CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND

RESPONSE OPTIONS AMONG

RURAL COMMUNITIES:
ISSUES AND STRATEGIES

By

Washington Muzari and Jackqeline

Mutambara

0
 CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND RESPONSE
OPTIONS AMONG RURAL COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND
STRATEGIES

By

Washington Muzari (BSc Hons., MPhil)

and

Jackqeline Mutambara (BSc Hons., MSc., PhD)

1
 CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND RESPONSE
OPTIONS AMONG

RURAL COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND STRATEGIES

Published by

ASARE Publishers

Copyright © W.M. Muzari and J. Mutambara (2014)

P. Bag 7724 Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe

Mobile: +263(0) 772 661 825 (W. Muzari);

Email: muzarimuchineripi@gmail.com

P.O. Box MP 167, Mount Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe

Mobile: +263(0) 772 482 561 (J. Mutambara)

Email: jmuzenda@yahoo.co.uk

ISBN: 978-0-7974-5943-4

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Dedicated to our beloved families

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 Authors’ Bio-note

Washington Muzari is an Agricultural Economist who holds a Master

of Philosophy (MPhil) degree in Agricultural Economics. His work in
agricultural and rural development has spanned many years, and he
is an accomplished and prolific writer on developmental topics. He
has worked in various capacities for different regional, international
and national organizations including ICRISAT, WWF, SAFER, EU,
USAID, UNICEF, DANIDA, JIMAT, the State University of New York,
the Ministry of Agriculture, and the University of Zimbabwe. He is
currently a tenured lecturer at the Chinhoyi University of Technology,
where his major research interests and activities have widened to
include climate change issues and strategies.

Among his previous works are some published books. They include,
“Rural Industrialization in Zimbabwe: Potential, Constraints and
Strategies for Development” edited by W. Muzari, M. Rukuni and S.
Schonherr (1993), ISBN: 0-86924-108-7; “Agricultural Economics” by
Washington Muchineripi Muzari (2010), ISBN: 978-0-7974-4244-3;
“Small Enterprise Development” by Washington Muchineripi Muzari
(2011), ISBN: 978-0-7974-4694-6; “The Revelations of Genesis:
Morning Glory” by Washington Muzari (2013), ISBN: 978-0-7974-
5597-9; and “Agricultural Production Economics for Tertiary
Education in Southern Africa” by Washington Muzari (2014), ISBN:
978-0-7974-5945-8.

Jackqeline Mutambara holds a PhD in Agricultural Economics. She

has been involved in a lot of developmental research and consultancy
work for various organizations. She is currently a lecturer and
Chairperson of the Department of Agricultural Economics and
Extension at the University of Zimbabwe.

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 Target Audience

This book is intended for, but not restricted to, a wide spectrum of
readers in the development community. They include climate change
researchers and development practitioners; geographers; lecturers
and students of climate change, geography, agriculture, water and
sanitation, renewable energy, public health, hospitality, wildlife, and
tourism; community workers; extension workers; policy makers;
planners; consultants, advisors; rural development specialists;
leaders and members of cooperatives; and rural development project
participants and managers. These could be individuals or groups
working for governments, universities, colleges, polytechnics, high
schools, food aid agencies, drought-relief agencies, disaster risk
reduction agencies, agricultural development organizations, rural
development organizations, non-governmental organizations, or
working in their own personal capacity. Rural residents and
communities stand out as a distinguished group of targeted readers.
The ordinary reader or layperson has also been kept in mind. A full
chapter has been devoted to climate change in Zimbabwe and
Southern Africa.

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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The earth’s climate is always changing. The observed warming is not
accounted for by natural variations in climate, but is consistent with the
expected effects of greenhouse gases emitted through anthropogenic or
human activity. Seventy-five percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas,
and rural livelihoods are especially vulnerable to climate change. The
impacts of climate change on rural communities are largely negative or
adverse. However, some impacts may also be positive. Climate change
impacts on rural communities discussed in this book include those on
agriculture and food security, water and sanitation, human health, energy,
ecosystems (biodiversity, wildlife and fisheries), and sustainable livelihoods.

Negative impacts include decreasing yields in rainfed agriculture due to

frequent droughts, rising temperatures, and floods. Lower yields lead to
reduced food security and incomes, and increased malnutrition, among
smallholder farmers. Malnutrition is a direct cause of stunted physical and
intellectual development in children, low productivity in adults, and
susceptibility to infectious diseases.

Climate change in Southern Africa will worsen water stress and shortages.
Thus, changing climate will also have significant impacts on the availability
of water, as well as the quality and quantity of water that is available and
accessible. Higher water temperatures will in addition encourage the growth
of aquatic vegetation such as the water hyacinth and algal blooms in areas
were river flows have fallen, reducing water quality. Recurring droughts
cause a decrease in river flows and lowering of the groundwater table, and
result in lower amount of water available for domestic use, irrigation,
livestock, and wildlife. Certain freshwater fish species have been known to
become extinct due to decreased river flow and changes in water
temperatures. Warming and declining wind speeds reduce the mixing,
nutrient-enrichment, and the primary productivity of surface waters, thus
affecting fisheries of major lakes such as Lake Malawi, Kariba in Zimbabwe
and Zambia, and Cahora Bassa in Mozambique.

Climate change may also affect human health. For example, even small
increases in temperature and changes in rainfall amounts can boost the
population of disease-carrying mosquitoes and result in increased malaria
epidemics or diseases spreading to new areas. The geographic range of
vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever is expected to
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expand because of changes in temperature and rainfall patterns due to
climate change. Heat-related deaths and illnesses caused by an increase in
heat waves, and often worsened by changes in humidity, are expected to be
on the increase. More frequent and intense flooding that accompanies
climate change will increase the risk of drowning, diarrhoeal and respiratory
diseases, and hunger and malnutrition.

Degradation of productive local ecosystems will cause climate-affected

wildlife populations to migrate in search of water, food and livelihood
opportunities. Loss of productivity in semi-arid and arid rangelands and dry
forests, because of increased drought and frequency of fire, could aggravate
land degradation. This will greatly increase the pressure on remaining
forests and agricultural landscapes, further accelerating resource demands
and environmental degradation.

Extreme temperatures (cold and hot) have a direct impact on energy

demand. For example, decreases in rainfall in countries dependent on
hydro-electric power such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique, will have
implications for the contribution made by the electricity generating lakes to
the economies of those countries. The coverage of Zimbabwe’s rural
electrification program is on the increase, and national power shortages will
in future impact negatively on socio-economic activities in the rural sector.
An associated ripple effect of electricity shortages will be the unsustainable
pressure on forests as an alternative source of energy.

Stakeholder participation is integral to climate change response strategies

because to be effective, policies developed and enacted at higher levels
need to be aligned with action taken to address risks and priorities identified
at the local level. At the community level, local communities, NGOs, local
government, businesses and vulnerable groups need to come together and
participate in identifying what changes they are vulnerable to, where and
who is vulnerable, and action needed to reduce their vulnerability. The
strong participation of women should be encouraged, recognizing their role
as community resource managers, while also acknowledging their specific
vulnerability to climate risks.

To strengthen adaptive capacity, communities need appropriate information

and skills, effective institutions, access to technology, infrastructure,
economic resources and opportunities to raise incomes, equity,
participation, and a national enabling environment. Building resilience is
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achieved by improving risk management, increasing assets and diversifying
the livelihood options available to vulnerable people. Other strategies to
support community-based adaptation include influencing policy making and
international negotiations to ensure that adaptation to climate change is
addressed in addition to mitigation; building linkages between government
institutions, the private sector and civil society; advocating urgent action on
development, poverty reduction and adaptation; and holding governments
and private institutions accountable for ensuring that adequate resources
are provided to prevent climate change from making elimination of extreme
poverty unachievable.

Examples of response mechanisms to reduce the severity of the

adverse impacts of climate change on rural livelihoods include crop
diversification, irrigation, construction of water reservoirs,
accumulating food surpluses, and use of drought resistant varieties,
among others.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6

CHAPTER 1: 15

INTRODUCTION 15

CHAPTER 2: 23

CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 23

2.1 Introduction 23

2.2 Sector impacts of climate change 25

Agriculture and Food Security 25

Water and Sanitation 29

Human health 31

Energy 34

Ecosystems: Biodiversity, wildlife and tourism 35

2.3 Positive impacts 37

2.4 Impact assessment 38

2.5 Impacts on rural livelihoods 40

CHAPTER 3: RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE

45

3.1 Some related concepts 45

Climate change and climate variability 45

Climate change mitigation 45

Risk and vulnerability 46

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) 48

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Sensitivity 48

Susceptibility 49

Impact potential 49

Stability 49

Robustness 49

Climate resilience 49

Resistance 50

Flexibility 50

Coping 50

Responsiveness 52

3.2 Climate Change Adaptation: Reducing Vulnerability to Climate Change

52

3.2.1 Introduction 52

3.2.2 Autonomous adaptation 55

3.2.3 Planned adaptation 62

3.2.4 Adaptation options/ strategies 65

3.2.5 Adaptive capacity 73

Determinants of Adaptive Capacity 76

Economic resources 76

Technology 77

Information and skills 78

Infrastructure 80

Institutions 80
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Equity 81

Participation 82

A national enabling environment 83

Enhancing/ strengthening adaptive capacity 84

3.2.6 Economic evaluation of climate change adaptation projects 89

3.2.7 Adaption and Sustainable Development 97

3.2.8 Future adaptations 100

CHAPTER 4: CLIMATE CHANGE AND GENDER 102

4.1 Introduction 102

4.2 Agriculture, Gender and Climate Change in Economic Growth and

Development. 104

4.3 Gender Imbalances and Implications for Sustainable Livelihoods 108

4.3.1 Gender and Demographics 108

4.3.2 Access to and control of economic resources 111

4.3.3 Gender roles 113

4.4 Drivers of Climate Change and Gender 117

4.5 Gender and Impacts of Climate Change on Sustainable Livelihoods

121

Gender and health related impacts of climate change 125

4.6 Adaptation to climate Change and Gender Implications 128

4.7 Conclusions 129

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CHAPTER 5: CLIMATE CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE AND SOUTHERN
AFRICA

5.1 Introduction 133

5.2 Climate projections 134

5.3 Impacts 135

5.4 Causes 137

5.5 Livelihoods 140

5.6 Perceptions by rural communities 140

5.7 Non-climatic stressors 143

5.7.1 Introduction 143

5.7.2 Agricultural stressors 143

5.7.3 Educational stressors 147

5.7.4 Health stressors 149

5.7.5 Poverty and environmental degradation 149

5.8 Climatic stressors 152

5.8.1 Introduction 152

5.8.2 Droughts 153

5.8.3 Floods and excessive rains 155

5.8.4 Some response options 157

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 160

REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING 174

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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1: The Millennium Development Goals and associated targets 18
Table 3.1: Bases for characterizing and differentiating adaptation to
climate change 43
Table 3.2: Examples of multi-level adaptive measures for some
anticipated health outcomes of global climate change 51
Table 4.1: Male to Female Ratio for selected Developing and
Developed Countries 83
Table 5.1: Rainfall Trends in the Zambezi Basin 103
Table 5.2: Reasons for children being out of school for the 6-12 year
agegroup, Zimbabwe 110

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4.1: Gender and Climate Change in Agricultural Growth and
Development 80
Figure 4.2: Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Framework 91
Figure 4.3: Implications of resources imbalances by gender on
productive activities and livelihoods outcomes 92

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AD Ano Domini
CAN Climate Change Action
CMD Clean Development Mechanisms
CSW Commission on Status Of Women
DFID Department for International Development
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
EMA Environmental Management Agency
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
GEF Global Environment Facility
GHG Greenhouse Gases
GoZ Government of Zimbabwe
ICRAF International Center for Research in Agroforestry
IDS Institute of Developmental Studies
IIED International Institute for Environmental Development
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IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
LDC Less Developed Countries
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MPSLSW Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare
NAPA National Adaptation Plans of Action
NAPs National Action Plans
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
SADC Southern African Development Community
UN United Nations
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNU-EHS United Nations University Institute for Environment and
Human Security
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
WEDO Women’s Environment and Development Organization
WHO World Health Organization
WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development

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 CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
According to the IPCC, climate change refers to any change in
climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of
human activity (IPCC, 2001). However, some authorities (e.g. Article
1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)
refer to climate change as a change of climate which is attributed
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of
the global atmosphere and which is in addition a natural climate
variability observed over comparable time periods.

The earth’s climate is always changing. The global temperature is

now warmer than at any time since 1400 AD. Recent warming is
evident both in observed air temperature and indirect physical and
biological records. Of note is that mountain glaciers are melting, the
temperature of the ground has been increasing, and sea levels have
risen by several centimeters this century (GoZ/EMA/ GEF/ UNDP,
2010). Global average surface temperatures have warmed by 0.7 oC
since 1910 (IPCC, 2007).

The 1990s was the warmest decade of the Millennium and the five
warmest years in the instrumental record, going back to 1861, are (in
descending order) 2005, 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2004 (Smith, 2006).

The observed warming is not accounted for by natural variations in

climate, but is consistent with the expected effects of anthropogenic
greenhouse gases based on global climate models. Observed
warming is associated with changes in rainfall patterns, increased
frequency and intensity of drought in Africa and Asia, and increases in
the destructive power of tropical cyclones since the 1970s.

Why is the climate changing? Observed climatic changes cannot be

attributed to a single factor with absolute certainty. However, there is
consensus among scientists that much of the warming after 1950 can

15
be attributed to human activities such as burning fossil fuels (coal, oil
and natural gas) and deforestation that have led to increased
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. Globally,
atmospheric carbon dioxide (the most important greenhouse gas)
levels have increased by 35% from pre-industrial times. The pattern
of temperature changes associated with this global warming now
suggest, according to the IPCC, “ ….. a discernible human influence
on global climate” (IPCC, 2007).

According to the IPCC fourth assessment report (IPCC, 2007), global

greenhouse gas emissions are mainly attributed to the following
primary sources: energy supply sector (26%); industry (19%); forestry
(17%); agriculture (14%); and transportation (13%). Thus forestry and
agriculture, the two predominantly rural based sectors, account for the
highest source (31%) of greenhouse gas emissions.

There are uncertainties in climate projections because of the

imprecision in models and because future greenhouse gas emissions
are unknown, but many changes are robustly and consistently
projected using a variety of models and methods. These changes
include further retreat of glaciers, melting of sea ice and polar ice
sheets, sea-level rise, higher rainfall in some regions but drying in
others, more frequent flooding and drought, and more powerful
tropical cyclones. Climate change is a reality now and the debate
about whether climate change is real is over.

Seventy-five percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas, and rural
livelihoods are especially vulnerable to climate change (Pettengell,
2010). For the poorest people in the world, poverty means being
unable to meet even basic needs for survival. They are faced with
chronic hunger, have to rely on unsafe water, lack basic sanitation,
health care and the money to send children to school, and perhaps
not having shelter and basic clothing (Sachs, 2005). This is ‘extreme
poverty’, where people have incomes of US$1 per day or less.
Extreme poverty afflicts roughly 1.1 billion people, including almost
half the population in sub-Saharan Africa. All in all, over 90 percent of
the world’s extreme poor live in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and
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East Asia. Raising incomes to US$2 per day is said to move people
from extreme to ‘moderate’ poverty, where basic needs are met, but
just barely. There are 2.7 billion people in the world (over 40% of
humanity) having to survive on less than US$2 per day.

Rural populations make up the largest number of poor people. In the

least developed countries, 75 percent of poor people are smallholder
farmers, pastoralists and small-scale fishers. Where agriculture is
more commercialized, the rural poor are mostly landless labourers.
Rural poverty is reinforced by lack of access to services such as
health care, education and credit, because people are too often
remote from where services are provided (van Heemst & Bayangos,
2004).

Poverty is about more than just low incomes. It has multiple attributes
and poor people must withstand and cope with multiple deprivations.
Poor health and social exclusion, lack of access to education, poor
control over resources and low security of food, water and
infrastructure are all factors that push people into poverty and make it
hard to escape it. Strategies needed to move people out of poverty
therefore need to be multi-dimensional, helping to raise incomes, but
also reducing deprivation in all its forms faced by the poor.

Climate change is fast pushing communities, particularly the poorest

and marginalized, beyond their capacity to respond. Across the world,
staple subsistence crops are approaching their outer viable
temperature ranges; erratic rainfall patterns and changing seasons
are upsetting agricultural cycles and leaving many people struggling
to feed their families.

Every year, more than 200 million people are affected by disasters,
such as droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires. Disasters have a
disproportionate impact on poor communities in developing countries.
For example, while only 11 percent of those exposed to hazards live
in developing countries, 53 percent of disaster mortality worldwide
occurs in those countries (Pettengell, 2010).

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For governments in developing countries struggling with multiple
problems, climate change comes as an added and largely poorly
understood complication. Climate change is often viewed as an
environmental issue that is peripheral and sometimes in competition
with the goals of development. Despite the crippling economic and
social implications of climate change, many countries continue to be
represented by environmental or meteorological departments at
international negotiations, which hold limited power at the national
level. In many countries, development and finance ministries are not
entirely engaged, or even convinced that they need to be engaged.
Yet development budgets are being overstretched by numerous
national crises in which climate change is playing a significant role.

Poverty, more than any other factor, determines vulnerability to

climate change and limits adaptive capacity. Access to and control
over land, money, credit, information, health care, personal mobility,
and education combine to determine the ability to survive and recover
from disasters and to make long-term changes and investments to
adapt. Existing gender inequalities combine with poverty to magnify
women’s vulnerability to climate change and undermine their ability to
adapt.

Climate change impacts, vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and barriers

to adaptation are location-specific and will change over time, but the
processes needed for adaptation that support the most vulnerable will
be similar. National adaptive capacity is one part of that puzzle.
Community design and implementation of adaptation strategies suited
to their location is another. A crucial element of both is the role of
local level government and services. They must be empowered and
resourced to act as intermediaries, linking the bottom-up and top-
down processes.

Communities are on the frontline of climate change impacts, and must

be at the heart of action to adapt. But their ability to adapt is
influenced by factors at multiple levels including global financing
provision, national policy environment, sub-national planning, and
gender roles and responsibilities in the household (Pettengel, 2010).
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Action on climate change adaptation must occur across all these
levels in order for the investment, knowledge, and skills needed to
design and implement adaptation to be available at the community
level.

Climate change is a reality now and will continue for decades to

come, with its effects potentially felt for centuries. Action is needed
both to prepare for inevitable impacts and to reduce the eventual
scale of these impacts; both mitigation and climate change adaptation
are imperative. Mitigation is needed to reduce the severity of climate
change and therefore limit the extent of impacts on the most
vulnerable communities in poor countries. Adaptation is needed to
increase the adaptive capacity and resilience of poor people to
climate change impacts and to help to ensure that they can escape
poverty. Action on climate change is not a choice between mitigation
and adaptation; both are imperative and urgent.

Strategies for adaptation need to focus on the needs of the people

most affected by climate change impacts and aim to reduce the most
important vulnerabilities they face. Vulnerability assessments are thus
the basis for development of adaptation strategies, including the
National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs) in the least developed
countries. Objectives for adaptation policies and approaches need to
be allocated at the most appropriate scale using participatory
processes involving stakeholders at all levels. Action on adaptation is,
for the most part, done at community level by the vulnerable
themselves. Where community-based adaptation is not feasible
because of local barriers to change or because costly new
infrastructure is needed, responses at national or sub-national levels
are needed.

In contrast to mitigation, which requires global coordination,

adaptation to climate change is rooted in local action. The primary
goal of governments and international processes in adaptation is to
develop and implement policy that is enabling and ensures that the
required information, resources, support and services are available to
communities (Smith, 2006).
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Reducing vulnerabilities in communities is guided by the need to build
adaptive capacity and resilience. To strengthen adaptive capacity,
communities need appropriate information and skills, effective
institutions, access to technology, and opportunities to raise incomes.
Building resilience is achieved by improving risk management,
increasing assets and diversifying the livelihood options available to
vulnerable people. Adaptation should be broad-based and
implemented within strategies for poverty reduction that aim to better
protect livelihood assets against risks and to deepen and broaden the
pool of assets that poor people can access to cope with disruption
and change.

Vulnerability-based approaches to adaptation share many synergies

and strategies with poverty reduction at the community level because
both benefit from building capacity and resilience. Development and
adaptation can therefore be mutually reinforcing and ‘no regrets’
strategies for adaptation can be used to provide both near-term
benefits for poverty reduction and long-term protection against climate
change impacts. However, because of climate change, strategies and
livelihood assets used in poverty reduction must be ‘climate-proofed’.
Policies and projects on any issue should not aggravate sensitivities
to climate or be vulnerable to projected climate change. Thus, rather
than adaptation taking priority over other drivers of poverty, it should
be integrated into poverty reduction as a cross-cutting issue.

Climate change will increase vulnerabilities over time and delaying

adaptation will make poverty reduction more difficult to achieve. In
addition to adding costs to poverty reduction, adaptation demands
that resources for sustainable development and poverty reduction be
delivered more quickly. Delaying adaptation because of other
priorities risks closing a window on poverty reduction and causing
failure of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (See Table 1.1).
Climate change thus makes development more urgent.

In 2000, world leaders came together and declared a common

commitment to ending global poverty. In an era of unprecedented
prosperity in the industrialized nations, the member states of the
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United Nations pledged to use this great wealth, new technologies
and international cooperation to tackle poverty, diseases and
environmental degradation (Sachs, 2005). The Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), to be met by 2015, cover the eradication
of extreme poverty and hunger, provision of health care and
education, and ensuring environmental sustainability. The eight
MDGs and 18 targets are summarized in Table 1.1

Table 1.1: The Millennium Development Goals and associated targets.

Goal
1. Eradicate extreme poverty
and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary
education
3. Promote gender equality
and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria
and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental
sustainability
Target
 Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the
proportion of people whose income is
less than US$1 a day;
 Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the
proportion of people who suffer from
hunger
 Ensure that by 2015 children
everywhere, boys and girls alike, will
be able to complete a full course of
primary schooling
 Eliminate gender disparity in primary
and secondary education, preferably
by 2005, and at all levels of education
not later than 2015
 Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990
and 2015, the under-five mortality
rate
 Reduce by three-quarters, between
1990 and 2015, the maternal
mortality ratio
 Have halted by 2015 and begun to
reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS;
 Have halted by 2015 and begun to
reverse the incidence of malaria and
other major diseases
 Integrate the principles of sustainable
development into country policies and
programmes and reverse the loss of
environmental resources;
 Halve by 2015 the proportion of
people without sustainable access to
safe drinking water and basic
sanitation;
 By 2020 to achieve a significant
improvement in the lives of at least

21
 100 million slum dwellers
8. Develop a global  Develop further an open, rule-based,
partnership for predictable, non-discriminatory
development trading and financial system;
 Address the special needs of the
least developed countries (LDCs),
including tariff- and quota-free access
for their exports and increased debt
relief for highly indebted poor
countries (HIPCs);
 Address the special needs of
landlocked countries and small island
developing states;
 Deal with the debt problems of
developing countries through national
and international measures in order
to make debt more sustainable in the
long term;
 In cooperation with developing
countries, develop and implement
strategies for decent and productive
work for youth;
 In cooperation with pharmaceutical
companies, provide access to and
affordable essential drugs in
developing countries;
 In cooperation with the private sector,
make available the benefits of new
technologies, especially information
and communications
Source: Smith, 2006

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 CHAPTER 2:
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
2.1 Introduction
Climate change exacerbates existing problems, including global food
prices, insecure land tenure, inequality and marginalization, gender
disparity, lack of access to financing, lack of access to modern energy
supplies, soil degradation, competing demands for water resources,
and deforestation. It also compounds these problems with glacier
melt, sea-level rise, increased frequency and/ or severity of storms,
droughts and floods, increased change in temperatures, and the
spread of diseases into areas previously not exposed. Climate
change adaptation must therefore reduce vulnerability both by
reducing exposure to climate risk and through addressing existing
and emerging inequalities of power and assets that would otherwise
make adaptation impossible. Successful adaptation means people
becoming increasingly able to make informed decisions about their
lives and livelihoods in a changing climate.

Impacts of climate change are superimposed on other socio-

economic stressors. Observed global impacts of climate change
include: rise in sea level; melting of glaciers and ice-caps; change in
weather patterns; range changes and earlier migrations of fish in
rivers; and changes in the behavior of various ecosystems (GoZ/
GEF, 2010).

Climate change is cited as a complex and interdependent

environmental challenge facing the world today (Clark et al., 2002).
Expected repercussions of climate change are twofold: bio-physical
and socio-economic. Biophysical impacts include rising sea waters,
more frequent and intense storms, the extinction of species,

23
worsening droughts and crop failure. In addition, changes in cloud
cover and precipitation, melting of polar ice caps and glaciers and
reduced snow cover are among other bio-physical impacts that have
been observed (Mendelsohn & Dinah, 2005; UNDP, 2004; UNFCCC,
2007).

Socio-economic impacts are characterized by multiple linkages with

biophysical impacts such as environmental degradation. For example,
food security and poverty reduction have been considered to be
linked to environmental degradation (Clark et al., 2002; Koch et al.,
2006). Such linkages have emanated from expectations that climate
change will affect food and water resources that are critical for
livelihoods and survival across developing countries (and Africa in
particular) where much of the populations rely on local supply
systems that are sensitive to climate variation (Nhemachena &
Hassan, 2008). Projected scenarios estimate a 5-7% increase in
malaria distribution by 2100 (Transer et al., 2003). The social and
economic costs of malaria are huge and include considerable costs to
individuals and households as well as high costs at community and
national levels (Holding & Snow, 2001; Malaney et al., 2004; Utzinget
et al., 2001).

Apart from its overwhelmingly negative effects, climate change

variability might also have a positive impact and localized benefits
(Mubaya, 2010). At a global scale, positive and negative climatic
effects are likely to be distributed unevenly, with the most severe
negative impacts occurring in regions of high present-day vulnerability
that are least able to adjust technologically to such effects (IPCC,
2001). Also, many identified adverse effects are expected to increase
in both extent and severity with the degree of climate change. When
considered by region, adverse effects are projected to predominate
for much of the world, particularly in the tropics and sub-tropics
(IPCC, 2001).

In climate change discussions, scientists and policy makers are

reluctant to recognize, address and discuss the existence of both
positive and negative impacts, especially the positive ones. Often,
24
such discussions are considered to be divisive and counter the efforts
to gain a global consensus on climate change (Gantz, 1989;
Schneider, 1989).

2.2 Sector impacts of climate change

Agriculture and Food Security

In contrast to temperate regions where higher crop yields are
projected for warming up to a few degrees, climate change is
generally expected to cause yields to decrease in the tropics because
of the predominance of rainfed agriculture. Where rainfall declines,
therefore, more severe yield impacts are expected. Adaptation of
farming systems, for example by adjusting planting dates and cultivar
selection, will lessen yield impacts, but not by enough to prevent
reduced yields in the tropics (IPCC, 2001). Agro-ecological zones and
crop suitability may shift, and increased temperatures may lead to
more heat-stress related deaths of livestock. Most studies indicate
that food prices would rise globally with increases in global average
temperatures of a few degrees or more because of a slowing in the
expansion of global food supply relative to population growth.
Economic analysis has estimated that these effects will combine to
reduce the incomes of smallholder farmers under future climates,
resulting in higher numbers of people worldwide at risk of hunger
(IPCC, 2001).

The vast majority of the world’s poorest people rely on local

ecosystems to support their livelihoods. For example, rainfed
agriculture will remain the dominant source of staple food production
for most of the rural poor in sub-Saharan Africa. Many are struggling
to cope with current rainfall variability, and predictions of the impact of
climate change suggest that this variability is likely to increase. In
some parts, droughts that used to occur once every ten years are
now more regular. For example, it is estimated that between 1950
and 1999, there has been a decline in summer rainfall over Southern
Africa of around 20 percent (Tearfund, 2006). It is also predicted that
such conditions will intensify in the 21st Century as a result of climate

25
change. In 2002, 14 million people in Southern Africa were affected
by drought and food insecurity as a result of the change in rainfall
levels and patterns.

By 2050, the US National Centre for Atmospheric Research reports

that the Southern African wet season could be 10-20 percent drier,
compared with the previous 50 years. However, few climate change
models can predict rainfall patterns in developing country regions with
certainty. This means that many recent approaches to adapting the
agricultural sector to climate change have relied on seasonal
forecasts, which are better developed and more accurate.

Climate variability and change directly affect agricultural production

since agriculture is inherently sensitive to climatic conditions and is
one of the most vulnerable sectors to the risks and impacts of global
climate change. Any significant change in climate at a global scale
should impact on agriculture at the local scale (Parry et al., 1999;
Rosenzweig & Hillel, 1995).

The impacts of climate change including droughts, desertification,

flooding, and largely unreliable rainfall, have a devastating effect on
agricultural production and food security. For example, following early
flooding in Mozambique in December 2007, more than 31,000
hectares of arable land was rendered unfit for agriculture (UNEP/
ICRAF, 2008). A UNDP simulation of the impact of climate change on
crop yields and output in the Zambezi River Basin estimates a 10
percent fall in the yield of wheat, rice, and maize for every 1 oC rise in
temperature (SADC, 2007).

There are linkages between agriculture and socio-economic impacts

of climate change. The area suitable for agriculture and the length of
the growing seasons and yield potential, particularly along the
margins of semi-arid and arid areas, are expected to decrease. This
can further adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition
in the affected areas. In some countries, yields from rainfed
agriculture can be reduced by up to 50% by 2020 (IPCC 2000).
Moreover, climate models show that 600,000 square kilometers
26
classified as moderately water strained will experience severe water
limitations across the globe. By 2020 between 75 and 250 million
people are projected to be exposed to an increase of water stress due
to climate change (IPCC, 2007). Although impacts will differ in
different parts of the world, it is expected that these repercussions will
affect every nation on earth (UNDP, 2004).

Adverse climatic events are now a more acute source of vulnerability

in the Mexican agriculture than before, since multiple socio-economic
stressors are now in action. The relationships between droughts and
El Nino events in Mexico have been documented and El Nino events
have impacted negatively on rainfed maize production in the last 40
years (Conde et al., 2006). Rainfed maize production is the most
important agricultural activity for the majority of subsistence farmers in
Mexico (Conde et al., 2006).

Climate change associated with increasing levels of carbon dioxide is

likely to affect developed and developing countries differentially, with
major vulnerabilities occurring in low-latitude regions (Darwin &
Kennedy, 2000; Reilly et al., 2001). Moreover, climate change is likely
to increase the disparities in cereal yields between developed and
developing countries in a more significant way than has been found in
previous studies (Parry et al., 2004). In this respect, climate will exert
significant pressure on the economic development of Africa,
particularly for the agricultural and water resources sectors, at
regional, local and household scales (Boko et al., 2007). The
agricultural sector is a critical mainstay of local livelihoods in some
countries in Africa (Devereux & Maxwell, 2001; Mendelsohn et al.,
2000) and climate change could exacerbate social and economic
instability for countries that rely on agriculture. Different features of
the climatic system changes that are considered to affect agriculture
include increases in temperature and its geographic distribution,
humidity, wind patterns and the changes likely to occur in precipitation
patterns, as agriculture of any form is influenced by availability of
water. The demand for water for agriculture increases in warmer
climate and when there is a decrease in precipitation (Rosenzweig &

27
Hillel, 1995; Unganai, 1996). For example, Kenya, Tanzania and
Mozambique experience warmer climates and are challenged by
persistent droughts (Schwartz & Randall, 2003).

Climate change impacts facing agriculture include: (1) Decreased

yields of major crops in dry and tropical regions, even with slight
warming; (2) Increased irrigation demand, coupled with declines in
water availability in some regions. This is due to decreases in
precipitation in the sub-tropics (particularly affecting rain-fed
agriculture in central America and sub-tropical Africa) and in others
due to snow pack and glacier melt. (3) Decreased grassland and
rangeland for animals in arid and semi-arid regions; and loss of
domestic animals during extreme weather events (e.g. droughts). (4)
Reduced productivity and fertility of animals due to heat stress.

In developing countries, crop yields dramatically decrease as a result

of regional decreases in precipitation and large temperature increases
in the modeled climate scenarios (Adams et al., 1990). Climate
changes also affect crops and livestock as pests and disease
infestation is exacerbated in warmer climates. Increasing
temperatures, changing seasons, and increases in frequency of
droughts and floods will lower crop and livestock productivity,
especially in already arid and semi-arid areas (GoZ/ MSD/ GEF,
2010). Agricultural production in many areas will likely be especially
hard hit, with yields declining by 20-50% by 2050 according to IPCC
estimates. A fall in crop production leads to household food insecurity,
loss of income generating capacity, sale of livelihood assets, a rise in
poverty and increased dependency on food relief. Poor rainfall results
in very poor pastures during the dry season, affecting the condition of
livestock, especially cattle. Under increased drought frequency, the
mixed farming model that relies on cattle for draft power may become
less viable.

A study that was done by Seo and Mendelsohn (2006) shows that
higher temperatures are beneficial for small farms that keep goats
and sheep because it is easy to substitute animals that are heat

28
tolerant. By contrast, large farms are more dependent on species
such as cattle, which are not heat tolerant.

Based on experimental research, crop yield responses to climate

change vary widely, depending upon species and cultivar; soil
properties; pests and pathogens; the direct effects of carbon dioxide
on plants; and interactions between carbon dioxide, air temperature,
water stress, mineral nutrition, air quality, and adaptive responses.
Even though increased carbon dioxide concentration can stimulate
crop growth and yield, that benefit may not always overcome the
adverse effects of excessive heat and drought.

Yields of some crops in tropical locations would decrease generally

even with minimal increases in temperature, because such crops are
near their maximum temperature tolerance and dryland/ rainfed
agriculture predominates. Where there is also a large decrease in
rainfall, tropical crop yields would be even more adversely affected.
With autonomous agronomic adaptation, crop yields in the tropics
tend to be less adversely affected by climate change than without
adaptation, but still tend to remain below levels estimated with current
climate.

Water and Sanitation

Rising global temperatures will lead to an intensification of the
hydrological cycle, resulting in drier dry seasons and wetter rainy
seasons, and subsequently increased risk of more extreme and
frequent floods and drought. Changing climate will also have
significant impacts on the availability of water, as well as the quality
and quantity of water that is available and accessible.

Climate change will substantially change flow regimes in rivers and

water availability and quality. Some areas will become wetter and
some drier, depending on the direction of change in precipitation and
on the size of increase in evaporation resulting from higher
temperatures (Houghton, 2005). In Southern Africa, where lower
rainfall is expected, higher evaporation will increase the likelihood of
drought and reduce flow in rivers and recharge of aquifers. Climate
29
change will heighten water stress in this region and contribute
substantially to the increasing numbers of people living in water-
stressed countries (IPCC, 2001).

Flood frequency and damage are expected to increase in many

regions because of more frequent extreme heavy rainfall, amplifying
the effects of land-use change and land degradation on flow regimes
and accelerating soil erosion. Upward shifts in the intensity of rainfall
are expected to be accompanied by fewer numbers of rainy days and
longer periods without rainfall. Paradoxically, therefore, climate
change is projected to increase the frequency of both flooding and
drought (IPCC, 2001; Houghton, 2005).

Where runoff from glaciers and mountain snow contributes

substantially to water resources, there is current evidence that there
is increasing summer run-off. There is higher risk of flooding and
mudslides, for example in the Himalayan river basins, that will
continue for several decades to come. In the longer term, retreat of
glaciers and reductions in snow cover will ultimately lead to reduced
availability of freshwater (Lal et al., 2001).

Degradation of water quality may accompany changes in flow and

water availability. Higher water temperatures under future climates
would degrade water quality, for example by encouraging algal
blooms. Decline in water quality will be most severe where river flows
fall because concentrations of pollutants might then increase (Arnell &
Liu, 2001). Impacts on water quality might be aggravated by more
frequent flooding leading to increased contamination of water supplies
by overflows from waste treatment facilities (IPCC, 2001).

Availability of water will vary within the country depending on physical

characteristics and seasonal rainfall patterns. Population growth,
increased irrigation demands and increased economic activity
coupled with reduced runoff and high water loss through evaporation
will put a strain on available surface and underground water
resources. Recurring droughts cause a decrease in river flows and
lowering of the groundwater table.
30
Climate change may substantially affect irrigation withdrawals, which
depend on how increases in evaporation are offset or exaggerated by
changes in precipitation. Higher temperatures, hence higher crop
evaporative demand, mean that the general tendency would be
towards an increase in irrigation demands.

Flood magnitude and frequency could increase as a consequence of

increased frequency of heavy precipitation events, which can
increase runoff in most areas as well as groundwater recharge in
some floodplains. Land-use change could exacerbate such events.

The greatest vulnerabilities are likely to be in unmanaged water

systems and systems that are currently stressed or poorly and
unsustainably managed due to policies that discourage efficient water
use and protection of water quality, inadequate watershed
management, failure to manage variable water supply and demand,
or lack of sound professional guidance. In unmanaged systems there
are few or no structures in place to buffer the effects of hydrologic
variability on water quality and supply. In unsustainably managed
systems, water and land uses can add stresses that heighten
vulnerability to climate change.

Water resource management techniques, particularly those of

integrated water resource management, can be applied to adapt to
hydrologic effects of climate change, and to additional uncertainty, so
as to lessen vulnerabilities. Currently, supply-side approaches (e.g.
increasing flood defenses, building weirs, utilizing water storage
areas, including natural systems, improving infrastructure for water
collection and distribution) are more widely used than demand-side
approaches (which alter the exposure to stress); the latter is the focus
of increasing attention. However, the capacity to implement effective
management responses is unevenly distributed around the world and
is low in many transition and developing countries.

Human health
Long-term changes in rainfall and temperature affect whether a
region, nation, or community is exposed to certain diseases. For
31
example, even small increases in temperature and rainfall boost the
population of disease-carrying mosquitoes and result in increased
malaria epidemics or diseases spreading to new areas. The first
detectable changes in human health may well be alterations in the
geographic range (latitude and altitude) and seasonality of certain
infectious diseases. These include infections transmitted by animals
and insects (vectors) such as malaria and dengue fever, and food-
borne infectious diseases, which peak in the warmer months. Warmer
average temperatures combined with increased climatic variability
would alter the pattern of exposure to extremes in temperature and so
would impact health, both summer and winter. Public health systems
will need to prepare and adapt to these new conditions.

The occurrence and severity of water-related diseases will increase in

most developing countries due to climate change (WHO, 2007).
Many vector-, food-, and water-borne infectious diseases are known
to be sensitive to changes in climatic conditions. The geographic
range of vector-borne disease such as malaria and dengue fever is
expected to expand because of changes in temperature and rainfall
patterns due to climate change. In all cases however, actual disease
occurrence is strongly influenced by local environmental conditions,
socio-economic circumstances, and public health infrastructure.

Projected climate change will be accompanied by an increase in heat

waves, often exacerbated by increased humidity and air pollution,
which would cause an increase in heat-related deaths and illness
episodes. Limited evidence indicates that reduced winter deaths
would outnumber increased summer deaths.

Extensive experience makes clear that any increase in flooding will

increase the risk of drowning, diarrhoeal and respiratory diseases,
and, in developing countries, hunger and malnutrition. If cyclones
were to increase, devastating impacts would often occur, particularly
in densely settled populations with inadequate resources. A reduction
in crop yields and food production because of climate change in some
regions, particularly in the tropics, will predispose food-insecure
populations to malnutrition, leading to impaired child development and
32
decreased adult activity. Socio-economic disruptions could occur in
some regions, impairing both livelihoods and health.

For each anticipated adverse health impact there is a range of social,

institutional, technological, and behavioural adaptation options to
lessen that impact. Adaptations could, for example, encompass
strengthening of the public health infrastructure and health-oriented
management of the environment (including air and water quality).

By 2100, changes in temperature and precipitation could alter the

geographic distribution of malaria in the Zambezi River Basin in
southern Africa, with areas of dense population becoming suitable for
transmission. Strong southward expansion of the transmission zone
will probably expand into South Africa (Boko et al., IPCC Working
Group, 2007). Occurrences of water-borne diseases such as cholera
and dysentery, while common to the Zambezi River Basin, may also
increase due to climate change. A study carried out in Zambia
between 2003 and 2006 concluded that rain, temperature and other
climate variables are related to the increase in cholera cases during
the epidemic period. The study notes that the increase in temperature
six weeks before the rainy season increased the number of people
affected by cholera by almost five percent (Luque et al., 2006).

Disease vectors such as malarial mosquitoes will increase in intensity

and expand into new regions of the country. Climate conditions will
interact with weak health infrastructure to impose worsening disease
burdens, mortality and morbidity among vulnerable socio-economic
groups. Increased malnutrition and diarrheal diseases in some areas
will increase vulnerability to extreme public health, and developmental
goals will be undermined by longer-term damage to health systems
from disasters.

Lower food security in developing countries, because of reduced crop

yields in tropical regions and increased impacts of extreme weather
events on food supplies, is expected to increase malnutrition. Climate
change is therefore expected to increase the number of malnourished
and under-nourished people in developing countries (Patz et al.,
33
2005), particularly in isolated tropical areas with poor access to
markets. Malnutrition is a direct cause of stunted physical and
intellectual development in children, low productivity in adults and
susceptibility to infectious diseases. Climate change thus threatens to
deepen human constraints to development (IPCC, 2001).

To address the negative impacts of climate change on human health,

the following measures, among others, are recommended: (1)
Promoting proactive, rather than reactive, health services is a priority.
Public health services are likely to be stretched as climate change
presents new challenges for combating disease. (2) Health authorities
need to be aware of scientific and meteorological predictions related
to potential epidemics, heat waves and floods. (3) Training public
health workers to use seasonal climate forecasts to identify health
risks is an option, which would allow for better planning and
implementation of preventive measures. (4) While surveillance,
vaccination programmes and education will remain important, it will
be necessary to broaden participation in public health, for example to
climate scientists and housing specialists. (5) Collaborating
approaches will help the vital task of screening current public health
projects for future climate risks, to ensure they improve the well-being
of communities in the long term.

Energy
Extreme temperatures (cold and hot) have a direct impact on energy
demand. For example, future decreases in rainfall in countries
dependent on hydro-electric power such as Zimbabwe will have
implications for the contribution made by the electricity generating
lakes to the economies of those countries. Lake levels are crucial for
energy generation since the electric turbines are turned by the force
of water at the dam walls of the lake. Reduced power output will
increase demand for costly imports whilst load-shedding puts
unsustainable pressure on forests as an alternative source of energy.

A recent report by the Climate Action Network (CAN) of Australia

projects that climate change is likely to reduce rainfall in the

34
rangelands, which could lead to a 15% drop in grass productivity.
This, in turn, is likely to lead to reductions in the average weight of
cattle by 12%, significantly reducing beef supply. Under such
conditions, dairy cows are projected to produce 30% less milk and
new pests are likely to spread in fruit growing areas (Schwartz &
Randall, 2003).

Ecosystems: Biodiversity, wildlife and tourism

Distributions, population sizes, population density, and behavior of
wildlife have been, and will continue to be, affected directly by
changes in global or regional climate and indirectly through changes
in vegetation. Climate change will lead to poleward movement of the
boundaries of freshwater fish distributions along with loss of habitat
for cold- and cool-water fishes and gain in habitat for warm-water
fishes. Many species and populations are already at high risk, and are
expected to be placed at greater risk by the synergy between climate
change rendering portions of current habitat unsuitable for many
species, and land-use change fragmenting habitats and raising
obstacles to species migration. Without appropriate management,
these pressures will cause some species currently classified as
“critically endangered” to become extinct and the majority of those
labeled “endangered or vulnerable” to become rarer, and thereby
closer to extinction, in the 21st century.

Possible adaptation methods to reduce the risks to species could

include: 1) establishment of refuges, parks, and reserves with
corridors to allow migration of species, and 2) use of captive breeding
and translocation. However, these options may have limitations due
to costs.

Terrestial ecosystems appear to be storing increasing amounts of

carbon. This is largely attributed to increasing plant productivity
because of the interaction between elevated carbon dioxide
concentrations, increasing temperatures, and soil moisture changes.
Recent results confirm that productivity gains are occurring but are
smaller under field conditions than indicated by plant-plot

35
experiments. Hence, the terrestrial uptake may be due more to
change in uses and management of land than to the direct effects of
elevated carbon dioxide and climate.

Global timber market studies that include adaptations through land

and forest management, even without forestry projects that increase
the capture and storage of carbon, suggest that a small amount of
climate change would increase global timber supply and enhance
existing market trends towards rising market share in developing
countries. Consumers may benefit from lower timber prices while
producers may gain or lose depending on regional changes in timber
productivity and potential dieback effects.

Degradation of productive local ecosystems will cause climate-

affected populations to migrate in search of water, food, and
livelihood opportunities. Loss of productivity in semi-arid and arid
rangelands and dry forests, because of increased drought and
frequency of fire, could aggravate land degradation (IPCC, 2001).
This will greatly increase the pressure on remaining forests and
agricultural landscapes, further accelerating resource demands and
environmental degradation.

Changes in rainfall patterns impact negatively on biodiversity, causing

shifts in the habitat range for wildlife, as well as disrupting the species
composition of some communities. In worse cases, the changes in
rainfall result in extinction and decreased populations of some
species. For example, the Zambezi Rapid Assessment Report
(SADC, 2007) shows that the warming and declining wind speeds
reduced the mixing, nutrient enrichment, and the primary productivity
of surface waters, affecting fisheries of Lake Malawi, Cahora Bassa,
and Kariba. The same report states that higher sea-surface
temperatures, rising sea levels, coastal erosion and flooding are
projected to adversely impact coastal ecosystems and communities.
Already, sea level rise and human development are contributing to
losses of coastal wetlands and mangroves, and increasing damage
from coastal flooding in the Zambezi delta.

36
Adaptation of forest management in response to climate change is
projected to increase global timber supply, even without increased
forest planting for carbon capture (IPCC, 2001). Impacts on
ecosystems will be most damaging to people whose livelihoods are
dependent on goods and services from ecosystems and whose
capacity to adapt or access alternative livelihoods is most limited.
Poor people in developing countries reliant on livelihoods associated
with, for example, fisheries, hunting, non-timber forest products and
wildlife-related tourism are highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate
change on ecosystems (Smith, 2005).

The Zambezi River Basin in southern Africa offers a wide range of

tourist attractions ranging from the Victoria Falls, artificial lakes such
as Kariba and Cahora Bassa to wildlife. Climate change impacts on
the range and habitats of wildlife, on river flows, as well as on the
spread of such diseases as malaria, would adversely affect the
tourism industry and make it less attractive.

2.3 Positive impacts

It is important to note that not all impacts of climate change are
negative.. For example, in the USA changes in precipitation and
temperatures under simulated doubled-carbon dioxide conditions
favour irrigated crop production. There have been recorded increases
in acreage in irrigated crops in the Northern Plain and in the Delta
(Adams et al., 1990). In North America, South East America, and
Australia, the effects of CO2 on the crops partially compensate for the
stress that is imposed on the crops by certain climatic conditions and
result in small yield increases (Parry et al., 2004). Under some
climatic modeling scenarios, crop yields increase as a result of
regional increases in precipitation that compensate for the moderate
temperature increases, and as a result of the direct effects of high
concentrations of CO2.

Similarly, due to a combination of temperature increases and rainfall

changes, certain parts of Africa, such as Ethiopia and Mozambique,
are likely to experience extended growing seasons, a fact which will

37
benefit these areas. Mild climate scenarios project further benefits
across African croplands for irrigated and, especially, dryland farms
(Thornton et al., 2006).

In middle and higher latitudes, global warming will extend the length
of the potential growing season, allowing earlier planting of crops in
the spring, earlier maturation and harvesting, and the possibility of
completing two or more cropping cycles during the same season
(Rosenzweig & Hillel, 1995).

Beneficial effects can be identified for some regions and social

groups, but they are expected to diminish as the magnitude of climate
change increases. Climatically, the gradual change of view of the
future assumes that agriculture will continue to thrive and growing
seasons will lengthen. Northern Europe, Russia and North America
will prosper agriculturally while southern Europe, Africa, and Central
and South America will suffer from increased dryness, heat, water
shortages, and reduced production. Overall, global food production
under many typical climate scenarios increases (Schwartz & Randall,
2003).

2.4 Impact assessment

Estimates of likely future adaptations are essential components of
climate change impact models. Integrated assessment models also
include assumptions about adaptations in the impact components
(Leemans, 1992; Rotmans et al., 1994; Dowlatabadi, 1995; Hulme &
Raper, 1995; West & Dowlatabati, 1999). Some early studies of
impacts assumed no adaptation (Tol et al.,1998), invoking the so-
called “naïve” or “dumb farmer” assumption. The “dumb farmer”
assumption, which is not unique to agriculture, is a metaphor for any
impacted agent that is assumed not to anticipate or respond to
changed climate conditions but continues to act as if nothing has
changed (Rosenberg, 1992; Easterling et al., 1993; Smit et al., 1996).
By ignoring autonomous and planned adaptations, such studies do
not distinguish between potential and residual net impacts and are of
limited utility in assessing vulnerability.

38
An alternative approach that is common in more recent impact
modeling has been to assume levels of adaptation (Mendelsohn et
al., 1994; Rosenzweig & Parry, 1994; Sohngen & Mendelsohn, 1998;
Rosenthal et al., 1995). These studies demonstrate that adaptive
measures have the potential to significantly alleviate adverse impacts
of climate change and to benefit from opportunities associated with
changed climatic conditions (Helms et al., 1996; Schimmelpfennig,
1996; Mendelsohn & Neumann, 1999). The models of Rosenzweig
and Parry (1994) show that, with adaptations assumed, food
production could be increased under climate change in many regions
of the world. Stuczyinski et al. (2000) conclude that climate change
would reduce agricultural production by 5-25% without adaptation; but
with assumed adaptation, production is estimated to change by -5 to
+5% of current levels. Downing (1991) demonstrates the potential for
adaptations to reduce food deficits in Africa from 50 to 20%.
Mendelsohn and Dinar (1999) estimate that private adaptation could
reduce potential climate change damages in India’s agriculture from
25 to 15-23%.

Impact models invariably are based on climate scenarios that focus

on adaptation to changed average conditions, with little attention
given to inter-annual variations and extremes. Limited research
suggests that the potential for adaptation to cope with changes in
average conditions is greater than its potential to cope with climate
change-related variability. West and Dowlatabati (1999) demonstrate
that considering variability and extremes can lead to estimates of
“optimal” adaptation and damages that differ considerably from those
based on gradual changes in mean climatic conditions. The
importance of considering variability, not just mean climate, when
estimating adaptation is widely recognized (Robock et al., 1993;
Mearns et al., 1997’ Alderwish & Al-Eryani, 1999; Alexandrov, 1999;
Luo & Lin, 199; Murdiyarso, 2000).

In numerical impact models, assumptions about perception and

adaptation are commonly arbitrary or based on principles of efficiency
and rationality and assume full information (Yohe et al., 1996; Hurd et

39
al., 1997; Mendelsohn et al., 1999). However, as some authors have
noted, actual or assumed behavior do not necessarily match (Tol et
al., 1998; Schneider et al., 2000; Parry et al., 1999). In addition to
questions relating to rationality principles, adaptation behavior is
known to vary according to the amount and type of information
available, as well as the ability to act. Hence, rational behavior that is
based on assumed perfect information differs from rational behavior
under uncertainty (Yohe et al., 1996; Yohe & Neumann, 1997; West &
Dowlatabadi, 1999).

Numerical impact assessment models tend to use, rather than

generate, information on adaptations to estimate future impacts of
climate stimuli, after the effects of adaptation have been factored in.
They indicate the potential of human systems to adapt autonomously
and thus to moderate climate change damages.

2.5 Impacts on rural livelihoods

The current and future changes in climate patterns will have multiple
direct and indirect impacts on physical, biological, social and
economic systems around the world. These changes will impact the
well-being of poor people in developing countries, making it easier for
people to fall into and harder to escape from poverty. Changes in
patterns of rainfall and river flow, and more flooding and drought, will
make the livelihoods of poor people more precarious. Numbers of
people at risk of hunger will rise and the incidence of infectious
diseases is projected to increase. Impacts on ecosystems will reduce
the availability to people of goods and services from, for example,
forests, wetlands, wetlands and the sea. Sea-level rise and saltwater
intrusion may cause inundation and displacement of communities
from coastal floodplains and delta. Increased frequency of damage to
infrastructure, buildings and homes will make development more
costly and slow, and reduce the security of jobs and homes. Climate
change will increase the risk of natural disasters, with potentially
devastating impacts on the livelihoods of poor people and the
economies of developing countries.

40
Most studies indicate that global mean annual temperature increases
of a few degrees Celsius greater would prompt food prices to
increase due to a slowing down in the expansion of global food supply
relative to growth in global food demand. Some recent aggregated
studies have estimated economic impacts on vulnerable populations
such as smallholder producers and poor urban consumers. These
studies find that climate change would lower incomes of the
vulnerable populations and increase the absolute number of people at
risk of hunger.

Essentially, the poor are the most vulnerable to climate change.

Negative impacts of climate change are likely to hit the poorest
people in the poorest countries hardest, and they tend to lose the
most. The impacts of climate change pose most risk where there is
poverty because people with the least assets are more sensitive to
change and vulnerable to adverse impacts. In addition, they are most
likely to live in marginal areas and on unsafe sites, such as steep
slopes or river banks, and are therefore more likely to be killed or
injured in the event of climate-related natural disasters. Furthermore,
their livelihoods are heavily dependent on assets like livestock, trees,
farm or fishing equipment or land, which are easily eliminated by
extreme climate events such as floods and landslides (Smith, 2006).
The livelihoods of most poor people, especially in rural areas, depend
on natural resources and climate-sensitive sectors such as
agriculture, forestry and fisheries. They have few options for
diversifying livelihoods away from these sensitive sectors and
reducing vulnerability. People living in poverty often do not have
enough assets to sustain or rebuild livelihoods after the impact of
hazards because of low financial resources, poor health, lack of clean
water and sanitation, weak physical infrastructure and remoteness
from government services. Lack of access and ability to use
technology reduces their speed of recovery and options for livelihood
strategies. Institutional support is in addition weak and
underdeveloped. Organization of protection for people in developing
countries has often proved to be inadequate.

41
Following immediate climate impacts, poor people are most likely to
suffer from reduced food security and increased disease. Without
alternative livelihoods, they may be forced to sell assets, take children
out of school, go into debt or migrate. The fact that poor people are
the most vulnerable to disaster makes their poverty deeper and
harder to escape. These impacts hit households headed by women
hardest because they are among the most asset-poor in many
developing countries (DFID, 2004).

The geography of many developing countries leaves them especially

vulnerable to climate change (Stern, 2007). Moreover, since women
form a disproportionate share of the poor in developing countries and
communities that are highly dependent on local natural resources,
women are likely to be disproportionately vulnerable to the effects of
climate change. Because of gender differences in property rights,
access to information and in cultural, social and economic roles, the
effects of climate change are likely to affect men and women
differently (Kyomuhendo & Mahungazi, 2008; Nelson & Stathens,
2009). Essentially, the poor are the most vulnerable to climate
change.

The major negative impacts of climate change on rural livelihoods are

as follows. Firstly, climate change is undermining the sustainability of
current agriculture-dependent rural livelihoods. Secondly, climate
change is pressurizing already depleted natural resources. Third,
climate change is increasing hazards that can lead to climate-related
disasters. Fourth, climate change will weaken the livelihoods of poor
people by eroding their livelihood assets. Poor people are vulnerable
to the loss of physical capital, for example because of damage to
shelter and infrastructure. They are also vulnerable to loss of human
capital as a result of increased malnutrition and diseases; to loss of
social capital because of displacement of communities, and of natural
capital because of loss of productivity in agriculture and fisheries, and
financial capital because of more natural disasters and lower income
(Smith, 2006). Degradation of livelihoods by climate change will thus
leave poor people with less of the assets they need to withstand

42
shocks and stresses. They will therefore be less resilient and face
greater deprivation.

Populations dependent on agriculture are particularly vulnerable to

climate change through the climate-sensitive nature of their activities
and their economic and political marginalization. This is further
compounded for women due to gender inequality and the impacts of
male outmigration in response to climate shocks and falling harvests
(Pettengell, 2010). Smallholder farmers have considerable experience
of dealing with climate variability, and local knowledge helps them to
cope during difficult periods. But these ‘coping strategies’ are largely
unsuitable to deal with sustained changes and increased variability
associated with change, as they rely on the conditions returning to
normal again. As a result, assets are depleted, limiting options for
adaptation.

While there are multiple stressors that confront farmers in Southern

Africa, climate variability and change remain the most critical and
exacerbate livelihood insecurity for those farmers with higher levels of
vulnerability to these stressors (Mubaya, 2010). Climate change is
likely to increase disaster risks through an increase in weather and
climate hazards (particularly floods and drought). Vulnerability of
communities to natural hazards is likely to increase especially through
ecosystem degradation, reductions in water and food availability, and
changes to livelihoods. Natural hazards themselves do not cause
disasters; it is the combination of an exposed, vulnerable, and ill-
prepared population with a hazard event that will result in disaster
situations (GEF/ UNDP, 2010).

There are variations in manifestations of direct and structural impacts

from climate variability and change as result of differences in types of
farming systems and general economic and political contexts
(Mubaya, 2010). Impacts of global warming such as disruptions in
food and water systems will adversely affect development and
livelihoods and will most likely add to the already existing challenges
for poverty reduction. This is likely to impact on the social as well as
the cultural and economic development of poor rural communities
43
(Howden et al., 2007; Mortimer & Manvel, 2006) and agricultural
productivity, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Mendelsohn et al.,
2000; Twomlow et al., 2008). In Africa as a whole, food demand
exceeded domestic production by 50% in the drought-prone mid-
1980s and more than 30% in the mid-1990s (World Resources
Institute, 1998). Africa is among the regions with the lowest food
security and the lowest ability to adapt to future changes. In Southern
Africa, 40% of the population is undernourished (Twomlow et al.,
2008).

44
 CHAPTER 3:
RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE
3.1 Some related concepts

Climate change and climate variability

The main distinction between ‘climate change’ and ‘climate variability’
is based on time scale. ‘Climate variability’ is conceptualized as
variations in the climate system over short time scales such as
months, years or decades. ‘Climate change’ is conceptualized as
longer term trends in mean climate variables of periods of one decade
or longer. This is the distinction adopted by the IPCC (Watson, 2001).
Climate change refers to a change in climate that persists for decades
or longer, arising from human activity that alters the composition of
the atmosphere (i.e. greenhouse gas emissions). Climate variability
refers to the natural variation in the climate that are not caused by
greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., it rains more in some years and less
in others).

Climate change mitigation

Mitigation refers to the measures to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. (It is important to note that this term is used differently by
DRR practitioners, who use it to mean reducing or limiting the
adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters). The benefits of
mitigation are hard to value and more uncertain because many
benefits are not valued in markets. The benefits of mitigation are,
consequently, inevitably undervalued and it is easy to paint mitigation
as expensive relative to the benefits. However, climate change
threatens the survival of cultures, species and whole ecosystems, and
will make poverty harder to escape. The benefits of avoiding climate
change are therefore very high for the most vulnerable. Poor people
cannot expect to take backward steps in the fight against poverty.

The costs of mitigation are affordable and should not be traded off
against poverty reduction. Investment in both development and
mitigation is needed to preserve the integrity of natural ecosystems,
45
to protect livelihoods and to achieve new progress in poverty
reduction in the face of climate change.

Risk and vulnerability

Many references have been made to the word vulnerability as if it
were the same phenomenon as risk. There has been fuzziness in
distinguishing between ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ in the context of
climate change adaptation (Bogardi, 2004). It is important to
emphasize that these are two different concepts. Despite efforts by
social scientists undertaken since the mid 20th century (Kates, 1971;
White, 1974), the issue of risk assessment seen from the perspective
of disaster risk has been treated fairly recently.
Risk can be conceptualized either as connected with probabilities or
certainties about life-long negative consequences or handicaps.
When risk is viewed as a function of a hazardous event, it is
understood to be connected with probabilities. Environmental, natural
and socio-economic risks are systematically connected and these
risks are individual actors within a specific community (Sapountzaki,
2007).

Climate-related risks, in particular extreme events, play an important

role in the climate change debate. Management of these climate
related risks can be either through disaster preparedness or climate
change adaptation and this can create positive synergies and
opportunities for progress in the climate negotiations (United Nations
University-Institute for Environment and Human Security, 2008).
Furthermore, resilience to climatic risks can be built by insurance
mechanisms which can in turn reduce the vulnerability of people to
climatic risks. The importance of moving from reactive ex post
(coping) disaster management approaches to more ex ante
(adaptation) pre-disaster activities is emphasized (UNU-EHS, 2008).

To date, the concept of vulnerability has been continuously widened

and broadened towards a more comprehensive approach
encompassing susceptibility, exposure, coping capacity and adaptive
capacity, as well as different thematic areas, such as physical, social,

46
economic, environmental and institutional vulnerability (Kron, 2003).
Vulnerability is considered to be “the ability or inability of individuals or
social groupings to respond to, in the sense of cope with, recover
from or adapt to, any external stress placed on their livelihoods and
wellbeing” (Kelly & Adger, 2000). Smit and Pilifosova (2001) define
vulnerability as “the degree to which a system is susceptible to injury,
damage or harm… the problematic or detrimental part of sensitivity”.
Examples of vulnerability include “a high degree of exposure to risk,
shocks and stress; and proneness to food insecurity” (Ellis, 2000),
and “a function of exposure, sensitivity and adaptability (McCarthy,
2001).

Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or

unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including
climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the
character, magnitude and rate of climate change and variation to
which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity.
Pettengel (2010) defines vulnerability as the characteristics and
circumstances of a community, system, or asset that make it
susceptible to the damaging effects of climate change and other
hazards. IDS (2006) defines vulnerability as a combination of
exposure to external shocks (e.g. a flood) and stresses (e.g. gradual
temperature increases), and the ability to cope with the resulting
impacts. It is dependent on a wide variety of institutional, economic
and environmental factors, not all of which are linked directly with the
climate.

Current climate shocks and stresses already test, and sometimes

exceed, this ability to cope. Without action to reduce exposure and
improve the capacity to cope, the gradual and sudden changes
associated with climate change will increase vulnerability in many
areas.

Vulnerability varies widely across people, whether in the same place

or not. It is therefore imperative to understand it both spatially and
socially in the given sites. Vulnerability is often used as a synonym for
poverty. However, poverty and vulnerability are not synonymous (Tol
47
et al., 2004). Extreme climate events can impact the wealthy and poor
alike, particularly in high risk environments (Liverman, 1994; O’Brien
& Leinchenko, 2000). Although poor people are usually the most
vulnerable, not all vulnerable people are poor. For example, a poor
household may not be vulnerable to economic shocks such as
collapse of agricultural prices, if almost all of its food is produced for
home consumption or is shared between households. Furthermore, a
better-off household may be vulnerable to climate change if, for
instance, it does not have sufficient access to weather information.
Although one could argue that the wealthy are more resilient to
recovery through mechanisms such as insurance, it is likely that
premiums in high risk areas become increasingly difficult to obtain if
climate variability increases with climate change (Kerry et al., 1999;
Stix, 1996).

Disaster risk reduction (DRR)

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is the concept and practice of reducing
disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the
causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to
hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise
management of land and the environment, and improved
preparedness for adverse events (Pettengell, 2010). The number of
disasters linked to extreme weather events doubled between 1980
and 2003 (Tearfund, 2006). They now form well over half of all
disasters.

To help communities adapt to climate change, DRR programs must

ensure interventions are sensitive to future climate-driven events,
which are potentially more damaging and more frequent than any
disasters lodged in the collective memory of communities.

Sensitivity
Sensitivity is the degree to which a system is affected by or
responsive to climate stimuli. It is important to note that sensitivity
includes responsiveness to both problematic stimuli and beneficial
stimuli (Smit & Pilifosova, 2001). The IPCC (2001) has described
48
climate change sensitivity as follows. It is the degree to which a
system is affected, either adversely or beneficially, by climate-related
stimuli. Climate-related stimuli encompass all the elements of climate
change, including mean climate characteristics, climate variability,
and the frequency and magnitude of extremes. The effect may be
direct (e.g. a change in crop yield in response to a change in the
mean, range, or variability of temperature), or indirect (e.g. damages
caused by an increase in the frequency of coastal flooding due to
sea-level rise).

Susceptibility
Susceptibility is the degree to which a system is open, liable, or
sensitive to climate stimuli. This concept is similar to sensitivity, but
with some connotations towards damage (Smit et al., 1999).

Impact potential
Impact potential is the degree to which a system is sensitive or
susceptible to climatic stimuli. This concept is essentially synonymous
with sensitivity.

Stability
Stability is the degree to which a system is not easily moved or
modified.

Robustness
Robustness is the strength or degree to which a system is not given
to influence.

Climate resilience
Resilience is the degree to which a system rebounds, recoups, or
recovers from a stimulus. Whereas adaptive capacity relates to the
ability to influence and respond directly to processes of change (to
shape, create or respond to change), resilience is the ability to absorb
shocks or ride out changes.

49
Resistance
Resistance is the degree to which a system opposes or prevents the
effect of a stimulus.

Flexibility
Flexibility is the degree to which a system is pliable or compliable.
This concept is similar to adaptability, but it is more absolute than
relative.

Coping
Coping ability is the degree to which a system can successfully
grapple with a stimulus. This is similar to the concept of adaptability,
but includes more than adaptive means of “grappling”.

Coping strategies can be defined strictly as short-term measures or

as “the bundle of producer responses to declining food availability and
entitlements in abnormal seasons or years (Davies, 1996). Coping
begins when a household is forced to mobilize resources in order to
respond to crises (Adams et al., 1998). In the same context, Ellis
(1998) defines coping strategies as actions that are invoked following
a decline in “normal” sources of food, and which are regarded as
involuntary responses to disaster or unanticipated failure in major
sources of survival. Coping strategies are also defined as natural
variation in seasons combined with the specific responses to the
season as it unfolds (Cooper et al., 2007; Mortimer & Manvel, 2006).
Populations and communities living in more marginal environments
are often more equipped to cope with periods of food stress than
those accustomed to more secure conditions than they have learnt to
adapt to (Reardon, 1988).

The coping strategies used in communities which face an annual food

gap (as in southwest Niger) make it difficult to determine the true
intention of a strategy, as over time they become more integrated into
annual activities. Discerning their meaning and disentangling them
from adaptation therefore becomes difficult (Young & Jaspars, 1995).
This may also be the case as coping strategies are not only used in
50
times of stress or when disaster strikes. Instead, they are used all the
time, but assume greater importance in difficult times (Campbell,
1990).

Coping strategies have sometimes been classified as “long-term” and

“short-term”. Long-term strategies involve risk minimizing and no
commitment of resources (Mubaya, 2010). These have also been
termed insurance strategies that have low risk, but high return
(Corbett, 1998). In addition, these strategies enable households to
sustain themselves for a relatively longer period of time. Coping
strategies classified as short term range from getting into a crisis,
coping within a crisis, to complete failure. Less resilient strategies are
used and this usually calls for the disposal of assets. They also tend
to threaten future livelihoods and are considered to have both low risk
and low return and high risk and low return (Davies, 1996). If these
coping strategies are ‘erosive’ and used over time, they may trap
farmers in cycles of food insecurity (De Waal, 2003). In addition,
these erosive measures are desperate strategies that farmers take in
order to cope in the immediate term and cannot sustain the
household for long. Examples of coping strategies that have been
cited by authors who distinguish coping from adaptation include
consuming crops before maturity due to hunger, borrowing money or
food and disposal of key productive assets among others (Phillips,
2007).

The fact that farmers are sometimes able to cope in stressful periods
indicates that it is important to identify local knowledge which enables
them to construct livelihoods in response to constraints and
opportunities and that they have the ability to cope with changing
conditions over time. Utilizing a context specific framework for
evaluating coping strategies can lead to better understanding the
concept as these coping strategies vary by context. For example, it
has been observed in Zimbabwe that most farmers rely on their own
production and on the market to fulfill their food needs. When the
same farmers experience a production shock, they become even

51
more dependent on money-based transactions (Gandure &
Marongwe, 2006).

Responsiveness
This is the degree to which a system reacts to stimuli. This is broader
than coping ability and adaptability because responses need not be
“successful”.

3.2 Climate Change Adaptation: Reducing Vulnerability to

Climate Change

3.2.1 Introduction
Crucial to reducing vulnerability to climate change is understanding
how individuals, groups and natural systems can prepare for and
respond to changes in climate, known in climate change terminology
as adaptation (IDS, 2006). Adaptation refers to actions that people
and institutions make in anticipation of, or in response to, a changing
climate. This includes changes to the things they do, and/ or the way
they do them.

Adaptation is a broad concept covering actions by individuals,

communities, private companies and public bodies such as
governments. Successful adaptation can reduce vulnerability by
building on and strengthening existing coping mechanisms and
assets, targeting climate change vulnerability with specific measures
and integrating vulnerability reduction into wider policies.

Mitigation (tackling the causes of climate change) and adaptation

(tackling the effects) are of course closely related. The amount of
adaptation necessary will depend partly on the success of mitigation
efforts. At the same time, some actions can help foster both
adaptation and mitigation, such as sustainable agricultural systems,
soil and water conservation measures involving planting trees which
can then absorb greenhouse gases, or renewable energy initiatives
that reduce dependence on fuel-wood collection.

52
Adaptation has been approached from both top-down and bottom-up
perspectives, with considerable overlaps between the two. The former
relies on climatic and applied modeling to predict secondary impacts
(e.g. on crops or water availability) from a projected change in
climate. Although fairly technical, these are applicable to wide areas
and can indicate where broader adaptation measures may be
necessary, such as drought-resilient crop varieties or expanded
irrigation systems.

Bottom-up approaches assess vulnerability and adaptive capacity to

current climate variations and future climate trends at the local level.
Climate variability is a reality that humans have always been exposed
to and have developed different ways of dealing with. Existing coping
mechanisms are used as a platform for fostering resilience to future
changes. While they can incorporate modeling projections, they draw
primarily on local knowledge and can more effectively target the
poorest and most vulnerable in developing appropriate adaptation
responses.

Climate change exacerbates existing environmental challenges, for

example declining water resources, and thus increases the urgency of
managing natural resources in a sustainable way. Therefore adapting
to climate change often builds directly on existing efforts to manage
natural resources effectively. In addition to the link with sustainable
development approaches, there is also considerable overlap between
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction.

Community-based adaptation has evolved alongside the UNFCCC

negotiations. So while there is considerable overlap with other sectors
and approaches, it has developed a distinctive set of terminology and
its own research community. As with work on disaster risk reduction
and water and sanitation, community-based adaptation recognizes
that environmental knowledge and resilience to climate change
impacts lie within societies and cultures. The focus should therefore
be on empowering communities to take action on vulnerability to
climate change, based on their own decision making processes. The
‘bottom-up’ aspects of community-based adaptation are in part a
53
reaction to the ‘top-down’ energy-based interventions, which
commonly dominate climate negotiations.

The goal of community-based adaptation projects is to increase the

climate resilience of communities by enhancing their capacity to cope
with less predictable rainfall patterns, more frequent droughts,
stronger heat waves, different diseases and weather hazards of
unprecedented intensity, While projects labeled as ‘community-based
adaptation’ are relatively new, work in other development sectors has
been developing participatory methodologies, raising awareness of
climate change and fostering adaptive capacity for many years,
without using climate adaptation terminology. The climate adaptation
community is increasingly aware of the common ground it shares with
the mainstream development community. The livelihoods and
vulnerability focus of much climate adaptation research and practice
will help forge stronger links between the two communities.

Adaptation is the ability to respond and adjust to actual or potential

impacts of changing climate conditions in ways that moderate harm or
take advantage of positive opportunities. Smit and Pilifosova (2000)
defined adaptation as the adjustments in ecological, social, or
economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli
and their effects or impacts. It refers to changes in processes,
practices, and structures to moderate potential damages or to benefit
from opportunities associated with climate change. It reflects positive
actions to change the frequency and/ or intensity of impacts, as
opposed to coping strategies that are responses to impacts once they
occur (Adger et al., 2003; IPCC, 2001; Reid & Vogel, 2006).

Adaptation refers both to the process of adapting and to the condition

of being adapted. The term has specific interpretations in particular
disciplines. In ecology, for example, adaptation refers to changes by
which an organism or species becomes fitted to its environment
(Lawrence, 1995; Abercrombie et al., 1997). In the social sciences,
adaptation refers to adjustments by individuals and the collective
behavior of socio-economic systems (Denevan, 1983; Hardesty,
1983). The broad interpretation of adaptation includes adjustments in
54
natural or human systems in response to experienced or future
climatic conditions or their effects or impacts, which may be beneficial
or adverse.

As both a process and a condition, adaptation is a relative term. It

involves an alteration in something (the system of interest, activity,
sector, community, or region) to something (the climate-related stress
or stimulus). Description of an adaptation requires specification of
who or what adapts, the stimulus for which the adaptation is
undertaken, and the process and form it takes (Downing et al., 1997;
Krankina et al., 1997; UNEP, 1998; Pittock et al., 1999; Risbey et al.,
1999).

3.2.2 Autonomous adaptation

Adaptations vary according to the system in which they occur, who
undertakes them, the climatic stimuli that prompts them, and their
timing, functions, forms, and effects. In unmanaged natural systems,
adaptation is autonomous and reactive; it is the process by which
species and ecosystems respond to changed conditions. The other
form consists of adaptations consciously undertaken by humans,
including those in economic sectors, managed ecosystems, resource
use systems, settlements, communities, and regions. In human
systems, adaptation is undertaken by private decision-makers and
public agencies or governments.

The increasing realization that future climate change may pose a

serious threat to society raises the question of how to adapt to these
changes. This question is now receiving attention from researchers,
governments, NGOs and donor agencies (Burton et al., 2002; Hertin
et al., 2003; Smit & Pilifosova, 2001; Smit et al., 2009; Subak, 2000).

Essentially, adaptive strategies are long-term and involve a longer

time frame and some learning of the strategy before or after a climate
related occurrence. Adaptation can be reactive (after impact takes
place) or anticipatory (before impact takes place). Therefore, it can be
carried out in response to or in anticipation of changes within existing
situations (IPCC, 1995; Reid & Vogel, 2006). In the proactive
55
scenario, this is where systems adjust before the initial impacts take
place. Change is introduced in response to the onset of impacts that
will re-occur and reflect a structural change of state of the system in
cases where adaptation is reactive (Adger et al., 2007).

Adaptation to climate change necessarily includes adaptation to

climate variability (Hewitt & Burton, 1971; Parry, 1986; Kane et al.,
1992; Katz & Brown, 1992; Downing, 1996; Yohe et al., 1996;
Smithers & Smit, 1997; Smit et al., 1999).

Adaptations come in a huge variety of forms. Adaptation types (i.e.

how adaptation occurs) have been differentiated according to
numerous attributes (Carter et al., 1994; Stakhiv, 1994; Bijlsma et al.,
1996; Smithers & Smit, 1997; UNEP, 1998; Leary, 1999; Bryant et al.,
2000; Reilly & Schimmelpfennig, 2000). There are different bases for
characterizing and differentiating adaptation to climate change (Table
3.1).

56
Table 3.1: Bases for characterizing and differentiating adaptation to climate
change

General Differentiating Concept or Examples of Terms Used

Attribute

Purposefulness Autonomous, Planned

Spontaneous, Purposeful
Automatic, Intentional
Natural, Policy
Passive, Active, Strategic
Timing Anticipatory, Responsive
Proactive, Reactive
Ex ante, Ex post
Temporal Scope Short term, Long term
Tactical, Strategic
Instantaneous, Contingency, Routine,
Cumulative
Spatial Scope Localized, Widespread

Functions/ Effects Retreat, Accommodate, Protect,

Prevent, Tolerate, Spread, Change,
Restore
Form Structural, Legal, Institutional,
Regulatory, Financial, Technological
Performance Cost, Effectiveness, Efficiency,
Implementability, Equity

Source: Smit et al., 1999.

Commonly used distinctions are purposefulness and timing.

Autonomous or spontaneous adaptations to climate change are
considered to be those that take place without the directed
intervention of a public agency. Estimates of these autonomous
adaptations are now used in impact and vulnerability assessments.
Planned adaptations can be either reactive or anticipatory
(undertaken before impacts are apparent). In addition, adaptations
can be short or long term, localized or widespread, and they can
serve various functions and take numerous forms.

Adaptations have been distinguished according to individuals’ choice

options as well, including “bear the losses”, “share the losses”,
“modify the threats”, “prevent the effects”, “change the use”, and
57
“change the location” (Burton et al., 1993; Rayer & Malone, 1998).
The choice of responses has been extended to include the role of
community structures, institutional arrangements, and public policies
(Downing et al., 1997; UNEP, 1998).

Adaptations consciously undertaken by human cover various sectors

including economic sectors, settlements, communities, regions, and
managed ecosystems. Human system adaptation can be motivated
by private or public interest. Private decision makers include
individuals, households, businesses, and corporations. Public
interests are served by governments at all levels. The roles of public
and private participants are distinct but not unrelated.

Types of anticipatory adaptation by human systems to climate change

include purchase of insurance, construction of houses on stilts,
redesign of oil rigs, early warning systems, new building codes and
design standards, and incentives for relocation. Reactive responses
include changes in farm practices, changes in insurance premiums,
purchase of air-conditioning, compensatory payments and subsidies,
and enforcement of building codes.

Adaptation involves adjustments to reduce the vulnerability of

communities, regions, or activities to climatic change and variability.
Adaptation is important in the climate change issue in two ways. The
first relates to the assessment of impacts and vulnerabilities, and the
second to the development and evaluation of response options.

Communities need to have access to forecasts and appropriate

technologies. Wise management practices should be used and
supported, and the existing conditions that limit adaptive capacity
should be addressed. The key to the success of some agricultural
projects includes educating farmers about the impacts of climate
change and linking them to sources of weather and climate
information; the development of farm-water management systems;
engagement with other communities to share experiences and to
advocate for change; and the opportunity to study the impacts of
climate change on women.
58
Climate change demands the wise management of natural resources,
firstly because climate change increases resource scarcity. For
example, in areas that are becoming drier and in coastal areas
suffering from saline intrusion, there is a reduction in the availability of
water for household and productive use. Second, the role that natural
resources play in buffering communities against extremes of climate
becomes more important as climates become more adverse. For
example, increasing the soil’s organic content improves water
retention and drainage, which can help crops where rain becomes
more concentrated into heavy downpours. Reforestation can reduce
local temperatures; provides additional income; protects against soil
erosion, landslides, and local flooding; and provides food and fodder
in times of scarcity.

In the Maharashtra State of India, the Watershed Organization Trust

is assisting poor, rural communities in watershed restoration projects
to combat the degrading effects of recurrent droughts and human
pressures on the surrounding land. Measures undertaken include soil,
land, and water management, such as trench building to control
erosion, improve soil fertility, and enhance groundwater recharge;
afforestation and rural energy management, such as banning tree-
felling and promoting the planting of shrubs and grass to meet
household fuel needs; and livestock management and pasture
management. Alongside these interventions, measures to improve
adaptive capacity include micro-lending, training in new techniques,
and the formation of community groups seeking to diversify
livelihoods (Oxfam, 2010).

Reducing the risk of climate-related disasters is an effective

adaptation strategy. Climate-related disasters have increased in
frequency and/ or intensity as a result of climate change. There has
been a dramatic rise in the number of small- and medium-scale
climate-related disasters. Since the 1980s, the average number of
people reported as affected by climate-related disasters has doubled
from 121 to 123 million a year. As a result, Disaster Risk Reduction

59
(DRR) needs to incorporate climate change analysis, and is an
important component of adapting to climate change (Oxfam, 2010).

Decades of development theory and practice prove that a holistic,

people-centered approach is the best path to effective and sustained
poverty reduction. The challenges presented by climate change mean
that it is also one of the principal strategies to adapt. To go beyond
resilience, which deteriorates as conditions change, to
transformational changes in the lives of people living in poverty and in
changing climate, demands enormous political will and investment. It
demands flexibility and learning through every institution, from
household to government. It demands an approach that combines
bottom-up with top-down processes; local knowledge and scientific
knowledge; specific responses and managing uncertainty; sustainable
livelihoods, natural resource management and DRR approaches;
change, and learning how to change. Climate change forces us to
draw the strands together, not only to lift people out of poverty, but
also to enable them to manage risk and uncertainty as well as shape,
create, and respond to changes throughout their lives.

Communities are at the centre of many approaches to climate change

adaptation; however, enabling them to adapt requires working across
multiple levels from household through to global. To reduce the
vulnerability of livelihoods to climate change risks, community-based
development projects must: (1) Begin with a thorough understanding
of local livelihoods, so protecting assets vulnerable to current and
future climate risks can be a core project activity. (2) Help
communities develop an understanding of the main climate risks and
how they impact on livelihoods (through a ‘learning-by-doing
approach). (3) Emphasize active participation of community members
in all stages of the project (design, implementation, monitoring). (4)
Build on existing social institutions to carry out activities. (5)
Encourage the strong participation of women, recognizing their role
as community resource managers, while also acknowledging their
specific vulnerability to climate risks. (6) Enhance local technical,
financial and managerial skills. (7) Invest in long-term resilience-

60
building efforts, which also meet immediate development needs. (8)
Advocate a policy framework that decentralizes natural resources
management. (9) Recognize that current coping strategies may not
be sustainable.

Adaptation to rapid anthropogenic climate change may be a new

challenge, but individuals, societies, and economies have adapted, in
various ways and with varying degrees of success, to changed and
variable environmental conditions throughout history (Smit &
Pilifosova, 2001). These experiences in adaptive behavior provide
information on the processes, constraints, and consequences of
adaptations.

Knowledge of the processes by which individuals or communities

actually adapt to changes in conditions over time comes largely from
analog and other empirical analyses (Wigley et al., 1981; Glantz,
1996; Meyer et al., 1998; Tol et al., 1998; Yohe and Dowlatabadi,
1999; Bryant et al., 2000). These studies indicate that autonomous
adaptations tend to be incremental and ad hoc, to take multiple forms,
to be in response to multiple stimuli (usually involving a particular
catalysts and rarely climate alone), and to be constrained by
economic, social, technological, institutional, and political conditions.

Conceptual models of adaptation processes describe sequential

relationships and feedback involving climatic and non-climatic stimuli,
system sensitivities and impacts, tactical and strategic adaptations,
and net or residual impacts. They also indicate conditions that
constrain or facilitate various kinds of adaptation (e.g. Carter, 1996;
Smit et al., 1996; UNEP, 1998; Schneider et al., 2000). Spatial
analogs have been used to gain insight into adaptation, by
transferring experience from existing climatic regions to places where
such climate may be found in the future. The contributions and limits
of spatial analogs are known (Schneider, 1997; Rayner & Malone,
1998).

Temporal analog or case studies document adaptive responses to

climatic stimuli in resource-based economic sectors and communities
61
over periods of several decades (e.g. Glantz, 1988; Oltshoorn et al.,
1996; Changnon et al., 1997). Other empirical analyses have
examined adaptive behavior in key sectors such as agriculture in light
of climatic variability and extremes over even shorter time periods
(e.g. Appendi & Liverman, 1996; Smit et al., 1997, Bryant et al.,
2000). These direct empirical analyses of adaptation processes tend
to start with the system of interest, then assess its sensitivity and
adaptability to climate and other stimuli.

For systems such as agriculture, forestry, water resources, and

coastal zone settlements, the key climatic stimuli are not average
conditions but variability and extremes. A direct climatic condition
prompts adaptation less often than the economic and social effects or
implications of the climatic stimuli that are fundamental in triggering
adaptive responses. Non-climatic conditions are important in
moderating and sometimes overwhelming the influence of climate
stimuli in the decision-making of resource users. Decisions on
adaptation are rarely made in response to climate stimuli alone.
These findings are important for predicting autonomous adaptations
and for improving adaptation assumptions in impact models.

In estimating future adaptations and developing adaptation policies, it

is helpful to understand factors and circumstances that hinder or
promote adaptation.

3.2.3 Planned adaptation

Planned adaptations are mainly anticipatory adaptations undertaken
or directly influenced by governments or collectives such as a public
policy initiative. These adaptations represent conscious policy options
or response strategies to concerns about climate change (Benioff et
al., 1996; Fankhauser, 1996; Smith, 1997; Pielke, 1998; UNEP,
1998). Public adaptation initiatives may be direct or indirect, such as
when they encourage or facilitate private actions (Leary, 1999).
Planned adaptation by public agencies represents an alternative or
complementary response strategy to mitigation (of net GHG
emissions).. Numerous reasons have been given for pursuing

62
planned adaptations. Six reasons cited by Burton (1996) are as
follows: (1) Climate change cannot be totally avoided; (2) Anticipatory
and precautionary adaptation is more effective and less costly than
forced, last-minute emergency adaptation or retrofitting; (3) Climate
change may be more rapid and more pronounced than current
estimates suggest, and unexpected events are possible; (4)
Immediate benefits can be gained from better adaptation to climate
variability and extreme atmospheric events; (5) Immediate benefits
can also be gained by removing maladaptive policies and practices;
(6) Climate change brings about opportunities as well as threats, and
future benefits can result from climate change.

Public adaptation initiatives are regarded not as a substitute for

reducing GHG emissions but as a necessary strategy to manage the
impacts of climate change (Burton, 1996; Pielke, 1998). Adaptation
can yield benefits regardless of the uncertainty and nature of climate
change (Ali, 1999). Some authors have contended that we cannot
solely or heavily rely on autonomous adjustments of private agents to
protect public goods; we should also examine public policy responses
to do so (Leary, 1999). Planned anticipatory adaptation, as
recognized in the UNFCCC (Article 3.3) is aimed at reducing a
system’s vulnerability by diminishing risk or improving adaptive
capacity.

Research work has been done on the process by which public

agencies might or should undertake planned adaptation strategies,
particularly noting the steps to be followed, relationships with other
policy and management objectives, and the criteria with which options
might be evaluated (Louisse & Van der Muelen, 1991; Carter et al.,
1994; Smith & Lenhart, 1996; Stakhiv, 1996; Major & Frederick, 1997;
Smith, 1997). Klein and Tol (1997) identify five generic objectives of
adaptation: (1) Increasing robustness of infrastructural designs and
long-term investments, for example by extending the range of
temperature or precipitation a system can withstand without failure
and changing the tolerance of loss or failure (e.g., by increasing
economic reserves or by insurance); (2) Increasing the flexibility of

63
vulnerable managed systems, for example by allowing mid-term
adjustments (including change of activities or location) and reducing
economic lifetimes (including increasing depreciation); (3) Enhancing
the adaptability of vulnerable natural systems, for example by
reducing other (non-climatic) stresses and removing barriers to
migration (including establishing eco-corridors); (4) Reversing trends
that increase vulnerability (also termed “mal-adaptation”) for example
by introducing setbacks for development in vulnerable areas such as
floodplains and coastal zones; and (5) Improving societal awareness
and preparedness, for example by informing the public of the risks
and possible consequences of climate change and the setting up of
early-warning systems.

Estimates of likely future adaptations are an essential ingredient in

impact and vulnerability assessments, and hence are fundamental to
estimating the costs and risks of climate change (Fankhauser, 1996;
Yohe et al., 1996; Tol et al, 1998; UNEP, 1998; Smit et al., 1999;
Pittock and Jones, 2000). The extent to which ecosystems, food
supplies, and sustainable development are vulnerable or “in danger’
depends both on exposure to changes in climate and on the ability of
the impacted system to adapt. Thus, to assess the dangerousness of
climate change, impact and vulnerability assessments must address
the likelihood of autonomous adaptations.

In addition, adaptation is an important policy response option, along

with mitigation (Frankhauser, 1996; Smith, 1996; Pielke, 1998; Kane
& Shogren, 2000). There is need for the development and
assessment of planned adaptation initiatives to help manage the risks
of climate change.

Planned adaptation often is interpreted as the result of a deliberate

policy decision on the part of a public agency, based on an
awareness that conditions are about to change or have changed and
that action is required to minimize losses or maximize benefit from
opportunities (Pittock & Jones, 2000). Autonomous adaptations are
widely interpreted as initiatives by private actors rather than by
governments, usually triggered by market or welfare changes induced
64
by actual or anticipated climate change (Leary, 1999). Smith et al.
(1996) describe autonomous adaptations as those that occur
“naturally”, without interventions by public agencies, whereas planned
adaptations are called “intervention strategies”. Thus defined,
autonomous and planned adaptations largely correspond with private
and public adaptation, respectively.

3.2.4 Adaptation options/ strategies

Strategies for adaptation need to ensure focus on the most important
vulnerabilities and the needs of the people most affected.
Vulnerability assessments are used to identify who is vulnerable to
climate change and to prioritize their vulnerabilities according to risk,
severity of potential impacts and expected time horizons (Spanger-
Siegfried & Dougherty, 2004). Assessment is based on identification
of current vulnerabilities to climate impacts for different social groups
according to climate sensitivities related to, for example, location,
economic sector and types of livelihood assets. Vulnerability to future
climate is assessed against projections and expected risks or
opportunities relating to climate, socio-economic change and natural
resource condition. When completed, vulnerability assessments are
the basis for preparing National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs)
or other adaptation plans, in which policies and actions needed to
reduce vulnerabilities are identified and agreed among stakeholders
(Lim & Spanger-Siegfried, 2004).

Stakeholder participation is integral to adaptation strategies because

to be effective, policies developed and enacted at higher levels need
to be aligned with action taken to address risks and priorities
identified at the local level. This requires coordination across scales
and negotiation and agreement of roles and responsibilities
appropriate for different groups of stakeholders at international,
regional, national and community levels. At the community level, local
communities, NGOs, local government, businesses and vulnerable
groups need to come together and participate in identifying what
changes they are vulnerable to, where and who is vulnerable, and
action needed to reduce their vulnerability (Smith, 2006).
65
For the most part, it is the vulnerable themselves who undertake
adaptation, based on local hazards, risks, context, traditions and
systems of organization. Adaptation therefore consists mostly of local-
scale action that is facilitated and supported by broader-scale
policies, instruments and institutions. Development of infrastructure or
institutional strategies that are beyond the control and capabilities of
local communities takes place at higher levels (IUCN, 2003). The
primary role of governments and international processes is in
developing and implementing policy that is enabling. This must aim to
ensure that the required resources, support and services are
available to communities where they are needed to help build
adaptive capacity and strengthen resilience. Thus, in contrast to
mitigation, which requires globally coordinated action, adaptation to
climate change must be rooted locally.

To facilitate action at local levels, adaptation strategies need to

effectively target the vulnerabilities of poor people. Adaptation cannot,
therefore, be either top-down or prescriptive, or restricted in practice
to discreet, narrowly focused adjustment (Adger et al., 2003).
Adaptations by communities need to be broad based and aim to
improve risk management and to broaden and deepen the pool of
assets that poor people can utilize in sustaining their livelihoods.
Increasing access to livelihood assets, and reducing the risks of them
being degraded or lost, improves the ability of people to cope with
disruption and change, including climate change (Smith, 2006). Thus,
to reduce vulnerability to climate change in communities, supporting
policies and locally-based action should be guided by the need to do
two things. The first is to build adaptive capacity. Developing the
capacity to adapt to climate change demands access to information,
skills, technology, new finance and infrastructure, and stronger
institutions and social equity (Munasinghe & Swart, 2005). The
second is to build resilience. Poor people need to have the ability to
maintain their livelihoods and make progress in escaping poverty
despite new shocks and adverse trends driven by climate change
(IUCN, 2003).

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The emphasis on building capacity and resilience ensures that
vulnerability-based approaches to adaptation share many synergies
with strategies for poverty reduction. Development and adaptation
can therefore be mutually reinforcing because progress in
development enables adaptation, and adaptation that reduces
vulnerability advances development goals.

There are many arbitrary lists of possible adaptation measures,

initiatives, or strategies that have a potential to moderate impacts, if
they are implemented (Benioff et al., 1996; Smit et al., 1996; Mimura,
1999). Such possible adaptations are based on experience,
observation, and speculation about alternatives that might be created
(Carter, 1996). They cover a wide range of types and take numerous
forms (UNEP,1998).

For example, possible adaptive measures for health risks associated

with climate change listed by Patz (1996) appear in Table 3.2

Table 3.2: Examples of multi-level adaptive measures for some anticipated

health outcomes
of global climate change.

Adaptive Measure Heat-Related Vector-Borne Health and

Illness Diseases Extreme
Weather
Events

Administrative/legal -Implement -Implement -Create disaster

weather vaccination preparedness
watch/warning programmes programs
systems -Enforce -Employ land-
-Plant trees in vaccination use planning
denuded and laws and reduce
deforested areas -Implement flash flood
-Implement education -Ban precarious
education campaigns to residential
campaigns eliminate placements
breeding sites
67
Engineering -Insulate -Install window -Construct
buildings screens strong seawalls
-Install high- -Release sterile -Fortify
albedo materials male vectors sanitation
for roads systems
Personal behavior -Maintain -Use insect -Heed weather
hydration repellents advisories
-Schedule work -Use
breaks during pyrethroid-
peak daytime impregnated
temperatures bed nets

Source: Patz, 1996

In coastal zone studies, comprehensive lists of potential adaptation

measures are presented. These adaptations include a wide array of
engineering measures, improvements, or changes, including
agricultural practices that are more flood-resistant. They potential
adaptation measures also include negotiating regional water-sharing
agreements; providing efficient mechanisms for disaster
management; developing desalination techniques; planting mangrove
belts to provide flood protection; planting salt-tolerant varieties of
vegetation; improving drainage facilities; developing flood insurance
schemes; and devising flood early warning systems (Al-Farouq and
Huq, 1996; Jallow, 1996; Rijsberman & van Velzen, 1996; Teves et
al., 1996; Mimura & Harasawa, 2000).

Examples of adaptation mechanisms that have been observed in

recent studies and assessments of impacts and adaptations of
climate change include crop diversification, irrigation, construction of
water reservoirs, accumulating food surpluses, and use of drought
resistant varieties, among others. There is an indication that in most
68
cases, these strategies have been adopted in response to multiple
sources of risk and rarely to climate risk alone.

Adaptation is largely influenced by the nature of the hazard in

question. In other words, farmers may be able to adapt to inconsistent
rains, but not to droughts depending on their capacity at that moment.
This is referred to as “specific adaptation”. On the other hand, when
they can adapt to a range of hazards, then this is referred to “generic
adaptive capacity” (Adger et al., 2003; Reid & Vogel, 2006).

Adaptation to climate change is not a recent phenomenon.

Throughout the history of society, communities have adapted to
climate variability through different ways such as altering settlements
and agricultural patterns. However, this adaptation has mainly been in
reaction to natural climate effects. The recent phenomenon of human
induced climate change, therefore, poses a new dimension to this age
old challenge (Burton et al., 2006).

Adaptation and coping with climate variability and change have

become key themes in current global climatic discussions and policy
initiatives (Downing & Patwardhan, 2003; Reid & Vogel, 2006; UNEP,
1998, 2001).

Significant responses to climate variability and change involve

organizing agriculture and related practices, than switching to off farm
initiatives (Mubaya, 2010).

Farmers’ selection of coping and adaptation strategies to climate

variability and change and the associated outcomes tends to be
overwhelmingly shaped by diverse factors such as demography,
access to information and assets and vulnerability levels. This was
found to be the case among farmers in Zambia and Zimbabwe
(Mubaya, 2010).

In the face of climate change and variability, there is need for farmers
to respond to growing crops that are more drought tolerant than the
ones they would usually grow in normal seasons.

69
Research in many sectors and regions indicates an impressive
human capacity to adapt to long-term mean climate conditions but
less success in adapting to extremes and year-to-year variations in
climatic conditions. Climate change will be experienced via conditions
that vary from year to year, as well as for ecosystems (Sprengers et
al., 1994) and human systems (Downing et al., 1996); these
variations are important for adaptation. Thus although human
settlements and agricultural systems, for example, have adapted to
be viable in a huge variety of climatic zones around the world, those
settlements and systems often are vulnerable (with limited adaptive
capacity) to temporal deviations from normal conditions (particularly
extremes). As a result, adaptations designed to address changed
mean conditions may or may not be helpful in coping with the
variability that is inherent in climate change.

All socio-economic systems (especially climate-dependent systems

such as agriculture, pastoralism, forestry, water resources, and
human health) are continually in a state of flux in response to
changing circumstances, including climatic conditions. The evidence
shows that there is considerable potential for adaptation to reduce the
impacts of climate change and to realize new opportunities. In China’s
Yantze Valley, 18th century regional expansions and contractions on
the double-cropping system for rice represented adaptive responses
to the frequency of production successes and failures associated with
climatic variations (Smit & Cai, 1996) . Adaptation options occur
generally in socio-economic sectors and systems in which the
turnover of capital investment and operating costs is shorter and less
often where long-term investment is required (Yohe et al., 1996;
Sohngen & Mendelsohn, 1998).

Although an impressive variety of adaptation initiatives have been

undertaken across sectors and regions, the responses are not
universally or equally available (Rayner & Malone, 1998). For
example, the viability of crop insurance depends heavily on the
degree of information, organization, and subsidy available to support
it. Similarly, the option of changing location in the face of hazard

70
depends on the resources and mobility of the affected part and on the
availability and conditions in potential destination areas (McGregor,
1993). Many response options have become less available; many
others have become more available. Individual cultivator response to
climate risk in India has long relied on a diverse mix of strategies,
from land use to outside employment (sometimes requiring temporary
migration) to reciprocal obligations for support. Many of these
strategies have been undermined by changes such as population
pressure and government policy, without being fully replaced by
others. In areas of China, many historical adaptations in agriculture
(e.g. relocating production or employing irrigation) are no longer
available as population pressures increase on limited land and water
resources (Fang & Lieu, 1992; Cai & Smit, 1996). In Kenya, effective
smallholder response to drought has shifted from traditional planting
strategies to employment diversification (Downing et al., 1989).

Not only is there rarely only one adaptation option available to

decision-makers (Burton and Cohen, 1993), but also rarely do people
choose the best responses (the ones among those available that
would most effectively reduce losses). This is often because of an
established preference for, or aversion to, certain options (Rayner &
Malone, 1998). In some cases there is limited knowledge of risks or
alternative adaptation strategies. In other cases, adoption of adaptive
measures is constrained by other priorities, limited resources, or
economic or institutional barriers (Eele, 1996; Bryant et al.,2000; de
Loe & Kreutzwiser, 2000). Recurrent vulnerabilities, in many cases
with increasing damages, illustrate less-than-perfect adaptation of
systems to climatic variations and risks. There is some evidence that
the costs of adaptations to climatic conditions are growing (Burton,
1997; Etkin, 1998). There is strong evidence of a sharp increase in
damage costs of extreme climatic or weather events (Berz, 1999;
Bruce, 1999). Growing adaptation costs reflect, at least in part,
increases in populations and/ or improvements in standards of living,
with more disposable income being used to improve levels of comfort,
health, and safety in the short run. It is not clear whether the
expansion in adaptations is likely to be effective and sustainable in
71
the long run. In any event, although adaptations to changed and
variable climatic conditions are undertaken, they are not necessarily
effective or without costs.

Many adaptations to reduce vulnerability to climate change risks also

reduce vulnerability to current climate variability, extremes, and
hazards (El Shaer et al., 1996; Rayner & Malone, 1998). Measures
that are likely to reduce current sensitivity of climate variations in
Africa are also likely to reduce the threats of adverse impacts to
climate change (Ominde & Juna, 1991). Many analysts in less-
developed countries believe that the urgent need, in the face of both
climate change and climate variation, is to identify policies which
reduce recurrent vulnerability and increase resilience. Prescriptions
for reducing vulnerability span drought-proofing the economy,
stimulating economic diversification, adjusting land and water uses,
providing social support for dependent populations, and providing
financial instruments that spread the risk of adverse consequences
from individuals to society and over longer periods. For the near term,
development strategies should ensure that livelihoods are resilient to
a wide range of perturbations (Rayner & Malone, 1998).

Examples of current adaptation strategies in agriculture with clear

applications to climate change are given by Easterling (1996) and
Smit et al. (1997). They include moisture-conserving practices, hybrid
selection, and crop substitution. In the water resources sector,
Stakhiv (1996) shows how current managerial practices represent
useful adaptive strategies for climate change. Some analysts go
further to point out that certain adaptations to climate change not only
address current hazards but may be additionally beneficial for other
reasons (e.g.. no-regrets or win-win strategies) (Carter, 1996).

To what degree are societies likely to adapt autonomously to avoid

climate change damages? Some studies show faith in market
mechanisms and suggest considerable capacity of human systems to
adapt autonomously (Ausabel, 1991; Mendelsohn et al., 1996;
Mendelsohn & Neumann, 1999). Other studies highlight the
constraints of “optimal” autonomous adaptation, such as limited
72
information and access to resources, adaptation costs, and residual
damages. These studies emphasize the need for planned, especially
anticipatory, adaptations undertaken or facilitate by public agencies
(Smith et al., 1996; Reilly, 1998; Tol, 1998; Fankhauser et al., 1999;
Bryant et al., 2000; Schneider et al., 2000).

3.2.5 Adaptive capacity

Adaptive capacity is the potential or capability of a system to adapt (to
alter or better suit) climatic stimuli or their effects or impacts. It is the
ability of a system to adjust to climate change, including climate
variability and extremes, to moderate potential damages, to take
advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences (IPCC,
2001). Adaptive capacity can also be defined as the potential of
individuals, communities, and societies to be actively involved in the
processes of change, in order to minimize negative impacts and
maximize any benefits from changes in the climate (IDS, 2006;
Pettengel, 2010).

Adaptability is the ability, competency, or capacity of a system to

adapt to (to alter to better suit) climatic stimuli. This concept is
essentially synonymous with adaptive capacity.

Adaptive capacity is the potential or ability of a system, region, or

community to adapt to the effects or impacts of climate change.
Adaptive capacity is also considered to be the ability of famers and
rural communities to respond successfully and make adjustments to
climate variability and change by drawing on resources and
technologies (Brooks & Adger, 2005). In addition, adaptive capacity is
the ability to ameliorate the negative consequences of climate change
and take advantage of the positive changes. Adaptive capacity is
thought to be determined by technological ability, economic resources
and their distribution, and human, political and social capital (Tol et
al., 2004). Farmers’ capacities to respond to stress and uncertainty
depend on ownership or access to a wide range of resources such as
landholding size and soil quality, machinery and equipment, credit
and insurance, education and age, technical assistance and

73
information, social networking, and public support programs (Blaikie
et al., 1987; Ellis 2000; Scoones, 1998).

Adaptation depends greatly on the adaptive capacity or adaptability of

an affected system, region or community to cope with the impacts and
risks of climate change. The adaptive capacity of communities is
determined by their socio-economic characteristics. Enhancement of
adaptive capacity represents a practical means of coping with
changes and uncertainties in climate, including variability and
extremes. In this way, enhancement of adaptive capacity reduces
vulnerabilities and promotes sustainable development.

There are a host of factors that influence the adaptive capacity of

farmers and rural communities in the face of a wide range of hazards.
These determinants have been classified by scholars into two
categories, namely, generic and specific. Generic determinants
include education, income and health. Specific determinants to
particular impacts such as droughts and floods may relate to
institutions, knowledge and technology (Brooks et al., 2005; Downing,
2003; Tol & Yohe, 2007; Yohe et al., 2007). Other determinants of
adaptive capacity include demographic factors, dependence on
agriculture and natural ecosystems and resources, poverty and
inequality (Adger et al., 2003; Reid & Vogel, 2006). For example, the
low adaptive capacity of Africa is due largely to the extreme poverty of
many African rural communities.

Developing countries are the most vulnerable to climate change

impacts because they have fewer resources to adapt; socially,
technologically and financially (UN, 2007;UNFCCC, 2007).

Risk spreading is accomplished through kinship networks, pooled

community funds, insurance and disaster relief. In many cases the
capacity to adapt is increased through public sector assistance such
as extension services, education, community development projects
and access to subsidized credit. This underscores the role of
institutions and social networks.

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Societies have inherent capacities to adapt to climate change, but it is
important to note that these inherent capacities may not suffice in the
face of not so well understood threats and extreme climatic events,
implying the need to complement their capacities with planned
adaptive strategies. The adaptive capacity of societies is also
considered to depend on the ability to act collectively in the face of
threats posed by climate variability and change (Adger et al., 2003).

Numerous studies have pinpointed that institutions and their effective

functioning play a critical role in successful adaptation (Adger et al.,
2007; Reid & Vogel, 2006). It is, therefore, important to understand
the design and functioning of such institutions which include both
formal and informal institutions. For instance, Reid and Vogel (2006)
established that these institutions may be conceptualized as farmers
and local community groups, public and government institutions and
local organizations. Therefore, links to these institutions also shape
the adaptive capacity of a household. Also related to these institutions
are the enhanced communication of climate related information and
the development of social networks which can assist farmers when
there is higher probability of success in use of adaptation strategies
(NOAA, 1999; Stern & Easterling, 1999).

Distinguishing among the various decision-makers involved in

adaptation is important. The case of African agriculture and water
resources illustrates that stakeholders and potential adapters range
from vulnerable consumers to international organizations charged
with relief and research (Eele, 1996; Magadza, 1996; Downing et al.,
1997). Poor and landless households have limited resources, and
failure to adapt can lead to significant deprivation, displacement,
morbidity, and mortality. Subsistence farmers do not have the same
adaptation options as commercial producers. Water supply
adaptations may involve landowners, private traders and local, local
authorities, water-dependent businesses, national governments, and
international organizations. Each stakeholder has distinct interests,
information, risks, and resources and hence would consider distinct
types of adaptive responses (Downing et al., 1997).

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Determinants of Adaptive Capacity
Adaptation to climate change and risks takes place in a dynamic
social, economic, technological, biophysical, and political context that
varies over time, location, and sector. This complex mix of conditions
determines the capacity of systems to adapt. The main features of
communities or regions that seem to determine their adaptive
capacity include economic wealth, technology, information and skills,
infrastructure, institutions, and equity.

Economic resources
Whether it is expressed as the economic assets, capital resources,
financial means, wealth, or poverty, the economic condition of nations
and groups clearly is a determinant of adaptive capacity (Burton et al.,
1998; Kates, 2000). Wealthy communities and nations are better
prepared to bear the costs of adaptation to climate change impacts
and risks than poorer societies (Goklany, 1995; Burton, 1996). It is
also recognized that poverty is directly related to vulnerability (Chan &
Parker, 1996; Fankhauser & Tol, 1997; Rayner & Malone, 1998).
Although poverty should not be considered synonymous with
vulnerability, it is “a rough indicator of the ability to cope” (Dow, 1992).

Bohle et al. (1994) state that, by definition, it usually is the poor who
are most vulnerable to famine, malnutrition, and hunger. An example
is the situation in India in which pastoralist communities are locked
into a vulnerable situation in part because of a lack of financial power
that would allow them to diversify and engage in other sources of
income. At a local level, Pelling (1998) concludes that the highest
levels of household vulnerability in coastal Guyana also are
characterized by low household incomes in conjunction with poor
housing quality and little community organization. Neighbourhoods
with higher levels of income are better able to manage vulnerability
through the transfer of flood impacts from health to economic
investment and loss. Kelly and Adger (1999) demonstrate the
influence of poverty on a region’s coping capacity. Poor regions tend
to have less diverse and more restricted entitlements and a lack of
empowerment to adapt. There is ample evidence that poorer nations
76
and disadvantaged groups within nations are especially vulnerable to
disasters (Banuri, 1998; Munasinghe, 2000).

Poverty, more than any other factors, determines vulnerability to

climate change and limits adaptive capacity. First, people living in
poverty tend to rely on climate-sensitive resources as the basis of
their livelihoods. As highlighted by the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (2005), most of the world’s 2.7 billion poor people
depend on natural resources (water, forests, seas, soil, biodiversity,
etc.) for survival and economic development (Oxfam, 2010). But the
environment and the world’s natural resources are already being
substantially degraded and increasingly being affected by changes in
the climate. Secondly, poverty means people have few assets to fall
back on in times of increased hardship, including little or no savings,
and generally limited access to credit. Poverty can lock people into
livelihoods by limiting access to information or opportunities to
develop new skills; limiting access to methods of spreading risk, such
as insurance; or through lack of opportunity in terms of making the
investments needed to improve output and maintain viability. Finally,
people living in poverty are often forced to occupy the least productive
or most disaster-prone lands, suc as flood plains, slums, eroding
hillsides, and low lying and unprotected coastal areas. Under these
already difficult conditions, even modest changes of climate hazards
will quickly push households and communities beyond their abilities to
cope.

Technology
Lack of technology has the potential to seriously impede a nation or
community’s ability to implement adaptation options by limiting the
range of possible responses (Secharaga & Grambsch, 1998).
Adaptive capacity is likely to vary, depending on availability and
access to technology at various levels (e.g. warning systems,
protective structures, crop breeding and irrigation, settlement and
relocation or redesign, flood control measures, etc.). Hence, a
community’s current level of technology and its ability to develop
technologies are important determinants of adaptive capacity.
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Moreover, opennesss to the development and utilization of new
technologies for sustainable extraction, use, and development of
natural resources is key to strengthening adaptive capacity (Goklany,
1995). For example, in the context of Asian agriculture and the impact
of future climate change, Iglesias et al. (1996) note that the
development of heat-resistant rice cultivars will be especially crucial.
Regions with the ability to develop technology have enhanced
adaptive capacity.

Information and skills

Successful adaptation requires a recognition of the necessity to
adapt, knowledge about available options, the capacity to assess
them, and the ability to implement the most suitable ones
(Fankhauser and Tol, 1997). Lack of trained and skilled personnel
can limit a nation’s ability to implement adaptation options (Scheraga
and Grambsch, 1998). In general, countries with higher levels of
stored human knowledge are considered to have greater adaptive
capacity than developing nations and those with economies in
transition (Smith and Lenhart, 1996). Magalhaes (1996) includes
illiteracy along with poverty as a key determinant of adaptive capacity
in northeast Brazil. Such findings have prompted Gupta (1997) to
conclude that it is important, therefore, to ensure that systems are in
place for the dissemination of climate change information locally,
nationally and regionally and that there are forums for discussion and
innovation of adaptation strategies at various levels.

Although communities are aware that weather patterns have

changed, they are not always aware of exactly which factors have
changed. For example, where rainfall patterns and temperatures have
changed, it might be only the change in rainfall patterns that is
obvious. These changes are often attributed to factors such as
deforestation, an ‘act of God’, or some other locally caused problem
(Pettengell, 2010). By linking these observations with information
about emerging local trends, global climate change, and local

78
impacts, individuals and communities can be empowered to make the
transformative actions necessary for them to adapt. Without this input,
they continue to rely on unsustainable and often damaging coping
strategies, assuming (or simply hoping) that ‘things will be better next
year’. Instead, negative trends continue and assets and resources
become further depleted, perpetuating a cycle of poverty. Awareness
raising in general, and climate- and weather-specific information in
particular, enable people to respond appropriately to current variability
and expected changes over time.

Generating this information requires investment at the national level,

where meteorological services are under-resourced in most
developing countries. The demand for climate information will occur at
multiple levels. Everyone from policy makers to subsistence farmers
needs accurate information that is relevant to the decisions they have
to make. This information must satisfy two requirements. Firstly, it
must be tailored to the different needs of different groups of people,
and secondly, those people have to receive it. National policy makers
and local planners might require different information over different
planning timeframes, one to allocate forward-looking budgets and one
to implement short-term planning initiatives or identify vulnerable
communities for urgent action. Communities themselves might require
different information again, like early warning for extreme weather
events, or seasonal forecasts. Participatory processes can help to
generate an understanding of the kinds of information needed at the
local level, as well as the best way to communicate it.

Communicating the information in a timely and accessible manner

may require addressing barriers such as lack of infrastructure,
different local languages, and differentiated access (i.e. which people
have access to a television, internet, a notice board or a radio).
Communities in remote locations are particularly vulnerable and could
be excluded through factors such as lack of electricity, roads, or high
rates of illiteracy. Information is most accessible when communicated
in the local language and in a medium that is culturally appropriate
but ensures that everyone has access. For example, women can be

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excluded if information is shared in public spheres to which they do
not have access.

Agricultural extension services are well placed to provide relevant

information to rural communities, but currently climate change
awareness within extension services often do not reach marginalized
areas, or men and women equally. Therefore, using this medium
would also require investment and prioritization. Adopting innovative
methods of communication from disaster risk reduction (DRR) early
warning schemes, such as using mobile phone alerts, could also be
useful tools to complement wider services.

Infrastructure
Adaptive capacity is likely to vary with social infrastructure (Toman &
Bierbaum, 1996). At the community level, Pelling (1997) notes that
the lack of flexibility in formal housing areas where dwelling form and
drainage infrastructure are more fixed reduces the capacity to
respond to contemporary environmental conditions.

Institutions
O’Riordan and Jordan (1999) describe the role of institutions as “a
means for holding society together, giving it sense and purpose and
enabling it to adapt”. In general, countries with well-developed social
institutions are considered to have greater adaptive capacity than
those with less efficient institutional arrangements (Smith & Lenhart,
1996). The role of inadequate institutional support is frequently cited
in the literature as a hindrance to adaptation. Kelly and Adger (1999)
show how institutional constraints limit entitlements and access to
resources for communities in coastal Vietnam and thereby increase
vulnerability. Huq et al. (1999) demonstrate that Bangladesh is
particularly vulnerable to climate change, especially in areas of food
production, settlements and human life. This reflects serious
constraints on adaptive capacity in the existing institutional
arrangements which is not conducive to ease the hardships of the
people. Due to inherent institutional deficiencies and weaknesses in
managerial capacities to cope with anticipated natural events, it would
80
be extremely difficult for the country to reduce vulnerability to climate
change (Ahmed et al., 1999). The case of Latin America provides a
good example in which the presence of inconsistent and unstable
agricultural policies has increased the vulnerability of the food
production sector. Drastic changes in economic and policy conditions
are expected to make agricultural systems more vulnerable to climate
change. Magadza (2000) shows how adaptation options in southern
Africa are precluded by political and institutional inefficiencies and
resulting inequities.

It is generally held that established institutions in developed countries

not only facilitate management of contemporary climate-related risks
but also provide an institutional capacity to help deal with the risks
associated with future climate change.

Equity
It is frequently argued that adaptive capacity will be greater if social
institutions and arrangements governing the allocation of power and
access to resources within a community, nation, or the globe assure
that access to resources is equally distributed (Ribot et al., 1996;
Mustafa, 1998; Adger, 1999; Handmer et al., 1999; Kelly and Adger,
1999; Rayner & Malone, 1999; Toth, 1999). The extent to which
nations or communities are “entitled” to draw on resources greatly
influences their adaptive capacity and their ability to cope (Kelly &
Adger, 1999). Some people regard the adaptive capacity of a system
as a function of not only the availability of resources but also of
access to those resources by decision makers and vulnerable sub-
sectors of a population (Kelly & Adger, 1999). In the case of
technological innovation, Cyert and Kumar (1996) show that
differential distribution of information within an organization can
impose constraints on adaptation strategies. Differentiation in
demographic variables such as age, gender, ethnicity, educational
attainment, and health are often cited in the literature as being related
to the ability to cope with risk (Chan & Parker, 1996; Burton et al.,
1998; Scheraga & Grambsch, 1998). Bohle et al., (1994) document
variable vulnerability to climatic variations of groups in Zimbabwe and
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its association with poverty, the macro-political economy, and
inequitable land distribution. Not only are conditions for adaptive
capacity diverse, they also behave differently in different countries
and regions, particularly depending on the level of development.
These determinants represent conditions that constrain or enhance
the adaptive capacity and hence the vulnerability of regions, nations,
and communities.

Participation
Due to the location-specific context of climate change impacts and
vulnerability, adaptation design and implementation is needed at the
local level to be successful. Those whose livelihoods and resources
are threatened by climate change are key to identifying their problems
and designing effective solutions, drawing on their wealth of skills and
local knowledge. Active participation by local communities in their
own adaptation efforts increases human security and ensures that
other processes that impact on adaptive capacity can be identified.
These processes include different roles and responsibilities within
communities, such as women’s unpaid work in care giving and
household labour, which are often overlooked. Good development
practice shows that cultural appropriateness, ease of use, ownership
and engagement, and impacts on labour or roles and responsibilities,
directly affect uptake of activities; and the same is true for adaptation.

Though the merits of participatory processes are widely accepted and

articulated in development practice, key groups are often overlooked.
This can simply reinforce existing inequalities and marginalization,
and is not conducive to effective adaptation for the most vulnerable.
Lessons from other processes include promoting women’s needs and
perspectives through more active roles for women and their
organizations in discussions and decision making, encouraging
balanced representation of women and men in all processes, and
using the knowledge and specialized skills of women in the design
and implementation of adaptation strategies. The private sector is
another key group that is often overlooked, through dual roles in
terms of addressing unsustainable practices that lead to land
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degradation (such as monocultures, mining, logging, etc.) and
investing in developing solutions (e.g. by developing more drought-,
flood-, and heat-tolerant crop varieties).

A national enabling environment

Climate change is a new and additional burden that developing
countries are facing. Existing investment will not be sufficient to adapt
to the range and scale of climate change impacts that countries face.
International finance that is adequate and predictable is required
urgently by developing countries to support or begin their process of
adapting to climate change. The location-specific nature of adaptation
is clear, which means that international finance should not be
prescriptive. Governments will need the flexibility to respond to their
particular national and local needs, but a focus must be placed on
reaching the most vulnerable.

Considerable investment is required in the institutions, processes and

people needed to deliver adaptation. Capacity building includes
increasing understanding at all levels (bottom-up and top-down) about
the problems climate change is causing, the processes by which
services are delivered, barriers to access, and differentiated needs.
Effective participatory processes require investments of time, skills,
and resources, as well as coordination, prioritization and institutional
capacity at the national level. Coordination bodies for adaptation to
climate change are being established in some countries, North and
South. These tend to focus on coordinating national adaptation
planning processes and research, through collaboration across
government departments, local communities, civil society, the private
sector, and academia.

Lessons drawn from National Action Plans (NAPs) under the United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) show that
national coordinating bodies are seldom successful unless they are
appropriately resourced, possess high level political backing, and are
representative. Planning processes led by government ministries
(rather than a cross-ministry approach) tend to be sidelined by other

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departments and sectors. Planning processes that are participatory
and that include key government ministries and stakeholders,
especially those that deliver directly to communities such as local
government and civil society, are more likely to be responsive to local
needs. Lessons from National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
process emphasize this importance, with many examples of lack of
ownership hampering implementation.

Local government services, as the level closest to communities

vulnerable to climate change, are key to enabling adaptation. But
generally, there has been far too little investment in mechanisms and
institutions for effective decentralized decision making, community
consultation, monitoring and evaluation, and lobbying of central
government for resources. When it works well, decentralized policy
making and service provision are more sensitive to local needs and
more accountable to the people they serve. But this is not always the
case when powerful elites control local resources

Many governments have processes in place to support decentralized

ways of working, including legislation and institutional structures.
However, existing structure tend to be hierarchical and do not lead to
participatory approaches, which are central to effective DRR and
adaptation

Enhancing/ strengthening adaptive capacity

Recognition of the nature of adaptation at community level is vital to
ensuring that adaptive capacity is effective. Many vulnerabilities to
future climates will be related to existing vulnerabilities. Community-
based vulnerability assessments therefore need to develop and raise
awareness of the potential limits of traditional coping mechanisms,
and hence identify where there is a risk that will fail under climate
change. Much action on adaptation may then be dominated by
adjusting or replacing coping mechanisms and developing alternative
livelihood strategies. This process will most often sit within the
broader action on poverty reduction and sustainable development.
Hence, most adaptation at community level will be autonomous and

84
remain indistinguishable among the myriad social, demographic and
economic influences on development (Adger et al., 2003). Within this
process, however, effective strategies and policies need to be in
place at higher levels to ensure that adaptive capacities needed are
available locally and enable change.

According to Munasinghe and Swart (2005), attributes of adaptive

capacity needed to incorporate climate change adaptation into
community-based development include the following.

(1) Availability of information and skills. People can use

information about vulnerability and the nature of climate change in
devising new risk management and livelihood strategies. Skills are
needed to use this information effectively in planning and facilitating
community-level projects, and in adapting and applying technologies.
Information and skills need to be supported by access to appropriate
education and training.

(2) Effective institutions. Communities benefit from access to

support and services provided by well-organized institutions with
flexible and appropriate policies in place in government, research,
education, civil society and the private sector. Effective community-
based organizations are key to informing and mobilizing local
communities and assisting them in incorporating adaptation into
development activities. Adaptation can be hindered by poorly
developed institutions. Strong, well-organized institutions
characterized by stable and effective policy arrangements can
support adaptation activities more easily.

(3) Access to technology. Many adaptation approaches involve use

of technologies, such as protective designs for buildings and homes,
flood control structures, early warning systems and crop breeding.
Access to these technologies, or the ability to develop them in a way
suitable to local circumstances, is one of the key factors underpinning
the adaptive capacity of a community. Farmers may need new
technologies for storing water, improving drainage and conserving
soil. Capacity to develop and adapt technologies to local needs
85
increases adaptation options and enables local enterprise
development.

(4) Economic resources. Increasing incomes and improving access

to financial means is likely to give poor people more options for
coping with climate change impacts. Ability to adapt is therefore
strengthened by, for example, access to micro-credit schemes,
development of markets and local enterprise development to open
new livelihood options that are resilient to climate change.

(5) Infrastructure. Adaptive capacity depends on the strengths and

weaknesses of physical infrastructure of a region or community. For
example, building developments in low-lying coastal areas or
dependency on climate-sensitive energy sources decrease the
adaptive capacity of communities.

(6) Equitable access to resources. Adaptive capacity not only

depends on the availability of resources, but also on the equitable
access of individuals and communities to those resources. In this
context, it is important to note that, rather than enhancing adaptive
capacity for poor countries, efforts may focus on enhancing adaptive
capacity for the poor communities in those countries.

Smit et al. (2001) also draw a list from the literature which highlights
specific actions for enhancing adaptive capacity, which also generally
help development. The list is as follows:

(1) Improve access to resources.

(2) Reduce poverty.

(3) Lower unequal distribution of resources and wealth among

groups.

(4) Improve education and information.

(5) Improve infrastructure.

(6) Diminish intergenerational inequities.

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 (7) Respect accumulated local experiences.

(8) Moderate long-standing structural inequities.

(9) Assure that responsive are comprehensive and integrative,

not just technical.

(10) Ensure active participation by concerned parties.

(11) Improve institutional capacity and efficiency.

More concrete recommendations would depend on local resources

and other circumstances. Nevertheless, the list makes clear the fact
that most ways of enhancing adaptive capacity are, in fact, also ways
of promoting development and equity. Only in a few specific cases
would enhancing adaptive capacity be an action targeting vulnerability
to climate change alone.

Autonomous adaptation needs to be backed up by explicit planning of

adaptation where there are vulnerabilities with high priority, but lack of
skills, technologies and social capital are barriers to change on the
scale and in the time required. For example, in a community living on
a riverbank that is experiencing increased frequency of damaging
floods, incremental change to coping strategies and livelihoods may
be too slow to adequately protect the community. A community-based
project would then help to organize the community to plan explicit
action that reduces vulnerability, such as perhaps moving the
community, raising homes or stabilizing the riverbank. Similarly,
explicit planning of adaptation may be needed if abrupt or rapid
impacts from climate change are forecast. Community-based
adaptation may not be feasible for large-scale impacts, which may
require planned responses at national and regional levels, or by the
private sector, especially if new costly infrastructure is required, such
as the construction of coastal defenses or river channel engineering.
Attention is also needed to identify where strengthening of adaptive
capacity and resilience may fail to achieve adaptation and therefore
where plans are needed for moving populations or communities to
safer locations.
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The adaptive capacity of a system (community, nation or region) is
likely to be greater when the following conditions are met: (1) The
system has a stable and prosperous economy. Regardless of
biophysical vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, developed
and wealthy systems are better prepared to bear the costs of
adaptation than systems in developing countries (Goklany, 1995;
Burton, 1996). (2) There is a high degree of access to technology at
various levels (i.e. from local to national) and in all sectors (Burton,
1996). Moreover, openness development of natural resources is key
to strengthening adaptive capacity (Goklany, 1995). (3) The roles and
responsibilities for implementation of adaptation strategies are well
delineated (4) Systems are in place for the dissemination of climate
change and adaptation information and there are forums for the
discussion and innovation of adaptation at various levels (Gupta &
Hisschemoller, 1997). (5) Social institutions and arrangements
governing the allocation of power and access to resources within the
nation, region, or community assure that access to resources is
equitably distributed because the presence of power differentials can
contribute to reduced adaptive capacity (Mustafa, 1998; Handmer, et
al., 1999; Kelly & Adger, 1999). (6) Existing systems with high
adaptive capacity are not compromised. For example, in the case of
traditional or indigenous societies, pursuit of Western/ European-style
development trajectories may reduce adaptive capacity by introducing
greater technology dependence and higher density settlement and by
devaluing traditional ecological knowledge and cultural values. (7) At
the local level, establishment of social institutions and arrangements
that discourage the concentration of power in a few hands and
prevent marginalizations of sections of the local population (Mustafa,,
1998) should be in place. Arrangements need to consider
representatives of decision-making bodies and maintenance of
flexibility in the functioning of local institutions (Ramakrishnan, 1998).
(8) Encouragement of diversification of income sources (and therefore
risk-spreading), particularly for poorer sectors of society (Wang’ati,
1996; Adger & Kelly, 1999). (9) Encouragement of formal or informal
arrangements for collective security (Kelly & Adger, 1999). (10)
Identification and prioritization of local adaptation measures and
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provision of feedback to higher levels of government. These efforts
would have to be reinforced by the adequate provision of knowledge,
technology, policy, and financial support (Ahmed et al., 1999).

3.2.6 Economic evaluation of climate change adaptation projects

As assessments of climate impacts (commonly measured as “costs”
that include damages and benefits) increasingly have incorporated
expected adaptations, and particularly as impact models and
“integrated assessments” models. These assessments have shown
the potential of adaptation to offset the initial impact costs, and
interest has grown in calculating the costs of autonomous
adaptations. Whether climate change or another climate stimulus is
expected to have problematic or “dangerous” impacts depends on the
adaptations and their costs (Leary, 1999). Climate change impact
cost studies that assume adaptation also should include the
“adjustment of costs” of these adaptations (Reilly, 1998).

Tol and Fankhauser (1997) provide a comprehensive summary of

analyses of the costs of autonomous, mainly (but not exclusively)
reactive adaptations, undertaken privately (i.e. not adaptation policies
of government). A common basis for evaluating impact costs is to
sum adaptation costs and residual damage costs (Fankhauser, 1996;
Rothman et al., 1998). Procedures for defining and calculating such
adaptation costs are the subject of an ongoinjg debate. Tol and
Frankhauser (1997) note that most approaches consider equilibrium
adaptation costs but ignore transition costs. Hurd et al. (1997) include
market and non-market adaptation in their assessment of impact
costs. Most research to date on adaptation costs is limited to
particular economic measures of well-being (Brown, 1998). Any
comprehensive assessment of adaptation costs (including benefits)
would consider not only economic criteria but also social welfare and
equity (Smit & Pilifosova, 2001).

Analysis of investment costs is relevant for evaluating adaptation

costs at the project level for the short term at local scales.
Determining the investment costs of adaptation projects involves

89
addressing a broad range of questions, some of which were listed by
Munasinghe & Swart (2005) as follows:

(1) Adaptation to what?

(2) How to adapt?

(3) When, how much, and in what form to adapt? (World Bank,
2010; Munasinghe & Swart, 2005)

(4) Who pays?

(5) What would have happened without adaptation?

(6) What are the costs and benefits unrelated to climate change
response?

The answer to the first question adaptation to what?, depends on

local circumstances: One may have to adapt to changing
temperatures, sea-level rise, or changes in precipitation or water
availability. Options for how to adapt?, can be very broad-ranging,
such as protection (e.g. sea-walls against sea-level rise);
accommodation (e.g. adjust lifestyles to a changing climate); retreat
or migration (e.g. to higher elevations because of sea-level rise); or
adjustment (e.g. shifting to other crop varieties). Clearly, adaptation is
not limited to conventional projects, but can involve a broad variety of
actions, e.g. behavioural adjustments of households, firms or
institutions, management changes, legal measures to enforce
adaptation regulations, information campaigns, etc. Some of these
actions can be costed relatively easily; others pose difficulties.

The question when to adapt?, is important from an economic point of

view. Here, the issue of no-regrets options is significant: those
measures that would have benefits even without would have not net
additional costs from a climate change perspective, and there may be
no clear reason to postpone the implementation of such options.

Two types of situations in agriculture, for example, can be termed “no-

regret” investments (World Bank, 2010). Adaptation in agriculture
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entails sustaining rural development in the context of risks from a
changing climate. However, many, if not most, of the needed
investments and other activities will also bring other benefits,
irrespective of how much the climate changes. In other words, actions
identified as good risk management strategies for adaptation to
climate change also can be valuable parts of broader strategies that
benefit livelihoods and “mitigate” other risks. First, adaptation
investments could increase resilience to current climate variability,
while also preparing for a future increase in variability due to climate
change. Second, many responses will have benefits beyond
managing climate risks (e.g. improving water-use efficiency in areas
that are already water-scarce due to non-climatic pressures, such
increased water demand from different sectors). In both cases, these
adaptations are referred to as “no-regret” investments (World Bank,
2010). Examples of no-regret adaptation responses in agriculture
include:

 Improving access to new crop varieties and other factors of

production, which can help farmers improve overall production
and better manage risks from droughts and floods.

 Enhancing resilience of the resource base to extreme climate

events through conservation agricultural practices that protect
soils against runoff and erosion, promote biodiversity and
conserve water.

 Modernizing irrigation systems, which can increase water-use

efficiency, bring greater flexibility to water delivery for
agriculture, and help farmers diversify and better manage
climatic risks.

 Improving coordination around the containment and

management of invasive alien species, which is needed for
managing both current risks from invasive species and for
building the capacity to cope with an expected increase in this
risk with climate change.

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  Creating opportunities for rural livelihood diversification, which
can then lead to increased economic security and less reliance
on climate-sensitive agricultural activities.

Decision makers have choices about when to invest as well as how

much and in what form? When making such a decision, a key issue
regarding the timing of adaptation interventions is the evaluation of
benefits and costs over time. Standard economic net present value
(NPV) analysis discounts future costs and benefits to a common base
year using a specified discount rate. Numerous debates exist with
respect to the choice of this discount rate in project assessment.
Conceptually, one seeks a discount rate that reflects the social
opportunity cost of capital (Bosello et al., 2007).

When to adapt/ invest also depends on the time profile of benefits.

Soft adaptation projects may yield the greater share of their benefits
over a relatively short term (a few years). Investments in infrastructure
that have a somewhat longer economic life (e.g. 10-30 years) may
also deliver the greatest benefit in the near term. Where such
investments have high co-benefits in reducing a current adaptation
deficit, the argument for more rapid investment is further
strengthened.

Deciding how much to adapt now, versus waiting to do more in the

future, also depends on difficult evaluation trade-offs related to
uncertainty. In particular, waiting can deliver a benefit from gaining
additional information on the impacts of climate change and the
options for ameliorating those impacts. However, the magnitude of
this benefit is uncertain and needs to be weighed against the cost of
delaying adaptation. For example, in circumstances where the
impacts of climate change or increased climate variability pose
serious threats to the livelihoods of whole communities, an adaptation
measure implemented now might give the affected population the
possibility of remaining in place versus the need to relocate when
climate change hits hard in the future. On the other hand, large
commitments of fixed capital to adaptation-oriented infrastructure

92
investments may foreclose options to pursue more gradual or
different types of adaptation in the future.

For adaptation options with a positive cost, the discount factor used is
an important consideration. Moreover, there is the question of
uncertainty and weighting of future information. If climatic change
would not materialize in the projected way, the investment costs may
be wasted. If there would be a chance that increasing knowledge may
reduce uncertainties about future climate change, it would be rational
to postpone adaptation investments. However, there are also large
uncertainties about the possibility that uncertainties about crucial
factors (e.g. local or regional climatic changes) would or would not be
resolved adequately in the future.

The next question is who pays? Autonomous adaptation is generally

considered costless. However, this assumption may be questioned,
since no adaptation would take place without human choices, which
usually entail some form of costs. A full cost-benefit analysis would
take costs for both autonomous and planned adaptations into account
as they are incurred by the various stakeholders.

What would have happened without adaptation? Which part of the

project costs should be attributed to climate change would vary per
option. Many investments, including climate change adaptation, may
lead to only small cost increments, but for other projects, climate
change adaptation may be the prime mover. Ideally, this question
also addresses impacts or damage avoided by the project. Valuing
impacts is a difficult job, as it can include different categories of
values: use value (direct use values such as food, biomass,
recreation and health; indirect use values such as ecological
functions, flood control or storm protection; or option values such as
biodiversity or conserved habitats), and non-use values (such as
habitats or endangered species). Decreasing tangibility of value to
individuals decreases from direct use values to indirect use values to
option values and non-use values. Valuation also becomes more
difficult and controversial and is included less often in analyses, as
you move in this direction (See Munasinghe & Swart, 2005, for some
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valuation techniques). A related question is: which costs and benefits
does the project imply for issues other than climate change?
Generally, the costs and benefits of a project are very much
dependant on the boundaries selected for the analysis (i.e. what is
taken into account and what is not).

The World Bank (2010) has outlined some nine basic steps for
project-level economic evaluation of adaptation. They are as follows:

(1). Develop information on relevant climate risks for the project area
and specify the temporal horizons for the analysis, clarifying, in
particular, the extent to which the focus of intervention is on dealing
with increasing climate variability and extremes, or longer term
changes in mean values.

(2). Assess several possible without-project scenarios by estimating

the impacts of different climate variability/ climate change projections
on agricultural productivity and other relevant measures of output and
benefit.

(3). Identify the types of adaptation projects (e.g. stand-alone or

integrated with a broader development project), and possible
adaptation measures (soft/hard) that the project could support and
implement.

(4). Estimate potential reductions in projected productivity losses (i.e.

adaptation benefits) in with-project situations, under the same multiple
scenarios used for examining the without-project case.

(5). Quantitatively and qualitatively assess, as appropriate, any co-

benefits and negative spillovers that the project may bring about
compared to a non-project situation. Stakeholder consultations may
be particularly useful at this step.

(6). Consider opportunities that the project may create in the future
(i.e. through knowledge development or capacity building), as well as
any options that the implementation of the project may destroy, and

94
the effects that the project may have on autonomous adaptation and
adaptive capacity.

(7). Attempt some economic estimation of future options maintained

or lost.

(8). Assess how different alternative project options perform under

different climate scenarios, based on estimated adaptation costs and
benefits from previous steps.

(9). “Stress-test” the project to identify particular investments and soft

adaptation initiatives whose benefits are particularly vulnerable to
changes in conditions, and investigate potential project modifications
that can reduce vulnerability to climate and other future shocks.

Finally, the criteria used for doing the analysis and comparing projects
alternatives determine the ranking of projects. A multi-criteria analysis
that takes into account other factors than monetary costs is likely to
lead to a different outcome than an analysis that takes into account
only direct monetary costs.

Cost estimation for autonomous adaptations is not only important for

impact assessment; it is also a necessary ingredient for evaluations of
policy initiatives, with respect to both adaptation and mitigation
(Rayner & Malone, 1998; Leary, 1999; Smit et al., 2000). Estimates of
the costs of adaptation in developing countries point to a scale of
finance of the order of US$50 billion to US$150 billion a year (Oxfam,
2010).

New funds targeted at adaptation to climate change in developing

countries were announced in 2001. Three Marrakech Funds were
established (Huq & Reid, 2004; Munasinghe & Swart, 2005). These
were (i) The LDC Fund, to enable the LDCs to develop NAPAs and to
identify priority adaptation actions for further funding; (ii) The Special
Climate Change (SCC) Fund, to finance projects on adaptation (and
mitigation), including capacity building and technology transfer in
energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste
management, with special attention given to economic diversification
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in countries highly dependent on exports of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and
natural gas); and (iii) The Adaptation Fund, to support ‘concrete
adaptation’ actions in developing countries party to the Kyoto
Protocol.

The LDC and SCC Funds were established under the UNFCCC and
are operated by the Global Environment Facility. Contributions to
these funds by industrialized countries are voluntary. The Adaptation
Fund was established under the Kyoto Protocol and is funded through
a 2 per cent levy on the proceeds of CDM (Clean Development
Mechanism) transactions, applied in effect by reducing the Certified
Emissions Reductions transferred to the investor. Although not
applied to CDM projects in LDCs, the levy has been criticized
because it places the CDM, and thus developing countries, relative to
emissions trading. In addition to the Marrakech Funds, the GEF has
an adaptation action program aimed at funding priority adaptation
actions in developing countries (Huq & Reid, 2004).

Governments of developed countries pledged to contribute US$410

million per year from 2005-2008 to fund adaptation actions, through
the Marrakech Funds, the GEF or bilateral and multilateral
development assistance (Smith, 2006; UNFCCC, 2006)). This is a
small fraction of the true level of financing that will be needed for
adaptation, given, for example, that the cost of protecting just the
coast of Tanzania against sea-level rise has been put at US$15 billion
(Simms et al., 2004). The amount pledged is also dwarfed the US$73
billion that developed countries spend annually on fossil-fuel
subsidies. Under the Marrakech Funds of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto
Protocol, funding is only available for actions to adapt to future
climate change and not for adaptation to current climate variability,
even though the most effective adaptation will benefit both. Under the
Global Environment Facility (GEF), only added costs needed to
provide ‘global environmental benefits’ are eligible for funding, even
though most adaptation is local.

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Co-benefits between adaptation and development are missed by
other donors because adaptation funded is separated from official
development assistance. Adaptation is treated as a narrow, discrete
activity that sits apart from poverty reduction, instead of an integrated
process of building adaptive capacity and resilience in communities.

To date, long-term financing proposals at international financing

agreements fall far short by at least 50%; have no source or
commitment of shares by developed countries; and do not mention
how finance will be divided between adaptation and mitigation. Much
of the short-term finance is to be met through loans and existing aid
finance diverted from other priorities, such as health and education, to
climate change. In the absence of comprehensive national plans and
appropriate levels of international and national finance, governments
and their services are simply not geared to respond to the challenges
of climate change facing the communities they serve.

Current funding structures are thus a barrier to effective adaptation. A

much more flexible, pragmatic approach to funding adaptation is
needed that facilitates the integration of adaptation into all relevant
development activities. Climate justice, and the ‘polluter pays
principle’, demands that industrialized countries are liable for the
damage caused by greenhouse gas pollution. Therefore countries in
the North are responsible for ensuring that effective funding
mechanisms and adequate finance are available to pay the costs of
adaptation in developing countries (Smith, 2006).

Developing countries have already lost between 2 and 15 percent of

their GDP to climate change disasters between 1990 and 2000
(World Bank, 2004), so there is an urgent need for disaster risk
reduction (DRR) to engage with climate change.

3.2.7 Adaptation and Sustainable Development

Sustainable development and adaptation to climate change are
interlinked. The great majority of sustainable development strategies
are not related to climate change, but they could make adaptation
more successful. Similarly, many climate change adaptation policies
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certainly will make development more sustainable (Munasinghe &
Swart, 2005). Climate change impacts and adaptation are part of the
larger question of how complex social, economic, and environmental
subsystems interact and shape the prospects for sustainable
development. Economic development affects ecosystem balance and,
in turn, is affected by the state of the ecosystem.

It is rather difficult to separate the analysis of adaptation and its costs

and benefits from broader development issues. Adaptation decisions
are unlikely to be taken for reasons of climate change alone. Taking
into account the economic, social, and ecological components of
sustainable development, there are three distinct objectives of
adaptation. Adaptation must be (a) economically efficient; (b) able to
advance social goals; and (c) environmentally sustainable (Burton &
Lim, 2001). Adaptation measures are likely to be implemented only if
they are consistent with, or integrated with, decisions or programs
that address non-climatic stresses (McCarthy et al., 2001).
Alternatively, the additional stress of climate change may be dwarfed
by other political, economic, social, or cultural forces. Measures
enhancing adaptive capacity and advancing sustainable development
can go hand in hand.

Poor regions, characterized by low levels of technological advances,

poor information availability, weak institutions, low educational levels,
and unequal access to resources, are generally highly vulnerable, i.e.
have low adaptive capacity. Poor communities and countries have
demonstrated that they can cope with climate extremes and other
natural hazards, but usually the toll in terms of human suffering and
economic costs has been very high (Munasinghe & Swart, 2005).
Enhancing the ability to cope with future climate changes is likely to
enhance the ability to cope with current climate variability and
extreme weather events, and in this sense constitutes a ‘no regrets’
option because of its immediate benefits. It is for these reasons that
adaptation is a particularly important issue for developing countries.

Enhancement of adaptive capacity involves similar requirements as

promotion of sustainable development. The requirements include: (1)
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Improved access to resources (Ribot et al., 1996; Kelly & Adger,
1999; Kates, 2000); (2) Reduction of poverty (Berke, 1995; Eele,
1996; Karim, 1996; Kates, 2000); (3) Lowering of inequities in
resources and wealth among groups (Berke, 1995; Torvanger, 1998);
(4) Improved education and information (Zhao, 1996); (5) Improved
infrastructure (Magalhaes & Glantz, 1992; Ribot et al., 1996); (6)
Diminished intergenerational inequities (Berke, 1995; Munasinghe,
2000); (7) Respect for accumulated local experience (Primo, 1996);
(8) Active participation by concerned parties, especially to ensure that
actions match local needs and resources (Berke, 1995; Ribot et al.,
1996; Rayner & Malone, 1998; Ramakrishnan, 1999); (8) Improved
institutional capacity and efficiency (Handmer et al., 1999; Magadza,
2000).

Since actions taken without reference to climate have the potential to

affect vulnerability to it, enhancement of adaptive capacity to climate
change can be regarded as just one component of broader
sustainable development initiatives (Ahmad & Ahmed, 2000;
Munasinghe, 2000; Robinson & Herbert, 2000). Hazards associated
with climate change have the potential to undermine progress with
sustainable development (Berke, 1995; Wang’ati, 1996). Therefore, it
is important for sustainable development initiatives to explicitly
consider hazards and risks associated with climate change (Apuuli et
al., 2000).

Clearly, adaptive capacity to deal with climate risks is closely related

to sustainable development and equity. Enhancement of adaptive
capacity is fundamental to sustainable development. Planned
adaptation can contribute to equity considerations of sustainable
development. In the context of African agriculture, Downing et al.
(1997) conclude that enhancement of present resource management
activities is necessary to prepare for potential impacts of climate
change. In Malawi, as in many other places, objectives to ensure that
food production is not threatened, and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner, are central to
national development policies (Theu et al., 1996). Thus, progress to

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reducing vulnerability to climate risks is consistent to a nation’s
planning and development initiatives.

3.2.8 Future adaptations

In order to predict autonomous adaptations and provide input to
adaptation policies, there is a need for improved knowledge about
processes involved in adaptation decisions. This knowledge includes
information on steps in the process, decision rationales, handling of
uncertainties, choices of adaptation types and timing, conditions that
stimulate or dampen adaptation, and the consequences of
performance of adaptation strategies or measures (Burton, 1997;
Rayner & Malone, 1998; Tol et al., 1998; Basher, 1999; Klein et al.,
1999; Pittock, 1999; Smit et al., 1999).

Evaluation of adaptation (i.e. how good is the adaptation?) can be

based on criteria such as costs, benefits, equity, efficiency, and
implementability.

Predictions or estimates of likely future adaptations are an essential

element of climate change impact and vulnerability assessment. The
degree to which a future climate change risk is dangerous depends
greatly on the likelihood and effectiveness of adaptations in that
system. Studies that ignore or assume no adaptation are likely to
overestimate residual or net impacts and vulnerabilities, whereas
those that assume full and effective adaptation are likely to
underestimate residual impacts and vulnerabilities (Reilly, 1999;
Risbey et al., 1999; Smit et al., 2000). Hence, it is important to have
an improved understanding of the process of adaptation and better
information on the conditions under which adaptations of various
types are expected to occur. Such scholarship on the “how, when,
and why” of adaptation is necessary to make informed judgments on
the vulnerabilities of sectors, regions, and communities (Ausubel,
1991, Kane et al., 1992; Klein et al., 1999). Insights into processes of
adaptation have been gained from several types of analysis, including
listing of possible adaptation measures, impact assessment models,

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adaptation process models, and empirical analysis of contemporary
adaptation processes.

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 CHAPTER 4:
CLIMATE CHANGE AND GENDER
4.1 Introduction
The existence of inequalities across races, tribes, religions, age and
gender have created a skewed pattern in access and control of
economic resources, income distribution, social and economic
participation among other issues (MYDGEC, 2005) that are major
drawbacks to economic growth and development. Climate change is
one development issue in which inequalities such as those created by
gender will require serious attention in order to provide a
comprehensive and meaningful understanding, explanations and
deriving solutions for mitigation and adaptation to the prevailing
changes that affects human livelihoods systems (DFID, 2008).

The issues of climate change are particularly important given the

overwhelming evidence of the reality of climate change and the
devastating consequences on the ecosystems. According to the
IPCC, 2007, warming of the climate system in recent decades is clear
and unambiguous, the earth’s temperature are highly variable, with
year to year changes often masking the overall rise of approximately
0.74°C that has occurred from 1906-2005 (IPCC, 2007; Bates, et al.,
2008). The global warming trend over the last 50 years is nearly twice
that of the last 100 years, and even higher over the last 25 years. It is
predicted that the increase in global mean temperatures over the next
century could be between 1.4 and 5.8 oC.This has resulted in rising
average sea levels from ocean warming and widespread melting of
snow and ice, sea levels will rise by 9cm to 88cm, mainly through the
thermal expansion of the ocean. Patterns of precipitation will also
change, affecting the hydrological cycle. By 2050, it is estimated that
the average temperatures over Zimbabwe will be 2–4°C higher and
rainfall 10–20% less than the 1961- 1990 baselines (Unganai, 2006;
Lobell et al, 2008). Simulation models show annual rainfall declining
by 5–20% of the 1961-90 average by 2080 in all Zimbabwe’s major
river basins.

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The ultimate effects are climate change and variability which is rapidly
emerging as one of the most serious global problems affecting many
sectors in the world and is considered to be one of the most serious
threats to sustainable development with adverse impact on
environment, human health, food security, economic activities, natural
resources and physical infrastructure (IPCC, 2007; Huq et al., 2006).
Watson et al. 1997 commended that developing countries are
especially vulnerable to climate change because agricultural
productivity depends on the climate. And in developing countries
agriculture employs most of the workforce and is responsible for
around a quarter of GDP (World Bank 2004). Africa is one of the most
vulnerable regions to climate change in the world. Previous
assessments (IPCC, 1998; Hulme, 1996) concluded that Africa is
particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change because of
factors such as widespread poverty, recurrent droughts, inequitable
land distribution, over-dependence on rain-fed agriculture and low
adaptive capacity.

To adequately deal with climate change, a comprehensive approach

to prevention, adaptation and mitigation is required given the
systematic, interdependences and complexity underlining the
sustainable livelihoods and economic development framework in
which the natural factors such as climate is part of (Carney, 1998).
Similarly, Eicher et al. 1990 stated that economic growth and
development is hinged on physical, natural, institutional, human,
technological and economic resources. These factors are interrelated
and they collectively interact together in driving the process of growth
and development. Climate change manifests itself as a change in the
natural variables such as temperature, precipitation, wind, humidity
etc, a part of the natural resource base upon which sustainable
livelihoods and economic development framework is hinged. On the
other hand, gender is contained in the human element, which are the
labors and organization inputs in all productive activities. Thus climate
change and gender forms an integral part of economic growth and
development driving wheel. Gender analysis is a sub-set of socio-
economic analysis, its purpose is to reveal the connections between
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gender relations and the development problem at hand (UNDP,
2001), in climate change debate gender analysis is thus an important
aspect needed to reveal connections between gender and climate
change causation, prevention, adaptation and mitigation strategies.

Climate change presents the most serious threat to development and

could potentially reverse many of the gains that have been made
according to DFID 2007: 32, threatening sustainable livelihoods and
human well being if corrective measures are not taken. This chapter
therefore seeks to explore the interrelationships between gender and
climate change and contextualize the two issues in the overall growth
and development process in a way that will open insights on pertinent
issues in climate change and gender debate. Presented in this
chapter are various sections starting from general development
models connecting natural resources and human capital
interconnectedness in growth and development, human livelihoods,
agriculture and gender synergies, gender imbalances and
implications for sustainable livelihoods, sustainable livelihoods,
gender and climate change, drivers of climate change and gender
roles, gender and impacts of climate change, adaptation to climate
change and gender implications, climate change mitigation and
gender and finally policy implications for gender, climate change and
sustainable ecological systems.

4.2 Agriculture, Gender and Climate Change in Economic

Growth and Development.
The relative abundance of natural resources (land, labour and
hydrology) and limited opportunities in secondary and tertiary sectors
in most developing economies makes them heavily dependent on
primary production especially agriculture. Watson et al. 1997
commended that developing countries are especially vulnerable to
climate change because agricultural productivity depends on the
climate. It is believed that developing agriculture under such situation

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will stimulate other sectors of the economy given the roles of
agriculture in food security and provision of raw materials in the
agribusiness and manufacturing sectors. A good agricultural
performance in most agricultural dominant economies translates into
a sterling overall economic performance and similarly, a sluggish
performance in agriculture will induce a negative performance in other
sectors given the positive inter-sectoral linkages. Agricultural
development is thus critical to economic development in most
developing economies. By nature agriculture is heavily dependent on
climate system which consists of solar radiation, the atmosphere, land
surface, snow and ice, oceans and other bodies of water, and living
things (IPCC, 2007) plus human resources as labourers and resource
organizers as earlier on alluded to. The climate system is part of the
natural resource base and any change in climate system also affects
agriculture and ultimately economic growth and development for
agriculture dominated economies. Three areas in which climate
change affect agriculture can be discussed in terms of moisture,
temperature and air gases. Firstly, changes in temperature and
precipitation lead to changes in soil moisture. Irrigation can help
reduce the sensitivity of agricultural performance to climatic variables
but only if water supplies are available. The availability of such water
is of course also likely to be heavily affected by climate change.
Secondly, temperature has a direct effect on crop yields. Different
crops have different optimal growing conditions and high
temperatures can damage those already close to their maximum
toleration limits under current conditions. Third, experiments have
shown that elevated concentrations of carbon dioxide may promote
the growth of certain crops.

Human resource is a crucial element of all productive activities in all

sectors of the economy though the engagement of labour and
entrepreneurship, the active factors among other passive resources.
The economically active age groups (15-64 years) of human
resources are made up of men and women and these are the critical
elements of human resources at the center of any productive activity.
Understanding the implications of this dichotomy of human resources
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becomes important in understanding production activities. Sex refers
to the biological differences between men and women, which are
universal and do not change. Gender refers to social attributes that
are learned or acquired during socialization as a member of a given
community. Because these attributes are learned behaviors, they can
and do change over time (with increasing rapidity as the rate of
technological change intensifies), and vary across cultures. Gender
therefore refers to the socially given attributes, roles, activities,
responsibilities and needs connected to being men (masculine) and
women (feminine) in a given society at a given time, and as a
member of a specific community within that society (UNDP, 2001).
Women and men’s gender identity determines how they are
perceived and how they are expected to think and act as men and
women. Even more, gender is one of the principal intersecting
variables (along with race and caste or class) deployed in the
distribution of privilege, prestige, power and a range of social and
economic resources. Thus gender is an integral component of
economic growth and development through the human resource and
the heterogeneous attributes associated with sex in societies.

According to the induced innovation model of economic growth and

development, six factors are important in driving the process and
these are physical, natural, institutional, economic, technological and
human factors (Eicher et al, 1990). The increases in productivity arise
not from technological change alone but from institutional innovation,
improvements in human capital as well as changes in the availability
of biological and physical capital. According to economists, change in
productivity is the unexplained residual in output after accounting for
conventional inputs land, labour, capital etc. This residual is
attributable to both new technology and to new human capital and
institutional innovations that are almost invariably preconditions for or
adaptive complements to any technological innovation. Because
technology, human capital, and institutional innovations tend to be
complementary inputs in production, it is impossible to separate their
relative influences with much accuracy. Institutional innovation
depends on prior human capital accumulation, just as technological
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innovation does. A change in any of the factors that builds up a
growth and development model will require a complementary change
in the whole system to ensure sustenance of growth and
development. This model is presented in figure below.

Figure 4.1: Gender and Climate Change in Agricultural Growth and

Development

Adopted from Eicher, et al, 1990

The gender element is contained in the human factor while climate

change is a change in part of the natural factors thus according to the
model above, climate change and gender interact together with other
complementary factors in continuous process of innovative
disturbance in one factor followed by managed adaptation of the other
factors to find a new, more efficient equilibrium of resource use. The
phenomena of climate change should thus be recognized as a
development issue and its complexity as indicated in the model above
entails that the challenge has to be addressed in a holistic approach

107
for effective mitigation and adaptation ensure sustainable growth and
development of the global economy.

4.3 Gender Imbalances and Implications for Sustainable

Livelihoods
It is important for people to note that we live in societies that are
dominated by gender deference’s in terms of social, political and
economic status of men and women (DFID, 2008). These differences
creates a skewed pattern in control and ownership of economic and
productive resources, political participation, power relations that affect
policy implementation and outcomes in dealing with developmental
issues. There is no country in which the outcomes of public policy are
equal for men and women, but the dimensions of these inequalities
are often so deeply embedded that they are difficult to perceive.
Women and men’s have differences in demographics, roles, and
access to social, physical, economic, financial resources that creates
imbalances with implications to sustainable livelihoods and other
factors in the framework such as climate change. Gender analysis is
an important sub-set of socio-economic analysis in climate change
debate that has implications on economic growth and development
(UNDP, 2001). Gender analysis in the context of agriculture, climate
change and economic development is essential in revealing the
gender differences to the attention of people who can make a
difference, so that their decisions are taken in a manner that is
sensitive to and reflects the outcome of gender analysis. The
succeeding section will explore the gender dynamics in livelihoods to
establish the heterogeneity in gender and synergies with other
movers of sustainable development including climate system and
provide a base for advocating for gender mainstreaming in climate
change related interventions.

4.3.1 Gender and Demographics

Demographic studies have evidence to prove that the population of
female tends to be greater than that of men with increase in age. At
birth the male to female ratio seem to indicate more males than
females with a world average of around 1.1 decreasing to 1.06 for
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below 15 years age group and further falling to 0.79 at above 65
years https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2018.html. These statistics indicate that the
economically active age cluster (15-65 years of age) is likely
dominated by females than males, thus emphasizing the likely role
played by gender in economic activity given that human composition
at that level tends to have a balanced if not greater proportion of
females than males. The male to female ratio over space by level of
development is indicated in Table 4.1 as follows using a case of
selected mix of developed and developing economies.

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Table 4.1: Male to Female Ratio for selected Developing and
Developed Countries

Developing countries Developed countries

Country Male to female Country Male to female

ratio ratio

Zimbabwe 0.81 Canada 1.02

Zambia 1 USA 1

Lesotho 0.96 China 1.06

DRC 0.99 UK 1.03

Sudan 1.01 German 1.04

Tanzania 0.97 North America 1

Ethiopia 0.96 Australia 1.03

Bolivia 0.96 New Zealand 1

Benin 0.99 Japan 1.02

Burundi 0.97 West Europe 1

Haiti 0.99 Israel 1.03

Hungary 0.98 South Africa 1.02

Gambia 0.98 France 1

Central African republic 0.98 Italy 1.03

Djibouti 0.8 Hong Kong 0.94

Lesotho 0.96 Singapore 0.95

Russia 0.92 Denmark 1.01

Average 0.96 Average 1.01

Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2018.html

Results from the analysis above indicates that the economically active
age group is slightly positively skewed towards females in developing

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countries while in developed economies there tends to be a balance
and in general slightly greater proportion of males than females. The
observed pattern can be attributed a greater level of reliance by
females to economic hardships in developing countries than males
among other issues. The overall implications for such a situation on
growth and development issues such as climate change is the need
to recognize equally presence of males and females and their
heterogeneity in development programs to ensure effectiveness in
achieving desired outcomes. Gender mainstreaming is useful in this
regard to give a picture of the dynamics of males and females in
society so that strategies are well placed. In Zimbabwe, women
constitute 55% of the country’s population of which 86 % live in rural
areas where they depend largely on agriculture for their livelihoods.
According to Muchena, 2004, about 70% of farmers in communal and
resettlement areas are women.

4.3.2 Access to and control of economic resources

Economic resources are the means through which productive
activities can be carried out. It is important to distinguish between
access to resources and control over them when examining how
resources (land, labour, credit, income, etc) are allocated between
women and men (CSW,2008). Access gives a person the use of a
resource e. g. land to grow crops while control allows a person to
make decisions about who uses the resource or to dispose of the
resource e.g. sell land. in order to understand human behavior in
production activities related to climate change in terms of causation,
mitigation and adaptation, it should be established whether there is
any differential in men’s and women’s access to productive(land,
credit, cash income, employment), political (education, political
representation, leadership) and time resources.

The historical persistence of gender inequality is prescribed by

tradition, culture, and religion. Women’s and men’s differential access
and control to social and physical goods or resources is one of the
key dimensions of gender inequality. Culturally a woman is expected
to be dependent, submissive, well mannered enduring emotional,
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fearful, soft hearted, hard working and conservative while man are
expected to be the opposite-independent, ambitious, brave,
aggressive, without emotions, and economically empowered while a
woman’s place is in the kitchen and men are bread winners
(Kanyenze, 2009).

In most African cultures and traditions, the rights to make decisions

on family land are vested in male members of the family. They are
entitles to a share of the family land while woman would only enjoy
the land entitlement through marriage to their husbands. As a result
women have access to less land than men, inheritance laws are
unfair to women, unmarried women do not have access to land, land
allocated is usually in the name of men and women do not have
tenure security. Even after the husband’s passing on, women will
continue to enjoy the access to land though the family name
otherwise if they leave the family, their rights are automatically
scraped off. Water and natural resources are associated with access
to land and in the same way women are deprived of land rights; they
are also deprived of water rights.

Agricultural finance is provided on the bases of collateral with women

disadvantaged on land use and control, as describe earlier they also
have limited access to finance. This is a serious hindrance to woman
participation in businesses as they do not have security to secure
loans for business activities.

Women are also marginalized in terms of access to health care,

information, skills, education among other human development
facilities, resulting in them having a lower human development index
than their male counterparts. The 1998 human development report
on Zimbabwe described the country as a highly unequal society in
terms of access, control and ownership of resources. The 2003
poverty assessment study survey report indicated that the poverty
was higher among female headed households than male headed with
incidence of poverty around 72% and 58% respectively. The
inequalities in human development make women to lag behind in
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terms of employment opportunities, decision making, political and
social positions among other issues (Kanyenze, 2009). Most
administrative posts are held by men who are insensitive to women
rights thus gender mainstreaming remains a policy on paper but in
practice it is not being implemented.

In terms of technology development, most technologies developed

are masculine making it difficult for women to operate them thus
women lag behind in terms of use of advanced technologies. Access
to institutional services such as extension, markets and financial
services is largely dominated by men. Participation on the market is
men dominant as women are confined to household duties. Women
have no decision making role with respect to income jointly obtained
with the men because of cultural and traditional norms despite the
general practices that men usually spend proceeds on their personal
utilities while women use it on household welfare and investment for
the future. A gender gap in earnings persists across almost all
employment categories, including informal wage employment and
self-employment according to the International Labour Organization
(ILO), 2007.

The disparities in access and control of basic resources between

women and men cannot be allowed to continue for this poses a
serious impediment to sustainable development and the attainment of
equality and equity between women and men. It is therefore
recommendable that all organizations, institutions, public, private
sectors, civic organizations, individuals and families, churches,
religious groups, traditional structures and cultural institutions to
mainstream gender in all their policies, strategic and operational
plans, programs and activities including climate change related
activities.

4.3.3 Gender roles

Men and women are the two human resources that are involved in
day to day activities in pursuit of human livelihoods. Roles can be
divided into reproductive and productive duties and there is a sexual

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division of duties and responsibilities. While both men and women
can be viewed as taking part in the two roles, there are differences in
responsibilities for specific tasks within these two broad roles that are
worth noting in understanding human behavior in livelihoods activities
from available resources. This allocation of activities on the basis of
sex is known as the sexual division of labour, and is learned and
clearly understood by all members of a given society, as are the
circumstances under which the typical practices can be varied, and
the limitations of this variation. Change usually takes place when the
society is under some form of stress, for example when community
migrates to find work, and their tasks must be undertaken by other
members of their families. The sexual division of labour is perhaps
the most significant social structure governing gender relations. Men
and women take part in different productive and reproductive work in
society (UNDP, 2001).

Productive work is work that produces goods and services for

exchange in the market place. This also includes production of goods
and services for subsistence purposes even though they never reach
the market place but is rather consumption of a form of non-monetary
income. Both men and women contribute to family income with
various forms of productive work, although men predominate in
productive work, especially at the higher levels of remuneration. In
every society, women and men have different roles in and outside the
household, and different resources to deliver them. In the rural
communities of developing countries, men’s roles typically focus on
earning cash by growing food, trading, or selling their labour. It is
largely the role of women to provide the food, fuel, water, and the
care of the family needs (all for no pay), in addition to earning some
cash (Pettengell, 2010). In Zimbabwean Society, women play multiple
roles in the agricultural sector. In the smallholder sector women have
the heaviest workloads as they provide the bulk of the labour (Rukuni
& Eicher, 2006). Female headed households are concentrated
among the poorer strata of society and often have lower incomes than
male headed households. Despite their high rates of participation in
agriculture and in the economy, women farmers have limited access
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to productive assets such as land, technology, credit, training and
education. Although rural women and men play complementary roles
in guaranteeing food security, women tend to play a greater role in
natural resource management and ensuring nutrition (FAO 2003).
Women often grow, process, manage and market food and other
natural resources, and are responsible for raising small livestock,
managing vegetable gardens and collecting fuel and water (FAO
2003).

Reproductive work involves all the tasks associated with supporting

and servicing the current and future workforce that is, those who
undertake or will undertake productive work. It includes child-bearing
and nurture, but is not limited to these tasks. It has increasingly been
referred to as “social reproduction” to indicate the broader scope of
the term than the activities associated with biological reproduction.
Socially reproductive activities include childcare, food preparation,
care for the sick, socialization of the young, attention to ritual and
cultural activities through which the society’s work ethic is transmitted,
and the community sharing and support which is essential to the
survival of economic stress. The fact that reproductive work is the
essential basis of productive work is the principal argument for the
economic importance of reproductive work, even though most of it is
unpaid, and therefore unrecorded in national accounts. Women and
girls are mainly responsible for this work which is usually unpaid.
Women’s social positioning in many situations means that the roles
they are expected to take on are often supportive and reproductive,
centered around the home and local community rather than the public
sphere. This does not mean that women do not play crucial roles in
agricultural production or other activities crucial to sustainable
livelihoods and national economies. But the roles they play are
generally less visible and attract less public recognition than the work
men engage in. Typically women – particularly those in poor, rural
locations – are expected to assume primary responsibility for their
families’ subsistence. Yet because they often do not earn a wage,
women are frequently excluded from decisions about spending or
about their children’s education. The expectation that girls will help
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their mothers with household tasks and with caring for younger
siblings means that they are more likely to be excluded from
opportunities to gain an education than boys, although these gaps are
gradually closing. Women earning a wage often earn less than men,
leaving them more vulnerable to changes in their working
environment caused by external phenomena, including climate
change.

Gender inequities exist within the agriculture and agribusiness sectors

in terms of decision-making, enterprise responsibility, training, labor
and staff composition. This is the situation in market institutions and
service providers, as well as in commercial farms and industry. While
women constitute the majority of farmers, men numerically dominate
in business decision-making positions, are the main applicants and
recipients of agricultural financing, receive more formal technical
training, are awarded larger salaries in the labor market, and make up
most farmer union participation. The situation is the same in the
agribusiness sector where men dominate leadership and key
decision-making positions. Women are only housewives, mothers and
agricultural labourers, they are also farm managers. In some
countries, when husband and wife are all farmers women still
performs more than 50% of the tasks in all major crops in subsistence
oriented farming communities. In addition they have to carry out
household chores such as fetching fuel, and water, processing food,
cooking, herding cattle and caring for the children, sick and elderly
(IUCN/WEDO 2007). It is also believed that the commercial
agricultural sector employs more women than men implying that the
labour market 35%/25% in Zimbabwe, in the agricultural sector is
dominated by women.

For the majority of women, particularly those who face additional

barriers, continuing obstacles have hindered their ability to achieve
economic autonomy and to ensure sustainable livelihoods for
themselves and their dependents. Women are active in a variety of
economic areas, which they often combine, ranging from wage labour
and subsistence farming and fishing to the informal sector. However,

116
legal and customary barriers to ownership of or access to land,
natural resources, capital, credit, technology and other means of
production, as well as wage differentials, contribute to impeding the
economic progress of women (CSW, 2008). Women contribute to
development not only through remunerated work. On the one hand,
women participate in the production of goods and services for the
market and household consumption, in agriculture, food production or
family enterprises.

The different productive and reproduction roles of women and men in

society and their different disposition to resources implies that the two
a bound to feel differently the impacts of shocks and disturbances that
affects livelihoods such as climate change and will require different
strategies for effective adaptation and mitigation to climate change.
The approach will be to mainstream gender into all program activities,
instilling gender sensitivity in all dialogue, discussions, debates and
advocacy activities—regardless of whether women are present or not.
The intersection of peoples’ productive and reproductive
responsibilities with policy priorities, which has repercussions at all
levels of an economy and society, is the principal focus of a gender
analysis. Insufficient attention to gender analysis has meant that
women’s contributions and concerns remain too often ignored in
economic structures, such as financial markets and institutions,
labour markets, economics as an academic discipline, economic and
social infrastructure, taxation and social security systems, as well as
in families and households. As a result, many policies and programs
may continue to contribute to inequalities between women and men.
Where progress has been made in integrating gender perspectives,
program and policy effectiveness has also been enhanced.

4.4 Drivers of Climate Change and Gender

Climate change is an altered state of the climate that can be identified
by changes in the mean and/or variability of its properties and that
persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer (Bates, et
al., 2008). Distinctions of climate change vary, not in terms of what it
is, but in terms of what is responsible, and specifically whether it is
117
attributable to natural causes and/or anthropogenic causes.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external
forcings, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of
the atmosphere or in land use (IPCC, 2007). According to UN, 1992,
climate change is a change of climate attributed directly or indirectly
to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere
and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over
comparable time periods. While the causes of climate change a
debatable the IPCC has found, based on a number of observed
trends, that global climate is changing, and that it is very likely that
human activities are in partly responsible. In pursuit of livelihoods,
human beings cause disturbances in the environment and ecological
systems that have resulted in climate change. These activities are in
line with the productive roles in primary, secondary and services
sectors of the economy. Mitigation to climate change is about
preventing or limiting the occurrence of climate change and thus
focus on tackling the causes of climate change: the increase of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) (Lambrou and Piana 2006) and given the
role of human element in causing climate change they are equally
important in mitigation for climate change.

Activities such as clearing of forests to pave way for farm land, cutting
down of trees to obtain firewood for domestic and other purposes,
veld fires, cultivation on wetlands, harvesting of forest products,
industrial gases among other activities are human related causes of
climate change. The degree of dependency on the natural system
and the extend of engagement by human beings in climate change
inducing activities by human beings is depended on need, enabling
and predisposing factor. The heterogeneity in socio-economic status
of men and women makes gender a critical factor in causation and
mitigation of climate change. This section will discuss implications of
gender roles and different socio-economic situations of men and
women in societies on driving the process of climate change.

118
Demographic evidence is indicating that the ratio of male to female
across age groups varies around one indicating the equal presence of
the two human class in societies. In developing countries, the
economically active age group consists of more women than men as
the ratio is below one indicating the prominence of women among the
economically active group. There is also evidence to prove that over
70% of women live in rural areas and derive their livelihoods from
rural livelihoods. This involves on farm, off farm and domestic
activities that are closely dependent on the natural environment. Most
of the economically active age group of men derives their livelihoods
from formal employment in urban centers. The balanced ratio
between the economically active men and women in societies and
their varied gender roles is indicative of the importance of the two
classes contributing to anthropogenic forces that drives climate
change. To further explore the contributions of gender clusters to
causing and mitigation in climate change, it is important to explore the
socio-economic circumstances, gender roles among these groups
and how they relates to anthropogenic forces to climate change.
Access and control of economic resource such as land, water,
physical assets, extension, markets, information and health are
positively skewed towards males due to cultural and traditional values
and beliefs as earlier on alluded to. These factors create an enabling
environment that facilitates ability of people to carry out productive
and reproductive activities especially in agriculture. As a result
women are disadvantaged in their ability and predisposition to carry
out productive activity in pursuit of livelihoods despite the roles they
play in food security and household upkeep. Because of this
limitation, women can resort to natural non regulated systems for
livelihoods and in the process cause disturbances that can lead to
climate change. Furthermore, understanding of the concept of climate
change and implications is enhanced by factors such as human
development (health, nutrition, education etc) and information access
which are similarly positively biased towards men. This weakens the
understanding and conceptualization by women on climate change
related issues thus predisposing them to climate unfriendly related
practices. The same factors also contributes to the bulky of women
119
depending on remote rural areas for livelihoods as they are found in
most cases without desired qualifications and competencies to
compete with men in urban employment. This causes women to be in
direct interaction with the natural environment such as forests, wet
land etc depending on them for livelihoods in a way that can cause
climate change.

As earlier on alluded to decision making on marketing of agricultural

commodities is dominated by men irrespective of contributions to
production activities because of cultural norms and beliefs that a
women should be under her husband. This contradicts with roles and
responsibilities that assign daily family subsistence requirements in
the hands of a woman. This duty will require cash to acquire
provisions such as health, food and utilities that are not produced or a
produced in insufficient quantities for the family needs. Without the
authority and control of major income flows into the family women
would have limited access to income and seriously constraint in their
responsibilities. In a desperate move to acquire income to meet these
needs, women can resort exploitation of natural resources in search
of natural resources to carry out alternative non contested income
generating activities and natural marketable products such as fire
hood, mushrooms, wild fruits, medicines etc to generate the
desperately needed cash for subsistence provisions.

The roles of men and women in reproduction are also important and
contributory to climate change as population plays an important role
in changes in climate systems. Although decisions on family sizes are
believed to be the joint decisions of a husband and wife, the roles of
women as the ones who conceive and shoulder pregnancy plus child
rearing makes them very important in family planning decisions. To
compact, climate change causation through population control,
women needs to be recognized and targeted to effectively strategize
for population control and minimize climate disturbing activities.

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4.5 Gender and Impacts of Climate Change on Sustainable
Livelihoods
Given the social, economic and political inequalities created by
gender in human life, the presence of a disturbance like climate
change will be felt differently by the two human clusters. In many
societies, men and women have distinct roles, responsibilities and
status, giving rise to differences in vulnerability and adaptive capacity.
Women are often particularly disadvantaged through unequal access
to resources and opportunities. Women are affected through their
multiple roles as food producers and providers, as guardians of health
and as care givers, and as economic actors. Women are more likely
to become direct victims (mortalities and injuries) of climate-related
disasters, such as hurricanes and floods, as a result of cultural norms
that mean that they have not learned to swim. They are more likely to
be at home when disasters occur, and they try to protect their children
before themselves. They are less likely to receive critical information
for emergency preparedness and warning information usually
transmitted in public spheres; or they are in most cases restricted to
their houses. It is noted that in the 1991 cyclone and flood in
Bangladesh, the death rate was almost five times higher for women
than men (Oxfam, 2010).

Drought, deforestation, and erratic rainfall force women, who are

often already marginalized and dependent on local natural resources,
to work harder in order to meet household needs for food, water, and
fuel. Consequently, they have less time to earn an income, receive an
education or training, or to participate in decision-making processes.
In many areas, climate change creates resource shortages and
unreliable job markets that lead to increased migration of men,
leaving women alone with additional agricultural and household
duties. Traditional roles are therefore reinforced, the ability of women
to diversify their livelihoods or to access income-generating jobs is
diminished, and girls are often taken out of school to deal with the
increased burden. Women’s high level of vulnerability is itself a
significant factor in the overall vulnerability of communities, given that
women produce more than 50 percent of the food grown worldwide
121
 and considerably more in many developing countries. For example in
sub-Saharan Africa women contribute 60 to 80 percent of the labour
in both food production for household consumption and for sale, in
addition to their significant roles as careers of children, the elderly and
the sick (Raworth, 2008).

The limited access to economic resources by women has an impact

on their sustainable livelihoods amid stresses and shocks. A
livelihood is sustainable if it can cope with and recover from stresses
and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both
now and in the future while not undermining the natural resource base
(DFID, 1998). Women because of their limitations are bound to be
more vulnerable to shocks and disturbances as they are less able and
predisposed to cope with the situation. The framework below in
Figure 1 helps to conceptualize livelihoods strategies and the likely
outcomes from shocks and disturbances such as climate change
given unequal resource base and power balances among human
lives.

LIVELIHOOD
OUTCOMES
CAPITAL ASSETS TRANSFORMING
VULNERABILITY More income
STRUCTURES &
CONTEXT Human PROCESSESES Increased well
Trends Financial LIVELIHOODS being
STRUCTURES STRATEGIES
Shocks Social Reduced
Level of GVT NR-based vulnerability
Culture Natural Private Laws Non-NR Improved food
Sector based security
Policies Migration More
Incentives
sustainable use
Figure 4.2: Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Framework of NR-base
Source: Carney, 1998.

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According to the sustainable livelihoods model above, vulnerability
context is related to capital assets, transforming structures,
livelihoods strategies and outcomes. Thus assets, governing
institutions are important in determining livelihoods strategies and
outcomes amid shocks and disturbances in human lives. The
disparity between women and men factored into the sustainable
livelihoods framework implies that serious impediments are created to
sustainable development and the attainment of equality between men
and women.

Access to resources is essential to improving agricultural productivity

of both men and women farmers. Because women play crucial roles
in agricultural production, improving productivity will depend to a great
extent on ensuring that women farmers, have sufficient access to
production inputs and support services. Women generally have much
less access to resources than men. The causes of this are rooted, to
a great extent, in gender-blind development policies and research,
discriminatory legislation, traditions and attitudes; and lack of access
to decision-making. Some studies have

shown that when women farmers have access to resources, they are
more productive than men farmers. For instance, it has been reported
that in Kenya the average gross value of output per hectare from
male-managed plots was usually 8 percent higher than from female-
managed plots, but when women used the same resources as men,
their productivity would increase by 22 percent (Saito, 1994).
Productivity and access to resources across gender classes and
livelihoods outcomes can be conceptualized as given in Figure 4.3
below as:

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 Female headed
Low production
Resource base households with
& productivity low incomes, more
negatively
by women vulnerable and
skewed towards
food insecure
women

Gender imbalances
in economic and
other productive
resources

High production Male headed

Resource base
& productivity households with
positively
by men higher incomes,
skewed
less vulnerable
towards men
and food secure

Figure 4.3: Implications of resources imbalances by gender on

productive activities and livelihoods outcomes.

Many studies show that the plots of land controlled by women has
lower yields than those controlled by men and that these lower yields
are usually a result of use of less labour, and fertilizer per acre rather
than inefficiency (common wealth secretariat, 1996). On the other
hand, a reduction of male labour can lead to shift in production
towards less nutritious crops and a decline in yields and output or an
increase in women’s reliance on child labour with children withdrawn
from schools, the girl child is most prone to this. Growing evidence
suggests that women could increase agricultural output if they have
greater access to inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer, credit and
extension information. Despite their important role in agricultural
development and overall economic development, women face legal,
social and institutional barriers. Female headed households are

124
concentrated among the poor strata of households and often have
lower income than their male headed households in agriculture and
other sectors. In the past decade the number of women living in
poverty has increased disproportionately to the number of men,
particularly in the developing countries. The feminization of poverty
has also recently become a significant problem in the countries with
economies in transition as a short-term consequence of the process
of political, economic and social transformation. In addition to
economic factors, the rigidity of socially ascribed gender roles and
women’s limited access to power, education, training and productive
resources as well as other emerging factors that may lead to
insecurity for families are also responsible. The failure to adequately
mainstream a gender perspective in all economic analysis and
planning and to address the structural causes of poverty is also a
contributing factor.

Gender and health related impacts of climate change

Climate change comes with changes in the variables that constitute
climate and these include changes in rainfall patterns and volumes,
changes in temperature, wind, humidity among other factors. These
variables are factors that also determine health of human beings
through their influence on disease incidence, productivity in
agriculture, basic resources availability, directly causing stress on
human beings plus the disturbance on human livelihoods can cause
mental stress and fatigue as people try to live with a difficult situation
(Bartlett 2008). Disturbances in agricultural productivity as a result of
climate change can lead to food and income shortages that will have
implications on food security, nutrition and health, high rates of
malnutrition can result especially among malnutrition vulnerable
groups such as pregnant women, children and even the rest of
population. High temperatures can cause heat related mortality and
morbidity among the populations exposed especially the weak and
vulnerably for which most women, elderly and children belong.
Changes in heat, ground water system, wind and humidity can result
in high incidence of air and water borne diseases specifically for
people who constantly use water like women and children. Stress is
125
likely to be heightened after disasters, particularly where families are
displaced and have to live in emergency or transitional housing.
Change that presents itself with disturbing situations of overcrowding
after evacuating homes, lack of privacy and the collapse of regular
routines and livelihood patterns can contribute to anger, frustration
and violence, with children (especially girls) and women most
vulnerable (Bartlett 2008).

Women and girls are generally expected to care for the sick,
particularly in times of disaster and environmental stress
(IUCN/WEDO 2007), further to these duties they are also expected to
take care of their daily household routine duties amid these
disturbances as human life has to carry on. This negatively affects
their time for economic activities to generate income and livelihoods
which, heightens levels of poverty. It also means they are less able to
contribute to community-level decision-making processes on climate
change or disaster risk reduction. In addition, being faced with the
burden of caring for dependents while being obliged to travel further
for water or firewood makes women and girls prone to stress-related
illnesses and exhaustion (Voluntary Services Overseas 2006; CIDA
2002). Women and girls also face barriers to accessing healthcare
services due to a lack of economic assets to pay for healthcare, as
well as cultural restrictions on their mobility which may prohibit them
from travelling to seek healthcare.

Water is a basic necessity for human live. Over 70% of human and
animal body fluids is water according to biological scientists, implying
that in terms of consumption it is one food item that is consumed in
greatest quantities. Besides its use as food, water is useful in so
many domestic purposes such as bathing, washing, cleaning cooking
and cooling among other uses. It is also a critical input in agricultural
production, all these uses of water are directly related and correlated
to health status of human and animals. Considering the various
gender roles mentioned earlier on, women and girls generally are
responsible for various roles related to water such as collecting water
for drinking, cooking, washing, hygiene and raising small livestock,
126
while men use water for irrigation or livestock farming and for
industries (Fisher 2006; Khosla and Pearl 2003). These different roles
implies that women and men often have different needs and priorities
in terms of water use and a further affected differently with
disturbances that directly affect water such as climate change. It is
estimated that by 2025, almost two thirds of the world’s population are
likely to experience some kind of water stress, and for one billion of
them the shortage will be severe and socially disruptive (WEDO 2003:
61). Women will have to go an extra mile to acquire water for daily
needs throughout the days while men given their responsibility in
annual crop production will be confronted with seasonal water needs.
In cases where climate change manifests itself in form of increased
frequency and intensity of floods, water quality will deteriorate, a
situation that will expose women to water born diseases, require their
extra effort in terms of boiling and purifying water to ensure health
safety, cleaning and maintaining their houses after flooding. This is
time that could be spent in school, earning an income or participating
in public life. Walking long distances to fetch water and fuel can
expose women and girls to harassment or sexual assault, especially
in areas of conflict; there are many accounts of women and girls
being attacked when searching for water and kindling in refugee
camps around Darfur (MSF 2005).

Recurring droughts and low rainfall patterns that characterize the

Zambezi River Basin in southern Africa make it a challenge to provide
accessible water supplies in rural areas. As a result, women and girls
walk longer distances to secure water. Poor access and low quality
increases the amount of labour that women endure to collect, store,
protect and distribute water. While estimates vary in different African
countries, women in Mozambique spend an average 15.3 hours each
week during the dry season and 2.9 hours during the wet season,
drawing and carrying water. In Malawi, each household spends five
percent of their active time collecting water (SADCC, 2008).

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4.6 Adaptation to climate Change and Gender Implications
Adaptation to climate change has been described as changes in
processes or structures to moderate or offset potential dangers or to
take advantage of opportunities associated with changes in climate”
(Lambrou and Piana 2006: 8). The heterogeneity in roles and access
to economic resources between men and women implies that the
adoptive measures to climate change can vary between men and
women. Under such situations, it is crucial to mainstream gender in
order to accurately specify and quantify the adaptive outcomes by
special groups such as gender. Women comprise the majority of
those working in the informal employment sector which is often worst
hit by climate change-related disasters and other shocks, increasing
women’s already unequal access to resources and diminishing their
capabilities to cope with unexpected events/disasters or adapt to
climate change. Despite these obstacles, recent evidence
demonstrates that women who are already experiencing the effects of
weather-related hazards – such as erratic monsoon patterns, flooding
and extended periods of drought – are developing effective coping
strategies, which include adapting their farming practices (Mitchell
et.al. 2007).

It is now widely acknowledged that the impacts of climate change will

be felt more acutely by those with least adaptive capacity, poor
countries and the poor in developing countries” (Lambrou and Piana
2006: 5). It is also recognized that the vulnerability or susceptibility of
a population group to the effects of climate change depends on the
resilience of the surrounding natural landscape unit and society’s
capacity to adapt” (ibid). At the household level, the ability to adapt to
changes in the climate depends on control over land, money, credit
and tools; low dependency ratios; good health and personal mobility;
household entitlements and food security; secure housing in safe
locations; and freedom from violence (Lambrou and Piana 2006). As
such, women are often less able to adapt to climate change than men
since they represent the majority of low-income earners, they
generally have less education than men and are thus less likely to be

128
reached by extension agents and they are often denied rights to
property and land, which makes it difficult for them to access credit
and agricultural extension services. Moreover, gender biases in
institutions often reproduce assumptions that it is men who are the
farmers (Gurung et al 2006). As a result, new agricultural
technologies – including the replacement of plant types and animal
breeds with new varieties intended for higher drought or heat
tolerance – are rarely available to women farmers (Lambrou and
Piana 2006).

4.7 Conclusions
In every society, women and men have different roles in and outside
the household, and different resources to deliver them. In the rural
communities of developing countries, men’s roles typically focus on
earning cash by growing food, trading, or selling their labour. But it is
largely the role of women to provide the food, fuel, water, and the
care of the family needs (all for no pay), in addition to earning some
cash (Pettengell, 2010). In such communities, women are likely to
have (1) greater reliance on natural resources, such as rivers, wells,
reliable rainfall, and forests; (2) fewer physical resources, like land,
fertilizer or irrigation, and fewer assets including machinery or
equipment to use to make money, or to sell as a last resort; (3) fewer
financial resources that encompass little cash, savings or access to
credit, and less access to markets that give a good price for their
goods; (4) less powerful social resources, due to social and cultural
norms that limit their mobility and their voice in decision making,
reinforce traditional roles, and put them at risk of violence; and (5)
fewer human resources, due to having less education, fewer
opportunities for training, and less access to information (Raworth,
2008).

Climate change affects women and men differently. In many

societies, men and women have distinct roles, responsibilities and
status, giving rise to differences in vulnerability and adaptive capacity.
Women are often particularly disadvantaged through unequal access
129
to resources and opportunities. Women are affected through their
multiple roles as food producers and providers, as guardians of health
and as care givers, and as economic actors. Women are more likely
to become direct victims (mortalities and injuries) of climate-related
disasters, such as hurricanes and floods, as a result of cultural norms
that mean that they have not learned to swim. They are more likely to
be at home when disasters occur, and they try to protect their children
before themselves. They are less likely to receive critical information
for emergency preparedness and warning information usually
transmitted in public spheres; or they are unable to leave their house
without a male relative to escort them. In the 1991 cyclone and flood
in Bangladesh, the death rate was almost five times higher for women
than men (Oxfam, 2010).

Drought, deforestation, and erratic rainfall force women, who are

often already marginalized and dependent on local natural resources,
to work harder in order to meet household needs for food, water, and
fuel. Consequently, they have less time to earn an income, receive an
education or training, or to participate in decision-making processes.
In many areas, climate change creates resource shortages and
unreliable job markets that lead to increased migration of men,
leaving women alone with additional agricultural and household
duties. Traditional roles are therefore reinforced, the ability of women
to diversify their livelihoods or to access income-generating jobs is
diminished, and girls are often taken out of school to deal with the
increased burden. Women’s high level of vulnerability is itself a
significant factor in the overall vulnerability of communities, given that
women produce more than 50 percent of the food grown worldwide
and considerably more in many developing countries. For example in
sub-Saharan Africa women contribute 60 to 80 percent of the labour
in both food production for household consumption and for sale, in
addition to their significant roles as carers of children, the elderly and
the sick.

Climate change affects women and men differently in their respective

social roles. In general, women and girls are more vulnerable to the

130
effect of climate change, as they interact more with environmental
resources that are threatened under conditions of climate change,
than their male counterparts. Recurring droughts and low rainfall
patterns that characterize the Zambezi River Basin in southern Africa
make it a challenge to provide accessible water supplies in rural
areas. As a result, women and girls walk longer distances to secure
water. Poor access and low quality increases the amount of labour
that women endure to collect, store, protect and distribute water.
While estimates vary in different African countries, women in
Mozambique spend an average 15.3 hours each week during the dry
season and 2.9 hours during the wet season, drawing and carrying
water. In Malawi, each household spends five percent of their active
time collecting water (SADC, 2008). Gender inequalities are also
exacerbated in the aftermath of disasters such as floods. The
household workload may increase substantially in the face of
disasters, forcing many girls to drop out of school to assist with
household chores.

Based on what has been presented so far, it is evident that women

contribute to the economy and to combating poverty through both
remunerated and unremunerated work at home, in the community
and in the workplace. The empowerment of women is a critical factor
in the eradication of poverty. While poverty affects households as a
whole, because of the gender division of labour and responsibilities
for household welfare, women bear a disproportionate burden,
attempting to manage household consumption and production under
conditions of increasing scarcity. Poverty is particularly acute for
women living in rural households and depending on agriculture and
natural resources for livelihoods. Women’s poverty is directly related
to the absence of economic opportunities and autonomy, lack of
access to economic resources, including credit, land ownership and
inheritance, lack of access to education and support services and
their minimal participation in the decision-making process. Poverty
can also force women into situations in which they are vulnerable to
sexual exploitation. Under situations of climate change, women
because of their roles and responsibilities are crucial in causing and
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mitigation against climate change. The impacts of climate change are
similarly felt differently by women and men given the gender
dichotomy in role, responsibilities and resource base. As a result
adaptation strategies need to be tailor made to suit the needs for both
men and women in light of the differences in the impact of climate
change between men and women. It is by now widely accepted that
failure to include women in decision-making processes around
climate change mitigation and adaptation at local, national, regional
and international levels not only exacerbates gender inequalities, but
also undermines the effectiveness of climate change responses.

Because literature has been presenting general evidence on climate

change without capturing gender dynamics, it is important that sex
disaggregated data and in depth qualitative studies into impacts
based on gender sensitive participatory approaches to data collection
be employed to inform policies on climate change. There is thus an
urgent need to clearly identify obstacles to women’s participation in
decision-making, and find ways to address these constraints through
supporting grassroots awareness-raising, confidence-building and
advocacy and leadership training programs. Particular attention
needs to be given to promoting girls’ participation, since girls may to
be doubly excluded from decision-making processes and fora on
account of being both a child/youth and female. This is perhaps the
single most important step towards achieving more equitable,
appropriate climate change policies and programs.

To facilitate gender mainstreaming in research on climate change,

research and training in gender analysis and gender sensitive
planning to provide up to date gender sensitive climate change and
agricultural sector planning. The research that will mainstream gender
in climate change will form the basis through which lobbying and
advocacy for gender policy in climate change programs will be
initiated.

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 CHAPTER 5:
CLIMATE CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE AND
SOUTHERN AFRICA
5.1 Introduction
Zimbabwe receives national average rainfall of between 500 to
750mm. Northern regions receive between 750mm to 1250mm,
whereas the eastern highlands get as much as 1250 to 2000 mm per
annum. However, the south and southwest low-lying parts of the
country have a rather dry climate with unreliable rainfall. These areas
receive little amounts ranging from 250 to 500mm per annum (GoZ/
EMA/ UNDP, 2010). The rainy season coincides with the time of high
sun in the southern hemisphere and span the period November to
March, though some significant amounts may occur in October and
April.

Temperatures in Zimbabwe are warm but rarely hot around the year,
except in the lower regions where hot conditions dominate. The
Highveld has average temperatures that vary from 12-13 o C in winter
to 24 o C in summer whereas in the lowveld (the Zambezi and
Limpopo Valleys), temperatures are usually 6 o C higher in winter and
average between 32 o C and 38 o C in summer (GoZ/ EMA/ GEF,
2010). Hours of sunshine average six to seven a day during the
winter season and as much as eight to nine hours during the summer
season.

About 70% of Zimbabwe’s population derives its livelihood from

subsistence agriculture and other rural activities, both of which are
threatened by climate variability and change.

Zimbabwe’s climate is changing. The country is experiencing more

hot and fewer cold days than before. The country’s annual mean
surface temperature has warmed by about 0.4 o C from 1900 to 2000
(GoZ/ GEF/ UNDP, 2010). This gives a warming rate of about 0.04 oC
every ten years. National average maximum temperature has warmed
by about 1 o C over the same period. From daily records, it can be
133
concluded that the frequency of cold nights and cold days has
decreased by about 1.2 and 1.1% per decade respectively from the
1971-1995 reference period. Warm day frequency has increased by
about 1.9% per decade (i.e. about seven warm days more every ten
years). The period from 1980 to date has been the warmest in the
instrumental record.

The timing and amount of rainfall in Zimbabwe are becoming

increasingly uncertain. Rainfall in the country is variable from year to
year and droughts have always occurred from time to time. The
country is prone to droughts, which have become more frequent over
the last two decades with devastating impacts on food security,
health, and environmental degradation. Over the past ten years, the
country’s economy has stagnated due to droughts and macro-
economic instability. However, the last 30 years have seen a trend
towards reduced rainfall or heavy rainfall and drought occurring back
to back in the same season. The period 1980-1990, as well as being
the warmest in the instrumental record, has also been the driest. In
addition, from 2000 to 2010, the length and frequency of dry spells
during the rainfall season has been increasing while the frequency of
rain days has been declining.

5.2 Climate projections

Climate projections for Zimbabwe are for a warmer future climate. It is
estimated that there will be: (1) Warming of 0.5 to 2 o C by 2030 and 1
to 3.5 o C by 2070 compared to the 1961-1990 average. These
scenarios assume greenhouse gas emissions continue along the
current increasing trajectory; (2) Rainfall predictions for the country
are less certain. However, various models suggest that rainfall
patterns (onset and cessation dates, rainfall intensity, dry spells) are
likely to change and extreme events are set to increase. Some
models predict a 10-20% decline in rainfall by 2050.

Similarly, Zambia’s economy is agriculture based, after the decline of

mining in the post-independence period and has been under threat in
the past 20 years. Drought frequency and intensity have rocked the

134
country with further disturbances from the recent floods in the
southern part of the country. This is made worse by an agricultural
sector heavily dependent on seasonal rainfed agriculture, making the
sector especially vulnerable to climate change (Chagutah, 2006; De
Wit, 2006; Gandure & Marongwe, 2006; Lynas, 2009).

By 2050, average temperatures over Zimbabwe will be 2-4 0C higher

and rainfall 10-20% lower than the 1961-1990 baselines (Unganai,
2006). Simulation models show annual rainfall declining 5-20% of the
1961-90 average by 2080 in all Zimbabwe’s major river basins.
Similarly, in Zambia temperatures are increasing at a rate of about 0.6
0C per decade, which is ten times higher than the global and southern

African rate of increase in temperature. Agriculture, an important

sector in both countries, has been identified as the sector most
vulnerable to climate change (Mubaya, 2010).

5.3 Impacts
The impacts of climate variability and change will require
management at different levels, namely, mitigation strategies adopted
by governments and environmental bodies (specifically to address
greenhouse gas emission, increasing adaptive capacity of
smallholder farmers, diversifying cropping mechanisms and improving
the reliability of information for managing climate risks). Farmers have
a myriad of practices that help them overcome the vagaries of the
harsh environment and allow them to sustain their livelihoods and
actively manage their environment (Scoones et al., 1996).

Climate change presents both risks and opportunities for Zimbabwe.

The close relationships between agricultural performance and rainfall,
and between the economy and agricultural performance are well
established. Zimbabwe’s high dependence on climate sensitive
economic sectors, coupled with low adaptive capacity, makes the
country particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate variability and
change.

Climate change directly affects natural resources and

the health of ecosystems on which human beings depend. The fact
135
that Zimbabwe is embarking is embarking on economic recovery
programmes aimed at sustainable development and poverty
alleviation, among other UN Millennium Development Goals, provides
an opportunity for integrating climate change policies in national
development programmes. The challenge will be to continuously
improve the climate change knowledge base, develop institutional
capacity and an appropriate institutional coordination framework to
guide climate change programming in the country.

The Zambezi River Basin, like the rest of Southern Africa, is facing
serious impacts of climate change. Assessment reports by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), provide
evidence that climate change is real and that southern Africa will be
one of the worst affected regions in the world.

The Zambezi River Basin drains an area of almost 1.4 million square
kilometers, stretching across eight of the 15 member states of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC). The eight
countries, which are home to more than 100 million people, are
Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia
and Zimbabwe. The Zambezi River flows over a distance of almost
3,000 kilometers, dropping in altitude from its source in the Kalene
Hills in northwestern Zambia at 1,585 meters above sea level, to its
delta in the Indian Ocean, 200 km north of the Mozambican port of
Beira. Its catchment is the most shared river basin lying wholly within
the SADC region.

Climate change is an alteration to measured quantities (of mainly

rainfall, temperature, radiation, wind, and cloudiness) within the
climate system that departs significantly from previous average
conditions and is seen to endure, bringing about corresponding
changes to ecosystems and socio-economic activity. The most
observable features of climate change in the Zambezi River Basin are
rising average temperatures and the worsening intensity of disasters
such as droughts and floods. It is anticipated that Basin countries that
have a coastline will be affected by sea level rise caused by the
melting of polar glaciers.
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5.4 Causes
Most of the observed increases in global average temperatures over
the past 60 years are due to the buildup of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere resulting from human activities, according to expert
reports (Boko et al., IPCC Working Group, 2007). Human activities
that lead to the warming of the earth’s atmosphere include the
burning of fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and petroleum. The use of
some agricultural and industrial chemicals also leads to the buildup of
greenhouse gases. Greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide and water vapour trap heat in the atmosphere,
causing global warming. Carbon dioxide is the most common
greenhouse gas found in the atmosphere.

Being a global phenomenon, temperature rise in the Zambezi River

Basin is not entirely a result of the greenhouse gas emissions in
southern Africa but also emissions from the rest of the world. This is
not to discount the role played by emissions within the Basin through
sources such as thermal power stations at Chichiri, Lilongwe and
Muzuzu in Malawi; the Copperbelt gas turbines in Zambia; and
Hwange, Harare and Munyati power stations in Zimbabwe (Chenje,
2000).

Another major source of greenhouse gas emissions in the Zambezi

Basin is deforestation. The expansive mature forests store large
quantities of carbon so much that when they are cut and burned the
carbon dioxide that is released contributes to the greenhouse effect.

The Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC states that global

greenhouse gas emissions due to human activities grew by 70%
between 1970 and 2004 (IPCC, 2007). This high rate of greenhouse
gas emissions is partly the cause of the temperature rise in southern
Africa averaging at least 0.5 o C over the past century, resulting in the
1990s being the warmest and driest ever in the Zambezi Basin (IIED,
2006). As a result of the rising temperatures, it is predicted that the
malaria-carrying female Anopheles mosquito will spread to parts of
the region where it has not been found before (IPCC, 2007).

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The Zambezi Basin experiences seasonal and variable rainfall,
resulting in cyclical spells of drought and intermittent floods. The
recent increases in the variability and intensity of drought and flood
spells is attributed to the effects of climate change. Southern Africa is
expected to experience increased incidences of floods and more
intense droughts as a result of warming temperatures. Extensive
droughts affected the basin in 1981-82, 1986-87, 1991-92, 1994-95,
and 2001-3, while floods ravaged parts of the Basin in 1999-2000,
2005-06, as shown in Table 5.1

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Table 5.1: Rainfall Trends in the Zambezi Basin
Period Rainfall trends

2007 Cyclone Favio-induced floods affect Mozambique and parts of Zimbabwe

2005- Parts of Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe flooded

06

2000-
A severe drought in the SADC region, particularly from Zimbabwe
03 northwards

1999- Cyclone Eline hit the region and widespread floods devastated large parts
2000 of southern and central Mozambique, south-eastern Zimbabwe, and parts
of South Africa and Botswana
1997-
98 Normal rainfall throughout most of the region, although impacts of El Nino
were significant
1996-
97
Normal rainfall for most of the region
1994-
95 Many SADC countries were hit by the worst drought in memory,
surpassing effects of the 1991-92 drought in some parts of the region

1993- Conditions improved

94
Severe droughts in Southern Africa, excluding Namibia
1991-
92
Near normal seasons
1988-
90 Drought conditions returned to the region

1986- Near normal seasons, but drought strains from the previous three years
87 were still felt in most parts of the region
1984- Most parts of the region experienced drought
85
Drought in most parts of southern Africa
1982
This period was relatively moist over much of southern Africa
1981-
82 This period was dry across the entire region, with a severe drought in
1967
1974-
80

1967-
73

Source: SADC/ SARDC/ IUCN/ UNEP, 2008.

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5.5 Livelihoods
Disasters induced by climate change cause loss of life for people,
livestock and wildlife; loss of property; and damage to infrastructure.
For example, in February 2007, Cyclone Favio hit Mozambique and
parts of Zimbabwe. The cyclone brought the worst flooding in
Mozambique. In 2000 Cyclone Eline caused floods that killed more
than 700 people and drove more than half a million people from their
homes (SANF, 2007). The 2005-2006 floods in Mozambique and
some parts of Zimbabwe caused considerable structural damage.
Schools and crops were destroyed, as were telecommunications
infrastructure and roads, while in some places whole villages were
flooded prompting relocation of people and livestock to higher ground.
At least 22 people were killed in Mozambique as a result of the floods
and 1,500 people were left homeless and up to 9,000 others were
affected (SANF, 2007).

Several pointers point to a changing climate in the Zambezi Basin.

Average temperatures have increased by 0.5 o C over the past
century, and the frequency and severity of droughts and floods have
increased. The impacts of climate change are already widespread,
ranging from social to economic and environmental. The geographical
range of malaria is spreading, while habitat for wildlife is changing.
The capacity to generate hydro-power is weakening, and access to
water for domestic, industrial and agricultural use is becoming a
challenge. These and other impacts of climate change require
creative and long-term solutions for not only mitigation but also
adaptation strategies. While most of the causes of climate change
can be far from the point of impact, deforestation, which is high in the
Basin, has a major impact on carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. It is
therefore important that the Basin states play a part in curbing high
losses of forests.

5.6 Perceptions by rural communities

The greatest proportion of rural communities in Southern Africa
perceives climate change as purely a natural phenomenon, without
any human intervention being responsible for climate change. These
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natural causes include natural changes in winters, low/ high
temperatures and changes in wind movement, among others
(Mubaya, 2010). In addition, there is an indication that farmers in
many countries seriously disregard the role that is played by
anthropogenic activities in the increase of climatic variability and
change. This fact is reinforced by high percentages of farmers who
assert that causes of climate change have also been due to factors
such as the wrath of cultural spirits and God who have meted out
punishment on their communities. The punishment has been for the
failure of people to continue to appease their spirits and conduct
traditional rites such as the rain making ceremony (mukwerera) for
asking for rain from God and for showing gratitude for the rains in the
previous season. However, some human induced causes of climate
change, have been highlighted by farmers among some rural
communities ..

Understanding of farmers’ perceptions of the causes of climate

change is important. This understanding might be decisive in
determining farmers’ and rural communities’ responses and mitigation
measures to the crisis. In essence, if famers are not aware of the
extent to which anthropogenic activities alter climate related
processes, the implication for adaptation and mitigation is negative.
The farmers would not make efforts to address human activities that
may lead to climate change and variability (Mubaya, 2010).

Case study findings among rural communities in the Midlands

Province of Zimbabwe have indicated that since 2005, rains have
become more unpredictable as they no longer start at the expected
time around October but rather later in November. Within the same
period, temperatures have changed and prolonged winters stretching
into September are now being experienced. Some members of these
communities have attributed these changes to the mass exodus of
people to churches and the abandoning of coordinated traditional
rituals, which were an integral component of the way of life of these
people. Others suspect that “something has gone wrong in the
oceans somewhere” but attribute this to the wrath of God and

141
ancestral spirits. Some believe that these changes have been a form
of punishment by God to Zimbabweans for the political unrest that
has been in the country for a number of years. Farmers have even
cited what they call “endless talks” that were going on between
political leaders in Zimbabwe, and given this as an example of the
cause of the cause of the wrath of God.

Farmers in Southern Africa have pointed to the increased

unpredictability and late onset of rains since around 1992. They have
also noted excessive rains and floods in intermittent years. These
have been particularly devastating to rural communities residing on
the banks of rivers.

Some farmers have observed that rains have become unpredictable

in recent decades. There has been a high incidence of excessive
rains which is a recent phenomenon. There has been an increase in
dry spells since the late 1990s and there is now a high incidence of
winters which prolong until September.

Research findings suggest that farmers in Southern Africa do not only

associate changes in climate with natural factors, but also with social
and spiritual factors (Mubaya, 2010). The implication is that when
there are political, social and economic problems in a country,
farmers tend to link them with climate change. Essentially, the cultural
context and spiritual world play a critical role in shaping farmers’
perceptions and attitudes, a factor which may cloud farmers’
consciousness of the negative effects of human activities on the
earth, particularly on climate change and variability. Therefore if
farmers are not aware of the extent to which activities such as
deforestation may alter natural processes, these farmers may not
consider taking remedial action.

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5.7 Non-climatic stressors

5.7.1 Introduction
It is important to note that climate change amplifies already existing
risks for farmers and rural communities. This is the case because
besides the climatic risk factors, there are also non-climatic risk
factors such as economic instability, trade liberalization, conflicts and
poor governance that may also be faced by rural communities. Other
factors are impacts of diseases such as malaria and HIV and AIDS
and lack of and limited access to climate and agricultural information
(Gandure, 2005; Gandure & Marongwe, 2006; Nyong & Niang-Diop,
2006). Africa is also characterized by institutional and legal
frameworks that constitute a significant risk factor to rural
development (Beg et al., 2002; Sokona & Denton, 2001). However,
vulnerability levels are heightened when there are droughts and
floods, among other climate risk factors (Gandure & Marongwe,
2006). It is important, therefore, to understand that non-climate
factors may compound the situation for farmers already faced with
climate variability and change.

Adaptation to climate change by rural communities is not always in

response to a single stressor such as drought risk, but rather the
outcome of a process of considering simultaneously a wide range of
stressors, including but not limited to climatic factors (Reid & Vogel,
2006). In order to understand what adaptation options are needed
and possible, it is important to identify the climatic variables to which
adaptations relate and to consider the role of non-climatic factors that
influence the sensitivity of rural households to climate change (Wehbe
et al., 2006).

5.7.2 Agricultural stressors

In previous research, risk elements have been considered to include
both climate and non-climate risks such as droughts, floods, macro-
economic conditions, crop failure, crop and livestock diseases, input
supply and pricing fluctuations, among others (Mubaya, 2010). Some
non-climatic stressors that compound climate change impacts among
143
smallholder farmers in Southern Africa include constraints for
increasing agricultural production, such as lack of capital to purchase
agricultural inputs, implements and crop chemicals for crops and
livestock. In addition, farmers in these countries indicate that
inadequate draft power also inhibits their capacity to maximize crop
yields. Loss of cattle due to disease has led to limited draft power
which has reduced their ability to prepare larger pieces of land.
Further compounding these challenges, farmers in many countries
are faced with a lack of appropriate seed varieties and improved
seed. Shortage of water for domestic use is another challenge that
smallholder farmers in Southern Africa have had to contend with. Also
cause for concern is the high incidence of HIV and AIDS. However, to
some extent the problem has been reduced by the availability of Anti-
retroviral Therapy (ART) and food assistance for the chronically ill.
What is emerging from research findings is that there is weakened
government capacity in the rural areas of some countries in terms of
provision of basic services such as non-functional dip tanks,
boreholes, feeder roads and bridges, agricultural marketing facilities,
and health and education facilities.

Other stressors include low pricing for both crops and livestock. Low
livestock prices are imposed on smallholder farmers by buyers who
take advantage of them knowing that because they are poor, farmers
will undertake the transaction as they need the money desperately.

Non-climate stressors in the agricultural sector of Zimbabwe include

limited access to land for cultivation, small landholding sizes for the
majority of the rural population with an average size of 3.2 hectares
nationally in 2003, inappropriate land tenure systems, underutilization
of agricultural land, lack of credit facilities to rural communities, low
ownership of agricultural assets by rural households, shortage of
labour, limited use of fertilizer, and lack of agricultural marketing
facilities (MPSLSW, 2006).

Agriculture is the main source of livelihood in Zimbabwe. Landholding

size determines how the farmers will allocate land for cropping,
grazing and building of homesteads. Both arable area and the
144
potential grazing area, together with other management factors
determine yield potential (total yield) of both crops and livestock.
Community perceptions of the land redistribution exercise are largely
that it has not been adequate, thus landholding sizes of households
remained small.

Land tenure systems determine the ownership of property and,

subsequently, a measure of collateral security. Security of tenure
determines the creditworthiness of the farmers and their asset base.
Tenure can be leasehold, freehold, or state land. State land, where
the farmer only has use rights, is the only form of land tenure in the
communal and resettlement areas. More than ninety percent of
households who have access to land in Zimbabwe have use rights,
and very few households have ownership or leasehold title to land
(MPSLSW, 2006).

At the national level, nearly 70% of households did not fully utilize
their land in Zimbabwe as at 2003. The major reasons for households
not utilizing their land fully were drought (30%), lack of seed/ fertilizer
(25%), lack of draft power (19%), and lack of ploughing implements
(12%) (GoZ, 2006). Lack of draft power, seed and fertilizer are
challenges especially for the very poor households. The problem of
drought as a major reason was expected, given that 2003 was a
drought year following two other years of drought. The results of the
main constraints faced by communities in agriculture further
confirmed these results, where 87% of the communities interviewed
cited agricultural inputs as the main constraint, followed by drought
(81%). Lack of funds came third (45%), followed by other natural
disasters (8%), and lack of draft power (mentioned by 2% of the
communities interviewed).

Availability and accessibility of credit facilities is critical for the

successful implementation of any business venture. Similarly,
successful agricultural production requires capital injection. At the
national level, the highest percentage of communities and their
households access credit through individual money-lenders, followed
by those who access credit from development finance institutions and
145
private finance institutions. The least available credit sources are the
micro-finance institutions.

Ownership of agricultural assets has an impact on agricultural

performance. An insignificant proportion of the agricultural community
owns tractors, and over 50% do not own an ox-drawn plough. Use of
household labour in agriculture in Zimbabwe is prevalent (84%)
among rural households, followed by hired labour and community
labour (16%).

The majority of rural households in Zimbabwe do not use fertilizer in

maize production because it is too expensive. A lower percentage of
households feel that they do not need fertilizer while in some cases it
is either not available or farmers have no transport to ferry it to their
farms.

In the livestock sub-sector in Zimbabwe, stressors include low

numbers of livestock. Analysis of livestock holding sizes indicate that
the majority (more than 50%) of households in the rural areas do not
own any livestock, followed by those who own 1-5 livestock and very
few (less than 5%) who own more than 10 livestock at national level.
The major types of livestock kept are cattle, donkeys, goats, and
poultry. It is important to note that ownership of livestock generally
increases with decrease in poverty.

Livestock is not only an important source of food (meat, milk, and

eggs), but also a source of transport and income. Livestock can be
used as a source of finance for education, to pay medical bills or buy
agricultural inputs, pay bride-price (lobola) or to carry out various
rituals. The proportion of households who sell livestock in order to
generate cash to buy food increases with poverty level of the
household. The situation is different for education, where the
proportion of households who sell livestock to pay educational
expenses increases with decrease in poverty. In summary then, the
analysis of reasons for selling livestock in Zimbabwe show that the
majority of households sell livestock for food, followed by those who
sell livestock for education and health.
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Access to veterinary services, dip tanks, and grazing schemes are
critical inputs in livestock production. In Zimbabwe, most communities
store their wealth in animals, especially cattle. Provision of these
services is one way of facilitating the accumulation of wealth. As high
as 30% and 47% of communities in Zimbabwe have no access to dip
tanks and veterinary services respectively.

It has been observed that the majority of households (62%) at the

national level do not receive any form of extension service (MPSLSW,
2006). Poorer households tend to lack information on community
development and capacity-building programmes and government
activities due to limited access to information. It is important to note
that the most common type of extension service received by rural
households is crop husbandry, followed by animal husbandry. The
proportion of households who did not receive extension services was
higher among communal areas, followed by resettlement areas. This
is a national problem given that communal and resettlement farmers
lack skills in farming, compared to their counterparts in commercial
farming areas.

5.7.3 Educational stressors

A detailed analysis of non-climatic stressors in Zimbabwe is provided
by the 2003 Zimbabwe Poverty Assessment Study Survey report.
With regard to education, there are non-climatic stressors which result
in children being out of school. Evidence abounds that the trend in
primary school enrolments has been on the decline in recent years. It
is important to understand the factors that resulted in the declining of
enrolments in both primary and secondary school. This will give the
government a platform from which to formulate policies and
intervention programs. Nationally, the main reasons for non enrolment
in primary school for the 6-12 years population, across all sectors,
provinces and poverty categories in 2003 are listed in Table5.2

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 Table 5.2: Reasons for children being out of school for the 6-12
year age group, Zimbabwe

Reason Percent

Financial constraints 20.2

School too far 3.8

Ill-health 3.6

Religious/ Cultural 0.2

Children considered too young 65.1

Education considered unimportant 1.1

Could not cope with the educational demands 1.3

Truancy 0.8

To work at home/ farm 0.9

Other 2.0

Total 100

Source: MPSLSW, 2006

The poorest households were more affected by financial constraints

and therefore recorded larger percentages of children being out of
school in the rural areas. While reasons for not enrolling in secondary
school were slightly different from those of primary school enrolment,
financial constraints (70%) continued to be a major reason for
children being out of school. Other reasons were: completed
education (8%), failing to cope (6%), truancy (4%), ill-health (3%),
education not important (2%), pregnancy (2%), to work at home/ farm
(2%), schools too far (1%), and religious/ cultural (less than 1%). It is
apparent that a comparatively high proportion of children in the
148
secondary school going age compared to that of the primary school
going age had financial problems (MPSLSW, 2006). This suggests
that as fees and educational costs rise, more parents cannot meet
educational costs. This is an indication that the rising costs of
education reduce access to education for the poor, thus increasing
their vulnerability and illiteracy.

5.7.4 Health stressors

Non-climate health stressors in Zimbabwe leading to the high
prevalence of diseases such as malaria (the most frequently
occurring disease) and diarrhea included long distances to the
nearest health facility, low staffing at health institutions, and lack of
funds to pay for medical costs (MPSLSW, 2006). Poverty, food
shortages, and inadequate institutional support are major reasons for
child malnutrition in the country.

5.7.5 Poverty and environmental degradation

Poverty and environmental degradation are other non-climate
stressors of our day. But poverty and environmental degradation are
not separate challenges; their inter-linkages are many. Poverty is both
a cause and a consequence of environmental degradation. As a
result, the poor are more affected by environmental decay, and are
less able to protect themselves from its consequences. An
unfavourable macro-economic landscape presents yet another hostile
face to the environment. In Zimbabwe, the depth of the current
challenges shows, more clearly than ever before, just how dependent
the welfare of the whole nation is upon the welfare of its natural
resource base.

Almost 40 percent of Zimbabwe’s economic activity is derived, directly

or indirectly, from natural resources-based activities. Seventy-six
percent of the country’s estimated 12.5 million people live in
communal areas, and they collectively contribute more than 80
percent of its staple food crop annually. This means the country’s
future depends, to a great extent, on its ability to maintain a healthy
natural resource base, particularly in its communal lands.
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Poverty exacerbates environmental degradation by forcing poor
people to overharvest and employ unsustainable natural resources
utilization practices in a bid to survive. For these reasons, poverty
eradication and environmental regeneration must jointly be at the
centre of national development efforts. The future of the environment
in Zimbabwe (and indeed many developing countries) lie in the
recognition and acceptance of an active conservation partnership
between communities, the private sector and the international
financial aid community. The objective is to assist Zimbabwe with the
development of improved systems for institutional management of the
environment.

The environment-poverty nexus was highlighted at the World Summit

on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002. It was a challenge to
sustainable development that needed to redress two issues. These
were the effects of poverty on at least 50% of humanity and the
wasteful consumption and inefficient resource use that perpetuates
the vicious cycle of environmental degradation and increasing
poverty. In its response to the WSSD, the Zimbabwe National
Sustainable Development Strategy (2004) indicates that all provinces
are affected by frequent and severe droughts, inadequate drought-
coping strategies, and environmental degradation. Zimbabwe is
signatory to various multi-lateral environment agreements that focus
on poverty and environment links, such as the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD). National development frameworks and
policies that allude to the poverty-environmental linkages include the
Macro-economic Framework (2005-6), Draft National Environment
Policy (2005) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Although poverty and environmental degradation in developing

countries are the result of the interplay of many historical, socio-
economic and political factors, climate undoubtedly plays an
important role (GoZ, 2006). Poverty is among the factors that propel
human-induced land degradation, since the natural environment
constitutes the bank of last resort, that determine economic

150
opportunities for the poor, who have limited livelihood choices beyond
the natural resources base.

Healthy ecosystems and biodiversity contribute to poverty reduction in

the key areas of food security, health improvement, income
generation, reduced vulnerability, and ecosystem services.
Environmental degradation contributes significantly to many health
threats and results in polluted air, poor sanitation, and the spread of
diseases such as cholera, dysentery, and malaria. Land quality and
productivity decline in cultivated areas resulting in reduced
agricultural yields, affecting the agriculture-based economy and food
security.

The Zimbabwe MDGs progress report (of 2005) notes that recurrent
droughts and floods gave rise to the destruction of livelihoods and
overdependence on the environment. Floods resulted in the
destruction of dams, infrastructure, homes, the environment, and
livelihoods. Droughts have caused high rates of deforestation,
erosion, siltation of rivers and dams, lowering of water tables, and
drying of boreholes resulting in lack of availability and low quality of
drinking water.

To break the vicious cycle of poverty and environmental degradation,

it is essential to integrate conservation of the environment and natural
resources as part of sustainable socio-economic development.
Sustainable use, conservation and environmental management are
synonymous to a life insurance policy, health, sanitation, energy and
water, which reduce vulnerability of communities. The current and
future economic and social well-being is dependent on environmental
well-being. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has
demonstrated that every US$1 invested in water and soil
conservation has a net return of US$13 in poverty reduction
(MPSLSW, 2006).

The Zimbabwean government has responded to the depletion of

natural resources and land degradation by encouraging sound
stewardship of the environment for sustainable livelihoods and
151
development. This effort is through environmental legislation,
institutional arrangements, programmes and initiatives.

5.8 Climatic stressors

5.8.1 Introduction
It is evident that while there is a multiplicity of stressors that bedevil
smallholder farmers in Southern Africa, climate variability and change
in its different forms such as erratic rains, frost, droughts and floods,
are the most critical. Such results are obtained from matrix scoring
and ranking exercises in farmer interviews. Group discussion results
show that while there are a multiplicity of challenges that they have to
contend with, farmers still find that most of these challenges emanate
from the recent changes and variability of climate (Mubaya, 2010).
This is consistent with the findings from a study done by Thomas et
al. (2007) that while climate does not operate in isolation from other
factors, it does play a significant role in how people attempt to shape
their livelihoods for the future. Farmers suggest that constraints such
as lack of capital to buy food and agricultural inputs, shortage of draft
power, imposed and low livestock prices, and pests and diseases of
crops and livestock among others are linked to climate variability and
change.

Smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa are mostly

concerned about disruptions to their farming systems more than they
are concerned with any other disruptions that may not be directly
related to crops and livestock, such as socio-economic status, human
health, and water. Farmers’ perceptions of negative impacts that are
dominant are on crop yield and livestock well being. Farmers have
also highlighted impacts on water resources, presumably because
water is more critical in agriculture than in some other economic
sectors. It has been perceived that due to droughts, most crops had
dried up, a factor which led to reduced crop yield. The major
consequence of a reduction in crop yield is food insecurity.

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5.8.2 Droughts
Many of the drought impacts highlighted by farmers in Southern Africa
transcend the climate dimension and are clearly played out within the
context of other pressures and disturbances on livelihoods. For
example, farmers perceive that drought has impacted on their socio-
economic status. They consider themselves to have been
impoverished by droughts as they no longer have an income from
crop cultivation as before, having had to either restrict or stop selling
produce. This poverty has manifested in the form of the farmers no
longer having money to send their children to school, culminating in a
lot of school drop-outs. In this regard, young men in some rural
communities which have been hard hit by frequent and severe
droughts have resorted to crime to make a living. An example is the
escalation of robberies and raids on some unsuspecting motorists
travelling along the Masvingo-Beitbridge Highway in the drought
stricken Masvingo Province of Zimbabwe. Cattle theft cases are
another form of crime that the young men have resorted to. Farmers
have also been forced to sell their livestock as a result of droughts.
This has negative implications for farmers since livestock is critical for
draft power and various other uses.

Also as a result of poverty in drought periods, the social fabric is

breaking down as it is no longer the norm to assist each other as
neighbours in times of need. It was revealed in in-depth case studies
that farmers are now even embarrassed to ask for assistance from
their neighbours when these farmers know that their neighbours have
too little, which is not enough for their own families. Previous research
has highlighted the important role that social and kinship networks
play in sustaining households in times of need (Drimie & Gandure,
2005). While farmers used to engage in reciprocal work parties, these
farmers have stopped as they no longer have adequate food and
money to sustain these activities, which would lessen labour
requirements and address shortage of agricultural labour force and
draft power. Domestic disputes among rural communities are also on
the increase and leading to broken homes. There are cases of wives
who are leaving their impoverished husbands to go back to their own
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families who were better resource endowed. In many such cases,
these women never return to their husbands.

Migration from and within rural communities has been largely

attributed to drought. Migration is reported to be on the increase in
drought periods due to food insecurity. In areas such as Lower Gweru
and Lupane, and indeed many rural communities in Zimbabwe,
farmers are migrating to engage in gold panning in order to
supplement household income. Farmers are also migrating to other
countries such as Botswana, South Africa and the United Kingdom in
search of a living (Mubaya, 2010). Migration has been cited as having
led to a number of broken homes and a sharp decrease in household
labour, a factor which smallholder farmers have attributed to reduced
yields and has also to the spread of chronic illnesses such as HIV and
AIDS. Subsequent deaths are also considered to have caused an
increase in HIV orphan incidence.

Because of drought, farmers in Zimbabwe and other southern African

countries have resorted to using water from dirty swamps for drinking
purposes due to the unavailability of clean water for domestic use.
This has reportedly caused diarrhoeal diseases. Previous research
findings in have revealed that climate change related diseases in
Zimbabwe are cholera, dengue fever, yellow fever, and general
morbidity. Malnutrition in children has risen during drought periods
due to high food insecurity levels.

During drought periods among rural communities in southern Africa,

there is an acute shortage of water for livestock. This leads to a
marked decrease in the quality of pastures. Poor quality pastures and
limited availability of water reduce the amount of draft power that
could be provided by livestock. In some countries, farmers have
reached a point where they temporarily migrate to areas where they
can get pastures and water for their livestock. Livestock diseases are
on the increase during droughts. These include foot and mouth,
anthrax, black leg, and lumpy skin. These have led to high mortality
rates of livestock. Farmers’ livestock among rural communities in
southern Africa are having to share the remaining dirty water with
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wildlife that have also started moving close to households in search of
water. Spread of diseases from wildlife to livestock has caused an
increase in livestock diseases and deaths. Drought occurrence is also
considered to have caused a reduction in wildlife through deaths in
the past due to a reduction in water flows at the Victoria Falls
(Chigwada, 2004).

However, climate-induced droughts have also had some positive

impacts. There is a marked decrease in the availability of labour to
work in the fields when young people leave for neighbouring countries
during droughts. However, the remaining members of the household
benefit through remittances that are sent back by their children and
relatives. Farmers in Southern Africa indicate that when there are
droughts, they become more hard working and enterprising, leading
to diversification into non-farming activities such as petty trading and
handicrafts. These activities supplement the poor harvests that they
get during drought years. These activities become a way of
adaptation. Remittances and livelihood diversification are considered
to contribute significantly to the livelihoods of rural households (Drimie
& Gandure, 2005; Scoones, 1996).

5.8.3 Floods and excessive rains

Floods and excessive rains have also led to very low yields among
rural communities in southern Africa due to water logging and
leaching. Some crops become stunted due to floods and those that
reach maturity rot. In some cases there is total crop failure. Some
fields are swept away and others are silted, making it difficult for
crops to reach maturity. Moreover, incessant rains make it difficult or
impossible for farmers to weed their fields as most of the time it will
be raining.

During floods, roads are damaged and bridges collapse. This leads to
transport operators withdrawing their services. Feeder roads become
impassable and farmers have to walk long distances to get transport
to ferry inputs from the cities and agricultural produce to the market.

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Houses and schools are destroyed and pupils consequently learn
outside classrooms as roofs are carried away by heavy storms.

Flood waters also contaminate sources of water for domestic use and
this has led to diarrhoeal diseases such as cholera and dysentery.
People (especially children) develop sores on their feet and between
their toes as they walk in water barefoot for a protracted period.
Malaria is another water-related disease in Zimbabwe which has been
linked to floods.

Livestock diseases have also been linked to floods, with foot rot and
blisters cited in cattle. Animal experts confirm that animals such as
cattle, sheep and goats standing in mud water for prolonged periods
of time may develop foot rot (Navarre, 2006). In Africa, precipitation
increase of 14% would be likely to reduce the income of small
livestock farms by 10% (a reduction of approximately US$ 0.6 billion),
mostly due to a reduction in the number of animals kept (Seo &
Mendelsohn, 2006). In addition, livestock are also lost as heavy
floods sweep them away in the pastures.

Floods and excessive rains can also damage wells and households
have had to dig new ones as a result. The overflowing of wells also
means that the water in these wells is no longer safe for drinking.
Rivers are also reported to have been silted after the floods due to
widespread soil erosion. Soil erosion reduces the quality of soil for
crop cultivation, as well as reducing the volume of water available in
rivers for use by humans, livestock, and wildlife.

Not all impacts of climate change induced floods or excessive rains

are negative. For example, farmers in southern Africa have reported
that there is adequate food for livestock as a result of increased
precipitation (Mubaya, 2010). During this time, pastures and
vegetation tend to be green and lavish and there is adequate water
for livestock, conditions which are good for general animal health.
Research has also shown that while their wells normally dry up during
drought periods, when there are excessive rains these farmers have
adequate water for domestic use and also for gardening in the
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wetlands which remain charged throughout the dry season. In
addition, in-depth studies reveal that farmers living on high ground get
good yields for crops such as cowpeas and sweet potatoes at these
times because floods do not affect high ground. Furthermore, during
seasons where there are excessive rains, there is good fruiting of
trees and households benefit from collecting and eating more fruit,
both domestic and wild. In some parts of rural Zimbabwe, some crops
that are planted late manage to do well as the late rains enable them
to reach maturity. This ushers in the notion that access to weather
information is critical for farmers so that they are able to take
advantage of and offset the effects of excessive rains and floods. For
those who live in the vicinity of rivers, live fish are found near
homesteads as they are swept away from rivers. Collection and
consumption of fish, which are an important source of protein, greatly
improves the nutritional status of households.

5.8.4 Some response options

The following response options are among those recommended for
Southern African rural communities: irrigation development;
conservation farming; crop insurance; growing drought-tolerant crops;
wetlands cultivation; early planting; off-farm work; crop diversification;
price stabilization; provision of information; credit subsidies; and land
reform.

Irrigation. Perhaps the most obvious policy response to natural

uncertainty is that of irrigation as an answer to rainfall variability.
Irrigation can serve both to (a) alleviate the risk of drought between
one season and the next; and (b) to smooth out within-season
fluctuations of water supply to plants. In addition, it can permit higher
productivity cultivation practices, such as double cropping (sequential
cropping in the same year), with a direct impact on the volume of
output and farm incomes.

Crop insurance. The most theoretically consistent and

comprehensive proposal for alleviating the impact of natural hazards
is crop insurance. Insurance is logical within a neoclassical framework

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as a method of achieving income security in the face of potential
disasters. People pay risk premiums, representing the average social
degree of risk aversion, and are thence protected against the
incidence of uncertain events. However, in practice crop insurance
has not got very far as a risk policy in agrarian societies.

Resistant varieties. More practical and relevant, because of the much

lower cost in relation to potential benefits, is plant breeding or
selection designed for resistance to pests, diseases and drought, and
stability of yields. There are of course trade-offs here. Stable yields
may not be consistent with the highest attainable yields. Research
station breeding of resistant strains may not be that much more
successful than traditional varieties, or agronomic practices, which
achieved the same end in the past. Moreover, there may be sacrifices
in palatability, storability, etc. of the crop, which are not foreseen
when new varieties are released.

Price stabilization. The most popular policy response to drought-

induced market price instability is price stabilization. Indeed this is the
main economic basis underlying agricultural policies worldwide,
including in all the developed industrial countries. Price stabilization
may take many forms, implying varying degrees of state intervention,
from minimum floor prices for key strategic staples through to fixed
producer prices across a wide range of crops.

Information. Where risk aversion is attributed to inadequate

information (about input prices, new seeds, etc), then information
provision is considered a useful component of risk policy. Diffusion of
information to peasants can take many forms such as extension work,
training and visit programmes, the radio, bulk leaflets, farm education
in schools, etc. The difficulty with this lies not so much in their basic
provision as in ensuring the quality, timeliness, and relevance of the
information with respect to location, latest alternatives, etc. This is
more costly than what might appear at first sight.

Credit subsidies. The provision of subsidized credit is often cited as a

risk related policy, even though it has wider connotations. Where risk
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aversion is related to disaster avoidance, and this prevents the poor
smallholders from adopting higher productivity technologies (e.g. new
seeds) and the variable inputs to go with them (e.g. fertilizer), then
easier credit is often seen as a means of overcoming this barrier.

Land reform. Land reform has the outcome of increasing landholding

sizes among smallholder farmers. Larger landholdings arising from
land reform have the effect of offsetting the negative impacts of low
crop yields (crop output per unit area) experienced by rural
communities in the face of adverse climate change and variability
phenomena such as droughts and floods in Southern Africa. Droughts
result in decreased yields, but if the lower crop yields per hectare are
spread over larger cultivated landholdings which arise from the land
reform process, the resultant effect on total crop output will be to tend
to minimize the negative impacts of yield declines on household food
security and welfare. In this way, land reform makes a positive
contribution to livelihoods and household food security among rural
communities.

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 CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are recommendations for adaptation to climate change
and climate variability. The proposed measures are aimed at reducing
the severity of the negative impacts of climate change in rural
communities. Although the recommendations are targeted chiefly at
developing countries, their applicability to the rural areas of the
developed world is in most cases equally valid. The strategies
presented below are not restricted to minimizing adverse impacts;
some of them are designed to capitalize on or take advantage of the
positive impacts of climate change among communities. The
implementation of this latter group of recommendations, as is the
case with the first group, is meant to improve rural livelihoods and
living standards, reduce rural poverty, enhance other rural
development variables like food security and nutrition, and in general
reduce the drudgery of rural life. Recommended measures include
the ones listed below:

 Strengthen the capacity of farmers and institutions for

identifying and assessing climate changes through
programmes to educate farmers and other relevant
stakeholders on climate change and variability and their
potential impacts on farmers’ livelihoods.

 Make a transition from designing policies that target climate

change issues as a distinct entity, to policies that address
climate change issues as an integral component of multiple
stressors that confront farmers.

 Design appropriate policies that buttress farming systems

against climate variability and change through taking into
account variations in these farming systems and other relevant
factors.

 Make a transition from conceptualization of climate change

impacts in the policy framework as being inherently negative,
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 to research and policy making with an open-minded lens that
dissects climate change and variability impacts in order to
enhance alternative livelihoods for rural communities.

 Provide support for appropriate agricultural innovations and

development of new livelihood activities emerging as farmers
respond to climate variability and change.

 Integrate sectors through interventions that target agricultural

extension, meteorology, academic research and other
developmental activities through civil society organizations.

In order to improve the adaptive capacity of rural communities, there

is need to strengthen institutions and facilities that disseminate
weather information for the benefit of farmers or rural communities.
This is important as there is evidence that seasonal forecasting in
Africa has not reached optimum levels implying that seasonal
forecasting needs to be improved in order to assist farmers in their
activities.

The following are some of the main conclusions arising from our
discussion of adaptation to climate change in the context of
sustainable development and equity:

 Adaptation can significantly reduce adverse impacts of climate

change. Adaptation is an important part of societal response to
climate change. Planned and anticipatory adaptation has the
potential to reduce vulnerability and realize opportunities
associated with climate change effects and hazards. There are
numerous examples of successful adaptations that would
apply to climate change risks and opportunities. Substantial
reductions to damages caused by climate change can be
achieved, especially in the most vulnerable regions, through
timely deployment of adaptation measures.

 In the absence of planned adaptation, communities will adapt

autonomously to changing climatic conditions, but not without
costs and residual damages. Societies and economies have
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 been making adaptations to climate for centuries. However,
losses from climate-related extreme events are substantial,
and in some cases increasing, indicating patterns of
development that remain vulnerable to temporal variations in
climatic conditions and to climate change. The ecological,
social, and economic costs of relying on reactive, autonomous
adaptation to the cumulative effects of climate change are
substantial and largely avoidable through planned, anticipatory
adaptation.

 The key features of climate change for vulnerability and

adaptation are those that relate to variability and extremes, not
simply changed average conditions. Most communities,
sectors, and regions are reasonably adaptable to changes in
average conditions, unless those changes are particularly
sudden or not smooth. However, these communities are more
vulnerable and less adaptable to changes in the frequency
and/or magnitude of conditions other than average, especially
extremes. Changes in the frequency and magnitude of
extremes underlie changes in mean conditions and thus and
thus are inherent in climate change. Adaptation initiatives to
these hazards are of particular need.

 Implementation of adaptation policies, programs and measures

usually will have immediate as well as future benefits.
Adaptations to current climate and climate-related risks
(recurring droughts, storms, floods, and other extremes)
generally are consistent with adaptation to changing and
changed climatic conditions.

 Adaptations to changing climatic conditions are more likely to

be implemented if they are consistent with or integrated with
decisions or programs that address non-climatic stresses.
Vulnerabilities associated with climate rarely are experienced
independent of non-climatic conditions. Impacts of climatic
stimuli are felt via economic or social stresses, and adaptations

162
 to climate (by individuals, communities, or governments) are
evaluated and undertaken in light of these conditions. The
costs of adaptation are marginal to other management or
development costs. To be effective, climate change adaptation
must consider non-climatic stresses and be consistent with
existing policy criteria, development objectives, and
management structures.

 Adaptive capacity varies considerably among regions,

countries, communities, and socio-economic groups. The
ability to adapt and cope with climate change impacts is a
function of wealth, technology, information, skills,
infrastructure, institutions, and equity. Groups with limited
adaptive capacity are more vulnerable to climate change
damages.

 Development decisions, activities, and programs play

important roles in modifying the adaptive capacity of
communities and regions, yet they tend not to take into
account risks associated with climate variability and change.
This omission in the design and implementation of many recent
and current development initiatives results in unnecessary
additional losses to life, well-being, and investments in the
short and longer terms.

 Enhancement of adaptive capacity is necessary to reduce

vulnerability, particularly for the most vulnerable regions,
nations, communities, and socio-economic groups. Activities
required for the enhancement of adaptive capacity are
essentially equivalent to those that promote sustainable
development and equity.

 Current knowledge about adaptation and adaptive capacity is

insufficient for reliable prediction of adaptations and for
rigorous evaluation of planned adaptation options, measures,
and policies of governments.

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  Although climate change vulnerability studies now usually
consider adaptation, they rarely go beyond identifying
adaptation options that might be possible. There is little
research on the dynamics of adaptation in human systems, the
processes of adaptation in decision-making, the conditions that
stimulate or constrain adaptation, and the role of non-climatic
factors.

 There are serious limitations in existing evaluations of

adaptation options. Economic benefits and costs are key
criteria, but they are not sufficient to adequately determine the
appropriateness of adaptation measures. There has been little
research to date on the roles and responsibilities of individuals,
communities, corporations, private and public institutions,
governments, and international organizations in adaptation.

 Given the scope and variety of specific adaptation options

across sectors, individuals, communities, and locations and the
variety of participants, private and public, involved in most
adaptation initiatives, it is probably not feasible to
systematically evaluate lists of particular adaptation measures.
Improving and applying knowledge on the constraints and
opportunities for enhancing adaptive capacity is necessary to
reduce vulnerabilities.

The following are useful guidelines for policy makers dealing with
impacts of and responses to climate change in the rural sector.

 Recent climate changes, particularly temperature increases,

have already affected many physical and biological systems.
Examples of observed changes include shrinkage glaciers,
thawing of permafrost, later freezing and earlier break-up of ice
on rivers and lakes, lengthening of mid- to high-latitude
growing seasons, declines of some plant and animal
populations, etc. Factors such as land-use change and
pollution also act on these physical and biological systems,

164
 making it difficult to attribute changes to particular causes in
some specific cases.

 There are preliminary indications that some human systems

have been affected by recent increases in floods and droughts.
There is emerging evidence that some social and economic
systems have been affected by the recent increasing
frequency of floods and droughts in some areas. However,
such systems are also affected by changes in socio-economic
sectors such as demographic shifts and land-use changes.
The relative impacts of climatic and socio-economic factors are
generally difficult to quantify.

 Many human systems are sensitive to climate change, and

some are vulnerable. Human systems that are sensitive to
climate change include mainly water resources; agriculture
(especially food security) and forestry; coastal zones and
marine systems (fisheries); human settlements, energy, and
industry; insurance and other financial services; and human
health. The vulnerability of these systems varies with
geographic location, time, and social, economic, and
environmental conditions. Projected adverse impacts based on
models and other studies include:

 A general reduction in potential crop yields in most

tropical and sub-tropical regions.

 Decreased water availability for populations in many

water-scarce regions, particularly in the sub-tropics.

 An increase in the number of people exposed to vector-

borne (e.g. malaria) and water-borne diseases (e.g.
cholera), and increase in heat stress mortality.

 A widespread increase in the risk of flooding for many

human settlements from both increased heavy
precipitation events and sea-level rise.

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  Increased energy demand for space cooling due to
higher summer temperatures.

Projected beneficial impacts based on models and other studies

include:

 Increased potential for crop yields in some regions at mid-

latitudes.

 A potential increase in global timber supply from appropriately

managed forests.

 Increased water availability for populations in some water-

scarce regions, e.g. in parts of southeast Asia.

 Reduced winter mortality in mid- and high latitudes.

 Reduced energy demand for space heating due to higher

winter temperatures.

 Projected changes in climate extremes could have major

consequences. The vulnerability of human societies and
natural systems to climate extremes is demonstrated by the
damage, hardship, and death caused by events such as
droughts, floods, heat waves, avalanches, and windstorms.
Conversely, the frequency and magnitude of extreme low
temperature events, such as cold spells, is projected to
decrease in the future, with both positive and negative impacts.
The impacts of future changes are expected to fall
disproportionately on the poor.

 Adaptation is a necessary strategy at all scales to complement

climate change mitigation strategies. Adaptation has the
potential to reduce the adverse impacts of climate change and
to enhance beneficial impacts, but will incur costs and will
address vulnerability and adaptation to climate change, not
simply changes in average climate conditions. Human and
natural systems will to some degree adapt autonomously to

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 climate change. Planned adaptation can supplement
autonomous adaptation, though options and incentives are
greater for adaptation of human systems than for adaptation to
protect natural systems. Experience with adaptation to climate
variability and extremes can be drawn upon to develop
appropriate strategies for adapting to anticipated climate
change. Adaptation to current climate variability and extremes
often produces benefits as well as forming a basis for coping
with future climate change. However, experience also
demonstrates that there are constraints to achieving the full
measure of potential adaptation. In addition, mal-adaptation,
such as promoting development in risk-prone locations, can
occur due to decisions based on short-term considerations,
neglect of known climatic variability, imperfect foresight,
insufficient information, and over-reliance on insurance
mechanisms.

 Those with the least resources have the least capacity to adapt
and are the most vulnerable. The ability of human systems to
adapt to and cope with climate change depends on such
factors as wealth, technology, education, information, skills,
infrastructure, access to resources, and management
capabilities. There is potential for developing and developed
countries to enhance and/ or acquire adaptive capabilities.
Populations and communities are highly variable in their
endowments with these attributes. The developing countries,
particularly the least developed countries, are generally
poorest in this regard. As a result, they have lesser capacity to
adapt and are more vulnerable to climate change damages,
just as they are more vulnerable to other stresses. This
condition is most extreme among the poorest people.

 Adaptation, sustainable development and enhancement of

equity can be mutually reinforcing. Many communities and
regions that are vulnerable to change are also under pressure
from forces such as population growth, resource depletion, and
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 poverty. Policies that lessen pressures on resources, improve
management of environmental risks, and increase the welfare
of the poorest members of society can simultaneously advance
sustainable development and equity, enhance adaptive
capacity, and reduce vulnerability to climate and other
stresses. Inclusion of climatic risks in the design and
implementation of national and international development
initiatives can promote equity and development that is more
sustainable and that reduces vulnerability to climate change.

Based on the analysis of climate change among rural livelihoods, it

can be concluded that improvements in rural livelihoods will require a
range of investments, policies, planning and information, that include
the following:

 Access to forecasts. Erratic rainfall patterns and changing

seasons are upsetting farming cycles in many parts of the
world. Many communities are experiencing changes of
seasons, with rainfall being concentrated into fewer, more
extreme events, or the delayed onset of rainy seasons. With
traditional farming calendars becoming less reliable, farmers
need interventions to help them plan and prepare, including
weather forecasts for assessing when to sow and when to
harvest, and seasonal forecasts for what to sow and how to
manage risk.

 Access to appropriate technology. With increasing salinity,

flooding, or droughts in many areas, many farmers will need
access to seeds for crops that are more salt-, flood-, and
drought-tolerant. Developing these varieties is one part of the
solution, but so is ensuring that they are widely available where
they are needed most. It is important that they perform well
under field conditions, not just under research station
conditions, and that the end user is involved from the outset.
Technologies for adaptation should be targeted at the needs of
the poorest and most vulnerable people, including women,
favouring small-scale technologies that can be adapted locally.
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 Changing management practices. Adaptation requires
consideration of how people use and manage natural
resources, given that these will be under increasing stress from
climate change. A number of factors impact on the resource
base and on the ability of different groups and individuals to
adapt. How resources are accessed, used, or distributed
depends on gender, ethnicity, productive use, wealth, and
informal and formal mechanisms. Agricultural policy must also
be adapted to climate change impacts. The central role of
women in farming in vulnerable communities must be
harnessed through their knowledge of local biodiversity and
wild foods, and household production. Negative impacts must
also be prevented by addressing barriers to women’s
participation in adaptation measures.

 Addressing factors that limit adaptive capacity. Addressing

existing conditions that cause vulnerability to climate change or
limit adaptive capacity are a vital component of adaptation.
Women are often at a particular disadvantage through limited
ownership of land, rights, and assets, or access to credit. If
women have limited control of, or a limited role in decision
making around the allocation of and access to assets, they will
be less able to adapt. Control of assets and access to
agricultural services will be key to enabling effective rural
adaptation.

While adaptive capacity must be increased through

involvement in decision making, education, and awareness
raising, and diversification and risk spreading, provision must
also be made for times when risk is simply unavoidable. A
number of social protection measures have been tried and
tested. These include employment programs, cash transfers,
and crisis-related transfers to overcome short-term crises and
prevent negative outcomes with long-term impacts such as
malnutrition, the sale of assets, and withdrawal of children from
school. Other crises that should be overcome include
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 insurance-related transfers, contributory as well as non-
contributory, to insure against loss of products and assets, and
also of jobs.

 Temperature increase on land and water can result in a

number of impacts that need appropriate intervention. Where it
results in increased heat stress on crops, an appropriate
intervention that contributes to adaptation includes
enhancement of access to heat tolerant crops. When
increased temperatures lead to increased crop water demand
and/ or reduced water availability, intervention measures could
include improved access to drought-tolerant and fast maturing
crops and varieties; increase in soil water content; water-
conserving crop management practices (e.g. ridge planting);
maximizing water capture and storage; and advocacy on
securing rights of access to water supplies for small-scale
farmers.

 Where temperature increase results on heat stress on

livestock, adaptation measures include tree planting for shade
and fodder; and changes to more heat tolerant livestock (e,g, a
shift from cattle to goats). When there is a worsening
availability of fish stocks, this impact could be addressed
through conservation of coastal mangroves and other
vegetation; and sustainable aquaculture, such as fish farming
in ponds.

 When the impact of changes in seasonality is increased

uncertainty for farmers about when to cultivate, sow, and
harvest, adaptation measures could include appropriate,
accessible, and reliable seasonal and weather forecasts; crop
diversification and crop mixing; and livelihood diversification.

 When changed seasonality results in crop damage due to dry

spells within the growing season, adaptation measures could
encompass appropriate, accessible, and reliable weather
forecasts; crop diversification and crop mixing; water capture
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 and storage; access to fast maturing or drought-tolerant crops;
and soil and crop management to conserve water.

 When changed seasonality impacts on rural livelihoods

through crop damage by unseasonal heavy downpours,
sustainable agricultural techniques could be undertaken, in
addition to appropriate, accessible and reliable weather
forecasts. Crop diversification, crop mixing and flood-tolerant
varieties are other alternatives.

 When changed seasonality has the impact of reduced

agricultural seasons, adaptation measures include livelihood
diversification; access to fast maturing/ drought tolerant crops;
and appropriate, accessible, and reliable seasonal and
weather forecasts.

 When there is an increase in intense rainfall or large increase

in annual rainfall, climate change impacts will include
increased frequency or severity of floods. This could be
countered through improved drainage or improvements in
water and sanitation provision.

 When there is a decrease in annual rainfall in arid or semi-arid

areas, increased frequency or severity of drought will occur.
This can be countered through rainwater harvesting;
community water management committees; and access to
more drought-tolerant crops.

Implementation of the following recommendations can also protect

poor rural people from the adverse impacts of climate change.
Recommendations for policy responses are as follows:

 Base strategies for adaptation on vulnerability assessments

and aim to reduce the most important vulnerabilities at
national, regional and community levels.

 Use participatory approaches in identifying adaptation needs

and support community-based adaptation to climate change;
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 focus action at higher levels on activities that are not feasible
at community levels because of cost, scale or capacities.

 Ensure that the information, resources, support and services

needed are available to communities to enable adaptation.

 Take urgent action to facilitate and deliver resources for

adaptation, as delays will result in deeper poverty because of
climate change and risk causing failure of the MDGs.

 Remove conditionalities from international funding

mechanisms for adaptation in developing countries that restrict
eligibility to narrow, discreet activities rather than promoting
integration of adaptation into poverty reduction.

 Enforce the polluter pays principle and ensure that

industrialized countries are accountable for their liabilities for
damage caused by climate change and pay the costs of
adaptation in developing countries.

Recommendations for project approaches are as follows:

 Use participatory vulnerability assessments to identify local

adaptation needs and actions needed to reduce vulnerabilities.

 Build capacity for adaptation in communities through provision

of information, development of skills, strengthening of
institutions and access to technology.

 Build capacity in support institutions by raising awareness of

climate change and providing training in community-based
approaches to adaptation.

 Build resilience by improving risk management and by

increasing and diversifying the livelihood assets available to
vulnerable people.

172
  Emphasize ‘no regrets’ options in adaptation that lessen the
impacts of climatic variability and contribute to poverty
reduction regardless of the eventual extent of climate change.

 Apply technology and participatory processes for the

development and adaptation of technology to reducing
vulnerability in communities.

 Integrate adaptation into poverty reduction as a cross-cutting

issue by ensuring that all projects are ‘climate-proofed’ and
thus do not aggravate sensitivities to climate and are not
vulnerable to projected climate change.

Recommendations for influencing strategies are as follows:

 Influence policy-making and international negotiations to

ensure that adaptation to climate change is addressed in
addition to mitigation.

 Build linkages between government, institutions, the private

sector and civil society needed to support community-based
adaptation.

Finally, urgent action should be advocated on development, poverty

reduction and adaptation, to prevent climate change from making
elimination of extreme poverty unachievable.

173
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