Jether K.

Corpuz

GUEVARRA vs. EALA

A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case concerns a complaint for disbarment filed against herein respondent for

committing gross immoral conduct and violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and

the Lawyer’s Oath.

FACTS:

Complainant alleges that respondent Atty. Eala, who is also married and has three

children, flauntingly entered into an adulterous relationship with his wife Irene, thereby

abandoning and neglecting his own family, and that he also flaunted his aversion to the

institution of marriage as a mere “piece of paper”. Complainant further states that his wife would

receive phone calls and affectionate messages from respondent; that she would constantly stay

out late at night and that she abandoned the conjugal abode when he saw respondent and Irene

together for the second time. Complainant also presented an “I Love You” card from respondent

that was addressed to Irene and given on their wedding day, which stated respondent’s profound

love for the latter; and a newspaper article showing respondent and Irene together at an event at

SM Megamall. Additionally, complainant saw respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly

parked at a place where, as he later learned, Irene was already residing. He was also told that his

friends saw respondent and Irene at a concert, the latter being pregnant. Thus, complainant

attached a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth of the child named Samantha, stating that the

latter’s father was respondent lawyer.

In his Answer, respondent admits that he sent the said card; but denies having ever

flaunted his adulterous relationship with Irene which he explains was low profile, not under

scandalous circumstances and known only to immediate members of their respective families,
even by his own legal wife. Respondent also explains that his statement of “a mere piece of

paper” referred to the formality of the marriage contract between complainant and Irene.

Despite the charge being sufficiently proven by the IBP-CBD Investigating

Commissioner, the IBP Board of Governors annulled and set aside the latter’s Report and

Recommendation. Hence, the present petition filed before the Court by complainant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent lawyer committed grossly immoral conduct and violations of

the ethical standards of a lawyer.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent is guilty of grossly immoral conduct

and violations of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Rule 1.01 of the CPR provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.” And, Rule 7.03 of the same also provides that “a lawyer shall not

engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.” Also, the Lawyer’s Oath

provides that the lawyer taking the same “will support [the] Constitution and obey the laws”.

The Court held that respondent denied ever flaunting their adulterous relationship, but he

never denied the existence of the same. The records show that respondent was well aware of the

recognition afforded by the Constitution to marriage and the marital duties mandated by the

Family Code between husband and wife. Thus, as held in the case of Vitug v. Rongcal, “sexual

relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate

disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and

affirmed by our laws.” Moreover, in the case of Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, it was ruled that the

respondent lawyer therein who carried on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly

immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession, renders him unfit and deserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his

license confers upon him.

It is of no merit that the relationship between respondent and Irene was low profile and

never flaunted, for the transgression lies in its adulterous nature. Respondent therefore

committed grossly immoral conduct, violated the abovementioned provisions of the CPR and

disregarded the constitutionally-recognized sanctity of the institution of marriage and the duties

imposed therein by the Family Code.

Jether K. Corpuz

OCA v. PRESIDING JUDGE RUIZ, RTC, BRANCH 61, MAKATI CITY

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361, February 2, 2016

FACTS:

In a decision laid down by the Sandiganbayan’s First Division which the OCA received a

copy and made a report out of, respondent judge was convicted of the crime of malversation and

for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act. It was held that, during his tenure as mayor of Dapitan City before becoming a

judge, he instigated Police Inspector Pepe Nortal to withdraw funds from the Confidential and

Intelligence Fund (CIF) for his personal benefit.

Respondent judge thus filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing

his convictions by the Sandiganbayan. Eventually, in a resolution, the Supreme Court’s third

division considered the OCA’s report as a formal complaint against the respondent for having

been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; furnished the respondent with a copy of the

OCA’s report and to require him to file a comment; and suspended respondent from office

without benefits.

In his comment, respondent avers that the administrative complaint against his is

premature because his Sandiganbayan convictions are not yet final and that he should no longer

be suspended having already retired from government service by the time he received a copy of

the Court’s resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for wrongful acts he committed

before he became a judge.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, that respondent is administratively liable for the

crimes he has been convicted of. He is therefore dismissed from service as a judge and disbarred

as a lawyer.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

In the case of OCA v. Judge Sardido, the Court therein ruled that whether the criminal

case against therein respondent judge relates to an act committed before or after he became a

judge is of no moment. Moreover, it is emphasized that judges should be the embodiment of

competence, integrity, and independence, and their conduct should be above reproach. A

magistrate is judged, not only by his official acts, but also by his private morality and actions.

For the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary is founded not only on the competence and

diligence of the members of the bench, but also on their integrity and moral uprightness.

The records show that, based on the testimonies by the city budget officer, city treasurer

and city auditor of Dapitan City and other relevant evidence, respondent judge during his time as

mayor had unliquidated cash advances from the CIF and that it was irregular to have processed a

request for funds intended for the entire year. Furthermore, the latest withdrawal from the same,

in which he instigated Inspector Nortal to do so for him and which he had documentarily

approved, was timely as it was done after he lost in his re-election bid for mayor.

Having failed to refute the evidence presented against him and considering his violation

of the high standards of morality, decency and probity expected of him as a judge, the Court

imposed the supreme administrative penalty of dismissal from service as provided for under

Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

Administrative Matter No. 02-9-02-SC provides that an administrative case against a

judge based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of
the Bar shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the

Bar. It also states that judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or

resolution. Also, Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be

removed from the practice of law for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, in

light of these provisions and his convictions by the Sandiganbayan for a crime involving moral

turpitude, the Court also disbarred respondent as a member of the Bar.

CONCURRING OPINION (JUSTICE MARVIC F. LEONEN)

Justice Leonen concurs with the majority ruling and opinion of the Court. However, he

explains that there may be situations where a closer review of the facts and corresponding

charges or crimes is necessary, such as in the instance when the Judicial and Bar Council deemed

an applicant qualified for a position in the judiciary despite a pending case against the latter.

Before an applicant is appointed to the judiciary, he or she is subjected to the rigorous

application and nomination procedure of the Judicial and Bar Council, which evaluates

applicants based on the minimum qualifications provided under the Rules of the Judicial and Bar

Council. The same Rules disqualify an applicant for an appointment to the judiciary if he or she

has a pending criminal or administrative case before the courts.

By nominating an applicant for appointment, the Judicial and Bar Council gives it

imprimatur to the applicant and deems him or her to be qualified for a position in the judiciary.

Justice Leonen thus states that if the Court does not carefully consider the prior acts of judges or

justices and automatically finds convictions or pronouncements of guilt as a reflection on their

qualifications, then it would disregard the JBC’s nomination process. Such disregard would be

more apparent and fatal when the President by his appointing authority appoints a nominee from

the JBC’s list. To automatically dismiss a judge in such a manner would undermine the said

authority of the President.

DISSENTING OPINION (JUSTICE LUCAS P. BERSAMIN)

Justice Bersamin dissents to the majority ruling and opinion of the Court. The

administrative matter may have been prematurely adjudicated in light of the pending appeal by
the respondent of his Sandiganbayan convictions. Pronouncing respondent guilty in the present

case would prejudice his appeal. Thus, it is humbly opined that the Court exercise self-restraint

and await the outcome of the appeal before deciding this administrative matter.

Also, it is believed that it was improper to have appreciated the testimony of Police

Inspector Nortal against herein respondent, given that the former, a co-conspirator, was not

discharged as a state witness in accordance with the procedure under Rule 119, Section 17 of the

Rules of Court. It is required under the said rule that the discharged witness must not appear to

be the most guilty. In the case of Jimenez Jr. v. People, the Court held that “most guilty” refers to

the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and

does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed.

The records do not show that the procedure in discharging a state witness was properly

observed. Thus, Inspector Nortal’s testimony should not have been used against respondent

judge. He remains as a co-conspirator, having been the one who withdrew the subject funds from

the CIF without force or intimidation on the part of respondent. Moreover, the person liable in

malversation is the public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for

public funds or property, and appropriates the same. Here, that public official was Nortal, not the

respondent, for all documents relating to the withdrawal indicated that the cash advance was

payable to the former.

Lastly, with regards to the penalties imposed, dismissal from service is not proper in light

of the mitigating factors noted. Because he could no longer be suspended by reason of his option

for early retirement, the recommended penalty is a fine of Php 40,000.00. Also, the disbarment

of respondent is unfounded. For the acts complained of were done by him in his capacity as

Mayor of Dapitan City and does not involve his professional or ethical conduct as an attorney.

Disbarment is unfair because such penalty is only proper when the attorney commits any

misconduct of a very serious or gross nature in connection to the discharge of his professional

responsibilities.
Jether K. Corpuz

NAVARRO and PRESBITERO v. ATTY. SOLIDUM, JR.

A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent attorney signed a retainer agreement with complainant Presbitero to follow

up the release of the payment of the DAR for the latter’s 2.7 hectare property and the payment of

debts to the PNB, among others. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10%

of the proceeds from the sale of the said property, with expenses to be advanced by Presbitero

but deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent thus received Php 50,000.00 from Presbitero

for the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.

Later on, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo, also engaged the service of

respondent to handle the registration of her property. The latter convinced her sister, complaint

Navarro, to shoulder the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent undertook the

task in consideration of 30% of the value of the property. After providing the needed money,

Navarro later learned that the property was already registered in the name of one Teodoro Yulo

and alleged that she would not have spent for the registration if she was informed earlier of the

status of the property.

Respondent also obtained loans from both complainants and executed several

Memorandums of Agreement for each loan, which respectively provided the duration of the loan,

the interest rate, and security by real estate mortgage of properties. Additionally, respondent

issued post-dated checks drawn from different banks for each loan to cover the principal amounts

and their interests. Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263 sq mtr property
mortgaged under the third MOA. Thus, respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage

over a 1,000-square meter parcel of land which was allegedly highly valued. However, no deed

was executed for the additional security.

Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months, but thereafter failed to pay

either principal amount or the interest thereon. Also, the checks issued to complainants were of

no value because the accounts from where they were drawn were closed. Eventually, respondent

withdrew as counsel for Yulo, Presbitero terminated the services of the former and complainants

filed petitions for the judicial for the judicial foreclosure of the mortgages and cases for estafa

and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.

Complainants alleges, among others, that respondent induced them to grant him loans by

offering very high interest rates and that respondent prepared and issued checks which turned out

to be drawn against his son’s accounts. Respondent, however, counters that the monthly interest

rates of 10% on the loan were usurious and illegal, and that their business transaction were

secured by mortgaged properties and postdated checks. He also explains that his nonpayment of

the loan was due to the negative factors which affected his sugar business.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent attorney violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, adopting the findings of the IBP-CBD that respondent

violated at least four violations of the CPR. He is therefore disbarred from the practice of law.

RATIO DECIDENI:

Rule 1.01 of the CPR provides that _______________________________. The Court

ruled that conduct, as used in this rule, is not only confined to the performance of a lawyer’s

professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his

professional capacity or private capacity. The test is whether he is shown to be wanting in moral

character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue

as an officer of the court.

 With respect to his client Presbitero, respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on the

loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he

sought to nullify the same on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. Also, he

deceived his client Presbitero and Navarro, in his professional and private capacity respectively.

He deceived the former as to the real value of the 263-sqr mtr property which was sold for a far

lesser price and the latter as to the irregular issuance of the checks. Thus, it is clear that

respondent violated the said rule.

Canon 16 of the CPR provides that _________________________. Also, Rule 16.01

provides that ____________________. The records do not show that respondent properly

appropriated the funds entrusted to him by his client Presbitero to its original purpose because

respondent was negligent in being transparent in liquidating the money he received from

complainant. His failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the

presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of

the trust reposed in him by, the client.

Rule 16.04 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client

unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.

Respondent does not deny that he borrowed money from his client, Presbitero. As shown by the

records, it cannot be said that Presbitero was secured by a MOA, for the postdated checks were

dishonored because the accounts had already closed, and that respondent misrepresented the

value of the mortgaged property. Respondent even questioned the terms of the MOA he himself

drafted on the ground that the interest rate imposed was unconscionable.

In all of these, respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty,

integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession. He took

advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his

client to secure undue gains for himself. Such wrongful conduct warrants his removal from the

practice of law.