Preclaro v.

SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The Chemical Mineral Division of the ITDI, a component of the DOST employed
Petitioner under a written contract of services as Project Manager to supervise the
construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building at the DOST Compound.
To build the CMD Structure, DOST contracted the services of Jaime Sta. Maria
Construction Company with Engr. Resoso, as the company's project engineer.
While the said construction has not yet been completed, the accused either directly
requested or demanded the sum of P200,000, claimed as part of the expected profit of
the contractor. Petitioner was charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for committing the said offense in relation to the performance of his official
duties.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
Petitioner asserts that he is not a public officer as defined by the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act, because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office. Rather,
the petitioner maintains that he is merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on a
contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified period.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in taking cognizance of the case, instead of
dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner not being a public officer.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner misconstrues the definition of "public officer" in R.A. No. 3019 which,
according to thereof "includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. . . ."
The word “includes” used in defining a public officer indicates that the definition is not
restrictive. The terms “classified, unclassified or exemption service” were the old
categories of position in the civil service which have been reclassified into Career
Service and Non-Career Service.
A private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a government
undertaking falls under the non-career service category of the Civil Service and thus is a
public officer as defined by RA 3019.
Poe, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo
FACTS:
The Congress, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo the duly elected President of the Philippines. 
Refusing to concede defeat, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this
Electoral Tribunal. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest.
As counsels for the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the presentation of their
respective positions on the controversy, an act of God intervened, the Protestant died in
the course of his medical treatment.
Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has submitted to
the Tribunal, a "MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE
AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ," by the widow, Mrs. FPJ.
As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her
husband and in representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because
of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to
continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him to
ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate.
In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, asserts that the widow of a deceased
candidate is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public
office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. She points out that the
widow has no legal right to substitute for her husband in an election protest, since no
such right survives the husband, considering that the right to file an election protest is
personal and non-transmissible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter’s protest case.
RULING:
NO. Pursuant to rule 14 of the PET rules, only two persons, the 2 nd and 3rd placers, may
contest the election.
Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court allows substitution by a legal representative. It
can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear
before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant
prescribed by said Section 16. However, in the application of this rule to an election
contest, a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible
to the heirs upon death. Thus, it is consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the
heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest.
Pimentel v. Ermita
FACTS:
While Congress is in their regular session, President Arroyo, through Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita,  issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of
their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed
in an acting capacity. Petitioners, senators filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare
unconstitutional the appointments issued.
They assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether
regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in session,
is constitutional.
RULING:
YES. Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents
as acting secretaries because "in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is
only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary." Petitioners further
assert that "while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether
regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent."
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-
gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter
ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as an acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in
the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who
her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session.
Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to
the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of
the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a
person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be
the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting
appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Flores v. Drilon
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,  otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J.
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the
President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first
year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of
executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the
constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states
that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that
Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
RULING:
YES. Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to
appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as
Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks
to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an
executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents.
The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by
providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City
shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the
congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President
to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
In Re Appointments: Valenzuela
FACTS:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President of Hon.
Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta as judges of the RTC. These appointments appear prima
facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The
said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art.
VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the
judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
RULING:
NO. During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so;
and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by
Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6
years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the
period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to
appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public
interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making
of the appointments during the period of the ban
De Castro v. JBC
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days
after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno seven days after the presidential election.
Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President
or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Carpio; Associate Justice Corona; Associate Justice Carpio
Morales; Associate Justice Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Nachura. However, the
last two declined their nomination.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members
of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its
“insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated
the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE:
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.
RULING:
YES. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16
refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that
Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the
framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,
would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely
within Section 4 (1) thereof.