What Is Modern Science?

Author(s): Hugo O. Engelmann

Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan., 1962), pp. 3-15
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4104613 .
Accessed: 28/06/2014 13:48

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Wiley and Midwest Sociological Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to The Sociological Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
What is Modern Science?

HUGO O. ENGELMANN

The Historical Setting

The Present Situation. The scientific tradition of Galileo and

Newton is no longer modern. We are in the midst of an over-all in-
tellectual transformation as extensive and significant as that which
led from the medieval to the Newtonian world picture. In its scien-
tific aspects, the present period is comparable to the late sixteenth
century. We can discern the direction of modern trends, but we are
still surroundedby the persistent tradition of an older science.
Therefore, modern science becomes fully comprehensible only in
a historical perspective. Since modernism differs from both New-
tonianism and scholasticism, and since both of the latter are still
strongly with us, the new organization of science must be contrasted
to its Newtonian as well as its scholastic antecedents.
Thus, in this historical approach, we must deal with two periods
of reorganization,one in the sixteenth and seventeenth, and one in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Four main areas of change
are involved in all such reorganizations of science: its relations to
other intellectual endeavors, its method, its concepts, and the divi-
sion between its differentfields.
Any particularorganizationof science can be approachedas a spe-
cific manifestation of a more basic perspective with regard to the
total nature of the universe. Such perspectives may be called meta-
physical. But if the word is used in this way, it has no connotations
of either mysticismor supernaturalism.
The ChangingPictureof the Universe.To the scholastic,the
universe is a transcendentalhierarchy of ultimate ends located nec-
essarily in the future and determining the essences of common-sense
phenomena. All empirically given phenomena appear then as mani-
festations of these essences.
3

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
4 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

To the Newtonian, the universe is a static entity in the infinite

space of which time flows uniformly. Empirical phenomena located
within this universe exert forces upon each other and thus determine
each other's characteristics.
To the modernist, the universe is a self-contained process the basic
characteristicsof which manifest themselves in the constantly shift-
ing structure and arrangementof empirical phenomena. Determina-
tion is involved only in the underlying processes, and no two com-
mon-sense phenomena can be said to determineeach other.
Science, Valuation, Metaphysics, and Mathematics. In the scho-
lastic perspective, the valuation of phenomena easily derives from
their relations to ultimate ends. No distinction need be made, there-
fore, between delineatory and valuative approaches.This is the case
neither under Newtonianism nor under modernism. Hence, the
Newtonian demand for a value-free science remains an integral part
of modern scientific organization. In fact, this demand must be sup-
plemented by one for a purely delineatory, value-free metaphysics.
But the latter question becomes urgent only with the modern ap-
proach.
Under scholasticism, since common-sense phenomena are directly
determined by metaphysical entities, no separation of science from
metaphysics is necessary. Both the Newtonian and the modernist
must conceive of the two as separate fields. However, the completely
passive role of the Newtonian universe makes metaphysical specula-
tion at best a side issue, permitting the positivist position which re-
jects metaphysics entirely. To the modernist, metaphysical articula-
tion of general processes is essential, but it is separate from its sci-
entific transliteration.
The logico-mathematicalformalization of basic metaphysical per-
spectives changes its position correspondingly. In scholasticism, it
is again simply part of the undifferentiated philosophical approach.
In Newtonianism, its relations to metaphysics are lost sight of, and
it appears as the scientific development of self-evident axioms. In
modernism, it is approachedas a separate discipline developing log-
ical postulates without empirical referents. Its significance for sci-
ence, in all three cases, is obvious.
Formulation and Verifcation of Scientific Theory. The scho-
lastic philosopher-scientistdeals only with metaphysical phenomena

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WHAT IS MODERN SCIENCE? 5

--ultimate ends and essences. He checks the validity of his assump-

tions by the purely logical operationsof the dialectic method.
The Newtonian scientist need not bother with metaphysical en-
tities; he derives scientific statements, by abstractionand generaliza-
tion, from common-sensephenomena. He checks his work by experi-
mentation in his sense, which means simply controlled observation,
either under original conditions not given before or under conditions
considered to be similar to but varying in some respects from the
original ones.
The modern scientist must provide a connection between meta-
physical and common-sense phenomena. He does so by postulating
additional phenomena, which are neither derived from nor ever
subject to immediate experience, such as, in physical science for in-
stance, photons or electrons, or certain intrinsic properties of the
space-time continuum. By a complex set of operations, there are
developed, from these postulates, specific hypotheses applying to
particular empirical phenomena. This work, too, is experimentally
tested. But an experiment in this modern sense, testing a theoreti-
cally derived hypothesis against empirical data, is quite different
from a Newtonian experiment, which tests either no hypothesis at
all or one which has been derived empirically.
The terms "theory" and "hypothesis" undergo similar changes
in meaning. In the currentthree-cornereddebate between neoscholas-
ticism, Newtonianism, and modernism, it is most significant to be
aware of such subtle differences in meaning. Hypotheses, strictly
speaking, exist only in experimental and, thus, not in scholastic
science. In the latter, a theory is a metaphysical proposition. To
this the Newtonian opposes theories which are empirically verified
hypotheses, which in turn are generalizations from empirical data.
In modern science, a theory is an expansion of postulates and in-
cludes all specific hypothetical statements developed from these
original postulates. Hence, it is theories which are experimentally
verified and not hypotheses, which remain such, even when positive
experimentalverificationof the theory has been achieved.
Scientific Theory and Common-SensePhenomena. In some re-
spects, among these three variants, modern science is furthest from
everydayevents. In scholastic science, where common-sensephenom-
ena constitute an unfolding of their essences, description of these

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
6 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

phenomena grows out of theoretical scientific work. In Newtonian

science, where theoretical work begins with empirical observation,
the description of common-sense phenomena is at least a prereq-
uisite for, if not in itself, a scientificpursuit.
In modern science neither is the case. Common-sense phenomena
are considered in the development of basic postulates, but the latter
are not derived from the former. In experimentation, assorted em-
pirical data from widely divergent areas are used to test a particular
theory. But these data are considered only in those of their aspects
which have a direct bearing on the specific hypothesis being tested.
Nowhere are everyday events examined for their own sake or in
their totality.
This has two consequences. First, common-sense description, sig-
nificant as it may be in its own right, is now completely divorced
from scientific work. Second, a scientific account of everyday phe-
nomena must be furnished separately from the construction, elab-
oration, and verificationof theoreticalconcepts.
Thus, while the scientific methods of scholasticism and Newto-
nianism are unitary ones, that of modernism is a dual one. In addi-
tion to theoretical, we find analytical science in which already elabo-
rated theoretical concepts are applied to the examination of our
everyday world. It is the utilization of theoretical concepts which
distinguishes such analysis from pure description.
Science and Technology. Modern science also is further re-
moved from the implementation of values than either of its prede-
cessors. Even the Newtonian division into pure and applied science
no longer holds.
Scholastic philosophy, intermingling ultimate ends and human
valuations, without difficultyencompasses technological implementa-
tions of the latter. Newtonian science and technology share a de-
scriptive approach to everyday events as a common point of depar-
ture. These descriptive statements actually are used differently in the
respective elaboration of scientific generalizations and technological
tools. But, taking a highly empirical view of science and placing
all emphasis on its descriptive aspects, the statement that technology
is applied science is not too distortive.
Modern technology, like modern science, begins with theory,
which is then applied to specific situations as is evidenced, for in-
stance, by the contemporaryorganization of industrial research.The

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WHAT IS MODERN SCIENCE? 7

resultant scientific and technological approaches to common-sense

phenomena are quite different. Accordingly, science and technology
become completely separated from each other. The former provides
us with an over-all integration of experience-an account of the
most diverse phenomena in terms of a few basic principles. The lat-
ter furnishes us means for the implementationof goals.
The Sociocultural Role of Science. Modern science, thus sepa-
rated from valuation as well as from technology, tells us neither
what to do nor how to do whatever we may otherwise wish to do.
This does not imply that science is meaningless. The new alterna-
tive value systems, and the new technological tools, required in the
continually changing social situation-and all societies change con-
tinually-can be elaborated only in terms of a thorough insight into
the newly appearing society. Such insights, in turn, rest on the per-
spective provided by scientific and, for that matter, artistic endeav-
ors. But these indirect relations between science, valuation, and
technology must not be confused with a scientific creation of values
or of technological means.

The New Science and Its Subdivisions

Bases of Scientific Specialization.We have examined the meth-

ods of scholastic, Newtonian, and modern science and their relations
to other fields. The differences found to exist are reflected in the
way the total scientific endeavor is divided into specialized areas.
The members of the scholastic trinity-theology, law, and medi-
cine-correspond respectively to the transcendentalpurposes of the
universe with their ethical implications, and to the social and bio-
logical necessities of the human being which follow from these ba-
sic purposes. Newtonian science is arranged topically, every new
class of events giving rise to a new scientific field allied closely with
a similar technological field.
In modern science, analytic fields are arranged topically. Except
for the lacking connection with technological fields, the division is
identical with the Newtonian one. Theoretical fields, however, are
divided conceptually, which means that they have no specific connec-
tion with particular groups of common-sense phenomena or with
any special area of analysis. New theoretical fields arise as the log-
ical development of postulational concepts requires further divisions

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

between areas of scientificinquiry. The structureof modern theoreti-

cal science, therefore, is inseparable from its concepts, and all
modern scientific fields, whether theoretical or analytic, must be
developed in agreementwith these concepts.
Fundamental Concepts of Modern Science. The metaphysical
perspective of the universe as a self-contained process is scientifically
transliterated into the concepts of particle and field. The universe
as a dynamic system appears composed of irreducible, indivisible,
elementary particles of organization, which continually and ran-
domly shift their arrangements with regard to each other and
thereby give rise to ever new and unique configurations.At the same
time, the thus prevailing total arrangementof the universe provides
the continuous field governing the events taking place within it.
Some of the configurations formed in this way also constitute
systems, which means that the configuration functions as a subfield
governing the rearrangementsof elements which participate both
in it and in the total system of the universe. Indeed, there can be and
are formed subsystems within systems, and further subsystems of
such subsystems.We may think in this connection of nuclear, atomic,
molecular, ordinary macroscopic, planetary, and galactic systems.
If a total system has several subsystems, they are related to each
other by an intricate network of interrelations. In complex systems,
this network of interrelations between some of their subsystems be-
comes a semiautonomous field with regard to which the subsystems
in question constitute irreducible, indivisible, elementary particles of
organization. All the events involved in such a situation play simul-
taneously two different roles, on two distinct levels of organization.
In principle, an indefinite number of such levels of organization
is possible. In actuality, we need assume only three, the physical,
the biological, and the behavioral, to account for all empirical phe-
nomena. Thus, behavioral systems emerge within biological, and the
latter within physical systems. Behavioral elements in their biological
aspects and biological elements in their physical aspects constitute
respectivelybiological and physical processes.
Concepts, Events, and Fields of Inquiry. The postulates and
derivative concepts referring to the internal dynamics of systems,
as well as to the interrelationsbetween systems on the same and on
different levels of organization, furnish the basis for the first specific
theoretical scientific field. This may be called general scientific, or

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WHAT IS MODERN SCIENCE? 9

general dynamic theory. Its concepts are used in all scientific work,
but only the area of general system theory, dealing with the internal
dynamics of systems, has so far been elaborated by itself, separately
from other scientificendeavors.
Apart from their dynamic characteristics,which can be delineated
with the concepts just discussed, events have specific structuralchar-
acteristics depending on the level of organization on which they oc-
cur. Since to account for empirically given events we must assume
three distinct levels of organization, we need three additional theo-
retical scientificfields. These are basic physical, biological, and social
theory, each centered in elemental postulation and derivative con-
ceptual development appropriateto the particular level of organiza-
tion.
It follows from general scientific theory that on each level of or-
ganization there are formed within and between systems, by the
events occurring on this level, conformations characteristic exclu-
sively of the particular level of organization. The relations between
such intrasystemic and intersystemic conformations of events are
again specific to each level of organization. Accordingly, three fur-
ther specialized theoretical fields, dealing respectively with intra-
systemic events, intersystemicevents, and the relations between intra-
and intersystemic events, are associated, each, with physical, bio-
logical, and social theory.
No additional postulation is necessary for the creation of these
specialized fields. Their concepts can be derived from the concepts
of the three basic theoreticalfields.
Extant and Projected Areas of Specialization. An arrangement
of existing physical theoretical fields, other than basic physical the-
ory, along the lines just indicated would give us the following array.
Fields dealing with intrasystemicevents: nuclear and atomic chem-
istry, and nuclearphysicsas far as it is concernedwith indivisible
particles.
Fields dealing with intersystemicevents:mechanics;thermodynamics,
molecular chemistry, atomic physics, and nuclear physics as far
as it is concernedwith divisibleparticles,such as neutrons.
Fields dealing with the relations between intrasystemicand inter-
systemic events: all investigationsof the mechanical,thermody-
namic, and atomic propertiesof phenomenadefined on the basis
of nuclearand atomicchemistry.

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
10 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

A similar array of biological theoretical fields, other than basic

biological theory, would look like this.
Fields dealing with intrasystemicevents: physiology, morphology,
and genetics.
Fields dealing with intersystemicevents:ecology.
Fields dealing with the relations between intrasystemicand inter-
systemicevents: all investigationsof physiologicaland morpholog-
ical transformationsconcomitantwith ecologicaltransformations.
In theoretical social science, again leaving aside basic social theory,
we would obtain the following array.
Fields dealing with intrasystemicevents: investigationsof psycho-
logical phenomena,such as emotionsor valuations.
Fields dealing with intersystemicevents: investigations of societal
phenomena,such as cultures,social orders,or institutions.
Fields dealing with the relations between intrasystemicand inter-
systemicevents: investigationsof concomitanciesbetween individ-
ual and societal organization,such as the personalitystructureof
leadersin differentsocieties.
The specialized social scientific theoretical fields just outlined co-
incide fairly closely with the theoretical core areas of, respectively,
psychology, sociology and anthropology, and social psychology.
However, as academic and occupational areas, these fields contain
so many nontheoretical as well as extrascientific admixtures, that
it almost would be better to coin new names for the modern areas
of social theoretical specialization.
Event Concomitancieson Different Levels of Organization. In
addition to the general treatment of the interrelations between sys-
tems on two different levels of organization, specialized fields are
also requiredto deal with the particularbiological events correspond-
ing to specific behavioral and the particular physical events corres-
ponding to specific biological events. Indirect concomitancies be-
tween behavioral and physical events can be handled by these two
fields in conjunction and require no additional scientific field.
Biophysics and biochemistry, which in terms of the present ap-
proach constitute a unitary field, its concepts deriving jointly from
basic physical and biological theory, deal with the relations between
biological and physical events. Psychobiology, the concepts of which
would derive jointly from basic biological and social theory, and

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WHAT IS MODERN SCIENCE? 11

which would deal with the relations between behavioral and biolog-
ical events, is not established as an independent academicfield.
Scientific Analysis. The preceding discussion completes the ros-
ter of theoretical scientific fields. For comparison, some examples of
analyticscientificfields may be given.
Examplesof physicalscientificanalyticfields: astronomy,food chem-
istry,geography,geology, meteorology,etc.
Examplesof biologicalscientificanalyticfields: botany, embryology,
parasitology,taxonomy,zoology, etc.
Examplesof social scientificanalyticfields: comparativegovernment,
economics,history;institutionalanalyses,such as an analysisof the
family or of crime; public opinion analysis;analysesof rural or
urbansocieties;etc.
Examplesof scientificanalyticalfields, cuttingacrossbasictheoretical
areas: population and area studies, biophysical resource studies,
etc.
The number of possible analytic fields is exceedingly large, since
any object of everyday experience furnishes a potential topic for
scientific analysis. For every such analytic field, the needed concepts
must be selected from the appropriatetheoreticalfields.

Traditionalism and Modernism in ContemporaryScience

The Actual State of Affairs. As indicated before, the picture of

modern scientific organization drawn in the preceding sections is
not a description of existing scientific practice but a projection of
present trends. The trends themselves, however, are clearly discern-
ible, and the picture in its main outlines can be considered to depict
accuratelyscientificpracticewhich is now developing.
On the other hand, Newtonian and scholastic approachescontinue,
and many people, both scientists, and nonscientists, have strong
vested interests in keeping them alive. But the record speaks for it-
self. The most successful scientificwork in our society, such as that in
physical science, most closely conforms to the new tendencies. In
areas where traditional approaches are most prevalent, as in social
science, scientificwork is most conspicuouslya failure.
Physical Science-Vanguard of Modernism. Contemporary
physical scientific concepts, uniformly, are the most modern of all
scientific concepts. In fact, the majority of modern general-scientific

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
12 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

and philosophic concepts were first elaborated by physicists as a

foundation for their more specialized work. The methods of present-
day physical science are fully postulational, with all that implies,
especially for the meaning of experimentation. Physical scientific
work is completely value-free, and the extrascientific nature of
mathematicsis fully recognized.
The separation of science from technology is fairly well accom-
plished. Architecture and engineering, for instance, are rarely con-
fused with theoretical science or considered directly as applied sci-
ence. Even among laymen, references to "basic research"rather than
"pure science" indicate a growing awareness of the differences in
question, even where some idea of eventual "application"persists.
There is still a tendency, however, towards a Newtonian distrust
of metaphysics. Consequently, much of the metaphysical spadework
done by physical theorists is mistaken for physical theory and is not
recognized in its general scientificsignificance.
The prevailing field division, also, still has strongly Newtonian
overtones, as exemplified by the outdated physics-chemistrydivision.
There is little recognition of the difference between theoretical and
analytic scientific work, with such fields as astronomy being con-
sidered co-ordinate to, say, theoretical physics. In line with this ap-
proach, even purely descriptive work is sometimes being mistaken
for scientific.
The appearance of a field such as astrophysics, however, might
be interpreted in opposite ways-as a continuation of the topical
Newtonian orientation, or as the deliberate creation of a modern
analytic scientific field. Most likely, both approaches are repre-
sented among the scientists active in the field.
But even in physical science, this veneer of modernism, evidenced
by a total absence of scholasticism and by Newtonian features
which do not interfere much with actual scientific work, is rather
thin, as witnessed by the committee of atomic scientists. Here we
confront again a fusion of scientific and technological roles, and
the assumption that the scientist, as a scientist, can decide questions
of valuation.
The Current Battle in Biology. The most modern aspect of
biological science is its field division, which requires no reorganiza-
tion. The difference between theoretical and analytic work also is
recognized in some recent publications, but for the most part biol-

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WHAT IS MODERN SCIENCE? 13

ogists still consider zoology or botany as fields co-ordinate with

physiology or morphology.
Postulational method has been introduced, but most scientific
studies are carried out with the methods of Newtonian abstraction-
ism. Yet, the purely descriptive material of natural history is not
ordinarilythought of as forming part of biology.
Technological fields, such as medicine, pharmacology, or veter-
inary medicine, are usually separated from biological science. But
mathematicsis treated by most biologists as an auxiliary science.
However, it is not the various Newtonian aspects just discussed
which account for the very real difficulties existing in this area of
science. These difficultiesare primarilyconceptual. Although modern
concepts have been developed, these as well as the still extant New-
tonian ones are heavily overshadowed by neoscholastic teleological,
essentially extrascientific, metaphysical concepts which permeate
most of contemporarybiological work.
While rejecting the extremes of vitalism, biologists customarily
describe the roles played by different structuresand processes within
given organisms, refer to these roles as "functions," invent some
basic "needs" which these "functions"presumablyserve, and believe
that in this way they have accounted for the phenomena in question.
Accordingly, they habitually speak of the uses and purposes of
organs.
The basic assumption is that organisms are oriented towards some
mystical goal- equilibrium, self-perpetuation, perpetuation of kind,
or the like. In other words, we are dealing with a full-fledged, neo-
scholastic metaphysics of final ends. And associated with it we find
the characteristicvalue-intrusion,expressed as an arbitrarypreference
for the continuationof life.
But such a metaphysicalposition simply does not square with our
everyday experience of the world. Fortunately, if all its scholastic
and even its Newtonian aspects were eliminated from contemporary
biological science, there still would be left a substantial and coherent
body of theoretical work and empirical data. And there are influen-
tial biologists who advocate just such a course of action.
The Morass of Social Science. There is nothing modern about
social science. Its concepts are a jumble of scholastic and Newtonian
leftovers. In the world of the contemporarysocial scientist, a wide
array of social phenomena chase each other around the mulberry

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
14 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

bush, being alternately "causes" for each other. In addition, teleo-

logical concepts are introduced by purposive, motivational interpre-
tations of behavior.
Arbitraryvaluation is rampant, expressed in areas of inquiry such
as "social disorganization, pathology, or problems," concepts such
as "simple and complex" cultures, and tests such as "social maturity"
scales. The widespread definition of abnormality as a "deviation"
from a statisticalnorm is clearly valuative.
Technology and science are hardly distinguished. The recent sep-
aration of social work from sociology notwithstanding, social sci-
entific "research"is expected to contribute to such social technologi-
cal endeavors, as is also apparent from the organization of rural or
urban "sociology," "anthropological" area studies, and the entire
fields of economics and political science. Psychology has practically
ceased to exist except as an adjunct to education or psychotherapy.
Crude empiricist data-gathering, camouflaged by a pseudosophis-
ticated use of mathematics,is almost universally accepted as an ade-
quate method in social science. "Limited hypotheses" have become a
fetish, with the raw data of the census, archeological digs, and even
travelogues being mistaken for scientificstudies.
No distinction is made between analytic and theoretical work, and
we find a proliferation of special "theories" for every conceivable
area of data from childbirth to movie-ticket-selling. The corre-
spondingly prevailing field division is meaningless in modern terms.
Such social "science" imperceptibly fades over into popular for-
ums, round-table discussions, and lectures by visiting firemen. It is
as if physical science became synonymous with "how-to-do-it-your-
self" instructionson plumbing in the home, or biological science with
lectures on the care of pets.
Occasional attempts, in recent years, to create a postulational so-
cial science, for the most part, had nothing to do with the assumption
of genuinely postulated entities by which to account for everyday
phenomena. Rather, the term "postulate" has been applied to or-
dinary, common-senseinferences.
Most of such social theory as is being produced at this time at-
tempts to account for social phenomena in terms of the "functions"
which they have with regard to individual survival and societal con-
tinuity. This neoteleological approach, again, implies a metaphysics
of final ends and is tied up with arbitraryvalue preferences, not only

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WHAT IS MODERN SCIENCE? 15

for societal continuity and individual survival as such, but for specific
modes of conduct and societal organization.
It is here that these pseudotheoretical endeavors link up with the
traditional value-prejudices of the social pathologist. In fact, this
particular position can best be understood as a rationalization for
their very existence and their doings by psychologists, social workers,
teachers, ministers, labor leaders, personnel managers, and others
whose claim to status, power, and income rests on their ability to
browbeat individuals into being something other than they are.
Intellectual and Academic Organization. The current reorgan-
ization of science, and the difficulties in the way of its completion,
have been discussed with reference to basic changes in our entire
intellectual perspective. Such changes eventually are reflected also
in the organization of institutions of higher learning. Here too, how-
ever, traditionalismhas carriedthe day so far.
Roughly speaking, the continental European universities still are
organized in terms of a scholastic orientation. The organization of
American colleges and universities reflects, basically, a Newtonian
outlook. A truly modern university as yet is nowhere in sight. Pos-
sibly such a one will not appear until the reorganization in science
and other intellectual areas has been completed.

Universityof Wisconsin, Milwaukee

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.103 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:48:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions