Rahim had been in Dhaka
Central Jail from March 2009 up until his death in custody on 29 July 2010. The post-mortem
report and the police investigation concluded he had died of a heart attack; however the final
police report has not been made public. An Ain-O-Sailish Kendra observer, who saw
Rahim’s body, said it looked like he weighed around 40 kilograms and had apparent torture
marks on it. Others like Havilder Kazi Saidur Rahman was taken to Dhaka Medical College
Hospital with injury marks over his body where doctors declared him dead on 16 April 2009.
Earlier Lance Naik Mobarak Hossain was taken to the same hospital from Pilkhana barracks
with multiple bruises all over his body and was also declared dead on 23 March 2009. In
most of the custodial death cases the BGB authorities issued press releases stating
‘irreversible cardio-respiratory failure due to acute MI type-3 or ‘cardio-respiratory failure due
to acute myocardial infarction and hypertension’ were behind the deaths. Unless the
authorities put an end to torture and custodial deaths as well as release detailed
explanations for each death, Bangladesh remains a long way from being a country governed
by the rule of law.
The law took its course and gave its verdict on the BDR case. Affected by the
outcome were the families of the victims who felt justice was done and the condemned
individuals and their families who felt aggrieved by the punishment awarded. Many of the
widows were present inside the courtroom as the verdict was being delivered, such as
Nusrat Jahan, the widow of Lt. Colonel Abu Musa Md Ayub Kaiser, Naznin Noor, widow of
Colonel Kazi Emdadul Haque who later talked to reporters and stated the court did not
identify which convict killed which officer. The aggrieved widows said they did not want to
comment on the verdict yet, since the judgement was not final and could be challenged at
the Appellate division of the Supreme Court. ‘We have looked to the state and the state has
done its job,’ said Nehreen Ferdousi, widow of Colonel Mojibul Haque who was inside the
barracks when the carnage took place131. ‘We have heard the judgment after about five
years. We will now wait patiently for the execution of the verdict. Once that is done, we will
get some relief,’ said Nehreen. She like the other wives wanted to know the real reason
behind the mutiny and observed ‘What could have caused such sheer brutality is still
128
For a good report into the torture allegations and extrajudicial killings see:
‘Crossfire: Continued human rights abuses by Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion,’ Human Rights Watch,
(10 May 2011). http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/05/10/crossfire-0
129
M. Rahman, ‘78 deaths in detention shrouded in questions’ (Note 126).
130
‘Bangladesh: End custodial deaths of massacre suspects,’ Human Rights Watch News Release, (24 April
2009). http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/24/bangladesh-end-custodial-deaths-massacre-suspects
‘Border guard dies in custody in Bangladesh,’ Amnesty International News Release, (27 March 2009).
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/border-guards-die-custody-bangladesh-20090327
131
Tamanna Khan, ‘Relief only after verdict execution,’ The Daily Star, (6 November 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/relief-only-after-verdict-execution/
unknown to us’132. The matter of the mutiny has yet to be clarified let alone sealed following
the verdict of the court. Many aspects of the massacre remain in the dark and need to come
to light in the interests of Bangladesh’s security and to prevent such a heinous crime from
ever happening again. As many others have noted, there is nothing to rejoice about the
verdict, especially since it portrays Bangladesh as a blood thirsty nation only seeking after
vengeance.
According to Attorney General Mahbubey Alam and Kurshid Alam Khan, editor of
Dhaka Law Report, it can take up to three years to execute the death sentences of those
convicted in the BDR carnage case. This is because the convicts can appeal the verdict and
challenge their convictions. The Supreme Court authorities will have to prepare paper books
on the appeals which contain the entire records of the case including all relevant documents,
statements and evidence cited before the trial court. Law experts opine this itself could take
at least six months to prepare the paper books via the Bangladesh Government Press133.
Whatever the length of time needed to execute the death sentences, the judicial process
itself did not provide a detailed explanation into the real reasons of how and why an incident
of such magnitude came into being. Although the judgement acknowledged certain issues as
being precursors to the massacre, including BDR grievances and intelligence failures, it
remains doubtful whether this is actually the entire story134. One thing is certain, it is next to
impossible that two district level politicians could have instigated such an event of that
magnitude.
Criticism of verdict
Bangladesh is a state party signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which contains a legal framework to conduct fair trials. It requires Bangladesh to
comply with international legal obligations such as: inform the accused in detail in regard to
the charges, allow them sufficient time to prepare a defence and let them have a counsel of
their choice. In mass trials like that of the BDR carnage case the legal obligations may
perhaps be more difficult to adhere to, but to ensure justice for the victims and survivors the
accused have to be given fair trials in both civilian and military courts. In addition, Article 15
of the UN Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, requires Bangladesh to ensure that any evidence obtained under torture is
inadmissible under international human rights law135.
The nature of the trial and the outcome of the verdict in the BDR carnage case have
both been criticised by the UN and human rights groups. Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights expressed deep concern over the death sentences for 152 people
claiming the trial fell short of international human rights standards. In a statement she said:
The crimes committed during the mutiny were utterly reprehensible and heinous, and
my sympathies are with the grieving families, but justice will not be achieved by
conducting mass trials of hundreds of individuals, torturing suspects in custody and
sentencing them to death after trials that failed to meet the most fundamental standards
of due process.
The perpetrators of the crimes must be held accountable in compliance with the laws of
Bangladesh and the country’s international obligations, including those pertaining to fair
trial standards, as laid down in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
132
Ibid.
133
Ashutosh Sarkar, ‘Next legal steps to take 3 years,’ The Daily Star, (6 November 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/next-legal-steps-to-take-3-years/
134
Editorial, ‘learning from the BDR mutiny,’ Dhaka Tribune, (7 November 2013).
http://www.dhakatribune.com/editorial/2013/nov/06/learning-bdr-mutiny
135
Statement made as a result of torture can only be used as evidence against someone accused of having
committed torture.
which Bangladesh ratified in 2000. The trial of these 847 suspects has been rife with
136
procedural irregularities, including the lack of adequate and timely access to lawyers .
Pillay called for an independent and thorough investigation into allegations of human
rights abuses, particularly custodial torture and deaths. She also expressed concerns in
regard to the conduct of the ICT saying, ‘The ICT should be a very important means to tackle
impunity for the mass atrocities committed in 1971, and to provide redress to the victims who
have had a long and difficult road to justice’137. However, she stressed that the proceedings
need to meet the highest standards if they are to reinforce the rule of law in Bangladesh.
Amnesty International in a statement termed the verdict ‘a perversion of justice... which, if
carried out, will only result in 152 more human rights violations’. The death penalty, Amnesty
argues is the ultimate cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment which has not been
proven to be a deterrent. Although those responsible for crimes in the mutiny have to be
brought to justice, it stresses this has to be done within the framework of fair trials:
There is no question that the 2009 mutiny was a brutal series of events that left in its
wake scores of people dead and a traumatised population. It is understandable that the
Bangladeshi authorities want to draw a line under this episode, but to resort to the use of
the death penalty can only compound the suffering.
With these sentences, Bangladesh has squandered an opportunity to reinforce trust in

the rule of law by ensuring the civilian courts deliver justice. Instead, the sentences seem
138
designed to satisfy a desire for cruel revenge .
Though the death penalty will not be able to entirely redress the loss of the traumatised
families of the victims or fill the void in their lives, it will give them some solace. While the
offenders have been punished, it has to be stressed that only under a fair legal framework
will it deliver justice instead of retribution sought by many. It should set an example and
serve as deterrence. In what is a dark episode in Bangladesh’s history, lessons need to be
learnt from the tragedy. However, the verdict has not brought closure to the Pilkhana incident
once and for all. The government cannot be complacent and have to pursue its efforts and
delve deeper into the issues to find out the causative factors of the tragedy and take all the
necessary steps to avoid any repetition in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
The tragic events of 25-26 February 2009 highlighted the state of affairs in the Bangladesh
armed forces and sent shockwaves throughout the country. What started out as a mutiny
ended in the indiscriminate looting and murder of 74 people. The primary aim of the carnage
was to destroy the BDR strength and cohesion as well as damage national security and
weaken Bangladesh’s defence capabilities. Undoubtedly the mutiny diminished the morale of
the Bangladeshi security forces, particularly the army which lost 57 of its officers. It was a
major setback for the BDR as its command structure was completely destroyed.
Furthermore, the army was left with the task to replace 57 highly trained officers that
included a large number of senior officers. The key decision taken by the Bangladesh
government was to disband the BDR and constitute the BGB, even though it included many
soldiers from the BDR. The image of the Bangladesh Army was significantly stained despite
the positive role it plays in UN peacekeeping missions. The mutineers that were responsible
for the carnage engaged in criminal activity as they themselves were not political actors;
hence their punishment should be awarded within a law and order framework. With a loss of
so many lives the mutiny weakened the army’s position making it unlikely it would intervene
136
‘BDR carnage verdict comes under fire,’ The Daily Star, (7 November 2013).
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/amnesty-intl-slams-bdr-trial-verdict/
137
Ibid.
138
Ibid.
in civilian politics in the near future, something it had done during emergency rule under the
CTG when it attempted to introduce political reforms.
It is still unclear as to what the real story behind the carnage is, but each and every
possibility has to be subjected to be verified to try and ascertain the real reasons. Questions
such as why did the BDR soldiers engage in mutiny? Which interest groups supported their
undertaking? What was the aim and outcome of the mutiny? And which interest groups
gained from the deaths of so many officers? These questions need to be thoroughly
investigated and answered. Was it a conspiracy to weaken the army and the government in
the long-term? The national probe report on the BDR mutiny also could not clearly establish
the causes behind the mutiny. The report stated:
The real cause and motive behind the barbaric incident could not be established
beyond doubt. The committee feels that further investigation is required to unearth the
real cause behind the incident. The negative attitude among the general BDR members
towards the army officers, and their discontent over unfulfilled demands may be
identified as the primary cause of the mutiny. Analysis of these demands gives the
impression that such small demands cannot be the main cause of such a heinous
incident. These points have been used to influence the general BDR soldiers. The main
conspirators may have used these causes to instigate this incident, they themselves
139
working from behind curtains to destabilise the nation.
Due to a lack of reliable information, much has been left to speculation. The verdict in
the BDR case pointed to some causative factors that led to the killings, such as security,
diplomatic, economic, political and social motives behind the massacre. Judge Muhammad
Akhtaruzzaman asserted a possible motive might have been to destroy the morale of army
officials posted in BDR. A diplomatic motive could be to demean Bangladesh and its armed
forces to the international community. ‘When such an incident occurs, it might discourage
foreign investment in the country. Those who had pulled the strings from behind possibly
thought about how the country could be weakened,’ stated the judge140.
To cite those as the main reasons for the incident is taking a simplistic view of the
issue. This would mean BDR soldiers took up arms against their superiors because some of
their administrative demands were not addressed. The brutality displayed during the mutiny
does not correspond with the grievances of BDR soldiers and defies all rational
explanations. Dead bodies were bayoneted, eyes gauged out, thrown off the tops of
buildings, hacked to pieces and dumped into sewers. Mass graves, the numbers killed and
the meticulous way the insurrection was carried out indicate the attack was engineered by a
far more powerful and shadowy group and not by a group of young soldiers disgruntled over
pay and conditions as was initially thought. It is also evident the mutiny was not the
brainchild of BDR personnel of the rank of DADs even though five of the four DADs;
Towhidul Islam, Nasir Uddin Khan, Mirza Habibur Rahman and A. Jalil have been awarded
death sentences. Another accused DAD Abdur Rahim died in jail during the trial141.
The verdict in the BDR carnage case also found many weaknesses in the intelligence
wing (RSU) of BDR as well as with various state intelligence agencies. Lt. Colonel Syed
Kamruzzaman stated on record that the field agents of the intelligence agencies were
complicit in the mutiny. Even if this allegation is false it indicates a huge intelligence failure
which led to the reorganisation of the intelligence agencies. Intelligence failure in a mutiny of
this magnitude has to be seriously questioned especially since it was not a spontaneous act,
but rather a pre-planned conspiracy, therefore how is it possible that the intelligence
agencies were caught unaware? Some have questioned whether the intelligence agencies
139
140
‘Though unclear, motives many,’ (Note 11).
141
Julfikar Ali Manik & Ashif Islam Shaon, ‘Gallows for 152 in BDR carnage case,’ Dhaka Tribune, (6 November
2013).
http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2013/nov/05/death-sentence-154-mutineers-bdr-carnage
were aware of what was going to take place and whether intelligence failure was a possible
explanation for the failure to prevent it.
Whether any of the inquiry reports yield credible results or their findings will be
consistent remain to be seen since to date no inquiry report has been made public. It would
have helped answer some of the unanswered questions that are troubling many families of
the victims. The central one being what could have been the motive behind the carnage?
The longer it stays this way the more suspicious it seems that the government is attempting
to conceal certain truths from the general public. From the start the government should have
set up a Judicial Inquiry Commission to conduct the investigation. The commission ought to
be headed by a retired Supreme Court Justice with the authority to access documents and
interview any person in relation to the case. Once the investigation has been completed its
findings would need to be made public, particularly as the families of the victims have the
right to know the facts, beginning with the events leading up to the mutiny which concluded
with the massacre on 25 February.
There has been persistent controversy in regard to how the mutiny was handled. One
view is that it was dealt with in an indecisive manner. There was too much delay in reacting
to the crisis which gave the perpetrators further opportunity to kill a significant number of
officers. Criticism has also been directed at some of the government’s decisions such as the
general amnesty offered to mutineers without confirming the fate of army officers and their
families. The removal of security forces 3km away from Pilkhana allowed thousands of BDR
mutineers to escape on the night of 25 February. Although it is easy to criticise the
government’s actions in hindsight, at the time it was a catch-22 situation for the government.
Whether military action would have been the logical approach at the time is a question for
debate, however to quarantine the Pilkhana barracks and cordon off the surrounding area is
unquestionable. After isolating the area the security forces should have removed the various
satellite media channel out of the scene. There were also not sufficient arrangements made
to gather the fleeing survivors and to have them debriefed by the authorities.
In short, the truth of what happened may never be known. Similar to Bangladesh’s
other unsolved mysteries such as who ordered the killing of Sheikh Hasina’s father, the
former PM and AL leader during Bangladesh’s Liberation War, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on
15 August 1975. Eighteen members of Hasina’s family were executed. Hasina and her sister
survived as they were both out of the country. Hasina’s nemesis, Khaleda Zia also lives with
mystery and loss. It is not fully known who ordered the 1981 assassination of her husband,
former military ruler Ziaur Rahman. For the interests of justice, corruption allegations have to
be thoroughly investigated and not be buried alongside the dead bodies of BDR officers. If
there was systematic corruption, then it is the responsibility of the government to uproot it. In
the same way, if the corruption allegations are found to be false then the names of the
deceased have to be cleared. By merely sending the accused en masse to prison and some
to the gallows hardly does justice to the victims. There are reasons to believe Towhidul and
his close associates who were at the forefront on that day were actually front men acting on
the instructions of others. The only way to find out who the real masterminds are is to track
the conversations these people had during the 33-hours of carnage. Even though a verdict
has been deliberated in relation to the BDR carnage case, the government needs to conduct
a thorough public investigation to discover the real motives of the mutiny and more
importantly, find the real masterminds behind the carnage and bring them to book.

Massacre at Pilkhana Mutiny of The Bangladesh Rifles

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1 Massacre at Pilkhana: Mutiny of the Bangladesh Rifles

Mutiny of the Bangladesh Rifles

Bangladesh Rifles: A Colourful History ............................................................5

The end of an Ordeal .....................................................................................15

Intelligence Failure .........................................................................................19

Destabilisation Theory ...................................................................................22

Jihadist Involvement ......................................................................................23

Criticism of Verdict .........................................................................................33

Bangladesh Rifles: A Colourful History

Background Events to the Mutiny

II. RECONSTRUCTING THE EPISODE

Meanwhile Sahara Khatun continued negotiations with the mutineers in relation to

The end of an Ordeal

Media and the Mutiny

III. FINDING THE PERPETRATORS

IV. INVESTIGATING THE MUTINY

Acts of violence are not mutually exclusive to Jihadist organisations. In many

Foreign Influence and External Actors

V. RELATIONS WITH INDIA

VI. BDR TRIAL

With these sentences, Bangladesh has squandered an opportunity to reinforce trust in

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