Eckhart Review

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MYSTICISM AND THEOLOGY IN MEISTER ECKHART’S

THEORY OF THE IMAGE

Loris Sturlese

To cite this article: Loris Sturlese (1993) MYSTICISM AND THEOLOGY IN MEISTER
ECKHART’S THEORY OF THE IMAGE, Eckhart Review, 2:1, 18-31, DOI: 10.1179/
eck_1993_2_1_002

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MYSTICISM AND THEOLOGY IN MEISTER
ECKHART'S THEORY OF THE IMAGE
Loris Sturlese

On September 26th, 1326, Meister Eckhart appeared before the court of the
Inquisition in Cologne. Following a denunciation by two members of the
Dominican Convent in Cologne, Archbishop Henry of Vimeburg had sum-
moned_him before a commission of theologians. The charge was serious and
degrading: heresy.l At the time, Eckhart was about 65 years old and had a
brilliant career behind him. He had been Dominican Provincial of Germany
and Vicar General of the Order; he had studied theology in Paris where he had
twice held the chair of theology and given lectures. He was the author of some
profoundly erudite works and a highly successful preacher; he also had a
reputation for saintliness. He was now in Cologne as administrator of the
studium genera Ie of the whole Dominican province of Teutonia. His incrimina-
tion was insulting, an affront to the whole Dominican order.

The official records of the trial have been lost but one document relating to it
has survived. This consists of two parchment collections, each of fourteen
folios, and covered in narrowly spaced lines of writing. Discovered in Soest
towards the end of the nineteenth century, it has become known in the
literature as Eckhart's 'Defence'. It is widely held that this is a copy of the
records of the trial. In actual fact, while this document does refer to the
rna terials Eckhart prepared for the session of September 26th, it is nevertheless
a later collation by Eckhart which was circulated afterwards by his support-
ers.2

The historical value of this document is, however, immense. It reveals that
Eckhart was presented with two lists of suspect sentences culled from his
works, and that for each proposition he prepared a 'careful defence' He
obviously wanted his defence to be recorded in the minutes. The Soest

1 See Winfried Trusen, Der Prouss gegen Meister Eckhart. Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und
Folgen, Paderborn, 1988. Eckhart's writings are quoted according to the critical
edition: Meister Eckhart, Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke, hg. im Auftrag der
Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft von Ernst Benz, Karl Christ, Bruno Decker,
Heribert Fischer, Bernhard Geyer, Josef Koch, Josef Quint, Erich Seeberg, Loris
Sturlese, Konrad Weiss, Albert Zimmermann, Stuttgart, 1936ff. (DW = Die
deutschen Werke; LW = Die lateinischen Werke). The documents concerning
Eckhart's life and trial are edited in Acta Echardiana, ed. Loris Sturlese, LW V,
pp. 149ff. For a new and very informative account of Eckhart's trial in English, see
Oliver Davies, Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian, London, 1991, pp.27-50.
2 See Loris Sturlese, "Die Kinner Eckhartisten. Das Studium generale der deutschen
Dominikaner und die Verurteilung der Thesen Meister Eckharts" in Die KOlner
UniversittJt im Mittelalter, Berlin-New York, 1989 (Miscellanea mediaevalia 20),
pp.192-211.
18
document allows us to reconstruct the two lists: in addition it preserves the
very text that Eckhart wished to read out at the trial and which he in all
probability did read out.

My point of departure in this paper is not, however, Eckhart's defence as a

whole but one particular proposition ou t of the hundred or so propositions on
which the charge of heresy was based. This is the eighth proposition of the
fourth section in the first list - the one in fact which contains the sentences
from the German sermons. The text is as follows:

The eighth proposition concerns the image in the soul (and says),
that the image of the Trinity in the soul is a sort of expression of
itself with neither will nor intellect. And this image exists prima-
rilyforhimfrom whom it has received its essence and nature. This
is explained by three examples, namely: the image in a mirror, the
wall in the eye, and the branch growing from a tree. From this it
follows, with regard to the image of the soul, that it is a sort of
unified expression of itself. And that which goes out from it is that
which remains within, and that which remains within is that
which goes out from it. This image is the son of the Father and I
am this image. This image is the wisdom of the Father and I am
this image.3

This passage is of central importance for the reconstruction of Meister Eckhart's

theory of the image. The term "image" is well known for having numerous
meanings, both in the philosophical tradition and in Eckhart's terminology.
Here, however, it must refer to the image of God in the Soul. This is the concept
which is crucial to the understanding of the relationship between the divine
and the human, and not just in the Middle Ages. Moreover, the text here is as
it were a paradigm of the problems of Eckhart scholarship. The passage seems
to lie outside the conceptual framework of the categories of scholastic thought
and it is difficult to bring it back wi thin the bounds of orthodox church
doctrine. But ignoring all this for the moment, what is immediately striking
about these words of Eckhart is their extraordinary theoretical and existential
density. The difficulty is to determine what exactly he means.

"The image of the soul is a sort of unified expression of itself; that which comes
out from it is that which remains within and that which remains within is that
which comes out from it. This image is the son of the Father and I am this
image." The last sentence is particularly surprising to the reader and if he or
she seeks advice or enlightenment from the Eckhart specialists, the answer
they give is almost unanimous: this is the voice of Eckhart the mystic. In this
passage he is describing the experience of the soul which is annihilated in
mystical union with the One and absorbed into the motion of the Trinity. This
experience cannot be expressed through the medium of rational, discursive
thought. So Eckhart rejects the clarity of philosophical argument and plunges

3 Prac. Col. 1, n. 62, Ada ECMrdiana 46, LW V, pp. 220-221.

19
into the mystical world of metaphor, analogy, and example. Here are two
among the many arguments of this type. For Klein, this passage refers to the
"unio mystica with God for which the mystic thirsts and pines".4 Secondly, Haas
says: "Eckhart's definition of the image and its function can never be discussed
in the purely epistemological area, for it is ahv:ays based on the mystical
description of the relationship between divine and human being. The a priori
element for Eckhart is not philosophical, but spiritual and religious, His goal
in every case is both personal and mystical and concerned with the
Ileilsgeschichte."s
I could quote many more scholars on this point but this would not, however,
throw any further light on the intended meaning of Eckhart's text. The
"mystical" interpretation of Eckhart's propositions presupposes a kind of self-
evident reading of the texts, which, at least in the passage quoted, is only
possible in a rather negative way. For these scholars, a sentence like "that
which goes out from it is that which remains within and that which remains
within is that which goes out from it; this image is the son of the Father and I
am this image" is incomprehensible and unfathomable by. normal rational
means, in other words, it is irrational and, therefore, so the argument goes,
mystical.
It is likely that Eckhart's students at Paris also found his lectures "mystical" or,
at the very least, vague and obscure; this becomes especially likely if we recall
the type of theology being studied at that time at the Sorbonne. Such propo-
sitions as Deus est intelligere and intelligere est increatum et increabile which were
the topics of his lectures there, did not fit at all neatly into the categories of
scholastic thought and were consequently ignored. Whereas even today
works like the quodlibeta of Henry of Ghent fill the shelves of old libraries, all
that remains of Eckhart's two periods as Master at Paris is five questiones - an
unparalleled catastrophe.

If it is true that Eckhart's ideas lie outside the boundaries of scholastic thought,
this does not by any means imply that they should be assigned to the obscure
area of mystical experience. In fact Eckhart's position is a product of its time
and arose within a clearly discernible historical context. But to reconstruct this
context, we will need to turn the present accepted historical perspective on its
head. Instead of looking to Paris, we should tum our attention to Germany and
the animated controversies and questions then taxing the minds of its think-
ers. For it was in Germany that Eckhart had conceived his ideas and attempted

4 Alessandro Klein, Meister Eckhilrt. La dottrina mistica della giustificatione, Milan,

1978, p.7.
5 Alois Maria Haas, "Meister Eckharts mystische Bildlehre" in Sermo Mysticus,
Fribourg, 1979 (Dokimion 4), pp. 209-237 (here p. 216). Haas' study includes an
extensive bibliography on Eckhart's theory of the image; see also Burkhard
Mojsisch, Meister Eckhilrt. Analogie, Univozitiit und Einheit, Hamburg, 1983, pp.
74-81, and Wolfgang Wackernagel, Ymagine denudari. Ethique de l'image et
mitaphysique de l'abstraction chez Maitre Eckhart, Paris, 1991.
20
to propagate them, and it was in Germany that they were scrutinised, and
accepted or rejected. To pre-empt my conclusion: I would argue that by
reconstructing the actual intellectual context in which Eckhart's ideas arose, it
is possible to interpret many (or indeed all) of those propositions generally
held to be "mystical" as rigorously structured processes of rational thought.

To test this thesis, the following question needs to be asked with regard to the
passages quoted above on the image and its "mystical" interpretation. Does
Eckhart describe an unusual private experience of union with the Godhead, or
is he formulating a philosophical doctrine based on rational argument, which
aims in particular at establishing a new theory of anthropology? To be more
precise: is Eckhart describing an unusual atemporal mystical experience, or is
his theory in fact a reaction to a particular historical situation?

As I have already suggested, Eckhart's text was included in the documenta-

tion that explained the charge of heresy and called on Eckhart to defend his
posi tion. Eckhart's defence is worth looking at, for it may assist us in finding
an initial key to his ideas. As preserved in the Soest document, the defence
reads:

As for the eighth point, "that the image of the Trinity in the soul
is a sort of expression of itself with neither will nor intellect" -
what is said is obscure in as much as the examples given there do
not throw light on it. From this I see no danger. But what is said
at the end that "1 am that image", this is an error and false. For
what is created is not an image, and angels and men were created
after the image of God. For an image in the real sense and likeness
is neither made nor is it a work of nature.6

This is a strange answer. Eckhart was professor of theology. We would have

expected him to clarify his position in order to defend the orthodoxy of his
propositions. But this is not what he did. Instead he emphasised the obscurity
of his train of thought, to reach the conclusion that these sentences were not
dangerous. The reason for his defence strategy has been identified in a study
by Winfried Trusen:7 Eckhart defended himself not because he had been
accused of theological error, but because he had been charged with heresy. He
therefore placed the emphasis in his defence on proving there was no danger
in his teachings. But in the end the professor of philosophy could not resist
writing: lithe sentence'I am that image' is false". The reason why it is wrong
is important: because an image is neither made nor is it a work of nature. It is
uncreatedand uncreatable.Hedid withdraw what he had said, but only in one

6 Proc. Col. 1 n. 141-142 (Acta Echardiana 48, in preparation); cf. Augustinus

Daniels, Eine lateinische Rechtfertigungsschrift des Meister Eckhart, Munster LW.,
1923 (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philo sophie des Mittelalters 23,5), p. 18.
7 See Trusen pp. 75f£.
21
particular sense.

We should note here that in his defence Eckhart makes no reference to mystical
experiences. If he had ever had any, he would have been able to appeal to the
exceptional nature and immediacy of his experience, but in fact the opposite
is the case - from start to finish he argued as a professor using the conceptual
apparatus of his school.

Obscurum est quod dicitur ... - did Eckhart wish to distance himself from the
words in the text placed before him? Although he sometimes complained
about the incorrectness of the prosecution materials,8 at least with regard to
the German sermons, this does not appear to be the case with the particular
proposition we are looking at. The original sermon on which his accusers
based their charge still exists, and a comparison between the original and the
translation reveals that they had translated it accurately and conscientiously.
The original is not a full edition but a fragment which Josef Quint edited from
the London manuscript; a second version was then discovered later by R.
Lievens.9 It contains an explicit attribution to Eckhart-this was missing from
the London manuscript - although from a textual/ critical point of view this
has no significance. I quote here a translation from the full text of the fragment
from Quint's edition:

A master says that if every medium were removed between

myself and a wall, then I would be at the wall but not in it. But this
is not the case with spiritual things, for with them one thing is
always in another. That which receives is the same as that which
is received, for it receives nothing other than itself. This is diffi-
cult. Whoever understands it has been preached to enough. But
now just a little about the image of the soul.

There are many teachers who are of the opinion that this image is
born from the will and from knowledge, but this is not the case.
Rather, I say that this image is a product of itself with neither will
nor knowledge. Let me give you an analogy. Imagine that a
mirror is held up to my face - whether I wish to or not, with
neither will nor knowledge of myself, my image is formed in the
mirror. This image does not derive from the mirror, nor from
itself. Rather this image is grounded in the one who gives it its
being and its nature. When the mirror is removed from me, then
I am no longer imaged in it, for I am myself this image. Another

8 Proc. Col. 1 n.127 (Acta Eckhardiana 48): Porro de aliis articulis sedecim extractis ex
sermonibus, cui mihi ascribuntur, respondere non haberem, cum passim et frequenter
etiam a clericis studiosis et doctis deminute et falso quae audiunt reportantur; n. 146
(Acta Echardiana 48): In hoc sermone multa sunt obscura et dubia et quae nunquam
dixie
9 Eckhart Pred.16a, DW I, pp.257-260. R. Lievens, "De mystiekeinhoud van het
handschrift Dr. P.S. Everts" in Leuvense Bijdragen 51 (1962), pp.1-33.
22
 analogy. When a branch grows ou t of a tree, it bears both the name
and essence of the tree. What comes out is what stays within, and
what stays within is what comes out. Thus the branch is an
expression of itself. The same is true for the image of the soul:
what comes out is what stays within, and what stays within is
what comes out. This image is the Son of the Father and I myself
am this image and this image is wisdom. Therefore God be
praised now and for evermore. Amen. May those who do not
understand this, not be concerned.10

For several reasons this passage is extremely informative. Of particular

interest is the fact that the examples given in detail here are those referred to
by both Eckhart himself and his accusers. These are examples intended to
illustrate three attributes of the image.

The example of the wall shows that when we are talking about the mental
being of something, then the normal categories (that is, Aristotelian categories
oriented to the ontology of things) are no longer valid. Material entities are
here and now existing in time and space. In the case of mental entities (such
as the image in the soul) the spatial dimension is replaced by the dialectal
relationship of the flowing of the self out of itself. In other words, the logic that
holds good for mental or spiritual things is very different to the one that
applies to material things.

The example of the mirror demonstrates that in the relationship between the
image and its source efficient and final causality have no role to play. This fact
in particular is strongly emphasised by Eckhart: creation and natural concep-
tion posit a final and efficient cause. But "going out as image" does not -
rather it is a purely formal flowing out. This means that for mental or spiritual
things not only logic but also physics is different to what it is in the natural
world.

The example of the tree expresses, this time in a positive manner, another
characteristic of the pair 'the image and its source', namely the identity of
being. This was clearly the point that drew the attention of his accusers, for
here the danger of pantheism is very close. Eckhart is referring specifically to
this question in his reply when he distances himself from the proposi tion "I am
this image" .

I will examine these three problems more closely in the course of our discus-
sion. But I shall tum first to two other important ideas contained in the sermon.

Firstly, when Eckhart says that these are difficult ideas, he reveals that he
regarded his sermons as a kind of initiation into the understanding of "subtle

10 Eckhart, Pred. 16a, OW 1, p. 258-259 (translated by Oliver Davies).

23
thoughts". Here it is a question of difficult ideas and not of mystical experi-
ences. If we examine more closely the content of these "subtle ideas", we
realise that they are purely philosophical notions - the impossibility of
subsuming spiritualia and naturalia under the same type of logic, the absence
of space and time in the spiritualia, and so on. Moreover, we also realise that
the question of the image belongs to a complex of questions in which the main
intention is to establish a new system of non-Aristotelian logic that would
allow a real investigation of the spiritualia.

Secondly, Eckhart really did say: I am this image, exactly as his accusers had
claimed. The charge is not therefore based on a crude misunderstanding, as
some commentators have suggested. Once this has been established, we can
examine his defence more closely. Did he or did he not withdraw his remark?
An answer to this is not easy: on the one hand he expressly declared as false
the formulation "I am this image" (egosum ista imago) , while on the other hand
he added two extra points to this declaration.

First of all all, it is wrong because my own I is a created thing and

the logic of the image has no validity in the sphere of created
things. The proof of this is that humanity and angels are both
created "in the image" (ad imaginem).

Eckhart appealed here to the authority of Holy Scripture and patristic tradi-
tion, and it is tempting to think that he wished to defend himself by assuming
the traditional scholastic posi tion. Scholastic teaching on this point is clear: the
biblical text faeiamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram was inter-
preted in the sense of an analogy between the Trinity and the three higher
functions of the soul: memory, intellect and will. What is expressed by the
phrase ad imaginem is a mere, pale analogy, whereas the term imago (which
implies pari ty) is reserved exclusi vely for the Son of God, Christ. We therefore
talk of a ereatio ad imaginem precisely because the imago of the human being is
not uncreated but created and thus is of lower ranking ontologically. The
words imparis similitudo , unequal likeness, are used by Peter Lombard to
describe this situation, although he placed his emphasis on inequality.ll

Eckhart's view of this, however, was completely different. This becomes clear
from a close reading of his defence. We saw that, in his reply, he emphasised
that the logic and causality of the image could only be applied in the sphere of
uncreated things. If he had been arguing within the framework of traditional
doctrine, this would not have been necessary, because traditionally the
asymmetry between human beings and the second person of the Trinity was
a pure fact based on the phrase ad imaginem. Nevertheless he chose to do this.
Clearly he was interested in investigating not the logic of the creature but the
logic of the uncreated image. Here we have arrived at the crux of the matter.

11 Petrus Lombard us, Sententiae in IV libris distindae, 1 3, 3, Grottaferrata,1971, pp.

74-75.
24
The proposition that the human being ("I" or ego) is created in the image of God
and the notion that the image (imago) exists in the human soul are both equally
true within scholastic teaching. But Eckhart distanced himself from general
scholastic thought when he said that the sphere of the image was radically
opposed to the sphere of created things and there was no 'intermediary
between the two. In other words, either we are in the sphere of the uncreated
- in which case we can speak of the image and its characteristics - or we are
in the sphere of created things where we have efficient causes, time, space,
essential differences between cause and effect, and so on. Thus the expression
ad imaginem does not mean "half an image" or "almost an image" or "a vague
image". Whenever Eckhart stressed that the human being is ad imaginem and
at the same time possesses the imago, the image, he simply wished to express
the fact that a human being in his or her wholeness and corporality is not
strictly identifiable with the image. The human person, which possesses a soul
and body, belongs within the dimension of spatiality and temporality and in
this sense is subject to the laws of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics. To the
extent however that a person is the imago, the image of God, they live within
a quite different metaphysical dimension - that of divine eternity. It is this
dimension which Eckhart sought to disclose in his sermon.

We are now able to understand what the famous Eckhart commentator editor
Josef Quint described as completely baffling, namely, why the sermon begins
with the example of the wal1.12Byusing this example, Eckhart wanted to open
up for his listeners the possibility of a different kind of logic, a "logic"
applicable to the sphere of spiritualia (spiritual things). At the same time he
wished to question the whole idea of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics as the
sole, exclusive, all-embracing means of interpreting reality. In the empirical
world, the body is not in but close by another body. In the world of the imago,
on the other hand, there is no possibility of being close by, there is only being
or non-being. Therefore the image is not closeto its source butis truly in its source.
This is the "subtle teaching" which the sermon is intended to impart. If the
listener knows this then he has no further need of sermons: Dit es subtijl, die
dit verstaet, hen es genoch ghepredecht ..
As confirmation of our interpretation we could look at a parallel sermon on the
topic Quasi vas auri solidum (Quint, no. 16b), which is partly concerned with
the characteristics of the image. Eckhart gives the same three examples as the
fragment and closes with the remark Diz enist niht gesprochen von den dingen,
diu man sol reden in der schuo,le;sunder man mac sie wol gesprechen ut dem stuole
ze einer lere ('1 am not speaking here of matters discussed in the schools, but
they can well be spoken of as from the pulpit as doctrine').13 The "subtle ideas"
are those discussed at the university. In this passage Eckhart claimed the right
to dissemina te the difficult conten t of philosophy through his sermons. But for
the philosopher such popularisation was unnecessary.

12 Josef Quint, zu Eckhart, Pred. 16a, DW 1, p. 258 note.

13 Eckhart, Pred. 16b, DW 1, p.270
25
 5

So far we have made frequent references to the logic and metaphysics of the
image. I will now attempt a closer definition of this concept in two stages. The
first is a short survey of the IIprofessional background" to the question, that is
Eckhart's pronouncements on the theory of the image in his Latin writings. In
the second stage I will attempt to reconstruct the IIcultural background", the
historical context in which Eckhart moved. Here the question must again be
faced as to whether and to what extent Eckhart can be seen as an exponent of
a specifically German form of thinking.

So far we have only looked at the sermons, at what Eckhart had to say as a
preacher, but Eckhart the theology professor also had something to say on the
concept of the image. And in view of the fact that Eckhart was a theologian
who twice held the chair of theology in Paris, we can allow ourselves to
formulate a question which must have been at the back of our minds for some
time. How is it possible that Eckhart saw no distinction between the image in
the sense of the Son of God (traditionally imago increata) and the image in the
human soul (imago creata)? After all, this was the reason why his accusers chose
the particular text in question as a basis for their charge. Eckhart knew this, yet
he tried to avoid the problem by stressing that man as man (that is as a
combination of soul and body) is ad imaginem, although he was quick to point
out that the notion of imago excludes any ontological distinction or nuance. An
answer to this question can be found in Eckhart's Latin writings.

The term lIimage" appears over five hundred times in Eckhart's works but it
is only in four places that the question is treated systematically. The passages
are the commentaries on Genesis 1,26: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et
similitudinem nostram (let us make man in our own image), on Wisdom 7,26:
imago bonitatis illius ('An image of his goodness'), on Colossians 1,15: Imago dei
invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae ('The image of the invisible God, first
born of all creatures'), and Matthew 22,30: Cuius est imago haec et superscriptio?
(Whose image and inscription?').14 Here the polarity that we have already
observed is once again discernible: imago is the Son of God (Col. 1,15) and ad
imaginem is man (Genesis 1,26). At every point Eckhart's teachings prove to be
consistent, and it is sufficient to take one of these passages for closer examina-
tion - the analysis of Colossians 1,15 in his commentary on John.

Here Eckhart looked expressly at the relationship between the Word (verbum)
and the Father and posed the question why the second person of the Trinity
should be called imago dei. In his answer to the question, Eckhart identified
nine characteristics of the concept image:15

14 Eckhart, In Gen. n.115ff., LW 1/1, pp.270ff.; Eckhart, In Sap. n. 143, LW II,

pp.480ff.; Eckhart, In Ioh. n.23-26, LW III, pp.19-21; Serm. XLIX 1-3 n. 505-
512, LW IV, pp.421-428.
15 Eckhart, InIoh. n. 23-26, LWIII, pp.19-21. See also the commentary by Mojsisch
(note 5), pp. 74-81. .
26·
 1) The image, in so far as it is an image, does not receive anything
from the bearer in whom it is located, rather it receives its whole
being from the source; 2) it receives its being from this alone; 3) it
receives its whole being according to all that makes it the source;
4) the image is single and there is only one; 5) it is and remains in
its source; 6) therefore the source and its reproduction form a
unity; 7) the conception of the image is a formal emanation; 8) the
image and its source are simultaneous; 9) they have knowledge of
each other. Eckhart closes with the remark that these nine charac-
teristics apply to the just man and to justice, existents and being,
the good man and goodness, to all concrete things and their
corresponding abstract qualities.

Eckhart concentrates here on two basic themes. The first is the fact that the
image and its source have the same being (coessentialitas): this was shown in
the sermon by the example of the tree, whereas in the Commentary on John he
talks of unity. The second theme is the fact that the image flows from its source
by means of formal emanation, that is without recourse to efficient and final
causality (which is shown where the sermon says "without the will"). This
notion is clarified further as the immanence of the image in the source and vice
versa. Clearly, Eckhart is no longer moving within the bounds of Aristotelian
logic.

But which image is meant when Eckhart talks about the emanation of the
image from its source? Does he mean the procession within the Trinity of the
Word from the Father, or does he mean rather the procession of any and every
image from its source? To put it differently: does Eckhart's theory of the image
have an anthropological significance as well as a theological meaning? With
this question we are at the heart of Eckhart's teaching. The answer he gave
moved him from the consensus of scholastic opinion to the edge of orthodoxy.
The nine characteristics of the image which he analysed in his Commentary on
John apply not only to the "most excellent" image (the Word of God) but also
to every intellectual image. As proof of this, it is enough to recall the first
characteristic of the image: "the image as image receives nothing which
pertains to it from the bearer in which it is located; rather it receives its whole
being from the object of which it is a representation" .16 So there is a source, an
image and a bearer of the image. Even the least theologically minded reader
knows that the Word of God does not have a bearer. It is only the image in the
soul that has a bearer. Eckhart was thus thinking simultaneously of the image
in the sense of the second person of the Trinity and the image in the sense of
the divine spark in the human soul.

In the metaphysical categories in which Eckhart worked there was both the
concept image-with-bearer and also image-without-bearer. It is my conviction
that Eckhart thought that by making this distinction he had escaped the

16 Eckhart, In loh. n. 23, LW III, p.19.

27
danger of pantheism. However, it is important here that the theory of the
image is the same in both cases- this is what is new about it. Eckhart says with
great clarity: through the relationship to a bearer the ratioimaginis is not changed.
This means that Aristotelian logic is invalid not only in the area of trinitarian
thought but in the whole sphere of the spirit.

Since the source of that image with which we are concerned is God alone it is
clear that Eckhart's theory of the image had radical consequences. The aim was
a whole new definition of the relationship between the human and the divine,
the temporal and the eternal, the created and the uncreated. The result was a
completely new anthropology and completely new ideas of God and man.
There is no question here of mystical experience. What we have instead are
profound but nevertheless rationally reconstructible philosophical and meta-
physical analyses.

There are many texts in the works of Eckhart where this type of analysis could
be applied and extended further. At this point, however, I would like to pursue
my enquiry from a different point of view and attempt a description of the
philosophical background to the period. From this description I hope to
demonstrate the newness and radicali ty of Eckhart's intentions, and at the
same time his close involvement in the debates and discussions in Germany
at this time.

I have already referred to the general scholastic theory of the image. This
distinguished between'imago and ad imaginem, between the most excellent
image in the sense of the Son of God and the lesser image in man, which is a
mere functional analogy. This theory forms the background to Eckhart's own
theory, but only to the extent that the one stood out radically against the
backdrop of the other.

Although Eckhart's ideas were completely new in comparison with those of

the Parisian scholastics, he nevertheless did not stand completely in isolation.
At the end of the thirteenth century a lively controversy had developed in
Germany on this very question of the philosophical and theological problem
of the image. Eckhart's theory was a contribution to this discussion, and can
only be adequately understood in relation to it. We will therefore need to look
at the historical context.

In claiming that the historical context for Eckhart's theory of the image is not
the theology of Paris but rather that of Germany at the close of the thirteenth
century, I am well aware that I am contradicting a well established scholarly
opinion, namely that it is impossible to consider medieval theology and
philosophy from a "national" point of view; in this case from a German point
of view.

The fact is, however, that the historical location of Eckhart's teachings is the
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philosophical thought of Germany at the end of the thirteenth century. This is
particularly true of his theory of the image. In the last decade of the thirteenth
century, as Eckhart was beginning his academic career, a stormy debate broke
out over Dietrich of Freiberg's polemical treatise On Three Difficult Questions.
Dietrich was a Dominican like Eckhart and a close personal friend. He was also
in the process of making his academic career, and he was Eckhart's predeces-
sor as Master at Paris. He wrote more than 30 philosophical and scientific
treatises, from which his ideological position is clearly readable: he was the
main spokesman of the German anti-Thomists. The work On Three Difficult
Questions was clearly written as a polemic against the Thomists, and the
Thomist Dominicans, whose numbers were increasing rapidly at the end of
the century, reacted with corresponding severity.

The second of Dietrich's questions deals exclusively with the theory of the
image. For much of the argument, Dietrich's theory differs very little from that
of Eckhart. Dietrich also argues thatprocedere utimago ("flowing out as image")
is a formal emanation which assumes a dialectical identity of the image with
its source and which overturns the requirements of Aristotle's logic and
metaphysics. The characteristics of the image, which Eckhart lists in his
Commentary on John, are already treated in Dietrich's De visione beatifica.17 In
Dietrich's writings we have in fact a key to the understanding of Eckhart's
theory of the image. Just how enlightening this is emerges particularly in three
major points.

First of all, Dietrich states explicitly that the concept of emanation, on which
the notion of procedere ut imago "flowing out as image" is based, is taken from
the writings of the Neo-platonist Proclus. The Neoplatonic character of
Eckhart's theory is thus confirmed.

Secondly, Dietrich expressly identifies the image in the soul with the intellect,
or more precisely, with the acti ve intellect of the philosophical tradition. There
is an exact parallel to this proposition in Eckhart, who, as we have seen,
preached that the image only exists in the sphere of spiritual being (in other
words in the sphere of the intellect). Dietrich developed this notion systemati-
cally in his writings. By identifying the biblical concept of imago with the
philosophical concept of the active intellect, Dietrich shifted the main point of
his analysis from the theological to the philosophicalleveI. This corresponds
exactly with Eckhart's aim, stated in the Commentary on John, to interpret the

17 Cf. Kurt Flasch, IIProcedere ut imago. Das Hervorgehen des Intellekts aus
seinem gottlichen Grund bei Meister Dietrich, Meister Eckhart und Berthold von
Moosburg" in Kurt Ruh (ed.), Abendliindische Mystik im Mittelalter, Symposium
Kloster Engelberg 1984, Stuttgart, 1986 (Germanistische Symposien. Berichtsband
8), pp. 125-134. On the teaching of Dietrich, see Burkhard Mojsisch, Die Theorie
des Intellekts bei Dietrich von Freiburg, Hamburg, 1977 (Beihefte zum Corpus
Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi I) and the extensive bibliographies in
the introductions to the four volumes of his Opera Omnia, Hamburg, 1977-1985
(Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi II, 1-4).
29
truth of Scripture through the natural reason of philosophy.ls

Thirdly, Dietrich used the identity of image and intellect as proof that the
vision of God (the visio beatifica) could take place through a natural human
capacity (that is, the intellect); this was in direct opposition to Thomas and the
Parisian theologians, who argued that natural human ability was incapable of
such a thing.

But for Dietrich, the opposite was the case. He declared that a philosophical
examination of human reason showed that it had its origins in formal and not
efficient causality. This meant that reason flowed out of the divine substance,
that it looked back to God, and that through looking back it received its being.
According to Dietrich, human reason exists only to the extent that it under-
stands God, and it receives its whole being through its unceasing vision of
God. There is only one way of expressing this relationship, namely by means
of the modeillsource and image". To become aware of this continuous active
vision-of-God and being-in-God is for Dietrich the goal and purpose of all
philosophy.

'When a branch grows out of a tree, it bears both the name and essence of the
tree. What comes out is what stays within, and what stays within is what
comes out. Thus the branch is an expression of itself. The same is true for the
image of the soul: what comes out is what stays within, and what stays within
is what comes out. This image is the Son of the Father, and I myself am this
image.'

These are difficult concepts that are being communicated here, but, as we have
seen, they are concepts which Dietrich of Freiberg analysed in his philosophi-
cal treatises and which Eckhart developed further in his Latin writings.

The collected sermons of Eckhart may be regarded as an attempt to convey in

German to a German audience a sophisticated philosophy which had as its
goal a redefinition of the relationship between God and humanity. The
cornerstones of this project were Scripture, with its concept of imago, and
classical philosophy, with its concept of intellect.

All this may be called mysticism, if by mysticism is meant simply the

realisation that the logic of natural things has no validity in the sphere of
spiritual things. To achieve this insight does not, however, require mystic
visions and auditions, or special experiences of the Godhead. What is required
is a philosophical deployment of reason to investigate the true fundamentals
of being. Eckhart's voice warns us quietly but unmistakably: dies ist subtijl. And

18 Eckhart, In Ioh. n. 2, LW III, p.4.

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a subtle theory can, I believe, only be understood by the humble and patient
exercise of our historical reason.

Translated by Mark Atherton

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