lntroduction:

Who AreWA

How Cognitive Science ReoPens

Central PhilosoPhical Questions

The mind is inherently embodied.

Thought is mostlY unconscious.
Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical'
These are three major findings of cognitive science. More than two millennia
of a priori philosophical speculation about these aspects of reason are over. Be-
cause of these discoveries, philosophy can never be the same again.
'V7hen taken together and considered in detail, these three findings from the
'Western philosophy.
science of the mind are inconsistent with central parts of
They require a thorough rethinking of the most popular current approaches,
namely Anglo-American analytic philosophy and postmodernist philosophy'
This book asks: What would happen if we started with these empirical dis-
coveries about the nature of mind and constructed philosophy anew? The an-
swer is that an empirically responsible phiiosophy would require our culture
to
abandon some of its deepest philosophical assumptions. This book is an exten-
sive study of what many of those changes would be in detail.
Our understanding of what the mind is matters deeply. Our most basic philo-
sophical beliefs are tied inextricably to our view of reason. Reason has been
taken for over two millennia as the defining characteristic of human beings. Rea-
son includes not only our capacity for logical inference, but also our ability to
PrrIrosoPHY IN rHn FLESH

conduct inquirS to solve problems, to evaluate ,

to crrtrcize. to deliberate about
of ourselves, other people,
how we should act, and L ,.u.h an understanding
of feason is therefore a
and the world. A radical change in our understanding
It is surprising to discoveg on
radical change in our ,rrrd.r.tuiding of ourselves.
rationality is not at all what the.west-
the basis of empirical research, that human
be. But it is shocking to discover that we
ern philosophical aruai ion t u, t.ta it to
told us we are'
;;;;.ry dif?erent from what our philosophical traditionhas of reason:
Let us start with the changes in our understanding

has largely held, but arises

Reason is not disembodied, as the tradition
experience. This is not
from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily
justtheinnocuousandobviousclaimthatweneedabodytoreason;
itself
rather,it is the ,.,it.i"g claim that the very Structure of reason
lf or' embodiment. The same neufal and cogni-
comes from the details
tivemechanismsthatallowustoperceiveandmovearoundalsocreate
Thus' to understand rea-
our conceptual systems and modes of reason'
the details of our visual system, our motor
sys-
son we -r].t .rrrd.rstand
tem,andthegeneralmechanismsofneuralbinding.Insummary,reason
is not, in any *uy, utranscendent feature
of the universe or of disem-
by the peculiarities of our
bodied mind. trrrrl"d, it is shaped crucially
remarkaLle details of the neural structure of
our
human bodies, by the
brains,andbythespecificsofoureverydayfunctioningintheworld' use
builds on and makes
o Reason is evolution"'5 i" that abstract reason
forms of p.r..iir"i
of motor inference present in "lower" animals'
"rrd
TheresultisaDarwinismofreason'arationalDarwinism:Reason,
eveninitsmostabstractform,makesuseof'ratherthantranscends'
utterly
is evolutionary
our animal ,r",rr.. The discovery that leason
changesourrelationtootheranimalsandchangesourconceptionof
humanbeingsasuniquelyrational.Reasonisthusnotanessencethat
,.puru,.ror*fro-otheranimals;rather'itplacesusonacontinuum
with them.
..universal" in the transcendent sense; that is, it is not
Reason is not
part of the structure of the-universe'.It is universal'5?I:t-t1'^:iY:lti:
;.;;;tt-"J.rr,*""ullv bv all human beings' \fhat
"t!y::t^l'
the way our minds are em-
shared are the commonalities that exist in
bodied.
n"uro" is not completely conscious, but mostly unconscious'
R;;;." is not por.iy literal, but largely metaphorical and imaginative.
engaged'
Reason is not dispassionate, but emotionally
 W'uo Ann \7n?
This shift in our understanding of reason is of vast proportions, and it entails
a corresponding shift in our understanding of what we are as human beings.
tr-hat we now know about the mind is radically at odds with the major classi-
cal philosophical views of what a person is.
For example, there is no cartesian dualistic person, with a mind separate
:rom and independent of the body, sharing exactly the same disembodied tran-
reason with everyone else, and capable of knowing everything about
'cendent
his or her mind simply by self-reflection. Rather, the mind is inherently embod-
ied, reason is shaped by the bodg and since most thought is unconscious, the
mind cannot be known simply by self-reflection. Empirical study is necessary.
There exists no Kantian radically autonomous person, with absolute free-
dom and a transcendent reason that correctly dictates what is and isn't moral.
Reason, arising from the bodg doesn't transcend the body. what universal as-
pects of reason there are arise from the commonalities of our bodies and brains
and the environments we inhabit. The existence of these universals does not
imply that reason transcends the body. Moreover, since conceptual systems
r-arv significantly, reason is not entirely universal.
.-l!t-.-,. rcasoo-is-shaped".by.the,bodyy-.i+is.not'r"adically-free, be-ca_u.sE.,ghg._p,g_.s.-qi-
ble human conceptual_lls*,+.-s,"_a*rrj,_thepossible".{orms-.qf_fe.asen_are Jimit-e"{. !n
;trdifion;--dfiae tre-ffi+;learned a conceprual system, it is neurally instantiated
in our brains and we are not free to think just anything. Hence, we have no ab-
solute freedom in Kant's sense, no full autonomy. There is no a priori, purely
philosophical basis for a universal concept of morality and no transcendent,
universal pure reason that could give rise to universal moral laws.
_lng gti!131i1_"-pg-rqsq, -fog who-r*n {-ati.o-_n-?Jity-.i.s,econonlc.{arionaliqy;1he
T""il':1,|''9".9f. ytilrtv,*dgst.ttpt.ex:sr."Bea-l..hp.gr-a$. be-rrs-q"-arqsg-trJg_{,the
inost pait, in conscious control of-or eJg1.^9_o;1jciggrly aware of-their rea-
ioning;Ivldtr rjFtheir rea'sbii, besii.;;i; ba;il-il;'i6ua"tfi&-of piototypi:s,
framings, and metaphors. People seldom engage in a form of economic reason
that could maximize utility.
The phenomenological person, who through phenomenological introspection
alone can discover everything there is to know about the mind and the nature of
experience, is a fiction. Although we can have a theory of a vast, rapidly and au-
tomatically operating cognitive unconscious, we have no direct conscious access
to its operation and therefore to most of our thought. Phenomenological reflec-
tion, though valuable in revealing the structure of experience, must be supple-
mented by empirical research into the cognitive unconscious.
There is no poststructuralist person-no completely decentered subject for
rvhom all meaning is arbitrary, totally relative, and purely historically conrin-
 PnrrosoPHY IN rne FLESH

gent, unconstrained by body and brain. fhe- Fiqd !g q.ot m-erely embg*-{-.1911r_!.ut
embodied in such a way th4t our conceptual systgm9 dte* largely upon the
eoffio"ititiei oi our bodies 4nd of the lnvirolments w9 live in.. The rei{.q-1q
sys-tem i,s e11h9r universal oi yid-.:g_:"..,1d
'lctosm"chof b personts conceptual
-tliai
Linguages and culturep. Oui'conCeptuil dysiems bie nijt'totally ?elativb
'
and iot merely a matter of historical contingency, even though a degree of con-
ceptual relativity does exist and even though historical contingency does mat-
ter a great deal. The grounding of our conceptual systems in shared
embodiment and bodily experience creates a largely centered self, but not a
monolithic self.
There exists no Fregean person-as posed by analytic philosophy-for
whom thought has been extruded from the body. Jhat -u,-t!.9r9-ig '1_9 r:{p*g_t*
,sonwho-gg glpbodiment.play,s nq lole in mean-ing,.yhose meaning
is purely ob-
jective and defined by the external world, and whose language can fit the
external world with no significant role played by mind, brain, or body. Because
our conceptual systems grow out of our bodies, meaning is grounded in and
through our bodies. Because a vast fange of our concepts are metaphorical,
meaning is not entirely literal and the classical correspondence theory of truth
is false. The correspondence theory holds that statements are true or false ob-
jectivelS depending on how they map directly onto the world-independent of
any human understanding of either the statement or the world. On the con-
trary, truth is mediated by embodied understanding and imagination. That
does not mean that truth is purely subjective or that there is no stable truth.
Rather, our common embodiment allows for common, stable truths.
There is no such thing as a computational person, whose mind is like com-
puter software, able to work on any suitable computer or neural hardware-
whose mind somehow derives meaning from taking meaningless symbols as
input, manipulating them by rule, and giving meaningless symbols as output.
Real people have embodied minds whose conceptual systems arise from, are
shaped by, and are given meaning through living human bodies. The neural
structures of our brains produce conceptual systems and linguistic structures
that cannot be adequately accounted for by formal systems that only manipu-
late symbols.
Finally, there is no Chomskyan person, for whom language is pure syntax,
pure form insulated from and independent of all meaning, context, perception,
emotion, memory, attention, action, and the dynamic nature of communica-
tion. Moreover, human language is not a totally genetic innovation. Rather,
central aspects of language arise evolutionarily from sensory, motor, and other
neural systems that are present in "lower" animals.
 Wuo AnB \fp?
.--:ssical philosophical conceptions of the person have stirred our imagina-
:s and taught us a great deal. But once we understand the importarrce o1 the
::.ii'e unconscious, the embodiment of mind, and metaphorical thought,
: : ' n never go back to a priori philosophizing about mind and larrg,rnge oi to
: , -'sophical ideas of what a person is that are inconsistent with what we are
:-r:l:ng about the mind.
':', e n our new understanding of the mind, the question of what a human
be-
-: :s arises for us anew in the most urgent way.

Arki"g Philosophical Quesrions

Requires Using Fluman Reason
- ..'", are going to ask philosophical questions, we have to remember that we
::: iuman. As human beings, we have no special access to any form of purely
r :.riye or transcendent reason. \we must necessarily use
common human
- ::rrri','e and neural mechanisms. Because most of our thought is unconscious,
, ::rori philosophizing provides no privileged direct access to knowledge of
-: \t\\-n mind and how our experience is constituted.
-: asking philosophical questions, we use a reason shaped by the body, a
: ::.lirive unconscious to which we have no direct access, and metaphorical
::,-:sht of which we are largely unaware. The fact that abstract thought is
:. - sllv metaphorical means that answers to philosophical questions have al-
'.:-,'' been, and always will be, mostly metaphorical. In itself, that is neither
: -'i nor bad. It is simply a fact about the capacities of the human mind. But it
.,'. najor consequences for every aspect of philosophy. Metaphorical thought
, :re principal tool that makes philosophical insight possibie and that con-
:.rrrrS the forms that philosophy can take.
?rrlosophical reflection, uninformed by cognitive science, did not discover,
:,:-.blrsh, and investigate the details of the fundamental aspects of mind we
' ,.. be discussing. some insightful philosophers did notice some of these phe-
: ::iena, but lacked the empirical methodology to establish the validity of
: =se results and to study them in fine detail. Without empirical confirmation,
:-=.e facrs about the mind did not find their way into the philosophical main-
ril:1iT].
T:'rntl)., the cognitive unconscious, the embodiment of mind, and metaphori-
:- :hought require not only a new way of understanding reason and the na-
.--:- of a person. They also require a new understanding of one of the most
- :riron and natural of human activities-asking philosophical questions.

fr*ii{dii'
p'r

PrrIrosoPHY IN rrrB FLESH

What Goes into Asking and

Answering Philosophical Questions?
you
If you,re going to reopen basic philoso.phical issues, here's the minimum
second, you have to use
have to do. First, yor, ,r..d a method of investigation.
that method to understand basic philosophical concepts.
Third, you have to
they are about
that method to previous philosophies to understand what
"ppry
and what makes th.- h"ng toj.th.r. And fourth, .Sfhat
you have to use that method
is morality? How do
to ask the big questions: lcttruil, is to be a person?
we underst""a,n. causal structure of the universe?
And so on.
This book takes a small first step in each of these areas, with the intent of
can be-
giving an overview of the .nt.rprir. of rethinking what philosophy
!o*.1The methods we ,rr. .o-. from cognitive science and cognitive linguis-
tics. \[e discuss these methods in Part I of the book'
ideas' That is,
In Part II, we study the cognitive science of basic philosophical
we use these method, ,o uiulytr- certain basic concepts
that any approach to
mind, the self,
philosophy must address, such as time, events, causation, the
and morality.
perspective of
In part IIi, we begin the study of philosophy itself from the
cognitive science. S. these analytic methods to important moments in
"pply pre-Socratics,
thJ history of philosophy, ct..k metaphysics, including the
plato, and Aristotle; Descartes's theory of mind and Enlightenment faculty psy-
These methods' we ar-
chology; Kant,s moral theory; and analytic philosophy.
g,.re, llad to new and deep insights into these great
intellectual edifices' They
;;lp understand those philosophies and explain whR despite their funda-
"r
mental differences, they huu. .".h seemed intuitive to many
people over the
centuries. \7e also take up issues in contemporary
philosophy, linguistics, and
philosophy, Chom-
the social sciences, in particular, Anglo-American analytic
skyan linguistics, th. rational-actor model used in economics and foreign
"rrd
policy.
in the course of this
FinallS in Part IV we summarize what we have learned
inquiry what human beings are and about the human condition.
"bor,
what emerges is a philosophy close to the bone. A philosophical
perspective
of mind is a philoso-
based on ouf empirical ,rnderstanding of the embodiment
we most basically are
phy in the flesh, a philosophy that takes account of what
and can be.
rou
use
:to
()ut
hod
The Cognitive unconscious
,do

rof
be-
rus-

t is, iving a human life is a philosophical endeavor. Every thought

we have,
hto every decision we make, and every act we perform i, b"r.J.rpon
philo-
rclf, sophical assumptions so numerous we .olldrr't possibly list
them all.
se go around armed with a host of presuppositions about what is real,
what
eof ;ounts as knowledge, how the mind works, who we are, and how
we should
sin a,--t- such questions, which arise out of our daily
concerrr., for- the basic sub_
rics, itrr marter of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemologS philosophy of mind,
psy- ethics, and so on.
: ar- \Ietaphysics' for example, is a fancy name for our concern
with what is real.
h.y Traditional metaphysics asks questions that sound esoteric: \rhat
is essence?
rda- \fhat is causation? \7hat is time? \il/hat is the self? But in everyday terms
there
: the rs nothing esoteric about such questions.
and Take our concern with morality. Does morality consist of a
set of absolute
om- moral laws that come from universal reason? Or is it a cultural
construct? Or
tign neither? Are there unchanging universal moral values? ril/here
does morality
;ome from? Is it part of the essence of what it is to be a human
being? rs there
:this en essence of what it is to be a human being? And what, exactlS
is In essence
anrrray?
ctive causation might appear to be another esoteric topic that only philosopher
a
bso- ;ould care about. But our moral and political commitments and u.tior* pr._
r are suppose implicit views on whether there are social causes
and, if ,o, -h"t ti.y
-,ght be. \Thenever we attribute morar or social responsibility, we are implic_
:tlr assuming the possibility of causation, as well u, ,r.ry specific notions of
n-hat a cause is.
F

IO PHrrosoPHY IN rHe FLESH

Or take the self. Asking about the nature of the self might seem to be the ul-
timate in esoteric metaphysical speculation. But we cannot get through a day
without relying on unconscious conceptions of the internal structure of the
self. Have you taken a good look at yourself recently? Are you trying to find
youf '(tfue self"? Are you in control of yourself? Do you have a hidden self
that you are trying to protect or that is so awful you don't want anyone to
know about it? If you have ever considered any matters of this sort, you have
been relying on unconscious models of what a self is, and you could hardly live
alife of any introspection at all without doing so.
Though we are only occasionally aware of it, we are all metaphysicians-not
in some ivory-tower sense but as part of our everyd ay capacity to make sense
of our experience. It is through our conceptual systems that we are able to
make sense of everyday life, and our everyday metaphysics is embodied in
those conceptual sYstems'

The Cognitive Unconscious

Cognitive science is the scientific discipline that studies conceptual systems. It
is arelatively new discipline, having been founded in the 1,970s. Yet in a short
time it has made startling discoveries.ft has discovered, first of all,.tha1 T9:1 9f
ouf thought is unconscious, not in the Fii:'iidan sense of being repressed, bgl i",
the sense that it operates beneath the level of cognitive awareness, inaccessible
to consclousness and operating too quickly to be focused on.
Consider, for example, all that is going on below the level of conscious
awareness when you are in a conversation. Here is only a small part of what
you are doing, second by second:

Accessing memories relevant to what is being said

Comprehending a stfeam of sound as being language, dividing it into dis-
tinctive phonetic features and segments, identifying phonemes, and
grouping them into morPhemes
Assigning a structufe to the sentence in accord with the vast number of
(
grammatical constructions in your native language d
,rd
Picking out words and giving them meanings appropriate to context
ll
Making semantic and pragmatic sense of the sentences as a whole ;l
Framing what is said in terms relevant to the discussion r
Performing inferences relevant to what is being discussed d
 THB COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS II

Constructing mental images where relevant and inspecting them

Filling in gaps in the discourse
\oticing and interpreting your interlocutor's body language
Anticipating where the conversation is going
Planning what to say in response

Cognitive scientists have shown experimentally that to understand even the

s:nplest utterance, we must perform these and other incredibly complex forms
:r rhought automatically and without noticeable effort below the level of con-
iL-lousness. It is not Te,$ly*thgt_1119._99caqio1a1ly do not lotige these processesl
ir.lber,,h.;;',eJ;?iiswiuj.-r. .onsciooe. i;tjene$ end;od;-"1.-
T-hen we understand all that constitutes the cognitive unconscious, our un-
;c,:scanding of the nature of consciousness is vastly enlarged. Consciousness
so,es way beyond mere awareness of something, beyond the mere experience of
;:alia (the qualitative senses of, for example, pain or color), beyond the
in-areness that you ate aware, and beyond the multiple takes on immediate ex-
r€,:-rence provided by various centers of the brain. Consciousness certainly in-
.l :,-r-es all of the above plus the immeasurably vaster constitutive framework
:rl';ided by the cognitive unconscious, which must be operating for us to be
,i'itr-r.re of anything at all.

\A/hy "Cognitivd' Unconscious?

Tre rerm cognitiue has two very different meanings, which can sometimes cre-
i:r contusion. In cognitive science, the term cognitiue is used for any kind of
ndrltal operation or structure that can be studied in precise terms. Most of
and operations have been found to be unconscious. Thus, vi-
=esf sructures
;u-ai processing falls under the cognitit/e, as does auditory processing. Obvi-
:r;;;.r. neither of these is conscious, since we are not and could not possibly be
s'wre of each of the neural processes involved in the vastly complicated total
m:{e:s that gives rise to conscious visual and auditory experience. Memory
an*: anention fall under the cognitiue,, .PJ,l.gpp9cts of thoqght aq4.t3.1g*3,9-e,
Ji:,nslous or unconscious, are thus cogii'tiue.This includes phonology, gram-
*,,fi: ;o,rceprual systemi;fu -;;;i"G;ffiil;;d a[ unconscious inferences of
Erinr itrrr. \{ental imagerg emotions, and the conception of motor operations
uel,s also been studied from such a cognitive perspective. And neural modeling
rr i:'.- cognitive operation is also part of cognitive science.
12 PnrrosoPHY rN rHB FLESH

Confusion sometimes arises because the term cognitiue is often used in a very
different way in certain philosophical traditions. For philosophers in these tra-
ditions, cognitiue means only conceptual or propositional structure. It also in-
cludes rule-governed operations on such conceptual and propositional
structures. Moreover, cognitiue rye-?.4i1rg_.i9.,.:g:1,a9, try1h-9.ogditigla,l_*e-?glS,
, f1t
is-,.4rqfiUs'd;f d no1 i11t,e1n-ally- in"i't'-ii-'i'iia qf uoai, f"t by
'.J.ifni.
t.
things in the external world. Most of what we will be calling the cognitiui iii-
"tonsei1usis
thus for many philosophers not considered cognitiue at all.
As is the practice in cognitive science, we will use the term cognitiue in the
richest possible sense, to describe any mental operations and structures that are
involved in language, meaning, perception, conceptual systems, and reason.
Because our conceptual systems and our reason arise from our bodies, we will
also use the term cognitiue for aspects of our sensorimotor system that con-
tribute to our abilities to conceptualize and to reason. Since cognitive opera-
tions are largely unconscious, the.!g{e cognitiue unconscious acc,gray{,y.
describes all unconscious mental opglatiols 9,9n9erned with concep-Ly4l.ry-
Gmq rii6a"i"g i"t t.il;;"d i"tg-,rug..

The Hidden Ftand That Shapes Conscious Thought

The very existence of the cognitive unconscious, a fact fundamental to all con-
ceptions of cognitive science, has important implications for the practice of
philosophy. It means that we can have no direct conscious awareness of most
of what goes on in our minds. The idea that pure philosophical reflection can
plumb the depths of human understanding is an illusion..Tradftlona! rnethg_g:
of philosophical analysis alone, even phenomenological introspection, cannot
coiiie close to allowing us to know our own minds.
r There is much to be said for traditional phiiosophical reflection and phe-
nomenological analysis. They can make us aware of many aspects of con-
sciousness and, to a limited extent, can enlarge our capacities for conscious
awareness. Phenomenological reflection even allows us to examine many of the
background prereflective structures that lie beneath our conscious experience.
But neither method can adequately explore the cognitive unconscious-the
realm of thought that is completely and irrevocably inaccessible to direct con-
scious introspection. It is this realm that is the primary focus of cognitive sci-
ence, which allows us to theorize about the cognitive unconscious on the basis
 THs CocNrrrvE UNcoNSCrous T3

lltilililll ifrlllqullllllllllll{lrtlilrri,, : :-.;rJi. horvever, does not allow us direct access to

fllillllllfi$llr' lll1llillr i 1;, -::-
r.rs rs doing as it is doing it.
"illllilllllllmu,,l'.. I' : :.-,: :.p of an enormous iceberg. It is the rule of thumb
I ,'i00ll]llllllllllllllllillllll'" -:rs:s that unconscious thought is 95 percent of all
- .'
itllillliltllilrlillrlllllll]xlllilltr : --- -r rcrious underestimate. Moreover, the 95 percent
t_ filrtl t"
rl$iril|||llll
"
" rs;ious awareness shapeg and structures all conscious
ll''f
'ri1lllilillilr triltulljit , : rnconscious were not there doing this shaping, there

iit,. \ fl ^,, -ht

-^
ilil illlll u -
"tt
.
rrr,l -r" : -r.- :s:ious is vast and intricately structured. It includes not
""'il

illl
til l L- j -: :'.r::;.ognitive operations, but also all our implicit knowl-
fl.iilllllllltlllr

tlllull 1' . -: -:, r-. ::-r in the cognitive unconscious.

-.-. *: aonceptual
i'- ":-. conceptual
onceptual System functions llKe
system rUnCtrOnS "nlcloen nan(l'
like a "hidden hand" tnat
that
r j' :: - ---:;eptualize all aSPELLS
".wcpLuaIILtr dLt of our experience. This hidden hand
aspects Ur
:.r. neraphysics that is built iinto our ordiinary conceptual sys-
" - -::r:i :ri entities that inhabit the cognitive unconscious-abstract en-
-: ':::.;iships, bargains, failures, and lies-that we use in ordinary
,- -: :;rsoning. It thus shapes how we automatically and uncon-
- .:.::ehend what we experience. It constitutes our unreflective com-
": ::
ir - ,'-.::-:ie. let us return to our commonsense understanding of the self.
' ::: ::. common experience of struggling to gain control over ourselves.
';r, : - : :,''' feel this struggle within us, but conceptualize the "struggle" as be-

" - r :r ",,':-n t\\'o distinct parts of our self, each with different values. Some-
* :: '.i. ihink of our "higher" (moral and rational) self struggling to get
- -:: , ri,'er our "lower" (irrational and amoral) self.
'We
-: -onception of the self, in such cases, is fundamentally metaphoric.
- ---.::r:alize ourselves as split into two distinct entities that can be at war,
.-:.,=l rn a struggle for control over our bodily behavior. This metaphoric con-
-:ti:,rrn is rooted deep in our unconscious conceptual systems, so much so that
: ::i.s considerable effort and insight to see how it functions as the basis for
:: :SOoing about ourselves.
>:milarly, when you try to find your "true self," you are using another, usu-
,--,.-unconscious metaphorical conceptualization. There are more than a dozen
t- ;;;h metaphorical conceptions of the self, and we will discuss them below.
i- \\-hen we consciously reason about how to gain mastery over ourselves, or
LS no\\r to protect our vulnerable "inner selfr" or how to find our "true selfr" it is
r4 PHITosoPHY IN rHn FLESH
system that makes such reason- lllmflilljlultr .]ililllilrl

the hidden hand of the unconscious conceptual 'jlilffttlilur,,tlturiuu'i

ing "common sense." 'ill1iiUttrr"

nuru

,.lllM[lll1llIl1r r ']fl

41fi lllllllllllllltliil I L'r'tu

MetaphYsics as N,4etaPhor iJiu$l|lllllllll|riilllll I lrL .,; I

in detail what the hidden ,J@[n,ilfllillllit,ltLi, r:tl

A large part of this book will be devoted to exploring

t,

like and how it shapes not " . illlllilll' lir

hand of our unconscious conceptual system looks ,illiit lllllllllllil,l]t{];r'lli:

onlyeverydaycommon,.,',.,.u,oningbutalsophilosophyitself.\Tewilldis-but
concepts, not only the self llilll0iilh J]liirlltis,,.

cuss some of the most basic of philosophical

mind' and morality' \rhat is startling
,nlllfilllilflllllrrrr'
also time, events, .unr"tion, t"t"tt, the
.,i,

of the uncon-
i. ,fru,, even for these most basic of concepts' the hidden hand
llllllilllll[tti trrttruri,r:

il'
unconscious metaphysics-the meta-
tilitlli'r"i

scious mind uses metaphor to define our

also by philosophers to make
llilillifllllfltrll''l':,lrl
physics used not 1.r.t ty ordinary people' but
counts as an "intuitive" philo- iilldlll "uil rr

sense of these concep,r. A, we wili r"*, -hnt

llllilllL

unconscious metaphors'-In short,

1il$trs( .ili"U"' r
sophical theory is orre that draws upon these
the hidden hand of the cogni-
prriroropni.al iheories are largely the product of
lllllllll|llilfl111[iill

i rfllr'Lrtlt",i,

tive unconscious. ]
for. philosophers to do tulllllllrll' '

Throughout history it has been virtually impossible ll i r'l

most part, philosophers engaged
ll{llllllllllllll ]u

metaphysics without ,.r.h -.tuphors. For the

I

the cogn-itive unconscious a

ir, -"t*g metaphysical claims are choosing from
ontology. That is, using uncon-
set of existing metaphors that have a consistent
seek to make a noncontradictory
scious everyday *ituphorr, philosophers
metaphors; they then take those
choice of conceptual entities iefined by those
entities to be real urrd ,yrt.-atically draw
out the implications of that choice in
that metaphysics'
an aftempt to account fo' ot" experience using
o{ course' supposed to characterize what is
Metaphysi., ln fnlio'ophy is,
real depends
real-literally reai. itr. iror-ry is that such a conception of the
upon unconscious metaphors'

Empirically Responsible Philosophy :

Beyond Naruralized EPistemologY

has defined metaphysics as the
For more than two thousand years, philosophy
is so great that it is
;r,rd, of what is literally real. The weight of that tradition
against the tradition it-
h"rdly likely to change i' th. lace ofempirical evidence
self. Nevertheless tha"t evidence, which comes
from cognitive science, exists and
ru,
THn CocNrrrvE UNcoNSCrous r.5

. ': ) :.ep questions not only about the project of philosophical metaphysics
.' : .' r about the nature of philosophy itself.
- - : - :qhout most of our history, philosophy has seen
itself as being indepen-
: -: : mpirical investigation. It is that aspecr of philosophy that is called into
e

,.: a br-results in cognitive science. Through the study of the cognitive un-
- : - cognitive science has given us a radically new view of how we con-
r'-rS.
: :..,r,:ze our experience and how we think.
.:rrive science-the empirical study of the mind-calls upon us to create
' , -. :mpirically responsible philosophy, a philosophy
consistenr with empir-
. :..;or-eries about the nature of mind. This is not just old-fashioned philos-
: - "raruralized"-making minor adjustments, but basically keeping the old
. rnhical superstructure.
-. r.:ious appreciation of cognitive science requires us to rethink philosophy
: :re beginning, in a way that would put it more in touch with the reality
j..r.onscious, the hidden hand that shapes our conscious thought, our
-r values, our plans, and our actions.
'-..--ss
rve know our cognitive unconscious fully and intimately, we can nei-
-)
:: .'no$, ourselves nor truly understand the basis of our moral judgments,
I
-: : rnscious deliberations, and our philosophy.
I

IE

:s

J
 3
The Emb odied Mind

1 A / +11,'ffi J Jffi. :'" TIJ i:: ; ffi:fi ;l,*:ili

ff #:,"' ff i1
plav in
V V ;J;, ;;;e role that the perceptual and moror svstems

,hupirlgparticularkindsofconcepts:colorconcepts'basic-levelconcepts'
(event-srructuring) concepts.
,puiiut_l.tutions concepts, and aspectual
Anyreasoningyoudousingaconceptrequiresthattheneuralstructuresofthe
the architecture of your brain's neural
brain carry out that ,."ronittgl Accordingly,
what concepts you have and hence the kind of
reasoning
networks determines
that studies which configurations of neu-
;;;; do. Neural-moa.iing is tne rieta that we experience as particular forms of
rons carry out the neural .olprrtutions
neural configurations are learned'
rational thought. frlLro studies how such
of what it means for the mind
Neural *od.ling .;; ;h"* in detail one aspect
of neufons, operating accord-
to be embodi.d, ho* purtl.rrlu, configuratior$
ingtoprinciplesofneuralcomputation'computewhatweexperienceasratio-
nal inferences. At this point the vague
q.r.rrion "can re.a.son make use of the
answerable question "can ra-
sensorimotor system?" becomes the technically
neural architecture used in percep-
tional inferences U. lo-por.d by the same
in Some cases, the answer to
tion or bodily Inou.*.,''1,, we now know that,
thisquestionisyes.Thosecaseswillbediscussedinthischapter.

How the BodY and Brain ShaPe Reason

tradition a theory of faculty
we have inherited from the'western philosophical
of i.uron that is separate from and in-
psychology, in which we have a,,Iactirty"

t6
 THe EMBoDreo MrNo r7

-:rrndent of what we do with our bodies. In particular, reason is seen as inde-

:.nJent of perception and bodily movement. In the \Testern tradition, this au-
. :omous capacity of reason is regarded as what makes us essentially human,
us from all other animals. If reason were not autonomous, that is,
':rnguishing
: rndependent of perception, motion, emotion, and other bodily capacities,
:--=: rhe philosophical demarcation between us and all other animals would be
::s clearly drawn. This view was formulated prior to the emergence of evolution-
.:-. iheory, which shows that human capacities grow out of animal capacities.
Tre evidence from cognitive science shows that classical faculty psychology
: -,,,-rong. There is no such fully autonomous faculty of reason separate from
, ": independent of bodily capacities such as perception and movement. The
:',-eflCe supports, instead, an evolutionary view, in which reason uses and
:: -,r,-s out of such bodily capacities. The result is a radically different view of
, .r:: reason is and therefore of what a human being is. This chapter surveys
rdied?
Lon. It , ::.; of the evidence for the view that reason is fundamentally embodied.
iav in T:e se findings of cognitive science are profoundly disquieting in two re-
aepts, 'r.r:s. First, they tell us that human reason is a form of animal reason, a rea-
- :. :nertricably tied to our bodies and the peculiarities of our brains. Second,
--..- results tell us that our bodies, brains, and interactions with our environ-
of the
neural - =:: provide the mostly unconscious basiis for our everyday metaphysics, th that
ioning :. -rf Seflse of what is real.
rf neu- -:enitive science provides a new and important take on an age-old philo-
,rnS Of
. :::cal problem, the problem of what is real and how we can know it, if we
t.
-.:- i:row it. Our sense of what is real begins with and depends crucially upon
t mind -: iodies, especially our sensorimotor apparatus, which enables us to per-
;cord- -: ',;. rrrove, and manipulate, and the detailed structures of our brains, which
-.' - been shaped by both evolution and experience.
; ratio-
of the
-an ra-
lercep- Neural Beings Must Categorize
!1\'er to
: =:', lii-ing being categorizes. Even the amoeba categorizes the things it en-
- *:.:-rs into food or nonfood, what it moves toward or moves away from.
- , :::roeba cannot choose whether to categorize; it lust does. The same is true
- :',.-iv level OI
of tne
the anlmal
animal Worto. Animals carcgoflZe
world. Anlmals predators, pOSSTDIe
food, preOators,
categorize IOOO, possible
',:.s. members of their own species, and so on. How animals categorize de-
faculty :: ,:: upon their sensing apparatus and their ability to move themselves and to
*. ..:ulate objects.
.:nd in-

illiilir
I8 PrrrrosoPHY IN rns FLESH
'We
Categortzation is there fore a consequence of how we afe embodied. have
evolved to categorize; if we hadn't, we would not have survived. Categonza-
'$7e
tion is, for the most part, not a product of conscious reasoning. categoize
as we do because we have the brains and bodies we have and because we inter-
act in the world the waY we do.
The first and most important thing to realize about categofization is that it is
'We
an inescapable consequence of our biological makeup. are neural beings.
Our brains each have 100 billion neurons and 100 trillion synaptic connec-
tions. It is common in the brain for information to be passed from one dense
ensemble of neurons to another via a relatively sparse set of connections.
'Whenever
this happens, the pattern of activation distributed over the first set
of neurons is too great to be represented in a one-to-one manner in the sparse
set of connections. Therefore, the sparse set of connections necessarily groups
together certain input patterns in mapping them across to the output ensemble.
'Whenever neural ensemble provides the same output with different inputs,
a
there is neural categorization.
To take a concrete example, each human eye has 100 million light-sensing
cells, but only about 1 million fibers leading to the brain. Each incoming image
must therefore be reduced in complexity by a factor of 100. That is, informa-
tion in each fiber constitutes a "categorization" of the information from about
100 cells. Neural categortzation of this sort exists throughout the brain, up
through the highest levels of categories that we can be aware of. \fhen we see
trees, we see them as trees, not just as individual objects distinct from one an-
other. The same with rocks, houses' windows, doors, and so on'
A small percentage of our categories have been formed by conscious acts of
categonzation, but most are formed automatically and unconsciously as a re-
sult of functioning in the world. Though we learn new categories regularlS we
cannot make massive changes in our category systems through conscious acts
of recategorization (though, through experience in the world, our categories
'We
are subject to unconscious reshaping and partial change). do not, and can-
not, have full conscious control over how we categorize. Even when we think
we are deliberately forming new categories, our unconscious categories enter
into our choice of possible conscious categories.
Most impott^nt) it is not just that our bodies and brains determine thatwe
will catego rize; they also determine what kinds of categories we will have and
what their structufe will be. Think of the properties of the human body that
'We
contribute to the peculiarities of our conceptual system. have eyes and ears,

. ,l,.,tliili,
 Tus EMBoDreo MrNl r9
'e
.:::s and legs that work in certain very definite ways and not
in others. \7e have
i- .'
' 'sual system' with topographic maps and orientation-sensitive
cells, that pro-
1e
':;s srructure for our ability to conceptualize spatial relations. Our abilities to
r- : -'.': rn the ways we do and to track the motion of other things give motion a
-r,r ,r
roie in our conceptual system. The fact that we have muscles
and use
1S
: , -:r ro apply force in certain ways leads to the structure
of our system of causal
s.
- :-Jeprs. rx/hat is important is not just that we have bodies and that thought is
' :rchow embodied. 's7hat is important is that the peculiar nature of our bodies
te ,: ::es ouf vefy possibilities for conceptualization and categor
S.
ization.
et
SC
The lnseparability of categories, concepts, and Experience
Pts
le. ''::rg systems must categorize.
-. since we afe neural beings, our categories are
IS, - ::red through our embodimenr. what means L ttui th..ut.lories we
- ::r are part of our experience! They arerhat the structures that differentiate as-
no
"It ::-:S of our experience into discernible kinds. categorization is thus not
a
: ..::ir- intellectual matter, occurring after the fact of experience.
Rather, the
Ld-
::arron and use of categories is the stuff of experience.it is part of whai
rut - :ris and brains are constantly engaged in. we cannot, our
as some meditative
up :=:lrions suggest, "get beyond" our categories and have a purely
uncatego-
' :-; and unconceptualized experience. Neural
-i''nar beings cannot do that.
tn- we call concepts are neural structures that ailow us to mentally
charac-
:r-zi our categories
^^-^-- ,l I r
and reason about them. Human categories are typically
of : i:e ptualized in more than one way, in terms of what are"called pro'totypes.
ie- :':: prototype is a neural structure that permits us to do some sort of inferen-
\\-e ' -- cr imaginative task relative to a category. Typical-case
prorotype,
!15 -- ::au'ing
------:--- :,-t,
inferences about category members in the absence of urry"r.
1 .
"r.a
'res special
: :::-rtual information. Ideal-case prototypes allow us to evaluut. .ut.gory
an- - relative to some conceptual standard. (To see the differen..,
ink ' =:rbers .o-iur.
: :rororypes for the ideal husband and the typical husband.) Social ,r.r.o_
rief ' :-r: are used to make snap judgments,
usually about people. salient exem-
r ::s *r'ell-known examples) are used for making probatility judgments. (For
' :i:\'ev of kinds of conceptual prototypes, see A4,Lakoff 19gr) In short,
ind :: :,rn-pe-based reasoning constitutes a large proportion of the actual ,.urorr_
hat : :.rar we do. Reasoning with prototypes is, indeed, so common that it is in-
3rs, - ..--ilable that we could function for long without it.
20 PHrrosoPHY IN ruB FLESH

(e.g., tall people), we also have

Since most categories are matters of degree
with norms of various
gr"J.J concepts ,lr^r^r,""ting degrees along some scale
quite normal cases' and so on. Such-
kinds for extreme cases, ,ror-"1 cases, not
d...rib.d by what ."ll.d lingwistic hedges (A4, Lakoff
*rlJ.a ""rms are "r.
1g72),for exampl r,-rr,r, prett'!, kind of' barely' and so on' For the sake of im-
essence prototypes'
por-g sharp disiinctions, we develop what might be called_
sharply defined and minimally
which conceptual ,r" ,urrg,ories as ii they *.r.
distinguished from one another'
.Whenweconceptualtzecategoriesinthisway'weoftenenvisionthemusing
a Spatial metaphor, as if they wefe containers,
with an interior, an exterior, and
as containers' we also impose
a boundary. \rhen we concept taltze categories
some category-containers inside
complex hierarchical systemi on them, with
categories as containers hides a
other category_corriuir.rr. conceptualizing
prototypes, the graded
great deal or .ur.goi;^ri*.r,rr.. tt t id.. corrc"pt,r"l
of category boundaries'
structures of categories, and the fizziness
structures for our cate-
In short, *" form extraordinarily rich conceptual
gories and reason about them in many ways
that are crucial for our everyday
are' of course' neural structures
irrrr.tlorring. A1l of these conceptual structures
trivial sense that any mental
in our brains. rrri, -uk". them embodied in the
is a deeper and more important sense in
construct is realized neurally. But there'$7hat makes concepts concepts is their in-
which our concep,, ur. emtodied.
in ways that yield in{er-
ferential capacity,i6eir aUitlty to be bound together
strwctwre that is actwally part of' or
ences. An embodied. concept is a neural
mal<es wse of, the sensorimotor system
of owr brains. Much of conceptwal infer-
ence is, therefore, sensorimotor inference'
sense, the philosophi-
If concepts "r., u, we believe, embodied in this strong(conceptual inference)
of reason
cal consequences are enormous. The locus which are
would be the ,n-. the locus of perception and motor control,
", claim, it is radical only from the
bodily functions. If this seems like a radical
perspective or r".or,f fsychology, a
philosophy that posits a *.dical separation
system. It is not at all radical
between rational uUitiri., and ihe ,.nrori-lotor
joint locus of reason' percep-
i-- ,rr. point of view of the brain, which is the
question from the viewpoint of the brain is whether
tion, and-ou.*.,,'. The perceptual mo-
conceptual inference -uk., use of the same brain structures as
and motor
tor inference. In other words, does reason piggyback on-perception
the locus of all three functions' it
control? From ,n. p.rrp..tive of the brain,
would be quite natural if it did'

rit;lili :i,,,i,,lili
 Tur EuBoDrro MiNo 2T

Realism, Inference, and Embodiment

ll:e question of what we take to be
real and the question of how we
:=ttricablv linked. Our categories of things reason are
:"aie to be real: trees, rocks, animals,
th. i' ;;;;;."rmine
what we
people, buildings, and so on.
-':rs derermine how we reason about ,ior. .ur.gories. Our con_
:'::;ically in the world, our In order to
function re_
''
categories and ou, ior-, must ..work,,
':-'- n-ell together; our concepts must characteriz. ,rr."i-r.ur.r,
,i.r.rure of our cate_
a:::rs sufficiently well enough for us to function
-\fainstream western philosophy adds
to this picture certain claims that
a':.J argue are false. Not we
trivialry furr., but so false as to d.urti.uily
distort our
-:ierstanding of what human beings
-hut th. ,rrna urrJ reason are, what
moralitv are, and, *h","r",ou, place is i' tt. u'iuerse. Here
:ji:::i::jd
--- _,)( CtatmS: are

,o inro.caregories that exist independenr

1::H ::T:jt'td:i
specific yrvp'LrEb
properties ul
of ruman
human mtnds,
mindsfbrai
bratns, or bodies.
of the
The world has a rational structure,'The
r.lrrion"hi^o
relationships among categories

i:r:T:::'i:::i::-'ac;Trized'bv,atransc,;;;;;;;;';';';i,;i:::'::,
is independent of uny p..uliuriti., l
*f*
bodies.
of human minds, ;:;:l:t"?
min d-, brain -, an d bo dy-rree re
1i;"::::::'" ::1 ?r-, brain_, .
and o dy f r.. .u,.so,i.,
a s on correctly

;*:::.:::: 11.,T]lo
_
urity" J,.
;;; il;;",.
.b

"_,lJ;ndent
of it. Human reason may be performed
by ,
lii'f,kllT"t"li.r:.31;r]:n
j:::: j:1':, th e *u*. . f t ; ;;; ;;; # i, ;:i,#;::#
s rr u
:T l-"j
jiillll"dependenr of human bodies b,;i;:.-ilJ,: ff;
:::::::
srructure of human reason is disembodied. ",
of transcendent reason. rhey are
d. n d ep n d:o"..f:,
H::#,".:::1T,11..:h. t
n t o i h um n br n s . J,;;; ; ; j iI
i
:*': l: :.,
:oo are disembodied.
"1.jf
e e a ai
fJ;
charac
l:T""r::.*e11s, frelefore reality.terize the objective caregories
rbLrrrtrs UI
of
rhat is, *. *o,rJ r,J, u,,,rq.,.,
lllj:"1".::::*j.:.1r |'ee we
and all know
1:.:.d:**.ry,structure, it and use ir when *.
soning
-- \r'hat
correctly. "r"l.j:
makes us essentiaily human is our capacityfor disembodied rea_
ton.

h'ii.',ff