BUNAGAN-BANSIG v. ATTY.

CELERA
A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014

Overview:
Respondent lawyer contracted a bigamous marriage and willfully disobeyed court
orders.
Facts:
1. Complainant, sister of respondent’s wife, filed a petition for disbarment against
respondent for contracting a second bigamous marriage a year after the solemnization
of his first marriage with his legal wife.
2. Complainant presented certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates of both the
first and second marriage.
3. Complainant thus alleges that such act constituted grossly immoral and conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Bar, rendering him unfit to continue his membership in
the Bar.
4. The Court required respondent to file a comment.
5. Respondent failed to submit comment numerous times and would only respond to the
show cause orders that would be given by the Court after each and every failure to
comment.
6. It would then seem that respondent is delaying the resolution of the case by repeatedly
reasoning that he was not able to receive a copy of the complaint.
7. Eventually, he moved to another place and his whereabouts were unknown. He was
declared in default.
8. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended for period of 2 years from
the practice of law.
Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience to lawful court orders.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent is guilty of grossly immoral conduct
and willful disobedience to lawful court orders. DISBARRED.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Legal Bases
a. Rule 1.01, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
b. Canon 7, CPR provides that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession.
c. Rule 7.01, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
2. By contracting a second marriage during the valid subsistence of his first one:
a) Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as
member of the Bar.
b) He made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage.
3. Rule 130, Section 7, ROC provides that certified copies of original documents are
admissible in evidence.
a. Thus, because of the certified copies of the marriage certificates presented by
complainant, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a
second marriage.
 4. Moreover, respondent willfully disobeyed the lawful orders issued by the Court in
requiring him to file a comment on the complaint. The case was therefore delayed and
dragged on for more than 10 years.
5. The Court cannot countenance respondent’s act of disregarding the judicial process and
maneuvering its liberality for him to evade the consequences of his actions.
6. His grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience to lawful court orders warrants
disbarment as provided for under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.

AREOLA v. ATTY. MENDOZA

A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014

Overview:
Respondent lawyer gave improper advice to her clients.
Facts:
1. Complainant, on behalf of his co-detainees, filed an administrative complaint against
respondent lawyer from PAO for deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
and for violation of the CPR.
2. Complainant alleges that respondent, during a speech for Prisoners Week, “advertised”
to the detainees that she can be trusted with their legal matters; that she’ll take care of
or bribe the Judge and Fiscal; and told all the women detainees who were facing drug
charges to beg and cry to the Judge, who was allegedly soft-hearted, so that they can be
released.
3. Complainant, who was knowledgeable in the field of law, further stated that respondent
undermined his capability in drafting his co-detainees’ pleadings and motions for them.
4. Respondent avers, among others, that the complaint was intended to harass her.
5. Respondent admits that she advised her clients and their relatives to approach the
Judge and the Fiscal to beg and cry so that their motions would be granted, and cases
dismissed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent gave improper advice to her clients.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent is guilty of giving improper advice.
REPRIMAND WITH STERN WARNING.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Legal Bases
a) Rule 1.02, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
b) Rule 15.07, CPR provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with
the laws and the principles of fairness.
2. The Court held that respondent’s improper advice only lessens confidence of the public
in the legal system.
3. A lawyer’s duty is not to his client, but to the administration of justice. His client’s
success is wholly subordinate.
4. The Court further held that a lawyer’s conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest
which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s
cause, is condemnable and unethical.
TALISIC v. ATTY. RINEN
A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014

Overview:
Respondent, during his time as judge, failed to require the presentation of documentary
proof of identity before notarizing the subject deed.
Facts:
1. Complainant filed an administrative case against respondent attorney, charging the
latter with falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer
of Wilberto’s mother’s property to Spouses Durante.
2. Complainant explains:
a) That he and his siblings only knew of the transfer after their parents’ death;
b) That his and his siblings’ signatures in the subject document were merely forged;
c) That his name was erroneously spelled “Wilfredo”.
3. In his defense, respondent denies the charge against him and states:
a) That he came to know of the transaction when he was approached during his time
as Presiding Judge of the MTC of Real, Quezon to have the subject deed prepared
and notarized;
b) That he administered the oath for the parties;
c) That the deed contained the certification that there was no other notary public
available in the area to notarize the document; and
d) That the notarial fees paid by the parties were covered by a receipt issued by the
Treasurer of Real, Quezon.
Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent was negligent in the notarization of the subject deed.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative. His notarial commission is therefore REVOKED, and
he is DISQUALIFIED from being him commissioned as a notary public for one year.
Respondent is also WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
shall merit a more severe sanction.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. The Court held that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the
oath in an acknowledgement or jurat is sacrosanct.
2. The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect, turning a private
document into a public one thereby rendering it admissible in court without further
proof of its authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it
engages public interest in a substantial degree.
3. The Court stressed that a notary public’ function should not be trivialized and a notary
public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest,
with accuracy and fidelity.
4. As the Court emphasized in the case of Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, a notary public should
not notarize a document unless that persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest the contents and
truth of what are stated therein.
5. Although there was no evidence of forgery, respondent did not deny that he failed to
require the parties to the deed their presentation of documents as proof of identity.
This negligence thus caused inconsistences in the dates that appeared on the deed.
 6. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
public instruments would be undermined.

ANG v. ATTY. GUPANA

A.C. No. 4545, February 5, 2014

Overview:
Respondent delegated his notarial duties to clerical staff and notarized an affidavit of a
dead person.
Facts:
1. Complainant filed an administrative complaint against respondent for the alleged
commission of forgeries and falsifications, among others.
2. Complainant alleges:
a) That he and two other heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo executed an Extra-
Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition involving a lot. He was thus given his share
of the same.
b) That when he tried to secure a TCT for his portion, he found out that new TCTs had
already been issued in the name of other persons.
c) That there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct participation
in the commission of forgeries and falsifications in preparing and notarizing the
Affidavit of Loss and Deed of Absolute Sale that led to the transfer and issuance of
the new TCTs.
d) That the said Deed which was allegedly executed by Candelaria on April 17, 1989
was antedated and her signature was forged.
e) That the Affidavit of Loss could not have been executed by Candelaria on April 29,
1994 as she died three years prior to its execution.
f) That respondent made himself attorney-in-fact of the other heirs and pursuant to an
SPA, executed a Deed of Sale selling the subject lot, doing so while it was still
involved in a pending civil case.
3. Respondent denied any wrongdoing and that complainant is merely using this complaint
as a tool for his benefit.
4. The Investigating Commissioner found that the reason behind the alleged forged
signatures was because of respondent’s delegating the notarial functions to the clerical
staff of their office before being brought to him for his signature. This is therefore a
violation of Rule 9.01 of the CPR.
Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for violation of his notarial duties.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Respondent is therefore SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year. Furthermore, his notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED
and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for 2 years, with STERN
WARNING.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Legal Bases
a) Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law provides that
the notary public taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person
 acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed.
b) Rule 9.01, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.
c) In the case of Bernardo v. Atty. Ramos, the Supreme Court held that notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public one, thus making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
d) In the case of Flores v. Chua, the Court ruled that when the notary public is a lawyer,
a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to
obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The CPR also
commands him to not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
2. Thus, in the case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria
subscribed to the affidavit before respondent on April 29, 1994. However, Candelaria
was already since 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the
notarial law.
3. The Court held that as a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated
to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by
public policy impressed with public interest.
4. Respondent likewise violated the aforesaid Rule 9.01, CPR. He averred that it has been
his consistent practice to delegate the identification of the parties and other procedures
to the clerical staff and that he would just ask the latter on the relevant details of the
documents before him and sign them.
5. In merely relying on his clerical staff to determine the completeness of the documents
brought to him for notarization, thereby limiting his participation in the notarization
process, and in notarizing an affidavit of a dead person, respondent is liable for
misconduct.

SPOUSES CADAVEDO v. ATTY. LACAYA

G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014

Overview:
Respondent Atty. Lacaya would make a champertous agreement with petitioners for
one-half of the subject property as attorney’s fees.
Facts:
1. The Spouses Cadavedo acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel
of land known as Lot 5415.
2. The spouses sold the subject lot to the Spouses Ames. A TCT was subsequently issued in
their name.
3. Later on, Spouses Cadavedo filed an action before the RTC of Zamboanga City against
the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of the
homestead. The former’s initial legal counsel in this case substituted by Atty. Lacaya
who would eventually help the petitioners in three civil cases.
4. On February 1969, with regards to the main civil case, respondent Atty. Lacaya amended
the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of the spouses Ames’
TCT. Such complaint also stated the petitioners hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee
basis, with the amount of Php 2,000.00. Such will be paid should petitioners prevail in
the civil case.
 5. Eventually, the possession of the property was finally granted to the petitioners. Atty.
Lacaya thus asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the
subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions and selected the more valuable
and productive half for himself.
6. Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente Cadavedo and his sons-in-law entered into the
respondents’ portion and ejected them. Eventually however, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya
entered into an amicable settlement which re-adjusted the portion obtained by each.
But, this settlement would be assailed by the sps. Cadavedo. This Civil Case No. 4038 is
the root of the present case.
7. In this petition, petitioners argue among others:
a) That the CA erred in granting one-half of the subject lot to respondents as attorney’s
fee instead of the originally agreed upon Php 2,000.00 contingency fee; and
b) That the CA erred in upholding the validity of the purported oral contract between
the sps. Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya regarding the division of the subject lot when it
was champertous and dealt with property which then still subject of Civil Case No.
1721.
8. In their defense, respondents point out:
a) That the attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended complaint was not the agreed fee
of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services and that the stipulation was in the nature of a
penalty that, if granted, would inure to the sps. Cadavedo.
b) That both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and subdivision of the subject
lot immediately after the sps. Cadavedo reacquired its possession.
c) That Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the agreement on the contingent
attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot.
d) That the compromise agreement or amicable settlement merely inscribed and
ratified the earlier oral agreement between the sps. Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the agreement on attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot
is void.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative. It resolved to grant the petition and deems Atty.
Lacaya entitled to one-tenth of the subject lot as attorney’s fees.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. The Court held that in controversies between a written and oral agreement on
attorney’s fees, the former shall prevail. Thus, in this case, the written agreement
providing for a contingent fee of Php 2,000.00 should prevail over the oral agreement
providing for one-half of the subject lot. More so because the oral agreement was not
reduced to writing prior to, or at the most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as
the sps. Cadavedo’s legal counsel.
2. Champerty is characterized by “the receipt of a share of the proceeds of litigation by the
intermeddler.” This doctrine was created in response “to medieval practice of assigning
doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation that
such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in
exchange for which they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation.” In
order to safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty were made
subject to criminal and tortuous liability. Eventually, a common law rule striking down
champertous agreements as contrary to public policy was developed. In our jurisdiction,
any agreement by a lawyer to conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the
expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of
the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to law. Thus, a lawyer is forbidden from
contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting
 the case at the lawyer’s expense because the lawyer would acquire an interest between
him and his client. In light of this and the ruling in Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales which
stated that a reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the lawyer in consideration
of some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute is against public policy, the Court
held that the oral contingent fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot is
champertous and is contrary to public policy.
3. In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case
expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the CPR. Under
Rule 42 of the CPE, a lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall
pay or beat the expense of litigation.
4. The Court also held that Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum
meruit basis, or “as much as he deserves”. Such will be based on the factors
enumerated under Rule 138, Section 24 ROC and Canon 20 CPR.
5. On a final note, the Court held that litigation should be for the benefit of the client, not
the lawyer. Premium consideration is on the rights of the owner, not the lawyer who
only helped the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around;
otherwise, the lawyer will indeed acquire a property right over the disputed property.

PICHON v. ATTY. AGLERON, SR.

A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014

Overview:
Respondent failed to file his client’s complaint before the court just because of the
latter’s nonpayment of the filing fee and 30% of the attorney’s fee.
Facts:
1. Widowed Complainant engaged the services of respondent attorney to file charges
against the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental for the death of her husband.
2. On three occasions, respondent requested and received funds for the payment of filings
and sheriffs fees amounting to a total of Php 10,050.00. However, no complaint was
filed by him.
3. Respondent admitted that complainant engaged his services and that he received the
said amount. However, he explained that their arrangement was that complainant
would pay the filing fees and other expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared
and ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of Php
100,000.00.
4. Respondent avers that complainant failed to pay the 30%. Thus, since the complaint
could not be filed in court, the amount of Php 10,050.00 was deposited in a bank whil
awaiting payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s fee.
5. In her reply, complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the filing fee
and asserted that the filing fee at that time only amounted to Php 7,836.60.
Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the CPR.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent violated the CPR by neglecting a
legal matter entrusted to him. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 3
months, with a stern warning.
Ratio Decidendi:
 1. Rule 18.03, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
2. The Court ruled that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to
serve his client with competence, and to attend his client’s cause with diligence, care
and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
3. In this case, respondent admitted his failure to file the complaint and attributed it to
complainant’s nonpayment of the full payment of the filing fee and the 30% of the
attorney’s fee.
4. Such justification is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from liability, for a case
entrusted to him as a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he accepts this for a fee
or for free.
5. Even assuming that complainant had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he
should have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of
the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Respondent obviously lacked
professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when he failed
to file the appropriate charges.

RE: MELCHOR TIONGSON, HEAD WATCHER, DURING THE 2011 BAR EXAMINATIONS
B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014

Overview:
Respondent brought in a digital camera inside the bar examination room.
Facts:
1. An administrative case was filed against Melchor Tiongson for violation of the
Instructions to Head Watchers, particularly by bringing in a digital camera inside the bar
examination room.
2. During the 2nd Sunday of the Bar Examinations, respondent brought his digital camera
inside Room No. 314.
3. His fellow Head Watchers allege that after the morning exam for Civil Law, respondent
took pictures of the Civil Law questionnaire using his digital camera.
4. Respondent also did the same with respect to Mercantile Law questionnaire after the
afternoon examination.
5. Respondent admitted that he brought his camera inside the bar examination room,
explaining that he did not surrender his new digital camera to the badge counter
personnel for fear that they might be negligent in handling it.
6. The Office of the Bar Confidant revoked respondent’s designation as head watcher and
found him guilty of dishonesty and gross misconduct for violating the Instructions to
Head Watchers.
Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent’s liability violating the Instructions to Head Watchers
prohibition against bringing in a digital camera amounts to dishonesty and gross
misconduct.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the negative, finding respondent guilty of only simple misconduct. He
is SUSPENDED for one month and one day, with WARNING. He is also PERMANENTLY
DISQUALIFIED from serving as bar personnel in any capacity, in succeeding bar
examinations.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. The Instructions to Head Watchers issued by the OBC specifically prohibits the bringing
of cameras, among others, inside the bar examination room; and, that a violation of the
instructions shall be a sufficient cause for disqualification from serving for the remainder
of the examinations and in future examinations.
2. The Court agrees that respondent is guilty of violating the prohibition but does not
agree that such wrongful acts amounts to dishonesty and gross misconduct.
3. The Court held that misconduct is grave if corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of an established rule is present; otherwise, the misconduct is only
simple.
4. On the other hand, dishonesty refers to a person’s disposition “to lie, cheat, deceive or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.”
5. As a CA employee, respondent disregarded his duty to uphold the strict standards
required of every court employee, that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and
obedience to the judiciary.
6. Due to the circumstances of the case; respondent’s length of service in the CA and in the
bar examinations, and his first time to commit an infraction; and the classification of
simple misconduct by the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as a
less grave offense, the above said penalty is meted out to respondent.

FIGUERAS and VICTORIA, JR. v. ATTY. JIMENEZ

A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014

Overview:
Respondent failed to file the appellant’s brief within reglementary period for its
submission.
Facts:
1. Complainants, as members of the Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc.,
filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent for his negligence in filing the
appeal of a civil case which his law firm handled for the said Association.
2. Respondent failed to file the appellant’s brief within the proper period, thereby causing
the Association’s loss of the case.
3. Respondent denied administrative liability, claiming that although his law firm
represented the Association in the said civil case, the case was actually handled by an
associate lawyer in his law firm and that he merely exercised general supervision over
the handling lawyer. He also claims that the disbarment case was filed to harass him.
Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent is administratively liable.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent is administratively liable. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 1 month.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Legal Bases
 a) Canon 12, CPR provides that a lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
b) Rule 12.04, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not unduly delay a case.
c) Canon 18, CPR provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
d) Rule 18.03, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
e) In the case of In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos, the Court held that an attorney is
bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable
negligence on his part. The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the
duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to
aid in the speedy administration of justice.
2. The records show that respondent was only able to file the appellant’s brief 95 days
after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief. To justify his
inexcusable negligence, respondent reasons that he merely supervises the handling
lawyer and that the fault lies with the latter. His contention is belied for the records also
show that respondent signed on behalf of the law firm an Urgent Motion for Extension
with the CA. Thus, it is clear that he was personally in charge of the case and that he
failed to uphold his duties as legal counsel.

BRUNET v. ATTY. GUAREN

A.C. No. 10164, March 10 2014

Overview:
Respondent received partial payment of his acceptance fee, but failed to perform his
obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants’ lot.
Facts:
1. Complainant filed a complaint against respondent before IBP-CBD.
2. Complainants allege
a) That they engaged the services of respondent for the titling of a residential lot they
acquired.
b) That respondent asked for Php 10,000.00 including expenses relative to its
proceeding;
c) That it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of
the title;
d) That respondent asked for an advance fee of Php 1,000.00 which they gave;
e) That respondent took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot;
f) That respondent for an additional payment of Php 6,000.00 which they gave;
g) That they always reminded respondent about the case and each time he would say
that the titling was in progress. Eventually, they demanded back the money they
paid;
h) That respondent agreed to return the money provided that the amount of Php
5,000.00 be deducted to answer for his professional fees.
3. Complainants also allege that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship
with respondent, the latter made a special appearance against them in another case.
4. Respondent admitted that he charged complainants an acceptance fee of Php 10,000.00
but denied that the amount included expenses for the titling of the lot. He also explains
that their agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the complainants
fully paid his acceptance fee.
 5. Respondent also avers that he did not take the documents relative to the titling of the
lot and he did not betray the complainants’ trust when he made a special appearance
against them.

Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the CPR.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent is guilty of violating the CPR and is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Legal Bases
a) Canon 17, CPR provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
b) Canon 18, CPR provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
2. The Court held that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration, and duty
to public service and the administration of justice the primary one.
3. In this case, respondent admitted that he accepted funds for partial payment of his
acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the
titling of the complainants’ lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Respondent breached his
duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him.

LORENZANA v. JUDGE AUSTRIA, RTC BRANCH 2, BATANGAS CITY

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014

Overview:
Respondent committed an act of impropriety by posting “seductive” photos on
Friendster.
Facts:
1. Complainant filed an administrative complaint against respondent alleging, among
others, that she committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs
in a social networking website called “Friendster” and posted her personal details as an
RTC Judge. This was done so by her allegedly to find a compatible partner.
2. Respondent also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly
suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
3. In her comment, respondent submitted that the photos posted at Friendster could
hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an off-shouldered attire is an
acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden.
4. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges and
that she is proud of her photo being aesthetically made.
5. Complainant made a reply, insisting that respondent’s acts of posting “seductive”
pictures and maintaining a Friendster account constituted acts of impropriety in
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
 6. The CA ruled that respondent’s act of maintaining a personal social networking account,
even during these changing times, constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be
legally justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent committed an act of impropriety by maintaining a social
network account.
2. Whether or not respondent committed an act of impropriety by posting photos of her
wearing an “off-shouldered” suggestive dress.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the negative with respect to maintaining a social network account.
2. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Respondent is therefore ADMONISHED to refrain
from further acts of impropriety.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Legal Bases
a) Canon 4, Section 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that in the exercise
of their freedom of expression, judges should always conduct themselves in a
manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.
b) Canon 4, Section 1 of the same Code provides that judges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
c) Canon 4, Section 2 of the same Code provides that as a subject of constant public
scrutiny, judges must accept persona restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
2. The Court held that it is not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking
sites in the Internet. While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and
from taking part in social networking activities, they must be reminded that they do not
thereby shed off their status as judges. Judges carry with them in cyberspace the same
ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her
everyday activities.
3. Respondent’s act of posting the subject photos on Friendster constitutes impropriety.
She disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she
posted those photos and made them for public viewing. As a judge, she must always
bear in mind of what she is communicating.
4. It may be acceptable for some of her friends and family to see her in such photos, but
when the same was subjected to public consumption, respondent placed herself in a
situation where she, and the status she holds as judge, may be the object of the public’s
criticism and ridicule.
5. Lastly, the Court held that as the visible personification of law and justice, judges are
held to higher standards of conduct and thus must comport themselves accordingly. The
very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality,
decency and propriety in both their performance of their duties and in their daily
personal lives.
QUIACHON v. ATTY. RAMOS
A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014

Overview:
Respondent failed to inform his client of the status of the case and to avail of the proper
legal remedy available.
Facts:
1. Complainant filed a disbarment case against her own lawyer, herein respondent, for
gross negligence and deceit in violation of the CPR.
2. Complainant would always ask respondent about the status of her case before CA. The
latter always told her that there was no decision yet.
3. Sometime however, while complainant was in respondent’s office waiting for him to
arrive, she noticed a mailman delivering an envelope with the title of her labor case
printed thereon. She then asked the secretary of respondent to open it and was
surprised in discovering that it contained an Entry of Judgment of the CA’s decision.
4. Complainant tried to contact respondent, but to no avail. When they finally got to talk,
respondent reassured her that they have six months to appeal the case to the SC. After
that however, there were no more updates on the labor case.
5. In his defense, respondent averred that complainant was informed of the status of the
case.
6. Despite the finding of respondent’s liability, the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors resolved to mete out an improper penalty and dismiss the case
because of the decision to withdraw the complaint.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the case should be dismissed because the complaint has been
withdrawn.
2. Whether or not respondent violated the CPR.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the negative.
2. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Respondent is therefore meted out the proper
penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for 6 months.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Legal Bases
a) In the case of Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, the Supreme Court held that the affidavit of
withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in
any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. The complainant is no sense a party
 but merely a person who brought the matter to the attention of the Court to the
alleged misconduct of the attorney.
b) Rule 18.03, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
c) Rule 18.04, CPR provides that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case, and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.
2. With regards to the first issue, the Supreme Court reminded the Investigating
Commissioners and members of the IBP Board of Governors that the withdrawal of a
disbarment complaint does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this
Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
3. The Court also ruled that the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to
the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. There is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real
question of determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. Public interest is the
primary objective.
4. With regards to second issue, the Court held that the failure of respondent to file an
appeal from the CA decision without any unjustifiable reason deserves sanction.
Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an appeal should properly withdraw their
appearance and allow their client to retain another counsel.
5. Respondent failed not only to keep the client informed of the status of the case, but also
to avail of the proper legal remedy that would promote the client’s cause. All lawyers
owe fidelity to their client’s cause. Regardless of their personal views, they must present
every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause.

ATTY. PAGUIA v. ATTY. MOLINA

A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014

Overview:
Complainant makes bare allegations that respondent gave wrongful legal advice to his
clients.

Facts:
1. Complainant attorney filed a complaint for dishonesty against respondent attorney for
allegedly advising his clients to enforce a contract on the complainant’s client who had
never been a party to the agreement.
2. A conflict existed between neighbors in a four-unit compound. Amongst these
neighbors were the clients of complainant and respondent respectively.
3. The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with their neighbors regarding the
internal rules of the compound, save for the clients of complainant.
4. Complainant alleges that respondent advised his clients that complainant’s client are
covered by the contract despite the fact that they did not sign.
5. The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit because:
a) The complaint consisted only of bare allegations;
b) Even assuming that respondent gave said advice, he could not be held accountable
in the absence of proof of malice or bad faith.
6. The IBP Board of Governors approved the Commissioner’s Report. No petition for
review of the resolution was filed with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not complainant’s case would prosper.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the negative. The resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
AFFIRMED.

Ratio Decidendi:
1. The Supreme Court held that when it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, the
quantum of proof is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proofs falls upon
the complainant.
2. In this case, complainant is without factual basis as to his allegations of respondent
giving legal advice of such nature.
3. Even assuming that respondent did provide his clients with such advice, he cannot be
held administratively liable absent proof of bad faith or malice.
4. The default rule is presumption of good faith. Bad faith is never presumed. It is a
conclusion to be drawn from the facts. In the absence of factual evidence to support
such a conclusion, the presumption of good faith therefore stands in this case.

REX M. TUPAL v. JUDGE ROJO, BRANCH 5, MTCC, BACOLOD CITY

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014

Overview:
Respondent violated basic rules of notarization by improperly notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation of marital parties whose marriages he also solemnized.
Facts:
1. Complainant filed with the OCA a complaint against respondent judge for violating the
Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.
2. Respondent allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He
instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties.
He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage. These “package
marriages” are allegedly common in Bacolod City.
3. Complainant presented as evidence 9 affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by
respondent.
4. Complainant contends:
a. That respondent violated Circular No. 1-90 which allows municipal trial court judges
to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with
their official functions and duties.
b. That affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official functions and
duties as solemnizing officer.
c. That respondent cannot therefore notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage he solemnized.
d. That respondent violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice by notarizing such
affidavits without fixing his judicial seal on the affidavits and by not requiring the
parties to present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law.
5. On the other hand, respondent comments:
a. That complainant was only harassing him.
b. That complainant filed the complaint only to delay the perjury case against his father
which was pending before respondent’s court.
 6. Respondent did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation, arguing that
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties
as judge and that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of
the Judiciary does not prohibit judges from notarizing such affidavits of parties whose
marriage they will solemnize. He thus concludes that he did not violate the said Circular.
7. Respondent also argues that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
because he was a judge and therefore he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the
affidavits he notarized.
8. Also, respondent argues that he need not notarize the affidavits with parties presenting
their competent pieces of evidence of identity since he interviewed them as to the
contents of their affidavits and that their identities are unquestionable.
9. Respondent also alleges that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also practiced
the same manner. He pleaded not to make him complainant’s doormat, punching bag
and chopping block.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of
gross ignorance of the law.

Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct, Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. He is therefore SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE for 6 months.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Legal Bases
a. Circular No. 1-90 provides that MTC and MCTC judges are empowered to perform
the function of notaries public ex officio under Sec. 76, RA No. 296 as amended
(otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Sec. 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code, provided that they notarize only documents that are
connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties.
b. Article 34 of the Family Code provides that the contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
c. Sec. 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by Members of the
Judiciary provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the
marriage in legal ratification of cohabitation. – In the case of a marriage effecting
legal ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally
interview the contracting parties to determine their qualifications to marry; (b)
personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to the fact of
having lives together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and the absence of
any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement
showing compliance with (a) and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
d. Rule IV, Section 2, par. B of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary
public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him.
Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to present a competent
evidence of identity.
e. In the case of Santos v. Judge How, the Court therein held that good faith does not
apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and
basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.
 2. The Court held that respondent notarized affidavits of cohabitation which were
documents not connected with the exercise of his official function and duties as
solemnizing officer and without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in
his court’s territorial jurisdiction. He thus violated Circular No. 1-90.
3. The person who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be
the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage, for notarizing the said affidavit is not
connected to the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize marriages. As a
solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit is to examine whether
the parties have indeed lived together for at least 5 years without legal impediment to
marry. A judge cannot objectively examine a document he himself notarized.
4. Moreover, Art. 34 of the FC and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary assume that “person authorized by law to administer oaths”
who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the “solemnizing officer” who performs
the marriage ceremony are two different persons.
5. In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation respondent notarized, he only stated that the
parties subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Respondent did not state
that the parties were personally known to him or that the parties presented their
competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, respondent violated the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.
6. Lastly, respondent’s citation of the ruling in Santos v. Judge How which stated that good
faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are defenses
against gross ignorance of the law is not meritorious. For the issues in this case are so
simple and thus, good faith does not apply. The Court additionally held that if the law
involved is basic, ignorance constitutes “lack of integrity”. Hence, by violating basic legal
principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.

OCA v. JUDGE LARIDA, JR., RTC, BRANCH 18, TAGAYTAY CITY

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014

Overview:

Facts:
1. In the course of its investigation of a mysterious fire that was started in the records
storage room of RTC Branch 18, the OCA found that respondent presiding judge
committed several anomalies. Among others:
a. Violation of Adminstrative Ciruclar No. 28-2008 by authorizing the detail of locally-
funded employees to his court without obtaining permission from the Supreme
Court and for allowing them to perform more than merely clerical tasks; and
b. Knowingly allowing detailed employees to demand commissions from bonding
companies in exchange for the issuance of release orders.
2. Respondent did not submit or cause to be submitted to the Court within one month
from receipt of the said Circular an inventory of all locally-funded employees detailed in
Branch 18.
3. Upon knowing the act of demanding commissions from bonding companies by the
detailed employees, respondent said to them that they should refrain from doing so and
that it was up to the said companies to give them any amount.
4. In response to the alleged violation of Administrative Circuler No. 28-2008, respondent
asserts that he tasked his clerk of court Atty. Calma to make and send to the SC the
inventory of the detailed locally-funded employees, but the latter did not comply.
5. Respondent admits that his detailed employees drafted court orders and had done legal
research.
Issue:
 1. Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for the acts alleged against him.
Court’s Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent is thus liable and is therefore meted
out with the consolidated penalty of SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE for 2 months.

Ratio Decidendi:
1. Legal Bases
a. Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 provides that the Presiding Judge/Executive
Judge shall submit to the SC through the OCA, within one month from receipt of this
circular, an inventory of all locally-funded employees detailed in their respective
court branches.
b. Paragraph 3 of the same Administrative Circular also provides that the service of
locally-funded employees is confined to giving assistance in the performance of
clerical works, like receiving letters and other communications for the Branch, typing
of addresses on envelopes for mailing, typing of certificates of appearance, and
typing of monthly reports.
c. Rule 3.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should not take or
initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
2. The Court held that respondent committed several lapses, specifically the non-
submission to the Court of the required inventory of locally-funded employees, and his
allowing detailed employees to perform more than clerical tasks. Such lapses
manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules and regulations issued for the
governance and administration of the lower courts, to the extent of disregarding them,
as well as a laxity in the control of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning
staff. The omission should not be blamed on Atty. Calma, given the wording of the
Admin. Circular which directly burdens the Presiding Judge with that responsibility.
3. Also, by allowing his detailed employees to do more than clerical work, he violated the
said prohibition under Paragraph 3 of the Admin. Circular. The intent of the prohibition
was to preserve the confidentiality of court records and proceedings, because such
employees were not employed in the Judiciary.
4. Lastly, respondent was not unaware of the solicitations from bonding companies being
done by the detailed employees. Such acts solicitations were surely irregular and
improper activities undertaken by persons visibly working for the courts. Respondent,
upon knowing the irregularity, should have done more than merely confront the said
employees and tell them to stop the solicitations. The Court held that respondent
should have conducted an investigation into the matter and, if the evidence warranted,
seen to their proper criminal prosecution, as required by the Code of Judicial Conduct.