G.R. No.
168105               July 27, 2011 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss7 contending that the landowner’s acceptance of the DAR’s
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  a compromise agreement that has attained finality. Respondent also cited the contempt proceedings
vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to set aside the
Decision1 dated November 12, 2004 and Resolution2 dated May 11, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70979. The CA affirmed the Order3 dated October 25, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, in Civil
Case No. 99-6639 dismissing the petition for determination of just compensation on the ground of
late filing.
Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a 246.0561-hectare land located at Inlagadian,
Casiguran, Sorsogon and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-20193. The land was
voluntarily offered for sale to the government under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the 240.9066 hectares for acquisition at
₱5,871,689.03. Since the respondent rejected the said amount, a summary proceeding for
determination of just compensation was conducted by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
On May 2, 1996, respondent wrote LBP Department Manager III, Engr. Alex A. Lorayes, requesting
the release of payment of the cash portion of the "accepted x xx 151.1419 has. with an equivalent
valuation of ₱5,607,874.69." Consequently, on May 7, 1996, a Deed of Transfer was executed by
respondent over the said portion of his landholding in consideration of payment received from the
transferee Republic of the Philippines consisting of cash (₱1,078,877.54) and LBP bonds
(₱2,747,858.60).4
On October 14, 1998, DAR Provincial Adjudicator Manuel M. Capellan rendered a decision5 fixing
the amount of just compensation at ₱10,956,963.25 for the entire acquired area of 240.9066
hectares. Copy of the said decision was received by petitioner on October 27, 1998.
Almost a year later, or on September 6, 1999, petitioner filed before the RTC of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, Branch 52, a petition6] for judicial determination of just compensation (Civil Case No. 99-
6639). Petitioner argued that the PARAD’s valuation is unacceptable and that the initial valuation of
₱5,871,689.03 for the 240.9066 hectares is in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and
DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994, as amended by DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998.
valuation resulted in a binding contract and therefore constitutes res judicata as it is in the nature of
against the LBP for its refusal to comply with the writ of execution issued by the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator’s (PARAD’s) Office on June 18, 1999.
The matter of contempt proceedings was the subject of G.R. No. 152611 (Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Listana, Sr.). The PARAD had issued on August 20, 2000 an order granting
respondent’s motion for contempt and LBP Manager Alex A. Lorayes was cited for indirect contempt
and ordered to be imprisoned until he complied with the PARAD’s October 14, 1998 decision. After
its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal which was likewise
denied due course by PARAD Capellan who also ordered the issuance of an alias Writ of Execution
for the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation and subsequently directed the
issuance of an arrest order against Lorayes. Petitioner then filed with the RTC a petition for
injunction with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain PARAD
Capellan from issuing the order of arrest. A writ of preliminary injunction was eventually issued by
the trial court and LBP posted a ₱5,644,773.02 cash bond. Respondent went to the CA and
challenged said writ via a special civil action for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 65276). On December
11, 2001, the CA rendered its decision nullifying the trial court’s orders. In our Decision dated August
5, 2003, we granted the petition filed by LBP and reinstated the January 29, 2001 Order of the RTC
of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51 which enjoined the PARAD from enforcing its order of arrest
against Lorayes pending the final termination of Civil Case No. 99-6639 of RTC Branch 52.8
Petitioner filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss,9 arguing that the filing of petition with SAC is
not an appeal from the decision of the PARAD which is deemed vacated upon filing of the case
before the SAC; hence res judicata cannot be applied. It stressed that the determination of just
compensation is inherently judicial in nature. There being no speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, petitioner averred that unless it is authorized to file this case it cannot protect
the interest of the government who is the owner of the Agrarian Reform Fund.
In an Amended Petition,10 petitioner additionally alleged the fact that respondent had already
accepted the valuation of the cocoland portion (151.1419 hectares) in the amount of ₱5,312,190.23;
that payment therefor had been received by respondent; and that a Deed of Transfer of the said
portion had been executed in favor of the government which was notarized on May 7, 1996 and
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Petitioner thus asserted that the valuation and compensation
process insofar as the 151.1419-hectare portion, should now be considered terminated.
Respondent, on his part, contended that by bringing the question of valuation before the court,
petitioner is estopped from asserting that such issue had already been laid to rest with the alleged
acceptance by respondent of the prior valuation.11
On April 28, 2000, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Page 1 of 19
In his Answer,12 the respondent asserted that petitioner, being part of the administrative machinery
charged under the law to determine the government land valuation/compensation offer is bound by
the compensation fixed by the DARAB. Hence, respondent’s acceptance of such offered
compensation resulted in a binding contract, especially under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)
scheme. The PARAD’s decision therefore constitutes res judicata as it is, in effect, a judgment upon
a compromise. Respondent also filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying his motion to
dismiss.
On October 25, 2000, the trial court issued the order13 granting respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and dismissing the petition for having been filed almost one year from receipt of the
copy of the PARAD’s decision.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration14 alleging that it had filed a motion for reconsideration
from the PARAD’s decision dated October 14, 1998 but the order denying said motion was received
only on May 12, 1999. It further averred that the cause of delay was not solely attributable to it but
also to the respondent through his counsel "because there was a manifestation on their part to settle
this case amicably." Petitioner stressed that while there was really a late filing, it was done in good
faith and without any intent to prejudice any person. Invoking a liberal construction of procedural
rules, petitioner argued that it is without any speedy and adequate remedy in this case, which is
necessary for the protection of the government’s interest.
In its Order dated March 27, 2001, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Copy
of the said order was received by petitioner on April 6, 2001 and on the same date it filed a notice of
appeal.15
In its memorandum, petitioner argued that on the matter of its late filing of the petition for judicial
determination of just compensation, the trial court should have given primacy to the very clear
demands of substantial justice over the rigid application of technicalities. It cited Section 57 of R.A.
No. 6657 allowing a party to bring the issue of valuation of lands acquired by virtue of CARP to the
Special Agrarian Courts, which should be liberally construed to afford LBP the amplest opportunity
to prove that its valuation pertaining to the remaining portion of 89.1419 hectares of the subject
landholding is in accordance with the legally prescribed formula spelled out in DAR AO No. 5, series
of 1998. Moreover, the government has not acceded to the alteration of the valuation pertaining to
the 151.1419 hectares, to which both the landowner and government gave their consent, which had
become a perfected contract having the force of law between the parties.16
In the meantime, following this Court’s ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr. (supra)
which voided all contempt proceedings against LBP Manager Lorayes, petitioner filed with the RTC
a motion to withdraw the ₱5,644,773.02 cash bond. The RTC denied the motion and petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Petitioner challenged the trial court’s order before
the CA which eventually dismissed the petition. When the case was elevated to this Court, we
affirmed the CA and sustained the RTC’s orders denying LBP’s motion to withdraw the cash bond.
By Decision dated May 30, 2011, we ruled that LBP cannot withdraw the ₱5,644,773.02 cash bond
which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC enjoining
the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest against Manager Lorayes pending final
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property.17
By Decision dated November 12, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal from the SAC’s
dismissal of its petition for judicial determination of just compensation. The CA said that petitioner
failed to adequately explain its failure to abide by the rules and "its loss of appellate recourse cannot
be revived by invoking the mantra of liberality." We quote the pertinent portion of the appellate
court’s ruling:
The argument of Listana that he rejected the pricing for the entire area and that the Request to Open
a Trust Fund x xx is proof of his refusal, is unmeritorious. If indeed Listana rejected the entire
valuation then he would not have executed a Deed of Transfer of Unsegregated Portion of a Parcel
of Land x x x covering the 51.1419 [sic] hectares. Said document is not only valid and binding but
also reflects the true intention of the parties and is athwart the claim of Listana that he rejected the
valuation of this portion of the property.
The PARAB in the summary proceeding it conducted to determine the land valuation, should not
have included in its determination of just compensation the accepted portion but should have limited
the scope to only the rejected portion of 89.7647 hectares.
While there is thus good cause to seek recourse against the PARAB ruling, Land Bank took
this appeal 117 days later and thus beyond the fifteen (15) day period provided by Rule XIII
Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. Land Bank claims the court a quo was wrong in saying
that it was late for less than one year for it was tardy only for 120 days by its reckoning. But whether
it is one or the other, the fact is it was late for a considerable time and cannot be absolved by the
poor excuse that there was a prospect for an amicable settlement. Rudimentary prudence dictated
that appellate recourse should have been timely taken instead of just relying with crossed fingers
that settlement would come about.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition alleging that the CA committed serious errors of law, as follows:
A. THE DARAB ORDER DATED 14 OCTOBER 1998 WHICH ALLEGEDLY BECAME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY CANNOT ABROGATE OR RENDER WITHOUT EFFECT A
CONSUMMATED CONTRACT INVOLVING THE GOVERNMENT AND RESPONDENT
LISTANA RELATIVE TO 151.1419 HECTARES OF SUBJECT PROPERTY. BEING
IMMUTABLE, THE CONSUMMATED CONTRACT CAN NO LONGER BE DISTURBED
OR ABROGATED BY THE DARAB ORDER DATED 14 OCTOBER 1998, WHICH THE
COURT A QUO AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED.
Page 2 of 19
 B. THE CHALLENGED DECISION AND THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION PLACE SO
MUCH PREMIUM ON A PROCEDURAL RULE AT THE EXPENSE OF SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE, A CIRCUMSTANCE THAT HAS UNNECESSARILY PUT A COLOR OF
VALIDITY TO THE DARAB ORDER WHICH IS VOID AB INITIO AS IT UTTERLY
DISREGARDED SECTION 17 OF R.A. NO. 6657 AND THE SUPREME COURT RULING
IN "LBP vs. SPOUSES BANAL," (G.R. NO. 143276, 20 JULY 2004).19
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the SAC may take cognizance of the petition for
determination of just compensation which is filed beyond the prescribed 15-day period or more than
100 days after the PARAD rendered its valuation in a summary administrative proceeding.
The valuation of property in expropriation cases pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the RTC acting as Special
Agrarian Court and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies such as the DAR.20 Section 57 of
said law explicitly states that:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Court shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within
thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
The CA affirmed the SAC’s order of dismissal applying Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB
Rules of Procedure which provides that:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. --
The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. Any party
shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner admits the late filing of an action with the SAC but nonetheless argue that the serious
errors committed by the PARAD when it included the 151.1419 hectares -- despite the initial
valuation offered by LBP having been already accepted by respondent who already conveyed said
portion to the government -- in its decision fixing just compensation, and non-application of the
formula provided in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994, as amended
by DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998 on the remaining 89.1419 hectares, warrants a review by this
Court. It contends that this case deserves a relaxation of the procedural rule governing finality of
judgments, adding that its "thoughtlessness" should not be deemed fatal to the instant petition "for at
stake is an OVERPAYMENT amounting to more than SEVEN MILLION PESOS, which is GREATLY
PREJUDICIAL to public interest, as the said amount shall be debited from the Agrarian Reform Fund
(ARF)."
The petition is unmeritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,21 private respondent landowner rejected the government’s offer of
its lands based on LBP’s valuation and the case was brought before the PARAD which sustained
LBP’s valuation. Private respondent then filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC sitting as
Special Agrarian Court. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private
respondent should have appealed to the DARAB, in accordance with the then DARAB Rules of
Procedure. Additionally, the RTC found that the petition had been filed more than fifteen days after
notice of the PARAD decision. Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which
reversed the order of dismissal of RTC and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
The government challenged the CA ruling before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
This Court, affirming the CA, ruled as follows:
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their
taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes
an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and
afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the
case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the
landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special
Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under
R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondent’s case was properly brought by it in the
RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of §57, the
RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for
the determination of just compensation to landowners." It would subvert this "original and exclusive"
jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in
administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from §57 that the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to
the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction
would be contrary to §57 and therefore would be void.What adjudicators are empowered to do is
only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners,
leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above ruling was reiterated in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals.23 In that case,
petitioner landowner who was dissatisfied with the valuation made by LBP and DARAB, filed a
petition for determination of just compensation in the RTC (SAC). However, the RTC dismissed the
Page 3 of 19
petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from
the orders of the DARAB. On appeal, the CA upheld the order of dismissal. When the case was
elevated to this Court, we likewise affirmed the CA and declared that:
To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly §50 thereof, Rule XIII, §11 of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure provides:
Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. -- The decision
of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice
thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the
power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the
courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, §11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given
to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been
transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of
administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to
determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge
in the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because
the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a
continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the
decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be
foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of the administrative action.
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided
in Rule XIII, §11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case
and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court noted that Republic v. Court of Appeals does not serve as authority for disregarding the
15-day period to bring an action for judicial determination of just compensation as there was no
pronouncement therein invalidating Rule XIII, Section 11 of the New Rules of Procedure of the
DARAB. Moreover, we stated that any speculation as to the applicability of said provision was
foreclosed by our subsequent ruling in Philippine Veterans Bank (supra) where we affirmed the
order of dismissal of a petition for determination of just compensation for having been filed beyond
the fifteen-day period under Section 11.25
However, in the 2007 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay,26 the Court ruled that the RTC
erred in dismissing LBP’s petition for determination of just compensation on the ground that it was
filed beyond the fifteen-day period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals (supra), we stressed therein the original and
exclusive -- not appellate -- jurisdiction of the SAC over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners.27
To foreclose any uncertainty brought by the Suntay ruling, this Court in its July 31, 2008 Resolution
denying LBP’s motion for reconsideration of the August 14, 2007 Decision in the case of Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Martinez28held:
On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its ruling
in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the
lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just
compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC
within the said period. This conclusion, as already explained in the assailed decision, is based on
the doctrines laid down in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica.
xxxx
The Court notes that the Suntay ruling is based on Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
decided in 1996 also through the pen of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza. In that case, the Court
emphasized that the jurisdiction of the SAC is original and exclusive, not appellate. Republic,
however, was decided at a time when Rule XIII, Section 11 was not yet present in the DARAB
Rules. Further, Republic did not discuss whether the petition filed therein for the fixing of just
compensation was filed out of time or not. The Court merely decided the issue of whether cases
involving just compensation should first be appealed to the DARAB before the landowner can resort
to the SAC under Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657.
To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the
bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in
Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just
compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but an
original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules;
otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord with law and
settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition
before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the
DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true
value of his property.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
Page 4 of 19
Petitioner’s action before the SAC having been filed, by its own reckoning, 117 days after notice of
the PARAD’s denial of its motion for reconsideration of the decision fixing the just compensation for
respondent’s landholding, the same has attained finality.
Anent petitioner’s plea of liberality and relaxation of procedural rules, it is contended that in the
interest of substantial justice, the matter of overpayment which is greatly prejudicial to the agrarian
reform fund must be addressed by this Court notwithstanding petitioner’s "thoughtlessness" in the
tardy filing of its case before the RTC.
In the more recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Umandap,30 the Court, in a decision
penned by Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, set aside the CA’s amended decision
affirming the RTC’s order dismissing the petition for judicial determination of just compensation
which was re-filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB
Rules of Procedure. After LBP’s initial valuation of the landowners’ property was rejected, a
summary administrative proceeding was conducted by the DAR’s Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD). Dissatisfied with the valuation fixed by the RARAD, LBP timely filed a petition
for judicial determination of just compensation before the RTC. The RTC dismissed the petition on
the ground that LBP failed to submit a proper certification against forum shopping. LBP immediately
filed a motion for reconsideration attaching thereto a certification signed by its LBP President
confirming the authority of its regional operation manager to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping. The RTC, however, denied the motion for reconsideration, and the order of
denial was received by LBP on May 29, 2003. On June 3, 2003, LBP re-filed the petition attaching
more documents showing the authority of its regional operation manager to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping. The RTC still dismissed the petition, ruling that even though the
previous dismissal was without prejudice, LBP nevertheless failed to re-file the petition within the
period allowed by the DARAB Rules of Procedure, and thus, the Adjudicator’s decision fixing the just
compensation of the subject property attained finality. LBP filed a petition for certiorari in the CA
which initially reversed and nullified the RTC’s orders. Respondent landowners filed a motion for
reconsideration and subsequently the CA rendered an Amended Decision dismissing LBP’s petition
and holding that certiorari is not the proper remedy since the RTC order dismissing the re-filed
petition was a final order and based on res judicata, hence certiorari is not the proper remedy.
In a petition for review on certiorari, LBP assailed the CA’s amended decision dismissing its petition
for certiorari. The Court noted that at the core of the controversy is a jurisdictional issue, that is,
whether the SAC acted without jurisdiction in outrightly dismissing the petition for the determination
of just compensation. The Court declared that since the SAC statutorily exercises original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners, it
cannot be said that the decision of the adjudicator, if not appealed to the SAC, would be deemed
final and executory, under all circumstances. Citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals
(supra) which affirmed the order of dismissal of a petition for determination of just compensation for
having been filed beyond the said period and explained that Section 11 is not incompatible with the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC, we held:
Notwithstanding this pronouncement, however, the statutorily mandated original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the SAC led this Court to adopt, over the years, a policy of liberally allowing petitions
for determination of just compensation, even though the procedure under DARAB rules have not
been strictly followed, whenever circumstances so warrant:
1. In the 1999 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that the
SAC properly acquired jurisdiction over the petition to determine just compensation filed by
the landowner without waiting for the completion of DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land.
2. In the 2004 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, we allowed a direct resort to
the SAC even where no summary administrative proceedings have been held before the
DARAB.
3. In the 2006 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, this Court upheld the
jurisdiction of the SAC despite the pendency of administrative proceedings before the
DARAB. We held:
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise
of the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of
just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is
vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC
properly took cognizance of respondent’s petition for determination of just compensation.
4. In the 2009 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belista, this Court permitted a direct
recourse to the SAC without an intermediate appeal to the DARAB as mandated under the
new provision in the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure. We ruled:
Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land
valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not
change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in
cases involving petitions for the determination of just compensation. In accordance with the said
Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in
dismissing the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Only a statute can
confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies while rules of procedure cannot.
In the case at bar, the refiling of the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation was
done within five days from the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing the
original petition, during which time said dismissal could still be appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The SAC even expressly recognized that the rules are silent as regards the period within which a
complaint dismissed without prejudice may be refiled. The statutorily mandated original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC, as well as the above circumstances showing that LBP did
Page 5 of 19
not appear to have been sleeping on its rights in the allegedly belated refiling of the petition,
lead us to assume a liberal construction of the pertinent rules. To be sure, LBP’s intent to
question the RARAD’s valuation of the land became evident with the filing of the first petition
for determination of just compensation within the period prescribed by the DARAB Rules.
Although the first petition was dismissed without prejudice on a technicality, LBP’s refiling of
essentially the same petition with a proper non-forum shopping certification while the earlier
dismissal order had not attained finality should have been accepted by the trial
court.1avvphi1
In view of the foregoing, we rule that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily dismissing said
refiled Petition. Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing this
dismissal should be granted.31(Emphasis supplied.)
In contrast to the diligence showed by LBP in the above-cited case, herein petitioner LBP admitted
its "thoughtless" filing of the petition before the SAC more than 100 days after notice of the denial of
its motion for reconsideration of the PARAD’s decision fixing the just compensation for the subject
property. Petitioner did not offer any explanation for its tardiness and neglect, and simply reiterated
the great prejudice to the agrarian reform fund with the erroneous inclusion in the PARAD’s
valuation of the 151.1419 hectares already conveyed to the government. As to the remaining
89.1419 hectares, petitioner asserts that the PARAD’s valuation failed to apply the computation
provided in Sec. 17 of R.A. No. 6657 as translated in DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998.
Petitioner clearly slept on its rights by not filing the petition in the SAC within the prescribed fifteen-
day period or a reasonable time after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. Even
assuming there was already a consummated sale with respect to the 151.1419 hectares and LBP’s
valuation thereof had been fully paid to the respondent, the amount already paid by LBP shall be
deducted from the total compensation as determined by the PARAD. Notably, LBP exhibited lack of
interest in the discharge of its statutory functions as it failed to actively participate in the summary
administrative proceeding despite due notice of the hearings. Clearly, there exists no compelling
reason to justify relaxation of the rule on the timely availment of judicial action for the determination
of just compensation.
It is a fundamental legal principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it
or by the highest court of the land. The only exceptions to the general rule on finality of judgments
are the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust
and inequitable.32 Indeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, even at the
risk of occasional errors.33
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated November 12,
2004 and Resolution dated May 11, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70979
are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139083            August 30, 2001
FLORENCIA PARIS, petitioner, 
vs.
DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, JUAN L. ALFECHE, MAXIMO N. PADILLA, DIONISIO Q. MATILOS,
Heirs of GREG A. ALFECHE, DIONISIO W. MATILO, SIMPLICIO L. ADAYA, TEOFILO M. DE
GUZMAN, FRANCISCO B. DINGLE and MARIFE NAVARO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Homesteads are not exempt from the operation of the Land Reform Law. The right to retain seven
hectares of land is subject to the condition that the landowner is actually cultivating that area or will
cultivate it upon the effectivity of the said law.
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the June 4, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA), in
CA-GR SP No. 45738, which affirmed the ruling of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB). The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, [there being] no grave abuse of discretion . . . committed by DARAB, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. Costs against the
petitioner."2
The Decision of the DARAB, which was affirmed by the CA, had disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated March 19, 1992 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered:
1. Declaring the private respondents to be full owners of the land they till pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228;
Page 6 of 19
 2. Declaring the validity of the Emancipation Patents issued to private
respondents; and
3. Dismissing the case."3
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
"Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon
with an area of 10.6146 hectares, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-8275 and another property with an area of 13.2614 hectares covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4985, also located at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon; the said parcels
are fully tenanted by private respondents herein who are recipients of Emancipation
Patents in their names pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27 (Annexes 'A', A-
1' to A-18) notwithstanding the fact that neither the tenants nor the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) [has] paid a single centavo for the said land. Petitioner and the tenants
have not signed any Land Transfer Production Agreement. Petitioner and her children have
been deprived of their property without due process of law and without just compensation,
especially so that the tenants have already stopped paying rentals as of December 1988 to
the damage and prejudice of petitioner.
"Petitioner contends that since she is entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under
P.D. 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her children under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to acquire the subject land and
the Emancipation Patents precipitately issued to them are null and void for being contrary
to law. Petitioner further alleged that she owns the subject property covered by OCT No. P-
4985 as original homestead grantee who still owned the same when Republic Act No. 6657
was approved, thus she is entitled to retain the area to the exclusion of her tenants. As
regards TCT No. 8275, petitioner has applied for retention of seven hectares per Letter of
Retention attached as Annex 'B', that the lands subject of the instant petition are covered
by Homestead Patents, and as decided by the Supreme Court in the cases of Patricio vs.
Bayug (112 SCRA 41) and Alita vs. Court of Appeals (170 SCRA 706), the homesteaders
and their heirs have the right to cultivate their homesteads personally, which is a superior
right over that of tenant-farmers.
"Petitioner moved for the cancellation and recall of the Emancipation Patents issued to
private respondents-farmers and to restore to petitioner and her children the ownership and
cultivation of the subject lots plus payment of back rentals from the time they stopped
paying the same until ejected therefrom.
"Respondents filed their answer dated May 29, 1991 and admitted the generation and
issuance of Emancipation Patents to private respondents as tenant-farmers thereof and the
Supreme Court rulings on the Bayug and Alita cases relative to homestead patents, but
denied the rest of the material allegations for want of knowledge or information as to the
truth relative thereto. Respondents alleged that when the subject lands were covered under
P.D. 27, the petitioner was repeatedly informed and invited by the DAR Office at Valencia,
Bukidnon to thresh out the matter; that petitioner's right to retain seven (7) hectares is not
absolute since she owns other agricultural landholdings, thus disqualifying her to retain the
area, aside from the fact that she has other properties sufficient to support her family as
shown in the Certification of the Provincial Assessor's Office listing down the petitioner's
landholdings (Annex '2'). By way of special affirmative defenses, respondents averred that
the criteria set forth under P.D. 27 were observed before the generation of the
Emancipation Patents; that under Executive Order No. 228, the tenant-farmers under P.D.
27 are deemed full owners of the lands they till and the lease rentals paid by them should
be considered as amortization payments; that under LOI 474, petitioner who owns more
than seven (7) hectares of lands are not entitled to retention. Respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the case. They likewise prayed that the Emancipation Patents issued to private
respondents and their peaceful possession of their farm lots be respected.
"The Adjudicator a quo conducted a hearing and afforded the parties their day in court and
the opportunity to present their evidence. On August 13, 1991, the Adjudicator a quo issued
an Order for the parties to submit their respective position papers with evidence to buttress
their allegations. On March 10, 1992, the Adjudicator a quo rendered the decision, thus:
"'WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Adjudicator declares the
following:
1. That all the Emancipation Patents issued to tenants-respondents shall be
canceled and recalled;
2. That the Register of Deeds of Malaybalay, Bukidnon shall cancel all
Emancipation Patents registered under the names of the herein tenants-
respondents; and
3. That back rentals due to the petitioners, which were given to the LBP as
amortizations, shall be given to the said petitioner."'4
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the adjudicator.
Ruling of the Court Appeals
Page 7 of 19
The CA rejected the claim of petitioner. It ruled that she could not retain her homesteads, since she
was not the actual cultivator thereof. It also held that she and her heirs had not been deprived of
their right to retain the area mandated by law, because the records showed that they had other
agricultural landholdings. Finally, it ruled that she had not been deprived of her properties without
just compensation, since "Section 2 of Executive Order 228 declared that tenant-farmers of
agricultural lands under P.D. 27 are deemed owners of the land they till and the lease rentals paid
by them shall be considered as amortization payments. "5
Hence, this Petition.6
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act [are] exempted
from the operation of land reform.
"II. Granting arguendo that homesteads are not exempt, whether or not the Emancipation
Patents issued to the respondents are valid notwithstanding lack of payment of just
compensation.
"III. On the assumption that homesteads are exempt from land reform and/or the
emancipation patents are illegally issued hence, void, can the respondents be ejected from
the premises in question?"7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious. Respondents are entitled to the lands they till, subject to the
determination and payment of just compensation to petitioner.
First Issue:
Petitioner's Homesteads Not Exempt from Land Reform
Petitioner contends that because the subject properties are covered by homestead patents, they are
exempt from the operation of land reform. In support of her position, she cites the cases Alita v.
CA8 and Patricio v. Bayug,9 in which the Court ruled that homesteaders had a superior right to
cultivate their homesteads as against their tenants.
Petitioner's contention is without legal basis. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the
Emancipation Patents sought to be canceled here were issued to respondents, applies to all
tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share-crop
or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not."10 The law makes no exceptions
whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere therein does it appear that lots obtained by homestead patents
are exempt from its operation.
The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1978, which
states: "Tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or corn which have been
acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, shall also be covered by
Operation Land Transfer." Unquestionably, petitioner's parcels of land, though obtained by
homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by land reform under PD 27.
Petitioner's claimed entitlement to retain seven (7) hectares is also untenable. PD 27, which
provides the retention limit, states:
"In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such
landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it."
Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition
that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon
effectivity of the law.
In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As admitted by petitioner herself,
the subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally
cultivate any part thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to retain any portion of her
landholdings.
Even under the current primary law on agrarian reform, Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, to which the
application of PD 27 is suppletory, petitioner's lands are subject to land reform. The said Act lays
down the rights of homestead grantees as follows:
"SECTION 6. Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which
shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of
age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That
landowners whose lands have been covered by PD 27 shall be allowed to keep the area
originally retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees
Page 8 of 19
 or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead." (italics supplied)
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original
homesteads, only for "as long as they continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of land are covered
by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the
fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall
exempt their lands from land reform coverage.
In the present case, as previously pointed out, neither petitioner nor her heirs are personally
cultivating the subject homesteads. The DAR and the CA found that respondents were the ones who
had been cultivating their respective portions of the disputed properties.
However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in accordance with Section 6 of RA 6657, which
requires no qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled to retain such area. This ruling is in
line with Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
from which we quote:
". . . In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights,
if any, under PD No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights
provided for by RA No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted
by the decree."
Petitioner's heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of three (3) hectares each, since they are not
actually tilling the parcels or directly managing the farm.
Patricio v. Bayug and Alita v. CA
Not Applicable
Petitioner insists that the appellate court ignored the ruling of the Court in Patricio v.
Bayug11 and Alita v. CA.12 She relies on the following pronouncement in Patricio: "We hold that the
more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right of the homesteader and his
heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by
tenancy relations."13 She also cites the statement in Alita that the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands
covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question" finds support in the aforecited
Section 6 of RA 6657.14 A closer look at these cases shows that they are not applicable to the issues
in the present case.
In Patricio, the owner and his heirs had previously cultivated the homestead, which was later sold
but subsequently reconveyed to the former. After the reconveyance, the owner's heirs wanted to
resume their cultivation of the homestead, but the previous buyer's tenants did not want to leave it.
In Alita, the owner was also desirous of personally cultivating the homestead; but the tenants, not
wanting to relinquish it, were asserting their own right to continue cultivating it. Thus, under these
circumstances, the Court upheld the right of the homestead owners over that of the tenants.
In the case at bar, petitioner herself has not personally cultivated the parcels of land. Neither has
she or her heirs expressed, at any time, any desire to cultivate them personally. She is invoking, yet
is clearly not intending to ever actually exercise, her alleged right as homesteader to own and
personally cultivate them.
Thus, the rulings in both Patricio and Alita, which are in line with the state objective of fostering
owner cultivatorship15 and of abolishing tenancy,16 would be inapplicable to the present case. Since
petitioner and her heirs have evinced no intention of actually cultivating the lands or even directly
managing the farm, they will undoubtedly continue to be absentee landlords. Therefore, to blindly
and indiscriminately apply the ruling in the cited cases would be tantamount to encouraging
feudalistic practices and going against the very essence of agrarian reform. This we cannot sanction
Second Issue:
Just Compensation
It is undisputed that the subject parcels were covered by Operation Land Transfer under PD 27, and
that private respondents were identified as beneficiaries. In fact, Emancipation Patents have already
been issued to them.
Petitioner, however, claims that she was not paid just compensation and, thus, prays for the
cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to respondents under PD 27. She contends that "it
is illegal for the DAR to take property without full payment of just compensation[;] until full payment is
done the title and ownership remain with the landholder."17
Petitioner's contention has merit. Section 2 of PD 266 states:
After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title
under Presidential Decree No. 27, an Emancipation Patent and/or Grant shall be issued by
the Department of Agrarian Reform on the basis of a duly approved survey plan."
On the other hand, paragraphs 8 and 9 of PD 27 reads as follows:
"For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer
pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one-half (2 1/2)
times the average harvest of three normal crop years immediately preceding the
promulgation of this Decree;
Page 9 of 19
 "The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) per centum per annum,
shall be paid by the tenant in fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations[.]"
Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are still
required to pay the cost of the land, including interest, within fifteen years before the title is
transferred to them. Thus, the Court held in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform:18
"It is true that PD 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmers as of October
21, 1972 and declared that he shall 'be deemed the owner' of a portion of land consisting of
a family-sized farm except that 'no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued
to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative.' It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also
had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement."
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents complied with the requirement of full
payment of the cost of the parcels of land. As they themselves admitted,19 their value had not even
been determined yet. In the absence of such determination, the Court cannot rule that just
compensation has already been fully paid.
Presidential Decree 27 and subsequently Executive Order (EO) 228, which recognized the rights
acquired by tenant-farmers under PD 27, provide in detail the computation to be used in arriving at
the exact total cost of the parcels of land. Evidently, therefore, the law recognizes that their exact
value, or the just compensation to be given to the landowner, cannot just be assumed; it must be
determined with certainty before the land titles are transferred.
Although EO 228 provides that the total lease rentals paid for the lands from October 21, 1972 shall
be considered as advance payment, it does not sanction the assumption that such rentals are
automatically considered as equivalent to just compensation for the land. The provision significantly
designates the lease rentals as advance, not full, payment. The determination of the exact value of
the lands cannot simply be brushed aside, as it is fundamental to the determination of whether full
payment has been made.
Necessarily, the lease rentals admittedly paid by respondents until December 1988 cannot, at this
point, be considered as full settlement of the value of the lands or as just compensation for them.
The value of the subject lands was never determined; thus, there is no amount that can be used as
basis for applying the lease rentals.
Under the circumstances, actual title to the subject lands remains with petitioner. Clearly then, under
PD 27 and EO 228, the application of the process of agrarian reform to the subject lands is still
incomplete.
Considering the passage of RA 6657 before the completion of the application of the agrarian reform
process to the subject lands, the same should now be completed under the said law, with PD 27 and
EO 228 having only suppletory effect. This ruling finds support in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
CA,20 wherein the Court stated:
'We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA 6657 should not apply to rice and corn lands under PD
27. Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228 shall only
have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act also provides —
SECTION 7. Priorities. — The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and
program the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of
(10) years from the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed
as follows:
Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all
private lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian reform; . . . and all
other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which
shall be acquired and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with
the implementation to be completed within a period of not more than four (4) years
(emphasis supplied).
This eloquently demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties
which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition
and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to.
In Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform this
Court applied the provisions (of) RA 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld the
constitutionality of the payment of just compensation for PD 27 lands through the different
modes stated in Sec. 18. "
In determining the amount to be paid petitioner, all lease rentals paid by respondents to her after
October 21, 1972 should be deducted therefrom. This formula is intended to put into effect the
provision of Section 2 of EO 228.
Third Issue:
Tenants Cannot Be Ejected
Petitioner submits that aside from canceling the Emancipation Patents issued to respondents, the
ejectment of the latter from the premises should be ordered by the Court, in accordance with the
doctrine in Patricio.
Page 10 of 19
Petitioner's position is unfounded. As earlier explained, Patricio finds no application to the case at
bar. Thus, there is no justification for ejecting respondents. Besides, Section 22 of RA 6657
expressly states that "actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be ejected or removed
therefrom." Furthermore, there is no reason for ejecting the tillers with respect to the area of five
hectares, which petitioner may choose to retain. Section 6 of RA 6657 further states:
"The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall
pertain to the landowner; Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by
the land owner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain
therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be
considered a lease holder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case
the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a
lease-holder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option
within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area
for retention "
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farm workers on the land prior to the
approval of this Act shall be respected."
The current provision on retention removes the necessity, present under PD 27, of ejecting actual
tillers. Under the current law, landowners who do not personally cultivate their lands are no longer
required to do so in order to qualify for the retention of an area not exceeding five hectares. Instead,
they are now required to maintain the actual tiller of the area retained, should the latter choose to
remain therein.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the provincial agrarian reform adjudicator is REINSTATED with
the modification that the lease rentals, which respondents have already paid to petitioner after
October 21, 1972, are to be considered part of the purchase price for the subject parcels of land.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138781      December 3, 2001
FELIX PASCUAL, petitioner,  petitioner and has been in possession of the disputed properties since 1960 up to the present. He
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICTOR SOLIS, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 41542,
which affirmed in toto the judgement of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 1529. In its decision, the DARAB reversed the Provincial
Adjudicator's ruling in DARAB Case No. 374-Bul. '92, by recognizing respondent as the lawful tenant
of the agricultural lots belonging to petitioner and ordering the latter to surrender possession of said
lots to respondent.1âwphi1.nêt
The two parcels of land subject of this controversy are situated in Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan,
designated as Lot Nos. 1923 and 2025, both of Cad-350. The lots are registered in the name of
petitioner Felix B. Pascual under Original Certificate of Title Nos. 1051(M) and 4364 (M),
respectively.1 Lot No. 1923, which measures 7,423 square meters was classified as rice land under
Tax Declaration No. 11383. Lot No. 2025, on the other hand, consisting of 27,456 square meters,
was divided into two portions: one consisting of 10,000 square meters classified as rice land, and
the other containing an area of 17,456 square meters, of cogon land, as reflected in Tax Declaration
No. 12734.2
On March 5, 1992, petitioner brought an action for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer
for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction" against respondent Victor Solis, before the DARAB
Region III, in Malolos, Bulacan.3Petitioner alleged that sometime during the third week of January
1991, respondent tried to enter into possession and cultivate the above-described agricultural lots,
thus disrupting petitioner's peaceful possession and personal cultivation of the same.
Petitioner claimed that he has been working on the agricultural lots with the aid of his immediate
farm household and has been occupying the lots for 52 years. To buttress his claim, petitioner
presented a certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Norzagaray,
Bulacan. Confirming petitioner's status as owner-cultivator and declaring the land holdings to be
untenanted.4
Additionally, petitioner submitted a certification issued by the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) Chairman of Poblacion, Norzagaray, to the effect that petitioner is in actual possession of
the lots in the concept of owner-cultivator and that respondent forcibly entered in to the lots in order
to establish him self as tenant thereof.5Petitioner, thus, prayed that respondent be permanently
enjoined from intruding into and disturbing petitioner's possession and cultivation of the properties in
question.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent averred that he is a lawful tenant of the lots owned by
has regularly performed all his obligations and duties as lessee, particularly the payment of rentals,
and cultivated the agricultural lots. As a legitimate tenant, respondent insisted that he enjoyed
security of tenure and cannot be ejected from the land he is tilling except upon authority of the court
and for causes provided by law.6
Page 11 of 19
To substantiate his assertion, respondent presented two agricultural leasehold contracts allegedly
concluded between him and petitioner. The first agreement was constituted over a farm lot
measuring 7,423 square meters and identified through Tax Declaration No.11383 (first lot). The
second contract was for a 1.3-hectare piece of land covered by OCT No. P-2780 (second lot).7
Respondent also submitted two Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold (CAL) covering the same lots
specified in the leasehold contracts. CAL No. 03-02-13-004-023 (or CAL 023) was issued for the first
lot, while CAL No. 03-02-13-004-022 (or CAL 022) pertained to the second lot. Both certificates were
awarded by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and recorded with the former Ministry of Agrarian
Reform on January 25, 1984.8
Petitioner countered in his reply that respondent's tenancy status over the first lot was extinguished
when respondent deliberately failed to pay the agreed lease rentals for the years 1987, 1988 and
1989. Respondent subsequently abandoned the lot without notice in 1990. This fact was attested to
by one Simeon Bartolome in a sworn statement.9
Petitioner also said that respondent abandoned the first lot because he moved to Manila to work as
a professional jeepney driver plying the Divisoria-Pier route. This was affirmed by a certain Matias
Santos in another affidavit attached to petitioner's reply.10
With regard to the second lot, petitioner stated that respondent voluntarily surrendered its
possession on December 5, 1985, upon payment to him of disturbance compensation in the amount
of P18,000.00.11 Consequently, petitioner was able to sell this second lot to the spouses Jose
Bemardo and Rosa B. Payumo, as evidenced by a "Kasulatan ng BilihangTuluyan
(VentaAbsoluta)" dated December 11, 1985.12
Petitioner added that in view of the sale of the second lot, the issue of respondent's status as lessee
thereof should be addressed to the new owners. Hence, petitioner maintained that respondent's
tenancy status over the second lot must be excluded from the present dispute, and that the
complaint should be limited to the first lot.13
Pursuant to an order issued by the Provincial Adjudicator on May 6, 1992, DARAB Legal Officer
Homer M. Abraham, Jr. conducted an ocular inspection of Lot Nos. 1923 and 2025. A second ocular
inspection was conducted on September 14, 1992 since it appeared that respondent was not duly
notified of the prior inspection.
Thereafter, on Nov. 5, 1992, the Provincial Adjudicator granted petitioner's prayer for a restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction.
In due course, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered judgement on May 3, 1993 and disposed of the
case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgement is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Felix Pascual and against defendant Victor Solis:
1. Maintaining plaintiff in peaceful possession over the subject landholdings;
2. Making the restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
SO ORDERED.14
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled that respondent was not a tenant of the disputed lots, despite the
existence of the leasehold agreements and Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold. The evidence
adduced by the parties clearly indicated that respondent was not in possession of the lots and did
not personally cultivate the landholdings, much less, share the proceeds of the harvest with
petitioner.
Respondent appealed to the DARAB, which reversed the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator. The
DARAB held that the contracts and certificates are the best evidence of a tenancy relation and that,
without a final court judgement dispossessing respondent on grounds authorized by law, respondent
could not be ejected from the land. The DARAB ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED,
and a new one entered:
1. Declaring Defendant-Appellant Victor Solis as a legitimate tenant and is entitled to
security of tenure;
2. Ordering Plaintiff-Appellee Felix Pascual to transfer and turn-over the possession of the
disputed property to herein Defendant-Appellant; and
3. The Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby revoked.
SO ORDERED.15
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB in toto.16 Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.17 Hence, the instant petition on the basic issue of
whether or not respondent was a tenant of the lands belonging to petitioner and, consequently,
entitled to security of tenure.
Initially, the question regarding respondent's tenancy status is factual in nature which is not proper in
a petition for review, where only questions of law may be entertained. However, after a careful
Page 12 of 19
examination of the evidence on record, there appears a compelling reason to modify the factual
findings below, since it appears that the appellate court and the DARAB failed to take into account
certain important considerations extant in the records.18
It appears that Lot Nos. 1923 and 2025 are registered in petitioner's name under OCT Nos. 1051
(M) and 4364 (M), respectively. Lot No.1923 is covered by Tax Declaration No.11383 and is
obviously the same lot described in the first tenancy agreement between petitioner and respondent,
for which CAL 023 was issued. Thus, with respect to this lot, there can be no question that a tenancy
relation was established between petitioner and respondent. Petitioner admitted the existence of the
leasehold contract and CAL 023 over Lot No.1923, which are the best evidence to show that a
leasehold relation has been established between petitioner and respondent. Thus, the real issue
over Lot No. 1923 is whether respondent may be ejected from this lot.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 384419 provides that once the leasehold relation is established, as in the case
of Lot No. 1923, the agricultural lessee cannot be ejected from the land unless authorized by the
court for causes provided by law. Under Section 37 of the same Act,20 the burden of proving lawful
cause for ejecting the lessee falls on the lessor/landowner. It is thus petitioner's duty to prove that
there were grounds for ejecting respondent from Lot No. 1923. Petitioner failed to discharge this
burden.
Petitioner alleged that respondent ceased to be a tenant of Lot No. 1923 because he failed to pay
the lease rentals for three consecutive years, and eventually abandoned the lot to work in Manila as
a jeepney driver. The DARAB and the Court of Appeals found these allegations not supported by
competent evidence. We agree.
The only evidence offered by petitioner to prove the non-payment of rentals is the affidavit of Simeon
Bartolome, where the latter declared:
5. Na naibalitasa akin ni G. Felix Pascual nasimulanoongtaong 1987 hanggangsataong
1989, si Victor Solis ay hindinanagbibigay ng buwissasaka, at noongtaong 1990 ay
tuluyanginiwan o inabandonani Victor Solis and nasabingsaka. x x x.21
As can be gleaned from the affidavit, Mr. Bartolome did not have personal knowledge of the fact that
respondent failed to pay the agreed rentals, but merely based his statement on information given to
him by petitioner himself.
Likewise, the sworn statement of Matias Santos is inconclusive to prove that respondent had indeed
abandoned the lot to work as a jeepney driver. Respondent explained that he drove a passenger
jeepney in between the planting and harvesting seasons, considering that the landholding is rain-fed
and planted to palay only once a year. This explanation is not inconsistent with Mr. Santos' sworn
declaration that respondent has been driving a jeepney in Manila since 1982.
As regards Lot No. 2025, there is nothing on record which shows that petitioner and respondent
entered into any lease agreement or that a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold was issued in
respondent's favor. The second contract and CAL 022, which respondent presented, referred to a
1.3- hectare farmland covered by OCT No. P-2780. Meanwhile, Lot No. 2025 is a 2.7456-hectare lot
registered under OCT No. 4364 (M). It is therefore evident that Lot No. 2025 is not the same
landholding over which respondent claims to be a tenant under the second contract and CAL 022.
Consequently, the appellate court and the DARAB erred in rendering judgment on the assumption
that these lots are one and the same. To repeat, the second contract and CAL 022 do not pertain to
Lot No. 2025. Hence, respondent cannot be declared a tenant of Lot No. 2025. No lease agreement
or certificate was adduced to prove that Lot No. 2025 is the same lot described in the second
contract and CAL 022.
Furthermore, there is an apparent absence of the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy
relationship between the parties over Lot No. 2025. For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that:
1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is
consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is
sharing of harvest or payment of rental.22
The findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and the ocular inspection indicate that respondent did not
personally cultivate the riceland portion of Lot No. 2025 or share its harvest proceeds with petitioner.
Petitioner did not consent to a leasehold arrangement with respondent over Lot No. 2025, as shown
by petitioner's filing of complaint below to enjoin respondent from encroaching and planting thereon.
Accordingly, respondent is not a de jure tenant of Lot No. 2025, thus, he is not entitled to security of
tenure relative to this lot.
As to the 1.3-hectare land subject of the second contract and CAL No. 022, petitioner contends that
this lot was already sold to the spouses Payumo in 1985. Therefore, the issue of respondent's
tenancy status over the 1.3- hectare agricultural lot covered by the second contract and CAL 022 is
not proper for disposition in this case. Petitioner is no longer the owner of this lot and will not, thus,
be benefited or prejudiced by any declaration made herein, recognizing respondent as its bona fide
tenant. The claim of tenancy over this lot should be directed against the new owners/vendees, who
are subrogees to the rights and obligations of the agricultural lessor/vendor.23
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41542 is MODIFIED. Respondent is declared a lawful
tenant of Lot No.1923, and petitioner is ORDERED to maintain respondent in peaceful possession
and cultivation thereof. On the other hand, respondent is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from entering
into, encroaching or cultivating Lot No. 2025.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Page 13 of 19
G.R. No. 122256 October 30, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL CORPORATION, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:p
Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao
del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A.
No. 6657). Private respondent's certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
The lands were valued by the Land Bank of the Philippines at P19,312.24 per hectare for the
riceland and P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It appears, however,
that in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings ("LISTASAKA") which private respondent had
earlier filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower "Fair Value Acceptable to
Landowner" was stated and that based on this statement, the Land Bank of the Philippines valued
private respondent's lands uniformly at P15,311.79 per hectare and fixed the amount of P390,557.84
as the total compensation to be paid for the lands.
Private respondent rejected the government's offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the
same crops were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought
before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992, sustained the
initial valuation made by the LBP.
On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional
Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Private respondent
prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its
petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latter's Revised Rules of Procedure, before
recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the RTC found that, in violation of the DARAB's
rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision
of the PARAD.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied on October 13, 1994.
Private respondent therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending that a
petition for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 §§56-57 falls under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of Appeals which, in its
decision 1 of October 4, 1995, set aside the order of dismissal of the RTC. Accordingly, the case was
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
In turn the government, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform, filed this petition for
review on certiorari, raising as the issue whether in cases involving claims for just compensation
under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must
first be made before a landowner can resort to the RTC under §57. Petitioners sustain the
affirmative proposition. They cite §50 of R.A. No. 6657 which in pertinent part provides:
§50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
(DENR). . .
and argue that the fixing of just compensation for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is
a "[matter] involving the implementation of agrarian reform" within the contemplation of this
provision. They invoke §16(f) of R.A. No. 6657, which provides that "any party who
disagrees to the decision [of the DAR] may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation," as confirming their construction of
§50.
The contention has no merit.
It is true that §50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform
matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform," except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is also true, however that §57 provides:
§57. Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation
to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The
Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts,
unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
Page 14 of 19
 Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and
exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." 2 The provision of §50 must be construed in harmony with
this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and
criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power
conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an
administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain
(for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus in EPZA
v. Duly 3 and Sumulong v. Guerrero 4 we held that the valuation of property in eminent
domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies,
while in Scoty's Department Store v. Micaller 5 we struck down a law granting the then
Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial
Peace Act.
Petitioners also cite Rule II, §5 and Rule XIII, §1 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure in support of
their contention that decisions of agrarian reform adjudicators may only be appealed to the DARAB.
These rules provide:
Rule II, §5. Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Board shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter or affirm resolutions, orders, decisions,
and other dispositions of its [regional and provincial agrarian reform adjudicators].
Rule XIII, §1. Appeal to the Board. — a) An appeal may be taken from an order or
decision of the Regional or Provincial Adjudicator to the Board by either of the
parties or both, by giving or stating a written or oral appeal within a period of
fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the resolution, order or decision appealed
from, and serving a copy thereof on the opposite or adverse party, if the appeal is
in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by
the appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served upon the opposite or adverse
party within ten (10) days from the taking of oral appeal.
Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies
— rules of procedure cannot — it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB,
which was adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with
a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the Regional
Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus Rule XIII, §11 of the new rules provides:
§11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the
Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof.
Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis
supplied)
This is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just compensation cases for
the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power vested in the courts.
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their
taking. 6 Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes
an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held 7 and
afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the
case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the
landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special
Agrarian Court. 8 This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases
under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondent's case was properly brought by it
in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of
§57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." 9It would subvert this "original
and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases
in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from §57 that
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer
such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate
jurisdiction would be contrary to §57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered
to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to
landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.
WHEREFORE the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 15 of 19
G.R. No. 138289       July 31, 2001
GRACIANO PALELE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Fourth Division) and TOMAS SOBREVIÑAS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision,1 dated February 4, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals, reversing the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
which affirmed in toto the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Adjudication
Board of Bataan awarding two parcels of land to petitioner Graciano Palele.
The background of the case is as follows:
The properties involved in this case form part of a larger tract of land, referred to as Lot No. 707,
consisting of 9,939 square meters in Dinalupihan, Bataan. The original holder-cultivator of the lot
was respondent Tomas Sobreviñas’ father, Daniel, who had worked on the lot as a tenant since the
1920’s. After Daniel died, Tomas succeeded to the possession of the said land.
On May 2, 1962, private respondent filed an application with the Department of Agrarian Reform for
the purchase of Lot No. 707. He paid the purchase price of P810.66 in five installments and
completed payments on the land on September 7, 1973.2 However, despite his full payment of the
purchase price, no deed of sale was issued to him, and the lot remained the property of the
government.
In 1981, the lot was subdivided into four parcels, to wit:
Lot No. 2681 5,262 sq. meters
Lot No. 2682 563 sq. meters
Lot No. 2683 1,044 sq. meters
Lot No. 2679     3,070 sq. meters
TOTAL 9,939 sq. meters3
On September 25, 1990, petitioner applied for the purchase of Lot Nos. 2679 and 2683. On
December 19, 1991, the DAR issued to him Certificate of Land Ownership Award Nos. 2361 and
2362, covering Lot Nos. 2679 and 2683, respectively. Not knowing these incidents, private
respondent continued paying the real estate taxes on Lot No. 707. Upon learning of the issuance of
CLOAs in favor of petitioner, he filed on August 18, 1992 a petition for cancellation of the certificates.
The case was filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Adjudication Board of Bataan
or PARAD. On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed an amended petition for cancellation.
On September 23, 1993, the PARAD rendered judgment for petitioner. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. DECLARING protestant-petitioner to be disqualified to purchase the subject lots;
2. DECLARING TCT-CLOA 2362, covering Lot No. 2683, containing an area of 1,044 sq.
meters, located at Brgy. Luacan, Dinalupihan, Bataan, issued in the name of Graciano
Palele to be validly and correctly issued;
3. DIRECTING the Register of Deeds of Bataan to cancel TCT-CLOA No. 2361, covering
Lot No. 2679, containing an area of 3,071 sq. meters, located at Brgy. Luacan,
Dinalupihan, Bataan, issued in the name of Graciano Palele;
4. DIRECTING the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, Dinalupihan, Bataan to initiate the
conduct of a subdivision survey of the aforementioned Lot No. 2679, and thereafter issue a
new CLOA, covering 1,000 sq. meters of the same to Graciano Palele and the rest be
awarded to the actual occupants or to qualified beneficiaries as the case may be.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO DECIDED.4
Private respondent appealed to the DARAB, but the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the
PARAD.5 Consequently, private respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals
which, on February 4, 1999, reversed the decision of the DARAB and rendered judgment for private
respondent. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for review is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), affirming the decision of the Provincial Adjudication Board, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 2362,
covering lot 2683, and CLOA No. 2361, covering lot 2679, are ordered RECALLED and
CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.6
Page 16 of 19
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION) COMMITTED AN
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT TOMAS SOBREVIÑAS
ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT ON THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING WHICH IS A PART
OF THE DINALUPIHAN LANDED ESTATE.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION) COMMITTED AN
ERROR IN DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB, FOR BREVITY) AND THE
RULES AND POLICIES ISSUED BY THE LATTER.7
After due consideration of the records, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and
setting aside the decision of the DARAB.
First. At the time private respondent applied to purchase Lot No. 707 on May 2, 1962, the law in
effect was R.A. No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, which
took effect on August 30, 1954. Pursuant to the said law, the then Land Tenure Administration, the
implementing agency of the government, issued Administrative Order No. 2, which was approved on
May 10, 1956. So far as pertinent to this case, §§ 14 and 16 of the order provided:
Section 14. Persons Qualified to Purchase; Number of Lots Granted. – Subject to the
provisions of Section 16 hereof, any private individual who is qualified to acquire and
own lands in the Philippines and who will personally cultivate and/or occupy the lot
or lots which may be sold to him, may be allowed to purchase not more than one (1)
home lot and/or farm lot except that in case of farm lots with areas less than six (6)
hectares, more than one (1) lot may be purchased provided, however, that the total area of
the lots which may be sold to one person shall not exceed six (6) hectares.
The cultivation of a farm lot by the husband or wife of the purchaser thereof, and by the
members of the family of said purchaser who are dependent upon him or her for support
shall be considered as his or her cultivation for the purpose of this section and of Sections
24 and 25 hereof.
Section 16. Right of Preference to Purchase of Bona-fide Tenant, Bona-fide Occupant and
Other Persons. – The bona-fide tenant and in his absence or if he fails to qualify under
Section 14 hereof, the bona-fide occupant of a subdivision lot in a private agricultural land
acquired by the government shall have the right of preference to purchase said lot. In the
absence of the bona-fide tenant and/or bona-fide occupant or in case said tenant and
occupant fail to qualify under Section 14 hereof and subject to the provision of said section,
the following persons shall be preferred in the purchase of a farm lot and/or home lot, in the
order in which they are named:
(1) A person who is the purchaser of a farm lot or lots in an agricultural land acquired by the
government, the production of which yields a net profit insufficient to maintain a decent
standard of living provided, however, that he will be preferred only as to the portion of the
farm lot applied for in the same agricultural land which if added to the area of the lot or lots
already sold to him will not exceed six (6) hectares;
(2) A person who is a resident of the municipality where the lot applied for is located.8
These provisions clearly require that the applicant should personally cultivate and/or occupy the land
subject of the purchase. This requirement is reiterated in §§ 23 and 24 of the same order, viz:
Section 23. Execution of Deeds of Sale. – The Chairman of the Land Tenure Administration
shall execute a deed of sale conveying a subdivision lot in favor of the purchaser thereof
upon payment by the latter of all rentals for the use of the said lot which are found to be in
arrears, and of the selling price thereof in full, and upon the performance by said
purchaser of all conditions required herein and in any agreement to sell made in his
favor covering said lot. . . .
Section 24. Conditions in Agreements to Sell, Deeds of Sale and Torrens Title. – It shall be
a condition in all agreements to sell and deeds of sale covering lots acquired under these
rules and regulations that said lots shall be personally occupied and/or cultivated by
the purchasers thereof. In case of a home lot, a purchaser thereof shall be deemed not to
have complied with the condition therein set forth if within a period of two (2) years from the
execution of the agreement to sell or deed of sale for said lot, he fails to construct thereon
his place of residence. A purchaser of a farm lot who shall fail to start cultivation of said lot
within six (6) months after the execution of his agreement to sell or deed of sale shall be
deemed not to have complied with said condition. . . .9
Private respondent’s application to purchase Lot No. 707 was approved by the Land Tenure
Administration such that he was allowed to pay the purchase price on an installment basis. Hence,
at the time respondent applied to purchase Lot No. 707 on May 2, 1962, he was a qualified
purchaser in accordance with the law and its implementing rules, i.e., that he was personally
cultivating and/or occupying the lot being purchased.
However, private respondent admitted that he had not personally occupied and cultivated Lot No.
707 since August 8, 1963, more than a year after his application to purchase the lot, because he had
instituted tenants on his landholding. This is shown by the allegation in his comment on the petition
that the enactment on August 8, 1963 of R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, prevented him from ejecting the tenants on Lot No. 707.10 In other words, as early as
August 8, 1963, prior to his full payment of the purchase price of Lot No. 707, he had already failed
to comply with the requirement of personal cultivation and/or occupation of the lot being purchased
because he was allegedly prevented by law from ejecting the tenants thereon. However, contrary to
respondent’s claim, §36, paragraph (1) of R.A. No. 3844 provided for the ejectment of tenants on the
Page 17 of 19
ground that the landholder shall personally cultivate the land.11 It was only upon the amendment of
R.A. No. 3844 by R.A. 6839 on September 10, 1971 that personal cultivation as a ground for
ejecting an agricultural lessee was abolished.12
It cannot be denied that private respondent had ceased to personally occupy and cultivate Lot No.
707 at least on August 8, 1963. Only a year after his application and before he had fully paid the
purchase price of the land, private respondent had already instituted tenants on the said lot. This is
clearly indicative of his circumvention of applicable agrarian reform laws. The fact that in 1992 he
was surprised to know that the lot had already been subdivided into smaller parcels in 1981, two of
which had already been awarded to petitioner, indicates quite clearly that he was not personally
cultivating Lot No. 707. Thus, the Land Tenure Administration, and later the Land Authority, was
justified in refusing to issue a deed of sale in favor of respondent even though he paid in full the
purchase price of the lot.
While it is true that due process protects vested rights, and this Court would be the first to stress this
basic principle, it is no less true that the guarantee cannot be invoked when, as in the case at bar,
no right has been acquired at all because of non-compliance with the requirements of the law.13
Second. Respondent assails the finding of the PARAD, as affirmed by the DARAB, that petitioner
was not an agricultural tenant of Lot No. 707. However, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers of
Dinalupihan, Bataan certified that petitioner had succeeded his father, Joaquin, as the original
allocatee and tenant of the lot and that he was the actual occupant and cultivator of the parcels of
land later awarded to him. Additionally, in his Inventory Report, dated November 28, 1991, Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer Ernesto M. Dizon recommended the issuance to petitioner of the certificates
of land ownership award. These documents were presented before the PARAD.14 Indeed, petitioner
built his house on Lot No. 2679, which is adjacent to Lot No. 2683.15 This is significant because only
tenants are entitled to a home lot as an incident of their tenancy rights.16 Finally, in his motion for
reconsideration before the DARAB, private respondent made the following allegation in arguing that
petitioner has abandoned the landholding:
. . . Appellee should apply for the purchase of Lot 3-B-16 which he is actively cultivating,
and also the 3.5 hectare of Francisco Palele, in Bakong, Hermosa, Bataan. But why award
those two lots (2679 and 2683) to appellee when he is not a bona fide tenant thereof? To
be sure, respondent-appellee has violated Sec. 27 of R.A. 3844 in reference to prohibitions
against an agricultural lessee, one of which proscribes working on additional landholdings
belonging to another lessor without the knowledge and consent of his agricultural lessor (in
this case, the petitioner-appellant.)17
Thus, private respondent impliedly admitted that petitioner was indeed a tenant on the disputed lots.
Petitioner applied for the purchase of the two lots on September 25, 1990, at the time when R.A. No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, was already in effect.
Section 22 of that law provides:
SEC. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. -- The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as
much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof,
landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
....
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate
and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring
the record or performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence
or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as
beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the performance of the beneficiaries
to the PARC.
Pursuant to this provision, the DARAB, after finding petitioner to have the necessary qualifications,
issued to him CLOA Nos. 2361 and 2362, covering Lot Nos. 2679 and 2683, with areas of 3,071 and
1,044 square meters, respectively. However, as there were other occupants on Lot No. 2679, where
petitioner’s house was standing, CLOA No. 2361, which covered an area of 3,071 square meters,
was cancelled by the DARAB and a new one was issued covering only 1,000 square meters,
corresponding to the area awarded to petitioner as home lot in accordance with §24 of R.A. No.
3844. Memorandum Circular No. 1082 prescribes a maximum area of 1,000 square meters as home
lots for agricultural tenants.18
Third. It is nevertheless contended that petitioner in effect abandoned the landholdings by cultivating
the lot of his brother in Bakong, Hermosa, Bataan. This contention has no basis. As petitioner
explained, his failure to cultivate the lots during the pendency of his application and his temporary
cultivation of his brother’s lot in March 16, 1991 was due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which
adversely affected the condition of the soil on the assailed lots. Indeed, for abandonment to occur,
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the tenant must have unequivocally and absolutely relinquished his occupation and cultivation of the
lots. This is not so in this case. Petitioner continued to occupy Lot No. 2679 for residential and small
backyard farming purposes, despite the fact that the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo made it impossible for
him to continue with its cultivation. Moreover, under Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of 1983,
the alleged abandonment of the land by the tenant does not automatically terminate the tenancy
relationship as there must be a proper court declaration of such fact.19 In this case, such court
declaration of abandonment is wanting.

Likewise, petitioner’s cultivation of Lot No. 3-B-16, covering an area of more than one hectare, which
is owned by respondent’s family, does not pose any obstacle to petitioner’s acquisition of the lots in
question. The fact remains that petitioner is an actual cultivator of the two lots he had acquired. The
Court of Appeals thought it impossible for petitioner to cultivate the two disputed lots when he was
also cultivating Lot No. 3-B-16. This finding presupposes that it is only petitioner who is personally
cultivating the land. But the requirement of personal cultivation of the land does not apply to the
tenant alone. The law allows him to engage the assistance of his immediate farm household or
members of his family in tilling the land.20

In conclusion, there is no cogent reason to set aside the findings of the PARAD which were
affirmed in toto by the DARAB. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative
departments over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not
finality, by the courts.21

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, affirming the decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Provincial Adjudication Board for Bataan, is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

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