Prosecutor Responds To Crumbleys Appeal of Bind Over To Supreme Court

RECEIVED by MSC 6/8/2023 11:11:59 AM
STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Supreme Court

No. 165667
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Court of Appeals
v No. 362210
JAMES ROBERT CRUMBLEY, Oakland Circuit Court

No. 2022-279989-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________________________________________________/
KAREN D. MCDONALD (P59083) MARIELL R. LEHMAN (P74760)

ATTORNEY FOR THE PEOPLE ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
OAKLAND COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE LEHMAN LAW FIRM, PLLC
1200 N. TELEGRAPH ROAD 8113 WILSON STREET
PONTIAC, MI 48341 SHELBY TOWNSHIP, MI 48316
(248) 858-0656 (586) 291-3414
_____________________________________________________________________________/
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S ANSWER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
KAREN D. MCDONALD
Prosecuting Attorney
Oakland County
MARILYN J. DAY
Chief, Appellate Division
BY: JOSEPH J. SHADA (P79648)

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office
1200 North Telegraph Road
Pontiac, MI 48341
(248) 858-0656
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED .............................................................................................. ii
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S STATEMENT OF JUDGMENT APPEALED

& RELIEF SOUGHT .......................................................................................................................v
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................................... vi
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................................1
ARGUMENT:
The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to quash because

the actions of defendant’s son were reasonably foreseeable and there
may be more than one cause of death ............................................................................17
Issue Preservation.....................................................................................................17
Standard of Review ...................................................................................................17
Discussion .................................................................................................................17
RELIEF REQUESTED ..................................................................................................................31
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .............................................................................................31
i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
American States Ins Co v Albin, 118 Mich App 201; 324 NW2d 574 (1982) .................. 19, 26, 27
District of Columbia v Wesby, ___ US ___; 138 S Ct 577; 199 L Ed 2d 453 (2018) .................. 18
Dortman v Lester, 380 Mich 80; 155 NW2d 846 (1968) ............................................................. 19
People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657; 549 NW2d 325 (1996)................................................... 25, 26, 27
People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179; 148 NW 400 (1914) ................................................................. 20
People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241; 893 NW2d 140 (2016) ................................................... 17, 30
People v Cook, 39 Mich 236 (1878) ............................................................................................. 22
People v Crumbley, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket Nos. 362210 and
362211) .............................................................................................................................. passim
People v Crumbley, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 11, 2023
(Docket Nos. 362210 and 362211) ............................................................................................. 1
People v Datema, 448 Mich 585; 533 NW2d 272 (1995) ............................................................ 19
People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184; 783 NW2d 67 (2010) .................................................... 20, 21, 30
People v Head, 323 Mich App 526; 917 NW2d 752 (2018) .................................................. 20, 30
People v Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1; 684 NW2d 730 (2004) ........................................................... 19
People v James Robert Crumbley, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 164885)
.............................................................................................................................................. 1, 14
People v James Robert Crumbley, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September
14, 2022 (Docket No. 362210) ............................................................................................. 1, 13
ii
People v Marshall, 362 Mich 170; 106 NW2d 842 (1961) .......................................................... 13
People v Metamora Water Serv, 276 Mich App 376; 741 NW2d 61 (2007) ............................... 17
People v Miklovich, 375 Mich 536; 134 NW2d 720 (1965) ......................................................... 28
People v Northey, 231 Mich App 568; 591 NW2d 227 (1998) .................................................... 18
People v Ogg, 26 Mich App 372; 182 NW2d 570 (1970) ............................................................ 19
People v Reigle, 223 Mich App 34; 566 NW2d 21 (1997)........................................................... 18
People v Rettelle, 173 Mich App 196; 433 NW2d 401 (1988) ..................................................... 27
People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106; 194 NW 609 (1923) ............................................................ 18, 19
People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418; 703 NW2d 774 (2005) .................................................... passim
People v Taylor, 316 Mich App 52; 890 NW2d 891 (2016) ........................................................ 28
People v Tims, 449 Mich 83; 534 NW2d 675 (1995) ....................................................... 20, 26, 29
People v Townes, 391 Mich 578; 218 NW2d 136 (1974)............................................................. 18
People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210; 749 NW2d 272 (2008)....................................................... 29
People v Webb, 163 Mich App 462; 415 NW2d 9 (1987) ...................................................... 21, 30
People v Yamat, 475 Mich 49; 714 NW2d 335 (2006)................................................................. 18
People v Yost, 468 Mich 122; 659 NW2d 604 (2003) .................................................................. 18
People v Zak, 184 Mich App 1; 457 NW2d 59 (1990) ................................................................. 23
People v Zitka, 325 Mich App 38; 922 NW2d 696 (2018)........................................................... 17
STATUTES
MCL 750.321 .................................................................................................................................. 1
iii
MCL 766.13 .................................................................................................................................. 18
RULES
MCR 6.110(E)............................................................................................................................... 18
MCR 7.305(B)(5)...................................................................................................................... v, 30
MCR 7.305(C)(2)............................................................................................................................ v
OTHER AUTHORITIES
LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law (1972)............................................................. 19, 27
M Crim JI 16.15 ............................................................................................................................ 26
Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed) ................................................................................ 25, 27
Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed) ...................................................................................................... 22
iv
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S STATEMENT
OF JUDGMENT APPEALED & RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant seeks leave to appeal the March 23, 2023 opinion of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash. People v Crumbley, ___ Mich App ___;
___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket Nos. 362210 and 362211) [Defendant’s Appendix A].
The People do not dispute that defendant timely filed his application for leave to appeal
within 56 days of the Court of Appeals decision, MCR 7.305(C)(2), but deny that leave to appeal
is warranted. The Court of Appeals opinion is a narrow one that is consistent with this Court’s
precedent. That is, it simply applies what this Court has already said: “[T]he linchpin in the
superseding cause analysis . . . is whether the intervening cause was foreseeable based on an
objective standard of reasonableness. If it was reasonably foreseeable, then the defendant’s
conduct will be considered a proximate cause.” People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 437; 703 NW2d
774 (2005).
Because the Court of Appeals decision is consistent with this Court’s caselaw and was not
clearly erroneous, this Court should deny leave to appeal. MCR 7.305(B)(5).
v
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTION PRESENTED
An intervening cause does not supersede a defendant’s conduct when it is reasonably

foreseeable. Defendants’ motion to quash argued that their son pulling the trigger was a
superseding cause as a matter of law. But the preliminary examination showed that the
ultimate harm of someone being shot was literally drawn out for defendants, who recently
gifted their son a gun and knew he displayed troubling signs. Was the decision to bind
defendant over within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes?
Defendant answers, “No.”
The people answer, “Yes.”
The trial court answered, “Yes.”
The Court of Appeals answered, “Yes.”
vi
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 3, 2021, defendant James Robert Crumbley was charged with four counts of
involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321. 1 Following bindover, defendant filed numerous pretrial
motions, including a motion to quash. Oakland County Circuit Judge Hon. Cheryl A. Matthews
issued an opinion and order denying the motion to quash on June 22, 2022. Defendant sought
interlocutory leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, challenging the denial of the motion to quash
and other evidentiary decisions. On September 14, 2022, the Court of Appeals denied the
application “for failure to persuade the Court of the need for immediate appellate review.” 2
Defendant then sought leave to appeal in this Court, which remanded this case for consideration
as on leave granted, “limited to whether there was sufficient evidence of causation to bind the
defendant over for trial on the charges of involuntary manslaughter.” 3 On remand and after
defendants’ appeals were consolidated, 4 the Court of Appeals (MURRAY, P.J., and RIORDAN and
YATES, JJ.) unanimously affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to quash. 5
Defendant now seeks leave to appeal in this Court.
For ease of reference, the transcripts will be referred to as follows:
PETr-I = Preliminary Examination Transcript – Volume I, 2/8/2022
PETr-II = Preliminary Examination Transcript – Volume II, 2/24/2022
MTr = Motions Transcript, 6/27/2022
These charges arise out of the November 30, 2021 Oxford High School shooting that was
committed by defendants’ son and resulted in the deaths of Madisyn Baldwin, Tate Myre, Hana
1
Codefendant Jennifer Lynn Crumbley (Case No. 2022-279990-FH) was also charged with four
counts of involuntary manslaughter, and she raises identical issues in a pending application for
leave to appeal (Docket No. 165669). In this answer, “defendant” will be used to reference
defendant James Crumbley, “codefendant mother” will be used to reference codefendant Jennifer
Crumbley, and “defendants” will be used to reference them collectively.
2
People v James Robert Crumbley, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September
14, 2022 (Docket No. 362210).
3
People v James Robert Crumbley, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 164885).
4
People v Crumbley, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 11, 2023 (Docket
Nos. 362210 and 362211).
5
People v Crumbley, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket Nos. 362210 and
362211).
1
St. Juliana, and Justin Shilling. The People allege that these deaths were caused by defendants’
gross negligence in allowing their troubled minor child access to a firearm and their gross
negligence in failing to perform a legal duty (i.e., failing to exercise care to control their minor
child so as to prevent him from intentionally harming others when they had the ability to do so and
knew of the necessity and opportunity to do so). (General Information, 3/1/2022.)
Background Information Leading up to the Shooting

As part of the investigation, Detective Edward Wagrowski, who was qualified as an expert
witness in cellphone forensics, examined defendants’ cellphones and their son’s cellphone, which
were obtained pursuant to a search warrant (PETr-I, 162-170). Those devices and social media
search warrant returns produced evidence showing that defendants’ son was displaying signs of
being in crisis, reporting hallucinations, and asking for help. For example, on March 9, 2021;
March 17, 2021; and March 20, 2021, defendants’ son sent text messages to codefendant mother
indicating that he thought someone was in the house; that there was a demon, which he claimed to
get a picture of and was throwing bowls; and that things were flying off a shelf. All of those
messages went unanswered. At the time their son sent these messages, codefendant mother was
horseback riding, and defendant was with her on at least one occasion. (PETr-I, 233-245; People’s
Preliminary Exam Exhibit “PX” 22-23, Mother-Son Text Messages [attached as Appendix A]).
Meanwhile, on March 19, 2021, defendants engaged in the following conversation about
their son via Facebook messenger:
Codefendant mother: [Is EC] awake?

Defendant father: um yeah
Codefendant mother: How is he?
Defendant father: He woke up looking like he had WAY to[o] much to drink
last night complaining about a headache
Codefendant mother: Well he was really worked up and out of control so I can
see why.
Codefendant mother: All I know is, he needs to eat, go to work and work hard
and not complain and he can get his stuff back
Codefendant mother: You respond and I didn’t get it?
Defendant father: Jesus
Defendant father: Yes
2
Defendant father: He said: Let me ask you a question. Why am I in your guys
room? LOL
Codefendant mother: OMG
Defendant father: I totally thought you [were] giving him a znax last night....
Codefendant mother: Does he seem better?
Codefendant mother: No melatonin
Defendant father: I know
Codefendant mother: But he hasn’t had one before should of only gave him
half..
Defendant father: He is just doing his school. Says his head hurts. He took
so[me] tylenol.
Codefendant mother: Is he ok to work?
Defendant father: yeah
Codefendant mother: Does he remember what he did?
Defendant father: Dude. I [am] working. On a demo right now. I have not
talked to him and he is doing school [PETr-I, 245-249; PX28, Defendant Facebook
Messages [attached as Appendix B].]
Moreover, on April 5, 2021, defendants’ son sent his friend the following messages: “I am
going to ask my parents to go to the doctor’s tomorrow or Tuesday again”; “But this time I am
going to tell them about the voicees [sic]”; “I only told them about the people I saw”; and “Like I
am mentally and physically dying” (PETr-I, 250-255). He also indicated that he was hallucinating
and hearing people talk to him and that, when he asked defendants to take him to the doctor,
defendant gave him some pills and told him to “suck it up.” Defendants’ son further stated that it
was at the point he was asking to go to the doctor and that codefendant mother laughed at him
when he told her. He even stated to his friend that he was thinking about calling 9-1-1 to go to the
hospital but then his parents would “be really pissed.” (PETr-II, 67-71.)
Detective Wagrowski also located evidence showing that defendants’ son had access to
firearms even before November 2021. On August 19, 2021 and August 20, 2021, defendants’ son
recorded videos handling a loaded .22 Keltec pistol and sent them to his friend. After sending the
videos, he stated, “My dad left it out so I thought. ‘Why not’ lol.” (PETr-I, 256-266; PX30-31,
Keltec Videos by Son [attached as Appendix C].)
3
November 26, 2021 to November 30, 2021
On Friday, November 26, 2021, defendant purchased a Sig Sauer SP2022 nine-millimeter
handgun. Cammy Back, the office manager at the store that sold the gun, testified that defendant
was not alone when purchasing the gun and that he was with a minor who had longer, shaggy hair.
The gun came with a plastic case, extra magazines, and a cable lock. 6 The plastic case only had
clasps to close it; it had no locking mechanism. (PETr-II, 79-80, 85-92.) The gun also came with
a Youth Handgun Safety Act Notice pamphlet, which provided numerous warnings such as (1)
“The misuse of handguns is a leading contributor to juvenile violence and fatalities” and (2)
“Safely storing and securing firearms will help prevent the unlawful possession of handguns by
juveniles, stop accidents, and save lives.” These warnings were also posted behind the register at
the gun store. (PETr-II, 82-84; PX33 & 35, ATF Youth Handgun Safety Notices, [attached as
Appendix D].)
Subsequently at 3:06 p.m. on that same day, defendants’ son posted various pictures of the
Sig Sauer on Instagram with the caption, “Just got my new beauty today � SIG SAUER 9mm.
Ask any questions I will answer.” (PETr-I, 192-194; PX13, Instagram Posts by Son, pp 3-5
[attached as Appendix E]). Both defendants followed their son’s Instagram account on which
these pictures were posted (PETr-I, 202-206).
At 6:39 p.m. later that evening, defendants’ son recorded a video holding the gun. In the
video recorded on his cellphone, the cable lock is shown at the bottom of the case—still in the
packaging and not on the gun—alongside the ATF Youth Handgun Safety Act Notice pamphlet.
(PETr-I, 210-212; PX17, Video of Gun by Son [attached as Appendix F].)
On November 27, 2021, codefendant mother took her son to the shooting range and
purchased range time, a paper target, and two 50-round boxes of nine-millimeter ammunition
(PETr-II, 174-177; PX39, Gun Range Receipt [attached as Appendix G]). When they finished
shooting at the range, her son packed up the gun and magazines in the case, and there was no cable
lock in sight (PX40, Gun Range Video, 0:08:12-0:09:03 [attached as Appendix H]).
Following going to the range, defendants’ son posted a picture of a target on Instagram
with the caption, “Took my new Sig out to the range today. Definitely need to get used to the new
6
A “cable lock” runs through the open slide of a pistol, preventing the slide from returning to the
forward position and preventing a bullet from being loaded into the chamber (PETr-II, 26).
4
sites lol” (Appendix E, p 1; PETr-I, 190-192). Within less than a minute, codefendant mother also
posted pictures of a target and the Sig Sauer, which was not locked, on Instagram with the caption
“Mom & son day testing out his new Xmas present. My first time shooting a 9mm I hit the
bullseye.” (PETr-I, 206-209; PX16, Instagram Posts by Mother, pp 1-3 [attached as Appendix I]).
At school on Monday, November 29, 2021, defendants’ son was caught looking up bullets
in class (PETr-I, 180; PETr-II, 109, 135). As a result, the school called codefendant mother and
left a voicemail regarding the incident (PETr-I, 180-182). Codefendant mother subsequently
messaged her son about the incident:
Codefendant mother: Seriously?? Looking up bullets in school??

Son: What
Son: Oh yah
Son: I already went to the office for that
Son: It was In first hour all I did was look up a certain caliber at the end of class
because I was curious
Son: It was on my phone
Son: Completely harmless
Son: Teachers just have no privacy
Son: They said I’m all good
Son: I understood why [] they talked to me and they said they that [I’m] good
Son: This is nothing I should get in trouble about
Codefendant mother: Your not they left me a voicemail � � � �
Codefendant mother: Did you at least show them a pic of your new gun?
Son: No I didn’t show them the pic my god
Son: I only told them I went to the range with you on Saturday
Son: It was a harmless act
Son: I have this bullet cartridge in my room that I didn’t [know] what kind of
Bullet it was and it said it was a 22 so at the end of first hour I just looked up
different types of 22 bullets and I guess the teachers can’t get their eyes of my
screen smh
Codefendant mother: Lol I’m.not mad, you have to learn not.to.get caught.
[PETr-I, 180-183; PX10, Mother-Son Text Messages, pp 286-290 [attached as
Appendix J].]
5
At school the next morning on November 30, 2021, defendants’ son was observed watching
a violent video on his phone. Shortly thereafter, defendants’ son made disturbing drawings on his
math assignment. (PETr-II, 112-113.) The drawing contained a gun strikingly similar to the Sig
Sauer purchased for him only days before, a bullet, a person who was bleeding and shot multiple
times, and a laughing face alongside the words “The thoughts won’t stop help me,” “Blood
everywhere,” “My life is useless,” and “The world is dead”:
[PX7,
Drawing
[attached as
Appendix
K].]
When the math teacher noticed the drawing, a picture of it was shared with the dean of
students who then showed the school counselor, Shawn Hopkins, around 9:00 a.m. Hopkins then
went to get defendants’ son from the classroom and grabbed the drawing off his desk. (PETr-II,
103-104, 113.) By the time Hopkins retrieved the drawing, defendants’ son crossed much of it out
(PX78, Crossed-Out Drawing, [attached as Appendix L]; PETr-II, 115-116).
6
Hopkins took defendants’ son back to his office where the dean of students was waiting.
They then discussed the violent video defendants’ son was watching in class and the drawing.
Defendants’ son initially indicated that the drawing was about a video game he wanted to design;
however, Hopkins responded that the presence of phrases such as “my life is useless” did not sound
like a video game. (PETr-II, 113-116.) Hopkins testified that defendants’ son then became sad
and started discussing some of the things that recently happened in his life:
He talked about how a family dog had died. He talked about that he had
lost a grandparent, that COVID had been incredibly difficult for him. Being out of
school the previous year had been difficult for those virtual days. He talked about
a friend who had left and wasn’t able to attend school anymore, had moved, and he
talked about an argument about grades the previous night with [his] parents. [PETr-
II, 117.]
Hopkins then called codefendant mother and left a voicemail. He also called defendant but
did not know whether the call was answered because it was “empty air” on the other side.
Codefendant mother eventually called Hopkins back, and they spoke on speakerphone with
defendants’ son present. (PETr-II, 117, 120-121.) Hopkins explained the situation, and pictures
of both the original and the crossed-out versions of the drawing were sent to codefendant mother.
Hopkins asked codefendant mother to come to the school, and she stated that she was at work and
would try to get in touch with defendant. She called Hopkins back and indicated that she was
unable to get ahold of defendant but would come to the school. (PETr-II, 122-124.)
Meanwhile at 9:33 a.m., codefendant mother Facebook messaged defendant, “Call NOW.
Emergency,” and the following exchange occurred wherein she sent pictures of the drawing:
Codefendant mother: Call NOW. Emergency

Codefendant mother: Emergency
Codefendant mother: [Pictures of drawing sent as attachments.]
Defendant father: My god. WTF.
Defendant father: Vet not here yet. It’s macklemurry for kiras horse. Still
waiting on vet.
Codefendant mother: He said he was distraught about last night
Defendant father: We talked about it this morning
Defendant father: You talked to him?
Codefendant mother: Can you call?
7
Codefendant mother: Heading to his school
Codefendant mother: I’m very concerned [PETr-I, 214-219; PX18, Defendant
Facebook Messages, pp 2042-2046 [attached as Appendix M].]
During the exchange with defendant, codefendant mother also messaged her then-
supervisor, Andrew Smith, at 10:05 a.m., stating, “I have to go to my kids school. Counselor just
called and this is what I’m dealing with. I’ll be back by 11:30-12 at the latest,” and she attached
a picture of the drawing (PETr-I, 70-71, 74-76; PX8, Smith Messages, p 1).
Following their message exchange, defendants had an approximately 7-minute-long phone
call together. They arrived together at the school at 10:37 a.m., entered the office at 10:39 a.m.,
and were greeted by a school employee at 10:40 a.m. (PETr-I, 220-226.) Hopkins brought
defendants in from the office lobby to have a meeting with their son. Hopkins testified that
defendants “weren’t friendly or showing care to their” son and that they did not greet him, touch,
or hug him. Hopkins then explained why he was concerned about their son’s wellbeing and
provided them with a list of resources for their son. He further told them that their son “needs
somebody to talk to for mental health support.” When Hopkins indicated that defendants’ son
needed mental health support as soon as possible, codefendant mother stated, “Today is not
possible. We have to return to work.” 7 Defendant did not object to or disagree with this statement.
(PETr-II, 126-129.)
Hopkins—who was unaware that defendants bought a gun for their son days earlier and
who was unaware that their son reported mental health issues in the past and asked for help—was
taken aback when defendants indicated that they could not take their son home. Without such
knowledge and after being told they could not take their son, Hopkins told defendants that their
son needed to be taken to therapy and that he would follow up in 48 hours. (PETr-II, 130, 162-
168.) Hopkins testified that, during the meeting, defendant was looking at the math assignment
and told his son “you have people you can talk to. You have your counselor you can talk to, we
talk, you have your journal.” Hopkins further testified that the meeting ended abruptly when he
“was asked by Mom, are we done, because at that point the student had wanted to return to class.”
Defendants’ son was still present when codefendant mother asked whether they were done. After
7
Defendant worked through DoorDash (PETr-I, 169), meaning he set his own schedule, and
codefendant mother did not need to return to work (PETr-I, 78-79, 102-103).
8
the dean of students indicated there was no disciplinary reason defendants’ son could not return to
class, Hopkins wrote him a pass back to class. Defendants did not hug or touch their son, and
Hopkins did not remember them even saying goodbye to their son. Defendants gathered their
things and left once their son went back to class. (PETr-II, 131-133.)
Defendants left the meeting at 10:53 a.m. and left the school parking lot together in the
same car at 10:56 a.m. (PETr-I, 225-226). At 10:58 a.m., codefendant mother messaged Kira
Pennock, the owner of the horse farm where defendants boarded their horses (PETr-I, 20-25), and
the following exchange occurred wherein she sent Pennock a picture of the drawing:
Codefendant mother: K I’ll bring some out later. Just had to go to my son’s
school and meet his counselor shit day
Pennock: Oh man. Everything okay? Do you still want to do lesson tonight?
Codefendant mother: Yeah, I still plan on doing the lesson everything’s okay
he’s just having a hard time after losing [his dog] tank his friend going away to a
treatment facility and who knows what else but he was caught drawing this on a
math assignment today [Picture of Drawing Attached to Message.]
Codefendant mother: As long as I can get out there early enough because I had
to leave work for an hour and I have a meeting in Southfield at 3:00[8] but I should
be done with that by 4:00 I plan on being there plus the vet said it’s better for him
to move around and keep it circulation going while he’s dealing with mud fever
Good times
Pennock: Omg ! He needs some horse therapy. I bet he would love moe !
Whatever works for you. Just let me know. I only have Bellas lesson tonight
at 5:30 so anytime after her lesson is fine.
Codefendant mother: Ok.. yeah well he’ll be coming with me tonight,
[defendant father] is working he can’t be left alone. [PETr-I, 37-41; PX6, Pennock
Messages, pp 1-5 [attached as Appendix N].] 9
At 11:00 a.m., defendant logged into DoorDash and started his first pickup. He dropped
this first order off at 11:19 a.m. He then completed three more DoorDash deliveries with the last
pickup at 12:51 p.m. and drop-off at 1:01 p.m. (PETr-I, 227-230.)
8
Smith testified that she did not need to attend this meeting (PETr-I, 78).
9
Detective Wagrowski testified that codefendant mother deleted the Facebook messenger app
from her phone (PETr-II, 61). Moreover, Pennock testified that codefendant mother previously
described her son as “weird” and not having any friends (PETr-I, 32, 66).
9
During this time, codefendant mother returned to work. Coworker Amanda Holland
testified that codefendant mother came over to her desk, said that she felt like a failure as a parent,
and showed her a picture of the math assignment (PETr-I, 122-123, 136). In addition, her
supervisor, Smith, testified that he saw codefendant mother in the copy room around noon and that
she mentioned her son needed some counseling. She also mentioned his dog and a grandparent
passed away recently and that she felt like she was failing him. 10 Smith further testified that
employees had brought their children to the workplace when needed and that employees were
always granted time off for family issues. (PETr-I, 76-79.) Similarly, Kathy Poliquin, the Human
Resources Director, testified that family first was a core value of the company and that employees
were always able to have time off for emergencies (PETr-I, 99-103).
At 12:51 p.m., defendants’ son began shooting other students at Oxford High School. He
stopped shooting at approximately 12:58 p.m. (PETr-II, 221). Their son used the Sig Sauer
SP2022 nine-millimeter handgun that defendants purchased for him as an early Christmas present
to commit the school shooting (PETr-I, 265-266; PETr-II, 227).
Shortly thereafter, defendant called codefendant mother to inform her that he received an
alert about an active shooter at the school. Smith then heard loud yelling and screaming at the
office, and codefendant mother indicated that there was an active shooter at her son’s school and
that she had to leave (PETr-I, 80-81, 138-139).
At 1:22 p.m., codefendant mother sent her son a message saying, “[EC] don’t do it” (PETr-
I, 249-250; Appendix J, p 293). Then at 1:23 p.m., which was about 20 to 30 minutes after
codefendant mother left the office, she sent Smith a message, and the following exchange occurred:
Codefendant mother: The gun is gone and so are the bullets

Smith: I’m praying everything is ok!
Codefendant mother: Omg Andy he’s going to kill himself he must be the
shooter
* * *
Codefendant mother: [My son] did it
Codefendant mother: I need my job. Please don’t judge me for what my son
did [PETr-I, 81-85.]
10
Holland similarly testified that concern was mentioned about defendants’ son being lonely
because his only friend had gone away (PETr-I, 121).
10
About ten minutes after codefendant mother sent the message that the gun and bullets were
gone, defendant called 9-1-1 at 1:34 p.m. (PETr-II, 221) and reported the following:
Operator: 9-1-1 what’s the location of your emergency?

Defendant: Okay, I, I’m not really sure, I’m at my house, there’s an active
shooter situation going on at the high school, my son goes to the high school, I have
a missing gun at my house. I need an officer to come to my house right away
please.
Operator: Okay, I’m not gonna be able to send anybody to your house right
now, sir they’re, they’re.
Defendant: Okay.
Operator: They’re on the active shooter situation right now.
Defendant: I understand that, there’s a million cops there.
Operator: (inaudible) at your house?
Defendant: I have a missing gun, and my son is at the school and, we had to go
meet with the counselor this morning because of something that he wrote on a test
paper and then I, I was in town and I saw a whole bunch of cops going somewhere
and I made sure that I, I, I wanted to get to the high school to see if something was
going on at the high school and then somebody told me there was an active shooter
and then I raced home just to like find out.
Operator: Okay.
Defendant: And I think my son took the gun, I don’t know if it’s him, I don’t
know what’s going on.
Operator: What’s your son’s name?
Defendant: I’m really freaking out.
Operator: I understand.
Defendant: My son’s name is [E.] Crumbley, C-R-U-M-B-L-E-Y. [PX5a, 9-1-
1 Call [attached as Appendix O].]
At this time, the shooter’s name had not been made public yet. Further, there were over a
hundred 9-1-1 calls made regarding the shooting. Out of all the calls, only defendant identified
his own child as a possible shooter. (PETr-II, 221-222.)
After defendants’ son surrendered and the scene was secured, a search warrant was
obtained for defendants’ house. Inside the master bedroom, Detective Adam Stoyek observed an
open handgun case that was empty and an empty box of nine-millimeter ammunition on the bed.
Detective Stoyek photographed this open case, which was plastic and had no locking mechanism.
11
(PETr-II, 185-191; PX43, Gun Case Photo [attached as Appendix P].) Inside the master bedroom,
Detective Stoyek also observed and photographed an additional gun case inside the dresser. The
dresser did not lock, and, although this second case had a combination locking mechanism, the
combination was zero-zero-zero. This additional gun case contained a .22 derringer and a .22
Keltec handgun. (PETr-II, 192-194; PX46-48, Master Bedroom Photos [attached as Appendix
Q].) In the kitchen, Detective Stoyek observed and photographed a third case, which was for the
.22 Keltec, was made of plastic, and contained a cable lock still in the packaging (PETr-II, 194-
198; PX50-51 & 53, Kitchen Photos [attached as Appendix R]). Other than the cable lock still in
the packaging, Detective Stoyek found no other cable locks in the home (PETr-II, 197-198).
Sergeant Matthew Peschke also participated in the search of the defendants’ home. In their
son’s bedroom, he observed gun range targets on the wall, an empty bottle of whiskey,
miscellaneous shell casings, and folding knives. (PETr-II, 204-206, 208-213.)
Moreover, as the scene was secured and processed at the school, a backpack worn by
defendants’ son was found in the bathroom. Detective Lieutenant Timothy Willis testified that the
backpack contained a journal authored by defendants’ son. This journal discussed plans to commit
the school shooting and contained various entries such as “First off I got my gun. It’s a SP2022
Sig Sauer 9mm. Second the shooting is tomorrow. I have access to the gun and the ammo”; “My
parents won’t listen to me about help or a therapist”; and “I have zero HELP for my mental
problems and it’s causing me to SHOOT UP THE FUKING SCHOOL.” (PETr-II, 219, 222-228.)
Procedural History
Defendants were charged as noted above. At the preliminary examination, the People
presented the evidence summarized above, and the district court bound the matter over. In doing
so, Judge Julie A. Nicholson summarized her holding as follows:
Therefore, in this case, after hearing extensive evidence—extensive
testimony as well as evidence and reviewing and viewing extensive exhibits, the
Court finds that the deaths of the four victims could have been avoided if James
and Jennifer Crumbley exercised ordinary care and diligence in the care of their
son. Specifically, the Court finds that the prosecutor has shown by a probable cause
standard that, one, the defendants’ son … presented a danger to the community;
number two, that that danger was apparent to an ordinary mind; number three, that
the defendants James and Jennifer Crumbley neglected to diligently address and/or
divert that danger; and, number four, that the danger resulted in the four deaths of
the young children at Oxford High School.
12
There was extensive testimony that [defendants’ son] was certainly a
troubled young man and that the defendants had knowledge of that situation, but
they purchased a gun which he believed was his and that he was free to use.
Therefore, the Court is binding the defendants over as charged. [PETr-II, 269-270.]
Once the matter was bound over to circuit court, various pretrial motions were filed.
Amongst these motions, defendants filed identical motions to quash, arguing that People v
Marshall, 362 Mich 170; 106 NW2d 842 (1961), foreclosed the People’s ability to charge
involuntary manslaughter; that defendants’ son was the sole cause of harm; and that the crime of
involuntary manslaughter was unconstitutionally vague (Defendant’s Appendix C). Defendants
also filed identical motions to exclude evidence based on hearsay and confrontation grounds,
arguing that their son’s journal, text messages, and internet searches were inadmissible.
On June 15, 2022, the People responded to both motions. With respect to the motion to
quash, the People argued that the motion should be denied because (1) Marhsall was an
inapplicable aiding and abetting case, (2) the act of defendants’ son pulling the trigger was not a
superseding cause given that it was reasonably foreseeable, and (3) involuntary manslaughter was
not unconstitutionally vague (Defendant’s Appendix D). Regarding the motion to exclude
evidence, the People argued that specific statements from the journal and text messages fit within
various hearsay exceptions and were nontestimonial statements. The People further argued that
internet search history was neither hearsay nor testimonial.
On June 22, 2022, the trial court issued an opinion and order denying the motion to quash—
essentially adopting the reasons set forth by the People (Defendant’s Appendix E). Further,
following a hearing on June 27, 2022, the trial court issued an order granting in part and denying
in part the motion to exclude evidence. The trial court agreed with the People that various portions
of the text messages and journal were admissible but excluded the internet searches based on
relevancy (MTr, 25-33).
Defendant then sought interlocutory leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, raising the
issues described above. On September 14, 2022, a panel of the Court of Appeals (CAVANAGH,
P.J., and JANSEN and PATEL, JJ.) denied the interlocutory application “for failure to persuade the
Court of the need for immediate appellate review.” (Defendant’s Appendix F).
Thereafter, defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court. On November 29, 2022, this
Court remanded this case to the Court of Appeals “for consideration as on leave granted, limited
13
to whether there was sufficient evidence of causation to bind the defendant over for trial on the
charges of involuntary manslaughter.” (Defendant’s Appendix G.)
On remand, defendants’ appeals were administratively consolidated for efficient
administration of the appellate process. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals (MURRAY, P.J., and
RIORDAN and YATES, JJ.) unanimously affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion
to quash. Crumbley, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 1-17. In the opinion authored by Judge
MURRAY, the Court quickly concluded that factual causation existed, reasoning defendants’ son
“would not have been able to shoot and kill four students but for defendants’ decision to purchase
their mentally disturbed son a handgun, their failure to properly secure the gun, and most
importantly, their refusal to remove EC from school when he made overt threats to hurt other
people.” Id. at ___; slip op at 14. That is, “ ‘But for’ defendants’ informed decision to leave EC
at school, these murders would not have occurred that day.” Id. The Court then went on to address
the issue of proximate cause and whether the conduct of defendants’ son amounted to an
intervening cause that superseded defendants’ actions. Id. In doing so, the Court rejected
defendants’ argument that the acts of defendants’ son amounted to a superseding cause as a matter
of law:
Defendants . . . see firm statements in both Schaefer and Feezel to the effect
that the intervening gross negligence or intentional misconduct of a third party must
always be a superseding cause. But as with many things in life, this rule is not as
black and white as defendants suggest. Indeed, while the Schaefer Court may have
used expansive language when discussing a specific example, it also made clear
that “[t]he linchpin in the superseding cause analysis . . . is whether the intervening
cause was foreseeable based on an objective standard of reasonableness.” Schaefer,
473 Mich at 437. Even when articulating the general rule that intentional
misconduct “on the part of a victim is considered sufficient to break the causal chain
between the defendant and the victim,” the Court notes that this is so only “because
[the intentional misconduct] is not reasonably foreseeable.” Feezel, 486 Mich at
195 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Hence, EC’s intentional misconduct
did not, as a matter of law, supersede defendants’ acts being a cause of the victims’
deaths, see id. and Bailey, 451 Mich at 676, as his acts will only supersede
defendants’ acts if his intentional acts were not reasonably foreseeable (which, of
course, is generally the case). [Id.]
In turn, the Court of Appeals addressed the foreseeability aspect of the analysis, noting
many of the facts discussed above such as the signs of distress displayed by defendants’ son; his
request to defendants for medical assistance; the purchase of the Sig Sauer SP2022 nine-millimeter
14
handgun (despite the knowledge of their son’s mental state); their son’s actions of looking up
bullets in school the day before the shooting; and the graphic drawing that he made with the words
“Blood everywhere,” “The thoughts won’t stop Help me,” “My life is useless,” and “The world is
dead.” Id. at ___; slip op at 14-15. As such, the Court went on to explain,
Despite their knowledge of all of these circumstances, when given the
option to help EC and take him out of school, defendants did nothing. They did
not, contrary to the recommendations of Hopkins, take EC home and get him
immediate medical help. Nor, when they decided to leave him at school, did they
tell school officials about EC’s history of mental health issues nor explain to them
that EC had access to a gun similar to the one he drew on the math worksheet.
Defendants neither asked EC if he had the gun with him nor did they look in his
backpack. And, when they left the school, defendants did not go home and ensure
EC had not taken the gun.
Given all those facts, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that there
was probable cause to believe that a juror could conclude that a reasonably
foreseeable outcome of defendants’ alleged gross negligence was EC committing a
shooting that day. One of the few reasonably foreseeable outcomes of failing to
secure the firearm that was gifted to EC was that it would be accessible to EC and
that, in his mentally deteriorated condition, he might use it in unlawful ways. In
light of those foreseeable events, when presented with what he had just drawn,
written, and viewed that morning, a reasonable juror could conclude that it was
foreseeable that EC possessed his recently gifted gun and intended to use it that
day. As a result, a reasonable juror could conclude that EC’s intervening acts were
not a superseding cause of the murders. [Id. at ___; slip op at 15.]
In addition, the Court of Appeals further noted the relation between the alleged intervening
act (defendants’ son committing the shooting) and defendants’ acts and omissions. Id. at ___; slip
op at 15-16. That is, defendants’ actions and inactions were “inexorably intertwined” with their
son’s actions—unlike other cases where the intervening act was separate and distinct. Id.
Notably, the Court also explained how its opinion was a narrow one, outlining (a) that “the
principle that grossly negligent or intentional acts are generally superseding causes remains intact”
and (b) that it “simply h[e]ld that with these unique facts, and in this procedural posture and
applicable standard of review, this case falls outside the general rule regarding intentional acts
because EC’s acts were reasonably foreseeable, and that is the ultimate test that must be applied.”
Id. at ___; slip op at 16. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of
defendants’ motion to quash. Id. at ___; slip op at 17.
15
In addition to joining Judge MURRAY’S opinion in full, Judge RIORDAN wrote a
concurrence, further expanding on the narrow nature of the decision and explaining how it would
not automatically subject parents to criminal liability:
The difference between this case and the typical case in which a child
commits a crime with a potentially dangerous mechanism, however, is that EC was
not merely a troubled child with obvious mental-health problems. Instead, the
morning of the shooting, EC drew a picture of a body that appeared to have two
bullet holes in the torso, apparently with blood streaming out of them, which was
near another drawing of a handgun that resembled the gun his parents, defendants
James Crumbley and Jennifer Crumbley, had very recently gifted to him. The body
in the drawing obviously could not have inflicted such wounds upon itself, so the
logical inference is that the body was shot by another. Thus, this drawing suggests
that EC not only was potentially suicidal, as school counselor Shawn Hopkins
believed at the time, but also that he presented a danger to others with his handgun.
In other words, there was visual evidence, known by defendants, that EC was
contemplating the act of gunshot wounds being inflicted upon someone.
* * *
In the end, our decision today is consistent with principles of proximate
causation and individual responsibility in criminal law. Our legal system does not,
nor should it, criminally punish people for subpar, odd, or eccentric parenting, or
require that children be deprived of any instrumentality that otherwise is legal to
possess and use. Moreover, I suspect that parents do not reasonably assume, as a
matter of course, that their children will commit violent crimes. However, before
us is the unusual case. EC was extraordinarily troubled, yet defendants nonetheless
provided him with a handgun and, despite having discrete, disturbing evidence that
EC contemplated harming others, did nothing when confronted with that evidence.
[Id. at ___ (RIORDAN, J., concurring).]
Following the Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
motion to quash, he now seeks leave to appeal in this Court.
Further facts may be discussed below where relevant to the issues presented.
16
ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to quash because the actions of
defendant’s son were reasonably foreseeable and there may be more than one cause of death.
Issue Preservation:
“For an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised, addressed, and decided
by the lower court.” People v Metamora Water Serv, 276 Mich App 376, 382; 741 NW2d 61
(2007). Here, defendant raised this issue, and the trial court addressed and decided it in denying
defendant’s motion to quash. Therefore, this issue is preserved.
Standard of Review:
“A district court magistrate’s decision to bind over a defendant and a trial court’s decision
on a motion to quash an information are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. However, [t]o the
extent that a lower court’s decision on a motion to quash the information is based on an
interpretation of the law, appellate review of the interpretation is de novo.” People v Bass, 317
Mich App 241, 279; 893 NW2d 140 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To amount to
an abuse of discretion, a court’s decision must fall “outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes.” People v Zitka, 325 Mich App 38, 43; 922 NW2d 696 (2018).
Discussion:
The district court did not abuse its discretion in binding defendant over for trial on four
counts of involuntary manslaughter, and the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to
quash.
The crux of defendant’s argument sets forth a single issue regarding the causation element
of involuntary manslaughter: does the act of his son pulling the trigger—as a matter of law—
constitute a superseding, intervening cause sufficient to break the causal link between his gross
negligence and the ultimate harm? As will be explained below, the answer to this question is no
because an intervening cause does not supersede a defendant’s conduct when it is reasonably
foreseeable and there may be more than one cause of death. Because the answer is no, whether
defendant committed gross negligence and whether such gross negligence caused the deaths of the
victims are now questions of fact for the jury. A review of the legal standards governing
preliminary examinations and the causation element of involuntary manslaughter necessitate one
conclusion for this matter: The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to quash.
17
A. Probable cause and the applicable standards governing preliminary
examinations.
“A district court must bind a defendant over for trial when the prosecutor presents
competent evidence constituting probable cause to believe that (1) a felony was committed and (2)
the defendant committed that felony.” People v Northey, 231 Mich App 568, 574; 591 NW2d 227
(1998) (emphasis added), citing MCL 766.13, MCR 6.110(E), and People v Reigle, 223 Mich App
34, 37; 566 NW2d 21 (1997). The probable cause standard “requires a quantum of evidence
sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a
reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt on each element of the crime charged.” People v Yamat,
475 Mich 49, 52; 714 NW2d 335 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Probable cause
is not a high bar,” District of Columbia v Wesby, ___ US ___, ___; 138 S Ct 577, 586; 199 L Ed
2d 453, 463 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted), and “[i]t is not the function of the
magistrate to discharge the accused when the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt as to
guilt. Such questions are for the trier of fact.” People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 469; 446 NW2d 140
(1989). See also People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126; 659 NW2d 604 (2003) (“[T]o find probable
cause, a magistrate need not be without doubts regarding guilt. The reason is that the gap between
probable cause and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is broad, and finding guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is the province of the jury.”) (citation omitted).
B. Under the proper analysis of the proximate causation requirement for

involuntary manslaughter, an intervening act does not supersede a
defendant’s conduct when—such as here—the act was reasonably
foreseeable.
Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of another without malice. People v

Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923). “The usual situations in which involuntary
manslaughter arise are either when death results from a direct act not intended to produce serious
bodily harm or when death results from criminal negligence.” People v Townes, 391 Mich 578,
591; 218 NW2d 136 (1974) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Within these usual situations,
there are various theories under which one may be charged with involuntary manslaughter, which
can include (1) the unintentional killing of another in doing some unlawful act, (2) the
unintentional killing of another “in negligently doing some act lawful in itself,” and (3) the
unintentional killing of another “by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.” Ryczek, 224
18
Mich at 110. See also People v Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1, 21-22; 684 NW2d 730 (2004). These
theories of involuntary manslaughter “are not mutually exclusive, and, under the proper
circumstances, multiple theories may be appropriate.” People v Datema, 448 Mich 585, 596; 533
NW2d 272 (1995). In this case, the latter two theories (i.e., negligent performance of a lawful act
and negligent omission to perform a legal duty) form the alternate bases for each of the charges.
Under the first theory, the involuntary manslaughter charges are premised upon
defendants’ gross negligence in storing the Sig Sauer SP2022 nine-millimeter and its ammunition
in a manner that was accessible to their troubled minor child. Alternatively, the second theory is
premised upon defendants’ gross negligence in failing to perform their legal duty of preventing
their minor child from intentionally harming others when they had the ability to do so and knew
of the necessity and opportunity to do so. For this alternate theory of involuntary manslaughter,
the legal duty must be a “legal duty imposed by law or contract.” People v Ogg, 26 Mich App
372, 382; 182 NW2d 570 (1970). The legal duty applicable in this case is one imposed by law:
“The law in Michigan is that a parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his
minor children as to prevent them from intentionally harming others or from so conducting
themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them if the parent [(1)] knows …
that he has the ability to control his children and [(2)] knows … of the necessity and opportunity
for exercising such control.” American States Ins Co v Albin, 118 Mich App 201, 206; 324 NW2d
574 (1982), citing Dortman v Lester, 380 Mich 80, 84; 155 NW2d 846 (1968). As explained by
LaFave & Scott, “One may stand in such a personal relationship to another that he has an
affirmative duty to control the latter’s conduct in the interest of the public safety, so that omission
to do so may give rise to criminal liability. A parent not only has a duty to act affirmatively to
safeguard his children, but he also has a duty to safeguard third persons from his children.” LaFave
& Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 26, p 186 (1972).
Under either alternate theory of involuntary manslaughter charged in this case, the crime
itself can be concisely described as gross negligence that “caused” death. 11 Over a century ago,
11
Of course, an “intent to injure” may be substituted for gross negligence when dealing with the
unlawful act theory of involuntary manslaughter. See, e.g., Datema, 448 Mich at 606 (“An
unlawful act committed with the intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately
causes death is involuntary manslaughter.”). However, such a theory is not at issue in this case.
19
this Court succinctly explained as much in People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 199; 148 NW 400
(1914):
To warrant a conviction of manslaughter, the conduct of the accused must
have been the proximate cause of death,[12] and must have been characterized by
such a degree of culpable negligence as to amount to gross negligence; and that is
a question for the jury.
The ultimate inquiry should be: Was the respondent criminally negligent,
and, if so, did his criminal negligence cause the death of the deceased?
“Causation in the criminal context requires proof of factual causation and proximate
causation.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 532; 917 NW2d 752 (2018). “Factual causation
exists if a finder of fact determines that ‘but for’ defendant’s conduct the result would not have
occurred.” People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184, 194-195; 783 NW2d 67 (2010). On the other hand,
proximate causation exists when the victim’s injury is “a ‘direct and natural result’ of the
defendant’s actions.” People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 436; 703 NW2d 774 (2005). Proximate
causation “is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability from attaching when the result
of the defendant’s conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural.” Id.
In analyzing proximate causation, it is often “necessary to examine whether there was an
intervening cause that superseded the defendant’s conduct such that the causal link between the
defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken.” Id. at 436-437. The crux of the
superseding cause analysis “is whether the intervening cause was foreseeable based on an objective
standard of reasonableness. If it was reasonably foreseeable, then the defendant’s conduct will be
considered a proximate cause.” Id. at 437.
On appeal, defendant cites Feezel for the proposition that “ ‘gross negligence’ or
‘intentional misconduct’ on the part of a victim is considered sufficient to ‘break the causal chain
between the defendant and the victim’ because it is not reasonably foreseeable.” Feezel, 486 Mich
at 195, quoting Schaefer, 473 Mich at 437-438. However, this statement in Feezel, which is
12
As explained by this Court in People v Tims, 449 Mich 83, 96; 534 NW2d 675 (1995), (1) “[t]he
phrase ‘the proximate cause’ is a legal colloquialism” sometimes used in older cases such as
Barnes, (2) “[t]he phrase does not imply that a defendant is responsible for harm only when his
act is the sole antecedent” of harm, and (3) “the proper test is ‘a’ cause.”
20
ultimately derived from Schaefer, must be put into context to be properly understood. In Schaefer,
this Court explained,
At the same time, gross negligence or intentional misconduct by a treating

physician is not reasonably foreseeable, and would thus break the causal chain
between the defendant and the victim.
The linchpin in the superseding cause analysis, therefore, is whether the
intervening cause was foreseeable based on an objective standard of
reasonableness. If it was reasonably foreseeable, then the defendant’s conduct will
be considered a proximate cause. If, however, the intervening act by the victim or
a third party was not reasonably foreseeable—e.g., gross negligence or intentional
misconduct—then generally the causal link is severed and the defendant’s conduct
is not regarded as a proximate cause of the victim’s injury or death. [Schaefer, 473
Mich at 437-438 (emphasis added).]
As indicated in Schaefer, there are certainly times when third-party intentional misconduct
will sever the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the ultimate harm. In fact, Schaefer
notes that intentional misconduct by a third party will “generally” act as a superseding cause. Id.
See also id. at 438-439 (explaining that “an act of God or the gross negligence or intentional
misconduct by the victim or a third party will generally be considered a superseding cause”)
(emphasis added). However, such a principle is not absolute. In addition to using the qualifying
language “generally,” Schaefer plainly states, “The linchpin in the superseding cause analysis,
therefore, is whether the intervening cause was foreseeable based on an objective standard of
reasonableness. If it was reasonably foreseeable, then the defendant’s conduct will be considered
a proximate cause.” Id. at 437 (emphasis added). See also Feezel, 486 Mich at 195 (“Whether an
intervening cause supersedes a defendant’s conduct is a question of reasonable foreseeability.”);
People v Webb, 163 Mich App 462, 465; 415 NW2d 9 (1987) (“The concept of an intervening
cause is predicated upon foreseeability.”). Thus, in this case, the Court of Appeals properly held
that the intentional misconduct of defendants’ son “did not, as a matter of law, supersede
defendants’ acts being a cause of the victims’ deaths, see id. and Bailey, 451 Mich at 676, as his
acts will only supersede defendants’ acts if his intentional acts were not reasonably foreseeable
(which, of course, is generally the case).” Crumbley, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 14.
Further illustrating this point that the ultimate question turns on reasonable foreseeability
is the example provided in Schaefer. In Schaefer, this Court noted grossly negligent medical care
or intentional medical malpractice by a treating physician as an example of when intentional
21
misconduct would not be reasonably foreseeable and, thus, would sever the causal link between
the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s death. Schaefer, 473 Mich at 437, citing People v Cook,
39 Mich 236 (1878). Under this example, if A inflicted a non-mortal wound upon B, and B
subsequently died—not from the wound—but from grossly negligent medical treatment of the
non-mortal wound or intentional medical malpractice by the treating physician, then the causal
link would be severed. Cook, 39 Mich at 240. The reason for this conclusion would be that “gross
negligence or intentional misconduct by a treating physician is not reasonably foreseeable.”
Schaefer, 473 Mich at 437. In other words, one generally would not reasonably foresee medical
treatment so deficient—whether by means of gross negligence or intentional misconduct—that the
victim would die from receiving treatment for a non-mortal wound. 13
Such an example can be contrasted with the instant case—where the intentional misconduct
by the shooter was foreseeable based on an objective standard of reasonableness. Using this
objective standard of reasonableness, defendant had glaring reasons to foresee this tragic event.
Defendant knew his son asked him for mental health help; 14 he knew the gun was purchased for
his son days earlier and that he was already proficient with it; 15 he knew he was distraught from
an argument the night before the shooting; 16 and he knew of the graphic drawing that his son made
13
Highlighting the fact that the applicable standard is one of reasonable foreseeability rather than
defendant’s intentional misconduct “as a matter of law” standard is the fact that even Perkins,
Criminal Law (2d ed), p 719—which Schaefer, 473 Mich at 437 n 64, relied on for the above
proposition—does not state the proposition as absolute: “But harm resulting from the grossly
erroneous treatment of a ‘quack’ or an intoxicated physician will ordinarily not be imputed to one
whose act resulted in the injury which received this extraordinary treatment.” Perkins, Criminal
Law (2d ed), p 719 (emphasis added). Again, the linchpin is foreseeability given the individual
facts and circumstances of the applicable case. Schaefer, 473 Mich at 437. See also Perkins,
Criminal Law (2d ed), p 726 (explaining that even when a “defendant’s act created merely a
condition, and the actual harm resulted from an ‘independent’ cause, or an abnormal response by
man or animal, the issue of proximate cause is dependent upon whether or not such harm, or harm
of the same general nature, was a foreseeable risk of the condition created by the defendant.”).
14
After his son asked to go to the doctor, defendant “just gave [him] some pills and told [him]
to … suck it up.” Moreover, defendant was plainly told that there were concerns about his son’s
wellbeing and that he “needs somebody to talk to for mental health support” hours before the
shooting.
15
Defendant himself bought the gun with his son present.
16
Defendants messaged each other about this fact on the morning of the shooting (PETr-I, 219).
22
on the morning of the shooting that stated, “The thoughts won’t stop help me,” “Blood
everywhere,” and “The world is dead.” The drawing also showed a gun that closely resembles the
Sig Sauer and a person being shot multiple times and bleeding:
Given these facts—when defendant’s troubled son literally drew out someone being shot
with a gun resembling the one he was gifted days earlier —it was foreseeable based on an objective
standard of reasonableness that the son would subsequently inflict this type of harm. Schaefer,
473 Mich 437. Although the standard here is an objective one, defendant’s subjective response to
seeing the drawing and actions afterwards serve to highlight the foreseeability of the events that
unfolded. Several hours before the shooting, codefendant mother sent a screenshot of the drawing
to defendant, who responded, “My god. WTF.” Yet, he did nothing to mitigate this dangerous
situation, despite owing a duty to others. After learning of the shooting, defendant went home to
look for the gun, called 9-1-1 about his son, and stated “I think my son took the gun.” These
reactions dispel any notion that the shooting was unforeseeable. Rather, the actions of defendant’s
son pulling the trigger and harming individuals was reasonably foreseeable conduct born out of
defendant’s gross negligence. Moreover, this intentional harm committed by his son was the exact
type of harm he had a legal duty to prevent from occurring; it is reasonably foreseeable that his
failure to perform this duty would lead to this type of harm. Given these circumstances, his son’s
acts do not serve as a superseding cause to break the causal link between defendant’s gross
negligence and the deaths of the victims. 17
17
As the Court of Appeals held, “Defendants’ reliance on People v Zak, 184 Mich App 1; 457
NW2d 59 (1990), is misplaced.” Crumbley, ___ Mich App at ___ n 14; slip op at 17 n 14. Zak
was a second-degree murder case with quite different facts. Unlike Zak, defendants gifted their
minor son the gun and allowed him to stay in school in the face of “significant evidence that he
was intending to use that gun to harm someone.” Id.
23
Defendant attempts to counter this glaring evidence above by citing to law enforcement
materials indicating that “simple statistical logic” makes it difficult “to pick out from [a] large
group the very few who will actually commit [a] violent act” such as a school shooting
(Defendant’s Application for Leave to Appeal, p 23). But this argument simply misses the mark.
There is quite the difference between predicting a mass shooting on a macrolevel (i.e., looking at
things from a global perspective and picking out a single individual from thousands of students)
and a shooting being reasonably foreseeable when presented with a specific individual who has
drawn out that result after being gifted a gun and displaying other troubling signs. To the same
end, it would be difficult for a random person to pick a needle out of a haystack. But when you
are the one who dropped the needle in the haystack and it has pricked you in the thumb, you can
reasonably conclude that you have found it.
The information known to defendant made his son’s subsequent use of that gun to shoot
others reasonably foreseeable. Indeed, a roadmap of this result was drawn out for him. Contrary
to what defendant argues on appeal, the act of his son pulling the trigger does not, as a matter of
law, supersede his gross negligence, and there was sufficient evidence of causation to bind this
matter over for trial. 18
18
As the Court of Appeals aptly noted, this case is different than most cases involving a third
party’s act. Crumbley, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 15-16. In most cases, the third party has
no relation to the defendant, and there is no connection between the defendant and the alleged
intervening cause. Id. That is, in most cases, “They were separate and distinct from one another,
which naturally led to the argument that the intervening cause was a superseding one.” Id. at ___;
slip op at 16. Take for example the medical treatment scenario: In the cases of gross negligence
or intentional misconduct by a treating physician, the poor medical treatment is completely
separate from the defendant’s act inflicting the original harm. But, here, “Defendants’ actions and
inactions were inexorably intertwined with [their son’s] actions, i.e., with the [purported]
intervening cause.” Id. The intentional misconduct by defendant’s son was dependent on and
intrinsically intertwined with defendant’s gross negligence, which included failing to perform his
legal duty of preventing his son from committing intentional misconduct and also in storing the
murder weapon and its ammunition in a manner so that it was accessible to him. At the end of the
day, the proximate causation element is designed to look at whether defendant’s conduct is “too
remote or unnatural” from the ultimate harm for criminal liability to attach, and the deaths in this
case were not “too remote or unnatural” for criminal liability to attach given the relationship
between the ultimate harm and defendant’s acts and omissions. Schaefer, 473 Mich at 436.
24
C. The acts of defendant’s son were not the “sole cause of harm,” and the
charges in this case are based on defendant’s own gross negligence rather
than his son’s actions or an aiding and abetting theory.
In support of his position that he cannot be convicted of involuntary manslaughter as a

matter of law, defendant argues that his son was the “sole cause of harm” and relies on People v
Bailey, 451 Mich 657, 677; 549 NW2d 325 (1996), for the proposition that “[w]here an
independent act of a third party intervenes between the act of a criminal defendant and the harm
to a victim, that act may only serve to cut off the defendant’s criminal liability where the
intervening act is the sole cause of harm.” Such an argument is misplaced because, similar to the
reasoning discussed above, defendants’ gross negligence is what put the murder weapon in his
son’s hands, it is also what allowed him to remain in the school with the murder weapon, and the
additional cause at play was an act that he had a duty to prevent (given his relationship, knowledge,
and ability and opportunity to prevent it). As Bailey, 451 Mich at 676, explained, there may be
several different acts that proximately cause the harm:
In assessing criminal liability for some harm, it is not necessary that the
party convicted of a crime be the sole cause of that harm, only that he be a
contributory cause that was a substantial factor in producing the harm. The criminal
law does not require that there be but one proximate cause of harm found. Quite
the contrary, all acts that proximately cause the harm are recognized by the law.
If a certain act was a substantial factor in bringing about the

loss of human life, it is not prevented from being a proximate cause
of this result by proof of the fact that it alone would not have resulted
in death, nor by proof that another contributory cause would have
been fatal even without the aid of this act. [Perkins & Boyce,
Criminal Law (3d ed), p 783.]
Here, defendant’s gross negligence in storing a firearm and ammunition in a manner that
was accessible to his troubled minor child and in failing to perform his legal duty (i.e., failing to
exercise care to control his minor child so as to prevent him from intentionally harming others)
was “a substantial factor in bringing about the loss of human life.” These circumstances did not
involve harm inflicted by a random third party. Instead, defendant’s gross negligence gave his son
access to the murder weapon and allowed him to remain in school with that murder weapon, even
when there was significant evidence that he would use it to harm someone. This gross negligence
was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the loss of human life—especially when considering
25
his relationship as the parent, his knowledge, and his ability to prevent such harm gave rise to the
specific duty to prevent his son from intentionally harming others. Albin, 118 Mich App at 206.
Given these circumstances, his son’s intentional misconduct was intrinsically intertwined with his
own gross negligence in failing to perform his legal duty. Under these circumstances, his son’s
actions were not “the sole cause” of harm, and defendant’s own conduct (and lack thereof) may
appropriately be considered a proximate cause of the harm. Bailey, 451 Mich at 676. See also
Tims, 449 Mich at 96-97 (“The suggestion that the presence of an additional ‘cause’ of death could
be a complete defense to negligent homicide is inconsistent with accepted notions of
responsibility.”).
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the appropriate standard for criminal cases is
“a proximate cause”—not “the proximate cause.” In Tims, 449 Mich at 95, defendant Roger Kneip
argued that he could only be convicted of involuntary manslaughter if his conduct was “the” cause
of death. This Court specifically rejected that argument and held “that the proper test is ‘a’ cause,”
explaining that “[t]here is no support in this Court’s decisions for the contrary view, and no policy
justification for its adoption.” Id. at 96. As further explained by this Court, the proper test for
proximate causation “does not imply that a defendant is responsible for harm only when his act is
the sole antecedent.” Id. Accordingly, as the applicable criminal jury instruction explains, “There
may be more than one cause of death.” M Crim JI 16.15. See also Bailey, 451 Mich at 676 (“The
criminal law does not require that there be but one proximate cause of harm found. Quite the
contrary, all acts that proximately cause the harm are recognized by the law.”). Defendant’s
argument to the contrary is without merit.
Next, in an attempt to bolster his position that he cannot be convicted of involuntary
manslaughter, defendant argues,
Certainly, if the prosecution could directly link Mr. or Mrs. Crumbley to the mass
shooting, they would be prosecuted for first-degree murder as if they had directly
committed the offense as aiders and abettors. However, because the prosecution
cannot support such a claim, they are left attempting to fit a square peg into a round
hole. [Defendant’s Application for Leave to Appeal, p 20.]
Stated differently, defendant argues that because this case is not first-degree murder, it
cannot be manslaughter (i.e., because the square peg does not fit in the round hole, it also cannot
fit in the square hole). The logic in such an argument is clearly flawed. What defendant fails to
26
acknowledge is that the law provides both a round (first-degree murder) and a square
(manslaughter) hole for the appropriate circumstances. As explained in Perkins & Boyce, Criminal
Law (3d ed), pp 670-671, the circumstances of a given case may amount to murder, voluntary
manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter:
One having a legal duty to take positive action for the protection of another,
who maliciously refrains from performance for the very purpose of causing death,
is guilty of murder if life is actually lost as a result of this malicious forbearance.
If the nonperformance is intentional and for the purpose of causing death, but the
determination not to act is suddenly formed in the heat of passion engendered by
adequate provocation, a resulting homicide is voluntary manslaughter. . . . Should
homicide result from the omission of such a duty—an unintentional failure of
performance due to forgetfulness or inattention—it would not amount to murder.
It would be involuntary manslaughter if the omission amounted to criminal
negligence . . . .
Defendant is not charged with aiding and abetting murder; he is charged with involuntary
manslaughter based on his own gross negligence that was “a substantial factor in bringing about
the loss of human life.” Bailey, 451 Mich at 676. That is, the criminal liability in this case is
premised upon his own gross negligence in storing a firearm and ammunition in a manner that was
accessible to his troubled minor child and in failing to perform his legal duty (i.e., failing to
exercise care to control his minor child so as to prevent him from intentionally harming others
when he had the ability to do so and knew of the necessity and opportunity to do so).
The distinction between liability for the child’s act and liability for the parent’s own
negligence is analogous to the civil context where it has been noted, “[T]he parent may be liable
for harm inflicted by a child under circumstances that constitute negligence on the part of the
parent. This, of course, is not a case of responsibility of a parent for the child’s tort, but liability
for his own wrong,” i.e., their own negligence. Albin, 118 Mich App at 206-207 (emphasis added).
And when the negligence is to such a degree that it rises to gross negligence resulting in death,
then there is not just civil liability but also criminal culpability under an involuntary manslaughter
theory. See People v Rettelle, 173 Mich App 196, 199; 433 NW2d 401 (1988) (“Involuntary
manslaughter occurs when death results from negligence which is gross, wanton or wilful, or
criminal, indicating a culpable indifference to the safety of others.”); LaFave & Scott, Handbook
on Criminal Law, § 26, p 186 (1972) (“One may stand in such a personal relationship to another
that he has an affirmative duty to control the latter’s conduct in the interest of the public safety, so
27
that omission to do so may give rise to criminal liability. A parent not only has a duty to act
affirmatively to safeguard his children, but he also has a duty to safeguard third persons from his
children.”). Such is the case here where defendant is charged with involuntary manslaughter based
on his own gross negligence. 19
D. The procedural posture of this case remains at the interlocutory stage, so

the evidence admitted thus far has only been the snapshot of the case that
was presented at the preliminary examination.
Of note, this case is still in the interlocutory stage, and the Court of Appeals review was of
the bindover decision, which only requires probable cause. As discussed above, the evidence
presented at the preliminary examination exceeded the low bar that is the probable cause standard.
But, if there were any question regarding whether this low bar was met, the People note that there
is additional evidence to be presented. 20 The appropriate remedy for any perceived factual
deficiencies would be a remand to cure such deficiencies. People v Miklovich, 375 Mich 536, 537-
540; 134 NW2d 720 (1965) (holding that it is appropriate to remand to the district court when the
evidence did not meet the probable cause standard). See also People v Taylor, 316 Mich App 52,
55; 890 NW2d 891 (2016). If needed, the People are prepared to present additional evidence
outlined below.
As an offer of proof, the People note there are additional Facebook messages between
defendants that demonstrate their knowledge of their son’s mental distress. On March 8, 2021,
codefendant mother expressed concern to defendant about their son, indicating that she was
“freaking out” when she could not reach him after school. She further expressed frustration with
defendant that he did not pick their son up after school, writing “I told you to pick him up because
he’s upset and I don’t want him to do anything stupid godamnit.” These messages, in context with
other evidence already admitted at the preliminary examination, further demonstrate that the
defendants were on notice of their son’s mental distress.
19
This point also quells defendant’s concerns about “open-ended criminal liability” for parents
(Defendant’s Application for Leave to Appeal, p 21). In order for there to be criminal liability,
the defendant themselves must be grossly negligent and that gross negligence must be a proximate
cause of a death.
20
Because the burden is simply probable cause, the prosecution did not and seldom ever does
admit all of the evidence at its disposal at the preliminary examination.
28
There is also a recorded interview of codefendant mother immediately after the shooting
wherein she tried to deflect responsibility. For example, despite her earlier messages to defendant
that she was “very concerned” about their son’s drawings and that it constituted an “emergency,”
she told the interviewer that she “didn’t even look at them closely . . . .” In that same recorded
interview where she minimized her knowledge of her son’s distress, she also attempted to absolve
herself for the deaths of other students, saying that “my biggest fear was that he was gonna turn
the gun on himself.” Such fear only highlights the foreseeability of their son using the murder
weapon—whether it be on himself or others.
Moreover, there is additional evidence regarding defendants’ knowledge of their son’s
proficiency with firearms. This additional evidence includes gun range receipts from their visits,
social media posts from codefendant mother wherein she stated that a firearm was purchased for
their son, and photographs from their range time. On the topic of firearms, the People will also
present evidence that defendant chose to take the receipt for the murder weapon with him when he
and codefendant mother fled Oakland County and attempted to evade capture. This receipt was
on defendant’s person when defendants were apprehended. Defendants’ flight and the taking of
the receipt for the murder weapon during such flight provide an inference of their consciousness
of guilt. See People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 225-227; 749 NW2d 272 (2008) (explaining
that things such as flight, inconsistent statements, destruction of evidence, and lying or deception
are admissible to support an inference of the defendant’s “consciousness of guilt”).
While the People are prepared to present additional evidence of causation, this Court need
not reach that issue because the evidence presented at the preliminary examination exceeded the
low bar that is the probable cause standard.
E. Conclusion
Defendant’s argument that causation cannot be established as a matter of law because his
son pulled the trigger is contrary to the established law. First, defendant’s argument is contrary to
the principles outlined in Tims, 449 Mich at 95-97, i.e., (a) the appropriate standard for causation
is “a cause” rather than “the cause” and (b) the proper test for proximate causation “does not imply
that a defendant is responsible for harm only when his act is the sole antecedent.” His argument
is also contrary to Court of Appeals caselaw and this Court’s precedent holding that reasonable
foreseeability determines whether an intervening cause supersedes a defendant’s conduct. See
29
Schaefer, 473 Mich at 437 (“The linchpin in the superseding cause analysis . . . is whether the
intervening cause was foreseeable based on an objective standard of reasonableness. If it was
reasonably foreseeable, then the defendant’s conduct will be considered a proximate cause.”)
(emphasis added); Feezel, 486 Mich at 195 (“Whether an intervening cause supersedes a
defendant’s conduct is a question of reasonable foreseeability.”); Webb, 163 Mich App at 465
(“The concept of an intervening cause is predicated upon foreseeability.”); Head, 323 Mich App
at 533-535 (using reasonable foreseeability to analyze whether there was an intervening cause that
superseded a defendant’s conduct). Defendant’s son pulling the trigger and committing intentional
harm was intrinsically intertwined with defendant’s own gross negligence (i.e., it was the very
harm he was duty bound to prevent) and was reasonably foreseeable. Thus, it does not act as a
superseding cause to break the causal link between his gross negligence and the ultimate harm.
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in binding this matter over for trial,
Bass, 317 Mich App at 279, and the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to quash.
Further, the Court of Appeals decision reaching this result is a narrow one that simply applies what
this Court has already said: the linchpin in the superseding cause analysis is reasonable
foreseeability. Because the Court of Appeals opinion is consistent with this Court’s caselaw and
was not clearly erroneous, this Court should deny leave to appeal. MCR 7.305(B)(5).
30
RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, Karen D. McDonald, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of

Oakland, by Joseph J. Shada, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, respectfully requests that this
Honorable Court deny defendant’s application for leave to appeal.
Respectfully Submitted,
KAREN D. MCDONALD
Prosecuting Attorney
Oakland County
MARILYN J. DAY
Chief, Appellate Division
By: /s/ Joseph J. Shada

JOSEPH J. SHADA (P79648)
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office
1200 North Telegraph Road
Pontiac, Michigan 48341
(248) 858-0656
Dated: June 8, 2023
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this document complies with the formatting requirements of MCR
7.305(D) and MCR 7.212(B). I certify that this document contains 12,205 countable words in the
elements listed in subrules (C)(6)-(8) of MCR 7.212 and is set in 12-point font with one-inch
margins and 1.5-line-spaced text, except quotations and footnotes are single-spaced.
/s/ Joseph J. Shada

JOSEPH J. SHADA (P79648)
31

Prosecutor Responds To Crumbleys Appeal of Bind Over To Supreme Court

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Prosecutor Responds To Crumbleys Appeal of Bind Over To Supreme Court

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RECEIVED by MSC 6/8/2023 11:11:59 AM

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Supreme Court

JAMES ROBERT CRUMBLEY, Oakland Circuit Court

KAREN D. MCDONALD (P59083) MARIELL R. LEHMAN (P74760)

BY: JOSEPH J. SHADA (P79648)

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED .............................................................................................. ii

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S STATEMENT OF JUDGMENT APPEALED

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................................... vi

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS ...........................................................................................1

The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to quash because

RELIEF REQUESTED ..................................................................................................................31

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .............................................................................................31

People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179; 148 NW 400 (1914) ................................................................. 20

People v Cook, 39 Mich 236 (1878) ............................................................................................. 22

People v Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1; 684 NW2d 730 (2004) ........................................................... 19

People v Reigle, 223 Mich App 34; 566 NW2d 21 (1997)........................................................... 18

People v Townes, 391 Mich 578; 218 NW2d 136 (1974)............................................................. 18

People v Yamat, 475 Mich 49; 714 NW2d 335 (2006)................................................................. 18

People v Zak, 184 Mich App 1; 457 NW2d 59 (1990) ................................................................. 23

MCL 750.321 .................................................................................................................................. 1

LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law (1972)............................................................. 19, 27

M Crim JI 16.15 ............................................................................................................................ 26

Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed) ................................................................................ 25, 27

Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed) ...................................................................................................... 22

An intervening cause does not supersede a defendant’s conduct when it is reasonably

Defendant answers, “No.”

The people answer, “Yes.”

The trial court answered, “Yes.”

The Court of Appeals answered, “Yes.”

Background Information Leading up to the Shooting

Codefendant mother: [Is EC] awake?

Codefendant mother: Seriously?? Looking up bullets in school??

Codefendant mother: Call NOW. Emergency

Codefendant mother: The gun is gone and so are the bullets

Operator: 9-1-1 what’s the location of your emergency?

B. Under the proper analysis of the proximate causation requirement for

Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of another without malice. People v

At the same time, gross negligence or intentional misconduct by a treating

In support of his position that he cannot be convicted of involuntary manslaughter as a

If a certain act was a substantial factor in bringing about the

D. The procedural posture of this case remains at the interlocutory stage, so

WHEREFORE, Karen D. McDonald, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of

By: /s/ Joseph J. Shada

Dated: June 8, 2023

/s/ Joseph J. Shada

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