MONTILLA V.

ARRELLANO

Facts

• An information having was filed against Carlos M. Molina for homicide, the case was set for March
15, 1950. When it was called, the Provincial Fiscal appeared but not the accused nor any attorney
in his behalf. Upon motion of the prosecution, Honorable Francisco Arellano, the Judge presiding,
ordered the defendant arrested and his bond confiscated. Immediately after that order was dictated,
the accused appeared with his counsel, Attorney Remigio M. Peña who explained that he and his
client had come from the town of Isabela and the road was muddy, in answer to the court's question
why the defendant had arrived late. Attorney Peña having moved for the reconsideration of the
order of arrest and confiscation of the bond, Judge Arellano set aside said order and in its place
fined the accused P5.00.
• When the Judge Arellano asked Atty. Peña if the accused is ready for trial, Atty. Peña insisted that
they were not yet ready due to time constraints, he was engaged by the accused a few days before
the trial and was not able to carefully study the case to be able to cross examine the witness of the
prosecution which is a doctor. Another reason presented by Atty. Peña is that he was cited in the
sala of another judge to be a witness to another criminal case.
• The prosecution opposed due to the fact that their witness came from Iloilo and it would prejudice
him if the trial will be postponed due the unpreparedness on the part of the accused. Atty. Peña
insisted that they were not ready for trial and that he would rather withdraw from the case than go
to trial unprepared. Judge Arellano denied the withdrawal of Atty. Peña and continued with the
trial.

Issue

• Whether certiorari and not appeal was the proper remedy?

Ruling

• The proper remedy for the case was an appeal and not certiorari. Section 7 of the Rule 114 provides
that "After a plea of not guilty, except when the case is on appeal from the justice of the peace, the
defendant is entitled to at least two days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause shown
shall allow further time.
• Under this rule, accused is entitled as for right to at least two days to prepare for trial and a denial
of this right is a reversible error and a ground for a new trial. (People vs. Mejares et al., 85 Phil.,
727; People vs. Valte, 43 Phil., 907; McMicking vs. Schields, 41 Phil., 971, reversed by the United
States Supreme Court, 238 U. S. 99, 59 Law ed. 1220, on the ground that the defendant's remedy
was by appeal and not in a proceeding in habeas corpus.)
• "The refusal of a trial court to give to the defendant in a criminal action, when demanded by him,
the two days in which to prepare for trial . . ., such provision being mandatory and imperative,
leaving no discretion the court, deprives the accused of a constitutional right, namely, a right to
trial by due process of Law, and habeas corpus will lie release him from imprisonment imposed
under a judgment of conviction in such case. A trial without opportunity to prepare for it given by
 the law of the land in a statute whose terms are mandatory and imperative, is no trial at all, and a
conviction based upon such trial is without anything to sustain it.
• The Court is unanimous in the opinion that the court erred in allowing over the objection of the
defendant the taking of Dr. Caram's testimony, for it thereby violated the defendant constitutional
right to due process. But an overwhelming majority also holds the view that the court acted within
its jurisdiction and for this reason, the error can only be attacked by appeal.
• If the parties wish the charges and counter-charges preferred against each other in the pleadings
acted upon, they are advised to make said charges in separate complaints in the form provided by
the Rules of Court.
 ARNAULT V. PECSON

Facts

• This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, assailing alleged refusal by the Court
of First Instance of Manila to grant the petitioner, who is confined in the Bilibid Prison for contempt
of the Senate, ample opportunity to prepare his defense in criminal case No. 12821 of that court, in
which he is charged with income tax evasion. In his prayer the petitioner asks that Judge Pecson,
the respondent judge, be commanded to allow him to go out of Bilibid Prison under guard to take
papers from his office in the Trade and Commerce Building on Calle J. Luna, Manila.

Issue

• Whether or not the accused judge committed an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error in not
granting the defendant's motion?

Ruling

• Yes. One of the most vital and precious rights accorded accused by the Constitution is due process,
which includes a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.
While the Constitution and the law of the land do not specify what this opportunity is to consist of,
beyond stating that accused shall have not less than two days to prepare for trial (section 7, Rule
114), it is by necessary implication within the court's sound discretion in exceptional cases to allow
him, besides time, adequate freedom of action, if the courts are to give form and substance to this
guaranty. Other judges conscious of this principle have allowed prisoners with proper safeguards
to leave the prison walls with the object of securing evidence, without in so doing exceeding the
bounds of their authority, of propriety, or legal procedure. Leave to go under guard outside the
prison or the courtroom would not, as feared, set dangerous precedent, for the matter is always
subject to the control and discretion of the court to be judged according to its merits.
• In the light of these circumstances, it would seem that the defendant has made a sufficient showing
to merit a favorable action on his request as a measure of necessity for an adequate preparation for
trial.
• The respondent judge committed an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error in not granting the
defendant's motion. By this refusal the defendant would be denied his fundamental right to a fair
and impartial hearing which the constitution assures him. When a request by a defendant charged
with crime for a chance to make his defense is reasonable and made in good faith and not for delay,
it is good policy to veer towards the liberal side avoiding refinements of argument that may serve
only to hide the substance of the issue. It is even greater importance to the cause of justice for courts
to deviate from the stereotyped technical rules of practice and lose a few hours than to run the risk
of depriving accused of the requisite opportunity to present this side of the controversy.
 PEOPLE V. NEBREJA

Facts

• This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 which
finds the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of Violation
of Section 3 (b) in relation to Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, and sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua), to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased for the damages.
• That on or about the 22nd day of March, 1988 in Pasay, Metro Manila the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, being armed with
handgun and bladed weapons, with intent to gain, by means of violence and intimidation on the
person of Paquito Duenas y Manalaysay and Romeo Duenas y de Guzman while both were on
board an owner-type jeep cruising F. Cruz, St., Malibay, a public highway, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest cash amount of P50,000.00 belonging to
the complainants, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforesaid amount of
P50,000.00. Due to the incident, Paquito Duenas y Manalaysay sustained mortal wounds which
caused his death, while Romeo Duenas sustained serious physical injuries.
• Upon arraignment, Guiraldo and Nebreja assisted by their counsel pleaded not guilty while the
other accused's true names and present whereabouts are still unknown.

Issue

• Whether or not the trial court erred in the application of the continuous trial system in too strict and
unbending manner that the rights of the accused had been prejudiced.

Ruling

• No, the trial court did not err in the application of the continuous trial system in too strict and
unbending manner that the rights of the accused had been prejudiced. The purpose of the continuous
trial system is to expedite the decision or resolution of cases in the trial court. Circular No. 1-89
(January 19, 1989) which laid down the guidelines in the conduct of the continuous trial, states that
"a strict policy on postponements shall be observed" and "the judge shall conduct the trial with
utmost dispatch, with judicious exercise of the court's power to control the trial to avoid delay."
• The non-appearance of the counsel de parte of both the accused during the hearings after his request
for postponement, and the fact that he could not present their witnesses were the reason for the
lower courts order to consider the case submitted for decision. The appellant has not shown any
meritorious reason for an extension of the proceedings. Also, the claim that he was not assisted by
counsel will not lie as the appellant was still represented by counsel as of that date despite his
counsel's non-appearance.
 PEOPLE V. MACEDA

Facts

• In the morning of 11 February 1986, the late ex-Governor of Antique, Evelio Javier, was gunned
down in the plaza of San Jose, Antique.
• Atty. J.T. Barrera filed a motion for admission to bail on behalf of private respondent (accused).
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe filed his opposition thereto, alleging that private
respondent was charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murders and
that the evidence of guilt is strong; hence, he is not entitled to bail as a matter of right.
• Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe filed a motion to discharge accused Oscar Tianzon to
be utilized as a state witness, alleging that there is an absolute necessity for his testimony against
all the accused; that there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offenses except the testimony of said accused, which can be substantially corroborated in its
material points by other evidence
• The prosecution adduced its evidence in support of the motion; however, respondent Judge deferred
the resolution of the motion. Thereupon, the prosecution moved that the presentation of its evidence
in opposition to private respondent's petition for bail be likewise deferred on the ground that
accused Oscar Tianzon is a material witness against private respondent and that his testimony is
necessary for the purpose of determining private respondent's qualification for bail, i.e., whether
the evidence of guilt is strong.
• Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the orders dated 3, 7 and 8
August 1989, claiming that said orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and prohibition
to enjoin the respondent Judge from hearing private respondent's petition for bail until he has
resolved the motion to discharge accused Oscar Tianzon, and praying that a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order be issued.

Issues

• Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders.
• Whether the respondent Judge should be disqualified from further hearing Crim. Cases Nos. 3350-
3355

Ruling

• No. The Court finds that respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion, i.e., that he
did not act "arbitrarily", "capriciously" or "despotically" amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the questioned orders of 3, 7 and 8 August 1989. The Court is aware of certain reasons
why accused Javellana should not be placed in the Provincial Jail. The court was left with no other
choice but to entrust his custody to the Provincial Probation Officer to escort him to Iloilo City for
a medical check-up. It is the perception of the court that there are movements going ground, by
whom is unknown yet to the court, to compel the incarceration of accused Javellana in the
Provincial Jail. The court abhors this situation and the court will not be intimidated by anyone. It
is the perception of this court that even its lawful orders have somehow been subverted. The court's
 perception of the circumstances presently obtaining on the custody and place of detention of
Javellana is a hot agenda and of grave importance, particularly his safety and well being during
detention in order that the court can try him on the charges against him. The Court, however, holds
that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he insisted in continuously hearing private respondent's petition for bail and in
ordering the arrest and commitment of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. It is well to recall that
in the restraining order issued on 31 August 1989, this Court ordered the respondent Judge to cease
and desist from continuing the hearing on private respondent's petition for bail until after he had
resolved the motion for discharge of Oscar Tianzon as state witness. Although the aforesaid motion
had already been denied in the order of 1 September 1989, nevertheless, the prosecution had filed
a motion to reconsider the said order which is still pending resolution. Hence, the said motion has
not yet been resolved with finality. When respondent Judge, therefore, denied the prosecution's
motion for deferment of the scheduled hearings on private respondent's petition for bail and in
proceeding to hear the said motion, by ordering the prosecution to present its evidence — which
precipitated the walk-out of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and his consequent arrest and
commitment to the Provincial Jail — he (respondent judge) was acting in violation of the restraining
order issued by this Court.
• And now to the question on whether or not respondent Judge should be disqualified from further
hearing Crim. Cases Nos. 3350-3355, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides: No judge
or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules
of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the records.
A judge, may in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. In the case at bar, the reason relied upon
for the inhibition or disqualification of respondent Judge, i.e. manifest partiality to private
respondent, is not based on any of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule
137 which per se disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case, but on the second paragraph thereof.
The settled rule is that the judge is left to decide for himself whether he will desist, for just or valid
reasons, from sitting in a case. Respondent Judge has not as yet decided whether or not he will
inhibit himself from further hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 in the face of the prosecution's
motion to disqualify or inhibit him. It would be premature for the Court at this stage to rule on the
matter.
 REYES V. CA

Facts

• In an information filed with the RTC of Bulacan and later assigned to Branch 22 thereof as Criminal
Case No. 9252-M, petitioner Zenaida Reyes was accused of falsifying a deed of sale of four (4)
parcels of land “by feigning and signing the name of Pablo Floro, who could not affix his signature
anymore due to age infirmity, on the said document as seller and causing it to appear that Floro had
participated in the execution of the said document when in fact, as said accused well knew, said
deed of sale was not executed and signed by the said Pablo Floro, nor did he ever appear before
any notary public for the purpose of acknowledging in the deed.
• Hearings were scheduled for the presentation of petitioner’s evidence on six different dates, to wit:
(1) February 6, 1989; (2) March 10, 1989; (3) April 12, 1989; (4) May 17, 1989; (5) June 5, 1989,
and (6) July 10, 1989. Petitioner was absent thrice, i.e., on February 6 1989, April 12, 1989, and
July 10, 1989. On the first date, petitioner could not come because she was sick and her counsel so
informed the court. She was absent also on June 5, 1989 and July 10, 1989 because of illness
(hypertension and rheumatism). Thus, while petitioner’s absences were explained, those of her
counsel were not.
• The court declared petitioner to have waived the right to present her evidence. Petitioner then gave
a medical certificate which the court noted the said certificate but maintained its previous order on
the ground that the same is not a motion and as counsel was also not in court during the last hearing
to the effect that the presentation of defense evidence is considered waived.
• Petitioner by herself moved for reconsideration. However, it was denied by the court. Hence, the
court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of falsification.

Issues

• Whether petitioner’s repeated failure to proceed with the trial of the case amount to a waiver of her
right to present evidence.

Ruling

• No. The postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence of a party is a
manner which lies in the discretion of the trial court, but it is a discretion which must be exercised
wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view to doing
substantial justice. In the case at bar, hearings were scheduled for the presentation of petitioner’s
evidence on six different dates, to wit: (1) February 6, 1989; (2) March 10, 1989; (3) April 12,
1989; (4) May 17, 1989; (5) June 5, 1989, and (6) July 10, 1989. Petitioner was absent thrice, i.e.,
on February 6 1989, April 12, 1989, and July 10, 1989. On the first date, petitioner could not come
because she was sick and her counsel so informed the court. She was absent also on June 5, 1989
and July 10, 1989 because of illness (hypertension and rheumatism). Thus, while petitioner’s
absences were explained, those of her counsel were not. Atty. Tenorio simply disappeared without
a trace, despite warning to counsel that her failure to present evidence for her client on June 5, 1989
would be considered a waiver of the latter’s right to present her evidence. But counsel failed to
heed the warning. Petitioner had to soldier on and, by herself, had to plead with the court for a
chance to present her evidence. Contrary to what the appellate court thought in affirming
petitioner’s conviction, this was not the case of a woman who treated the criminal proceedings
against her with cavalier disdain. Indeed, we do not think that petitioner’s absences were so many
capricious, or egregious as to indubitably indicate an attempt to stall the proceedings of the criminal
case as was the case in People v. Angco and People v. Dichoso. Petitioner might have tried to delay
the filing of her appellant’s brief, but her effort can be attributed to an understandable desire to be
allowed to present her evidence. Hence, the filing of a motion for new trial. Even in her present
petition before this Court petitioner’s prayer is not that she be exonerated but only that she be given
the chance to prove her innocence by being allowed to present her evidence. Keeping in mind that
this case involves personal liberty, the negligence of counsel was certainly so gross that it should
not be allowed to prejudice petitioner’s constitutional right to be heard. The judicial conscience
certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just
because the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid application
of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice where justice is due to secure to every
individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime with which he or she might
be charged.
 MARCOS VS. RUIZ

Facts

• After conducting a preliminary investigation, Asst. Fiscal of Tagbilaran City filed to RTC Bohol 2
information against Marcos for violation of BP 22.
• Marcos appeared during the scheduled arraignment but asked for resetting because his lawyer has
just withdrawn from the case. The court granted his request.
• Later, Marcos was able to settle his obligation with the complainants and the latter executed an
Affidavit of Desistance. Because of that, Asst. City Fiscal filed a Motion to Dismiss the case
because without the testimony of the complainants who withdrew, he cannot successfully prosecute
the case.
• During the arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty. When the case was called for hearing, Marcos
and his lawyer already left. The prosecution proceeded in the presentation of its evidence and rested
its case.
• Because Marcos did not attend the trial, the court forfeited his bail bond. Counsel explained that he
was unable to attend the trial because he had attended urgent matter which needed his personal
attention. He also explained that Marcos left in belief that there would no presentation of evidence
since an Affidavit of Desistance was already filed before the court.
• Essentially, the 2nd information was the same as the 1st so the counsel of the accused offered that
reading of information is waived and plea of not guilty be directly entered.

Issue

• Whether the court erred in forfeiting the petitioner’s bail bond for his non-appearance during trial.
Stated otherwise, what are the instances where the presence of the accused during trial is
indispensable? May a counsel enter a plea in behalf of the accused?

Ruling

• The forfeiture of the bail bond was inappropriate. A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances
where the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court of the ROC and, despite due
notice to the bondsmen to produce him before the court on a given date, the accused fails to appear
in person as so required.
• Under the ROC, the accused has to be present: 1. at the arraignment pursuant to par. (b), Section 1,
Rule 116; 2. at the promulgation of judgment, except when conviction is for a light offense, in
which case the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative
pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 120, or unless promulgation in absentia is allowed under 3rd
paragraph of said Section; and 3. when the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will
identify the accused.
• Thus, the petitioner's appearance was not required at the subject trial. It is true that he has the right
to be present at every stage of the proceeding (from arraignment to promulgation), but he can waive
his presence. The failure of the accused to appear at the trial despite due notice and without
 justification is deemed an express waiver of his right to be present. As such, the trial may proceed
in absentia.
• With regard to the 2nd information, the court made no ruling on the manifestation and offer by
petitioner's counsel that the reading of the information is waived and a plea of not guilty is entered.
The petitioner was neither made to confirm the manifestation nor directed to personally make the
plea. There was no valid arraignment as it is required that the accused would personally enter his
plea.
 LUMANLAW VS. PERALTA

Facts

• Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police District for illegal possession of a
dangerous drug in the form of (0.011) grams of white crystalline substance known as SHABU.
Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet Lumanlaw remained uninformed
of the charges against him, while continuing to be in detention and despair all throughout that period
of limbo. Petitioner’s counsel manifested his intention to file a motion to dismiss on the account of
the violation of his client’s right to speedy trial. In totality, petitioner herein points out the fourteen
postponements over the course of the case, that resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two
years.

Issue

• Whether or not there was a violation of the right to speedy trial, therefore warranting a quashal of
the Information against petitioner.

Ruling

• NO. The Court held in the negative. After reviewing the other reasons for the postponements in
this case, the Court finds them far from being reasonable. Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal
proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of the charges against them. A perusal of
the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process.
Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial. Petitioner cites Section 2 of
Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as
"The Speedy Trial Act of 1998"), which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days
from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused.
• An arraignment consists simply of reading to the accused the charges leveled against them, ensuring
their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and resolute
judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are presented before the court.
Furthermore, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
• In the case at Bar, respondent judge’s postponement of the arraignment on August 6, 2003, had no
substantial basis. Thus, the postponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioner’s counsel,
became unreasonable and ultimately attributable to respondent’s inflexibility as regards
contingencies.
 CORPUZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts

• The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioners
Antonio H. Roman, Sr. and Marialen C. Corpuz, the President and Vice-President of FILSYN
Corporation, respectively, and several others.
• The petitioners, the Undersecretary of Finance Antonio P. Belicena, and the officers of the Petron
Corporation, were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, involving the
so-called tax credit scam.
• Aside from the aforestated case, there are another sixty-one (61) similar Informations were filed by
the Office of the Ombudsman against some fifty (50) public officials and private individuals
relating to the issuance of tax credit certificates.

Issue

• Whether or not the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and
to a speedy trial.

Ruling

• The Court held in the affirmative. No less than Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The judicial bodies envisaged in the said provision include
the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
• Applying Rule 115, Section 1(h) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this further provides
that the accused has the right to have a speedy, impartial and public trial. The said rule requires that
the arraignment of the accused should be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided by special
law or unless excusable delays as provided in Rule 119, Section 10 of the Rules are attendant.
• The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such
right is not susceptible by precise qualification. That said, the concept of a speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
• In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for
the delay; (c) the defendants’ assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
• Applying the above, there can be no denying the fact that the petitioners, as well as the other
accused, was prejudiced by the delay in the reinvestigation of the cases and the submission by the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor of his report thereon. So was the State. The People has yet to prove
the guilt of the petitioners of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. We agree with the ruling
of the Sandiganbayan that before resorting to the extreme sanction of depriving the petitioner a
chance to prove its case by dismissing the cases, the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor should be
ordered by the Sandiganbayan under pain of contempt, to explain the delay in the submission of
his report on his reinvestigation.
 PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE

Facts

• Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for the
lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he filed an application
for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition, and claiming
the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
• The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course of
appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick
pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
• On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the conditions
justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when
the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.

Issue

• Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of
Leviste.

Ruling

• NO. The Court herein held in the negative, applying Sec 5 of Rule 114, thus stating that bail is
discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment. Furthermore, applying the third paragraph of the same rule if the
penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other circumstances:
1. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; 2. That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; 3.
That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; 4. That the
circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or 5. That there is
undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. Lastly, that bail
is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed
grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion.
 GALVEZ V. CA

Facts

• On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate information with homicide and
two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and
seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
• On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex
Parte Motion to Withdraw Information of the original information. This motion was granted by
Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the
docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new information against
herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
• Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new information for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners
before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners
on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash.
• In the meantime, prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration to Judge Villajuan that the reinstatement of the original
information be granted. Judge Villajuan granted the MR.
• On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari, petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.

Issue

• Whether or not the ex parte motion to withdraw the original information is null and void on the
ground that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court.

Ruling

• NO. The Court held in the negative considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the
trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was
filed and granted before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and
hearing thereof.
• In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three
information but the filing of four new information, three of which charge graver offenses and the
fourth, an additional offense. Had this new information not been filed, there would obviously have
been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural
lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to
3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position.
 PEOPLE V. MARCIAL

Facts

• The respondents, all members of the Philippine National Police, were charged with homicide and
frustrated homicide in connection with a shooting incident which killed Junnyver Dagle and
seriously injured Wendell Sales.
• On arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against them. Pre-trial was
thereafter held and terminated. During the hearing held on February 6, 2002, petitioner made an
oral motion to reverse the order of the trial upon the ground that respondents admitted committing
the acts for which they were charged in the two informations but interposed lawful justifying
circumstances. The motion was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Its motion for reconsideration
having been similarly denied. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue

• Whether the trial court erred in denying petitioner's request for a reverse order of trial.

Ruling

• No. Rule 119, Section 3(e) states that “When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.” In
this case, the RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying the request for a reverse order of
trial, a matter which under the rules is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The RTC
correctly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's request for a reverse order of trial. In any
event, a denial of a motion to reverse the Order of Trial is interlocutory in nature and, hence, not
appealable. As it turned out, petitioner's appeal has in fact caused more, a lot more, delay than
would have been caused by proceeding with the trial forthwith as directed by the trial court. No
further delay should be countenanced in these cases.
 VINO VS. PEOPLE

Facts

• The petitioner, Lito Vino, together with Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder for the death
of Roberto Tejada. It was alleged that after two gunshots, the victim’s father, Ernesto heard Roberto
crying out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot, asking and calling for help. With this, he
and Julius, the victim’s brother, went down to meet Roberto. After meeting Roberto, the two, saw
Vino and Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle
while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch
Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.
• Salazar’s case was endorsed to the Judge Advocate General's Office as he was a member of the
military, while the case against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an information charging
Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court. Upon arraignment, the accused Vino
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss
for insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an answer. The RTC found Vino guilty
as an accessory to the crime of murder. He filed for a motion for reconsideration before the CA but
said court only affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, Vino petitioned for review.
• During the pendency of the appeal in the CA, the case against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded
to the civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He was later charged with murder
in the same RTC. In a supplemental pleading, the Court was informed that the RTC acquitted
Salazar.
• The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The Court then resolved to deny the
petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the present motion for reconsideration.

Issue

• Whether a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the
alleged principal in a separate proceeding.

Ruling

• Yes. In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled
that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority
or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the
crime was in fact established. Further, in United States vs. Mendoza, where the Court held in an
arson case that the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory
where it was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident.
Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.
• In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner
as an accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the
same offense had been proven in the separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal.
However, Salazar was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who
convicted Vino as an accessory. The acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of
the prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he was not
positively identified as the person who was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.
Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as
two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the
case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he
was positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the
trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability
as such an accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of
the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material significance
for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the
responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.
 PEOPLE VS. WEBB

Facts

• Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in a criminal case for Rape with
Homicide. During the course of the proceedings in the RTC, respondent filed a Motion to Take
Testimony by Oral Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of five (5) citizens
and residents of the United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines in
Washington D.C. and California. This is in lieu of presenting them as witnesses in court alleging
that the said persons are all residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by
subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them. He claims that the oral depositions
of the individuals whose testimonies are allegedly "material and indispensable" to establish his
innocence of the crime charged.
• The RTC denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not allowed by Section
4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent elevated
his cause to the Court of Appeals which later granted his petition. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

Issue

• Whether the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take testimony by
oral depositions in the United States which would be used in the criminal case before her Court.

Ruling

• No. Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court states that “The court may stop the
introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so
full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally
persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution.”
• It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign
witnesses is "to foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of
Defense Exhibits "218" and "219"." This issue has, however, long been rendered moot and
academic by the admission of the aforementioned documentary exhibits by the trial court in its
order dated July 10, 1998. In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence
to be obtained through the deposition-taking would be superfluous or corroborative at best. The
RTC cannot be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondent's motion considering that under
the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in
his defense. Certainly, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to
present his side. Whether or not the respondent-accused has been given ample opportunity to prove
his innocence and whether or not a further prolongation of proceedings would be dilatory is
addressed, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Under the circumstances,
the Court sustains the proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she
decides that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the United States could not possibly
add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved. There is no showing or allegation that
the American public officers and the bicycle store owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb as
the very person mentioned in the public and private documents. Neither is it shown in this petition
that they know, of their own personal knowledge, a person whom they can identify as the
respondent-accused who was actually present in the United States and not in the Philippines on the
specified dates.
 JOSEPH VS. VILLALUZ

Facts

• The petitioners, James Joseph, Miguel Romulo, Antonio Santamaria, Ramon Ignacio Moran,
Eugenio Lopez III, and Jaime Claparols Jr., were charged by Noemi L. Garcia with the crime of
multiple rape. The petitioners Jaime Claparols, Jr. and Ramon Ignacio Moran were also charged
with another offense of multiple rape by the same complainant. Upon arraignment, the accused-
petitioners entered a plea of not guilty in both cases.
• After the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence in chief, the petitioners
Claparols, Jr., Romulo, Santamaria, Joseph and Moran filed a motions to dismiss while Lopez filed
a motion to acquit. The respondent judge, Hon. Onofre Villaluz, heard the oral arguments who then
later denied the motions. He also denied the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the petitioners
filed a motion asking for separate trial for each accused which was denied by the respondent judge
as well as their verbal motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for prohibition, certiorari
and mandamus with preliminary injunction and/or petition for habeas corpus.

Issue

• Whether the petitioners Motion for separate trial be granted.

Ruling

• Yes. Section 8, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court provides that, “When two or more defendants are
jointly charged with any offense they shall be tried jointly unless the court. n its discretion upon
motion of the fiscal or any defendant orders separate trials. In ordering separate trials, the court y
order that one or more defendants be each separately tried, or may order that several defendants be
jointly tried in another trials, or may order that each defendant be separately tried.”
• The foregoing provision does not state when the application or separate trial may be made. As a
matter of law, the granting of a separate trial when two or more defendant are jointly barged with
an offense is discretionary with the trial court. Considering the established circumstances, the cause
of the State would not be jeopardized by the granting of separate trials to the accused. Inasmuch as
the petitioners are said with capital offenses, great care should be taken the evidence of one should
not prejudice the others. It appears they have different defenses which may be antagonist to each
other. in the interest of justice, this Court a separate trial may be granted even after f the prosecution
as finished presenting its evidence in chief. It is understood, however, that the evidence in chief of
the prosecution shall remain in the record as evidence against al the petitioners. It is not necessary
for the prosecution to adduce all over again its evidence in chief in each separate trial of the accused.
In the separate trial of the accused, only the accused presenting evidence has to be present.
 PEOPLE VS. FERRER

Facts

• April 27, 1976, Florante Agtang, Apolonio Villanueva and Oscar Viernes, three young men from
Dolores, Quirino, Isabela, went together to barangay Vintar of the same municipality and a
neighboring barrio, to visit ladies of their court — Florante Agtang to the house of one Ester Galasi
and Oscar Viernes to the house of one Leticia Gambalan. Apolonio Villanueva preferred to go with
Oscar Viernes and stayed in the house of Leticia after they conducted Agtang to the house of Ester.
• At about 10:00 o'clock that same evening, Florante Agtang dropped by the house of Leticia where
his companions were and bade the duo for all of them to go home. They all went together
homebound when upon reaching the outskirts of barangay Vintar, after they had just passed an
Independent Church not far from the house of Leticia, they heard a whistle and two men emerged
from nowhere and warned them not to run away. The trio stopped and identified themselves. The
two unidentified persons approached and frisked them for hidden weapons with one of the two
pointing a long firearm at them. Apolonio and Oscar were found to be carrying knives while
Florante was divested of a homemade-gun known as "paltik". Proceeding further as they were
ordered to follow, they came upon a place near a cornfield where four (4) more persons emerged,
one of whom was identified as the accused Tomas Agner. Apolonio was able to flee as he was
frightened by their captors that they would use the knife confiscated from his possession to kill
them. Running as fast as he could, he was shot at but they missed him. Infuriated because of
Apolonio's escape, they started beating Florante and Oscar before they reached a river bank. They
were ferried across the river and upon reaching the Magsaysay-Quirino boundary near the proposed
railroad, the two were again ordered to remove their clothes with which they used to tie them. After
they were tied a certain Doming hit Florante with a butt of the gun felling him to the ground as a
result. Florante lying fallen, Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes took turns in stabbing their hapless
victim. They waylaid Florante and the group left him where he was slain, including Oscar Viernes
who was released but was forewarned not to reveal what happened to anyone.

Issue

• Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of the crime charged notwithstanding
the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the testimony of their
former co-accused.

RULING

• No. Apolonio Villanueva was a prosecution witness but not a state witness. Under Section 9 of
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a state witness is one of two or more persons jointly charged with
the commission of a crime but who is discharged with his consent as such accused so that he may
be a witness for the State. He shall only be discharged after the court has required the prosecution
to present evidence and his sworn statement at a hearing in support of the discharge and the court
is satisfied that the requirements of Section 9 are present.
• In this case, Apolonio Villanueva was not an accused. Having been in the company of Agtang when
he was killed, Villanueva was presented by the prosecution as a witness. It was Tomes Agner who
was originally included as an accused in the information, but before the start of the hearing, he was
discharged as an accused upon the motion of the prosecution in order that he could testify for the
state. While the procedure undertaken in discharging him may be questioned because the trial court
ordered his discharge even before the prosecution had started presenting evidence, it is safe to
assume that said court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, considered as basis for his discharge
the sworn statement Agner executed before the police. Moreover, his discharge was effected upon
the motion of the trial fiscal who, being in possession of evidence ahead of the court and even the
defense, was best qualified to determine who among the accused should be discharged to be a state
witness.
• Be that as it may, any legal deficiency attending Agner's discharge from the information may not
affect the admissibility and credibility of his testimony in the absence of proof to the contrary.36
The trial court, upon which is vested the task of assigning probative value to the testimony of a
witness, affixed the stamp of credibility upon the testimony of Agner while treating it with "extreme
caution."3 7 In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case,
the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal.
• The Solicitor General correctly points out that the alleged discrepancy was clarified during the
redirect examination of Villanueva when he testified that he recognized appellants as the ones who
first whistled at his group but that he could not recognize the companions of Agner who emerged
from the banana plantation.
• The trial court correctly held that treachery qualified the killing of Agtang and that appellants shall
be held responsible for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There is treachery
because Agtang was tied and therefore in a helpless condition before he was killed.
 US VS. ABANZADO

Facts

• In the month of November, 1911 in the barrio of Hinlayagan, municipality of Talibon, Bohol
Province, the seven defendants and appellants first above named killed a neighbor named Sixto
Lota, together with his wife and three small children.
• It appears that these men believed or suspected that Lota was a "bad man," a kind of a wizard, who
kept in his possession a "barang," a mysterious and deadly insect which can be taught to seek out
and kill or injure anyone who has the ill-will of the owner. The leading spirit in the commission of
the crime was Pantaleon Abanzado, who gave some of the others small sums of money, ranging
from P4 to P9 for their assistance, and although not present himself when the killing took place,
worked out the plan in all its details which was followed by the others, acting under and in strict
compliance with his instructions. The party assembled at his house where they were supplied with
ropes. From there they went to the house of their victims, secured admission on the pretense that
they had come to buy tobacco, seized and tied that man and his wife and their three children, the
eldest of whom was not more than six or seven years of age, and dragged them by the ropes, tied
about their necks, to a stream called Cambinoy, where they were hastily buried in accordance with
the directions of Pantaleon Abanzado. On the way to the burial place the party came to a stream
called Canlagbason, and finding that by that time every member of the family except one child was
dead, one of the party held the still living child under the water until it was drowned.

Issue

• Whether or not the trial judge erred in the admission of the testimony of the accomplices.

Ruling

• No. There is no real or substantial conflict, then, between the provisions of section 2 of Act No.
2709 and the provisions of General Orders No. 58 on the same subject. Both recognize the judicial
discretion of the courts in the premises; and the express condition set forth in the later statute are
in substance and effect identical with those implied in the grant of discretion in the earlier law, for
the provisions of General Orders No. 58 should not be presumed to have amounted to a grant of an
arbitrary discretion to the trial courts, but rather a sound judicial discretion to be exercised with due
regard to the correct administration of justice.
• In the case at bar, the trial judge, although not consciously controlled by the provisions of the later
statute in the exercise of the discretion with which he was clothed, did in fact exercise his discretion
in conformity with the express and implied conditions contained in both statutes-and as we have
already indicated, an error in the exercise of that discretion, even if it appeared that there was such
error, would not justify or necessitate the reversal of the judgment of conviction of the defendants
not included in his order of dismissal.
• There is nothing in the statute which prescribes that after one of several accused persons have been
discharged by the trial judge in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon him by law, such
discharged person may not be used as a witness against his coaccused, even if it should develop
 that the trial had erred in the exercise of his discretion through inadvertence or for any other reason.
And certainly the testimony of one of several accused persons, who is discharged by the trial judge
in the exercise of the discretion with which he is clothed by law, in strict accord with the provisions
of section 2 of Act No. 2709, should not be held incompetent merely because the trial judge did not
have those provisions consciously in mind when he entered the order of discharge.
• The statute prescribes merely the conditions which should control the court in the exercise of its
discretion in discharging accused persons in order that they may be used as witnesses against their
coaccused; and we must look elsewhere to find the rules touching the competency, admissibility,
relevancy, and probative value of the testimony of these witnesses when it offered in evidence,
after they have been discharged by the court in order that they might be called as witnesses for the
prosecution.
 DELARMENTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts

• In 1977, petitioner Jose Sayson y Delarmente was a budget examiner, Ministry of Public Highways,
Region VII, Cebu City. In Lapu-Lapu Highway Engineering District, no vouchers were sent to the
regional office for counter-signature because all the vouchers were split into amounts of less than
P50,000.00. In the Danao City Highway Engineering Office, no voucher exceeded P50,000.00.
• Accused Delia Preagido y Comahig, an accountant assigned to the Ministry’s Region VII office,
was discharged from the information to be utilized as a state witness. She handled the journal of
collections and deposits, as well as the general journal. In the last week of January 1977, accused
Mangubat told her to stay after office hours and handed her the sum of P500.00, saying that her
salary was too small and that he would need her someday. Sometime February 1977 accused
Mangubat again told her to stay after office hours because they would go to a conference at the
Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City.
• It was agreed upon that on Saturdays accused Preagido, Cruz and Sayson would prepare and sell
the simulated LAAs at 26% of the gross amount. Accused Cruz and Sayson would be responsible
for negotiating the fake LAAs to contractors, district engineers and accountants of different cities.
Out of the 26% proceeds, 6% would go to the signatories of the fake LAAs, ¾ of 20% to the
regional office and ¼ of 20% to the central office people. The signatories on the fake LAAs were
accused Rolando Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez and Heracleo Faelnar. They started selling fake
LAAs in February 1977 until June 1978.

Issue

• Whether or not the Sandiganbayan grievously erred in discharging her as an accused and allowing
the prosecution to utilize her as a State witness.

Ruling

• Yes. Delia Preagido not a credible witness. She was convicted of several cases of estafa through
falsification of public documents and of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Her
discharge as an accused to be utilized as State witness was improper. She was one of the guiltiest.
In fact, she was given conditional pardon to induce her to testify against her co-accused. The
Sandiganbayan itself found her testimony against the other accused to be incredible. How come
that she was credible as against the petitioner? The Sandiganbayan erred in giving credence to her
testimony against petitioner.
• Indeed, the Sandiganbayan grievously erred in discharging her as an accused and allowing the
prosecution to utilize her as a State witness. Rule 119, Section 9 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, requires that in allowing an accused to be discharged to be a witness for
the State, the court must be satisfied that the accused does not appear to be the most guilty and that
he has not at any time been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude.
• As a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order to utilize
him as a prosecution witness rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. This discretion shall be
 exercised strictly on the basis of the conditions set forth in Rule 119, Section 9 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure. The court’s discretion is not absolute or arbitrary. Sound judicial discretion
must be exercised with due regard to the proper administration of justice. We consider it
unthinkable that the Sandiganbayan can so grossly violate the strict conditions set out in this Rule.
• In the discharge of a co-accused, the trial court may be reasonably expected to err. Where such
error is committed, however, the error in discharging such accused cannot affect the legal
consequences of his discharge. Neither may such error affect the quality of his testimony, if
otherwise credible.
• However, as heretofore stated, we find Delia Preagido not a credible witness. She implicated
petitioner to give a semblance of truth to her testimony. The Sandiganbayan found her testimony
incredible as against the other accused. There is no rhyme or reason to consider the same incredible
testimony credible against petitioner Sayson.
 YUN VS. RTC TAGAYTAY

Facts

• Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and his driver
Eduardo Constantino were abducted by several persons in Alabang, Muntinlupa, and brought
somewhere in Cavite where they were both shot to death. At about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
17 November 1994, the bodies of the two victims were dug up in a shallow grave at Barangay
Malinta, Sampaloc 2, Dasmariñas Cavite.1 Charged to investigate the abduction and killing was
the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). After having conducted a thorough investigation
of the case, the PACC filed charges before the Department of Justice (DOJ) entitled, "Task Force
Cabakid v. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon
and John Does."
• Petitioner and his wife, Patricia Lim-Yu, were also named respondents in I.S. No. 94-557. The
charges against them however were dropped for lack of evidence to establish probable cause.
Thereafter, an information was filed against several accused, namely private respondents Rodolfo
Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos among others, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, of
Tagaytay City presided by respondent judge.
• Petitioner, who is one of the accused in the criminal cases, claims that the orders were issued by
public respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, claiming that there is no legal basis or justification to discharge as state witnesses
accused Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos.

Issues

• Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred when it held that the discharge of an accused
is not a judicial function.
• Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred when it did not consider that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion when it discharged the accused despite the failure of the prosecution
to present evidence to show that the private respondents are entitled to be discharged as state
witness.

Ruling

• An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may
be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may
upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State
Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, Rule 119, Section 17,
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, upon which petitioner relies reads: Section 17.
Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may
direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses
for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of
 each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge. The discharge of an accused
under Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the prosecution in favor of the private respondents,
is distinct and separate from the discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act
No. 6981 is only one of the modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be a state
witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is another mode of
discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is granted by the DOJ while the
other is granted by the court. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
contemplates a situation where the information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned
and the case is undergoing trial. The discharge of an accused under this rule may be ordered upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case, that is, at any stage of the proceedings, from the
filing of the information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence.
• NO. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom
to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and
legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department
of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion
of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible
for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine
who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.
The discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981, only compliance with the requirement
of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure11 is required but not the
requirement of Rule 119, Section 17. An amendment of the information made before plea which
excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14,
Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies
in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when
it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
 PEOPLE VS. OCIMAR

Facts

• Accused Eduardo Labalan Ocimar, Alfonso Ramos Bermudez, Alberto Venzio Cruz and Alexander
Cortez Mendoza, together with Venzio Cruz alias "Boy Pana" and one John Doe alias "Bunso"
conspiring and confederating together did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation take, rob and carry away with them
cash money, jewelries and other valuables amounting to P36,100.00 more or less, belonging to the
passengers and driver of the Baliuag Transit, Alejandro de Jesus, while he was driving the said bus
along the North Expressway and that on the occasion thereof, the said accused, in furtherance of
their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
Capt. Cirilo Cañeba, an Army Officer thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which
directly caused his death.
• The trial court rendered judgment finding accused Eduardo Labalan Ocimar and Alexander Cortez
Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the violation of P.D. 532 and
accordingly sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua, and directing them jointly and severally
to indemnify the heirs of the late Capt. Cirilo Cañeba, Jr., the amount of P30,000.00 for his death,
P45,000.00 for funeral expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, and P720,000.00 representing
loss of expected support of the victim's heirs, plus the costs.
• Accused Ocimar and Mendoza are now before us on appeal.

Issue

• Whether or not the court erred in discharging accused Bermudez, who had earlier pleaded guilty to
the charge, to be utilized as a state witness.

Ruling

• NO. Sec. 9 of Rule 119, the trial court must be satisfied that the conditions prescribed by the rule
exist. The court, therefore, upon prior determination by the public prosecutor, retains the
prerogative of deciding when a co-accused may be discharged to become a state witness. With Sec.
9 providing the guidelines, the discharge of an accused depends on sound judicial discretion. Once
that discretion is exercised under those guidelines and a co-accused is discharged to become a state
witness, and subsequently testifies in accordance with his undertaking with the government, any
legal deficiency or defect that might have attended his discharge from the information will no
longer affect the admissibility and credibility of his testimony, provided such testimony is
otherwise admissible and credible.
• Sec. 9. Discharge at accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly charged
with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the
court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may
be witnesses for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
satisfied that: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
 requested: (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most
guilty; (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
• The matter of discharging a co-accused to become state witness is left largely to the discretion of
the trial fiscal, subject only to the approval of the court. The reason is obvious. The fiscal should
know better than the court, and the defense for that matter, as to who of the accused would best
qualify to be discharged to become state witness. The public prosecutor is supposed to know the
evidence in his possession ahead of all the rest. He knows whom he needs to establish his case.
 PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT

Facts

• On or about the 8th day of February 1994 at around 2:00 o' clock dawn, more or less, in the
Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by
means of violence against and intimidation upon persons, with intent to gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away without the consent of the owner
thereof one (1) gold necklace and Three Thousand Pesos (₱3,000.00) cash, Philippine Currency,
and one (1) blanket which were placed by the owner Spouses Simon Hermida and Corazon Manabat
Hermida on their wooden trunk, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner spouses Simon
Hermida and Corazon Manabat Hermida of said items and the cash aforestated; that by reason or
on occasion of the said robbery and for the apparent purpose of enabling the said accused to take,
steal and carry away the aforestated personal belongings of spouses Simon Hermida and Corazon
Manabat Hermida, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, armed with bladed
weapons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab the
spouses Simon Hermida and Corazon Manabat Hermida and inflicting upon them several injuries
which caused the said victims' death.
• Upon arraignment, accused-appellant Pedro Bariquit entered a plea of guilty while accused-
appellants Cristituto Bariquit, Emegdio Lascuña, Jr. and accused Baselino Repe, pleaded not guilty
to the charge.
• During trial, however, accused-appellant Pedro Bariquit withdrew his earlier plea of guilty and,
upon being re-arraigned, entered anew a plea of not guilty.

Issues

• Whether the trial court erred in giving weight and credit to the testimony of state witness Rogelio
Lascuña despite lack of corroboration in its material points.
• Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused appellants despite failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling

• As to the first assigned error, accused-appellants in effect assail the propriety of the discharge of
Rogelio Lascuña as state witness on the ground that Rogelio's testimony was not corroborated in
its material points, allegedly in violation of Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which enumerates the requisites of a proper discharge; The testimony of said accused
can be substantially corroborated in its material points. On this score, we are of the firm view that
the testimony of state witness Rogelio Lascuña was, in its material points, substantially
corroborated by the testimony of accused-appellant Baselino Repe, and the findings of Dr. Valentin
Ubas, who conducted and prepared the autopsy report of the victim spouses, and who testified
thereon during trial. Verily, corroborative evidence refers to additional evidence of a different kind
and character tending to prove the same point. Beyond this, long-settled is the rule that the discharge
 of a defendant, in order that he may be called to testify against his co-defendants, is within the
sound discretion of the court;60 the discharge of an accused in order that he may be utilized as a
state witness is expressly left to the sound discretion of the court. Indeed, the Court has the
exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist.62 For the law seeks
to regulate the manner of enforcement of the regulations in the sound discretion of the court. The
grant of discretion in cases of this kind under this provision was not a grant of arbitrary discretion
to the trial courts, but such is to be exercised with due regard to the correct administration of justice.
Under these circumstances, the trial court, in ordering the discharge of Rogelio Lascuña as state
witness, merely exercised its discretion in a manner consistent with the law and prevailing
jurisprudence.
• As to the second assigned error, accused appellants aver that the prosecution failed to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In support thereof, accused appellants question the admissibility of
the testimonies of the police officers who propounded questions and conducted the custodial
investigation without apprising them of their constitutional rights. Moreover, accused-appellants
argue that certain physical evidence such as the blanket, passbook, bolo, knife, necklace, Japanese
money, wallet, and cash are likewise inadmissible in evidence, since the same were recovered and
obtained by the police because of accused-appellants' uncounseled admission. After an exhaustive
perusal of the records, we find inadmissible the uncounseled extra-judicial admission of accused-
appellants, as well as the testimonies of the police officers pertaining thereto, for having been
obtained in clear violation of accused-appellants' rights enshrined in the Constitution.

END.