UT MMNOW THMOTHJEBMR Le aH STETopau Jlapuyosuh Musom Tumotujesuh SATAMIbEHA HWPOMLJIOCT MCTOPHJA PABHOTOPAIIA YAYUAHCKOFP KPAJA KIBHTA TPERA ATOHMUIA HW CJIOM. PATHE 1944. 1 1945. TOWMHA YAYAK - KPAJBEBO 2004.DARKENED PAST ; The history of the Ravna Gora Movement in the Caéak region Book Third Agony and the breakdown of war 1944 and 1945 SUMMARY The formation of the Ravna Gora Movement in the region of the Western Serbia, and upon it its spread within the main part where the Serbian people lived in Yugoslavia, metges completely with the events of the 27th March 1941, as well as with a short-term, unfinished April war. Yugoslavia was rapidly and effectively defeated; even during the clashes the territory was divided up, and mass treason of the Croatians and national minorities was astonishing. Soon huge pogroms of the Serbs outside the matrix, which was maximally restrained to the territory it had oc- cupied prior 1912 with the treats that it had no place in Hitler's Europe. started. Many assumed that for the Serbs apocalypse was inevitable. Apathy prevailed. Nonetheless, a small group of the officers with the then less-known colonel Mihailovic at the head, did not accept capitulation. They hid within the plateau of Ravna Gora in the vicinity of Caéak forming around itself a network of commis- sars, out of which the Resistance Movement should develop. The organization which they formed merged with the inheritance of war and liberation of the Serbi- an people, anti-germanism, as well as with traditional connection with the Westem allies from whom it was expected to defeat Nazism and Fascism on large fronts. The formation of this officer group evoked strong self-confidence within the occu- pied population who could not consciously accept Nazi regime. Since all the ex- pectations of the country liberation focused on the group headed by colonel Miha- ilovic, the first months of the Ravna Gora Movement even brought the greatest fa- me to them. It seemed that freedom of the Serbian people and its constitutional, na- tional and democratic thoght did not extinguish under the German arms. In the late summer of 1941, the first severe clashes with the occupier started. The officers of colonel Mihailovi¢ were the first conquering heroes over the Germ- 298Saiiawecna pou rw. Heimopuia pasnozopaya “auancKo? xpaja 3 ans in the Western Serbia. Although futile and despite of mass reprisals of the Germans in the town, the huge siege of the Kings during October, 1941, was a ra- re sample of heroism, sacrifice, persistance in the battle with technically superior enemy in the entire enslaved Europe. In the autumn of 1941, the forces of colonel Mihailovic in these clashes Jost even its best. and perhaps more important for the uprising, the most charismatic officers, such as Jovan Bojovi¢ or Jovan Derok, who was killed in the Civil War. It tamed out that in the first months of the upri- sing even the most apt soldiers were killed. Never again had these losses been compensated. Even then, the first indications of the greatest vulnerability of the Ravna Gora Movement could be perceived: lack of discipline and respect of com- mand responsibility by many officers. Further line of the war only strenghtened and reinforced such a state. and Mihailovic had never found the right solution how to discipline those submitted to him. Contranily, the organization of competitive Communist Movement ascribed a new dimension to the war. As to start the revolution according to the Soviets’ mo- del, the Communists conducted violent measures of October revolution, the greatest enemy being the Chetniks, who wished to restore Yugoslavia as democratic mo- narchy with Serbian dynasty. Within the hearts of a considerable portion of young Communists in the region of Ca¢ak flamed the strong wish for violent clash with re- gime advocates prior to 1941. Individual executions in the summer of 1941, indica- ted further line of the events. Soon commanders with the instructions on necessary permanent fight in which both local and foreign blood would be spread, arrived. It tumed out that such measures yielded better results compared to Mihailovic tactics, who struggled for the least possible victims in the war. The Communists assumed that the war would soon be finished. and that victorious Red Army had to be waited for with the ‘results’. i.e. already finished clash with class enemy. A short-term col- laboration between the Chetniks and Partisans in the liberation of the towns in the Wester Serbia resulted in a severe clash. The preparation of the Partisans for the clash was a long-lasting: their leaders planned to liquidate their enemies, which bro- ught them victory in the first clashes with the Ravna Gora people. From the onset of the war. the Communists accused the Chetniks for advo- cating hegemony and superiority of the Serbian bourgeoisie. During the occupati- on, treason, along with the crimes in the fight with the members of the Partisans Movement, were ascribed to them. In the primitive propaganda, which had been repeated for more than fifty years. people from general Mihailovi¢ movement we- te deprived of human features. The fight against them was equalized with the fight for the survival of humanity. Severe suffering of the Communists and Partisans in December of 1941 served as a decisive proof of Chetniks’ treason. Actually, at the lime already general. Mihailovic held no responsibility for such events. Upon all these happenings, two anti-fascists movements never again collaborated, and the victims always served as a proof that with the opposite movement collaborataion was futile. The Communists were more persistant in it. Premature uprising, which 299Topan Jasudosuh - Muiou Tumotiujeauh otherwise had minimal military effects. along with the population sufferings for which the Communists were largely responsible, capitalized in a further line of the war as a proof of unyiciding fight of the Partisans against the occupier. They sho- wed no interest in the consequences due to which the population in Serbia suffe- red. In the theory of the revolution, the victims were calculated. Converscly, in the oncoming stages of the war, waiting for the right moment to inflict a decisive blow to the occupier. i.e. when great allied forces defeated him. became a strategy of the Ravna Gora Movement. The fate of Yugoslavia upon the German occupation had not actually been in the hands of its inhabitants anymore. From its onset, the lifted uprising depended on the financial support of the allies, as well as on the relation between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. and later on, on the United States. Selfish interests of the great forces bore no sentimental re- gards to the small nations. and thus neither to the Serbs in the Second World War. The ‘waiting-for’ strategy did not suit the allies. Regardless of the victims. gene- ral Mihailovic had to help the allicd in his actions. Blood of the Serbian people had no high value, and the guarantees that it would also be ‘capitalized’ also lacked. Firm belief in the support of the Westem allies which existed during the uprising and occupation within the Ravna Gora people, turned out to be a wrong and dan- gerous estimate both for the very Ravna Gora Movement and further historical fa- te of the Serbs. Those who remained with the Partisans and withdrew from Serbia strengthe- ned during further three years of the war and came back as brutal conquerors mer- ciless to the region from which they withdrew in late 1941. Loners who were hi- ding on the terrain exhibited the severest fear. They provoked reprisals against the- ir families with insignificant actions against the Ravna Gora people. The Partisans needed victims for mobilization of the masses and as a catalyst of the revolution. ‘Bloody death dance’ which they joined ceased at the end of the war with revenge over the Chetniks and their families. The consequences were conspicuous even fifty years later. Defeat of the Partisans as an organized military formation in early 1942, ope- ned a new Serbian-Serbian front. The war between forces loyal to general Mihai- lovi¢ and those with Milan Nedi¢ started in the spring of 1942. This fight had no severe frontal clashes; however individual attacks, pursuits and murders took many victims and Znatural front’ in Serbia was not formed till the end of war. Upon 1941, the Ravna Gora people waged no severe fights with the occupi- er in the Caéak region till the end of the war. Individual incidents which the Rav- na Gora people had with the Germans and Bulgarians assured them about the strict measures of the occupier to punish each military action by mass firing, terror. fi- re. No rebellious formation in Serbia could alone defeat the Germans in the occu- pied and divided country. During large offensive by the Partisans onto Serbia in the spring of 1944, a tacit or agreeing collaboration between the Ravna Gora people and the occupier 300Saitamrena ipouioca Hcimopuja pasnozopaua wavaxcKv? Kpaja 3 against mutual enemy was established. In the weakest moment, the Chetniks with such actions provided the Partisans with prolific advertising material. Deserted by the allies, minimal support in the ammunition by the Germans was the only way out. It tumed out to be a high price: however, there was no other salvation at the moment. To attack the Germans while the Partisans advanced from the back with huge ammunition and military equipment obtained by the allies, meant an instan- taneous disaster. Ruin itself occurred but a year later. and up to then military and political head of the Ravna Gora Movement did not see to survival of the organi- zation. The will of the great forces was decisive, nevertheless, serious inner vulne- rability also existed. The Ravna Gora people did not manage to boost morale sufficiently within the lines of its mobilized soldiers as to have succesful offensive. Manpower was utterly untrained, lacking military equipment, with modest armament and regularly scant stock of munition. Heavy armament was almost non-existant. Simultanco- usly, mobilized men did not believe in waging war and dying for the ideals of the Ravna Gora Movement. The officers in command did not manage to nourish such a belief nor to serve as an authority by their example and behaviour. Excluding mobile brigades and later on assault corps, during entire war the Ravna Gora army was a feeble unit, a kind of territorial police, nominally under Mihailovic: however. many units acted individually. The lack of mobility charac- terized most units, and military morale frequently was not on a high level, particu- larly in case of rapidly mobilized peasants from whom it was expected to fight out- side their region. It turned out that the Ravna Gora people lacked even firm politi- cal ideology which would serve as a support in the crucial moments. Tough disci- pline from the head to the bottom lines lacked, and envy among the commanders concerned to the position and reputation in the Supreme Command, was conspicu- ous. Hence, quarrels and petty rivalry existed. Concurrently, military value of the units was not checked. In such a way, waiting-for swategy with survival of the ter- ritorial police had a high price. When the Ravna Gora people reached its military and political zenith in the summer of 19-+H, everybody deserted them. The allies clearly supported the Parti- sans, and the Government in London followed such a route. A long-time expected defeat of the Nazism was not met utterly unpreparedly; nevertheless, the Ravna Gora people lost control over a crucial link of this strategy, i.e. support by the al- lies. The Partisans were the chosen option who had to liberate Yugoslavia. That sensed the soldiers who feebly and unwilingly fought against the Partisans whom thev regarded as brothers and also as sure victors. A strong desire to avoid victims in the war also existed. A mass desertion of the front or capitulation were noted. However, when the same young men were brought to the Srem’s front, desertion ceased. Death penalty was introduced then. Those were the greatest sufferings of the population in the Caéak region in the frontal clashes, most probable irrational, induced by improper or perhaps ‘thought-out’. dangerous command by the Parti- 301Topan Tasudoeuh ~ Murow Tumotiuiesuh sans. It turned out that the price of the Partisans’ surrender was enormous. Nevert- heless, the officers were responsible for a military morale of their soldiers. The Ravna Gora Movement had many problems. Charismatic commanders were killed even in 1941, and a long-lasting occupation and forced immobility we- te not an ambient for distinguishing and creation of new effective officers’ cadre. The time during 1944 rapidly elapsed. Almost entire year passed in the clas- hes with the Partisans. The final defeat came with the Red Army. A short-term col- laboration with the Soviets had nourished an unrealistic hope that all had not yet been finished, for only a few days. It was only one insignificant war episode. Up to late December, the Movement was military defeated, and instantaneously seve- re reprisals occurred. At first, everything looked like revenge: however the prepa- ration of the reprisals was a long-lasting. They had to induce permanent changes in the social system. The number of the victims from the Partisans’ arrival to the power testificd to the brutality of a new regime. Simultaneously. the story about the crimes of the Chetniks during the war was perpetually repeated. That was a propaganda which had continual repetition for more than fifty vears as a ‘perma- nent war consequence’. The foundation of revolutionary power laid in the victory over competitive anti-fascist movement-the Chetniks. Ritual fight against them had never ceased, and legal support via putting on trial individuals for violation of the new order provided security to the Communists’ nomenclature as a new ruling class aggressive towards each opposition. In the reality, new authorities needed much time to pacify the Caéak region. The entire 1945 elapsed in petty clashes with the groups of the Ravna Gora peo- ple; pursuits of the individuals prolonged to the late 1956. Desperate loners had be- en hiding for the oncoming ten years. It testified to the unpopulanty of a new aul- hority. Namely, regardless of mass mobilization of the youths into various organi- zations, it remained frail to settle accounts with special modem outlaws. It is of in- terest that even despite of huge repressive apparatus which the authority had from early 1945, a small guerilla survived for almost entire decade. Without accompli- ces it would be hardly possible. The potential for the armed fight against the aut- hority of Josip Broz existed. There were no strategic decisions of the great Western forces to incite and support such an action, as was the case with monarchists in Greece. Yugoslavia was the most extreme member of the Soviet impact zone and ideologically the most honest till 1948. Further line of the events pushed the Rav- na Gora people. their struggle. ideology into oblivion. Although the Rayna Gora Movement lost the war on the military and politi- cal plan, it turned out that it was a formation which brought the renewal of the de- mocratic civil order to the Serbian people and entire Yugoslavia. The Partisans consciously longed for dictatorship of the Soviet model which brought the civili- zational break of the connection with the traditions of the Western Europe. Nonet- 302Batiamrena ipoustocia. Hciiopuja pasxozopaya YauancKo? Kpaja 3 OO heless, it had to be admitted that a special traditional connection of the Ravna Go- ta people was actually adverse for the patriarchal Serbian village, ie. in such a way, the Communists were left alone to fight for modem civilizational heritage, known to all young generations. It is likely that such difference is best manifested in the struggle for woman’s position in the society. Due to the requirements of the propaganda, in compliance to the will of the victors, the Chetniks survived in the collective conscious of the population as ne- gative heroes and archaic representatives of the Serbian village which resisted mo- dernization. Such narrowed picture of general Mihailovi¢ movement revived on the streets of Serbia for more than fifty years with the introduction of multyparty system. Political daily life introduced new manipulation with general Mihailovic movement, and the wars within the region of the former Yugoslavia in the planet propaganda brought a new negative conotation of the name *Chetnik’. It opened a possibility for a new identification of many generations of the youths. It turned out that the Ravna Gora people could hardly be expelled from the collective conscio- us; however a severe distortion of historical facts was achieved. _ Asa place at which geographically the Ravna Gora Movement was formed, the Caéak region with the population who was during the Second World War un- questionably inclined to the movement, created a new historical heritage, which shaped the conscious of an individual. This process has not been completed yet, and the Chetniks of general Mihailovic still wait in the special ‘purgatory’ betwe- en ‘paradise’ and ‘hell’ of mythical collective conscious of the population. This book presents a contribution to a historical survey of the Ravna Gora people in the Caéak region wishing them to become a part of the rational, historical heritage de- prived of anger and partiality. Goran Davidovi¢ Milo$ Timotijevic 303