INTRODUCTION

PART A

This Introduction is in two parts. A and B. Part A poses the problem and part B
concerns methodology.

The Problem

Collective Bargaining is universally acknowledged as the most ideal method or

resolving labour- . management conflicts. Irrespective of the form of Government in power.
the political system in vogue or the level of economic and industrial development of e
country, this method is considered the best.
Collective Bargaining is not only peaceful and inherently voluntary in character, but
it tends to defuse tense situations and promotes an orderly resolution of industrial conflicts
through discussion across table. It avoids constant class-struggle and resolves differences
through discussions characterised by a spirit of give and take. The aim of collective
bargaining is to develop labour-management relationship to a level where the parties take no
unilateral decisions on matters of mutual interest. The participants do not shy away from
situations but accept the end act on them. Therefore it does not build wells between them, but
brings them together to respect each other, to co_operate with each other and to opt for
conciliation rather than confrontation. Where collective bargaining is practised, rigidity gives
way to flexibility, and rationality triumps over irrational impulses. By making decision-
making broad based, an element of democratic principle is introduced and practised.
Trade unions have come into existence primarily 1. To protect and promote workers'
sectional interests. They achieve their objective by collective action, the most peaceful being
collective bargaining • Employers. after initial . resistance, yielded to the inevitable. Soon,
however, they found collective bargaining to be the best method in management of industrial
relations.
Governments, even those which are remiss in the strict observance of progressive
industrial relations practice, extol the virtues of collective bargaining in their industrial
relations policy declarations. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has in a
convention, recommended collective bargaining as the best method in conflict resolution. The
world div·ided into two major economic and political systems, the communists and the
 2

capitalist follows the collective bargaining system. The developed and developing economies
do welcome and. Practise he concept with varying degrees of success. In Sum, collective
bargaining is widely accepted and frequently employed method in labour-management confli-
ct resolution in the civilized societies allover the world.

The Indian Scene

" In India collective bargaining has yet to become widely accepted and practised. The
Royal Commission on labour and the National Commission on labour have stated that the
system has been in vogue in India for over 50 years now. They have, however, hastened to
add that it has been prevalent only in a small number of units and has been confined to only a
few industrial pockets in the country. The labour Bureau's Statistical Abstract further
substantiates this fact with the relevant data accumulate over the years.

The available literature on the subject reveal that the collective bargaining system has
yet to become the favoured choice in conflict resolution on an all India basis. G.L. Srivastava
(1962), A.V. Rama Rao (1964). Mary Sur (1965) the Employers federation of India, (1966).
the Government of India Study Group on Industrial Relations (1968) and B.K. Tandon (1972)
corroborate the views expressed by the Commissions mentioned above as well as the data
cited by the Labor Bureau. Even those industrial units which apparently believe in collective
bargaining are seen to lack a steady and positive tradition in its practice.

The Kerela Scene

Kerala of late presents a totally different picture. Collective Bargaining is very

frequently resorted to for resolving conflicts. Medium and large scale industrial
establishments in Kercila give a fair trial to collective bargaining before they adopt any other
method. for a number of years now, the labour and managements in Karala have been
successfully arriving at bipartite agreements as well as tripartite settlements with only
nominal participat ion by Government conciliation machinery. It is intriguing that in spi{e of
several adverse factors, collective barga~n~ng nas become the accepted method for conflict
resolution in Kerala.

Cochin-Alwaye Industrial Belt

 3

The Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt, the industrial centre of Kerala , is a new growth
centre. There, public sector dominates in capital invistment, labour strength, and value of
output. Divorce of ownership and management in large undertakings facilitated the growth of
professional management in the area. Management personnel of the region are drawn from
hetrogeneous sociel strata devoid of industrial or even tradeing traditions. Workers for most
part are first generation industrial employees. Their commitment to industrial activity in
which they are engaged relatively less than their commitment to social organisations like
trade unions to which they belong.
Since Independence, the political scene in· Kerele has been unstable and
unpredictable. for the first time 5 since 1969 a State ministry has survived all political -crisis
and managed to remain in office for its full term. Proliferation of political parties has
produced a plethora of splinter organisations. Such splitting of political parties into opposing
factions has no parallel record in the country except perhaps in West Bengal. This led the way
to B corresponding proliferation in trade unions. Multiplicity of trade unions in the area has
been 50 great 85 to result some industrial units having ten or more trade unions. Yet, not only
col'lectiva bargaining is welcomed, but is the preferred choice in labour-management conflict
resolution in all collective issues. Even minority unions are recognised, and they do
participate in collective bargaining, a phenomenon not found common anywhere else in the
country.
These facts are bewildering to any observer or student of industrial relations. All
negative forces operating against collective bargaining at all India level Bra present in Kerala,
and particularly in the Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt too. Some of them are very intense and
sharp. In addition, the peculiar problems of Kerala do not appear to be very conducive to
development of collective bargaining practices. Yet one notices contrary to natural
expectations, wide spread prevalence of collective bargaining. There must, therefore. be
stronger forces and likely multi-causes responsible for this curious phenomenon. .This rather
uncommon phenomenon was considered worth studying as it would shed new light on the
contributory factors for the evolution and development of stable collective bargaining
practices in the region.
The objectives of the study were:
a) To investigate and explain the factors • that were responsible for stable collective
bargaining system in the Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt;
 4

b) To identify and outline the distinguishing features of the collective bargaining

process in that geographical area; and
c) To understand collective bargaining as a model of social dynamics. Our knowledge
of the geographical area and the industrial relations climate there have helped us to make a
few hypotheses. They are: 1. Workers and managements of the region act and react the way
thsy do primarily because of their cultural background and political consciousness. 2.
Political expediency demanded trade unions to experiment with join fronts and to bargain
together wish managements. 3. Political climate and power structure in the State Government
have compelled managements to recognise all major unions operating their units. 4. The
Government intervention in industrial disputes in a formal and informal manner 'discouraged
adjudication and facilitated collective bargaining; The Scope and Coverage of the Study. The
study was limited to manufacturing industries in the Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt. Those
industrial units employing 300 or more employees were only covered. The study covered a
period of 7 years. From 1970 to the beginning of 1977.

PART B
The methodology used in the study is as follows: Selection of the area. At the very
outset of the plan of this study, it was decided to make it an area study and confine it to
Kerala in order to understand the peculiar phenomenon prevailing there. Ernakulam District
being the industrial centre of Kerala, the choice has naturally fallen on that on that district. In
Ernakulam District, Cochin-Alwaye is the most developed industrial belt, and it was felt that
the practices Cochin Alwaye industrial belt would be truly representative of the State as a
whole. In the Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt, there are several types of industrial activities.
These include plantation, fishing, handling of cargo at ports, trade and business and man
ufacturing. Among these, manufacturing activity is predominint in terms of its organised
character, strength of labour employed, managerial practices etc. It was realised that for a
meaningful investigation of the collective bargaining practices of the area, the focus of the
study should be on manufacturing industries which thus predominated in various respects and
tended to set the trend for other types of industries to follow. In the manufacturing industrial
category itself, a choice was to be made in selecting the units. We restricted the choice to
those units employing 300 or more employees for the following reasons: (1) a reasonably
small number of units helps to make an intensive study, and (2) industrial units with around
300 or more employees normally have specially trained full-time professionals to deal with
industrial relations management can be counted active cooperation in eliciting reliable data.
 5

The universe was only 26 and an exhaustive study of all the units was undertaken to enhance
its reliability. Data and their Source. The relevant were of two types, primary and secondary.
The primary data were available from the carefully selected respondents and from the
agreements and settlements made during the relevant period as aveilable with managements
Trde union offices and the District Labour Officer. The secondary data were drawn from the
records of office of the State Labour Commissioner end from several relevant reports and
authentic publications. Method and Tools of Data Collection. For the data collection,
carefully constructed questionnaires were designed separately for managements and trade
union officials, and these were previously given to selected respondents of both categories
with necessary explanations and guidelines for filling them. The questionneires were duly
studied and independently answered by most of the respondents. About 50 per cent of the
questionneires were promptly received back from the respondents duly filled in. The rest of
the questionneires were either personally collected or received back later after some of the
respondents had sought further clarifications on certain questions. All in all, there was an
intelligent response from every respondent. The specific data thus collected through
questionnaires were supplemented by historical deta end statistical information directly
collected from a number of authentic sources including the offices of unit managements,
trade union officials, the District Labour Officer and the State Labour Commissioner. In
addition, records of actual agreaments and settlements made between managements and trade
unions of the area during the relevant period were consulted and analysed. Besides, the date
collected were sought to be confirmed and corroborated through a series of personal
discussion with a number of prominent and responsible persons intimately connected with the
development of labour-management relationships of the areas.
Selection of Respondents : Respondents were selected from among those who have
been participating in collective bargaining and thus have been signatories to agreements and
settlements. From the management, two respondents were selected from each unit and they
were senior management personnel with 10 to 25 years experience in collective bargaining.
All the respondents from trade unions were drawn from within the establishments. Outside
leadership has been deliberately left out, as they are known to be participate in bargaining
only at two stages demand formulation and final round of negotiation. Besides, each outside
leader was found to be associated with a minimum of six unions covered under the study and
it was felt that their experience was of a general nature rather than specific to any particular
unit. Out of 122 unions, 87 unions were selected and one respondent from each union was
given the questionnaire. Only those unions with a minimum of 100 members or 20 per cent of
 6

the potential membership were ·selected. In 80 per cent of cases, the general secretaries
replied the questionnaires. In the remaining ones, the presidents replied.
Nature of Data: The data collected can be classified as those relating to
environmental organization, human, economic cultural and educational factors relevant to
the industrial relations field of enquiry. The data also pertained to the industrial relations i.e.
climate and practice of the area. As duly filled in questionnaires started coming in, they were
studied one by one. On receipt of all questionnaires, code books were prepared, cards
punched and tables made out on the machine at Tata Institute of Social Sciences,
Bombay.They were not difficult to interpret. The hypothesis in full or at least to a
considerable degree.
Limitations of the sample : Out of 26 industrial units, the study actually covered 1B
units only. Attempts were made to include the others tob, However, there was no responsive
co-operation from their management. One among the 8 units, not covered by the study was a
Government of India undertaking. The Managing Oirector of that unit felt it inappropriate to
give the data requested. In two other units, the period of data collection coincided with their
workers agitation over the bonus issue. Though they promised to cooperate later, they failed
to keep up their promise. Of the remaining four, three belonged to cotton textile industry,
managed by personnel without much education. We confess that we failed to get their co-
operation despite earnest attempts to persuade them to respond. The remaining one unit is a
new one without much collective bargaining tradition, Since we have covered another unit
belonging to the same company, this particular unit, we left it out voluntarily. Out of the total
of five units earning under textile industry, we have covered two. The collective bargaining
practices in the units 10 left out were known to be the same as in those covered in the study.
The differences were (i) the particular units were comparatively older, (ii) the workers there
were in the age group of 45 and above (iii) the management personnel were traditional in
outlook and general with little appreciation of modern management principles, and (iv) the
trade unions were not very militant.
Difficulties Faced :Except For the non-cooperation by managements of seven units,
the study was practically free from any major difficulty. The dispersed location of the units in
a large geographical area did however create certain minor difficulties in reaching the
organizations in time. As some of the units were located outside tbe local telephone exchange
area, telephonic contacts had to be made through trunk calls and this also posed some
difficulty at times. All the units" demanded a minimum of three visits. In 50 per cent of cases,
the number of visits exceeded five. The respondents were generally co-operative and positive
 7

in their attitude and reactions making data collection fairly smooth. The Government officials
wp.re liberal in their approach in providing the necessary data and making available official
records for reference and study.

CHAPTER 1

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM • Introduction In the early days of

industrialisation, industrial relations were between individual workers and individual
employers. Individual workers bargained with individual employers their terms and
conditions of work . With the birth and growth of trade unions, industrial relations have
become institutionalised. Today, they are in the nature of a collective relationship between
employers organisations and trade union organisations within the framework of statutory
regulations. Governments also play roles of umpires, conciliators, arbitrators and
administrators. Industrial relations means the relations between employers and employees in
industry. In the broad sense, the term also includes relations between the various unions,
between the State and the unions as well and between employers and the Government.
Industrial relations can be understood and explained at different levels - national, industrial,
state and unit. Industrial relations at the national level, in quantitative terms ,are the aggregate
of the industrial relations at the units level. Here, the federation of employers organisations
and the federation of trade unions at the national level are the principal participating parties,
with the Government playing their legitimate roles. Industrial relations at the units level, on
the other hand, imply the relationship between indiviqual employers and trade union(s) at the
units or undertakings level. Since the present study is concerned with collective bargaining at
the units level and is confined to units in a small geographical area, the coverage here is units
level industrial relations.
1.2 Characteristics of a System :Before we see how a system operates, it is
desirable to state the basic characteristics of a system. According to McGregor a system is an
assembly of interdependent parts (sub-systems) whose interaction determines its survival.
Interdependence means that the change in one part affects the other parts and thus the whole
 8

system. 1. Every system exists within a socio-cultural environment (super system) and has its
boundary which differentiates it from other systems within the super system. 2. A system is
open, organic and dynamic. It is open because it transacts with its environment in terms of
inputs and outputs. It is organic because it adapts itself to the changes in the environments.
Again, it is dynamic in the sense that it undergoes constant change as a result of interaction
among sub-systems and with the larger environmental system. 3. A system has multiple goals
which relate to itself, to its sub-systems and to the super system within which it exists. As
soon as a system is constituted, consciously or unconsciously, it acquires certain objectives
which are generally more important than the immediate objectives of its sub-systems. Thus,
the most important objective of a system is survival and growth, and all its other objectives
depend on effective attainment of this objective. It does not imply mere retention of the
physical existence of the status quo.
Besides the svstem's basic objective it also has to facilitate the attainment of the goals
of the systerns in a co-ordinatedway for which the system might have been constituted, D r
which might be needed to attain the former.
System's objectives: It towards the super system arise out of its obligations towards
the society of which it is a part and the attainment of which is likely to further other
objectives. 6. Every system has an operative feed back which helps it to correct for its own
malfunctioning or for changes in the environment. 1.3 Dunlop's Theory It is Professor John T.
Dunlop3 , who provided the first theory on Industrial Relations. He names it the "Industrial
Relations System". He has presented industrial relations system as a dynamic unit composed
of four basic elements namely actprs, rules, ideology and environmental context. The actors
in his model are a hierarchy of workers and their representatives, managements and
Government agencies concerned with labour-management relations. According to him, these
three actors John T.Dunlop, Industrial Relations System, New York, 1958 interact within the
contexts of the system of which there are: (1) technological characteristics of work
ervironment (2) the.market or budgetary limitations imposed on the actors. and (3) The
relative distribution. of power among the actors in the larger society of which the industrial
relations concept is a sub-system 5. The actors in Dunlop's system interact to establish an
acceptable network of rules. These rules are contained in comprehensive agreements. Those
rules or guidelines not included in such agreements are customs, policies, traditional
practices, awards, and statutory regulations a web of rules that govern labour-management
relationship. Figure 1 presents a schematic of Dunlops Industrial Relations System
 9

Characteristics of Work Environment :The technological features of the work

place have very far-reaching consequences for an industrial relations system. They influence
labour and management organisations and problems of supervision as well as technical
knowledge, skill and other features required by employees. Airlines, pharmaceuticals,
scientific laboratories, coal mines, plantations, ports and docks, off-shore oil drilling
installations etc. are typical examples of organisations and industries where·lhis influence is
discernible.
Market or Budgetary Constraints: Market or budgetary constraints are a second
feature of the environmental context which is fundamental to industrial relations. The market
conditions may go against, or there may be budgetary limitations. Both of these affect
directly the rules in industrial relations. For instance, if the sheltered market conditions
enjoyed by India, an industrial products such as automobiles, electrical consumer appliances
etc. are removed it may upset the whole network of rules governing-industrial relations in the
industries manufacturing them. Similarly, the rule making process in public utility services is
also affected by market or budgetary constraints. An industrial relations system created and
administered by its actors has therefore to be adaptive to its market and budgetary
constraints. It is true that the distribution of powers within the industrial relations system
decides the relative bargaining power of any of the actors. In addition, the relative
distribution of power among the actors in the larger society tends to be reflected within the
industrial relations. It does not directly determine, but it facilitates interaction an additional
and final element introduced by Dunlop in the industrial relations system, is the set of beliefs
and attitudes commonly shared by the actors. These bind them together and integrate the
system into a single entity. Ideology thus helps the actors to choose their roles and recognise
their status in the system. Walton and Mckersie Hodel Walton and Mckersie have offered a
new theoretical framework of labour-management relations. They contend that negotiation is
the major functions in labour management relations. According to them, this function consists
of four sub-systems of activity or subprocesses. These sub-systems are: (1) Distributive
Bargaining, (2) Integrative Bargaining, (3) Attitudinal Structuring, and (4) Intra-
organisational Bargaining.
Distributive bargaining: By distributive bargaining, Walton and Mckersie mean the
bargaining geared to settling the conflicts of interest. They see in bargaining certain issues
with Richard Walton and Robert Hckersie, A Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations,
New York, McGraw Hill Book Co. 1965 fixed sums. In the process of bargaining, if one
party gains, the other one loses. They are, therefore, resolving pure conflicts. The authors see
 10

them as pure bargaining in the strictest sense of the term. Conflict issues regarding promotion
or transfer, reinstatement of a dismissed or retrenched employee anomalies of wage increases,
etc. come under distributive bargaining. In the process if the unions gain, managements
naturally sustains a corresponding loss.
Integrative Bargaining: Integrative,bargaining is seen as another subprocess in the
negotiation process, This is concerned with those objectives which are not inherently in funds
mental conflict with the objective of the participants. The subjects or areas are in the nature of
integration of interests and are for mutual satisfaction. Both parties generally benefit from
negotiated settlements. In any case, one party's gain will not be a loss to the other party.
Services rendered by enterprises and charging the employees for the same or check-off
system, if included in agreements, are beneficial to both or beneficial to one but without
corresponding loss to the other.
Attitudinal Structuring- Attitudinal structuring influences the relationship between
the parties. It results interest or distrust, friendliness or hostility, and competitiveness or
cooperation. It is a socio-emoitional interpersonal process designed to alter attitudes and
positions. The highly negative attitude of parties gets altered considerably by the negotiation
process. Over a period, an entire approach which has no relationship with the earlier attitude
may emerge as a result of the successful process.
Intra-organisational Bargaining; This type of bargaining is designed to achieve
unanimity within unions and different segments of industrial organizations. It is a process
which aligns the expectations of the rank and file with those of the representatives or those in
the negotiating teams. When one union, the majority one is recognised as the sole bargaining
agent, the discussion of that union with minority union can also-be seen as intra-
organisational bargaining. Here, all the workers are seen as One unit and division among
them into different unions is treated as a result of the existence of divergent interest groups
within the same union. Union negotiating teams will be subjected to pressures from the rank
and file. Company representative on the bargaining team likewise move in accordance with
the wishes of the management personnel at all levels. A General System Model of Industrial
Relations Negotiation of agreements and administration of such contractual instruments are
difficult because of their inherent complexity. They are fraught with colourful and often
contradictory variables. Interpersonal and inter-group conflicts, decision making under
uncertain conditions and pressure, constraints of the legal frame-work, political and
extraneous influences the constant , • manipulations and string pulling by interested parties
are some of the variables to be considered in the context of an industrial relations system. It is
 11

therefore almost impossible to structure an ideal system model of an Industrial Relations

System which will give due weightage to ell variables thet condition the relationship In what
follows, a simplified framework of a Basic System Model is illustrated and explained. Input
1.5.1 Input : External environment generates data which are relevant and decisive to
organisations and inputs are those data which ara absorbed by organisations for use.
Feedback is a special kind of input data from within the organisations. They constitute past
decisions, and other historical data experiences which are examined and evalusted for their
relevance to future decision making. Feedback is considered to be very crucial. It acts as a
stabilizer to make corrections where deviations from the set output are required to be made.
Use of feedback should however be timely; out of phase feedback may lead to erroneous snd
misleading output
1.5.2 Transformation Element :The transformation state is the core of the system.
the inputs are analysad, shuffled about, sorted, coded, summarised and finally the end product
of decisions are made. Not all data is used. Those not used and those which are considered
useful for future reference and application are stored in the memory element. As additional
date are fed to the memory element, the data stored in the memory get modified end updated
for recall at later occasions and to be used to the transformation element.
Control Element : The control element provides direction by means of policies,
decisions, etc Controls constantly interact with the transformation element to guarantee the
continued and efficient progress towards generating desired output. Thus, a dynamic open
Industrial Relations System is one in which the internal elements are interdependent and
constantly admitting inputs from external environments, transforming this information in to a
useful form, and emitting the desired outputs, portions of which are reabsorbed into the
system via the feedbackB, 1.6 Inter-system Model of Labour-Management Relations Besides
the general system model explained in sub-sec'tion 1.5 inter-system model can be conceived
of present labour-management relationship. In this model, both managements and unions are
treated as full-fledged systems inter-acting each other and also with a super system (socia-
cultural environment). Here enterprises and unions are treated as full fleogeo systems because
of their autonomy and capability for independent interactions with the super system. They
not only interact SIbid. p.l07 with each other but ~ith fullfledged systems also. It is "true
however that there is an element of interdependence as far as unions ,are concerned. Without
management systems, union systems cannot subsist. Despite this limited union dependence
on management, one can define their relationships in terms of an inter-system model as
llustrated in figure 3. Inter-system Model Labour-Management Relations Figure Both
 12

Enterpirse and Union are independent systems interacting with :ach other-within socio-
cultural environment .- 1. 6.1 E--n-t-e-r-p-r-is-e- --as- --a --S-y-s-te-m- An~enterprise. iike
Bny other organisation. is an open ~nd dynamic system. .But it is more than a social system.
It can best be seen as a socio-technical system • The level of tec~nology used limits the scope
... of the work organisation. But the work organisation has social and psychol~gica! f~at.u" r
es of its own and is free from technology9. Enterprise has, therefore, to ba~nce between
technological demands' and ~he needs of the people in the organisation. For instance, Air
India and the , Forest Development Corporation of Kerala apply extremely divergent
technologies: While their work organisations are geared to the demands of their respective
technology. the needs and aspirations of the human elements in these organisations do not
differ very much. These organisations are dynamic and adapt themselves to the changes in the
super-system, and at the same time affect the super-system i tsel f. 9A•K• Rice, Productivity
and Sociel Organisation _ The Ahamedabad Experiment, Tavistale Publications, London,
1970, p.4. An enterprise will have multiple objectives to attain. Apart from attaining its basic
objectives of survival, growth and profit maximazation, it has to protect the interests of
various constituents of the industry as such and the welfare of the community of which it is a
part. The attainment of its the basic objectives depends on its efficient, economics and
effective performance of the primary task of production and distribution of goods and .s
ervices. ' The enterprise cannot operate in isolation. It has to sense the changes in its
environment. and .adapt itself to the changing circumstances and needs. Survival, growth,
profit maximization and welfare of the community in general a,.r e only a few of its multiple
goals. Pers.o. nal goals of individuals in the enterprise have to be integrated with those of the
enterprise. According to Ralph C. Davis, personal objectives of individuals in an enterprise
are: (1) profit for owners, (2) salaries and other compensation for managements, (3) wages
and compensation for employees, (4) psychic "< benefits to all such as (i) pride in work, (ii)
security, ( ~~~) <t< d « ) t 10 ~~~ recogn~ ~on an ~v accep anca 10Ralph C. Davia,
Industrial Organisation an~ Management, Harper and Row, 1957, p.26. In its effort to achieve
these multi-dimensional objectives, the enterprise has a number of functions to perform.
Production and distribution of goods and ser~ice~,of course, remain as its primary function.
But maintenance of equilibrium with its sub-systems, other parallel systems and the super
system is necessary and inevitable for attaining the objectives. 1.6.2 Trade Union as a System
----------------------- A trade union a~so is developed as an open and dynamic system. But it is
purely a social system composed of different sub-systems comprising of the workers and not
a socio-technicsl system as in the case of an enterpirse. As an open system, it adapt itself to
 13

the changes in the external system surrounding it. It is dynamic in the 'sense that it undergoes
changes as a consequence of the interactions among the sub-systems and the environmental
system • A union as it grows sets certain goals which may become more important than the
objectives' of its membe~~ (sub-system). As an open and dynamic social • system, its basic
o~jective is survival and growth. To survive, it has to fulfil its primary task, namely enlisting
members~ integrating them and motivating them to promote their:interests12• Itquglas
t·kljregor, Op.CH. p.<lU. 12Edgar H.5chein, Organisational Psychology, Prentice-Hell of
India, New Delhi, 1969, p.90. Trede unions help members to achieve their need satisfaction
both on and off the job. The economic needs - • of members include higher weges, other
financial benefits during their service period and after retirement, shorter hours of work,
improved working conditions etc. Safety needs include security of service and safety on the
job. Social needs are those which stem from their association with other -.,people.
Psychological needs comprise those which make them aspire for~dignity, status, self-respect,
psychological security, satisfactian through participation in decision ,!"" t 13 ma~1ng e c. •
Collective bargaining practised by trade unions helps their members to achieve these on the
job needs. Trade unions have social and political objectivas which indirectly relate to broader
society. While their roles in these areas benefit society (the supersystem), they ere in their
ultimate analysis meant to promote the sectional interest of trade unions and their members. "
Social and political objectives of trade unions ara more pronounced in developing countries
where healthy social and political conventions and traditions are in the process of
development than in developed countries. India 13Arncld S.T,ennenbaum, Unions, Hand-
book of Organisation, , Ed. James G. 'March, 1965, p.718. '" and particularly Kerala are
typical cases where the sociopolitical objectives of "trade unions have to be actively pursued.'
,: The Industrial Relations System concepts discussed here were evolved in the West and are
actually relevant to developed industrial societies. In the Indian • • context, as the parallel
systems in a super-system are different from those in developed countries, the Industris!
Relations System outl"ined here has to be suitably adapted and modified • The concluding
chapter of this • treatise attempts to present a modified version of the Industrial Relations
System incorporating the special characteristics of the collective bargaining practices in
Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt.
 14

CHAPTER - 2

. . INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CL1MAT~ 2.,1 Indian Industrial Scene ------

~---------------- India, almost a sub-continent, .with. 550 • ')l .1 t million people, is~the second
highest populous country in the world. It is also .the largest democracy. It is • divided into 22
 15

full-fledged States an~ seven union territories, mainly on linguistic basis. The people are of
different reces, religiona, castes and ~ub-caste8, speaking different languages and having
diverse cult"ures and customs. Her iandscapes, climate, food crops and natural . resourc.s, as
well as level of literacy cif hat people, level of industrialisation, extent of urbanisation and •
stability of political and trade union ~rgariisBtions are, all varied and distinctive from region
to region. Even within tha Game regions differences exist. Peoples' expectationG vary
considerably. Their political and trade union organisations are too many, '~nd a· sUbstantial
number of t~ea ere unstable. Many among them remain regional ill character both in their
approBch and in their day_to_day operations •. Workers' organisations were in the forefront
in the freedom struggle. They participated in the freedom movement vigorously. Their
expectations, therefore, skyrocketed with the dawn of Independence. However, no significant
changes have occurred in their lives, especially • in the lives of those in the traditio.nal
industries. The gulf between the rich and the poor appears to have only widened 1• While
their money wage has gone up, their real wage has been eroded2• The principle of full
neutralisat ion of the higher cost of living is applied o~ly at the lowest wage level J • In the
midst of plenty, and even extravagance, ignorance and dire poverty co-exist. This is true even
among workers of the same type of indust~ies or of different industries. While the rich in the
country can be compared to the rich in eny developed countries, more than 40 per cent paver t
y 1 l· ne4 . of the Indian popUlation lives below the Although India has produced greet
persona- 1Dandekar V.M. and Nilakantha 'Rath, Povert~ in India, Indian School of Political
Economy, Poona, 1971, p.31. 2Index of money and real earnings of employees in
manufacturing industries indicate t~at in-1971, while the money earning (bas e year 1960 =
100>, has gone upto 187, the real earnings remained at 102. Labour Bureau, Indian Labour
Statistics, 1974, p.54. JEmployers Federation of India, Dearness 'Allowance, Monog rap h
No.' a, Bomba y, 1975, p. 17 • ~]andeker V.M. and Nilakantha Rath, op.cit. 34. An estimated
160 million live below poverty line. Minhas B.S. Planning for the Poor, S. Chand & Co (P)
Ltd., Delhi, 1974 p. 74. ,}v lities respected and remembered the world over, the vast majority
of the population, both in cities and the countryside, live without an identity, an environment
congenial for grwoth and development, and without any achievement motivation. They live
in perpetual misery toiling dayby- day and hopefully looking forward to a better future. The
Indian scene thus presents diversities and complexities that are beyond the comprehenSion of
average men and women of the country. Numerous problems clamour for speedy solution,
and the gap between the p:omises and ~~hie~ements has grQ~n so wide that it is ~Qtential to
trigger a revolution unless some radical remedial measures • are implemente'd soon. • The
 16

industrial relations concept is a dynamiC • one, end in the complex industrial and soci~l
SCene in India, it is all the more 50. In the context of tha prevailing industrial relations
climate, major facets of which ere discussed in the subseq•u ent sections of this chapter,
swell-planned indusfrial relations policy ~cceptable to • the pluralistic society of the country
has to be introduced and vigorously followed up, if Indian democracy has to surviva, develop
and flourish, and if collective bargaining in labour managament relations has to become a
practical raality. .1 , 2.2 Industrial Relations Context -------~-------------------- All countries
now recognise industrialisstion as an effective means for accelerating the developmental
process, The Governments which had followed a 1aissezfaire policy in the past.are now
highly concerned about ensuring steady and speedy industrial development • They, •
therefore, create the necessary climate fo~ stepping up the tempo of industrialisation. John T.
Dunlop and othersS identify nine elements of the logic of industrialisation. Among them, the
first three are relevant concerning work-force. They are: 1. the development of a
concentrated, disciplined • industrial work-forcs with new skille, a wide variety of jobs and
occupations and a hierarchy of skill levels broadly distributed through the work force; 2. the
n~cessity of frequent changes in the skill, responsibilities and occupations of th& work force
as a consequence of the dynamic science and technology that accompanies industrialisation
leading to a more mobila society; and 5John T. Dunlop, frederick H. Harbison, Clark Kerr
and Charles A. Myers, Industrialisation and Industrial Man Reconsidered, Inter-University
Study Team of Human Resources in National Development, Princ~tonJ New Jerse" 1975, p.
6. 3. the structuring of labour force through a . set of rules affecting job classifications, •
compensations, and relative rights and duties. ~vailability of all the factors of production is
n~ 9ua~Bn~~~ i~~ \~~i~ ~~~i~i~~~ ~~~l~i\~\i~n ~~~ ~~~i~ industriali~ation and growth, if
the rules affecting their harmonious co-operation are not settled. In other words, industrial
peace is of' cardinal importance. When the quality of the work-force and of the management
itself is ,I short of the required demand, the level of growth may not be at the anticipated rate.
In some cases, the people in industry and organisations may not be well-suited for industrial
life for decades. This is so because the society is not prepared for a sudden breakthrough on
account of its past condit~oning. Industrialisation ~s the course of transition from the
preceding agricultural or commercial society towardS before they belong to industry. A
transformation has to take place in the society by effecting change in their beliefs, values and
8ttitudes. This reorientation speeds up the move to industirel life. Then there are a variety of
other factors also inhibiting orderly [ndustrial grwoth. • Although the functions of industry
are mainly economic, it cannot insulate ,- itself.. from social and political consequences
 17

resulting from the disequil'ibrium that may occur occasionally in a society •. These make
industrial relations environment.and • its climate further complex and uncertain. 2.2.1 .T-h-e-
-I-n-d-i-a-n- -W--o-rk-e-r India, an agricultural country, is witnessing a transformation from
an agricultural to an industrial and from a rural to an urban society. Of late, the industrial
society itself has been undergoing changes. The concept of 'master and servant,6 has changed
to that of the 'employer and the employed'. The profile of the Indian worker has changed. The
National Commission on Labour records "A worker today is far more urban in taste and
outlook than his predecessor • • • • The worker today has acquired the dignity not known to
his predessor. He is no longer the coolie of the days gone by, engaged in an unending •
6No_where in any legislation, as they stand today, tha terms "master and servants" are used.
But the term used is "workman". ,Earlier, the Supreme Court and the subordinate Courts used
the terms "master and servant" in many cases that came up for decision. few examples are:
Shivanandha Sharma ~. Punjab National Bank, AIR, 1955, S.C. 404 Dhasangatha Chemicals
Works Ltd. Vs. State of Saurastra, AIR, 1957, S.C. 264. Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd., ~.
Hanumant Laxman Eihave, LLJ I, 1963, p.126. Currently the terms used are: "employer and
employee l1 • struggle to eke out. his existence; neglected by society • " except for his labour
and limited aspirations. He has • now a personality of his own. He sh--ares the benefits, •
albeit meagre, which a welfare state with vast population • and inadequate resources can
offer. He enjoys a measure of social security. He is secure in his employment once he enters
it. A process of industrial civilisation of the working class has set in. A worker of today is
more politically conscious than before, more articulate in his criticism of the existing order
and more sensitive to his conditions of hardships7. They are getting more interested and
committed to trade unions. 2.2.2 -T-h-e --I-n-d-ia-n-- -M-a-n-a-g-e-r The concept of
management is also fast changing< The outlook, thinking and attitude of the present day
management have little in common with those of the earlier generations. A new species of
management personnel with • professional training and-result-orientation is coming into
existence. The traditional method of good guess or intuition that worked in less competitive
industrial situations is discarded in preference to rational onss, supported and strengthened by
hard data obtained in real-life situations. The social base, from where the management
personnel are 7 Government of India, Report of the National Commission on Labour, 1969,
pp.2B-32. • drawn, has become wider. The divorce of ownership and management has made
decision making process more rational. These changes have brought about qualitative
improvements in the inter-relationship between interest groups within the industry and the
society at large. 2.2.3 -I-n-d-u-s-t-r-i-a-l --O-w-n-e-r-S-h-i-p The concept of ownership is also
 18

undergoing change. Goverments have come to industry in a big way. ~ sett~ng up the public
sector. Certein sectors of economic activities are earmarked as the exclusive reserve of
Govern- 8 ments • Joint sector ownership is being experimented with. The co-operative sector
is taking OVer certain activities, including some major undertakings. The small-scale sector is
protected and encouraged. A worker se~tor is being talked about. Giving representation to
trade unions on the Board of Directors of public enterprises has been in practice for about
decades now. Representation to workers • at shop council, department and unit levels is being
experimented with. A new class of self-employed, bare-foot entrepreneurs ia coming into
existence with the help and encouragement of Government and Government-sponsored
financisl institutions. The managing agency system by which a few indu6- • trial houses used
to control industrial empires is no more a Government of India, Industrial Policy Resolution
1956, Schedule A, reproduced in NCL, 1969, p.36B. alive, due to legislative ban9 . The
Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act aims at curbing unhealthy con- • centration of
industrial power in the hands of a few. Financial participation in and assistance by
Governments and Government~sponsored financial institutions to private sector industries
help the Government to have control over . them, to some extent. In some caseS
Governments have appointed their nominees on .the Board of Directors. Takeover of sick and
mismanaged units too has been the Governments policy. All these have had a major impact
on the structure of industrial organisations and the dispersal of the management control.
These also have injected fresh values and concepts about the role of industry and trade
unions. 2.3 -T-h-e --P-a-r-t-ie--s- -in- --I-n-d-u-s-t-r-i-a-l- -R-e-l-a-t-io--n-s In establishing
and maintaining healthy industrial relations, there are three main parties namely, the
employer,. the workers' organisations and the Government. It is true that the employers' and
workers' organisations are the more direct and affected parties. If they so prefer, they can very
well keep out the third party, the Government, without its direct involvement in labour-
management relationship. But this does not hsppen even in the most ideal situations, more
particularly in India. The State interference in industrial confliet is B reality. The State's role
is re-defined in 9Ma n ag1. ng sec. 324 Agency System has been abolished since 1969 vide
Aof Company's Act, 1956. the light of past experience and new changes and challenges ~ . ...
anticipated. The ·State, as a third party, is, therefore, required to play the role of a guide,
facilitator, an umpire and, at times as an arbitrator according to the demands of the
circumstances. The Government's role is guided' by the goal the State has set. Establishment
of an egalitarian socialist society is the goal of the Indian government. It, therefore, attempts
to follow policies in attaining the goal in the context of the strength, effectiveness and the
 19

tradition built up by the more direct and affected parties in industrial relations. 2.3.1 MT
_ra_d_e_ __U_n_i_o_n s_ The economically active popul~tion in India was around 180
million 10 out of the total of 550 millions • in 1971. Of this, 72 million11 are classified as
workers. Only 25 million 12 out of the total workers belong to industry end allied activities.
The potential membership of the trede unions is, therefore, 25 million only. The tot;l number
of union members at 4 million 13 makes it little over 16 per cent union density. This may
compare favourably with countries in the Asian region. : 10Labour Bureau, Indian Labour
Year Book, 1972, p.2. 11 Ibid 1 2 I bid, p. 61 13 lbid• The figures regarding membership of
unions indicate that the trade unions in India are weak. Their weak position can be explained
and understood in respect ofs .i) Membership .and influence; ii) Union finance; and iii) Union
leadership. a) -M-e-m--b-er-s-h-ip- --an-d- --in--fl-u-e-n--c-e. The membership size of the
Indian trade union movement gives a misleading impression. Though the union membership
fluctuate between 16 to 20 per cent, the unions do not enjoy a corresponding strength and
influence. Their membership is distributed in an uneven way, having high density in some
industries and local areas, and low density in others. It is true that where the unions enjoy a
high density of membership, they are strong. However. their stronger position alone cannot
bring the workers the benefits and privileges the vast majority of the rest of the workers do
not enjoy • • In other words, the. .. unions' real contribution to the workers will not be
directly• proportionate to their numerical strength. It is so, because, there are msny other
constraints .. ... operating in the context. One of them may be the absence of unions or the
existence of weak unions in other sectors with no bargaining capacity at all. The enactment of
the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and ita continuance since then amply justify the view that " ,
in the less developed sectors of industry. the unions are either weak to protect the ~Iorkers'
interest or they are yet to develop. The. different establishment laws regulating work ing
conditions, theminimu!'l welfare me asutes, leave and holiday, etc. wotild become redundant,
if there existed strong trade unions. While some employers in metropolitan cities provide
housing, transport, nightshift allowances ana educational facilities for children on their own
or as a result of collective bargaining, such .amenities Bnd welfare measures could be
negotiated· and agreed to by all the employers and workers, had there been strong unions.
Trade unions may boast that all the 1egislation which conferred new rights and benefits on
workers BrB the result of their efforts or influence with the Government. If it is really so,
their influence does not actually derive from their numerical strength, but could be explained
as the outcome of their right political connection£. b) Union finance. As the union
membership base is small, its revenue source is limited. Since there is more than one union
 20

operating in a substantial number of units and industries, the actual membership is divided
among several unions, making the revenue source for Bach union· further limited. As the
competing unione keep their SUbscription rates at the minimum legally prescribed leve114 ,
14M1" n1,m um mem b erah 1' p fse' 1S as R· e •0•" 50 per . sec. 6 (ee) of Trade Unione Act,
1926. month, as per • • .. __ ; __ - ___________ . _______ rived through memberships
becomes small. It is true that unions having a minimum memberships sUbscriptions at or
above rupee one per month are not exceptional, but their number cannot be too large • ...
Irregular payment or non-payment of subscriptions is also a cause for poor union finance.
According to the recent Labour Bureau Statistics the annual realisation of union SUbscription
is only about rupees two 15 • This makes it amply clesr that either the sUbscription in respect
of at least one third of the total membership is not fully collected or the actual membership
figure is unrealistically inflated. The membership figures claimed by rival un1. 0ns may ac t
ua 11 y go d own, 1. f th e spec1. a 1 con tr'1 b ut 1-0ns 16 made by -the members at the time
of bonus payment, and the higher membership subscription fee paid by a s.ignificant number
of unions are also taken into account. The unions' ,liability to share the membership
subscription, as affiliation fee, with State industry and national level organisationa to which
they are affiliat~d, further depletes their meagre financial resources. 15Labour Bureau, op.cit.
p.6B. 161t is a regular practice with almost all unions to collect speciel contribution at the
time of bonus payment. It is convenient for'the unions to collect and the workers generally do
not grudge to pay. Very few unions in India have office premises, either owned or hired. Nor
do they have adequate office equipment, and full-time paid union functionaries. This can be
taken as an indication of their straightened financial circumstances. Generally a few unions in
a local area owing allegiance to a single leader or a national centre jointly use one office and
its facilities. This arrangement may be argued as ideal for practical working convenience end
co-ordination among themselves, and not due to their weak fin-ncial position. But when a few
other unions with a better financial strength and associated with a single leader are seen to
have such facilities exclusively for themselves, this argument about co-ordination may not
have much force. Very few unions in India have financial provision for libraries, welfare
work among me~~ers and salary payment to striking workers. by unions on developmental
work is almost nil, except in a few isolated cases. No programmes are organised to involve
family members of unions. All such weaknesses stem from the inadequate financial resources
of the unions. e) -U-n-io-n- --le-a--d-e-r-s-h-i-p. In leadership too, the Indian trade union
movement is weak. All the potential members are potential leaders. But as only 16 per cent
are brought under the trade union influence, the remaining 84 per cent are lost for union
 21

leadership-building. The fact that outsiders still dominate the Indian trade union movement
clearly shows the lack of leadership from within. Wherever outsiders hold union office
positions, it is an. open admission that inside leadership is not equipped to take over. At unit
level, a changing trend is noticeable in certain geographical areas. More and more outsiders
are being replaced by insiders in the day-to-day union functions. This happens not because
the insiders deliberately push the outsiders out, but because new entrants into trade union
field are few and far between. Those outsiders who have been in the field for longer period
are attracted to more and more unions as the union numbers multiply. They, therefora, devote
les~~ime per union, ". ", • • leaving day-to-day functions to their hand-picked, and trusted
followera. The presence of outsiders and their strong desire . to perpetuate their control go
against developing internal leadership. As they do not have time to work on a fulltime basis
with anyone union, they do justice to none. And once they secure any political pOSition, they
virtually cut themselves off from their own unions and maintain only nominal interest in
order to protect their political base. Inside leaders still remain at unit level. Those who have
reached industry and national level are very few. At these levels, the outsiders still
predominate. Qualitatively, Indian trade union leaders at national level end even et lower
levels are superior to their counterparts in any developed countries. This is due to their higher
educational level, intellectual sharpnesS, position held in social hierarchy and political con~
nections. d) U--n-io-n- -d--iv-i-s-i-o-n- -a-n-d- -m--u--lt-i-p-l-i-c-i-ty-. Indian trade unions
suffer from two more major weaknesses. i) They are divided and fragmente~ ii) They are
highly politicalised. , The second weakness leads to the first one alwo. " Trade union division
amd multiplicity are mainly due to ideological diversity of their leaders. This divi- • sion and
multiplicity are manifested at~the unit, industry, state and national levels. Till 1969, four
national centres namely the INTUC, AITUC, Hr~S, "and UTUC have enjoyed ell India
recognition and consultation, and participation in industrial relationa machineries at the
national level. Since 1969 the UTUC loat ita all India character and consequently its
recognition. There are a few others such as EMS, HMP, and CITU, which because of their all
India character end membarat the regional level. Those which ere not affiliated to any
national or regional centres and thus remain uncommittea, form yet another,variety. On
several national industrial ralations issues, these trade union centres and the iodependent
unions often take up divergent positions suited to their political masters, even at the cost of
real trade union interest. No trade union leader except in AITUC and CITU admits to be
maintaining any tangible link between political parties and his trade union 17• But the very
same leaders, perhaps with the exception of a microscopic minority, are + either activa party
 22

workers or ere patronaged by political parties. Tha fact that wherever there are splits in
political parties, such' splits are invariably found echoed in trade unions,of their patronage
clearly shows the indirect • but inseparable link between the two. When the trade unions are
organised primarily on political considerations, the essential trade union focus is lost sight of.
An outside trade union leader without any political ambition is a rare specimen to be
identified. 17 For AITUC and CITU, the trade union work is part of their broader political
work. In case of others too, the fact is not different, although they refute this. All get
influenced by political parties and in turn influence the political parties to some extent. !
~rnrnlfljflj\lil~\fl~ 048626 '..--- -- ----' 11, "s. ::; .----- --' 51 Therefore, whenever there are
pulls from opposing directions. one from trade unions 'and the other from the political parties
patron aging tha trade unionists, the teropt- . ation invariably is to yield to the external
political • pressure. This is so because the trade union leaders' long-term interests are
ineKtricahly tied up with the political parties. The outside leaders often use trade unions as a
vehicle to reach their political destination. In that sense, the outside union leadership is not
committed to the unions, and therefore they are in a sense more a liability in the total union
function than an asset. In the long run it is the workers' union that is weakened and
undermjned by the dissipatory activities and divided loyal~ ties of its leaders. Trade union
weakness is noticeable from their programmes and activities. ,They are generally active only
during certain periOds. Wage an'd bonus negotiation periods are critical. Thereafter, they
normally remain dormant, unless stirred up by political exigencies. Leaders create the
necessary psychological atmosphere, et times in collusion with their employers, to make s~re
that their leadership is not challenged. Those who believa that legal bettles with employers is
real trade union .'ork, may have litigation ell through the year and thereby try to make their
leadership inevi table. Generally. during the intermittent lull per~ iods in between wage
negotiations, 9gitations or litigations, the outside leaders leave the union affairs to their hand.
picked confidants. who by any account are far from rebellious. By keeping many unions
under their control and generally. in different industries,. the leaders keep themselves busy,
devoting full-time attention to none. Cadrebuilding, education and training, welfare, and such
other constructive work are not within the area of their interest, either immediate or long
term. The union therefore remains inactive except on ceremonial occasions. In effect, the
trade unions in India are weak, impoverished, divided, politically dominated and exploited,
and ineffective in playing their rightful roles in building up a aound industrial relations
system. Their bargaining power is poorer than what their numerical strength indicates. The
lack of collective bargaining tradition in the country can be attributed to the poorly organised
 23

and enfeebled trade unions which are led by lack-lustre le.dera having divided allegiance.
2.3.2 -E-m-p--lo-y-e-r-s-' --O-r-g-a-n-i-s-a-t-io--n-s Employers' organisations are also
classified under trade unions, as they are normally registered under the Trade Unions Act,
1926. However, as they are understood and treated differently i~ all industrial relations
literature and as they fall in opposing camps in collective bargaining, they are separately
treated here. 53 Employers' organisations are free from the limitations and major defects of
trade unions. However two significant drawbacks can be pointed out in their case: i) Their
mUltiplicity ii) The non-participation of public sector undertakings in them. e) -M--u-l-t-i-p-
l-ic-_it y.. . The mUltiplicity of employers organisat ion at the nationel level (eg. the fEI,
AIDE, end AIMO) is not the outcome of conflicting ideological faiths of th ' 1 d h' . th f t d .
18 e~r ea ers ~P6. as l.n e case 0 ra e unl.ons .• The fEI in the early days, protected the British
industrial interest with a large number of British fi~ms as constituents. The AIDE consists
mainly of indigenous entrepreneurs. The AIMO, on the other hand, is an organisation of
comperatively smaller industrial establishments. Even though each of them has its own
peculiar problems and interests in the area of industrial relations, it does not pose as a rivel to
the others 19 • But, all the same, it is true that the existence of more than one employers'
association in any particular industry or local area has hindered the progress of collective
barganining on industry or local area basis. 18 Government of India, Royal Commission on
Labour, 1931, p.J16. 19r;overnmemt of India, National Commission on Labour, 1969, p. 299.
Employers in the public sector are still outside the organ'i- - . • sationsl membership of the
employers' ergsnisations • • They, therefore, are not parties to the commitment the employers'
organisations make. fo this extent, the employers' orgBni~ sations are not strong as they
should be. The Bureau of , Public Enterprises is not an association of public sector • units.
Nor does it have any power to have any association • with trade unions. . At best .i. t tenders
advice to public undertakings on collective bargaining on specifi~ requBst; .. even so, such
advice is limited to Government of India Undertakings only. 2.4 Labour Policies The
Government of India make labour policy decisions gene~elly in consultation with the parties
concerned. namely, the State Governments, the employers end the workers. It is true that the
broad policies to be followed and the priority to be·accorded for specific SUbjects among
them are indicated in the Five Year Plan documents. . The plan docu- • ment itself is finalised
with the partic, ipation of the int• 20 erested parties, at"least at its final approval state • • A
major departure from this may at times become necessary • 20The National Development
Council, whic~' fin,,!-lly approves plan proposals is represented by employers and workers.
due to exigencies of situations or on advice by-the Supreme Court; even so, both parties are
 24

consulted before actions are pIa n ne2d1 . • 2.4.1 Consultative Bodies Periodic informal
consultations do take place between the Government of India and the nationally reco- ...
gnised central .trad,e unions on the one ha~d and'the Govern- ~ • ment and employers'
organisations on the other. Initiative for such contact and consultation may come from anyone
of the parties. That apart, informal contacts between the employers' organisations and one.
section of trade unions have also been taking place22, in the past, howsoever short lived their
active interests may have been. Similarly, from early 1970, informal contacts among the
different central trade unions helped in forming a 1 oose aSSOC1. a t·1 0n 23 among th em.
Since 1972, another informal body consisting of central trade union and employers'
federations, have been meeting at regular intervals 24 •. Tha 21Such consultations ara
generally m~de at Indian Labour Conference where employers and workers are participating
parties. 22 • '. Between 1961 and 1972, the Fleel and the INTUC have had informal contacts
among them at least on three occasions. The areas of mutual interest were: (i) industrial peace
(ii) improved productivity level. 23 The National Counoil of Trade Unions con~istin9 of
INTUC. AITUC and HMS was formed in 1972 at the initiative of the Central Minister for
Labour. However, the Council did not survive for long. 24 This is the National Apex Body, a
bipartite one formed in 1975 at the instance of the Central Minister for Labour. This body got
defunct in 1976 when Janata Government came into power. 5G above-mentioned two
arrangements came into existence at the initiative of the Central Govarnment. Similar bodies
at the State level also have been formed • Besides these, • there are formal non statutory
consultative bodies of a tripartite nature functioning at the national lev~l. They are the ILC,
SLC, IC and CIEC. The Labour Ministers' Conference and the Trade Unions' Meet
immediately prior to ILC are other formal bodies where dis'cussion of labour policies takes
place. In addition to the above organisations there are a few statutory bodies wherein both the
employers and the trade unions are represented. They.operate in the limited areas of their
jurisdiction. and therefore.~ne imp~ct of their performance on'industrial reiations at the all
India " level is unlikely to be g• reat. However, their failure to • resolve-issues on which the
labour is consistently agitated • • may give them an OCC8S1on• to confront the employers
and the • Government alike when other 'unresolved issues accumulate., • The above-
mentioned consultative or administrative bodies, both informal and formal, ar,e not directly
contributing to the promotion of.collective bargaining as such. Their bes.t. results are: (i)
making each others stand on major issues known with reasons thereof; and (ii) when
agreeing, agree for a uniform approach by all employers, on crucial issues on which
otherwise individual employers might • take divergent stand and can never commit
 25

uniforma~. Here there is- no"bargaining as such, in the sense of demands and , . c~unter
demands. There is no .e. xchenge'o'f.-)abour or rulemak ing process • At timss, the
Government, keeping to its • declared policy may agree to one party and impose a decision
on the other. Therefore, it cannot be strictly called 8S • agencies for collective bargaining at
the national level. The Wage Board s~stem in practice ,during the, • Sixties better qualifies to
be treated as some form of col- ,. lective bargaining. Or for. that matter, t•h e committees set
up for fixation of Minimum Wages ~re closer ~o.~ollective bargaining agencies than the bod-
ies mentioned above.·~ 'But . • • . due to the nature of their composition, 'th,ey are ,aptly
named • tripartites. 2;4.2 -T-r-i-p-a-r-t-i-te--s Whatever might have been the orioinal intentio~
of the Government of. India "1'"n instituting the' tripartite system in indu~trial relations, the
system has served"as a , useful mechanism. It brought different interest groups, .' . (within
the.. mselves. at times with divergent opinions) together .. ,.. ..... . et 'con"farenees a,!'ld
committees 25 • Th~ employers, 'the workers • and the Govarnm~nts, both the Central and,
State, enjoyed participative rights. The Indian Labour Conference (ILC) norm~lly m~t once
every year till 1972 when it was discontinued. The 5t~ing Labour Committees (SLC) also
normally met once and 25Seth N.R. and Kamala Mathen, Tripartism, Shri Ram Centre for
Industrial Relations, New Delhi, 1969, pp.120-134. 58 at times more than once a year. The
industrial committees (IC) met irregularly according to the demands of the industrial relations
in those industries. • There are at present 13 industrial committees. The Central
Implementation and Evaluation committee meets once a year to take stock of tha
implementation of different awards, wage board recommendations, observance of the code of
discipline. out-of-court settle- • ments, etc. The ILC reviews the industrial relations climate in
the country as a whole, discusses major industrial rela- " tions problems, and makes
recommendations. party has a right to suggest agenda items. Each par~icipatin~ The SLC is a
sub-committee of the ILC, and takes up agenda items left for SLC to consider and also to
report back to ILC if any instru- • • , • t ctions are given. The'ICs confine themselves to
problems concerning the particular industry • • The major achievements of the tripartite
bodies have been the enactment of labour legislation, as far as possible with the consent of
the affected parties, acceptance of certein ethical codes26 and making available to the • ..
Government opportunities for effective intervention, wherever found necessary. ,Non-
representation of a sizeable number of workers has been a serious limitation in its actual
functioning. TherE 26 eg • Code of Discipline jn IndustrYi 15th ILC, 1957. is a general feel,i
ng among the intelligent and thinking section of. the working class that the protracted
discussions at tripartite sessions are the best ways to put off • the issues for a considerable
 26

period of time. There have .... been allegations and counter-allegations that the employers'
organisations accept all reasonable demands by workers, except in legislative matters, fully
aware of the nonb1 · n d1' ng c he recter 0 f t h e1' r comm"1 tmen t s 21 • Similarly, workers'
representatives on such bodies without fully understanding the implications or getting proper
authorisation from the policy decision making organs have made commitments in areas
where their organisations aIe known to be against28 • This happens at IC level. In such cases,
along with others, they too fail to keep the spirit of tripartite decisions. The tripartite system
resulted in the creation of elabo,rate sets of norms and codes of conduct which applied to all
part ies. However, none of the constituents in the tripartites, including the a'nd codes
faithfull/9• Governments abided by those norms 2.4.3 .B. _i-p-a-r-t-i-t-es.. • Dramatic
changes that have taken place in early 1970 indicated that the Government of India was
conSidering 'alternatives to the tripartite ~ystem. 0) At the instance of the Government, the
"National Council of Trede Unions (NCrU) 27 NCL Report, p.313. 28 Ibid • 29 Ibid • 6U
comprising INTUC. AITUC and HMS was formed. This created an impression that tripartites
have outlived their utility, and a long holiday was given to the ILC and SLC, as a prelude to
the introduction of the bipartite system. With the burial of tripartitism, the
Government ,hoisted bipartitism on the employers and a section of workers. The central trade
unions such as UTUC, HMP, BMS, CITU and the public sector employers were kept outside
the National Apex Body {NAB) thus created. The HMS, after its initial experience opted to
disassociate itself from the NAB, but the emergency situation compelled it to maintain
nominal participation against its free will. The employers in the early stege, became
enamoured by the idee, but got disillusioned soon. • The NAB had the same functions 8S the
ILC. Though bipartite in c~aracter and composition, leaving more than half of the organised
labour from participatin~ in the decisian makiQg process had its own serious l~mitations.
The ... presence of the Centrai Labour Minister and the emergency situation, tt an extent,
allowed the NA.B to survice without accomplishing any substantial achievements. Like the
tripartites, the NAB too did precious little to encourage collective bargaining • . ~ • 2.4.4 -V-
o-l-u-n-t-e.r.. ism Vs. Compul"sion -""'--'~-!"'".~---------- Industrial relations in the country is
caught up in a well established ambivalence. There is on the one , h an d pro f esse d f a1.
th·1 n co 11 ec t·1 ve b arga1.n.1n g 30 as th e m06~ effective system for developing sound
industrial relations. There is on the other, deep-rooted reluctance to recognise trade unions as
collective bargaining agents, the first prerequisite for translating the professed ideas into con-
• crete action. Where legislative regulations are absolutely • unne~essary, there is a plethora
of legislation. a) -T-. -U-. --R-e-c-o-g--n-it-i-o-n. The fundament~l question of recognising
 27

unions as collective bargaining egents is still unsettled; such recognition even now is on a
voluntary basis except in the State of Maharashtra 31 • In spite of the past record of over two
decades, the GovErnment still cling to the voluntary code. Employers point at the
mUltiplicity of unions and advance it as a convenient excuse for evading union recognition.
Normally when the employers do not even recognise unions, they do not entertain collective
bargaining. In countries where collective bargaining has developed well, recognition of
unions is compulsory, and refusal to bargain is treated as an unfair practice32 • In the process
of bargaining, the terms and conditions on which the p~rties should ultimately agree are
voluntary. There is no compulsion in that. Effective bargaining is basically a pressure process
• • But this is open to both the participating parties. '" 30Five Year Plan Documents. • 31
Under Bombay Induddal RelB..ti.ons Ac t.--.' 9 46 and!'1aharasht~e-.Recognition of Trade
Unions and Unfair Labour Practices Act. 1971. 32For ego The Taft-Hartley Act, 1949 of
USA. Recognition of trade unions under the Code of Discipline amounts to granting licence
to employers to make their sweet choice. If it suits them not to confer recogntion, they have
liberty to do so. Even when they recognise, the unions have to fulfil the qualifying condition
of one year's clean record 33 • Similarly the employers enjoy the right to de-recognise the
unions for any alleged violation of the Code of Discipline. These conditions place the
emplayers and unions in unequal positions. The verification process followed may not have a
parallel even in developing countries. Instead of using ballot as the deciding factor in
determining the rep res entative character of unions, where rival unions exist, the present
system of membership verification is prone to be misused when the party in power has its
own labour wing. In a country where in the Central and State legislatures, municiplaities and
penchayats, the representative che~acter is dicided on the basis of ballot, the argument by one
of the national trade union centres that 6uch a practice will generate tension among workers
does not convince anyone but the • Government. Political considerations outweigh all others
in such decisions. Here voluntarism is built in the wrong area, where there should have been
legislative compulsion. Again, placing' the employers and workers in uneq~el positions,
33Non_violation of the provisions of Code of DiSCipline. 34 NCL Report, op.cit. p.347. ~
under the Code of Discipline discourages collective bargaining at least in those unit;'where
there occurs breach of the Code by the unions. The NCL hes, therefore, recommended for •
34 a legislative compulsion for recogntion of un10ns • The reluctance to recognise the
essentiel nature of the collective ba~gaining process, namaly work-stoppage as the ultimate
sanction, gives rise to elaborate legislative and administrative devices for restricting the
freedom of the parties to resort to the ultimate pressure. The Governw ment do have cogent
 28

arguments in favour of this policy restricting the parties' freeODm tD effect work stoppages.
The fact, however, remains that these restrictions do not help to promote heelthy collective
bargaining35 • The industrial relations system in India is highly legalistic. For every
conceivable subjsct under labour-management, there is a variety of statutory regulations. The
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 prescribes the work rules that bind the
lebour and management. The establishments be it in respect of factories. mines; plantations,
transport, shop end other establishments, OF subjects like the conditions at work places, the
hourse of work, overtime, leave with wages. safety, welfare, etc. ere regUlated by legislation.
In the social security area, 34;CL Report. op.cit. p.347. 35Tulpule B, A Look at Industrial
Relations Scene, Indian Management. New Delhi. Vol.12, No.12, p.13. the compensation for
disability or death caused as a result of employment, injury, or industria~ disease, as well as
wages for the days of sickness, compensation for forced unemployment, payment (,', of
provident fund, gratuity, pension, etc. are regulated by a variety of labour legislation. In the
area of industrial relations ag~in, legislative provi~ i sions abound. In short, there are very
few areas in employer-employee relationship that are left untouched by compre h ens~. Ve 1
eg~. s 1 a t·~ on 36 • When a subject matter is covered under legislation it is hard to make a
more liberal departure from it. What the legislation prescribes becomes the national norm.
For example, take the hours of work. Except in Pharmaceutical industries five days a week is
not observed uniformly in production units. Forty-eight houts a week still rules the Indian
industrial Bcene. In terms of benefits under the provident fund and gratuity the minimum
prescribed under the law has become the standard. rhese legislation have ~ " thuG become a
hindrance to progressive liberalisation of worker's benefits through collective bargaining • •
The subject left untouched by law such as wages, dearness allowance, leave, etc. offer limited
scope for collective bargaining. The operation of different legal .3 6 As on 1968, there were
on both Central and States. the Statute book 19B enactments, NtL Repott, op.cit. p.316. 65
constraints makes it impossible to make much. headway. Easy availability of legally
established dispute settling machinery makes one opt for its services rather than resort to the
process of bargaining • • c) -G-r-i-ev--an--ce- --M-a-c-h-i-n-e--r-y. Where stable collective
bargaining is practised, the functioning of a grievance machinery .. normally removes the
day-to-day grievances of workers. The step-ladder machinery recommended under the Code
of Discipline is a voluntary one. Even where the parties have jointly agreed to have a
grievance machinery, it is very seldom used to the satisfaction of both the par~ies. The age-
old open-door system in varying forms is used for the removal of grievances. Quick removal
of grievances lessens the discontentment among the employees. These grievances, therefore,
 29

do not add to the collective issues. The NCL reports . that the progress made in instituting
grievance machinery in India is far from satisfactory37. , 2.5 Internal Machinery In addition
to the Works Committee and the grievance" machinery, there is in industry a management
branch which constantly observes the industrial relations, and reviews it wherever found
necessary. This branch is known by different names. Since our focus is Industrial Relations,
we term it Indust~ial Relations Department. 37Ibid , p.347. nu There was a time when the
Accountaht in an industry occupied an all-important position. With the coming of large
investment, multiple prod~cts and mass production, the production men assumed greater
importance. The third stage was that of the cost control personnel. Now the marketing men
and the persol1nel men have acquired the pride of place. .. Industrial Relations is the
responsibility of personnel men. Every factory or urlit with even a labour strength of 300 may
be having a spe~ially trained personnel officer to keep a constant watch on industrial
relations. He is a crucial point in the communication system of that unit. He transmits to the
workers end the unions the company's policies and decisions on va~ious issues on which the
workers are interested. Simil~rly, he assesses the feelings of workers and the trade urlions on
various vital issues and communicates them to the top management. He is associated with
policy decisions in respect of industrial relations. In lergp.r organisations, this function is
done by a group of specially selected pets, onnel. They not only do the fire fighting but
anticipate the problems that lie ahead and prepare the organisation for effectively meeting the
situation. The role and funcHons of en Industrial Relations Department can be better
appreciated by comparing 67 the industrial relations in two est~blishments, one having a
competent band of industrial relations specialists and the other without it. 2.6 Kerals Situation
The State of Kerela formed in 1956 consists of the former Travancore State (with the
exception of the Kanyakumari District), the erstwhile Cochin State and the west coastal
districts of the former Madras State. It is bounded by the Arabian sea on the west and south,
Tamil Nadu on the east and Karnatake on the north and north east. The State is divided into
11 administrative districts, but depending upon the terrain it can be divided into three long ~
strips namely, highland, midland and coastal land. The State is situated on the southernmost
part of the country, cut away from the main industrial centres. It is close to equator. It is
blessed with both south-west and north-east monsoons. Nearness to the equator and abundant
rains, lakes and backwaters make the climate hot and humid. During the monsoon seasons,
the State enjoys a fairly moderate temperature. The soil is rich. The high-land contains
natural forest ares, part of which is cleared for agriculture and human habitation. Plantations
like tea, coffee and rubber have been established. Cardamom, clove, ginger, pepper, cashew,
 30

and other cash crops are raised on-the midland. Paddy, sugarcane, tapioca, coconut and spices
are the major crops of the plains. The coastal land also produces paddy and coconuts. The
backwaters, lakas, canals and rivers provide facilties for fish landing and inland transport.
The State's economy is agrarian, and the bulk of the labour-force is employed in agriculture,
including plantation and fishery and allied activities. 2.6.3 -T-h-e- -P-e-o-p-l-e The density of
popUlation in Karala is one of the highest in the country. It has a population of 21 million and
a density of 549 per sq.km. 38 The people there, unlike in the usual Indian villages, live in
continuous villages, which present an appearance of semi-urban areas. The language of the
people is Malayalam. Tamilians and the people from the Konkan region who are settlers in
the area together form around 7.7 per cent of the total population. They are found in all walks
of life and they do not face any discrimination. There are three major religious groups,
Hindus, • Christians and Muslims in that order. Jews, Parsses and Sikhs are also found. But
their number cannot be more than a few hundreds. All liVe in complete harmony without any
religious or communel hatred. Even when the North India 38public Relations Departme~t of -
Kerela Government, Industrial Scene, Trivandrum, 1976, p.1. was r.eeling under communal
passion an-d violence immedia tely after attainment of Independence, complete calm
prevailed in Kerals. This is perhaps an indication of the cultural maturity of the people of
Kerala, who traditionally in practising the motto 'live and let live'. 2.6.4 Kerala has a
homogeneous culture. The migrants get absorbed and assimilatad in the culture of the region.
The literacy rate of her people is 61 per cent, the highest 39 in the country • The State spends
40 per .cent of its revenue from tax collection for education40• The second major share of
expenditure goes to health41 and transport and communication gets the next largest share 42 •
Malayalam language has 465 newspapers; 71 dailies, 73 weeklies and 321 other periodicals.
The combined circulation of all together make one copy make available to every four people4
3 • The circulation of dailies alone make one copy for every seven people 44 • However, the
per capita income at ~.625 • (1971-72 prices) is one of the lowest in the country 45 • But
Kerala leads other States in PQU - a new me'asure 39 Ibid. 40 rhe State Planning Trivandrum,
p.60. 41 Ibid , p.53. 42 • Ibid, p.62 . ,- Board, fifth fiveY~a! Plan (1974-79) • 43Department
of Public Relations, The Press in Kerala, Trivandrum, 1977, p.e. 44 Ibid• 45State Planning
Eoard, op.cit.p.2 • • 'iU constructed to understand the progress of mankind46• These facts are
indicatige of two things: {il the Government giv~ priority t~ such programmes that improve
the quality of life and (ii) the people, in general, ere capable of meking uae of the available
feciltiea to the optimum. Minerals like ilmenite, monazite, silliminate, mica and quartz,
important in the development of the national economy as a whole are available locally.
 31

Nature has blessed her with vast power generating potentialities in the shape of 41 rivers. The
cost of hydro-electric ?ower generation in Karele is the lowest in the country. Besides fully
meeting her needs, Kerala supplies her excess power to the neighbouring States. The State
leeds the other regions in having a wide network of good 41 roeds • Her inland transport
system connects all important commercial centres from the north to the south. Her natural
harbour at tochin, and the air-ports at Trivandrum and Cochin provide facilities for internal
and external travel, and for easy movement of goods. Her educated ~nd • technically skilled
population is second to none in the country In fact she ,is providing manpower to other parts
of the • coun try as well as to other parts of the g" lobe 48 • All 46 Overseas Development
Agency RepQrt; 1975, Washington,- PQLl ; Physical Quality of Life Index. 47State Planning
Boa~d, op.cit. p.62 48 ' Annual remittance to the tune of ~.450 crores by people from Kerela
employed in the Gulf countries speaks of the number of people seeking employment outside
the country. Malayala ManorBma,-~ottayam, dated January 1976. , 71 " these factors are
favourable for making a break-through in industrialisation. However, there are certain
limiting factors which prevent the State from developing itself into and industrially advanced
region • • 2.6.5 Rea$ons for Industrial Backwardness ---~------------------------------- Karala
has not developed into an industrially prosperous State for several reasons. The more
important among them are listed below: i) The people of Kerala do not have the capital base
for capital for large~ scale investments called for by modern industrial ventures. ii) The local
business community prefe15 to be traders without risking their resources in long-term
investment which are normally beset with uncertainities~ iii) Those who have financial
resources and are willing to invest prefer to develop plantations or to enter fishing industr~.
These BIe traditional economic activities free from major management problems, ivJ The
educated middle-class is highly service oriented and are willing to serve in any part of the
globe. But they ire disinclined to take up self-employment or entrepreneurial activities. • v)
Even those few with financial resources and busines"!r acumen tend to invest their capital
outside the State for fear of labour unrest. vi) Capital from outside is generally shy to cross
over to Kerals because of her past record of labour unrest. All the limiting factors listed above
have I '" retarded the speedy development of the region, despite the existence of many
favourable factors for development. In view of these severe constraints, it has becoma
necassary for the Governmant to step in and this has resulted in concentration of public sector
undertaxings in the eochin Alwaye region. ~However, there is a change in the trend, but it is
slow. Well established all India organisstions have started units in Kerals for catering their
products to the local markets. Those who thus set up within Kerala find generous assistance
 32

from the State Government. 2.6.6 T--r-a-d-i-ti-o-n--a-l -B--u-s-i-n-e-ss- -a-n-d- --In--d-u-s-t-r-

i-e-s The Portuguese, followed by the Dutch, french and the British came to India for trade.
Their original gate-way to India was the Kerala coast. Their main attraction in those days was
trading in spices like pepper, cardamom, cloves and ginger etc. as well es timber, especially
rose-wood. Even today these items are in great ., demand in foreign countries. Export of
manufactured goods included agro-based products like ropes, mats, carpets as well as cashew
nuts. The msnufactured items were produced by cottage industries. In sddition to agroJbased
industries, there were industries end production centres like bost building yards, tile factories,
handlo~m weaving establish- _.. .... - ments etc. the products of which were mainly for
internal . markets. These manufacturing units did not warrant employ- • ment of a large
number of work-force at anyone place, and therefore the present day labour-management
problems did not arise then. The exporters in those days found"it profitable to
establish .p~roduction units of their own f.o. r ensuring ~ steady availability of quality
products according to over- 't.' .. sees demands. These exporters, both of loca~ and foreign •
~~ . origin entered end established themselves in the traditional , sector of industry. Some of
the industrial houses set up Qby them still survive, they are now owned and operated by the
Indian capital and management. Modernisation has not taken place in these industries and
therefore the old near p~imitive methods of production still continues in them • • , Industrial
activities which can be termed 'modern' were initiated in the State by industrialists from
outside the State. These industrialist's were attracted to the State • ma!nly because of thi
abundant supply of power, the potentially skilled manpower, and the generall,y good
infrastructure facilities including reads. canals and railways as well as the •• port and shipping
facilities available in the State. ¢ Cotton Industry has the largest number of units in the State.
Except for two composite mills, all the other cotton textila units in the State can be classified
as spinning mills.' Although Kerals produces 91 per cent of country's natural rubber output, in
the country, she had till very recently only three major industrial production engBge~ in
rubber products, Heavy chemicals, timber based industries, engineering, electronics, and
basic metals (like aluminium and zinc) are some of the other ind~stries which have been set
up in Karela. Among the 11 districts of Kerala, the Ernakulam district has tne maximum
concentration of such industries. The Cochin-Alwaye~'industrial belt is located in this district
• • Because ~f its proximity to a good sea port anij as its hinderland is well connected up with
a net work of roads and canals, many large scale pro"duction units with high capital
investment, and business turnover have been located here. The traditional industries are
located elsewhere. Almost all the large public sector undertakings belonging to both the \)
 33

C"e.l. Hral and State Governments are located in this belt • The industries in the Cochin-
Alwaye industrial belt set the pattern for industrial relations practices in tha State, and
normally othe~ centres follow this pattern • . , 2.6.~ Political Inatability o -------~-------------
Kerala is notorious for its political instability • ..•. The first Congress ministry in the former.
Travancore State Ilad fallen, only S'ix' month after its formation. \.- Thereafter, the Stata as
Travancore-Cochin, and, subsequantly as Kerala (since 1956) had unstable Governments till
1971. After attainment of Independence, in 1947, there were in all 18 I u UUV 'I::'.l. "
Itlt::11 \oI.-;J ; "'" ... .Q .L.If\..,o..l.UU~'-I one party Governments t coalition Governments
and spells of President's rule. Kerala thus leads all other States in the matter of Governmental
instability. The only Government that has had a full time in office was that of the coalitioft
Government of five parties formed in 1971 • • This politicsl instability and consequent
chaotic ... political conditions"have largely prevented leaders of Government frOm fully
devoting their time in developmental plans and programmes. r;;. A State in turmoil also gets
ignored by fund releasing authorities. The investors also feel discouraged to invest in a State
where the Government do not encourage them with concessions and aids. The net result was
that the potential investors found it safer to invest elsewhere than in Kerals. This trend has
been arrested with the coming into power of the coalition ministry in 1971. As all the major
political parties in the State joined hands and formed a Government (leaving only one major
party out), the Government could ensure a measure of stability in spite of certain differences
and disputes among the participating parties. Since 1972, the image of Kerala .h. as
undergone a salutary change. The employers have been given undertakings by the
Government that law and order situation will be maintainad at all cost and this has resulted in
an overall improvement· in the investment climete. The industrial relations environ- . " ment
has also shown a marked improvement. , • J 2.6.9, -P-o-l-i-t-ic-a--l --In--fl-u-e-n-c-e- -o-n- --
T-r-ad-e.- -U-n-i-o-n-s During the period preceding 1971, when political instability was
prevalent in Kerela, labour leaders used to play very crucial roles. This was because of the
fact that the trade union leaders were actually members of political parties.~ In all political
agitations of those days, labour • N • was made to participate and demonstrate in support of
the issues involved. Labour thus became mere tools in the hands of political parties. This was
very much true of those workers and unions with leftist ideological leanings. By promoting
the status of trade union leaders in political The political leeders thus wanted trade unions to
be actively participating in politics, and the trade unions themselves wanted a place
in,political parties. This mutuality of interests brought them closer and triggered innumerable
st;ikes in industries till 1971. Occasionally such strikes have culminated in violences. But
 34

since they have occurred during political activities, far away from the employment place and
unconnected with labour-management relationship, the upshots of political squables rather
than the sequal of trade union bickerings. Trade union activities without political involve •
roen•t are very rare in soma areas of Kerels. The Cochin- Alwaye industrial b~lt, the area
under study, is haweve~ I I somewhat different. Here, majority of the unions do not involve
themselves in politics openJY, although the workers individually do so. At the most, ~he
unions may support their leaders in case they are candjdates for elections. In this, some of
them even go again~t their own avowed "I political interests for furthering ~heir immediate
interest. 2.6.10 -M--u-l-ti-p-l-i-c-i-ty-- -o-f- -U-n-i-o-n-s 'One union in one industfY' remains
only a dream in Kerala. Among the 18 units stu~ied, only in three units no rivalry of unions
was found. EVen in such units, multi- This situatinQ ia not the outcome of hiqh
politicalisation alone, but to a ce~tain extent is the result of irre'sponsible social behaviour of
the working class. It does not seem pl~usible that all the half a dozen rival unions operating
in any unit unifor~ally suffer from ideological diversities or have currupt leaders at the helm
of affairs. for the emergence of the several rival unions the only explanation is that the office
bearers of the newly born union could not find berths in any of the existing unions. And they
all aspire to be~ome leaders, whether they are acceptable to others or not. fhey are often
leaders among themselves, but without follo~ers. The employers' policy of recognising all the
• registered unions may be acting as ~n incentive to form new unions. Jhe Trade Union Act
itself does not discourage multiplicity, but rather makes the formation of new rival unions
easier. The unions are therefore too numerous, divided and often with outside leaders and
poor finance. This aa mentioned earlier is typical of an Indian Union. Multiplicity and rivalry
however do not come • in the way of collective bargaining. Despite their political and
ideological differences, the unions in Kerela in general and those in the Cochin-Alwaye
industrial belt in particular achieve e high degree of unity in approach at the collective
bargaining stege. It cannot be claimed that multiplicity of unions ha~ encouraged collective
bar-. ga in in g. The units with single unions have better collective bargaining records. In
addition, they have proved to be assets to the employers. 2.6.i·~ -A- -C-om--m-o-n --U-n-i-o-
n --A-p-p-r-o-a-c-h Rival unions making a common approach towards problems affecting
them is not a usual prective elsewhere in India. But it is just a normal thing in Kerala since
long. These unions without exception and irrespective of their colour and shades of opinion,
conduct themselves in collective bargaining in the same manner as single unions do in any
part of the free world. If a comparison is made, Karala labour may be found to be less violent
and more vocal in their trade union activities than the Unions in other ps.rtsof India. The
 35

organised working class there do not indulge in violent activities bordering on arson and
physical assault of mana, y gement personnel. But they are very vocal and they do shout their
specially coined slogans raising their fists in the ai~. They conduct mass demonstration, but
they are orderly and peaceful. This is true of even egriculturel labour in the villages. Their
behaviour is defi- • nitely refined. Organisationally too, with an estimated 53 per cent union
density, trade unions in Keralaappear to be stronger than in any other State. This may perhaps
be attributable to their level of education, union and political consciousness and an
ever~burning sense of equality with others, •

CHAPTER 3
 36

J METHOD Of CONfLICT RESOLUTION 3.1 Genesis of Conflicts Labour-

management relationship is said to be a relationship of simultaneous co-operation and
conflict1• This co-operation and confli~ts are eternal in cap±talis t l".C an dm"l. xe d
eConom"l.2es . The free world theoreticians consider labour problems universal3• In the
communist countries, however. tha scope for co-operation is broadened and strengthened
while that of a conflict is limited or restricted to a manageable level because of the economic
and social philosophies practised there 4 • 1C•M• George, Industrial Relations at National
Level, Indian Manager, Vol. VIII, No.2, p.146. 2k• Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the
Communist Party. Moscow; Foreign Publishing House (1955) various pages. 3 John T.
Dunlop, frederick H. Harbinson, Clerk Kerr and Charles A. Myers. Industrialisation and
Industrial Man Reconsidered, Inter-University StUdy of Labour Problems in Economic
Development, Princeton, New Jersey, 1975, p.a. 4Ibid• N! Employers as a class, be they in
the private, p~blic, co-operative or joint sector, invest capital for specific goals, the main
among them being profit and growth. The emphasis on profit may vary among different
sectors, but without profit they cannot sustain and grow. • Employers in the private sector are
more profit and growth oriented than others, as their self interests are stronger than ell other
interests~. This orientation often leeds to flow of capital across national frontiers, 85
evidenced by the operations of multinational organisations. While they give an overt
impression of actively contributing to the progress of a developing country, their underlying
concern is their own profit expansion, and if possible, capture of the whole market. In the
pursuit of profit and growth, the industries face many constraints. Among them, the claim of
the labour they employ is increasingly becoming predominant, though flexible to a certain
extent. Employers in the same industry may have uniform or near uniform environmental
conditions. This is true of raw materiel procurement,· availability of power, interest rate they
pay for the money they borrow, tax rate etc. One employer may however enjoy adVantage
over others on account of long-term of contract, monopoly position, market reputation, size
of the establish- 5Government of India, NCL Report, 1969, New Delhi. 82 ment. link with
other units in the same industry or other industries, etc. But employers' bargaining power on
these factors is limited. On the other hand, labour ~s one fector which is flexible, and
therefore bargainable. The wage differences for the same trade existing in different units in
the same industry and in different industries clearly show the differential treatment meted out
to labour.because of its essential flexibility and consequent bargainability. No two industrial
units surveyed in the present study have the same wage rates for anyone trade. This is so
because of the prevailing bargaining practice. However, the wage rates for the same trade in
 37

the different units are found comparable. This is also the result of the bargaining tra" dition in
these units. A worker, unlike a machine. is flexible. A machine needs its moving parts to be
regularly oiled failing which it inevitably breaks. Unless the lequisite quantity of fuel is
~onstantly fed. the machine will stop functioning. for every additional input of fuel, the
machine will work for a known unit of time. But man, unlike e machine, is infinitely flexible;
his standards of requirements for specific functions can be anything between the bare
subsistence minimum and all the ingredients for a comfortable living. During the early part of
industrialisation, eVen children worked for 12 to 14 hours a day working and sleeping in the
same premis~s6. What the employers considered as a f~ir . 6 Government of India, Royal
CommissiQn. Report on labour, 1931, p.341. compensation for the labour became the
prevailing wage rates. And the employers always considered their share as the first claim in
the profits of their establishments. With the birth and growth of trade unions along I) with
changes in social and economic thinking, a sea change has taken place in labour-management
relationship. Employers have now come to realise that even in an unemployment economy,
they cannot effectively employ their capital unless the labour co-operated. Just as they
employ labour, labour in its turn is employing capital7. Without labour capital remains idle.
Labour organised in trade unions at times withdrawn labour. Industry is therefore, a co-
operative effort between the cepital and labour, irrespective of the distribution in ownership.
When both employ each other, each has its claim in the fruits of the joint effort. When these
claims are not satisfactorily settled, conflict situations arise. Some settle their conflicts
mutually. Others invite third party intervention for conflict resolution. In some cases the
Government, as tha guardian of law and order and administrator of social justice, inteFfe,r.e
in industrial conflicts, 3,2 Consequences of Industrial Conf-licts Just as the parties co-operate
and produce goods and services, they at times decide to effect work-stoppages. 1Gulzarilal
Nanda, A thart~~ for Labour in Gandhi: His life and Work, Karnataka Publishing House,
Bombay, 1944, p.le1. 84 Employers lock-out their establishments as e weapon against the
labour. labour in turn, effect work-stoppages by strikes - abstaining from work in a concerted
manner. Every year work-sbppages occur in hundreds of units. The • ultimate consequence of
such work-stoppages, for whatever reasons they are resorted to, is loss of production. To
employers, loss of production means many things: idleness of machinery and capital, wage
payment in some cases even if no work is done, and overhead costs with little or no output. In
addition, it inflicts incalculable damage to the business image because of the failure to honour
the business commitments made to their customers, patrons, etc. To labour, it means idleness
and loss of wages. The Government also suffer in the forms of loss in sales tax, excise duty
 38

etc. The public suffers due to short supply or non availability of goods and services and
disruption to normal life. The loss is greater and affects larger number of the population and
the national economy as a whole if stoppages of work occur in the basic and crucial
industries. Breakdown of labour-management relationship in the basic and crucial industries
craates a ripple effect which engenders artificial problems in many other economic sectors.
for example, if coal extracted from coal mines remained at pit heads, because of some
transport bottle-necks caused by the strained labour-management relations in the transport 85
industry, it affects power generating units which in tUrn affects all the industrial units
depending on those units for energy. A major stoppage e of w. ork in coal mines or steel
industry affects all those industries depending on coal end steel. A shut-down of petroleum
refining industry has the potential to paralyse the whole economy. Work stoppage at ports and
docks brings international trade to a stand-still. All business activities come to a stop, if banks
do not function. Similar is the chaos in social life, if work stoppage takes place in certain
public utility services like railways, road transport, airways, electricity and water supplies,
hospitals, public distribution systems, etc. for the health of the economy and the well-being of
the society and its orderly life, every industrializing society, therefore, creates arrangements
for defining and administering a vast complex of rules applicable to work-place and to the
relationship among employers, workers and their organisations and Government agencies.
This net work of rules consists of three elements _ procedure for establishing regulations,
substantive rules themselves and the procedure for settling disputes on their application to a
particular situation • The rule-making • processes by their nature are of three types: (i)
unilateral decision by the employer, (ii) bipartite negotiation, and (iii) tripartite decision. In
the more developed countries with free market economies, the first one, i.e. unilateral rule
making is no more in practice. Sipartism has become part of their industrial culture. In the
developing countries, however while bipartism is preferred in policy statements, both
bipartism and tripartie system co-exist, due to expediencyB~ The oldest system, i.e., the
unilateral one, still survivBs where industrialisation as a deliberate development process is
yet to become an economic phenomenon • • In all these economies, the State regulates the
labourmanagement relations by appropriate legislative enactments and policy directions. In
India, both the Central and State Governments make decisions in the area, as Labour is -. a
concurrent subject. 3.3 labour - A Concurrent Subject There is a division ofpow~a between
the Central • and State Governments. Labour is, however, included in the concurrent list in
the Indian Constitution. It means that both the Central and State Go~ernments enjoy the
constitutional right to make laws on the subject and to administer them. However. the Central
 39

lagislation will have over-ridigg jurisdiction OVer the State legislation, if there occur any •
B1LO, International Labour Review, Sever~l issues since 1~65. contradictions between the
two. Since the President of India has to give his assent for any legislation; the Central
Government further enjoy th~ right to prevent any State legislation becoming operative.
Central legislation have an all India applicability, unless otherwise states •. The State
legislation have operational jurisdiction within the geographical limits of the State only. If
another State Government adopt the legislative piece of one State for a limited or indefinite
period by the concurrence of its legislature, then alone a State legislation shall haVe
geographical jurisdiction outside its boundaries. The concurrent nature of Labou.r has been in
con- • uation ever since the 1919 Constitution. ~.The 1935 .~ stitution also retained the same
nature. ~he 1950 ublican Constitution did-not alter this position. The concurrent nature
facilitatea both the Central . . State Governments to legislate on the very same subject. ~
Central legislation need not be applied fully in the test The States enjoy the right for
modifying, and y do modify9, the Central legislation to suit the special ds or circumstances.
most all the State Gov£rnments have modified the Indusial Disputes Act, 1947 and the
Industrial Employment \5tanding Orders) Act, 1946. The State of Maharashtre has its own
Standing Orders Act, enacted in 1946. • Even when the Central Government make laws on a
concurrent subject end envisage an all India application for them, such laws normally contain
provisions conferring , rights on the State Governme'nts to frame rules under the Acts. The
Central Government make rules for administration within its own jurisdiction and proviPe
them . as . models for the State Governments to follow, .if they so desire. This rule-making
right is conferred on the States in order to make the rules flexible enough to be pdapted to the
different geographical areas depending on their level of development, tradition and other
relevant peculiarities. In addition to the above mentioned jurisdictional powers, the Central
Government have earm.a.r ked certain indus tries under its exclusive jurisdiction. In the
industrial relations area, the Industrial Disputes Act specifically men t ~· ons sue h ~. n d us
tr'le s 10 • The nature of these industries is such that either their operational control is made
the exclusive right of the Central Government or the industries are distributed in more than
one State because of the special ." nature of such industrial units. All units under study,
however, fall under the Kerala State 60vernment ' s jurisdiction. on the very eX.l e t s 11 •
Only very rarely do State 60vernments legislate same subject in whieh a c~ntral legislation
alredy But in other areas there are numerous State l8gis- 10See • 2 (a) (i) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1941 • • 11eg. Tha Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and the Bombay
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. lation. 1· In fact, in many cases the State
 40

Governments have legislated first, followed by the Central Government immediately or after
the lapse of some time 12 . • This is 50 ~ because the peculiar conditions obtaining in a State
may demand a particular legislation and the all India situation may not be r~pe enough'to
introduce the same legislation. 3.4 Preventive Legislation As mentioned earlier, in India the
practice of employers unilatterly laying down condition~ of employment is no longer in
vogue. Individual contracts have given place to collective agreements13 • Where there exists
no trade unions or where such unions are in an underdeveloped stage, tha State set up legally
constituted machinery for deciding the basic conditions of employme1n4t . Even agricultural
operations are brought under their coverage. The spirit behind such legislative mechanism is
that labour in certain sectors are weak to protect their legitimate rights, 12eg. The different
Welfare Legislation by State Governments, Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 19;1, the Kerels Agrari~n Relations Act, 1975 etc.
13Unsettled disputes can go for adjudication. Industrial Adjudication may involve extensign
of the existing agreement or the making of a new one', or in general, creation of new
obligations or,modification of old ones. AIR, 1949 f.C. III and AIR 1950 S.C. 168, 14Under
the Minimum Wages Act, 1946. ~jU and if the empl~yers are permitted to exercise their
earlier prerogative, exploitation of the worst type may result. At least one State Government
in the country has been lib- • • eral to the labour to the extent of legislating for social . ,. 15
security for 1tS agrar1Bn labour. • Legislative compulsion16 on employers Ito
define4precisely the conditions of employment and to make them known to the empl~yees.
and an enabling provision for labour participation in framing 'them and the Governments
overseeing the fairness of them, in effect seal off the chances for disputes and litioation on the
issue. Viewed in this perspect111e, It can be expla·lned that every legislation that conferred
new rights which were not universally available to workers, ~as not only guaranteed the
workers what-the legislatures thought appropriate at the given point of time, but itchas
narrowed down the scope of conflicts. employees. Let us examine the case of Gratuity to
industrial The Gratuity Scheme a~ a retirement benefit has been in existence over the
decades, first in the railways and tea gardens and then in other industries, but.limited ... " ... ~
to the higher levels of hierarchy only. Later, aS,a result of collective bargaining and
adjudication awards, it became a common benefit scheme available to workers as well of
organised industries. 15Agrarian Relations Act, .1975 by Kerala Government. It provides for
_rovident fund for agricultural labour. 16Industrial imployment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
and the Rules framed. thereunder. 91 By 1972 when the Pavment of GratUity Act was passed,
it was merely sufficient fori the workers to raise industrial disputes on gratuity to get the
 41

benefit 17 If bilateral negotiations' succeeded in ~'settlemeni, the" matter ended there. If the
matter could not be settled even at tripartite cO"Eiliation, it waS a foregone- -conclusion that
the dispute went for adjudication, and 'the workers ~ - benefited by a gratuity scheme,
however mode~t it was. The • , tribunals, in the light of near universal practice, consi- • dered
only one aspect, the financial capacity of the industry, immediate and anticipated. Thellegal
requirements for certification of standing orders, pay~ents of compensation in case of death
or disability resulti~g from employment i.njury_ while in the course of employment,
maternity" leave. financial benefit and job protection during maternity leave, provident fund
scheme as a retirement benefit, ~ay-off and retrenchment benefits, etc. to men~jon a few,
have considerably restrictea the scope of COnT~~CcB on sucn 1ssues. It is true that in spite
of legisla~ive regula- " tions, conflicts do occur on the very same subject; but they are limited
to the quantum of payments, and a? times to the • question of application to a particular
section of workers • Such conflicts are not basic ones, out are rea• lly relatad to the.issua of
properly interpreting the statutory provisions. Some of these ~onflicts are not restriet~d·to
legislative _ 17LLJ , 1962, I, p.iee. provisions alone. They often arise in the interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements and also of adjudication awa~ds • .. 3.5 Voluntarism The
tripartite conferences and committees that functioned at national-and State levels have also in
an indirect way helped to resolve industrial conflicts at • national and State levels. It is true
that they Bre more ... in the nature of laying down guidelines for legislative acti~1 and labour
policy decisions by consensus • They however at • times take Up specific issues which if left
unregulated may '-: escalate into conflicts of a higher magnitude at the national level. The
objectives of the tripartite bodies ara: 18 i) promotion of~uniformity in labour legislation; ii)
laying down of a pro~edure for settlement .w of industrial disputes and; iii) discussion on all
matters of all India importance as between the employees and employers. The discussion on
bonus since 1965 onwards and of contract labour since 1957 are clasaic examples. The
Inplementation end Evaluation Committee functioning at the Centre and States make a more
direct attemp~ for conflict resolution 1BLabour Buteau, Labour Bureau Pamphlet Series "
Cansult: ive Machinery in the labour field, 1959, p.3. 93 They come to the conflict resolution
after the conflicts reach the adjudication stage. The·committee and the cell working under its
direction endeavour to bring about auto of-court settlements of disputed issues, mainly by
persuaSion of the involved parties through their central organisat ions. 3.6 Settlements
Several methods are available and applied in conflict resolution in India. The earliest and
perhaps the best is Collective Bargaining19 • It came to be in practice in the Ahmedabad
Textile Industry around 1918 between the Ahmedabad Textile Mill Association and the
 42

Textile Labour Association at the instance of M.K. Gandhi20 • The second method as per
chronology, namely Voluntary Arbitration came into vogue around the same period. The place
of its origin and the parties to the practice too have been the same as th ose f or co 11 BC t ~·
va b arga~.n.~n g 21 • Further, here again the guiding apirit of the idea itself and the architect
of the method has been none other than Gandhi himself22. Perhaps the cultural pattern of the
people in the textile industry at Ahmedabad in those days, and other environmental factors
may have favoured the successful working of the experiment for a short duration. But it did
not receive 19Government of Kerala, Speeches and Addresses by V.V. Giri, Trivandrum.
1965. p.19. 20Gulzarilal Nanda, op.cit. p.183. 21 Ibid . 22Ibid• 94 acceptance in other parts
of the country. The result of these two methods did not enjoy legal enforceability as they did
not come under any legal provisions. When the first legislative piece for settlement of
disputes "The Trade Disputes Act, 1929" was passed, a new method namely. Conciliation
became available. The then Bombay Province pioneered in directly bringing Govern~ m~nt
into the labour management relationship with tha enactrnent of the Bombay Industrial
Disputes Act, 1938. This piece of legislation provided for compulsory conciliation of
disputes, recognition of the representative trade unions by employers, and approval by the
Provincial Labour Commissioner of Plant Rules (now known as Standing Orders) formulatad
by the employers. This principle of Government intervention in labour-management
reletionship was extended to the whole country under the Defence of India Act, 1940. This
Second World War legislation set the pattern of Government intervention in industrial
conflicts during the post-war period. The Governments thinking was evident from the speech
of Mr. A.l. Ramaswami Mudaliar, the then Labour member of the Government; when he said
at the second session of the Labour Ministers' Conference that though the war had ended, th e
emergency con t 1o nue d23 • The GOvernment therefo~e replaced the Trade Disputes Act,
1928 with the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. This Act provided for varioue conflict
23Ramsewami Mudaliar at the Second Session of the Labour Ministers' Conference held at
New Delhi, 27-28, January 1941. Conference Report, p.2. JV settlement means including
Works Committee, Conciliation, Court of Enquiry, Arbitration and Adjudication. However,
the Act is silent about Collective Bargaining. 3.6.1 -W-o-r-k-s --C-o-m-m--i-tt-e-e Works
Committee is an internal machinery consisting of the representatives of management and
employees in every undertaking employing 100 or more workers 24 • The , woikers'
representatives are to be chosen from among the workmen employed.in the establishment,
and their number shall not be less than that of the management. The lndustrial'Disputes Act,
1941 gives the objective of the Works Committee as "to promote measures for securing and
 43

preserving amity and good relations between the employer, and the workmen and to that end
to comment upon the matters of their common interest or co'ncern and endeavourt • to
compose eny material difference of opinion in respect of such matters". It is not a joint
committee for settling industrial disputes as such. But it is mainly a channel for joint
consultation aimed at promoting and strengthening • better relation between the employers
and employees by discussing matters of mutual interest and thereby avoiding possible
conflict at a later occasion 25 • The progress made by the institution of Works Committee has
been far from satisfactory. 24 Sec• J of the I.D. Act, 1947 25 NCL Report. op.cit~ p.342. The
grwoth of its number and the quality of its performance have been far short of expectations.
In 1959-60, out of 4730 units that were required to constitute works committee only 2574 had
really set up such committees. This works out to only 54.05 per cent. The corresponding
figures for 1965-66 are 5,091 and 3,133 respectively which represents a 61.30 per cent
coverage. It is true that there has been an incresse in the number of units that constituted,
Works Committees. ~. B~t~ it amounts to making more than a mere compliance with . 26 the
statutory requirements • The National Commission on Labour reports that evaluation studies
have revelaed the failure and futilit~ of the Works Committees except in stray cases. In Uttar
Pradesh the Government has withdrawn the provisions for the constitution of Works
Committee in the private sector where they found the system unworkable 27 • The
functioning of Works Committees in Kerels has not been far different from that of similar
committees throughout the rest of India. Till the mid-fifties their progress there in terms of
the number hes been very encouraging. But their indifferent functioning appears to have
brought disrepute to the system by the early si~ties2~. In the Seventias, however, the position
eppears to be improving. The units covered under the present study have healthy Works
Committees functioning to the satisfaction of both the Management and the Labour. ~~Ibid.
Ibid. 2B lbid p.343. Collective Bargaining as a method of conflict resolution at an all India
level is a post-independence phanomanon29. It is true that it has a history dating back to the
eerly Twenties30 at the Ahmedabad Textile Industry, to the forties at the Bombay Textile and
Madras Textile Industries31 and to the forties again in the coir and cashew ;.~.,: 32 •
industries of the Quilon and Alleppey districts in Kerala. Although the ide~ was acceptable to
many industrial centres, it had not become a common practice prior to 1947 except in stray
places. Where it was experimentad with, a uniformity in approach and practice was absent. In
any case, the successful Ahmedabad expariment was not copied in toto in any- -: 33 other
place • Between 1946 end 1957 several industrial organisat ions in India have accepted the
collective bargaining system. Notable among them are the multinationals. They found their
 44

unions responsive to the idea and capable of 29 Ibid• p.321. 3DGulzarilal Nanda, op.cit.
p.1S1. 31 Government of India, Report of the Study Group on Industrial Relations (Northern
Region) Delhi, 1968 p.17. 32 R.K. 'N air, Industrial Relations in Kerals, New Delhi 1973
p.37. 33 Ibid• 98 responsibly participating in negotiations end fulfilling the commitments
mede in the agreements. Prominent among such multinationals are companies like the
Dunlop Rubber Company Limited (1947), the Bata Shoe Company Limited (1946), the
Indian Aluminium Company Limited (1951), the Imperial Tobacco Company Limited (1952),
the Mysore Iron and Steel Works Limited (1953). the Mysore Paper Mills Limited (1955), the
Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited (1955) and Hindustan ,.~ . Lev~i limited-(195S)34.
These organisations recognised either their single union or their majority ones, (whera
multiple unions existed) as the collective bargaining agent. These industrial organisations
have had their second and third series of bargaining agreements, at timas broken by
conciliations settlements and adjudication awards. An out- ~ standrng achievement of these
early days was the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement in 1957 between tha -
Aluminium Industries of Kundara, Kerala and six rival unions with different political
influence35 • The multinationals which pioneered the collective bargaining practice could
probably understand the political and trade union developments in the country. They could
notice this trend at least in the case of the Indian National Trade Union Congress which was
organised by the top congress 34Mery Sur, History of COllective Bargaining, shing House.
Bombay, 1965 p.57. 35 Ibid• Alia Publi99 36 leaders • Settlement of disputes otherwise under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 appeared to them to be 10n9- winding. That apart, those
multinationals intheir own mother countries and in their operating units throughout . the
globe, both in the developed and developing countries with dissimilar socia-political
environments, have had sufficient experience of the success of their pragmatic industrial
relations approach. This,along with the conditions obtaining in the country, made them tryout
the collective bargaining idea in India as well. This pioneering practice of these
multinationals has appreciably influenced their local counterparts, and they also started to
experiment with the idea. The Employers' Federation of India, in their Study on Collective
Bargaining, reports • ,~ that between 1956 and 1960 the number of disputes settled by
collective bargaining varied between 32 and 49 per cent in the units studied37 • This figure
may appear impressive. But it includes, in addition to voluntary collective bargaining
agreements settlements with the participation of conciliation officers, those agreements
registered with the Government and the consent awards 38 85 well • 36 Ibid• p.se, Vithalbhai
Patel in his inaugural speech of INTUC, at New Delhi on May 3, 1947 explained the purpose
 45

of organising INTUC as.a national trade union centre was to prevent workers from
communist influence. He also wanted INTUC to support Governmental policies and co~op
erate with employers. INTUC's First Annual Report, 1948 New Delhi, p.4. 37Employers
Federation of India, Monograph No.7, Bombay, 1961, p.5. 38 Ibid• It is a practice with
employers to register an agreement with conciliation officers. Conciliation Officers therefore
participate in such dispute settlements. In ••• 100 Most of the collective bargaining
agreements are at pl~nt level, though in important textile centres like Bombay and
Ahmedabad, industry-wise agreements are also coml-f.lo n; Where there is a concentration of
any parti- ~ .. " ' ': cw.ar industry and where both the workers and employers • are organised
at the loe;al level, the structural"frame':work for collective bargaining is easily established. In
indust: tries like coal, plantitions, carr, cashew, etc. such structural framework exists.
'Bargaining in such industries takes place on industry basis at the local area. In the case of
coir and cashew, since the units are concentrated in a few geographical pockets, it can be said
that the,agreements are on industry and national basis, as ell the units are brought under the
coverage of negotiation and agreements. The Study Group on Industr~al Relations (Western
lI. Region) records that all management representatives f~voured d ' t 11 t' b ,,39 5' 'I'd ~rec
co ec ~ve argaJ.n~ng. ~m~ ar v~e~ls were expresse by the other three Study Groups on
Industrial Relations set up by the National Commission on Labour. The National Commission
itself, on an evaluation, concluded that, on the whole, ..t he record of reaching collective
bargaining agreements has not been unsatisfactory,' though its extension to wider area is
certainly desirable40 • strict sense, they are settlements and not agreements. Similarly when a
disputed matter is settled outside the court while the same matter is pending before judiciary
such agreements are also treated 68 collective bargaining agreements. 39Government of
India, Report of the Study Group on Industrial Relations ("Wes.tern Region) 1968, p.6. 40
NCL Report, op.cit. p.321 • • IU1 Viewed"alongside the all India picture, the record of
Kerala~seems impressive. The Study Group on Industrial A Relations (Southern Region)
evaluated the Industrial Reletl. o ns c l'~ .a t e 1. n Ke re 18 'a·s sa t1"Sf ac t or.y 41 • There
the number of collective bargaining agreements has been steadily on the increase year after
year with . . the exception of the year 1969-70. Table pres~,nts a claar picture of this trenl
Table 1 NO. Of COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS42 .
----------------------------------------------. -------------- Year 1 • 196~-67 1967-6B 196B-69
1960-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 .,-. - #- If: •.. • No. of Disputes
Percentage of No. of Disputes 2 - - - - - - 5211 4919. 6094 6406 5950 6286 7821 9620 9111
12423 settled,by Col- successful bargainlective Bargain- ing·to. total ing. - disputes 3 4 2219
 46

991 2025 1094 2325 2275 31BO 5435 4506 5574 - .. - - - - - - - 42.58 20.14 :33.22 17 .07
39.06 36.46 40.66 56.49 50.00 44.86 _____ w _________ ~
______________________________________ .-___ • 41 Government of India, Report of
Study Group on Industrial Relations, ( Southern Region), 1968 p.16. 42Data supplied by the
Labour Commissioner, Government of Karala. 102 The number of disputes OVer a decade
has more than doubled. The number of disputes settled also indicate the sarna trend. 1f we
overlook.th~ apparent set-back during the years ,1967-66 and 1969-70 and c()nsider the
gradual per- I ... ~ . centage incresse in the number'o..f collective agreements • Since then as
the figures in the ab()ve table do not include conciliation settlements and conset ewards it is
certainly B better pattern than ~he one presented by the all India figures for the period ending
1967-&8 quoted and commented upon by the Nationa~ Commission on labour. -This superior
record could be established because a.~~jo'" .......... ....- • of several reesons,·some of wh~ch
a~e listed below: • • • i) the local trade union leader\; and workers" in general, have exhibited
maturity in dealing with managements; ii) in many cases workers are or9anised on industry
basis as in the case of plantation~, coir and cashew industries; iii) employers BrB also
organised on industry basis. This achievement is especially notewarthy when • one considers
the multiplicity of unions and intra-union rivalries prevalent there. The -16 units studied have
as much as 126 unions the average, being 7. Only 3 out of the 18 units are free from union·
rivalry. All the units under . . study haVe existing collective bargaining agreements on all
major common issues. Instances of taking recourse to adju_ 10;) dicetion on disputes of·a
collective nature are totally absent. The reasons for this may be that the trade unions in the
region Bre fairly mature in the dealing with employers, as the Study Group on Industrial
Relations of the National Commission records. 3.6.3 Conciliation ... ----------- The need for
conciliation arises when· there exists a conflict, and either negotiation fails or it doe.s not
take place at all. Myers C.A. attributes the difficulties faced by the Indian Management in
developing systematic labour-mana• gement relationship to the managerial attitude in
general. ... (i . He sees overtones of authoritarianism and paternalism in the behaviour and
attitudes of managers, who. often consider union f unc t ~. on8 as an .~nva,s~o n a f
manager~. a 1 r~. g h t 4 3 • Myers himself points out, however, that the management attitude
is changing. He attributes this change to the growing professionalism of managements, and
regrets that this change is somewhat retarded because of the inherent weaknesses of trade
unions44 • Even today; it is not uncommon to bbserve the employers refusing to recognise
trade unions under one pretext or other. The Code of Discipline prescribes a qualification of
one year of clean record before the employers need to confer recognition. A union once
 47

recognised can be de-recognised by the management unilaterally for any alleged major unfair
labour practice. Multiplicity of unions and 43 Charles A. ~lyers, Industrial Relations in India,
Asia Publishing House, 1957, p.197. 44 Ibid • 1 V'i their rivalry make bilateral negot~ation
difficult,if not possible. In the circumstances, conciliation is very frequently tried in the
settlement of industrial disputes. Like collective bargaining, conciliation too has its history
dating back to the poet-world war years, when Ganchiji offered his good offices to settle the
industrial conflicts in the textile industry in Ahmedabad. It attained statutory recognition in
1928 when the Trade Disputes Act -oJ provided for a Board of Conciliation. The Bombay.
lndustrial Disputes Act, 1938 also provided for an agency to conciliate in case the industrial
disputes were not settled by the parties. , The principle beHind conciliation is that the parties,
however, desirous to conclude conflicts, may be incapable, in the circumstances, to reach a
negotiated settlement of disputes in all cases. The presence or participation of a third party,
the most concerned bei.n g the State, might help to hasten the disputant parties to narrow
down their di fference's. A person playing the role of the conciliator normally has sufficient
background knowledge about the prevailing practices in the industry. A person, rated as one
with the basic potentiality to conciliate, when give.n. the necessary knowledge, input and
skill training, acquires the • necessary competence to bring the warring groups across the
table for cool and mature discussion of the specific issues. IUJ The aim of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 was to invetigate and amicably settle industrial disputes • . Hence the
investigation is to be made by a third party - the State. Two types rif conciliation envisaged
under the Industrial Disputes Act are: a) conciliation by a conciliation officer, and b)
conciliation by a board of conciliation. The latter means is very sparingly used and therefore
we , confine our discussions to the former one. Under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
concilietion is compulsory in all disputes in public utility services, if notice for strike or
lockout is given; it is optional in other industries. . , Hoever, the conciliation - machinery may
interfere in any dispute, actual or apprehended, if any of the involved parties approaches the
conciliation machinery for its good offices. But over the years, this optional provision is
acquiring a compulsory character in practice in non-pUblic utility services also. The Act
prescribes a time limit of 14 days within which conciliation proceedings to be closed, unless
the parties jointly agree otherwise; makes the settlement binging on the parties and those who
appeared at conciliation before a conciliation officer, and prohibites stoppages of work for
seven days thereafter, is made illegal. This provision prevent the parties from taking
unilataral action abruptly. 1 VV The National Commission on Labour comments upon the
performance of the conciliation Dachinery at the Central sphere as "one which does not
 48

appear to be unsatisfactory45. This basis for this conclusion is the relevant data available for
the years 1959-66. In the Central sphere, its success varied between 57 and 88 per cent of the
cases taken up for conC1'1 1' a t'~ on 46 • But the performance of the State conciliation
machinery does not show a uniform and steble pattern. According to the National
Commission on Labour, in some cases the success is impressive but in other cases the
performance is disappointing. In the State of Orissa, for instance, the percentage of successful
conciliation has ranged between 27 to 3S per cent only during the period, whereas in Kerele,
conciliation has been quite successful, the percentage of disputes settled by the method being
almost as high as 88 per cent (see Tabla 2) during certain years47. 45 NCL Report op.cit.
p.322. 46 Ibid 47Ibid• 107 Table" STATISTICS Of DISPUTES WHICH WENT fOR
CONCILIATION46 -----------------------------------.----------------------- Year No. of disputes - -
- - - - - - - - 1 2 - - - - - - - - - 1966-67 1967-6B 196 B- 69 1969-70 1970-71 t91t-12 1972- 73
1973 .. 74 1974-75 1975-76 5211 4919 6094 6406 6336 5950 7B21 9620 9111 12434 No. of
disputes teken up for conci~ lietion. 3 No. of successful conciliation. 4 Percentage of c01:4 .
over col. 3 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2992 3928 4069 5312 4061 3625 5741 4185 4605 6730
2340 3480 2267 4654 2241 2144 2136 2936 2673 3601 81.22 BB.59 55.73 87.63 52.72 69, t
1 37.03 70.22 63.62 54.74 ----------------------------------------------------------- It can be seen
that for the ten year period, the record has not been poor except for the year 1972-73. The
figures regarding conciliation settlements do not reflect the correct picture as they are
actually somewhat inflated considering the fect that the statistics of those bipartite
agreements which resulted from negoti_ ations are 91so included in the data. This inclusion
has • taken place because the_parties to the agreement sign them before the conciliation
machinery, end therefore technically such agreements become conciliation settlements. ~- 48
-- Deta made availabla by the Labour Commissioner, Government of Kerels. 108 Similarly
the date is inadequate in another way. There is no subject-wise break up of the settlement~.
While . some of them involved really major disputes, it is possible . . that many others may
have been on insignificant lssues and with trivial outcomes. There ~s also a belief that
disputes of a minor nature or on non-substantive issues ~et settled more often than those
involving basic conflicts. Non-aviailability of data on such basic conflicts preventa us from
attempting an in-depth analysis of the conciliation • settlements. • Voluntary Arbitration
--------------------- Arbitration as a method of conflict resolution in industry prevails in all
economies in one form or another. In the moxe developed countries of the West which have a
free economy, it is fairly common. Here, the frequently used method of collective bargaining
agreements include provisions for arbitration if differences of opinion arise at the
 49

implementation stage of the agreement. Generally, arbitration ~s understood as a method of

conflict resolution whareby a third party is chosen to • render a decision on the facts and
merits of the case. Depending on the basis on which such third party is chosen. the . terms of
reference of the arbitration and the binding character of the resulting award, there are
different types of arbitration. • In the Indian context, by arbitration one understands tha
voluntary type of arbitration. The compulsory one 109 is always referred to as adj udication •.
Voluntary arbitration is a procedure v.o luntarily chosen by the disputant ... parties whereby a
conflict is settled by an impartial judge of their mutual selection and whose decision, based
on the facts and merits of the case, they agree in advance to accept as final and binding • •
Here the choice of the method itself as wel'l as aspects such as who should be the arbitretor,
what should be the terms of reference, etc. are voluntary. However, the acceptance of the
arbitration award is compulsory. The voluntary arbitration recognised as a method of conf'l"
'ict resoiLution undar the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is of this nature. To quality for the
legal coverage and the binding character of the award, the arbitration agreements are to be
made in a specified manner! and • should be-'forwarded to the appropriate Government for
notification in the official gazette. The situation for voluntary arbitration arises when the
disputant parties fail to arrive at agreementsl settlements either by themselves or through the
good offices of the conciliation machinery. The alternative choices available to them than are:
i) direct action or; ii) joint application to the appropriate Government for adjudication of the
dispute. Voluntary arbitration is practised where there 110 exists a healthy industrial relations
climate end the • parties have faith. in the efficacy of the arbitration ~ W· proc ee dinQS. It is
the preferred choice, at least in two situations: i) Where there is a collective bargaining
agreement 0wherein a cleuse is included making it oblig• a tory on the part of the signatories
to refer all matters of disputes arising from the agreements to an arbitrator for interpretation
and implementation. ii) In the event of a dispute regarding termination OT serv~ce of
employees. Availability of acceptable and competent arbitrators, State recognition of
arbitrators' awards 6 and the existence of a structural framework are some of ~ the
environmental pre-conditiona for the growth of the method. When arbitration is widely used
for conflict resolution, two underlying reasons for resorting to the method can be. pointed
out: i) Both the employers and employees want to avoid a trial of strength through direct
action. ii) Both 'parties want to avoid the legal entanglement and consequent delay in dispute
settlement which is bound to occur if the dispute goes for adjudication. Voluntary arbitration
as a method of conflict resolution has been in vogue in India for some tim~ now. It originally
came into ecceptance in the textile industry 111 at Ahmedabad at. the instance of Mahatma
 50

Gandhi. The Bombay Industrial ~isputes Act, 193B.snd the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
194649 ~recognised arbitration and made legal • provision • an~'definite procedures for its
use._ The Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 did not accord legal sanction for private arbitration.
Introduction of an amendment to t~e Act in 1956: b!,ought about voluntary arbitration as one
of -<t the legally recog-nised methods in conflict res~l-ution on a . 50 voluntary bas~s • Shri
G.l. Nanda's period as labour Minister witnessed an "increasing emphasis given to vol untary
arbitration. The successive plan documents, the code of discipline, the code of conduct for
productivity and wel~ fare, etc.-have been drawn up with the basic idea of Spreading the
gospel of voluntarism· for amicably resolving industrial conflicts. The IlC and the Labour
Ministers' Conference in 1962 reiterated the need for wider acceptance of the techniques of
voluntary arbitration. The Third Plan.document has endorsed this view by making a pious
hope that arbitration would become the normal practice in conflict resolution in preference to
adjudication. The newly constituted implementation and Evaluation Committee, with a
special cell at the Central Government level, made yearly review of the cases which went for
adjudication in preference to arbitration. The Industrial Truce Resolution, 1962 reemphasised
the need for voluntary arbitration, and recom- . " 49Sec.72 of Bombay Industrial Relations
Act. 1946. 50 Sec • 10A of Industrial Disputes Act,·1947. mended that all cases like
dismissals, discharges, victimisations reinstatements, etc. be preferably settled by voluntary
arbitration. The Government of India subsequently create~ the National Arbitration
Promotion Board with . , the main obJ~~"~vC of promoting and co-ordinatlng the practice of
arbit~ation and reviewing its progress. • In spite of all these efforts over the years including
the~powerful .. advoc.a. cy for it "in different policy making bodies, arbit- " ration has not
taken roots in India. The number of cases • settled by arbitratio~amoun*s to only about 1.5
per cent of the totDI dispute. Tabl", 3 DISPUTES SETTLED THROUGH ARBITRATION
S1 (KERALA) • ---------------------------------------------- Year 1965-66 • 1966-67 1967-68
1968-69 1969-70 "1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 No. of disputes 5004
5211 4919 6094 6~06" 6236 5950 7621 9620 9111 12434 Settled by arbitration 17 37 15 47 8
16 " 150 1 434 26 ---------------------------------------------- 51 Data given by Labour
Commissioner, Government of Kerala. Kerala, which had established a commendable record
in collective bargaining and conciliation, could maintain only a poor image in respect'of
arbitration. Till 1965 , the percentage of dis, putes that were settled by arbitration was less
then 0.45 per cent of the total (except, for two yea~s. namely 1956-57 and 1960-61 with
figures 1.03 and 1.36 respectively) •• r: This compares very poorly with the . _. all India
record of erbitration which itself is poor. But • • a consistency.of ratio between the disputes
 51

that have gone for adjudication and arbitration is noticeable. For every dispute referred for
adjudication, one dispute got settled by arbitration. This ratio now stands de-stabilised and
imp~oved. Again this reford of ratio between the two methods of conflict resolution is a
better one in comparison with the all India position. Table 3 presents a clear picture af the
~tatistics af disputes and arbitration during the last decede, Cb~rt of enquiry is very sparingly
resorted to as a meth~d for conflict resolution, and. therefore, data regarding its incidence is
almast absent. In Kerala this method has been used o~ly once, and that too, in tha Plantation
industry, where the labourers are employed in contiguous areas owned by different planters.
114 3.6.6 A__d_j_u_d_i_c_a_t_io__n Adjud~cation is the ultimate remedy for the settlement
of 'industrial diiDutes in a constitutional mannero -This is done bv referrina disD~tes to the
adiudicating authorit'ies, depending on their intlustry-:wise '" ' , . . jurisdiction in the case of
nation~l tribunal and subject- . . .," wise' jurisdiction in't'he case of industfial tribunal
and. ,..; .. labour court. Unlike the regular courts trying civil and criminal cases, the labour
courts, inoustrial trib~nals and national tribunals appointe~ under the-Industrial Disputes .
Act, 1947 to adjudicate industrial disputes arB not fullfledged courts of law. They are
quasi~judiciary bodies and are therefore free from be observed in any court of the rigid.legsl
formalities to law 52 . 52' A full,..fledged court of law h"as to, strictly follow the the
procedures prescribed under"releva~t law. Here, the Jaw which creates the adjudicating
machinery says "subject to any rules that may, be made in this behalf, the Labour Court or
indusirial tribunal shall follo~'such procedure as it may thinkJit~>Sec.-11 (1) of LD. Act,
1947. - -- . Again, the,functions of B 'full-fledged court of laVl are to interpth the
IBw.~con·tract fBtc~. end apply them to the subject matter under consideration. But
industrial adj udicating authoritie·s have' wide powers to· create new obligations and modify
the existing ones in the settle~ ment of industrial,disputes. AIR 1949 f.C, III and AIR 1953
SC 53. . In, a, eo~rt-of law. the aggrieved parties enjoy .... the:;ioht oj;~irect iooroach
t~cfile.their petition for redtessal ot" 't'!eirgriev8nces or for est~.blis~ing, their rig hts. 1 t is
their discretion that Idecides ,:"hether j udicial~ onsideration is required to get ,Justice. in the
~8se t.:.. -. ' of industrial adj ui:ii~ation, however, the partie~ do not • ,act JOY the right of
dir!ct app~oach. There may arise disputes'. The parties may fail to resolve them by
negotiation conciliation or by arbitration. They, may eve~ believe that their disputes deserve
judicial consideration. Yet all , such disputes may not get adjudicated. The~reaso.'n for this is
that the reference of dispute to the 'adjudicating autho- t , -: • .. , ~ , i1't'ie"s is to, be made by
the appropri.a t-e Go.. vernment • ~ ala ne adj udic atian., is pass ible. • Such iefBr'~n ces are
ooti- I-< fied in the offici'sl gazette with :the parties:1IIIetltioned, .. • " r .,. the terms of
 52

reference made out 'and the'oresiding officer • named • The 'appr;piiate "Government d'o
~o'.l'aftar studying • ;. r .. _ the data on .. the .. tib';eet'and acquainting themselves of the
~ ... ...... ~ .. circumstances 'of the cas'e, and on being , '.., . : . '. . .. conv1nced of the need for
'adj udic;ation -of the dispute • . ~ , It may however refuse reference o'f a dispute even if the
parti'e~~ to the :disput 8 sepaditely or jointly make an application to the approp, ri,a-t"e"
Government, but such refusals are made only after recording the reasons, for such refusal.
Reference of any~dispute,~existing or apprehended, cen be • made any time. A rafuaal once,
made can be rev.i Ewed and the earlier decision can'be reversed in the light of new facts.
Once xeference is made, it cannot be withdrawn but the terms of reference can be'modified.
"Once a refer•e nce 1• S made, work~.s toppage alreadv'commenced can be prohibited. Any
~~rk-sto~page aft~; a refer~nce, during ~he adju~ication pro " ·ciss·Bnd·t~o months
thereafter is ill.. e... .b al. The adjudication . ' proceeding' is treated as pending till such time
the adjudi- • cation award becomes en~orceable. The'eward.becomes ehfor-~ • ceable' one
month after its publ'ication. The award given • ~Y th;~adjudicating 8u'thorities is binding on
the parties to the dispute and also on those who were summoned as parties, unles. s the'.- ,a.
ward itself excludes them. The awards given by the Labour Courts, Tribunals and National
Tribunals are not • ~ .. ~ l subject to Bppeal'in~any court of l~w. But during 1950 to 1956\
when a special Labour Appellate Tribunal was specially • constituted, appeals over awards
become permis~ible. However, in im.. portant cases and in cases in\which undue injus,t'ice
seems ·to have bee~made, ~he parties can exercise their right to obt;in-special leave from the
S:preme Court, and thu.s. appeals get admitted. Adjudication processes n~ve been , subjected
to ~ review ever since they were introduced in 1941 as'an emergency '.1 measure. during the
early days, th~ national ·tr~de union cen t res VO.l. Ce d the~'r ., Op1.n.l.O.n" a ga1.n 5 t 1' t
53 • Pe r ha' ps th1' S ~. ' was but natUral since its introduction altered their earlier •
advantageous po~spion of ,~ollective bargaining as the only 53 INTUC was against the
system, INTUC Reports 1-4 New Delhi, 1948-51. H{ effective ~ethod for settlement of
dispute with proven gains to workers in certain established industrial centres. Weak
in,membership, finance and leadership and without legal back-ground they found it tough to
wage legal ,,- ..... .., battles against employers having unlimited resources. However. over a
period of time - by the second half of the Fifties, 4c. the"tr'ade unions in the country equipped
thellJl5s1ves with legBl knowledge end skill that match those of even the most re• sour~c
eful emp 1 Dyers, During these years they coul~ make notable achievements, which they
themselves might not have anti. cipated through collective bargaining, thanks to the liberal
adjudication principles evolved and applied. , . ~ ~ Once a major principle giving liberal
 53

concessions was given to workers in industry, region or unit, it did not in similar industry or
units on an all'India basis. In ,rn..sny cases, such benefits got wider acceptance subsequ~ntly
even without the adjudication process. The coverage of the terms to workmen, industry and
industrial disputes got established and was broader than what was considered possible. The
jurisdiction and powers of adjudi- • cators to c.o nfer new rights, modify the existing
contracts,· ' ' .. 54 etc. got accepted • The tribunal have taken note of - - - - 54"1n settling the
disputes between employers end workmen the function of the tribunal is not confined to
administration of justice in accordance with law. It can confer 118 the spirit of the as the
objectives Directive Principles in the Constitution of the Stat5e5 . Even the usage of the terms
'master and servant' had undergone a change to."emplayer and employee'. The unlimited
po~ers the employers enjoyed 'to hire and fire' have been moderated by an equally . 56
forceful prinCiple of the employees' right for job secU:rlty' .• The financial position of the
units as the deciding factor in wage determination has been repla~ed by the financial position
of the industry as a whole on a regional basis. A nee-based minimum wage has been made the
first claim in inrlus- A.fair wage and a living wage have been • right and privileges on either
party which it considers reasonable and proper, through they may not be within the terms of
any existing agreements. It has not merely to ~iT1te.rpret .. or~give· effect to the--
coritractual rights and - obligations of the parties. It can create new rights and obligations
between them which .it considers essential for keeping industrial. peace". Mukerjea, J, LLJ, I,
1950,921. 55Hlndeed. the concept of social justice has now become such and integral part of
industrial law that it would be idle for any party to suggest that industrial adjudication can or
should ignore the claims of social justica in dealing with industrial disputes". Gajendragadkar
J, LLJ, 1963, II, 436. 56" ••• it is important to remember that just as employers' right to
exercise his option in terms of the contrsct has to be recognised, so is the employees' right to
expect security of tennure to be taken into account". Gajendragadkar J, LLJ, 1960, I, 587. 57
"If an employer cannot maintein his enterprise without cutting dow~ the wages of his
employees below even a bare subsistence or minimum wage, ha would have no right to
conduct his eqterprise on such terms" Gajendragadk~r, lLJ, 1958, I, 1. • "At the bottom of the
ladder is the minimum basic wage which the employer of any industrial labour must pay in
order to be allowed to continue an industry", Gas Gupta J, LlJ, 1963, I, 108. made the fargets
to be achieved, wherever possible. sa, The right of workers to get relief in case of forced
unemploy- .. ment or termination of service for reasons other than punish- ,; ment and ill
health has oeen recognised59 • profi~-sharing is eccepted es a legitimate The claim for 60
one. Improvement in the working and service conditions over those prescribed under
 54

regulatory prOVisions hss been recognised as "Broadly speaking, the first principle is that
there is a minimum wage which, in any event, must be paid irrespective of the e~tent of
profit, financial conditions of the establishment or availability of workmen on lower wages",
Hidayathulle J. LLJ, 1967, 11,55. 56" ••• O, ur po I'1 t'lC;'d1 81.m l. S '1"lV lng wage t th
oug h'1 n ac t ue I prectice, living wage has been an ideal which has eluded our efforts like an
ever-receding horizon and will remain so for some time to come. Our general wage structure
has at best reached the lower levels of fair wage though some employers are paying much
higher wages than general aver-- a.g e", Hidayathulla J, LLJ, 1965, I, 175. ~- -~--- "Fair wage
liesbetween-HieMiniinul'rn.Jsg-e-, ~Jhichmust- be paid in any event. and the living wage,
which is the goal". Hideyethulla J, LLJ, 1967, II, 55. 59 Secs• 25 c, F, FF and fFF were
introduced in 1.0. Act, 1947 in 195.3 by an amendment (43 of 1953) to provide for
compensation for involuntary unemployment, such as lay-off, retrenchment, transfer of
undertakings, and closure. 60The claim of bonus is a claim to shara the available surplus out
of the gross profits to which the labour contributes. It is meant to partially fill the gap
between the living wage and actual wage paid. When the wage paid is a living wage, bonus is
only a cash incentive for higher efficiency, AIR. 1959, SC.676. 120 essentiat for the
continuous progress towards a more egalitarian society.· Provision for old age has become a
matter of right 61 • Some of these principles laid down by the tribunals and the highest
judiciary in the country have got incorporated in tne legislation of the relevant period. or new
legislation have been brought in to give effect to such principles on a country-wide scale62•
Each such principle laid down or legislation made narrowed down th"e area of industrial
conflicts •. This trend reversed the attitude of the parties towards adjudication. Trade unions
became ardent supporters of adjudi_ cation till the moral codes received a higher emphasis
from _the_Government .. _ IhB-emp..Loy~rs~'ear~ieJ;_sup.port_for_adj udication withered
away, as each major legal battle erroded their earlier commanding position. The availability
and'use of adjudication helped to avoid potential work-stoppages. It also brought about great
uniformity in conditions of service between different 61 eg_ Industrial Employees Provident
fund Act, 1952, with pension scneme, the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 etc. 62The
provision relating to lay-off, retrenchment, trensfer of an underteking, and closure in LD. Act,
1947, the payment of Bonus Aet, 1965, the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the Regulation
and Abolition of Contract Labour Act, 197.1, etc. ax-e directly and indirectly the result of
observat10ns made by toe Supreme Court of India on the subJects. sectors. In short, the
adjudication prOcess has exercised considerable influence on several aspects of labour
management relationship such as wages, allowances and their standardisation, neutralisation
 55

of higher cost of living, bonus, social security, etc. This has had a far reaching effect on a vast
section of the working po~ulation who could otherwise have not obtained these improved
conditions just by means of the collective bargaining process. The fact that adjudication,
despite its limitatio~5 and drawbacks, has become the inevitable ultimate method in conflict
resolution, itself speaks volumes for its effectiveness and superiority OVEr other methods in
the conditions that prevailed. The available deta on adjudication do not indicate any
uniformity. On the contrary, wide variations are notice-; t,le~-Inthe'CiintIal~Elptle~-the-
perCe.flt-sge, oLdisputes_ referred for adjudication to the totel number of disputes is very
negligible - less than 1 per cent. f!or th e yesI' 1966 the Study Group on Industrial Relations
records the percentage figure for Delhi as 11, Punjab '15, Uttar Pradesh 25 end Rajasthan 37.
fo-r the same yesr the record of Karals is 3.33 per cent. This is a clear indication that in
Kerala, recourses to adjudication is not a popular practice. Since the record of arbitration 1S
also far below all India rate, the methods adopted invariably sre collective bargaining and
Cone iliation. 122 3.7 -The Kerals Situation In Kerale Stete the legal machinery for
investigetion and settlement of disputes functions in the same manner as in any other parts of
the country • • However, in Kerala there exists certain additional non-legal and informal
State-sponsored machinery called In~ustriel Relations Committee. Such committees are
organised on industry basis for a local area. The fact that there is an Industrial Relations
Committee even for paddy cultivation clearly shows how the workers and employers are
organised even in the traditionally conservative agricultural sector. 3.7.1 -I-n-d-u-s-t-r-i-a-l --
R-e-l-a-ti-o-n-s- --C-o-m--m-i-tt-e-e-s The Industrial Relations Committees dates back to
1940, two years earlier than the birth of the Indian Labour :onference and eight years prior to
the setting up of the :entral Industrial Committees. The first exploratory meeting held in 1940
at the initiative of the then Government of Travancore and attended by the employers and
workers from the coir and mat industry proved to be the beginning of a multi-employer
industry-wise collective bargaining practice. Initially formed as a bipartite institution to
prevent and settle industrial disput~s through negotiation and joint consultation, later in the
early Fifties it became tripattite in character without any change inits basic objectives. This
institution pro-vided both employers and WOrkers a common 123 forum to meet, discuss and
settle knotty industrial relations problems in an atmosphere free of tension. • • • The State. to
a large measure, accorded autonomy to the Industrial Relations Committee. In 1943 a
decision was taken to estaqlish an Industrial Relations Board in all major industries. In
compliance with this decision, Industrial Relations Committees were constituted in all
important industries. In the course ~f their long yearS of functioning, there has been a break
 56

in 1948 when the trade unions in the coir industry eppatently became subversive. However.
the Government then sub~tituted the Industrial Relations Committees with ractory
Cornmittees. The Factory Committees met regularly and provid~d opportunities for joint -can
suli;a·tiofl-et·_. . un it_l.e vel • ~ .. --- In the early fifties, the Industrial Aelations Committee
system was revived. New committees were constituted • on industry .bssis for each regiol'1
according to the felt need. The committee functions more or less on the British model of Joint
Industrial Councils. Such Industrial Relations Committees are set up at Government
initiative. Members of these committees are nominated by the Government. Representation to
all the trade unions operating in the industry is given on the basis of their known
memoership. The number of members may very from committee to committee. As mUltiple
unionism and interunion rivalry ere inherent features of trade union movement in Kerals, the
representation to these bodies at times has 4. posed problems. The committees met once 8
month. The decisions are given due publicity • The members •c an suggest items to be
included in the agenda of the committee meeting. The committee is essentially e preventive
machinery. Before the disputes emerge on the surface, discussions are held to prevent them.
However, they also act at times as dispute settling intitutions where the disputes deserve
priority attention because of their magnitude and complexity and because t~ey cannot be left
to shop level or conciliation consultation. The commitments made by the participatinq parties
are morally bindino .to-ba-cempHe-d-wi:tti-. --ItTs asserted tnat the prevailing salutory
industrial climate in the coir industry is due to the successful functioning of the -Industrial
Relations Committee. The record of other committees In all cases are. however, not highly
creditable. In seme cases the committees have be,c ome defunct. The reasons for this
deterioration arE! said to be I i) non co-operation by a section of employers and workmen; ii)
non-statuto~y charactl:r of the committee; iiiJ threat to unit-level bargaining; and _ iv) non-
implementation of decisions by 50me employers 125 The Industrial Relations Committees
have come to stay in Kerals. They have in the pest played 6 very constructive role in
maintaining industrial peaca. As the major industrial relations problems are tackled
industrywise for' a local area, ~he weaker trade unions gained because of their association
with the strong unions. Collp.ctille bargaining has been strengthened when industry-wise
joint consultations succeeded in giving broad guidelines snd settling minimum standards. Its
multiple role as 8 conciliation and arbitration agency, a court of enquiry, a fact finding agency
and an institution for joint consultetion has • conferred on it the advantages the machineries
provided for in the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, and yet allowed it to remain as a voluntery
system. This also accommodat.adthe ri.val-unionS-'lIna-sccorded them opportunities to
 57

participate in the decision-making process. In the Kerala context, multiplicity of unions is not
a major limiting factor for • collective bargaining. Conferring recognition to all registered
trsde unions may appear to be anti-collective bargaining in the birth place of the collective
bargaining system. However, the Karals practice may be the most pragmatic alternptive. in
the situation that prevails there.

CHAPTER 4

CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 4.' General Be they managements,

trade union functionaries, Government leaders or academicians, all are unanimous on one
thing: that collective bargaining is the most desirable method of conflict resolution in
industry'. This is so because of several reasons, some of which are listed below: Unilateral
 58

decisions by the managements • • Ind the i~position of such decisi?ns are avoided. '. T\,,~
pa:rtiBs to the conflict 'IIolunta:ri1'i agree on the terms and conditions of service. c) The
decision making process is across the table, generally in an atmosphere of cordiality and
mutual respect. d) The process is quicker with no financial burden on the parties. 'F.H.
Harieon. Goals .and Strategy of Collective Bargaining, Harper ~ Brothers, 1951, p.5-10. 127
e) No trail of bitterness and negative attitude is left. • Where collective bargaining is
practised, it is believed that the disputant parties are capable of protecting their sectional
interest, and a foundation for positive and mature reletionship for joint efforts is laid. Once
the major areas of differences are either eliminated or settled, co-operation can be
spontaneous and natural. 4.2 Definitions Here are several definitions of the term 'collective
bargaining'. They are mostly given by theoreticians and labour analysts. There are two major
schools of,thought: one accept the concept and analysis given by those authors who coined
the term 'collective bargaining'; and the other considers the process as 'collective negotiation'.
The students and practitioners of industrial relations owe the term 'collective bargaining' to
Sidney and Beatrice Webbs who expounded it in their monumental work 'Industrial
Democracy' (1904). The laymen and the practitioners at the grass-roots level, disinterested in
any scientific theoretical analysis, feel contented with, their vague understanding of the
~eaning of the term. However. commentators on the classical model of cnllp~tivp bargaining
have attempted to analyse the concept. Some of them have even gone to the extent of giving
their Own cautious definitions. A 91. an t 2 among tehm, '1 n -h1' S crl. - tique of Webbs, has
attempted to reappraise the concept, in the light of present day knowledge and conditions.
The Webbs dealt with collective bargainins as one of several methods adoptEd by trade
unions to further their basic purpose working of mainteining . 3 11 fe • or improving the
conditions of their The Webbs did not give any precise definition of collective bargaining as
such. However, they offered comparisons by way of explanations. Their ~iew5 are quoted
below: " In unorganised trades the individual workmen, applying for jobs, accept or refuse
the terms offered by the employer without communication with the fellow workmen. and
without any other consideration than the exigencies of his own position. for the sale of labour,
he makes, with the employer, a strictly individual bargain. But, if a group of workmen
concert together and send representatives to conduct the bargaining on behalf of the whole
body, the pOSition is at once changed. Instead Of the employer making a series of separate
contracts with isolated individuals, he meets with a collective will, and settles, in a single
settlement, the principle upon which, for the time being all work- 2Allen flaunders,
Collective Bergaining - A Theoretical Analysis presented as an opening Paper to the first
 59

World Congress of the International Relations Association, held in Geneva, September 1967,
und~r the title 'Bargaining Theory under Modern Capitalism' British Journal of Industrial
Relations, Vol.VI, No.1, 1968 p.l. 3SidnBY and Beatrice Webbs, Industrial Democracy, 1904
p.173. 129 men of a particular group, or class, or grade, will be engaged" 4 • The Webbs
explained how with the growth of trade unions, the scope of collective bargaining was
progressively enlarged from a single unit to the whole local area and the whole industry on a
national basis. Thus the workmen sought to enhance their bargaining power without the •
limiting influence of a particular unit5• According to Webbs, collective bargaining is
equivalent and alternative to individual bargaining, The \~orkers secured higher price for
their labour when they bargeined collectively, unlike with their earlier individual bargaining.
Likewise. they • believed that higher the scale of their bargaining unit. greater was the
advantage 6 • 4.2.2 -V-ie-w--s --o-f- -F-l-a-u-n-d-e-r-s 7 . Flaunders questions this theory. as
according to him. the Webbs have overlooked the emergence and the role of the stronger
employers' organizations in the bar- B • gaining process • Further. he argues that if the words
are given consistent and unambiguous meaning, then collective bargaining meant by Webbs
are not really collective b argal..n.l.n g 9 • 4 I bid. SIbid p.174 6Ibid , p.181 7Allen Flaunders,
op.cit. p.a. BIbid • p.3. 9 lbid • p.3. ~. To estabri~h'his contention, he attempts to make r . .,
· ... ~ ,c ontrast betwee.n individual b.ar.ga.in.in g. and collective bargaining. He quo"t es
R.H. MaclveF and C.H. Page ~efining ., .... 4 colle-ctive bargaining las th·. e Ip rocess by
which the anti-. • thetical interests of supply and demand, of buyer and seller, are finally
adjusted, sa as to end in the act of exchang1e0 . flaunders argues that individual bargain 1
concluded between emplOyers and employee~ in~labour markets, which is given a legal
form of employment contract accords with this definition. It provides. for exchange of work
for wages, and, in stipulating the condi'tions of the exchange, adjusts for th.e time being
conflicts of interest between . a buyer and seller of labour.· A.. co. llective agreement, on the
other hand, though it is called a 'collective bargaining' and in soma countries wh~re it '';'as
legal force of a collective contract, does not commit any, one to buy or sell. It does something
different. It is meant to ensure that when labour is ,bought and sold, its price and other terms
of • the transaction will accord with the provisions of the .. agreement. These provisions are
in fact a body of r~les intended to regulate, among other things, the terms of employment
contracts. Thus according to him collective bargaining is eseentially a 'rule making~process'
and this is a feature which has no proper counterpart in individual b arga"J..n.J. ng 11 • 10
R•H• MacIver and. C.H. Page, SocietX' Macmillan, London, 1953, p.474.' 11Flaunders,
op.cit p.4." "Webbs have not ruled out the rule making chara- • -cter at certain stage~_of
 60

collebtive_bargsining. Collective r • ~ • . .. #' .. bargaining has a series o~. stag. es. .,And it- is
true that rule ,,- -.making is a major stage. 'If it is admitted that collective t ~ -- ... •• .. .' .. -.
I .,.., bargaining,starts with the submission of demands, and ends with the conclusion of an
agreement, it~may have some vali- • ~dity as well. In fact the conclusion of an agreement is
~..- . - - . , the~baginning stage of a series of collective negotiations throughout the life- time
of the agreement. Having characterised individual bargaining as an economic process of
purchase and sale in the market place which does not involve ~ule making, how does
collective bargaining become just a ~ rule making process is left unexplained. 4.2.3 Political
and Economic Implications ---~------------------------------- • The distinction drawn-by
Flaunders oetween o~rgaining and negotiation leaps h{m to usages and definitions • • He has
declared that the '1) the process of negotiation be"ers ,no resem- 2 ) • blance mark.e t - • to
the prOCESS 12 .... activity ; • . of: bargaining as a - that barg,ains are _~omething quite
different from co~p~o~ise settlements of power conflict 13 ; and 3) that the process of-
negotiation is best des- 14 cribed, a_s 8 dip.lo~atic !.ISO of power • '12 Ibid , p.218 131bid ••
14 Ibid , p.219. , 132 'His _proposition 1 is a'simple statement of his • definition. )roposition
2 i~lustrates one curious conse- • •• quence on them. Theye maY'be • ~ '. . from a
compromise settlement. ~ • a .gener~lt 8Qreement resulting • This "is precisely' what many
bargains are. Proposition 3 asserts as characteristics • ~only of collective negotiation which
can also be true of ~~ndividual bargaining. -:I. .,.. ... Flaunrlers then proceeds to the
proposition that, .!' ... • whereas bargaining is an economic process, -negotiatio.n is a political
process 15 • Whether or not one-'agrees that uule making is not involved, one would certainly
be inclined to accept the pro~osition that in compromise settlements power politics are
involved. 4.2.4 Chamberlain's Theories ---------------------- , -.• " The many deficiencies in the
traditional view of collective bargaining stimUlated thinking and analysis for evolvin~ a
more comprehensive theory. An attempt made to evolve a generic definition of the institution,
considering ~the present day developmemt is found in the \<lorks of Chamberlain.
Chamberlain held that the different theories about the nature of collective b~rgai~ihg could
he reduced to three. 'They are collectiye bargaining is (1) a means of • contracti,ng for the
salF. of labour, (2) a form of industrial Government, and, (3) a method of management 1.6 ~_
--:!" ~ - He named 15 lbid• 6 • . 1 -Chamberl§lin N.14. Collective Bargaining. McGraw-Hill.
New YorK, 1951, p.121, • them respectively the marketing, the Governmental and •
Managerial theories. No doubt, they ara presented against • the. American background.
tIDdian context as well. Yet they have relevance to the ~, . Chamberlilints merketing th,eory
dOflS not 'differ ~ .... ~ . ~n its essentials from th~t of Webbs, although he was more ,'" ." •
 61

concerned with the contrac'fual'-aspect. Distinction can be • ~ .. drawn but 'for m.ost practical
purpose the individual labour " , • ~ 4contract has been replaced by the collective' agreement.
• .1. .' I' Consequently. collective bargaini~g may be viewed as the ~ , labour" process which
determines under what termE¥' will be continued , to be supplied to a unit by its existing
e"!:'ploy'ees, and by those newly employed as well 17 • The Governmental theory admits the
contractual character of bargaining relationships, but sees the contrast mainly as providing a
constitution for industrial self-government • • " i Its principal function is to set up organs of
government, to define and limit them, providJ agencies for makirig, executing and
interpreting laws for industry and " . . .~eans 6f their enforcement1B • The managerial theory,
in contrast, stresses the .~functional relationshi~ betwe.e n-unions and companies. They ' •
jointly make .decisions on matters in which both, have vital • • • The fact that uni.on officials
disclaim any 1!Ibid. ·p.121. 1B 1bid: 'p.137 19 Ibid• .." .l ;) 't intention of usurping
managements functions is immaterial, as collective bargaining, by its very nature, involves
them "in ... managerial role 10 • They are l' ectua~ly de facto managers • 4~ 2.5 Negotiations
at Managemen't Level --~----------------------------- Webbs are attacked on another count also.
Their ,. . .; .' , ex@mples and explanations fail to accommodate'the present - .-...." • day
unionsation among whil~-collar employees, 'highly skilled -, .. specialists and those
personnel in the manag~rial cadre , • • .. • \ .... .i.. tself.: A study on tne impact of collective
bargaining on the managements in'lAmerica, concludes .that- agreements have limi ted the
managerial discretion in three ·principal ways; (i) by requiring that management follows
~ules for lay-offs, • transfers, promotions, retirements, assigning overtime, setting production
standards and rates, etc; (ii) by.requiring that management be reasonable and fair or that
management act only with just cause or after consultation • with the union or with the consent
of the union; and (iii) • by prohibitino certain tvoes of ~onducts. ~u~h as excessive • t .. 22
over lome • 2.1 Cham'berla in, N. W. Control, Harper & Trade Union Chaflenge to
Management Brother, 1948, p.198. and E. Robert Liv~rnash, on mana ement (The P.C. 1960,
p.948. 135 Here the question is whether the degree of penetration turns collective bargaining
into a method of management and involves trade union in the managerial function. Even
when the subjects covered'by collective agreements penetrate deeply into the managerial
functions, the responsibility accepted by the trade unions in signing them does not go beyond
upholding the observance of the rules they have helped to make. The managements, as a
result, " have to conduct themselves within the limits set by the rules, but otherwise, their
responsibility for run~ing the establishment remains unaffected • 5chem~s which provide ..
for representation of trade unions on the boar~ of directors, for joint consultation or for
 62

worke• rs' participation in management are considered to be of a different category from that
of collective bargaining. A leading proposition in Chamberlain's original argument was that
managerial theory can be viewed as a 'collective argee.m. ent cons, ituting a set of
administrative stBndards"i~ the op-eratio'n of the business 23 • This was 50 ... •• '. $0
because, apa~t ~rom the known standards formulated in the • written agreements, there were
also 'the assumed standards which are ~, n d e f'~ n~' t. e 24 • ' But when an agreem~nt is.
looked upon in • this way 'ss providing guidance in Breas of managerial dis- 23Chemberlain,
op.cit. p.153. 24 Ibid • 136 cretion, its application proceeds f~om the intere&t to accomplish
certain jointly conceived objectives. This is a functional conception, and when the terms of
agreements • fail to achieve that function in a particular case, it is the joint objective and not
the terms that mu~t contro125 • 4.2.6 Tha I L 0 Definition ---~---------~------- The
International Labou•r Organisation (ILO) gives • the following definition in its
Recommendation 91 on • Collective Bargaining ~n 1951 at its 34th session: "1he term
collective agreements means all egreements conditions in writing regarding workini . • • ... L
and terms of .em ployment 'concluded ' betwean an employer, a group of employers, or one
or more employersl organisations, on th~ ~ one hand, and one or more representative
workers' organisations, or in the absence of such organisations, the representatives of workers
duly .e..i ected and authorised by them in ac"cordance with the nationsl laws and .regulations
on the other • . Nothing 10 the "present definition should be interpreted as implying the
recognition of any sssociationof workers established. dominated or financed by employers
ox: their representatives«26. This definition stipuLates that all collective bargaining
agreements shall be in writing. The S\Jbject 25 Ibid• 26 ILO Collective Bargaining, Geneva,
1960, p.141. 137 matters covered in such agreements should be working conditions
and.'terms of employm.e. nt'. The parties to agreements so concluded can be: a single
employer and representatives of one or mora employees organizations; One or a . group of
employers or one or more employers' organisations on the one hand and one or more
representatives of workers' organisations on the other. In the absence of workers'
organisations, the representatives of workers duly authorised by them in accordance with the
national law or regu- • . ~ lations can be a pa:cty on the workers' side. The second part of the
definition does not recognise any agreements as collective bargaining agreements, if any
association of workers established, dominated or financed by. employers or their
representatives conclude agreements with any employer employers or employers'
organisations. The ffrst part in the body of Recommendation 91 also speaks about the
collective bargaining machinery. 1. "Machinery appropriate to the conditions existing in each
 63

country should be establisned. by meens of agreements or laws or regulations as may be

appropriate under national conditions, to negotiate. conclude, revise and ren~w collective
agreements or to be available to assist the partieS in the negotiation, concludion. revision and
renewal of collective bargaining. 2. The organisation, methods of operation and functions of
such machinery should be determined by agreements between the parties or by nat~on~l laws
or regulations, as may be appropriate under national conditions27• The second part in the first
para of the recommendation suggests an alternative to the machinery for direct negotiation,
This, taken together with the second para, clearly indicates ~hat machinery other then
bilateral can be made available to assist the parties in negotiation, conclusion, revision and
renewal of collective agreements. This opens wide the scope of collective bargaining process.
Such agreements, and settlements arrived at between the parties in a process other than direct
bargain can also be brought under the coverage of collective bargaining,if the ILO definition
is accepted as all inclusive. It is true that conciliation is something different from pure
collective bargaining between the disputant parties as ~ccepted in the legal sense in India,
But, according to the ILO definition, if there is a machinery created by mutual agreement or
under the law or re'gulation appropriate under national conditions and if that machinery is
made available to assist the parties in negotiation, conclusion, revision and renewal of
collective agreements, 27 ILO op.cit. p.140. then such a machinery is a collective bargaining
machinery. And the resulting agreements are collective bargaining agreements. This view is
shared by top Indian industrial • .. 28 '. leaders. The managements and the workers of the
units under study see even in the wage board system the elements of collective bargaining. In
conciliation, the conciliator does not impose anything on either of the parties. His role is that
of a facilitator, helping both. parties to understan.d and appreciate each others stand, to
narrow down the differences by persuasion, parading data if required and to create the
necessary psychological climate for agreement. In a newly developing country where
collective bargaining principles are just finding roots, large scale bargaining practice ~ may
be too much to expect as well. In such circumstances, conciliation could be seen as an
intermediary stage which indirectly acts 85 complementary to bilateral a,g reements. In the
absence of such a machinery, the parties might take more serious attempts in collective
bargaining. Equally true is that they might, due to ignorance or rigidity, prefer a trial of
strength. Thereafter, even if they se.t. tle the issues themselves across the table, it is less
desirable than settlement at conciliation, which avoids . confrontation. 2B N• H. Tata,
Commerce, Spf'ech deli verad at Bllarat Chamber "f Commerce, Calcutta, December, 1966.
14U In both conciliation and the wage board system, • there is an element of bargaining. No
 64

one party can dictate terms to the other. It is only after obtaining the consent « of th:parties is
the agreement put down in writing. The presence of a third party, without th~.power to
impose his '. decision on any of the conflicting interest .g roups, need not make the process
other than collective bargaining, if the other conditions are satisfied. The ILO definition
provides for such third party assistance and aid by a machinery created under national laws
and regulations. For the purpose of the analysis in the succeeding chapters, we take the
definition of ILO. 4.3 Pre-conditions for Collective Bargaining Collective bargaining practice
does not take , roots in all environmental conditions. There are several favouraole conditions
which may promote the idea, make it acceptable to the parties and even stimUlate the parties
to opt for a particular method from among several alternatiVes available. They are: • _ the
level of industrial development: _ the size and quality of the labOur force: _ the freedom of
association of the labour force; : -.the stability and strength of workers' and employers'
organisations; _ the creation of a machinery for bargaining; - the willingness of the pertie~ to
adjust and accommodate; _ the avoidance of unfair practice; . . ~-the provision of the legal
fr~mework; • 141 - the political climate for collect.i ve bargaining; • - willingness to adjust
and accommodate; and 4 - avoidance of unfair labour pr~ctice, Details of these
environmental pre-requisites are discussed in the following 5ub~sections. It is in the
industrial ~oci;ties that trade unions have emerged first. The a~rarien economy did not, and
normally does not, provide the environmental conditions • for the inception of trade unions.
This is true of India too. The-only reported exception~ may be the trade union activities of
the agriculturel labour in Kuttanad, Kerela, since 1953 29 • Here the agricultu~ists are also
organised. The Government set up an informal Industrial Relations Committee which takes
upon itself thF. responsibility of conflict resolution. The very idea of workers', combined
strength and collective bargaining is the contribution of the industrial 29Alexander K.C ••
Agrarian Tension in Kuttanad, sconomic and Political WRekly, 1971 Vol.-, p.SY3 societies.
In the early times, the workers formed . groups and approached the employers .:ith their
grievances " in respect of working and service conditions. On a few occasions, they
succeeded, not because of their strength, » alone, but the employers were convinced of the
rationality 1 and bonafiees of their requests. ~ In tne textile centres of India, the early
attempts to improve the <conditions of workers were not the outcome of their combined
strength. The justification for their demand coupled with the stature of the personalities who
supported the worker~1 cause and, to some extent, the pressure from the~Eritish textile
interests, both employers end workers, helped to secure them , d' l' f 30 per~o ~c re ~e. •
However, the ~orkers. when they feiled to evoke sympathetic consideration by the
 65

~mployer~, resorted to withdrawal of their labour. In many countries, formation of

association for the purpose of making conscrted demands on employers and the subsequent
withdrawal of theirl.bour were considered as illegal conspiracies. This WS$ true in Indian
condition too. The trade unions in , the circumstances were not permanent, but temporary and
weak organisations which lac~ed cohesion, stability and authority to negotiate binging
agreements with employers. <' In the Indian situation 3D Kydd, J.C. History of Labour
Legislation in India, 1920, University of Calcutta, p.17. Also See NCL Report, op.cit,
p.55. .l"tv the early un~ons were in the form of strike committees 31 without any continuity
of activities or even existence • • ...- It is around the middle of the nineteenth century that the
earlier illegal and underground workers' organisations found acceptability in th~ form of
friendly 50- "' ( cie ties. In India too, the trade Snions "had to be clothed 1"n t h e gar b 0 f
fr"1 en dl y SOc1"e t1 " eS 32 as the law did. not permit full-fledged trade union
organisations. Only later, with the set up of large-scBle mass prodUction centres did trade
unions get established, and thus the first pre-condition for collective bargaining became a
reality. . Yet it ramained confihed to the unskilled and semi-skilled • workers. Unioniaation
among skilled and white-collar employees is a phenomenon of the twentieth centur"y . - In
India, t~ade union itself is a twentieth century phenomanon and the white-collar unionism a
post Independent 33 develop- • ment. It ac~uired stability and acceptability only in the past-
independent era. In the circumstances collective bargaining could nat have been developed
and widely practised as in the developed countries. In the developed countries, a stage has
reached that trade unions exist within trade unions, i.e., the employees employed in large
trade union offices have their own unions, which bargain with their emplo.vers(unions) and
settle the conditions' of Ser"vice. j'Ibid, p.13. 32 Govt • of IndiB,'RoYBI Commission Report,
1931, New Delhi p. 33 2. • 33 S• D• Punekar & Madur~, White Collar Trade Unionism. This
is a natural consequence,of the practical application of the trade union principles. Agriculturi
still remains the predominant occupation of the people in the industrially under-developed
countries. Indian condition is also not different. Eighty per cent of her population .st~ll lives
~n the rural areas depending directly on agriculture or on related economic activities.
Industries, wherever they exist, are mainly agro-based, small ventures requiring no large-
scale concentration of workers and well-developed organisational infra-structure. This
situation can be compared with the • conditions that obtained in the medieval period of the .4·
~ present industrial societies. Regulation o~ conditions ~ at work and of service in this sector
remains difficult even • today. One of the reasons for the non-application of labour .' .....;~ ~
legislation to agricultural.,occupation in India is ·the anticipated difficulties in their
 66

imple'me,ntation34 • In the medieval deys, when worfers had no social status unlike at
present, and when they lived under conditions of lerfdom with no mobilit~ of employment or
wage earriings, • '. but engaged only a share of the produce in kind, they had one thing -
security. Wage payment in kin~ is not an alien • practice in India: Even today, it is practised
in the agricultural sector, but is regulated under the MiniMum ~i~~s 34 V•K•R• Menon,
Impact of ILO on Labour Legislation in India, ILO lndia Branch, New Delhi, 1956, p.16.
~Act, 1948, wherever the Act is made applicable. Bonded labour, a form of serfdom, was in
practice in India till 1975, when it was abolissed under the emergency rule. With the
establishment of industry in a m6dest scale, craftsmen became the masters, and the wo{kers
had to depend on them and even to live with them. [o'nditions of employment as well as any
grievances could be discussed personally at the workbench or at the house of the master to
arrive at a speedy settlement. In these circumstances, • • trade unions could not hav~
developed and collective bargaining need not have been resorted to. > The modern industry
organised on large scales tendS to make direct personal relationships " between employers
and employees almost impossible to maintain. The ownership is not rested with j.a..n..y..
single person or a family • ' , ~.. .~... . be thousands of share-holders. These ~ Normally ther.
may .. , representatives of managemen.t are mainly 'interested in secur- • ing better financial
results for their own growth which is tied up with the grwoth of the·enterprises to which they
belong. The relstionshfp is, "m o.re contractual than anything r-,. . else. In the circumstances,
the security the workers had enjoyed earlier, whatever its worth might have been, .has been
lost. The workers thus needed protection in the-new envi- • ronment, and the trade uni.o ns .
provided it. In the underdeveloped countries, the status and role of trade unions have been
quite different from those of the developed countries. In some developed countries, trade
unions are associated with national plenning bodies and several other lower level policy
formu 1 etl.n g b 0 d·l es 35 • Participation in direct administration is also~xperimented in
some countries36 • But the position existing in underdeveloped countries is altogether
different. The industrial base of such countries is smell, the units are small and few, the
technology used is not of a higher order demanding concentra~ion of work f~rce at any one
place, the industrial-employment strength is limited and the national income generated from
industry, although significant does not enjoy a major share of the total. It is true that new
industries are being planned and started in l .•. a scale that the economy permits. ~ .Yet the
total number of people absorbed in industry in relation ~o the total population is very small.
Out of the 65 crore population of • India, only 1.25 croreare absorbed in industry. Under
developed countries Bre handicapped because • they cannot employ modern technology. - In
 67

some countries primitive Bnd most modern technologies co-exist. In India also, such
extremes co-exist. But the vast majority of . industries are run on interme.,d iary technology.
Whilo thevast majority of the people are engaged at a near-primitive • technological level,
sophisticated technology is used in selective areas. 35 ".>T 'PAC, Quarterly, 4/1970 p.16. 1._
rf. i The agricultural output pccounts.for more than 50 • per cent of the national income •
There is little. if any. of mass production in that sector. Rural and small scale urban industries
predominate the industrial scene. Their share is no less than that of the well-organised
industries. Jhe consequences of ~ll these are that industries ave s"mall in size. and colleCtive
bargaining is limited to negotiation with individual employers or at best with a small group of
lo• cal empl.oy~rs-. The exceptions are all India org~nizations like R~ilways, Banks,
Insurance CQoo.9a~ies, et.~, and indus.t.r:ie.s like Coal Mining" Plantations., etc. When the
industrial base is small, the number of industrial employees is invariably small. A 25 per cent
union density makes the union mambership still smaller. - . Many of the unions may have
only a few hundred mambers, their membership is unstable and fund-short; multiplicity of
unions is common than rare, and politicalisation of • unions is real. . - . There are some of the
reasons why the employers ere reluctant to recognise and bargain collecti~ • vely with the
unions, which they consider to be the representatives of workers. The several difficulties
confronted by trade unions and the failure of the unionS to play even their basic roles, made
some Governments in the underdeveloped area to appoint Government.officials to advise and
assist trade unions in th eir .• conduc t.· For ins tance, t he General Labour Officer37
appointed under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 was meant to help. the workers in
the . • redressml of their grievances and to. represent them before the employer. ~ Apart from
th~ national federations and some international federation of trade unions, some
Governments in the Asian countries also involve themselves in imparting workers education
and training in trade union functions3B • The Central Board of Workers Education, under the
Ministry of Labour, Government of India, is established with the objective of developing
trade union officials to fulfil their responsibilities more faithfully and efficiently. 37 Sec. 34
of B.LR. Act, 1946, "It shall be the .duty of the labour Officer to: i) watch the interest of the
employees and promote harmonious relations between the employers and employees. ii)
investigate the grievances of employees and represent to employers such grievances and
make recommendations to these in consultation with the employees concerned for their
redress. iii) Report to the State Govern~ent ,the existence of any industrial dispute of which
no ~6tice of charge has been given to gether with the names of the parties thereto".
3BI.e.F.T.U. College, New Delhi is meant to give trade union training to trade union officials
 68

in the Asian region. The INTUe and HMS are affiliated to IeFTU and thefefore beneficiaries
of the training programmes. The Steel workers College, Jamshedpor haa been working over a
decade for training trada union officials in steel industry. Other federations have adhoc
training programmes, organised independently or with the financial aid from the CBWE.
4.3.2 _T_h_e __S_i_z_e_ _a_n_d_ _Q_ uJ a_l_i_ty__ _o_f_ _L_a_b_o_u_r_ _f_o_r_c e_ ,
We have seen in the preceding paragraphs that trade unions have come into being with
industrialisation. Agrarian economy did not favour its birth or its growth. This is one major
reason why trade unions have not developed in th~ less developed countries. Just as
collective bargaining is not possible where there are no tr~de unions, no trade unions are
possible where there are no industry/ large scale employment. In the underdeveloped
countries with no industrial base, trade uniona may however come into existence if there are
large plantetions or major farms. This is so because the concentration of workmen at one
work-place can enable them to experiment with the idea of trade unionism. As the trade
unions in the more developed countries consider it , ' , their fraternal responsibility to help
their less developed counterparts by providing them with men, material and money, it has
helped to spread the trade union" movement. For instance, Malayasia is normally ..v iewed es
a developing country with an agrarian base. • However, the trade union in their • • plantations
are strong and have a record of stable collective bargaining. The Philippines is aMother Asian
country moving towards development, but already with stable workers' organisations and
established collective bargaining practices. 150 From these examples we can draw the
following inference. These countries although basically agrarian and on the path of industrial
development, s~nce a large segment of their work-force is concentrated at one area and is
employed in a particular economic activity, offer potential scope for ,the birth and emergence
of trade unions. It is a fact that trade union movement is totally absent among the agricultural
labour in India, except in the State of Kerala. However, 8trong~movements of workers do
exist and have operated for several decades in the Assam, Tamil Nadu and Kerala plantations.
There are several achi. evements to their credit. The stability and relative success of these
movements can perhaps be attriouted to the intrinsic homogeneity of the largely concentrated
and localised labour force in these regions. In fact, except for the management personnel, the
whole popUlation in the plentation area comprising several square kilometers is either
plantation labour or their dependents only. Their homQgenous culture and interdependence i~
all social activities securely bind them together. Compared to this, ind- . ' ustrial workers in a
city are a collection of heterogenous individuals having no specific identity or co.~on
interests. 4.3.3 -F-re-e-d-o-m- --o-f- -A-s-s-o-c-i-a-t-io--n Freedom of association is one of
 69

the basic pre- requisites for any • organiza~ion to work collectively and conduct its activities
in a lawful manner. If that basic • 15t right is deni!ed. movements may still exist and operate •
but underground. and not in the open. When one organisation is not legally permitted even to
exist, it cannot have the status of a bargaining agent. Prior to 1926, when the Trade Unions
Act was passed, the freedom of association for trade union activities was not available to the
Indian working class. 50me of the earlier unions registered under the Societies Act, a 1860
and the Companies Act, 165938 did'~o not ~nly because of the ebsence of a permissive
legislation like the Trade Unions Act, 1926. but also because of the prosecution39 against
trade unionists for their collective action. Removal of legislative restriction on concerted
action of introduction of any permissive law for freedom of association does not
automatically encourage workers to form .trade,unions. At best, it facilitetes. Still it is left to
the workers to decide whether they want to organise them_ selves in trade unions or not.
Even if there are underground organisations or there exists legally per"m itted unions, it is
again left to the workers to join them or not. Where workers form unions, it is the beginning
of an attempt to have collective bargaining at some stage, immediate or distant. However,
where fr~edom of association is denied, ~36~he Amelgamated Society of Indo-Burma
Railwaymen Registered in 1806 was under the Companies Act, 1682. 39Wa d~' a waS
prosecu t e d for .c.r~.m.~n sl consp.l racy as h e organised a strike in Buckingham and
Carnatic Mills in 1926. 152 collective bargaining is impracticable, and where that freedom is
restricted collective bargaining is also restricted. In the early stages of trade union
development in any country, industry or occupation. the small size of the .unions and their
instability in membership have acted against developing collective bargaining on an enduring
basis. This is particularly true even today in the underdeveloped countries. Legislativa
restricting may not prohibit union formation. On the contrary, freedom of association to form
unions may be guaranteed under national laws. Yet. unless the workers exercise their right
and build up strong and stable. .. unions, collective bargaining will still be· elusive. ~ ... .I f
the ~embership base is very amall compared to the total .. number of workers. the employers
may well refuse to recognise such unions for any meani~gful dialogue. ·The reason is that
such unions will not be able to bind the workers to the commitment theymake with the
management. Under the Code.. of Discipline, a 15 per cent minimum is the required
percentage membership for unit-wise employer to recognise a union as collective bargaining
agent. Normally the union with the maximum membership above the minimum prescribed ••
level will quality for recognition. if there ar~ rival claimants for such recognition. 15,j
Similar to meml lp strength, the workers' • commitment to union and union activities, i.e.
 70

regular payment of membership subscription, active participation in union activities, etc. also
contributes towards. union stability and collective bargaining strength. Rivalry among unions
is always a cause of the instability in workers' organisations. Strong and stable unions at unit
level create the structural framework for collective bargaining at that level. federation of
unions and employers' organisations on industry basis at local, regional and national levels
provide the structural framework for collective bargaining on a larger scale. Those unions
which flourish, but are limited to the unit level, achieve only a limited objective. The higher
the scale of operations, the greater is their strength, influenc. e. and bargaining capacity •
Employers as a class have well-knit organisations. ~ . . at local, industry and nat10nal levels.
But the level of their enlightenment ~aries. Some of them are definitely out of tune with the
reality of the day. Yet, when compelled by circumstances, they react positively. And once they
realise the advantage of industrial peace resulting • from collective bargaining, they generally
prefer that -method for conflict resolution. 154 '. 4.3.5 Creation of Machinery
--------------------- In all democratic societies, irrespective of their level of development, the
right to form associations is guaranteed. When trade unions are permitted to function,
agitation, picketing, go slow, worK stoppage, etc. may occur as part of rightful trade union
activities. And this may create discomfort to the industrialists. But there are the price once
has to pay, in a free democratic system, where people can dissent, criticise and protest
without being unlawful. Even if freedom of association is guaranteed, and workers have
organised themselves into strong and stable trade unions, collective bargaining practice will
not develop, unless the necessary machinery is created for a mutual • dialogue. In collective
bargaining, recognition of union(s) by employer(s) as collective bargaining agent(s) creates
the necessary machinery. In the under-developed countries where the tradition of bargaining
has yet .to become dmeprooted, there occurs certain amount of reluctanca on the part of
employers to recognise unions. In other forms of conflict resolution, this recognition by the
employer is ~ not required. Multiplicity of unions provides the employers to a
convenient~excuse to pJay one union against the others. Some employers even install
company sponsored .~ unions for their self interest. Employers recognising or dealing with
more than one union in multi-union situations are also not uncommon. But where the national
laws stipulate compulsory recognition of unions for collective bargaining. the creation of the
ne~essary machinery does not pose problems. In India voluntarism has been the Government
policy ~n this respect. . 40 Except in Maharashtra there is no legal compulsion on employers
to recognise trade unions. In its own establishments, the Government of India h as no t f a 11
owe d a d ef~.n,~t e po l'~ cy ~'n th e matter4 1 • 4.3.6 -T-h-e --L-e-g-a-l- -F-r-am--e-w-o-r-k
 71

Industrial relations legislation have great .. impact on collective bargaininj. Some national
legislation specifically mention collective bargaining as the principal method for establishing
industrial peace and orderly growth. Some others have different methods, and bargaining
remains as one among several. In countries which are ~ot developed, trade unions are also
not highly developed to give collective bargainin.g the full scope • ~ •• The legal framework
acts in two ways: • i) it encourages ~ limit the scope of collective bargaining. ii) It provides
legal sanctity to collective ( bargaining agreements. Where there are too many legislation,
almost touching all the areas of labour-management relationship, ... .. r • • • even if collective
bargaining is encouraged in policy state- . men.,t s, the real effect could be the curtailment of
the scope 40BIR Act, 1946, Compulsory recognition of Trade Unions end Prevention of
Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. 41 NCL Rep~rt. op.cit. p.371. HiG of collective
bargaining. In the case of Indie. with the array of legislation on standing orders, provident
funds, gratuity, maternity, incapacity to work due to employment inj ury, bon us, etc. the act
tiel· stop e for bal'gaining in these areas has become limited. This situation is a legacy of the
past. . It is true that if t~ere were no such legislation, all the working population could not
have enjoyed these benefits. This advantage conferred on a vast majority of workers had,
however, limited the scope and range of collective bargaining in the country., The legal
sanction42 accorded to bargaining agreements is a guarantee for their implementation, their
nonimplementation attracting liability of prosecution. Where such legal sanction i$ not
accorded, or where the collective bargaining agreements enjoy a lesser degree of legal
sanctity for enforcement than the results of other forms of conflict ~ resolution, the parties are
likely to opt for other methods. Registration43 of bargaining agreements with the
Government or signing a bargaining agreement before a conciliation officer is brought about
by the highe~ legal sanction those methods enjoy than that of pure collective bargaining
agree_ ments. 42 No legal sanc t1"0n" 1 5 accor d e d to pure or multilateral collective
bargaining 43 Under Sec. 2 (p) of I D Act, 1947. and simple bilateral agreements. 4.3.7 -P-o-
l-i-t-ic--a-l- -C-l-i-m-a-t-e • 1 .,- ... \ . _vI Among the several environmental factors, the
political climate obtaining in a countr~ iS,the most important contributory reason influencing
the practice of collective bargaining. It is in democracies that the system has gained ground
and flourished. In dictatorial regimes, democratic functioning of trade unions is not tolerated.
Even where the system was practised, the parties I freedom often got curtained under
emergency conditions. It is therefore necessary that both the Government and the public
should be convinced of the efficacy of • this institotion. In some countries, the Government
may be indif. ferent or even hostile to the system. Nevertheless, the system csn survive and
 72

be a common practice. In some other countries, the system may be tolerated without giving
any positive encouragement. In such situations it is an uphill task even to have a limited
success. In contrast to this, some countries make positive steps. They encourage bargBining
in a positive way. Removing legel restrictions ageinst unions, regulating the conduct of both
employers and trade unions, conferring legal enforceability to bargaining agreements, making
provisions for registration of egreemen.t.s, .. trainin9 up. trade union le-adetsiri~t'heir
functional area, etc. are some these positive steps. If the political part in power does not
believe in free collective bargaining on 15S ideological grounds, the practice can hardly
survive. 4.3.B Willingness to Adjust and Accommodate --------------------------~----------
Eargaining implies two things: i) Existence of differenCes; ii) Hope for adjustment and
accommodation. If there is no difference, there is no necessity for bargaining. Likewise, if
the~e is no hope for adjustment and accommodation, there exists no scope for bargaining.
When the parties prepare themselves for bargaining, they admit the existence of conflicts, and
simultaneously attempt hopefully to nBrro~ down the differences and arrive at a final
agreement. Obviously, if one Or both parties merely make a few demands, when they meet,
there cannot be negotiation or agreement6. Consequently, at the beginning, each side
normally puts forward claims, which are intended to provide the basis for bargaining, and as
the negotiations proceed, one side may agree to reduce its claim on one or more items, or
even put off the claims on one or more issues in return for some liberal consideration by the
other side on some other item or items. Bargaining is an art. Doring bargaining each
participating party attempts to identify the other party's strong and weak positions.
Assessment of one's own strength and weaknesses as well as study of the environmental
influehces help them to develop the course they should follow. 159 Wherever stable
bargaining practices are in vogue, none takes a rigid stand on any disputed issue. On one
item, any party may be relatively rigid than on others, but may be subject to adjustment
according to the circumstances. A union, quite legitimate in getting its demands in toto, may
not at times press for the same. Similarly a company which has no capacity to commit itself
to granting liberal concessions to labour may do so at times, if convinced that alternatives are
disasterous. This is a process of adjustment and accommodation. Both parties do it for
industrial peace and for self-walfare. 4.3.9 Avoidance of Unfair Practices Unfair practices by
anyone party spoil the mutu~l respect and shatter the confidence in the bargaining process.
Where such practice is resorted to, relations become bitter and strained, and consequently
negotiations become diffi-' cult. Yet, unfair practices are resorted to by the employers as well
as the trade unions. That is why some 44 . national laws conta~n provisions prohibiting unfair
 73

practices. Such laws aim at regulating the conduct of the parties in collective bargaining. In
India, a voluntary code of prescribed which is meant to regulate the conduct of the parties.
The code ~s divided into three sectionsl 441n USA under the Taft-Hartley Act, 1948. 160
Section 1 mentions the unfair practices on the pert of employers. Section II deals with the
unfair practices of unions. • Section III is concerned with employers in their general conduct.
4.4 The Process of Collective Bargaining Collective bargaining consists of three stages: i)
Negotiation and agreement; ii) Administration of agreements, and iii) Grievance settlements.
4.4.1 -N-e-g-o-t-i-a-ti-o-n- --an-d- --A-g-r-e-e-m-e-n-t A negotiation for an agreement is to
the beginning of the process. Negotiation may succeed or fail to produce an agreement. Yet
the process is known and understood as collective bargaining. On the other hand, ~ven after
coming to the negotiation table, if one party takes up a stiff position - an attitude of 'take it or
leave itl, _ then there is no real bargaining, and, therefore, it cannot be treated as collective
bargaining. Similarly, if the unions do not care to consider the counter_demands, if any, made
by the employers, there again the process cannot be termed as bargaining. In fact, such stands
can be treated as 'ultimatum'. ltii A new negotiation normally starts at. the expiry of an
agreement, settlement or an award. In the Indian situation, as per the law regulating such
things, anyone of the parties can terminate the existing terms on completion of its stipulated
life, and ask for a revision. Normally, the unions present demands popularly known as
tcharter of demands t • This form the basis of negotiation. In the charter of demands, the trade
unions list items for revision and the extent of their quantum. They may also include new
rights and privileges as additional terms and conditions. These additional items may be
introdUCed for the first time in industry, or they' may be existing elsewhere as an industrial
practice. They may, in some cases, give justification for each demand. The quantum of • such
demands may be either a percentage of the existing one or an absolute figure or a
combination of both. Where stable collective bargaining is in practice, the employer, or
employers' association, invites the trade union(s) for a negotiation conference. In a multi-
union situation, anyone union may not have sUbstantial following. Therefore, several unions
operating in tha unit or industry are invited for negotiation. Where the rival unions have a
common approach or maintain a working relationship for ~ar~aining purposes, they may
participate at the negotiation conferences togehter. In other cases, the employ~r or employers'
organisation may have separate negotiation me~tings with each union. 1f,2 Bargaining may
take place on unit basis, company basis or even industry basis. Unit base bargaining is more
common. If the same company has more than one unit in the same industry, company-wise
bargaining is attempted. Bargaining at the all India level is rare, except in organisat ions like
 74

railways, banks, insurance port and dock. etc. in which the nature of work, nomenclature of
the job and job contants, etc. are the same or similar. Industry-cumregion basis bargaining ~s
also not uncommon. The textile industry at Ahmedabad, Bombay and Coimbatore, the jute
industry at Calcutta, and the Plantation industry at Assam, Tamil Nadu and Kerala are best
examples. Collective bargaining over the terms of an agreement can be better understood if it
is recognised as three~ way negotiations. There are negotiations between the trade uniona in a
mUltiple union situation, or between the different c, onstituents in case of federation of
unions, or the management representatives and their principals. Negotiations across the
bargaining table tend to mask these two negotiations. But they are important in establishing
priorities of eech side. A trade union organisation may have members with such 8S,
conflicting interests,/skilled, semi-skilled, young and old, day-workers and those on shifts.
All have to work· under the same agreement. Tke trade unions, therefore, 163 have to make
choices of the needs of diverse groups. Similarly, they have to decide priority items on which
they are prepared to make the least relaxation, the issues on which they can be flexible
depending on the trend and the subjects that can be conveniently put off for the time being.
Similar is the dilemma of the management. When the workers and management are unable to
reach an agreement, they may resort to strike or lock-out. Such strikes and lock-outs are to be
understood as a meanS of stimulating a change in the position and of inducing the parties to
reach an agreement. 4.4.2 Administration of Agreement --------------------------- The process
of administering a collective bargaining agreement providas the flesh and blood to thebare 45
bone of the contr.ct language. The agreement may have been written with care and with the
help of attornies. Yet, all possible circumstances may not be covered in the written down
agreement. Therefore, difficulties arise in the operation of agreements. Ambiguities creeping
into the agreement have to be cleared. Here, there is a need for interpretation of the different
provisions of the agreement. Then alone can their administration be possible. Where
collective bargaining is a steble practice, the agreements 45Richard B. Freeman, Labour
Economics, Prentice-Hall. Ne\~ Jeraey, J 972, p_,1 03. 104 tnemselves contain provisions for
referring such differences of opinion for arbitration. 4.4.3 -G-r-i-e-v-a-n-c-e- -S-e-t-tl-e-m--e-
n-t-s Wrongful administration gives rise to grievances. It may happen as a day-to-day reality.
This is normally remedied through grievance handling procedure. This prevents arbitrary
actions of fitment, lay-off, retrencnment, promotion, transfer, discipline, etc. and sets up an
orderly procedure for handling grievances • • 4.5 Bargaining Teams . The teams to represent
the parties at the bargaining table are chosen by the respective ~rganisations. Single-unit,
multi-unit company-wise or industry-wise may be the basis for bargaining. In single and
 75

multi-union situation, the bargaining teams could be the single union or the recognised
bargaining agent, or all the rival unions. In a multi-union situation, where the legislatic
restrictions demand and single bargaining agent, the party representing workers will be only
one. Where no such restrictions exist, association of all the major unions in negotiRtion is the
pragmatic approach, as otherwise those unions neglected can create crisis situations. Here,
the union'witn majority membership may assume the leadership, Although rivals, wherever
they maintain working relationship for common good, they may have consultations and eVen
joint, pre-negotiation conferences. If the relationship among lOJ rival unions are strained, one
may try to outwit the other, and joint negotiation with the employer is therefore not possible
in such cases. The employers' representatives at unit level could be the person who holds
ultimate control over the affairs of the organization or his nominee, assisted by a group of
senior managerial personnel. The initial stage probing and preparation of the groun~ for
meaningful discussion are usually done by the persons holding the industrial relations
responsibilities. Other members of the teams are selected on the basis of the position they
~old and the skill in collective bargaining they have established. 4.6 Negotiation Meetings •
The basis of negotiation is the claims made by the unions in the form of a charter of demands.
The items included in the charter of demands are normally many more than the unions
themselves anticipate to get accepted. Similarly the quantum demanded may bear no
relationship to what finally gets settled. As the employers generally make counter demands
from this stage onwards, the negoti_ ations is on the issues raised by the unions and the
employers. The employers may be willing to accept some or even all the demands of the
unions at reduced scales, but on condition that the unions agree to the counter demands made
by the employers. The first few sessions may be exploratory, to understand each other and to
identify which among the dif16G ferent dem@nds are more crucial to the workers and on
which the unions are not that serious. They may sort out the items ~hich need be given
priority in negotiation. Ihey may pick u~ the minor ones from among them. The way each ?
o~\~ ~~act~ tQ t~~ ~ituatiQ~ co~ i~~icot~ t~~ li~al~ t~~~i in the negotiation. lhere may
occur many meetings before final settlement is arrived at. If the Industrial Relations
Department makes adequate background work and preparatory studies. the number of sittings
by the negotiating bodies can be reduced. In between two meetings, there may take place
meetings of smaller groups to explain and understand the implications of the demands or the
terms about which there is already partial understanding. The meetings are held with advance
notice~ The venue of the meetings is generally a common place except in the case of initial
m~etings. Normally the employer meets the expenditure connected with such negotiations.
 76

4.7 Patterns of Bargaining There are three patterns of bargaining. They represent three stages
in the development of collective bargaining practices, They are: conVentional, modern and
productivity bargaining. 167 4.7.1 -T-h-e --C-o-n-v-e-n-t-i-o-n-a-l --A-p-p-r-o-a-ch- This is
the earliest form of approach and is • still followed in many parts of the world, including
India. Here, the unions initiate the process by presenting a charter of demands.' Negotiations
take place. They may succeed or fail. If they succeed, industrial peace is maintained. Failures
result in strained industrial relations. The employers want to concede as little as possible, and
the workers want to get as large a~ concession as possible. This is a ,one-way negotiation. No
effort is made to commit the labour for highe:r productivity. This approach cannot therefore
qualify as a positive one • • 4.7.2 A More ~odern Approach ---------------------- This is one
step ahead of the conventional approach. While the managements agree for negotiation on
union demands, they put conditions for higher output, higher productivity, better discipline,
etc. This makes negotiation a two-way process unlike in the conventional pattern • Here, the
managements can be more generous with • unions in their demands, if they in turn get
agreement on at least part of what they expect. 4.7.3 The Productivity Approach '1
------------------------- This approach I-:!as a recorded history dating back to 1960 only. Under
this pattern, employers offer speci165 • fic contributions from workers to achieve higher
productivity. Wherever this type of bargeinin, g has been the . practice, the terms and
conditions of service ;re m~ch super{or than those in situations where they ere absent. ,This
is a positive, dynamic and novel approech to col- • lective bargaining.

CHAPTER 5

ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 5.1 Introduction Every industrial society,

irrespective of its social and political philosophies, forms of Governments, and socia-
economic polities, develops workers and managements. In such societies, unlike in the
agrarian ones. industrial relations problems are universal. There is, therefore an imperative
 77

need for defining the inter-relationship between the different participants in industry - (, the
workers, the managers and the Government. 5.1.1 -E-n-v-i-ro-n--m-e-n-t-a-l --In--fl-u-e-n-c-
e- --o-n --I-n-d-u-s-t-r-i-a-l- -R-e-l-a-t-io-n--s • It is now well-accepted that the environment
in which the industry exists has a high degree of influence on the participating parties • But
the environment is not static. The changes may be either slow, or abrupt and o radical. New
technologies may get introduced. The beliefs and attitudes of people are subject to change.
The aspirations of people in industry may know no limits. Governments may change, their
policies modified and at times even reversed. Even constitutions may find modify at ion or
replacement. The trade unions and employers' organisations undergo changes, ideologically,
qualitatively in their functioning and quantitatively in their number and strength. These
changes are symptoms of dynamic societies. In such dynamic situations. the industrial
relations system and process become dynamic and increasingly complex. However, the
parties try to adapt themselves to the demands of the changing situations otherwise a break
down of relationship and chaos will result. Just as the environmental factors influence
industrial relations quality the industrial relations pattern/decides collective bargaining
possibilities end their smooth practice. When there is trust and confidence among the parties,
collective bargaining is possible. In the absence of the above two • essentials, other methods
are adopted for conflict resolution. ~ 5.1.3 -O-r-g-a-n-i-s-a-t-io--n-a-l --F-a-c-t-o-r-s Besides
the environments I factors, there are certain organisational aspects, which are more or less
171 independent and free from external influences. These aspects have a profound influence
on the quality of the structure of industrial relations system. As John T. Dunlop puts it an
industrial relations system at anyone • time in its development is regarded as comprised of
certain actors, certain context and ideology which binds industrial relations system together
and a body of rules created to govern the actors at the work place" 1 • According to him the
actors are: , 1) a hierarchy of manager and their representatives in supervision; 2) a hierarchy
of workers and their spokesmen; and 3) specialised Government agencies, concerned with
workers, enterprise and their relations h1"p 2 • The first two hierarchies are directly related to
_' each other, in the sense that the managers have responsibilities at varying levels to issue
instructions, end the workers at each corresponding level have the duty to follow such
instructions. The specialised Government agencies may have functions in some industrial
relations system so broad and decisive as to override the hierarchies of both management and
workers on almost all industrial relation matters. 1John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations
System, 1961,p.3. 2 Ibid• 172 It is the special characteristics of those actors we understand as
organisational factors. are different from environmental factors. The environmental factors
 78

can affect them, but normally in a limited -.. way only~ Unlike the environmental factors,
they are not subject to abrupt changes. Changes, when they take place are slow, and therefore
these factors are independent to a very great extent. The industrial setting as such,J_ the types
of industries, their ownership, organisational structu~e, management personnel, their
philosophies and policies, the workers' organisations, their ideological faith and functions,
and the Government role, to an extent, pre independent organisational factors. These
independent factors peculiar to a particular area may not be present in any other geographical
area of different socio-economic and political backgrounds. It is true that all the factors that
affect industrial relations on an all India level are operating in the industrial belt studied.
Then, there are certain peculier characteristics immediate to them which have greater impact
on industrial relations in the area under study. It may be due to this reason that the industrial
relations climate and collective bargaining practices prevalent there are different from the BII
India pattern. In other words-. -the~ independent organisational factors of the three actors,
17J v namely the workers, management and the Government and also .. certain peculiar
characteristics in the context are responsible for the emergence of certain inter-depent'and
invervening factors, resulting to development of collective bar- • • • gaining. Since the
peculiar characteristics provided the background we shall treat them first. 5.2 A New Growth
Centre A new industrial grwoth centre has its own ad vantages and disadvantages. The chief
advantage is that during the incipient stages, the managements have greater opportunities for
moulding the industrial relations system and building up healthy traditions than during
subsequent stages. A major disadvantage however is that employees' organisations normally
take some time to grow and mature. 5.2.1 Industry - a Recent Origin --~----.------------------
The first large scale industrial unit in the region was established in 1919. Only two moreunits
covered by the study got established prior to Independence. All the other units in the region
established at different periods of time after Independence. One major untt covered in the
study is still not fully commissioned. Seven among the units got expanded considerably. Four
among them almost doubled their capacity. In one case, a new plant of similar capacity has
been set up 20 kilometers away. Diversification of produc!~ hes been a regular feature with
almost all units except the 174 recently set up ones. Industrialisation process in the area under
study has been therefore a phenomenon of the lest 30 years only. The geographical area under
the study is thus a new growth centre. • 5.2.2 Dispersed Location ------------------ The
industrial units are not situated in continuous geographical areas, except in six cases where
close proximity has become a necessity. as four of them drew their raw materials from the
neighbouring units by ducting them through underground pipe-linea. The industrial units are
 79

distributed over a region of 25 kilometer diameter. Each one is located in large plots, unlike
in other industrial cities. The largest the FACT, has a total aree of 600 hectare. The smaller
industrial units are also scattered except those located in a large industrial estate. This,
dispersed location avoids concentration of workers from different units at one place as a
nature120ccurrance. The area still presents e rural appearance. The transport system in the
region is a very efficient one. However, there are not enough routes to connect one unit with
others in majority of cases. Only in a few cases are transport facilities provided by the
industrial units - three in the public sector and one in the private sector unite. In the two
public sector units it is provided basically because it is the practice in other 175 units of the
company elsewhere in the country; there appears to be no real local need for such transport.
In one case, the unit is located in a corner of the industrial belt. This demands transport
facilities. The private ~ sector unit providing transport facility is also situated in a remote
region without adequate public transport sys.t.e ms • 5.2.3 -H-o-u-s-i-n-g-, --S-p-o-r-~-a-n-d-
--C-u--lt-u-r-a-l- -A-m--e-n-i-ti-e-s Housing facilities are provided by 6 out of the 16 units
under study. Canteen facilities are provided by all of them. Consumer stores, on a co-
operative basis or otherwise, are available in all the units. Sports and games get liberal
encouragement by the units. Teams fro~ the units participate in the regionel tournaments and
some of them have maintained steady record o~ achievements. One of the industrial units has
set up a rowing trophy, and regional tournaments are held every year. Libraries, and library-
cum-dramatic clubs are organised by employees and officers alike. In one unit, their cultural
troupe used to visit other parts of the country as well as foreign countries, on invitation from
them and with the generous encouragement from the management. At least in a few cases,
wives of officers and employees have their own ladies' clubs too. The employees in the
region, therefore. have the benefits enjoyed by industrial workers in any other part of the
~ouRtry. .1 / U 5.2.4 Schools Although Kerala has the highest literacy rate (61 per cent)3 in
the country and has a good network of schools, from Kindergarten to the higher secondary,
three • of the units studied were found to have their own schools. This is so because, the
nearest school outside the company colony is a few kilometers away. The company vehicles
take the children to and from the schools. Those students attending scho6ls outside the colony
also enjoy the transport facility. Similarly, those living outside and studying in the company
school also get the transport facilities provided by the company. 5.2.5 Social Need and Social
Life --------------------------- The city of Erna~ulam is within 30 kilometers of even the farthest
of the industrial units studied. Market facilities are available in the immediate neighbourhood
of all the industrial units. Places of worship and entertainment, as well as medical centres are
 80

available either within the industrial colony itself or iri the immediate vicinity. Between every
two large industrial units, except the six mentioned above eerlier, lie contiguous villages, a
speciel feature of Kerele. Multi-storeyed flat system has not invaded the e'rea. - 111 the
housing colony, the houses 3 Census Report 1971, Vol.9. p. 177 are eithe•r separate single
blocks with space on all four sides or two houses in one block. The architectural designt
construction pattern and facilities provided are the same - the unique Kerala pattern or even
an improvement on it. In fact, the people in indUstry virtually lead a village life ~here. At the
work-place, they are subjected to the rigid industrial discipline. But back at home, they are
like any other villagers. A vast majority of those employee! at all levels living outside the
industrial colonies have their own lands, houses, and even some small scale farms. Those
migrated from other regions may have left behind similar facilities. A great majority have
therefore some income or property on which they can fall back. A society which abolished
untouchability as early as in 1612, Kerala presents today no trace of social discri_ mination of
any kind. Industrial employees suffer no social disability. However, status consciousness as a
result of role differentiation still persists, but it is much less noticeable than in other societies
in India. Since it is a new growth centre, the employees on the whole may not be well-suited
to the industrial way of life in all respects. It is a tradition-bound society, but none-the-leS5
willing to accept rationality and is gradually transforming itself into an industrial society. ~ In
brief, the ~ochin-Alwaye industrial belt, a new industrial grwoth centre, has the major
advantages of an industrial society. Yet, till now, it is insulated against the ill effects of a well-
developed industrial centre. It is free from congestion at public places, is devoid of urb~n
noise and tension, and does not suffer from air pollution, slUms, purely commercial
relationship even with one's immediate neighbours, and the several other vices of an urban
society. The PQLI4 of the region, the highest among the different States in India. and double
the national average clearly indicate~ ihe highly civilised life the people in Karals enloy.
Among the 11 districts of the State, the Cochin-Alwaye region being one of most developed
one the PQLI is certainly higher than in anyother parts of Kerela. Since the industrial
employees of the locality have a relatively stable and high monthly income, they have the
capacity· to enjoy the higher PQLI, and are far better than the rest of the labour force
elsewhere. In other words the ~ndustrial employees in the ragion enjoy a better life than
many other industriel communities in the country. 5.3 Small Industrial Base As mentioned
earlier, the Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt is a new growth centre. It has its history since the
last 30 years only. The number of units employing 300 or mOre workers is only 26 in the
area. Others registered 4physical Quality of Life Inde~. Overseas Development Agency
 81

Report 1975. Washington. 179 under the Fa'ctories Act, 194B: But this apparen tly is an I
inflated figure in comparison with the all India figure. In Kerala, according to the revised
rules under Factories Act, 194B, any place employing two or more paople and where
manufacturing process takes place with the aid of 5 power is a factory • Industries are
normally located in a geographical area because of certain infrastructural advantages afforded
by the area. The main advantage is raw material and skilled manpower availability. The first
unit to come up in the region an oil mill was established because of the ready availability of
copra. The second major unit stUdied requires large supply of electric power. and it was set
up because of the cheap and abundant supply of electricity available locally. The traditional
industries (coir, cashew, tiles, etc. ) are in the smell scale sector a..n. d are located mostly
outside the district. • • Sinca the number of large and medium units in the area is only 26 in
number, the scope for ancillary units is also limited. Because of the s~all industrial base, the
employment potentiality. direct and indirect, is limited. 50 is the case of tuinover and total
impact on the economy of the region. The main activities of the people of the area still remain
to be the traditional agricultural or related occupations. 5 Government of Kerala Notification,
Kerala Gazette, 29, DecembaT 1970, p.5S. . 5.4 Chemical Industries predominant The first
industrial unit in the region was set up 2n 1919 to extract oil from copra. Even to-day, this
unit is known as an oil ffiill, and its products are oil based. It is in fact, a chemical
manufacturing unit "Fine Chemical" is the category under which it can be rightly classified.
The second one set up in 1943 happened to be a basic metal industry unit established to
extract aluminium from bauxite. The next two units to come up were also chemical units. In
fact, the in~estment made by one fertiliser industry with two production units the largest in
Kerala, may be near equal to the total investment of all the other industries that fall under the
coverage of the present study. Break-up of the units on the basis of their nature is given in
table 4. • Table 4 CLASSIfICATION Of INDUSTRIAL UNITS
-------------------------------------------------------- Sl.No. 1 • 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Nature of ind-ustries .,
No. of u.. nits - - - - - - - - - - - Chemicals Engineering Textile Basic Metal Glass and Ceramic
Tyre Total 9 7 5 2 2 1 26 -------------------------------------------------------- 181 The chemical
industries in the region are highly automated. The engineering units manufacture machine
tools. printing presses, high capacity electrical transformers, electrical motors and 50 on.
Except in the glass and ceramic units and the textile mills. the general educational level and
skill of the work force are naturally higher then those in the traditional industries in Kerala as
well as elsewhere. The fact that as far back as in 1957 at least one of the units covered (The
Indian Aluminium) had productivity bargsining6 demonstrates how both the labour and
 82

management could evolve new dimensions in collective bargaining. It will be recalled that
the world heard about productivity bargaining only 1n 1960 through Allan Flanders in his
famous case study of the Fawely Productivity agreement 7 • The Indian Aluminium
experiments haVe been repeated in eany units in Karala, including some in the Cochin-
Alwaye industrial belt. Even to-day, the Indian Aluminium agreements are productivity
agreements. 5.5 Highly Capital Intensive Character. . . • Chemical units are generally capital
intensive in nature. Thia is more so in the case of heavy chemicals and fertilisers • If they
happen to be in the public sector, the tendency is all the more so. Out of the nine chemical
6The Indian Aluminium. Alwaye Agreement. 1957. 7The outstanding description and
analysis of the events at Fawley is thst of Allen Flanders, The Fawi-ey PrlJdlJdivity~~
Agreement. London 1964, Faber and Faber. 1('') ,.,., l) "- units- studied, eight fall under the
category heavy che- ~ micals and fertilisers. , "', A.ga in, seven out of the nine , , ,.. are in the
publ~c sector. Similarly the engineering unite • in the public and joint sectors, because of
their social • o~erheads for townships, hospitals, etc. tend to become ~ more capit~l:intensive
than if they were owned by private enterprise. Here two examples (one from the public sector
and another from the private sector) from life situation "" . may illustrate this. 'One public
sector undertaking has spent one fifth of its total investment for a 12 storied administrative
building alone. This building is the tallest in the whole of Kerala and perhaps in the whole of
south India south of Madras city. ~ A vertical building requiring heavy expenditure on
foundation was not really required whan the industrial unit had hundreds of scres of land
lying unused. The second case is that of a privata sector unit with modest capital resources
out with notable working resul ts. For ten years it hou'ed its head office in a rented ~uilding
in the city. From the profit generated from the unit, it has then gone in for a grand head-office
building closer to the factory. The salary scale and other benefits enjoyed by the employees
here are more attractive than those in the public sector unit mentioned above • .. Among the
units under study, only 12.50;per,centage can be categoriesed as labour intensive' units
whereas 45.83 per cent are capita~ intensive and 41.67 per cent , highly 183 , capital
intensive. • This capit~l inhnsive'n~ture of the industry has a.-n i:pact on in.d ustria~ felations
on two possible - . ways: 1) The wage rates are generB~~y n~gn Que .0 higher machine
prod..u ctivity • 2)~ Idle machine' time means higher loss to • management. These two can
lead to peaceful settlement of -:t' disputes as work-stoppa~es cause heavy loss to both labour
and management. ~,~ Q~~~~ahiq Patt~ Ownership pattern of the units "does influence l' the
quality of industrial relation9 and collective bargaining practices that prevail in th~m. In
respect of these preactices, the private sector unitS enjoy a better record than the public sector
 83

ones. Thi& has been consistent over the years. The private sector pioneered the industries.in
the region. Numerically, the industr}es of that sector still • outnumber '1.) those of the public
sector (11). However, all the private sector units taken together have only a lower
complement of workers than t~ree large public sector • units combined. The public sectof
therefore. a predominant position. Apart from units ofth~se two sec-tors. th 8rl'!~i-s' one unit
in the joint sector also. Within the p~iveti sector . "\, classification a~ 'private limited' IW.t
units, ~ further " t • and 'public'limited' is found. Th~ private sector units with the exception
of five, are private limited companies. A comparison of these two classes of units shows that
the private sector • ~ - piivate limited companies have a longer period of tradition in
collective bargaining than the public limited companies. Among the public sector units, those
belonging to the State Government have a better record of collective bargaining than those
belonging to the Central Government taken as a whole. Those units having their head office
locally enjoy greater freedom than those with head office elsewhere. In brief, the private
sector units show greater dynamism and flexibility than the public sector units in maintaining
durable'labour management relationship. Among the pr~vate sector units the performance
record the p-rivate limited companies is notable. , In the caSe of public sector units, those
belonging to the State Government and those having head office locally have healthier
industrial r~lation$ and collective bargaining record than others. However the only joint
sector unit in the area. . has the best record in this respect. Ownership p~ttern to some extent
decides the organisation structure ar"s o. 185 ~ 5.7 Organisation Structure It is now generally
accepted that structure of an organisation has a significant influence on organisational
performance. Professionally managed companies periodically r~tructuring their organisations
with a view to optimising their activities is in tune with the prevailing trends. As
environments change, or priority of goals get modified and as new technology and methods
are introduced, the old organisation, structure becomes inadequate to play an effective role.
Organisation structure can exert a vital influence on collective bargaining. The extent of the
type of this influence is examined here with respect to two basic determinants of organisation
structure namely: il decision making authority; and Ii) delegation of powers. 5.7.1 In the
Private Sector Among the 18 units studied, 5 have their head offices located outside the State.
Consultation with and approval from the head-office are required'in every major decision
except in respect of prodUction, which is pre- • planned. However, the telex facilities
available permits quick' communication with the head-office. Yet, delays are inevitable. Even
stoppages of work had taken place in the • p~st due to the managements' failure to fulfil their
commit. ment to intimate the unions their final decisions on several • IBG issues on which
 84

they had differences, but had come to mutual understandings. • In three out of the five units
which have headoffices outside the State, the unit managements enjoy freedom to negotiate
with the trade unions within a given ~ framework. In the remaining two cases, however, the
headoffice representatives have to be present in the final round of negotiations and signing of
agreements. But in all these five units, in case there arise differences of opinion regarding
interpretation of agreements which have financial implications, prior approval from the head-
office is required. In the remaining private sector units, since the top executives are locally
available, the decision making centre is local and therefore decisions are taken on the spot.
5.7.2 In the Public Sector In the public sector units of the area, the extent of decentralisation
of decision making authority is far from smooth and quick. In the case of Government of
India undertakings, it is very poor. In all cases, for any major decision, epproval from the
employing ministries is insisted upon. In case of multi-unit companies, there is an additional
atage namely head office. This leck of • c~mpleta autonomy BCts as B constraint on
management in making fir~ commitments to unions when such actions Bre 187 most
appropriate and even urgently needed. Here again, the State government units hsve an
advantBge over the Central Government units. In crisis situations, the political connections of
the unions comp~l the State Government leaders to be alert and take decisions quickly.
Physical proximity of the decision making centre is an advantage with the State units,
Blthough decision-making is centralised, and the delegation of powers is limited. ' 5.7.3 -In- -
t-h-e- --T-r-ad-e- --U-n-i-o-n-s All except in one. case, the trade unions of the area are
organised unit-wise. In the case of the exception, there are two units and the workers there are
organised jointly. In the union,&", the authority is vested with the executive committees. The
members of the executive committee can meet at any time, even at short notice. The
negotiating bodies appointed by the executive committees from generally enjoy absolute
freedom/~1 workers. They, however, consult the active members of the union at every stage
of negotiation, which indirectly helps to keep the ranks and file informed about progress of
negotiations. The terms of agreements are finally presented to general body in a formal
meeting for ratification, merely in deference to the democratic tradition of trade unions. This
also serves BS a two-way communication system. Presidents, genera~ly being outsiders" the
General Secretaries invsriably take an active part in the early 188 stages of collective
bargaining in an informal manner. Besides, the Presidents normally do not find time to
participate in all negotiation parleys under the constitutions of the unions almost all business
of the unions can be transacted without the active involvement of Presidents. In the multi-
union situations, as the unions ofter consult each other informally, an informal frame-work
 85

for collective bargaining is well established in the region. Only in such cases where the inter-
union rivalry is intense such working framework is absent. However, even in such cases, joint
participation is possible and has been taking place in the presence of the District Labour
Officers, who are assigned the responsibilities of conciliation. In the light of the above facts,
it is very clear that the structure of trade unions does not pose a problem in collective
bargaining. 5.8 Management Team Management teams of the units studiad are educated and
professionally trained. More than half of the units studied belong to multi-unit organisations.
The selection criteria and recruitment process in all such units being the same, the
management personnel of the units are alike in respect of education, experience and
managerial ability. In the remaining units also there is ~ b~si~ . similarity in the calibre and
background of tha management personnel. 189 Managerial positions being transferable,
nonlocal people are found both in public and private sector undertakings having units
elsewhere. The Government of India undertakings normally recruit their managers on all
India basis giving scope to candidates from allover India to get selected. As a consequence,
there are some nonlocal people working in managerial positions in the area. Their number is
estimated to be less than ten per cent of all management personnel. However, managers
responsible for industrial relations of th~ units are all drawn from within the State only. The
educational level of the managerial personnel as revealed by the data is very high. The table 5
indicates the level of education of these personnel. Table 5 LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF
MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL -------------------------------------------------------- Educational
qualifications B.A., B.Sc., B.Com., with M.S.W. or M.B.A. B.E. with professional
qualification Total Frequency Percentage 30 83.33 6 16.67 ----------.----------- 36 100.00
------------------------------------------------------- None among the respondents is without a
professional qualification. In fact, 55.55 per cent of tbose with M.S.W. also hold M.B.A.
degree to their credit. Those with B.E. degree have general management qualifications in in
addition to advanced training in management. They hold top executive positions in the units.
Management personnel of the units who participate in collective bargaining have to their
credit considerable years of experience as can be from table 6 which gives the experience
grouping, its frequency distribution and percentage. Table 6 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
EXPERIENCE OF MANAGERS -----------.--------------------------------------------- _
Collective bargaining Respon- Percentage experience dents - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - Below 10 years 4 1 1 .11 11 - 15 years 6 16.67 16 - 20 years B 22.22 21 - 25 years • 16
50.00 --------------------------------- Total 36 100.00
--------------------------------------------------------- Half of the 35 respondents from the
 86

managerial have cadre,/20 years of experience in collective bargaining, while another 39

percentage have to their credit 10 to 20 years experience in the field. This, on the job
experience, coupled with the fairly high educational qualification have made the~ quite
competent and successful •. Among the 36 respondents, 30 belong to the peraonnel
departments. They are specially trained in the Brea of Industrial Relations. The remaining 6
hold higher job 191 positions, with the personnel department chief reporting to them. In all
cases, the management team have people of high calibr~. The successful collective
bargaining record or the units is to an extent, the contribution of such competent personnel. In
all the units the industrial relations specialists are associated with collective bargaining at all
stages. In fact. it is they ~ho prepare the ground and hold preliminary discussions. It is only at
a later stage that more members join the management team. The industrial relations
specialists play very crucial roles during the policy formulation stage and subsequently till
the collective bargaining agreements are administered throughout their life time. 5.9 Workers
and Individuals and in Groups ~ Workers in Kerala are in no way inferior to or different from
other segments of the local population. A highly invividualistic and proud stock, they did not
allow the colonial rules and reforms introduced by the British to interfere with their
community life. The industrial labour, in some respects, maintain a higher standard of life
than.the working class in general. Their superior skill. higher educational level employment
in industry. and the they assured steady income/earn bestow on them a relatively higher status
than workers in general. Additional income. howso. ever, small it may be, from small land
holdings or the houses 192 where they live in, give them distinctive identity, which the
industrial workers in large industrial cities generally do not enjo,Y. t The workers of the
region did not go to a city for industrial jobs. The industry got established in their villages.
Unlike the villages of the rest of India which normally comprised a conglomeration of
houses, these villages present a masonic of continuous, but independent houses with fenced
compounds. The local workers who own and live in such cottage-type houses are enjoying a
privileged 1uxuary which even the Chairmen of large industrial houses in cities do not enjoy.
All workers in the units covered under the study are literates. A sa~ple study ~n five units.
covering eight thousand workers has shown that the persons who hold even the lowest level
position ha~e studied upto fourth class. The large cirCUlation of newspape-Ts in Kerala
which provides on an average of one copy for every four persons of the State indicates the
high literacy level and wide spread reading habits of Keralites in general. The local industrial
workers • with their high degree of literacy, general interest in current affairs and relatively
stable economic status are well-informed of national and international events through mas s
 87

media. No peon or IV class employees of the area does any personal services like bringing a
cup of tea/coffee or a glass of water etc. to his superiors, unless his terms of employment
specifically required him to do so. Late193 coming is not a problem among the workers in the
area and apparently no one has to be punished on that score. Absenteeism is marginal in the
industries of the units under study and in the State as a whole. Some employees command
higher social status than their immediate superiors or even the managerial personnel, outside
their work-place. An operative or a clerk enjoys a better financial stability than the
managerial personnel because of his supplemental income from the land he owns. In fact the
standard of living of tha highly skilled operative or administrative staff member is almost on
par with that of the managerial personnel, some of whom have only their salary income to
live on. From the family or a worker, some members may be and others, employed as school
teachers,/government officials, supervisors and even as managers in the very same locality. In
other wordS, there is no social stigma attached to the worker merely because he belongs to
the working class. However, all these are pertinent in the case of the upper castes only. Those
in the lower rungs of the caste hierarchy have yet to find themselves in industrial jobs in
substantial numbers, exoept in public undertakings where they get preferential treatment in
recruitment. However, eVen in cases of low casta job-holders, there does not seem to be any
perceptible social discrimination although thay do suffer from the inadequacies of their
financial status. The economic independence and the social status enjoyed by the industrial
workers of the region have apparently made many of them somewhat self-willed and
stubborn, particularly in their relationship with their superiors. They ~rupulously perform all
their assigned duties complying with every laid down rules or procedure and are careful not
to be caught on the wrong foot. Added to this, they in general are highly critical of all, who
fail to fulfil theassinged or expected duties; even top management personn~l. their trade
union leaders and government officials are 5ft~n the target of their criticism. They do not
hesitate to express their feelings openly, and at times ~n a quite provocative manner, at trade
union meetings and through the press as well. They thus have a low tolerance level. Their
hair-splitting interpretations of legal definitions and stipulations have in fact earned them
national notoriety. Generally argumentative, they respect their opposite number, if they can
be convinced by logical counter arguments supported ~ith facts and figures. They seldom
passively accept official dictates or interpretations just because such communications Come
from the higher level of hierarchy. but they make their own judgements based on available
data with them. The workers' commitment to work ethics as perceived by the trade union
leaders and by the management are given in tables 7 and B respectively. Table 7 WORKERS'
 88

COMMITMENT TO WORK ETHICS AS PtRCEIVED BY TRADE UNION LEADER..S

195 ----------------------------------~--------~------. Workers commitment to: - - - - - - -- - - ------
------ Efficiency Discipline T.U. Movement I.U. to which they belong 82.76 72.41 79.31 .
79.31 • 17.24 • 27.59 • 20.69 , 20.69 --------------------------------------------------•. • Table 6
WORKERS' COMMITMENT TO WORK ETHICS AS PERCEIVED BY
MANAGEMENTS .• • -----------~------------------------------------~--_\ Workers commitment
to: F~gure in percentage - - - - -- - - - - - - Yes No • - - - - - - - - - - Efficiency 72.22 '27.78 •
Discipline .; 38.89 61. 11 • Relatitln with superiors 66.66 33.33 Grow with the organisation
61. 11 38.89 • --------------------------------------------~------- Table 7 shows that an
overwhelmin9 majority of the trade ,union leaders are of the opinion that'workers want to
maintain efficiency and dis,c.ipline at work-place and that they are loyal towards trade unions
to which they belong and to the trade IJn1.ol"l movement in general. However, this teble 7
read with table 8 projects the difference l!:1ti in views between the two class of respondents.
It is true that a substantially high percentage of. the managements in the units also agree that
workers are committed to maintain efficiency. However. in respect of disci pline. the
difference is very marked. The trade union - leaders themselves admit (2].59 per'cent.) that
the worckers are not committed to discipline. but the percentage of, management having the
same view is 61.11 This, is not' a very discouraging fact considering that 38.89 per cent of
managements admit that their units are free 6~ indiscipline. Indiscipline is of varying degre,
es. A particular act or behaviour of a worker may be viewed' by the management and trade
union leader dif~erently. '; ..... , . ment generally takes person charged with an o~fence as an •
indisciplined person. But the trade union leader defends him and may succeed in getting him
acquitted There.is, therefore. a marked difference in their perception of an act of indiscipline.
The perception in fact depends on the actual role played by each of them. There i~ an
apperent contradiction in the management response to .:the ques.tionabou' workers
commitment to discipline (61.11 per cent) and to maintaining good relations with superiors
(66.66 per cent). When workers as individuals and in groups possess certain qualities and
traits, and whe~ these traits influence their behaviour pattern et work situations, they no more
remain as individual characteristics; they form part of the workforce culture. They can,
therefore, be treated as organisational factors. 197 5.10 Trade Unions Trade Unions in the
region are not very much different from those in other parts of India. They are divided,
numerically small, financially unsound and'a~~ led by outside leaders mainly political.
differences are: (i) they are dynamic, .(ii) union rivalry is not intense; (iii) fluctuation in
membership is practically nil, and (iv) unions consult and cooperate among themselves when
 89

the political .climate is free from tension. These positive factors tend to promote a favourable
climate for steady collective bargaining. 5.10.1 Trade unions of the region are organised
unitwise. The only exception is the union of one company having two units located at two
different places 20 ki.l ometres apart. This makes the decision-making centres located within
the units themselves. Policy decisions are mede by the executive bodies. All members, except
Presidents or General Secretaries where they are from outside, ~re working people. Even
where outside leadership is welcomed, such leaders play their role only during organisational
events and at crucial periods of collective bargaining. In a few cases, the same persons are toe
leaders for several unions. Leaders drawn from in some cases, outside/appear before
tribuna~s and labour courts on behalf of unions. This outside leadership is absent only in two
units. and there rival unions are also absent. 198 • No leaser to any union is ~ leader on a
permanent basis. They are subject to change. If the workers have sufficient reasons to believe
that their leader is not devoting e~ough time or doing sufficient justice to their unLon, or if
the~ find another person who can be more effective leader to them, they seldom hesitate to
change their leader. The new leader might not have had anything to do . with such unions till
then. By such change of leaders, the workers are not accepting the political ideology of the
new leader either. There is an elem~nt of expediency in such leadership replacement~.
Instances of leadership changes in time with the changes in labour portfolio in the Coalition
Government have also been reported in the past. Outside leadership is welcomed mainly due
to four reasons. i) The financial stability of the unions does not permit the appointment of
full-time union functionaries; ii) Political connections of leaders from outside are always
assets to unions; iii) Leaders from outside are often associated with a number of unions, and
over the years they may have eUDlved well tested strategies and tactics in gatting the
demands of " workerS; and iv) All trade unionists normally would have built up a good
reputation with one employer ar another and the workers would like to avail of their services.
5.10.2 -U-n-io-n- --A-f-f-i-l-ia-t-i-o-n- Union affiliation to central trade union organisations is
resisted by two third of the local unions. Only those unions which are highly committed to
politic~l ideologies get themselves affiliated to central trade union centres. According to the
union officials who resist affiliation, their unions do not stand to gain by getting them
affiliated. By becoming affiliates, they are only burdened with two liabilities: (i) pay the
affiliation fee and (ii) subject to directions from leadership in whom they do not have much
faith. In the past where some unio~s • were affiliated with national centres, the directives
from. these centres had prevented the local unions from, fo~m.. ing ~ . united fronts to fight
for common cause. for instance, in the sixties, the INTUC central leadership ~ssue..d,
 90

direstiv:s to their local affiliates forbidding them to form ,united provoked frunts and this in
fact/a few unions to disassociate themselves by withdrawing their affiliation. The reluctance
of the local unions to seek affiliation with national centres is perhaps an indication of their
spirit of self-reliance and inherent strength. 5.10. 3 -I-n-te-r---U-n--io.-n- -R-e--la-t-i-o-n-s-h-
i-p- -a-n-d_ .U-n-i-t-e-d- -f-r-o-n-t-s The presence of outsiders as leaders and the higher
edueational level of the workers seem to heve en influence in union relationship with rivals.
If one outside leader cornerS another union leader in one unit, its 200 repercussions are
echoed in several units, as in these units both 4nion leaders may be active rivals. Working in a
small geographical area and meeting end dealing with each other almost every day, the
leaders, irrespective of their rival political and trade union interest are able to maintain
professional comradship. This induces mutual tolerance of rival unions. The workers too are
enlightened. enough to appreciete the right of rival unions to exist and operate independently.
As the union leaders realise that no single union alone can establish industrial peace, each of
them recognises the others' presence, strength end role. These naturally leads them to have
mutual consultations, co-operation and at times collaboration. This tolerant and mutually
helpful attitude obviate open hostility. However, any provocative action by anyone union •
against another is seldom tolerated and the brutel retaliation, • which inevitably follows acts
as an effective deterrent aga- ' I,i' :." . inst openly offending one's rivals beyond a limit. A
high proportion (77.78 per cent) of the managements in the area under study is of the view
that rival trade unions of their units maintain consultative and co-operative relatio nships.
None among them is of the view .th at their ~, unions have unhelathy competition of the
worst type. The workers (79.31 per cent) are also of the view that their trde-- unions maintain
consultative and co-operative relationships among themselves. 201 Co-operation is a
precondition for collaboration. It is observed that trade unions, including the rivals, in the
area covered under this study, make joint fronts in making demands, conducting agitations
and participating ~n negotiations with employers. Table 9 shows frequency of formation of
such joint fronts as revealed by the responses received from managements and workers of the
units studied. Table 9 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED FRONTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Frequency Distribution of united ftonts
Respondents Always - - - - - - - - - - - - - Workers Managements 60 (66.79%) 12 (33.33%) -
-,- - - - - - - - - - - - At times Never Not appli Total - - - - c-ab-le- - - 12 (13.79%) 16 (50.
OO~O 9 6 67. (10.04%)(8.34'){,) (100'){,) 2 4 36 (5.56%) (11.11%)(100'){,)
----------------------------------------------------------- The managements and the union leaders are
of the view that in a very high proportion of cases, the unions form joint fronts to fight for a
 91

common cause. However, only 1/3rd of the managements feel that joint fronts are always
formed, whereas 2/3rd of the trade union leaders state that joint fronts are invariably formed.
As the unions are the directly involved parties, their view has to be accepted as correct and
that of the management as only their impression. In any case. there ie no conflict of views.
The formation of joint fronts create the structural framework for collective bargaining. 5.11
Government During the last 30 years when the industrial belt got established and started
developing, increase in the volume of working population, accelerated tempo of
industrialisation, qualitiative and quantitative change in , . trade union movement, change in
political ideologies and alignments, commitments made by the country in respect of labour in
the Constitution end plan documents, changes in the concept of economic and social values, a
limited but far reaching management revolution in favour of professionalism, more liberal
poliCies followed by progressive and enlightene~ employers etc. have created a vast change
in the labour scene and have made labour-management relations in the aree complex and
crucial for the progress of the State. The State has been playing a dominant role in matters
related to labour and labour-management relationship in the area. An increasing number of
labour legislation was introduced during the last three decades. During the early part of
development, labour legislation were designed to maintain law and order in the region. Police
interference in labour-management disputes was quite frequent in those days. During the next
stage the thrust of the legisletion was to improve the conditions of workers at their work
place. Health and safety became the focal point when industrial occupation became
hazardous. 203 financial security against occupational risks, labour welfare and labour
management relationship became subjects of topical relevance in their sequence. The State,
thus, by legislative enactments, regulated the conditions at work. health and safety, social
security, labour welfare and labour-management relationship. Most of the labour legislation
were enacted by the Central Government, but their administration is the responsibility of the
State Government. As all the units under study are located within the Kerela State, all of them
are influenced and governed by the broad labour policies initiated by the State Government.
However, this influence is less pronounced in the cass of Central Government undertakings
located in the area. This may perhaps be the reason why the private sector and public sector
undertakings other than those belonging to the Centrel Government were able to enjoy e
better industrial relations climate. The State Government has played a significant role in
promoting industrial peace in the area. The information of Industrial Relations Councils in
major industries as early as in 1942, impartial treatment meted out to rival unions (especially
by the Coalition Government), the encouragement given to trade unions for active
 92

participation of their leaders in statutory and non-statutory bodies, etc. are all posi~ive steps
taken by the Stete Government which paved the way for the emergence of trade union united
fronts functioning as effective collective bargaining agents. The Government's reluctanca to
refer collective disputes for adjudication and encouragement of other methods of conflict
resolution, including informal intervention by ministers'· created an atmosphere that
compelled the employers to recognise all the unions and to give bargaining a fair deal.
Besides, the Coalition Government's anxiety to give Kerala a better image than what it had in
the past, in order to • attract capital for fresh investment from outside and the trade union
leaders own realisation in the futility of constant conflicts when other better methods are
available, created a climate for fruitful bilateral negotiations. • • •
 93

CHAPTER 6

DETERMINANTS OF CQLLECTIVE BARGAINING 6.1 Introduction Before

examining the various external and internal factors having a bearing on collective bargaining
practices in the region, some general misconception about the incidence of work-stoppage
and its influence on the industrial relations of the area are briefly discussed. 6.1.1 . Index of
Industrial Relations ~---------------------------- The traditional Governmental approach is to
view the number of work-stoppages and man-days lost therefrom as an index of industrial
relations. However.. with this approach, one cannot adequately gague the quality of industrial
relations. In any relationship, where co-operation and conflicts are inevitable a~d
simultaneous, work-stoppage or a temporary break-down of relationship' indicetes only • the
stage at which conflicts manifest themselves into open • confrontation. In other words, it
portrays only one aspect," • the n~gative ona in .. the total relationship. ' .. It blacks out the
positive aspect namely the spirit of co-operation and 20G joint endeavour that normally
characterise the day-to-dey labour management relationship in any organisation. Likewise,
absence of work-stoppage need not necessarily be a real indication of industrial peace. In
innumerable cases, many conflicting undercurrents and silent hostility between labour and
capital as well as among different hierarchies in organisations may actually be present and
operating without any occurrence of workstoppages. It is also possible, and it has happened in
many cases, that even in the worst industrial relations climate, work-stoppages have not taken
place because of i) the absence of a catalytic agent to spark off workstoppages; ii) the
inability or lack of courage of the parties to effect work-stoppages; iii) the operation of anti-
work-stoppage law or prohibitory order; and iv) the parties t patience to buy time till the
opportune moment for launching en overt action. Similarlv. any conclusion that occurrence of
workstoppages, is an indication of unhealthy industrial relations , is equally illfounded. It
may be true "in certain cultural background and not true in others. Th~.following examples
may prove this statement; GVI a) The tamil speaking communit.y in the South, earlier wanted
separate nationhood outside Indian Union. They have not however taken arms to achieve
their ends. But, the Nagas, with similar goals, heve been up in arms. b) The Indian freedom
movement has been generally non-violent. However many other nations had to have armed
struggle to achieve their independence from their colonial masters. The militant sections in
India itself had formed the Indian National Army and fought against Britishers. Their
behaviour is conditioned by their culture. c) When workers were ignorant, illiterate, and
 94

without any trade union organisations, in spite of the primitive conditions under which they •
worked they did not resort to strikes. They did not even protest. It was only the enlightened
social educators and social welfare workers who protested ageinst the inhuman conditions to
which workers were being subjected during the pre-trade union and early trade union periods.
This passive attitude of the workers could perhaps be attributed to the cultural pattern of
tradition-bound societies • d) Certain parts of the"country do not suffer from high incidence
of strikes and lock-outs. labou Bureau statistics indicate that Gujarat and Karn taka are
relatively free from such incidents an they consistendly excell other state~ in this respect. In
these states even wh~n disputes occur, they are generally settled peacefully and 6.1. 2 208
quickly •. West Bengal and Kerala are on the other extreme. Even mild provocations can
cause viole~t labour upheavals. However, in Kerala such outbursts seldom deteriorate into
physical violence. cultural heritage. This is again due to their Background of the Workers in
the Region --------------------------------------- The workers in the area under study are more
educated than their counterparts in any other part of the country. They are a proud
community, with a distinct culture of their own. Although exposed to industry and the
industrial way of life. they are protected from the evil effects of industrial societies. At the
same time, they enjoy the benef~ts available to any other industrial society in the country. In
addition, they retain their identity in their village social life and are free from sociel
discrimination of any kind. There is no community or caste embargo for ettaining managerial
position in the region. Workers and managers belong to the same community and work
shoulder to shoulder. In the same family itself, industrial workers aijd higher hierarchiea!
level personnel are found. In such a social background the interpersonal ~ relationship based
on the hierarchy of the job held alone is recognised and accepted. Even this recognition is
limited to the work place only. The management pp.rsonnel of the locality accept this social
norm. 209 Political Consciousness and its Effect ----------r--------------------------- Kerals
being a laboratory for politica! experi- ... ments, Qll sections of society ha~e a highly
developed sense of political consciousness. The industrial workers Bre the solid foundation
of political parties in the State. They are ~ery vocal too. They hs~e no inhibition in voice
ferously criticising anyone irrespective of his status in life, especially if they feel. that some
injustice is done by them. Their tolerenc~ level against social injustice is low. Howe~er, they
seldom indulge in physical violence. In such a context, work-stoppages do take place
occasionally on industrial and non-industrial issues. But when it is understood that such
incidents are totally free from physical ~iolence, that the workers' commitments to their
organisations are not adversely affected, that prework- stoppage productivity is either
 95

maintained or even improved upon and that collective bargaining is their preferred choice in
conflict resolution, we consider such situations q~ite different from the all India pattern.
Further, if it is appreci~ted that work-stoppages are pressure tactices, occasional work-
stoppages for ~ery short period have little impact on indus...t rial relations • Strikes caused by
alleged ~ictimisation are pertier because the rival unions do not generally co-operate in such
strikes. Strikes due to no~-industriel issues are not organised as a result of any conflict
between labour and the management. They too, therefore, leave the labour-mana- • gement
relationship unaffected. The managements seem to accept that, so long as trade unions are
under the strong influence and control of political parties, such strikes on non~industrial
issues are inevitable. Amony the factors that affect healthy industrial relations and consequent
collective bargaining practices are the positive aspects of labour-management relationship.
The negative on as prevent or discourage it. It is our attempt . . to examine them and show
how they have cantr~buted to collective bargaining practices prevalent in the Cochin-Alwaye
industrial belt. 6.2. The External Factors By external factos we mean here those factors, over
the origin of which neither the workers nor the managements have any direct control. The
labour-management attitudes and behaviour may influence the external factors to an extent.
But when it is understood that such influence is the sum total of the influences of all the
industrial establishment it is clear how insignificant is the contribution of • the units covered
under study. • 6.2.1 -T-h-e --S-t-a-te-- -L-a-b-o-u-r- -P-o-l-ic-y- • There is a general
impression among the thinking publtc in Kerala that the Kerela GavBr~men~ du.ri ng the
period .. covered under the study has been a pro-laboui one and that ~ll the Government has
been more progressive than the neighbouring States. As can be seen f,r om the following
table (Table 10) most of the respondents representing managements Table 10
RESPONDENTS VIEW ON GOVERNMENTS LABOUR POLICY --------------------
~---------------------~----------- ------ Respondents Government Pro-Labowr State labour
policies more progressive than those of neignbouring States. -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - Yes No Yes No {Figs. in %age)(figs. in (Figs. in (figs. in %age.) %age.) ~age) - -
- - - - - - - Managements 76.92 23.06 64.62 15.36 Trade Union Leaders 75.86 24.14 65.5'
34.49 ---------------------------------------------.-------- -~------ and labour of the units under
study have confirmed this general impression. • An overwhelming majority of both the
manegemant and trade union leaders are of the view that the State Government is pro-labour
as well as mOrs progressive then the Governmenta in the neighbouring States. In Kerals,
almost all agricultural and allied occupations in rural arees, and most of the trades in the
wrban centres are governed by the Minimu~ Wages Act, -1948. The frequency of revision of
 96

wages under this S~atute has no definite pattern, but it has never b•e en later than the period
prescribed under the Act. This is 8n exception when 212 compared to the occupation and
trades that fall under even the Central Government sphere. It can be attributed to the pro-
labour commitment of the Government and militancy of trade unions which haVe a strong
lobby in the State legislature. A male agricult~ral labour in Kerala earns ~.6.00 per day as per
minimum fixed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. His counter-part in Maharashtra
villages gets only ~.4. 00 per day. An unskilled worker in Bombay City cannot get anything
more than ~.6.00 per day as per minimum wage fixation,. -. The very fact that the agriculture
and allied workers in Kerala are able to earn higher wages solely because of the
Government's intervention in their favour by Statutory wage fixation. There is thus clear
evidence of a pro-labour slant in the policies pursued by the Government of Kerela. Large
scale smuggling of raw ~ashew nuts from Kerala to the ne~ghbouring States and the factory
owners setting up new units just outside the Kerala boundary can perhaps be explained by the
higher labour cost prevailing in Kerala as a direct result of the local Government according
its official sanction for such enhanced wage rates. The Legislation on .Gratuity (1969) the
first of its kind i-n the country and another legislation on agricultural workers (1975) are
monumental legislative efforts of the Kerala Governments to extend social s~curity bsn~fits
to both industrial and non-industrial labour. The amendment to the Factories Act, 1947 to
cover even those establishments employing two or more employees has enlarged the
coverage of the Act and has guaranteed the benefits under it even to those workers engaged in
smaller units. There is thus a definite tendency on the part of the State Government to
ameliorate the conditions of workers. 6.2.2 -C-o-n-s-e-q-u-e-n-ce- --o-f- -S-m-a-l-l- -I-n-d-u--
s-tr-i-a-l- -E-a-s-e Kerala's industrial base is very small. Her major industrial belt, the Cochin-
Alwaye region has only 26 units employing 300 or more persons. This being sa and as all the
political parties have their own newspapers, any major industrial relations problem in any
unit in the State gets flashed State-wide through the medium of the presS, Political and public
discussions as well as editorial comments for and against strike situation are quite common.
The Labour Department charged with the responsibility of remedial measures also gets
alerted to take prompt action. This is evident from the NCL comments that the State labour
machinery is quite experienced and efficient in dealing with labour unrest. Many of the
Kerela ministers, particularly those holding the labour portfolio have had close association
with trade unions of the area and are therefore only too glad to extend their good offices in
resolving industrial disputes involving such unions. MDst of the managers (88.89 per cent) of
the units contacted were of the view that any major industrial dispute in the area gets the
 97

immediate attention of the State Government at the highest level. This direct and prompt
intervention is made possible because of the relatively small geographical spread of the
organised industry in the State. 6.2.3 !~!!~:~::-~~-~~!~!~:~!-~~:!~=: In Kerala, all the major
political parties except the CPI (M) have been participating in the Coalition Govern ment. All
of them, except one the Kerala Congress have had their trade union wing. All the local unions
except the CITU and those unaffiliated ones, therefore enjoy political patronage and have a
direct link at the Minister level. This has made the coalition partners flexible and
accommodative et times, and stubborn and aggressive at other times, according to the needs
of the occasion. They thus directly or from behind the scenes play their role in bringing ebout
an amicable settlement of disputes either by biliterel discussions or through tripartite
meetings. While the majority (60.60 per cent) union leaders of the regionare of the opinion
that the state Ministers directly or indirectly intervene in disputes at times, only 39.40 per
cent said that Ministers never interfere directly in the disputes. None of the respondents have
stated that Ministers interfere all the time. The Ministers end the Labour Department do
exerc~ se their influe~ce on trade unions. In addition, the poTitical parties too, especially the
leftist oriented ones, have considerable influence on trade unions. The moderating effect of
their influence is discernible in strike situations arising out of the initial failure of bargaining.
More than half the trade unions leaders (51.72 per cent) have admitted that the political
parties at times pressurisB the unions to make compromise agreementa rather than continuing
with the agitation. However the rest of the respon~ ents feel that they are never pressurised
by political parties. These included leaders of thosa unaffiliated unions as well"as unions
believed to be belonging to the rightist ideology. None of the respondents has come out with
the view that Ministers invariably exert their pressuring influence all the time. 6.2.4 -E-q-u-a-
l --T-r-e-a-tm--e-n-t- -o-f- -U-n-i-o-n-s A majority of trade union leaders (72.23 per cent) have
indicated that in their opinion the State Government is impartial and does not discriminate
between rival unions. This neutral policy is perhaps a practical necessity for the coalition
partners except one, derive their strength and support from one union or another. , 6.2.5 I-m--
p-a-c-t -o-f- -t-h-e- -C--o-a-l-i-ti-o-n- --G-o-v-e-r-n-m-e-n-t Kerala, politically a 'problem'
State, never had a stable Government, whether of a single party or of multipIe parties, till
1971. The five-party Coali tial"! Govern~ . ment formjd in 1971 have however survived
many an acid te~t 2lG and have completed their full term as well as the extended ter~ during
the emergency period (1975-77) mainly because of the spirit of determination and
accommodative attitude of the participating political parties. In the legislature those parties
have evolved and adopted a formlised approach to mutual Co-operation. But in the trade
 98

union field there existed no such formalised machinery for mutual accommodation and
adjustment. Yet the spirit of co-operation had found expression in all critical occasions
involving rival trade unions. Among the trade union leaders, responding to the questionnaire,
44.82 per cent have said that they had tried to establish co-operative relationship with rival
unions and have almost always succeeded in doing so, just as the different political parties
have been working together in the Coalition Government. Another 34.48 per cent of the
respondents have indicated that they also have been adopting a co-operative approach
although with only occasional success. This means that 79.30 per ~ent of the respondents are
of the opinion that a measure of co-operaticn has been induced in the working of rival unions
by the collaborative approach actively perused by the Coalition p~rtners at the Government
level: In other words, just as the Coalition Government partners developed certain amount of
political toleration against the rival political parties, the trade unions too developed tolerance
and even respect among themselves, in spite of being basically opposed to each other. 217 -
M-i-n-o-r-i-ty- --U-n-i-on- --S-t-a-tu--s In Kerala, min~rity unions are seldom ignored either
by the employer or by the other unions. On the contrsry the employers usually consult them
on all issues which are the subject matter for discussion with majority unions. This is done
due to two main reasons: i) A minority union can cause a crisis, irrespective of their strength.
ii) If the minority unions belong to any of the political parties in the Coalition Government,
the Government wiil not do anything to weaken the position of those unions. In the general
political and industrial climate, the Government's attitudes and reaction towards the different
trade union have influenced the managements considerably. They have accepted trade union
multiplicity as a reality just as they have come to live with a multiplicity of political parties.
About 68.95 per cent of the managements give the minority unions all the privileges e~joyed
by the majority un~ons. In fact no on~ precisely knows the strength of the unions. Since it is
certain that all unions are to be treated alike irrespective of their numerical strengths, the
temptation to claim inflated membership is totally sbsent • • 6.2.7 Rightly or wrongly, the
goneral public in Karels ~s very sharp in its criticism of the Government, employers and
workers alike on two aspects: , 21b i) The private capital is shy to invest in Kerala and ii)
Each successive Government have feiled to get industrial investment in Kerala in proportion
to ~er;natural resources, highly competent manpower, abundant avail_ ability of power and
the highly developed infra structure. People in general believe that the perennial labour
problemds ~n the State deter the flow of capital ecross its borders. Political platforms and
press media are liberally used by the people to express their feelings. These public criticisms
as well as their own realisation that some thing positive must be done made the Coalition
 99

Government in Kerela since 1971 to take all possible steps to brighten the otherwise tarnished
image of Kerala. The political parties participating in the Coalition Government and the trade
union leaders under their influence are conscious of the strong public opinion for improvigg
the investment climate. They want to attract and not to shy away private capital from Kerala.
They are anxious for the Central Government to invest in such areas where the private capital
because of its obvious limitations cannot do much, although there is no guarantee that the
surpluses generated will be ploughed back. The Government also want to reassure the
existing and potential investors that in the State industrial peace will be maintained and the
militant 2t9 • trade un10ns will be kept under check. The Statets policy in general has been
dictated by an ardent desire to establish. preserve. and maintain industrial peace. Both the
trade unions and the managements of the units studied have expressed their views tonfirming
this fact.
Internal Factors Just as the external influences decide to an extent the charactar of the
industrial relations climate and the 220 scope for collective bargaining, the internal needs and
pressures compel the organisations to charter their course of action. In fact, the external
influences provide the background, while internal factors determine the ultimate choice in
respect of organisational objectives and practices. In their choice, their own past'experience
guides the organisations managements to a considerab~e degree. Both labour and,
managements in the State had experienced uneasy industriel relations for over two decades,
immediately preceding the period covered the under the study. Labour in the state has not
gained anyghing spectacular throthey ugh its generally intransigent stance. In fact
that/themselves now realise that their militancy had frightened away potential investors from
the region. The managements too did not attain their ambitious targets and grwoth rates
because of the troubled industrial relations climate. They too have oome to realise that their
past approaches to unions of dividing them did not pay the expected dividend. They too now
recognise that their policies in dealing with organised labour have myopic and grossly
inadequate to meet the prevailing complex situations. They have, therefore, changed their
policies and attitudes towards labour. The change agent in this case has perh,aps been the
School of Management Studies situated very close to the industrial belt under study. Offering
an evening part-time M.B.A. course to executives the School has trained up SOD executives
over a period of 10 years. The exposure to higher 221 management theory and practice which
the executives from all the units under study have· had benefited them considerably and has
influenced management decisiohs at all levels As a consequence the internal organisational
environment got transformed into a very favourable one for building up healthy traditions.
 100

The following sub-sections outline the internel factors such as the relationships among trade
unions as well as labour-management co-operative efforts which have had their positive
impact on the industrial relations climate ~n general and on collective bargaining in
particular. 6.3.1 ~=~~!~~~~~~e:_~~~~a_IE~~~_YU!~~~ Kerela differs from mast other
Indian States in many respects. In respect of relationships among trade unions, there is a
marked difference. These relationships appear to have been gradually evolved over a period
of time. Even the ideologically opposite and, therefore, rival unions in the State often join
hands for common cause and establish a working relationship. This in it~elf has
immeasurably contributed to restoring industrial peace and stability, for it minimised
provocative actions against each other. Their mutual respect, consultation and co-operation,
and the absence of violence in their day-to-day work are indications of their maturity and
general awareness of the need for industrial harmony in the State. • 222 6.3.1.1 Multiplicity
of unions need not invariably result in rivalry. Where workers are organised in broad
category~wise unions, rivalry is totally absent., Unions of operatives, supervisors, clerical
and administrative staff and of the watch and ward employees co-exist without being rivals.
Here, the rival claim of recognition of one union as the sole bargaining agent does not arise at
all. The operatives, being large ~n number and crucial in their role, find that their unions
enjoy a predominant position. Their agreements with managements become the basis for
negotiations for other unions. The unions of non-operatives, therefore, not only take interest
in the negotiation do proceedings which the operatives' unions/with the management, but they
in fact co-operete to their utmost to make such negotiations successful. This is generally true
on all India basis. However, the understanding and co-operation among rivals and their joint
participation in the collective bargaining process are unique to Kerala. In this context the
views of a scholar who attempted to understand the Kerala labour is quite pertinent: •
"Multiplicity of unions has been acting as a great hindrance to the grwoth of collective
bargaining. However the Kerala experience is different. Here, despite multiplicity of unions, •
the workers face the employers as a team, and the employer, in fact wants them all as a single
group to negotiate. This has resulted in large number collective bargaining agreements signed
by mo•r e than one union operating in the same establishment • Despite political and
ideological dif- • ferences, a great degree of unity of goals and approaches 1S exhibited by
the unions in the bargaining rooms". • This understanding and co-oper~tion is the direct result
of the respect the unions command from their rivals. The Kerala workers and his unions.
know how to distinguish between political issues and economic issues despit~ of the political
involvement of trade unions. There are cleer indications that the workers are slowly freeing
 101

themselves from the grip of political parties. • A variety of causes can be attributed to this
phenomenon. The unity efforts and conferences held in the past, the working of the Industrial
Relations Committee and the workers' participation in different statutory and non-statutory
bodies have brought the leaderships together. These meetings and close association have.
created respect for each oth er. In addition the Government's and the managements' anxiety to
deal with a single agency in the collective bargaining process has also indirectly influenced
the rivals to come closer and work in unison. The educated and shrewed workers have thus
opted for a new era of collaboration even with rivals for the furtherance of their common
goal. The working of the Coalition Government as a stable, more progressive and pro-labour
administration • than any earlier Governments in the State• has also anthused them to
continue the experiments of co-op~rat~~n w~ich have " been largely successful. ~ultiplicity
of unions have, in • fact resulted in the low incidence of political strikes in 6.3.2 -C-o-n-s-u-l-
t-a-ti-o-n- --a-n~- --C-o---o-p-e-r-a-t-io-n .. . Consulteti.on and -Co-operation "among
unions", which +' are not rivals are quite ~ommon and natural. ElY=" such good will among
themselves, they strengthen their position in relation" to their employers and even benefit l.n
thefr en-" counters and confrontations witn the employers • True, the • ,administrative and the
supervisory pe.r sonn.e l are better educatad and well placed in job positions than the
operatives. But their unions are less powerful than that of the'oper- • atives. Strikes by them
singly are~ery rare. Further, as their bargaining potentiality is tied up with that of their
operatives, they always consult and co-op~rata ~ith the unions of the operatives • This
practice con~orms to . the all India pat{ern, and.exceptiD~s. if any, ar~ likely to be few. , ,
However, consultation and co-operation among rival unions is something new found as a
common occurrence in Kerala Only. • . • • The workers are wise enough to appreci(t~- that
their mernbe£s hip stren gth rema in more or less the same and is not subject to wide
fluctuations as individual members are not li~ely to shift their allegiance from the union • t ~
~ . • ~~' • .... i ~ ',~ of their choice. h .... . ..... -10 'Ir ,J e Unl0nSj .:therefore,' do not waste . ~ .
, . ....... '~ ". . .... .. their effoi"tsin strengthening -their memb~ership -base for • " w ~ L ... 010
.... reinfcircin9 thei+, bargain-ing power with the. . 'managements. ~ - They loIould have
re~6inei:l weak and ga'ined precio~s little' ~ ... .. t" - • if t~ey fo~ght amo~g themselvesa~
ihe~negotiation;s{age.· • They have therefore decided wisely to extend co-operetion among
them@elves. More than half (58~62 per cent) of th~ trade nion respondents have said that
they consulted, the rival nions in the collective bargaining process. The remaining .' 1.38 per
cent have gone a step fu~ther in the sense that hey ha.v...e been actively co-operating with
their rivals • one remains either indifferent or competitive to the rivalS. he
 102

mutual~consultation and co-operation are evident during he pre del1land period in

formulating the chart'er of demands • • n conducting joint agitations and even in
forming ,joint egotiation teams • • 3.3 -C-o,~-o-p-e-ra-t-i-v-e-s- --an-d- --S-p-o-r-ts- . In
running the co-operative societies and condu- . ting the GPorts_and games programmes, the
workers rlse above • heir trade union and political consia~ration~.'· These ,n stitutions and
programmes belong to. the employees as a hole and they are meant for entirely differenf-
purpose"s: he political leaders guiding tha destiny of the unions are • nlikely to gain
politically by attempting to exe;t their ~> . influence in· the da.y tods'y management of'these"
welfare ,- amenities. is another •• • • • 'Besides. the managements.' direct control ,11( •• " f' - .
; . , ~ significant fact that help to keep political • • interference. I,n ot~er words, theie are
ag~ncies and . , occasions in whith~the 'orkers belonging to rival trade union organisations'
work t~gether without rencour •. Their .~ ~ . . - - membership or official positions in rival
trade union. organisations do not get reflect~d i~ their p~r~icipation • in running the
cooperatives Or joining the sports events. 6.3.4 -S-t-r-ik--e-s- -a-n-d --V-i-o-l-e-n-c-e Strikes
caused by union rivalry were rampant . • 'in Kerele a dec8se ago. The present position is that
strike are generally absent' in established industries. Strikes if any, are now confined to new
units,where the unions are also new. When one section of inexperienced t.rade union
members attempt to establish their supremacy over others, the result is that the rivalry
between unions becomes intense. However, the management policy of reoo- , 9nising all the
unions makes the rivalry irrelevant, except in the initial stages in membership building. In
other words. as the unions attain maturity the number of work-stoppages resulting from union
rivalry can decline. This is what the Cochin-Alwaye industriel belt experi!'!nce - -= - - -
indicates. As the major cause for inter-union rivalry is eliminated, there is no scope for trade
unions to quarrel among themselves and resort to violence. There appears to be no reported
case of violence by workers against the management personnel of the units studied. During
the pre-independence period when the leftist trade union leaders were operating from I
underground I, occasional' :.,1"_ incidence of violence had been reported. The Punnapra
Vayalar Revolt was more political than trade union one, although the masses involved were
workers, and their leaders were trade unionists. Evsn if it is considered as the outcome of
trade union action, the revolt was a passing phase in the history of politicsl parties and trade
unl.ons. Even the Communist parties, both left and right now believe that revolution cen be
brought about without violence. After that historic revolt, 30 years ago, workers in Karela
have not relapsed into violence in their day-to-day conduct. When all the trade unions
operating in tha region have their political parties participating in the Coalition Government,
 103

they are further handicapped to adopt extreme steps, which may embarrass their political
bosses. The people in Kerela, in general, ere peace loving. 1110 doullt. tRey are v~ril ~vocal
tooo_ Even those • who have no interest in party politics, but are confined to silent
community work and live in convents and monastries, had in the past corne out on the streets
to demonstrate against Government measures threatening their interests. In such a general
context, the conduct of· workers whose main weapons are agitation, protest, demonstration
and strike can be better appreciated. However they conduct their mass demonstrations and
strikes in a • peaceful manner. A few gherao's which took place in tne area could be construed
as some what violent; but they were of a mild nature nat causing physical injury to anyone.
Their slogans, songs, cartoons, etc. specially made for every situation may ridicule and deride
managements I their verbal warfare, articulation and vigorous gesture are likely to give a
wrong impression to any outsiders that . the workers are violent and aggressive, and that the
situation is explosive. However, not a single management representative has said that the
local trade unions indulge in violent actions. Here, a workers' individual violence egainst
another worker is viewed merely as an isolated personal incident, and not as something
involving the unions to which they belong. Keralites, in general, are rational and not
immediately provoked to violence by' communal discords or 229 political cleavages. When
large areas of the rest of the country were rocked by arson and bloodshed during the post-
partition years, Kerala remained peaceful. All communities lived, and still live there in
perfect harmony. This is a sign of maturity which is reflected in the trade union field ~s well.
6.4 Labour Management Co-operation We have repeatedly emphasised that simultaneous co-
operation and conflict are inherent in any labour management relationship. Both the parties
desire to strengthen the co-operation and reduce or eliminate the negative relationship. This is
so because, both the parties gain by co-operation. Stability and growth of both workers and
management depend on the result of their mutual co-operation. However, this realisation and
even the concern for such co-operation the same do not bring the desired result in all cases.
So~e units succeed, to a very great extent, in strengthening the positive efforts, especially
when the negative pull is the least. The intensity of the negative pull will be less, when the
strength of the conflicting interests is not strong, or when there is an effective machinery to
remove the causes of friction or to reduce their force. The machinery that exists in labour
management relations can be classified into four groupsl , - i) . )hose meant for removal of
conflicts. ii) Those designed to prevent conflicts. iii) Those entrusted with the resp"onsibinty
for administration of certain services. iv) 'Those intended to bring about co-operation
between the parties. 6.4.1 Machinery for the Removal of Conflicts _________ ~ ______
 104

W_8W ____ M ____ Mw ______ _ A plant without any labour-management problem can
hardly be found. Problems are inevitable. Therefore, there is a need for a machinery for their
timely removal. The plant level industrial relations is the sum total of the satisfaction, or its
absence among its • employees, as reflected in their attitudes towards the management. The
origin of dissatisfaction may be at different points w the establishment premises, shop floor,
canteen, administrative service and so on. Similarly, • the causes may be different -
interpersonal incompatiabilit~, problems arising out of supervision, pro.duction schedule,
working conditions, disciplinary action, etc. Subject matters like union recogniticn, wages,
bonus, company policy, etc. become common cause to all or to a substantielly large number
of employees • The workers so affected may individually or• in groups express their
dissatisfaction to different levels ·of authorities. When the causes of dissatisfaction evade·
solutions, they ma.ke tbeir presen·ce felt ,in the labour-management relationship, which ulti- .
mstely tell upon the collec"tive bargaining'. . possibilities • Reco'gnihon of 'unio"n's by
managements as col- • lective bar~a~ning agents provides the' machinery for .. - '* , . • ,.
removal of conflicts and preventi~n of open disputes. ....... ~. ' The all India practice is to
confer recog. nition. to majo- • rity unions only. Wherever regulatory legisla'tion exist. the
majority unions get the ,sole collective bargaining status • The code of discipiine also
provides for recoM . , gnition of majority unions only. But these offer no effective solution,
where nona of the unions functioning in any uni.t enjoys absolute majority of workers. Even
majority unions cannot guarantee a t~ouble-free at~osphere. The best course in the circum.,
stances,was to recognise all • the unions in the units and to deal with them separately or
together. This is what managements have done and achieved a measure of success. The
Government of India is currently planning to constitute councils of. trade, , unions where
multiplicity of unions are establis~ed~ " realities, and to meke legislative provision for
compul~ .' '. . . sory recognition of such trade union councils as collectlye bargaining agents.
The idea seems to have been taken from the successful practice informally evolved by labour
and managements. Once recognition is granted to all the unions .a or councils of union~. the
structural framework for perio- • • dica! fro~al negoti~tion meetings between labour and
manage • mlI!lntt . d ~s rna e. ..:... -:.'" .f _ _ Each union confine its discussion with the _ 282
mana.g ement on problems faced by its members only. ~hen . general issues are to be
negotiatsd, 'consultations among unions do take place. Joint meetings are also h~ld at times.
Besides the issues covsred under the a~reements, the-day-to-day problems axe discussed
between the management and trade unions. This could be understood as having resulted from
the collective bargaining agreement provisions. However, even where the conciliation
 105

settlements or even awards decide the terms of service, such periodical meetings are
common. The unions need not wait for the managements to take the initiative. The unions can
take the initiatives The managements are too willing to draw up agenda and arrange meetings.
This practice has become so common 1n all the units studied that it is now a part of their
relationship culture. 6.4.2 Machinery for Prevention of Conflicts
------------------------------------- ~e have seen that conflicts are inevitable. They are also
preventable, if sufficient advance care is taken. Settlements after the tocurrences of open
conflicts often leave trails of bitterness, farsighted managements therefore, endeavour to
prevent the potential issues from becoming conflicts. The traditional approach to permit the
workers to present their problems to their superiors has ma~y limitations. The higher
eXt'rcutiv~s may not always have the time to look into the innumerable minor • problems of
workers. It may not in to the workers that the attention of all lis the cases be apparent
required. higher ups/ Even when they realise the need, they may lack the courage and
competence to present their problems convincingly to the higher level of hierarchy and
demand immediate solution. Absence of any systematic method to deal with the workers'
problems as they arise brings in trade unions, at all levels, and may create avoidable
complications in many cases., There is, therefore, 8 need to create a machinery for prevention
of possible conflicts. In the all India context, two machineries are functioning one statutory
and the other non-statutory. The statutory machinery is known as Works Committee. We have
seen in our earlier chapter thet the NCL has found the performance of this machinery on all
India basis far from satisfactory. The units having this machinery are only 50 per cent of the
total covered under the study. Table 12 throws lights on the functioning of Works Committe
and its contributions to the industrial relations climate in e broad way. TABLE 12
RESPONDENTS VIEW ON WORKS COMMITTEE AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS _~
______ ~ ___ ~_ •• ~_~_~. _____ .~ _______ ~ _______ ._ •••• ~~-~._. ___ • __ •• _ M ___
~. _______ • ___ ._ •• Part I Part I I • _ • _ M _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • _ _ _ • • • • _ _ _ ~ ~ • _ _ _ _ • •
~ • _ • Trade Unioh Views Management Views Works -~ - ---~ - ~ -. . - - -~ - - - -. . " . -~ ---. -
- ~ -. - Pesce ful . Industrial Relations committee Exists Does not exists Total Exists Does not
exists Total • .. - . -. --. ----- -- . ----. -----~ . . . ~ ----. -. --. . . (70,83) (29.17) (100) (61.54)
(36.46) (100) Yes 51 21 72 16 10 26 (94.44) (63.64) (62.76) (88.88) (55.55) (72,22) • _____
•••• • e'. ___ • _ ~ __ w _________ • ____ • __ •• ___ _ ( 20) ( 80) ( 1 00) (25 ) (75) ( 100)
No 3 12 15 2 e 10 ( 5.56) (36,93 ) (17.24) (11,11) (34.44) W.78) ---- -- ~ - -. . . ~ - . - --. -. ~ .
- - --~ ~ . -- . -- ~ ~ . --~ -. . - (62. 07) (37.93) ( 1 00) (50 ) (50) ( 1 00) Total S4 33 ar 18 18 36
(100) ( 1 00) ( 1 00 ) (100 ) (100 ) ( 100) -... -~ .. -.--... " .. -----.~-.--... -.. ~ .... -~.~.-.. ~.~~.~-
 106

~~ .. ~ .... ~-.. -... ~--.--.-.. ----.. The first part of the Table 12 shows that 70.B3 par cent of the
trade union leaders who admit that industrial relations climate is peaceful also state that
Works Committees exist in their units. On the other hand, 80 per cent of their counterpart
who report that industriel relations are not peaceful state that no Works Committee exist in
their units. A natural conclusion from these statements is that wherever Works Committees
exist. the industrial relations environment is peaceful. 0.40 and it is significant). (PhiQ EO
The second part of the Table 12 relating to management shows that 50 per cent of the units
have Works Co~mittee. Among them BB.BB per cent report that the industrial relations
climate is peaceful. In the growp where Works Committee are absent, only 55.55 per cent
units are with peacefwl industrial relations. Of the units having peaceful industrial relations,
61.54 per cent report of Works Committee functioning. The corresponding figures for
unhealthy industrial climate is only 25 per cent of units. These views clearly suggest that the
industrial relations climate is influenced by the existence and working of Works Committees.
(The PhiQis 0.31 close to significant correlation). The data PEesented in the table, taken
on_the whole. is a clear indication of the positive influence of Works Committees on the
industrial relations climate which finally decides the chances for successful collective
bargaining • • 23G The respondents' views on the functioning of Works Committees are
presented in Table 12. From the above table, a definite conclusion can be arrived at that
wherever Works Committees function, all the trade union ~eaders are satisfied with the
functioning. irrespective of the industrial relations climate. There can be two explanations for
the workers' satisfaction. {i} The C~mmittees must be really functioning well, bringing
substantial number of issues to successful settlement and thus a general feeling might have
gained ground of their usefulness. (ii) More and more issues are taken up at the Works
Committee level, freeing the trade union leaders of petty issues on the shop-floor. From the
management response, it is evident that 50 per cent of the units having Works Committees
functioning satisfactorily enjoy peaceful industrial relations. The . remaining 50 per cent
where it is functioning not so satisfactorily, also have good industrial relations climate. In the
absence of any other data two possible conclusions can be made: 1) Industrial relations
climate depends to an extent on the existence of Works Committee. i;x.-rBspective of their
functioning; 2) 50 per cent of not satisfactory performance 237 of the Works Committees
have not affected industrial relations climate adversely. Here, what remains to be explained is
that how cent per cent trade union le.ders are satisfied with the performance of Works
Committees while only 50 per cent of the managements are happy with the result. The
difference in perception originated from expectations could . be one reason. The second may
 107

be that, as Works Committes get their jurisdiction' enlarged and succeeded in getting the
workers problems removed more than antici~ pated by them, The third possible one could be
that it created a sense of satisfaction in participative decison making. b) -G-r-ie-v-a.-n-c-e- -
C-o-m--m-i-tt-e-e. Absence of a definite grievances procedure and machinery often· leads to
minor grievances developing into disputes. In industrially developed countries, grievance
procedure and machinery forms a part of the collective bargaining agreement contents. The
Shop Steward system practised there virtually frees the trade union officials from
unnecessary involvement in the grievance settlement process. In India, those
industrialestablishments with foreign managerial practices generally have a well-defined
stepladder grievance procedure and machinery. Grievance Committees is one of the stages,
the third one, wherein workers get an equal representation with the management to consider
the unresolved grievances at lower levels, the shop-floor and departments.· The unanimous
decisions of the Grievance Committee are binding on the parties, The grievance committee
recommended under the code of discipline is also a step-ladder one with time I bound stages.
The NCl records that in several establishments arrangements for formal processing of
workers grievances exist, but they do not conform to the model prescribed under the coda.
Tha NCl recommended statutory backing for the formal grievance machinery as it felt that .
qu~ck and satisfactory redressal of grievances has a positive impact on the general climate of
industrial relations. Table 13 presents the views of trade union leaders on the functioning of
Grievance Machinery and the impact it has on the industrial relations climate of the units
with which they are co"nected. Industrial Relations Climate TABLE 13 WORKERS' VIEW
ON THE FUNCTIONING OF GRIEVANCE MACHINERY Grievance machinery
functioning Somewhat Satisfactory satisfa~ dory Not satisfactory Total _ _ • • • • • • _ ~ _ _ _
_ • • ~ _ _ • ~ • ~ • ~ _ _ - ~ ~ • - w - • • _ _ _ M _ • Peaceful (37.50) (50,00) (12.50) (1 00 )
27 36 9 72 ( 100) (92.31 ) (42.86) (82.76) Not peaceful ( 0 ) (20.00) (80.00) (100 ) 0 3 12 15 (
0) ( 7.69) (57.14) (11.24) Total ( 31. 03 ) (44.83) (24.14) (100 ) 27 39 21 87 ( 1 00) ( 100) ( 1
00) (100 ) _. ________ . __ .~ ___ .. _ . __ ~_M. __ ~._¥_ ..... ._-._ .• _~ __ -.
_______________ ....•. ___ .. _ 240 Here 87.50 per cent of the workers, who state that the
industrial relations climate has been peaceful consider that the grievance machinery has been
working satisfactorily. Only 20 per cent of the workers who report that the industrial relation
climate has not been peaceful think that the grievance machinery has been working fairly
satisfactorily. Wherever grievance machinary has not been working, the industrial relations
climate has not been very happy. This indicates that the industrial relations climate depends to
an extent on the working of the grievance machinery. • All the units studied have well
 108

'defined step ladder grievance machinery which indicates that the management and labour are
earnest about resolving grievances in a systematic manner. The machinery itself was set up as
a result of collective bargaining, and its functioning, in turn, helps to create a climate for
collective bargaining. Machinery for Administration of Services ------
_________________________________ ft A number of personnel services are available to
workers in industrial settings. Some are statutory services, while others are not. As a result of
collective bargaining, the number of non-statutory personnel services is are on the increase.
The association of employees in the administration of such services is being experimented
with~ Beside8giving - • a sense of participation to workers, this also helps the workers to
appreciate the practical difficulties often confronted by the managements in mObilising
popular support for several issues. The workers thus tend to become more tolerant towards
managements' lapses that occasionally occ ur. Such participation also provides greater
opportunity for interpersonal interection between workers and their superiors away from the
work setting. All these positive factors have a definite bearing not only an the personality
development of workers, (which indirectly contributes for better industrial relations) but in
creating a climate of tolerance and interdependence. The units under study have committees
in the following areas: • Production - Safety Canteen .. WeI fare - Suggestion and Sports. e)
Production Committee. Production committees have -----.-------------- been in vogue in the
area for nearly 20 years now; but they are confined to a few units in the private sector only.
The Government of India directive to set up emergency prodlJction committ.ee in 1962 in the
wake of "Chinese aggression gave a boost to the formation of production commi tt ee s.
However, only 46.15 per cent of the units covered under the study have production
committee. Table 14 depicts the views of trade union respondents on the existence and
functioning of Production Committees. TABLE 14 PRODUCTION COMMITTEE
FUNCTIONING - WORKERS' VIEWS -----------------------------------------------------------
Product ion Indu _ Committee trl.alf re.Lail.. ons ------ Peaceful Not peaceful Total Do not
exist If exist, ------------------~~~- Satisfactory Not satisfactory - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (37.50)
(54.2H 27 (69.23) 39 ( 1 00) (80.00) (0) 12 0 (30.77) (0) (44.83) (44.83) 39 39 ( 1 00 ) ( 1
00 ) (8.33 ) 6 (66,66) (20.00) 3 (33.33 ) (10.34) 9 ( 1 00 ) Total - - - - - ( 100) 72 (62.76) ( 1
00) 15 (17.24) (100) 87' (100) ----------------------------------------------------------- In units
where industrial relations are peacefui, 62.50 per cent of trade union respondents report that
they have Production Committes in their units. In the units where production committees
exist, 86.67 per cent of the Committees are working to the satisfaction of the workers. On the
other hand, where industrial relations climate is not peaceful, 80 per cent of the respondents
 109

state that there are no Production Committees in their units. The remaining 20 per cent who
say that they have Production Committees also say that' the Committees are not working
satisfactorily. The possible indication here is that industrial relations climate is positively
influenced by Production Committees, which is supported by value of Phi Q at - 0.32. In
some industries, due to taB very nature of the manufacturing process and the materials
handled, accidents are quite frequent. Different industries have dissimilar accident records.
Likewise, the severity rate of accidents also differs from industry to industry and unit to unit.
With all the safety precautions taken by the machine manufacturers and managew ments,
accidents do occur, in many caseS due to faulty operations, negligence of operators, etc.
Safety is therefore given its due place in all units. The Government has prescribed the
minimum standards for safety. The National Safety Council gives yearly awards for those
units with best safety records. Managements give 'safety training' to operators. In addition to
organising safety programmes, celebration of 'safety weeks' under the auspices o~ Safety
Committees is quite COmmon with industries which aim at redUCing their accident rates and
keeping their otherwise good record unblemished. In all these efforts, workers paxticipate
through Safety Committees. Table 15 gives the views of the trade union leaders on the
functioning of Safety Committees. TABLE 15 SAfETY COMMITTEE FUNCTIONING -
WORKERS' VIEW ---------------------------------------------------------- Safety D t C 'tt 0 no
omm~ ees . t Industrl'. al exlS Relations Satisfactory Not satisfactory Total
-----------------------_ ... ---- (50.00) (50.00 ) (0) (100 ) Peaceful 36 36 0 72 (70.59) ( 100) (0)
(82.76) ( 1 00 ) ( 0 ) (0) ( 1 00) Not peaceful 1 5 0 0 15 (29.41 ) ( 0 ) ( 0 ) ( 1 7. 24 ) (58.62)
(41.88 ) ( 0 ) (100 ) Total 51 36 0 87 . ( 1 00 ) ( 1 00 ) (0) ( 1 00 )
---------------------------------------------------------- Only 30.77 per cent of the units studied have
Safety Committees. Where Safety Committees are absent, 70.59 per cent of the workers
report that industrial relations climate is peaceful. However, where they exist and function,
100 per cent of the respondents state that the labour-management relationship is ~.t peaceful.
It·is also worth noting that where the labour-management relations are not peaceful, Safety
Committees are absent. This establishes the correlation between Safety Committees and
industrial relations climate which is further supported by Phi coefficient at 0.38. c) Canteen
Committees. Providing canteen facility to ------------------ employees has become an
industrial practice. It adds to the efficiency of the workers. When the efficiency curve starts
decending, a cup of stimulating tea or coffee is certainly is good boosting productivity. A
Canteen at the work place saves the workers their time ·otherwise wasted in going out for
food. Clean and nutritious food prepared under hygienic conditions and served in a pleasant
 110

environment at subsidised rates is again meant for the welfare of the workers and indirectly
for the benefit of the industry. .. • The Factories Act, 1947 and other similar establishment
legislation impose a liability on employers to provide canteen facilities if they employ 250 or
more employees. Participation of employees in the running of the canteen is also prescribed.
All the units under study have canteens run either by the employers or by co-operative
societies formed. by employees. In either • case, workers representatives are participating in
their administration except in one unit. Table 16 summarieses the views of workers on the
functioning of Canteen Committees in their units. TABLE.16 CANTEEN COMMITTEE
fUNCTIONING - WORKERS' vIEW ------------------------------------------------------ Canteen
Do not If exist CommitteB -------------------- exist 5atis- Not setis Total Functions Industrial
factory factory Rele t ions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (4.17) (62.50) (33.33) ( 1
00 ) Peaceful 3 45 24 72 (25.00) (93.75) (88.89 ) (82.76) (60.00) (20.00) (20.00 ) ( 1 00 ) Not
peaceful 9 3 3 , 1 5 (75.00 ) 6.25) (11.11) (17.24) (13.79) (55.17) (31.03) ( 1 00) Total 12 48
27 87 (100) ( 1 00 ) ( 1 00 ) (100 ) ------------------------------------------------------ It may be
noted that where industrial relations climate ~s peaceful, in 95.83 per cent cases Canteen
Committees exist, and where the climate is not peaceful, in 40.00 per cent cases canteen
committees do not exist. And where such committees are not set up, only in 26.00 per cent
cases industrial peace is seem to prevail. This clearly indicates that Canteen CommitteefO
also has a bearing on industrial peace. This is supported by the value of Phi Q at 0.61. t,~ • dl
Welfare Committees. Progressive employers in this ------------------ country started providing
a few basic amenities at the work place as a welfare measure. . the facilities this provided.
Later they agumented have Some of them/even appointed full-time personnel to organise and
provide welfare measures to employees. The different establishment legislation made specific
provisions compelling employers to provide minimum welfare amenities to their employees.
Now a stage has come when such benefits are extended to all employees by way of personnel
services. Housing colonies, transport facilities, holiday homes, co-operative societies, mutual
aid funds, scholarships for the children of employees and a host of other items are included in
Personnel Service Programmes. All the units under study have well-organised welfare depart-
• ments with elaborate programmes. In 46.15 per cent cases however welfare committees do
not exist. Table 17 gives the trade union views about the functioning of Welfare Committees.
• TABLE 17 WELFARE COMMITTEE FUNCTIONING - WORKERS' VIEW
--------------------------------------------------------- Welfare Do not If exist committees - - - ... - -
- - - - - - exist Total Satisfs- Nof satis-" Industrial ctory factory .R.e lations - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (33.33) (41.61) (25.00) ( 100) Peaceful 24 30 18 72 (61.54) (100)
 111

( 100 ) (82.76) (100 ) (0) ( 0) (100 ) Not peaceful 15 0 0 15 (38.46 ) ( 0 ) ( 0) ( 17 .24 )

(44.83) (34.46) (20.69) ( 1 00 ) Total 39 30 1 a 87 ( 1 00) ( 1 00 ) ( 100 ) ( 1 00 ) --------------
~--------------------------------------- --- In 53.85 per cent of units there exist Welfare
Committees. According to the man<:lgement, 100 per cent of them functi on satisfactorily.
The value of Phi coefficient is 0.03 which means that it is not related to industrial relations
climate, althdugh 77.78 per cent of them are in units with better lsbour management
relationships. The workers, however, look at it differently. It can be understood from the table
that in units where Welfare Committees operate, the labour-management relations 2~9 • are
peaceful irrespective of their achievement. And in units where they are nan-existent, only in
61.54 per cent of cases have healthy labour-management relationship. Further, where labour-
management relations are peaceful, in 66.76 per cent cases Welfare Committees fUnction.
And where Welfare Committees are non-existent, no units enjoy peaceful climate. It ~an
therefore be confidently concluded that the existence of Welfare Committees has a sign
ificant influence on the quality of industrial relati.o ns climate, which, in turn, enhances the
possibility of collective bargaining. The value of Phi coefficient here is 0.51. e) -S-u-g-g-e-s-
t-io--n-s- -C-o-m--m-i-tt-e-e. The people who operate the machines have a better
appreciation, how the job methods can be improved for optimum efficiency, for reduction of
wastage in time and raw materials and for avoidance of accidents. Suggestion, schemes
introduced by employers have paid good dividends to the industries. Besides, the wor~ers
feel a sense of participation in a vital area they are interested in. Offering cash and merit
incentives are methods to enthuse workers to participate in the programme whole-heartedly.
The committee in this area scrutinise the suggestions made by the employees, recommend
cash awards for such suggestions that improve efficiency, reduce waste and minimise
accidents, and effect all-round 250 • improvement ~n t"h e operation of the units. Only in 50
per cent of the units under study have suggestion schemes. According to the managements, all
such schemes are functioning to their satisfaction. But according to the,trade union leaders in
62.07 per cent, the suggestion schemes are not functioning to their satisfaction. This
difference in views may be due to their divergent perception. ~·.The Phi coefficient value is
very low indicating that it has li.t tle or no significance to the overall labour-management
relationship. f) _S_p_o_r_t_s __C_o_m_ wm _i_tt_e _e . Some units take an active interest
~n sports and games of their employees. At least one unit has established a rolling cup in
foot-ball. All India teams perticipate in the tournament. Only 38.46 per cent of the units have
Sports Committees with management participation in both their administration and finance.
The managements in all cases and the trade union leaders in 50 per cent of cases are happy
 112

aver the functioning of the Sports Committees in their units: The data i~dicate there is no
significant relationship with the functioning of such committees and the industrial relations
climate. 9 ) -O-t-h-e-r- -C-o-m--m-i-t-te-e-s. Besides the above Committees, there are a few
others. Some of them are of a ed hoc nature while others are permanent ones. The nature and
purpose of such committees vary from unit to unit. Their influence is, however insignificant.
The managements of ", the units under study are very hesitant to introduce • Joint
Management Councils in spite of their appreciation of the scheme at an intellectual level.
Only 17.24 per cent of the units have Joint Management Councils. Managements are getting
set for the scheme to be introduced at a later stage. The younger management personnel are
being prepared for its eventual introduction •. M~nagements hope that the trade unions will
not in the meanwhile insist for its introduction till they are fully prepared. This appears to be
a sound policy.

CHAPTER 7

HE PROCE~S OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 252 7.1 -I-n-tr-o-d--u-c-t-io--n

Today, a fundamental feature of any industrial relations system is the extent of the growth ~.
and nature of collective-organisations of employees and workers. Employers are organised in
strong federations with specialised wings to protect and promote their own interests in regard
to labour. The main form of workers' organisations is trade unions • Their leaders repre- • sent
workers in negotiation~ with employers and in political, and legislative activities. ~ o
Because of grwoth of collective organisations of employers as well as workers, state-wide
collective ~r . Lbargaining is possible and this~is 50 in Kerala in quite ~ a few industries.
Industries like~lantations, co~r including mat-making, cashew processing. e~c. are in the list.
In other industries the absence of trade unionism on industry b~sis. restricts the scope for
specific industry-wise bargaining. Colle~tive bargaining'in • Kerala, in general, is therefore
 113

~nit based. Even • industrial houses with mUltiple u~its but located far apart prefer unit based
bargainin9' The industrial units covered under this study; h~wever. fall under the general
collective bargaining plttern. , 7.2 Organization of this Chapter ---------------------------~ The
term "Collective Bargaining" refer to the following three separate forms ot labour-manage_
ment actiVity. 1. Negotiation . and ag•r eement over the '. terms and conditions of ~~rvice. •
2. Administration or implementation • of agreements • Consultation on matters of mutual
interest. These processes ~n practice are not always • easily separable in practice. This
chapter deal.s. ,wit h the special ch~racteristics of collective bargS:inin9 in the cochin-
Alwaye ihdustrial belt an~ tha p~ocess of bargaining. It must be reiterated here that the col...
lective bargaining process does ~ot terminate with . . . s~gn~ng of a negotiated agreements
but runs through the whole validity perliod of that: agreement. This validity period is
gove.rned by the provisions contained ~ . 4 • . ... in the agreement and the State ~~gulations
governing • suth matters. , It i.s therefore ~ continuous process, starting with the
termination~of an earlier agreement, ... settlement, or award, and ending with the expiry of ~
the current agreement. In between, periodic consult- ., atian is made, as na ~a~t~ is qenerall~
free to take .~ unilateral action an any issue covered under the agree- ;.". ..' ment and even on
those of mutual c~ncern. c 7.3 Characteristics of Collective Eargaining In the
orga~ised'sector of the industry in Kerals, labour-management negotiations which settle
the .. .; . ~erms ~nd conditions of work and service, are conditioned by. the framework of the
existing law, customs and insti- .' 7- J are _ ,tutional structure; further, the negotiations/by
economic • and political farces that operate on~the industrial relations scene at the time. Tne
forces in s8J1'eral· aspects, resemble the all-India pattern. Howe.v . er, there are • di fferenc
es. Thbse differences with the all-India ". pattern make them closer to the practices of more
developed countries. Collective bargaining in the geographical area covered under the present
study is distinguished by t~e following features: - Unit level industrial relations - M.tiltiple
union participati~n' - Comprehensive agreements • • - Long-term agreements - Union
ideology • - Government's role. 7.3.1 -U-n-it- -L-~-v-e-l- --In-d-u-s- t-r-i-a--l --R-e-la- -ti-o-
n-s-" As stated earlier industrial-re.l ations are generally tdecentralised at th-e unit level. This
circumstance resembles ~r is the same as the all-India 1~ .. pa ttern • One reason is that
usually the structure is on a unit basis. -In other words, unions are generally - • • with the
exception of two belonging to same company - -- organised on unit basis. The chief
advantage of the unit-based bargaining system is that the parties involved take account of
local work practices and market conditions. ~ .. In other parts of the country too this system
predominates over others. In the USA also, the same system is practised. • Under more
 114

centralised collective bargaining systems in vogue in Europe, major conditions such as wages
are determined in the first instance by broad national, industry-wise or broad regional
bargainings. Such wage or income-benefit plans are then often supplemented by local or unit-
wise negotiations to absorb local conditions. In the UK, industry-wise ba~gaining is the ~
practice. France follow region-wise bargaining. Sweden on the other hand practises
bargaining on a national basis. The size of a country, its stage in industrialisation, grwoth,
development and maturity of collective organisations, Governmentts income an~ wege
policies, level of technological development and its homogeneous acceptance or applic.ation
in industry, etc. have theirlvarying influence on the practice of collective bargaining. In India
many of these influencing variables are not applicable end do not contribute to a uniform
pattern of bargaining. The country is the second lerft gest in population in the world. It is still
an agricultural country. Collective organisations are yet to develop and function as in
industrialised countries. There is no definite income a~d wage policy followed as yet. The
worldts latest technologies and perhaps the most primitive ones co-exist in India. In the
circumstances, a set pattern of collective bargaining is just evolving. 7.3.2 -M-u--lt-i-p-le---
U--n-io-n- --P-a-r-t-ic--ip--a-ti-o-n- At the national scene, multiple union participation in
collective bargaining is rsis, although not totally absent. This type, however, is operating on a
large scala in Karala. Tha units under study all have multiple-union participation in collective
bargaining for Some time now. This is due to a variety of reasons explained in the earlier
chapters. The practice of collective bargaining presupposes the existence and recognition of
effective structural frame-work. In the American situation, exclusive recognition is accorded
to a union within the industrial relations system as per statutes. Such recognised unions are
treated as sole collective bargaining agents. The Indien situation is close to that of America.
Here recognition of unions is on a voluntary basis. While some employers recognise only one
union, others can and do recognise more than one or all the unions in the units or i~dustry as
the case may be. Even the Central Government is not different. While it would prefer to
recognise the majority union only in any unit or industry; it has on record the recognition of
more than one union simulta neously. Recognition of National Federation of Indian
Railwaymen and All India Railwayments Federation is a classic example to prove this.
Except in the State of Maharashtra, where ,statutory regulations exist under Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act of 1971,
employers on the whole exercise their preference of one union over others a~ per the Code of
Disci. pline, a body of principles to be applied in the determination of majority unions and
their recognition. Even so, employers enjoy near-unlimited freedom to confer recognition to
 115

anyone of the several competing unions. Deterioration of industrial relations climate due to
inter-union rivalry over recognition has been found to be the cause for prolonged industrial
strife in a substantial percentage of industrial disputes and consequent work-stoppages. This
situation itself limits the scope for free collective bargaining, if not making it impossible.
This may be one of the reasons; in fact a major one, for the slow progress of collective
~argaining in India. • In countries like Belgium, france, the Netherlands, etc. where workers
are historically divided on political or religious grounds, recognition is accorded to different
un10ns. Rival unions representing different groups of workers in the same units or occupation
do meet at the bargaining table together with employerst representatives for settlement of
issues. Communist, .. ;59 Socialist and Catholic-Unions co-exist in the same units in France.
Each union represents its members in the bargaining process. They, at times, make joint
fronts too. The position in the Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt is very close to the- French
system in forming barga in ing teams. Multiplicity and union rivalry on ideological grounds
are realities which must be faced. The managements have little or no cont~ol to change it.
'They, therefore, adapt themselves to the situation and pragmetically recognisa all the unions
and negotiate with every one of them. Majority unions or those union with majority
membership of workers do not object to this practice. They are realistic enough to appreciate
that they are powerlass to represent all the workers. Thus, even a small minority union can
create a crisis in industry, which would be undesirable. Industrial peace can, therefore. be
established and preserved only with the participation of all the workers. This participation
became possibla when all unions operating .. in the units, irrespective of their membership
strength, were invited to participate in collective bargaining. Both employers and workers of
the region welcome multiple union participation in bargaining. The forms and nature of
participation, however, depend on two factors I ( 1 ) the quality of ~, nter relationship among
rival unions. and (2) the relative strength of rival unions. Negoti~tions 260 • • are held jointly
ox separately depending o~ these factors • . • Only in extreme cases are separate n~gotiations
held through • out, otherwiae even if rivalry is intense, the unions come .together at the last
stages of negotiations • Agreements or • settlements as the case may be are slgned jointly by
all the • parties. Multiple union participatton in collective barga- • ining is thus the prevalent
practice in the Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt. All the industria~ units covered under the study
follow this pattern. Cent per cent of both management and workers accept this pract~ce as the
only practical solution in the conditions that preveil. 7.3.3 -C-o-m-p-r-e-h-e-n-s-iv-e- --A-g-r-
e-e-m-e-n-t-s Collective bargaining 1" the European context is limited to documents which
cover only minimum areas such as wages, other benefits and standards ~f working
 116

conditions. , Sped fic issues in in'dividual plants are dealt with outside national, industrial or
regional agr~ements. The practice in the USA, on the other hand, is to have detailed
agreements that cover almost all areas of labou~ management relations. The Indian tradition
is not comparabl~ with· either of the two examples stated above. ~irst of all, collective
bargaining is not universal. Where. it is practised, only those issues which agitate the
worke~s are included in their charter of demands. It is not for a revision of the whole set of
rules regulating labour-meneg~ment relationship. "f • matters, provisionally or finally, settled
by part~es • • Some subjects left over remain undecided. Durino' the validity period of such
agreements} these can be rebrought •• up for further negotiations. This is a piece-meal
approach . and does not guarantee finality of 81\ ~ssues for any definite period. Legislative
invasion into all conceivable indus- ·trial relations areas, further restricts the scope for
comprehensive bargaining. Each new piece of labour legislation seals off the otherwise
almost unlimited freedom the • parties, at least in theory, enjoy. Absence of legislation ~s no
guarantee that there would be comprehensive bargaining. ential hindrance. In the absnence of
any legislation on • gratuity till 1972, several agreements contained provisions On the benefit,
The Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 has made such provisions redundant. Several other legi"
slation' such as Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act 1946, Employees' Provident
Funds Act, 1952, Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, etc, have the same effect. In the
Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt, cent per cent of the units studied rigorously practi::;o
bargaining in all: collective issues. This results generally in comprehensiva agreements.
Those Subject matters regulated by statutes are excluded from bargaininQ as well as
aqreements. Similarly, those industrial practices which have become strong traditions over a
period of time are not i.n corpo- . . ~ . rated in agreements. Annual bonus is an exception ~n
more than 50 per cent of units. Here negotiations are '" .,. held yearly. In the remaining about
50 per cent of units, • separate negotiations are held for bonus, and agreements ~,~ • •
reached generally have a validity of a few years. Yearly negotiations are therefore avoided.
All the respondents in this study, both employers and workers, have expressed their
preference for comprehensive covereage of agreements. 7.3.4 l-o-n-g---t-e-r-m- --A-g-r-e-e-
m-e-n-t-s Long-term collective bargaining agreements indicate two results (i) there are less
wide fluctuations in market conditions, and (ii) technological innovations are slow. It is
mainly due to these re~sons that collective bargaining practices in developed countries are on
an yearly basis or are otherwise on a short-term basis. ,An a greement for a period up to two
years is considered.as a shortterm one. The practice in the USA is an ideal example of short-
term agreements. There, no sooner is an agreement signed, than the parties prepare
 117

themselves for a fresh agreement in the succeeding year. Such industries catering
international markets and which those weLcome rapid technological innovations, have both
the potentialities and the n'eed for frequent modification of labour-management reguf latory
rules. In less developed' countries, however, these essentials for labour progre$S are almost
absent. Thus in Indian industriss, long-term agreements have been the practice, when
collective bargaining got accepted. In Kerala, collective bargaining agreements came into
vogue in Plantations - tea, rubber, coffee, cardamom etc., cashew, and coir including mat
manufacturing industries. These are the ones which employ the largest amount of industrial
labour. While it is true that the products of these industries find international markets (except
rubber). the technology used remains hardly unchanged over the decades so that there is
virtually no modification in the manufacturing process or work methods. In these industries,
collective barga~ n~ng agreements have been and still continue therefore on a long term
basis. The life time of wage board recommentations on plantation industry or for that matter
in any industry has been for a period of five years. Since the geographical area under study is
predominated by chemical industries in which there had been a wage board, long-term
agreements is the accepted practice there. It is the influence of the wage boards and practice
in traditional industries in Kerala that has had their impact on otner industries and units as
well to have long term agreements. All managements respondents have been in favour of long
term agreements for B period of up to five years. Tne workers, on the other hand, prefer
shortterm agreements. But in practice, except in the case of bonus issues in about SO per ce~t
units agreements - are for a period of three years. This is at the lower limit of long-term
agreements. J 7.3.5 Union Ideologies ---------------- The Indian trade union movement is
divided mainly on political ideologies. Active trade union participation in the freedom
struggle with outside leadership is the principal cause for deep politicalisation of trade
unions. Formation of INTUC, in 1947, with the support of Indian National Confress. HMS in
1948 supported by Socialists, UTUC in 1949 organised by Revolutionary Socialist Party.
leaving their parent body AITUC to be controlled by Communist Party of India amply
demonstrates politicalisation of unions. further, division of AITUC into AITUC and CrTU
when there occurred a split in the Communist Party of India in 1967 into CPI (R) ~nd
CPl(M} was also due to ideological differences. Formation of HMP by one faction of
Socialists in 1960 and EMS by Bharathiya Jan Sangh have also been influenced by political
considerations. With the split of Indian National Congress in 1969, the INTUC lost its
strongest trade union namely the Textile Labour Association. It along with few others in
Ahmedbad formed NTUC. Besides these, there ere innumerable others operating at regional
 118

and local levels with regional political parties or even independently. This splitting of trade
unions is conditioned and inspired by political considerations. ) The Kerala situation, on the
whole, is not different from that of all India, Any major trade union event at national level has
had its effects echoed in Kerala as well. These impacts are confined to unions with political
commitments. The main difference is that Kerala union involvement in politics is deepr,and
consequently, members' commitment to political parties is of a higher order than elsewhere.
While eslewhere. workers are influenced and led by political party leadership, in Kerala the
trade union members of unions with political party affiliation are active party members tao.
This is true of one third of total unions. Around two thirds remain outside any control of
national trade union centres and political parties. But their membership strength is less than
50 per cent. This could be explained as due to • their belief that they should not fall prey to
political parties, In other wards, it is due to their political consciousness. Trade unions' deep
ideological faith make their active members mare committed to their unions and pol~tical
parties ret her than those industrial organisations to which they belong. Hero again,
commitment is of 8 higher order among those who belong to unions with leftist idealogies.
Trade unions' ideological conflicts had made inter-union rivalry very intense in the Fifties and
the Sixties. The latter part Df the Sixties found 8 definite trend of lesser intensity of rivalry.
Colle~ ctive bargaining with multi-union participation became possible as intensity of rivalry
lessened. This decrease is probably due to the fact that ideological differences have nerrowed
down or that,political parties leading trade unions have had short-term ceese-fires at the
political level. 7.3.6 Government1s role .~~~------------- The Government of India's policy in
respect of collective bargaining has been one of ambivalence. While they extalled the virtues
of collective bargaining, they did precious little to make it part of the industrial relations
system. Pure and simple collective bargaining agreements are not accorded legal sanctity.
Compulsory adjudication, legislative invasion to all major areas of labour-management
relations, reluctance to legislate on the most crucial area of union recognition, etc. are glaring
examples to prove how the Government have not been true to their public-policy
announcements. On the other hand, the State Government of Maharashtra has been more
sincere ink heir policy declarations. This is the only State in which recognition of trade
unions has been made compulsory. 267 In Kerala, the former Travancore State had elsa made
a welcome departure when it constituted tneir first Industrial Committee for Coir I~dus~ry in
1940. ~'. Trade unions belonging to conflicting ideological faiths were brought together for
dialogue with employers. Since then, that tradition has been kept up as already mentioned
earlier. The Coalition Government in Kerala - 1966-77 - encouraged the idea. It was ezasy for
 119

them to influence all trade unions, except crTU and independents' because all with these
exceptions had political patronage f.rom one political party or another in the Coalition
Government. The small industrial base facilitated the political parties and the Government to
pay individual ettention as and when problems arOse. 7.4 NatUre of Negotiation The process
of negotiating a new agreement var~es considerably from one establishment to another. Thus
industrial establishments CBn be classified-Bs: i} Old establishments with a collective • •
bargaining .,,t radition; ii) Large establishments without collective bargaining tradition; and
iii) Smaller establishments. 7.4.1 -O_l d Establishments .... -._ ..... ------------... Old
establishments, with a tradition in colJ. ect.lve oergi:t1nlng, rlOrIllQJ..LY TOJ..,LUW t:I eel..
jJCfL~~J..11 .... 11 course, stages, steps, actions and reactions. Over the'. years, new elemants
get introduced in the list of subjects bargained for and the course is alSO modified as
technology and production processes. change. • Acceptance of scientific management
principles also influence the process and course. The area under study is a new grwoth centre.
• Among the units studied 72 per cent have existed for more than 15 years. Technological
changes haVe been nominal. >:l The management personnel, however, are now professionally
qualified and are therefore quite willing to experiment with new ideas. In thesa units, as both
managements and unions are committad to collective bargaining methods, ~itial diffi~ulties
even unforeseen by them, seldom discourage the parties in departing from their standard
course; They, therefore, confidently try for solutions ev~n if on an experimental basis, to be
corrected/adjusted later in til the light of techniques and experience. However, in case the
negotiations completely fail, workers resort to (', strike as a pressure tactlcs. Direct action
U~nerally brings quicker results. Prolonged strikes weaken both parties. ,·hey are, thereYore,
generally avoided. Also • the high caprtal-intensrve nature of rndustrres comples
managements to minimrse work-stoppages rf they occur. c 7.4.2 New Large Estqbl~shments
------------------------ Those establishments wh~ch opt for collective' ~ , bargaining for the
f1rst time sim~~Y follow others t foot seeps. . . Ihey make m1nor adjustments made by the~r
compe- • ititors in the same local area or elsewhere. ihis is more true of pUblic sector
undertakings. Here, management teams, on the whole, may be inexper1enced 1n the process.
Ihey, therefore, understandably go very cautiously • and very seldom beyond what their
cpmpetitors do. Ihere are only tour establishments 1n the pUblic sector rightly fitting the
large establishments caeegory. It is true that an establ1shment may oe a new one. But the
management need not at all be inexpert and inexperienced. Ihis is more so, if the un1t oelongs
to a multi-unit organlsation or belongs to a well estaolished " . 1ndustrial house. Among the
four puo1ic sector establishments that fall in the present study, ~wo belong to multiunit
 120

organ1sations with several years of successful performance record. Ihese two, theretore, do
not sutfer Ilm1tations due to their recent origin in Kerala. '1 , Among the remaining two, one
enjoyed ~he management expertise of their principal during its inltlal operation. In this unit
too, healthy traditions have been established. As trad~ union leadersh1p consists of outslders
also, 1t benef1ts from ehe long years exper1ence of such • • 270 .~ leaders trom the J.nJ.ti!3+
.stage itself. However, in thuse units where superior technology, notcompatiole with local
Lrade un~on conditions is app~ea, the trade unions are at a disadvantage initially •. However,
in co~r~e of time, the leaders make up their knowledge in such ,areas. 7.4.3 -S-m-a-l-l-e-r- -
E-s-t-a-b-l-is-h-m--e-n-t-s Larger units enjoy financial capacity to engage highly competent
professionals in their management team. Size, financial positio~. and the scale of operations
of smaller establishments do not permit them to follow the larger ones in such
professionalism. They, therefore. always search for guidance and already esta~ blished
principles. of larger firms. •• • . These they get f.r. om the practices Trade union leaders in the
reg~on appreciate the economics of operations of smaller firms and ta'4e up %1i!!150PJal.!
Jle positions which are reasonable. The maqagement personnel, generally of the "first
generation" and with no experience in collective bargaining as such, are quite compatible
with trade union leaders. This is more so in the private sector. Facilities for management
education on a"part.time basis have helped to develop professionally qualified management
personnel in the smaller establishments. 7.5 Stages in Collective Bargaining Collective
bargaining is a process of joint effort. ie. employers and employees participate. There 271 are,
therefore. at least two parties. As per the broad definition stated in Chapter 4, Government, as
a third party permitted under statute, is also included. Since mUltiple union participation is
a.reality, the number of constituents representing employees are at times too many. In some
cases, i.e., vertically, they are not necessarily rivals. In others - horizontally - they are
invariably rivals. By 'stages' we mean different, definite wholesome, logical and
chronological sequence of joint section process, which each of the constituents expect from
themselves ~nd accept from others as possible and necessary operations or reactions in any
successful collective barga- - ining process. Various actions by each constituent party in the
preparation for and conduct of collective bargaining are distinguished as steps in collective
bargaining. ~~ Steps are, in other words, parts of stages. One step by management may be
influenced by one or more steps taken by trade unions. Thes~ steps, minor moves in the total
process, are therefore, not included under 'stages', but treated separately. 7.5.1 _M_u_t_u_a_l
__R we _c_o_g_n_i_ti_o_n_ _o_f_ _O__r_g_a_n_i_s_a_ti_o_n_s _ An ideal method of
recognising collective bardo gaining agents'is taVso spontaneously without outside
 121

intervention. Intervention by the State through operation of ~- 272 statutes o..r by employers'
and workers' organizations operating at the national level is the next best method after
absolute freedom to the parties but with no stable • co.llec.tiv e-ba rga in ing tradition. ~ . The
classic i-n-sta,n ce of spontaneous mutual recognition is in the UK. .... r Both employers and'
trade unions have saved themselves from legal restrictions which would otherwise become
necessary. This is purely ~ voluntary system, the operation of which depends essentially on
the mutual good-will of parties. The obligati~ns .'.a ccepted under the sys tem are regarde d
as more of a moral. r,a ther than of a strictly legal character. In this country,. legislative
actions have contributed minimally to ,give • • immunity to trade unions from criminal
~roceedings~nd civil liabilities in case of industrial disputes and to fixing of minimum rates
of wages in unorganised industries. In the USA, mutual recognition is by oper- • ation of
statute. It is compulsory, and failure to recognise and bargain in good faith are unfair labour
practices punishable under law. In European countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Norway,
etc. mutual recognition is made and agreements concluded between national organisations of
employers and workers, In these two instruments of recognition and agreements, the two
parties undertake to respect_ freedom of Bssociation and to conduct their mutual relations -
ethrough a system of collective bargiining, Recourses to , .273 conciliation and arbitration are
also attempted within ••• • national regulatory laws. The Indian'system is based on the pattern
prevailing in UK. The ~olic~ makers have been influ- :.r enced by the superiority ·of ~he
mutual r.e cognition system ~ in continuing it. They hoped that goodwill and mutual respect
would evolve and develop. Except in isolated indus- • • trial centres, such hopes have been
belied. Multipli- • city of unions has acted as a strong deterrent in the anticipated
evolutionary process. In Kerela inter-union rivalry ha~ been a ~erennial problem in
recognising bargail)ing agents. '. Employers are now fully convinced that union rivalry is
likelv"to • • continue for many years to come. Recognising anv_one union from _among
many contending ones has only agg.ia vated ' the indUstrial relations scene. 01) the contrary·,
,.some have found Industrial Relations Com~ittees; with rival unions particip ating in
them"tfunctioning for about 30 years with a meesure of success. They have, in effect
experimented with the idea of recogl)ising all trade unions operating in industrial
establishmel)ts. The national ~rade , union centres controlling one third of total unions also
found the idea beneficial to effectively operate in all units in which they had affiliates. The
net r~sult has been that multi-union recognition al)d their participation in collective
bargain~ng have found acceptance to all concerned. The State Government of t~e reievant
period itself being a Coalition Government .f..o und it sound and necessary to influence their
 122

trade union wings to collaborate with each other inith~ir common cause. However, ~ ......
whenever rivalry due to sny reasons surfaced, which threate ned joint collaboration in
collective bargaining, Govern~ ment leaders belonging to that political party with which such
unions had relations make themselves available • (88.89 per cent cases) to remove the
difficulties •• Among all the trade unions, 68.89 per cent formed united fronts .. with rivals
too frequently. The remaining did so on~y rarely. Only 33.33 _per cent of unions did ever
submit their membership record for verification and this ~oeaks of their indifference to get
recognition as per their real strength. All these facts point out the fact t~at every union has
made its presence f.lt and the manageme~ts, have ~- recognised them for all practical
purposes. Recognition of collective bargaining ageo:l;-s has, therefore. not been a problem at
all. 7.5.2 -T-e-r-m-i-n-a-t-io-n- -o--f -E--x-i-s-ti-n-g- --A-g-r-e-e-m-e-n-t-s --an-d-- -S-e-t-tl-e-
m--e-n-t-s • Once unions are ~ecognised, the next stage is the exercise of their status. Except
in the case of indi_ vidual or even group service termination cases, all other issues are settled
either by bipartite negotiations or by tripartite settlements. The mean average life of
agreements is three year~. Without exception, trade unions terminate such agreements and
settlements immediately on their expiry. Much ahead of such terminations, union prepare
themselves for net agreement~ • • 7.5.3 Submission of Charter of Demands
-------------------------------- I As soon as existing agreements or settlements are terminated,
unions submit a new charter of demands to managements. In the study it was revealed that in
33.33 per cent cases, notice of termination of agreements or settlements and charter of
demands are given simultaneously in the same communication. Submission of the charter of
demands is an important stage. The demands so submitted become the basis for negotiation.
Before dOing so, 61.11 per cent of trade unions in the units studied generally demand from
employers data regarding industrial organisations. Their requests are not totally turned down
by managements. The managements who give all data demanded at all timeS constitute 27.78
per cent; those who always g4ve some data from 38.89 per cent; and those who furnish some
data sometimes come to 33.33 per cent. This is a clear indication of the mutual respect and
healthy relationships that prevail in the units. In making demands, 83.33 par cent of the
unions ask fur spacific increase Or rise ~n wage and other monetary incoma. The remaining
16.67 per cent demand for a percentage , .. Z/U increase. Construction of wage' structure in
detail is a clear indication of the likely homework the unions have done with, the employer
supplied data before making demands. According to management respondents, it was found
that only 5.56 per cent of union demands are always identical, 38.89 per cent sometimes
identical, 27.78 per cent never identical, 11.11 ,per cent always of the same degree; 5.56 per
 123

cent sometimes of the same degree. and 11.11 per cent never of the same degre-e. Similarly
27.78 per cent managements are of the view that trade unions' demands are always realistic;
61.11 per cent, at times realistic and 11.11 per cent, never reali~tic. 7.5.4 Only 5.56 per cent
of managements follow the conventional practice in collective bargaini~g. They straightaway
acknowledge receipt of the charter of demands. Another 16.67 per cent always make counter
demands. The remaining 77.78 per cent make counter demands sometimes. Among those
who make and those who do not make counter ,demands, 61.11 per cent managements invite
the trade unions for consultations. They inidiate action without delay. In the remaining 38.89
per cent cases, mere acknowledgements or counter demands serve as tha immediate reaction.
An inference can be made from this data. In 61.11 per cent of cases, the managements seem
to be prepared, but they do not so indicate that in their initial reaction. 7.5.5 C--l-a-r-i-fi-c-a-t-
i-o-n- -o--f -C--l-a-u-s-e-s The charter of demands generally contains several items. The mean
average is 19. The charter of demands is not really for a complete revision of all provisions in
previous agreements or settlements. Trade unions pick up only those subjects on which they
consider revision is necessary or possible. Demands made by unions are not always very
clear to managements. But wi tho ut cl'arity, pa rties cannot comprehend their impact or
liab~lity. In such case, manage~ ments do demand clarifications from the unions. Such
requests invariably get prompt attention. 7.5.6 Starting with crude forms of assessment of job
l:I contents, requirements and workload, scientific approaches are increaSingly evolving.
Where workload, wage differentials, etc. are determined on the basis of studies, the
participants' opinions about them are first settled. May be, en earlier study result has not been
found from experience to be accurate. In case a study has been conducted by an outside third
party, the results have to be approved by the negotiating parties. This means, before actual
negotiation starts, preliminary discussion and clarifications are made. This clearance need not
always be done through person~l discussion. Minor things get settled through 278
correspondence. In any case, clear understanding of the basis of negotiations ~s made even
before preliminary meetings are fixed. 7.5.7 -P-r-e-li-m--in--a-ry-- -M--e-et-i-n-g-s
Preliminary meetings ~re held in a variety of forms~ It differs from unit to unit and
individual to indion vidual and depends more/personal styles of individuals entrusted with
that responsibility • ... First, unit managemen..t s ;invite trade unions Whe~e demands are
made iointl~ by several trade unions, all such trade union representatives are invited. Here
again two types of approaches can be identified. In the first type, the chief executive may be
physically present~and welcome the parties. It is more of (I an informal type of meeting.
Such managements seldom touch any specific matters in the demands from either side;
 124

unions are advised to meet industrial relations departments. In the second type, letters of
invitation go from industrial relations departments. It is generally the chief of the industrial
relations departments who meet trade unions. No commitments are made from either aide
initially. Generally. the place of meetings is in the esta- • blishments themselves, the "dey is 8
working day and trade d>. union officials are treated well and with respect. Outside , leaders
are seldom present in~such preliminary meetings • • Only 25 per cent of establishments
follow this formal pre- I liminary meeting style. WheIe such formal meetings are held, 279
minutes. are recorded. It is admitted by employers and workers alike that behind such. formal
preliminary meetings, informal meetings between top managements and outside leadership
are also held. They are not deliberate or pre-panned ones or with any ulterior motives to
ignore formal meetings. However, such informal meetings are useful both from emplayers
and workers point of view. However there are alleg~ ations, though from a small minority of
trade unions unaffi~ liated to any national centres, .that managements do surrept~ eously
meet leaders in Government and arrive at a broad understanding as to the quantum of
additional benefits that should go to workers. They allege that the unitlevel bargaining
attempt is, therefore, a farce. The remaining 75 per cent of units do not ma~e their
preliminary contact with unions as formally. They invite union leaders indiVidually and
discuss issues raised by both sides. Though no official announcements are made, for all
practical purposes, negotiations are on. Here again, industrial relations departments play this
initial role. .. 7.5.8 Understanding Each Other's Stand ---~---------------------------- Unions are
the first to know that all their • demands are unlikely to be a•c cepted or to the same degree •
• Managements too know that. Some deman·ds"are. ·there forI'!. • • made not serious.
Managements, therefore, probe to understand which are the ones unions are serious about.
They also want to understand unions' likely reactions to their counter demands. Different
unions have different priorities. This process helps both managements and unions to
understand more or less the likely stand of each other. Managements do not commit on any
thing unless they know precisely what would be their immediate and long-term finy ancial
liability on Bach demand. Those managements who opt for formal negoti- • ations indicate
broadly the additional financial burden they are prepared to accept. The distribution of it
among several items identified as cardinal issues are to some extent left to unions. At this
point, negotiation for more . liberal benefits are made by unions. Management at times do
consider such union insistence, provid-ed unions are willing to accept manage~ent demands,
generally o~ higher productivity anc better discipline. Those managements who want
produ~tivity-bargaining, offer package deals. They may fully or substantially meet trade
 125

union demands, both in number of itims and their degree. The stipUlating conditions are
normally within easy reach of workers too. ~ the chances of satisfactory agreements are more
because both parties stand to gain. . ' Here, - .~ ·Those managements which prefer informal
negotiations try to understand unions stands on several issues 281 over e period ·of time.
Normally, they are in no hurry to settle lossues. At the seme time, they know that delay is not
harming them unduly. They also see the trend l.n settlement in other units in the same
industry elsewhere and have another comparablBs in their loc.al -'area. Through meeting all
unions separately, they get a picture about their own stand in relation to union~. 7.5.9
Separate and Joint Bipartite Negotiafions ____ - ____ ~ ____________________ ~ ___ J __
• __ _ Separate negotiations here means managaments' negotiations with individual,unions
separately. Joint negotiations, on the other hand, loS management ~egotiations with all union
simultaneously. The all-India pattern, with the exception of stray cases, is that negotiations
are made with single recognised unions only. Anv Question of separate and joint formal
management meetings with unions, therefore, does not arise. Informal coniultations may,
however, become inevitab'le, if unrecognised' unions ·singly or in combination with others
have substential membership • • In situations where rival unions are recognised, as in the
Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt, and if they form themselves into united fronts, negotiation
meetings are not held separately with different constituents of units fronts, but united fronts'
action councils themselves. In the Cochin- Alwaye industrial belt, united fronts are formed in
68.97 away from such united fronts. But it ~s true that in o· 16.66 per cent cases united fronts
are not formed at all. In others, i.e. 17.24 par cant united frorits ere" formed only sometimes.
The united fronts formed generally last onfy till collective bargaining agreements a~e signed.
During agreement implementation stages. they fall apart and may even support opposing
view points. Table 18 gives the frequency and percentage of units fronts formation ~n the
units studied. TABLE 18 FREQUENCY FORMATION OF UNITED FRONTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Frequency (General) Always Sometimes
Never Total Frequency (Nos.) Percentage • - - - - - - - - 60 15 12 - - - - - ~ - - - - 87 68.84
17.23 13.83 ---.-- 1 DO, 00 -----~------------------------------------------------ -- Separate
meetings as a permanent feature are • held only in 13.79 per cent of unions. _ Such meetings
invariably demand more time and conse.q. uently delay becomes unavoidable. More than
that, the parties face greater difficulties to identify areas of agreement. Priorities of rival
unions differ and there is no coordinating agency. However, once agreements or settlements
are reached and agreed pr"' .... determined to oe signed, all unions present themselves
at/place. In effect, a joint meeting takes place at ~ least once. In 86.21 per cent of caseS,
 126

though negotiations are on a multi-union basis, in reality negotiations progress or fail as if

they were a single bargaining agency. In two thirds of the number of units, more than 10
negotiation meetings are held before agreements and settlements are arrived at. Quick
settlement was arrived at only in one case, Table 19 gives the frequency and percentage of
bipartite joint meetings in successful bargainings. TABLE 19 NUMBER Of BIPARTITE
JOINT MEETINGS & ----------------------------------~-------------------- frequency (General)
frequency ( Nos, ) Percentage ~ -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - " - .. ~ ." - - - ~ No joint meeting 3
16.68 Less than 3 1 5.56 5 to 10 2 11. 10 More than 10 12 66,67 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Total
18 100,00 ------------------------------------------------------- 7,5.,0 -S-e-p-a-r-a-te- -a-n-d.- -J-o-i-
n-t- -M-e-e-t-i-n-g-s- -in-- -C-o--n-c-il-i-e-t-io-n- In our operational definition, even
settlements are included in collective bargaining results. Two reasons influence parties to take
disputes for conciliation: 1 • When bipartite negotiations do not progress as expected, trade
unions at time give strike notices. They may be serious in such notices or may 'be intemested
only to pressuri.e managements to speed up and to yield to union demands. This has two
possible effects: (i) managements become more sensitive to possible work-stoppage, and (ii)
intervention and participation by a conciliation officer became innevitable. This is required to
get the issue referred for adjudication if that is the ultimate remedy to solve disputes. In either
case, unions consider it advantageous to them. 2. Manag 7ments generally prefer to sign
agreements before a conciliation officer to make such agreements settlements. This way, they
attract legal sanctity attached with settlements which pure agreements do not enjoy to that
e~tent. Even if bipartite agreements are possible, managements do take the issues to
conciliation officers for this advantage. At conciliation, there is no definite procedure
prescribed under law. Conciliation officers enjoy discretion as to which method is to be
employed. They can summon disputing parties separately or jointly. Even if separate
meetings are held initially, joint meetings be~ome ne~ess6ry at the final rounds of
negotiation. Several rounds of joint meetings are common in ~onciliation, if issues are not
fully settled in all respects in earlier bipartite negotiations. . Even otherwise, conciliation
officers, as a policy, prefer a few conciliation sessions before final settlements are made. Such
actions by conciliation officers give them a disproportionate image of importance in relation
to their real contribution, Table 20 gives the frequency and percentage of joint meetings at
conciliation. TABLE 20 • NUMBER OF JOINT MEETINGS AT CONCILIATION
--------------------------------------------------------- Frequency (Gen eral ) Frequency (nos. )
Percentage - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Less than 5 '2 66.67 5 to 10 4 22.22
More than 10 2 11 • 11 -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Total 18 100.00
 127

------------------------------------------------~-----~-- The data in the table 20 clearly indicates that

services of conciliation officers are required in a limited way in two thirds of such cases that
are taken up. This means that considerable progress in narrowing down differences between
parties is made before disputes reach the stage of conciliation. 7.5.11 -Im--p-l-e-m-e-n-t-a-t-
io-n- --o-f --A-g-r-e-e-m-e-n-t-s --a-n-d- -S-e-t-tl-e-m--e-n-t-s The conclusion of collective
bargaining agreements is only the first half of the collective bargaining proc ess, The second
is implementation of agreements. 286 Without the first, the second is impossible; but
without , the second, the first is mean~ngless. If employers do -not faithfully honour
provisions workers get no beriefit from such agreements. 'It is, at times,'as good as not having
signed agreements at all. Similarly, if workers do not fulfil their role as specified in
agreements, employers are not bound by other, obligatory provisions. ~ The net result in such
circumstances would be worse than precollective bargaining period and bitter hostility is a
natural consequence. Both sides, therefore, try their best to avoid such a dead-lock or crisis.
Agreement documents are normally written as clearly as possible. Whereever explanations
are found to be necessary for greater clarity, they are given generously. Still, ambiguity can
creep ~n. Then conflicting.interest groups are bound to give contradictory interpretations
favourable to each. - Agreements, therefore, contain provisions for use as to the manner of
correct interpretation, acceptable to divergent interest groups. Arbitration is then considered
to be ideal in cases of conflicting interpretations. Reference to a labour court by joint
application is yet another method available under law. The latter is time'consuming and,
therefore, during the intermediary period between reference and interpretation award, the
relationship between management aod labour normally remains far from cordial. Table 21
gives the views of trade union respandents on arbitration. TABLE 21 INCLUSION Of
ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS.
---------------------------------------------------------- frequency (General) Frequency (Nos).
Percentage - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Arbitration clauses exist No clause exist 60 aV - - - - - 6~.
9 7 31.03 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Total 87 100.00
~----------------------------------------------------- ---- The views of trade union respondents
closely correspond with the data collected from all agreements of all the units covered in the
study. They show that 66.66 per cent of agreements and settlements do contain provisions to
refer disputed interpretation issues for arbitration. In settlements particularly even the names
of persons who should be the arbitrators are mentioned. b) -G-r-i-e-v-a-n-c-e-s. Agreements
and settlements could be highly satisfactory to both managements and trade unions. There
may prevail unanimity in interpretations of provisions as' well. Yet, workers need not be quite
 128

happy with different provisions and their working. This can arise due to a variety of reasons.
~ss Some workers who were getting a better deal than others under previous agreements may
find additional benefits not commensurate with their expectations or in the ratio in which
others get additional benefits. Trade union< themselves take up anomalies in earlier
agreements for correction. Managements. when convinced, normally accept such demands.
This infuriates those affe'cted unfavourably. Some others who had wnated anomalies in
earlier agreements to be removed may find continuance of the same in new ones as well.
Unfair wage differences made earlier • without any job evaluation or improper job evaluation
are carried through in new agreements. He"re again, another group of workers is affected.
Blacking promotional chances may be yet another grievance of a section of workers • Then, •
as a result of a union's acceptance of rationalisation due to introduction of automation, a
group of workers may be dis. pleced. They may be compXelled to accept other jobs
uninteresting to them. There are some areas in which workers feel aggrieved, real or
imaginary, in'any new berg&ining agreements. It is,true that agreements once signed, are not
subject to re-open soon. Trade unions, however, are free t( bring to the management's notice
serious anomalies and discrepancies, far from the spirit and intent of agreement provisions.
Table 22 gives the views of trade union respondeni in their own units. TABLE 22
REOPENING OF ISSUES IN AGREEMENTS -----------------------------------------------------
Yes/No - - - - - - - - - - Yes No Frequency Percentage - - - -- - - - - - - 51 36 58.62 41.38
__________ w __________________________ _ Total 87 100.00
----------------------------------------------------- Reo~enings of subjects covered in agreements ~
are sought not in the form of demands. They are more in the nature of appeals to
managements, 'not as a matter of right but as requests to remove glaring anomalies. Not all
managements listen to trade unions in this matter • • Those who do, do so to strengthen union
position in relation to members, which ultimately helps management. nary grievances are
explained as such to workers~ Imagi- Then, there are serious individual grievances of another
nature. They arise out of the manner in which agreement provisions are implemented at lower
levels in organizations. Playing safe. management personnel at different levels and pOints
wrongly apply agreement provisions to the advantage of organizations, creating avoidable
grievances. Such real grievances occur throughout the operative period of agreements.
Agreements, therefore, contain provisions for"redressal of grievances. In 75 per cent of -- 290
agreements, definite grievance procedure for individual grievancas ..a. re laid down • If the
affected workers do not find satisfactory solutions in all cases, they at times become
collective issues, depending on the nature of gr~- evances and type and number of personnel
 129

affected. Trade unions thus get involved in individual grievances as well. Besides individual
grievances, action or lack of it by managements brings to light group grievances at different
points of administration. It is only logical that such group grievances are taken up ~ith
managements ~ cumulatively and collectively rather than left to be done at different levels
and points of administration. Periodic pre-arranged meetings between managements and trade
unions are found to be the best way for removal of group grievances. ~ , Table 23 presents
data regarding frequency and percentage of post-agreement bipartite meetings. TABLE 23
POST-AGREEMENT BIPARTITE MEETINGS --------------------------------~--~-~-
~-------------- --- frequency (General) Frequency (Nos) Percentage - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - --- Once a week 3 3.45 Once a fortnight 12 13.79 Once a month 9 10.35 As problems
arise 63 72.41 --------------------------------------------------------. 2Hl c) Review Clauses. It is
not always possible to settle -------------- finally al~ issues that come for negotiation. This
happens, more often, if such matters are considered for the first time. In this circumstance,
one pa~ty may not be fully convinced of the logic of arguments made by the other party. The
subject matter may be one of any urgency as well. In the situation, both labour and
managements agree provisionally to certain terms with clear written down clause that such
agreements are provisional subject to review in depth. Parties are free even to discontinue
such newly introduced .. schemes or modify conditions governing them, but with prior
discussion and clear understanding. Unilateral and abrupt changes Bre av-o-ided. Such issues
included in any agreements need constant assessment and review to set acceptable standards.
In amny collective bargaining agreements, the more crucial ~ssues may get settled leaving
less important one to be considered and settled later. In a certain situation, in spite of best
efforts, parties may not have adequate data to make a sound judgement which would form •
the basis for collective bargaining. In such cases, issues are postponed for time bound
consideration later. Such issues when agreed upon may even attract retrospective effect
depending on the nature of the subject matter. 'Here a gain, both managements and l.bour
continue to have mutual negot~~tiqn • 292 e) Mana gement Cons ultations with Uni ans.
------------------------------------ It is true that agreements are of a comprehensive gsture • But
they are restricted to work rule only. Innumerable new develapments not antiCipated by
managements or labour and, therefore, not included in agreements crop wp between two
agreements. This is all the more so, when agreements are long-termoneS. We have seen the
mean average duration of agraements as three years. During a period of three years, several
changes and'modification in production process itself or introduction of new lines of
production due to change of product mix, etc. may demand geployment"of existing personnel
 130

to new lines. Promotion from within or recruitment from outside, weightage to service, etc.
are issues that need periodic operational adjustment for mutual satisfaction. Introduction of
multiple shifts, changes in conditions of service, etc. need to be made in any progressive
prodUction centreS. It is true that managements enjoy the right to introauce such changes
within the framework of the existing law. That approach, however, does not guarantee
spontaneous co-operation from labour. On the other hand, if prior discussions arE made with
unions, new management plans may get full support from unions. If there is initial
oppositions, they can be lessened or even changed to acceptance by appropriate benefits or
incentives tolabour not in the current agreement. Any unilateral introduction of new schemes
are likely to mest with resista nce. Progressive employers, therefore prepare unions in •
advance for any planned changes that affect their members directly or even indirectly.
Similarly, from a union's side, several new problems not covered in agreements dO occur. It
establishments have elaborate labour welfare schemes, a housing colony etc. problems
mUltiply. It is true that industrial r~lations departments do play their role in solving them, but
it is limited to matters up to a certain magnitude only. Bigger problems', especially those
involving financial liability, need to be approved by higher management at regular int ervals.
The net result is that constant dialogue between managements and trade unions is a regular
feature in the Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt. Tables 24 and 25 provide facts on what trade
union officials feel about implementation of agreements end settlements in general. TABLE
24 DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS •
~7~T-------------------------------------------------- --- Frequency (General) Frequency (Nos.)
Percentage Yes No ------ --------- 39 48 - - - - - 44.83 55.17 - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - Total
87 100.00 --------------------------------------------------------- Table 24 shows that trade union
officials are almost equally divided in their views with regard to difficulty or otherwise in
implementation of agreements. This is partly so because of their expectation of mechanical
implementation approach and the reality of presence and reactions of human elements
involved at different points in implementation. Table 25 however presents the real picture at
the higher management level. TABLE 25 MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN
AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION --------------------------------------------------------
Frequency (General) Frequency (Nos.) Percentage - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - .... - - -
Full co-operation 84 96.55 Do not co-operate 3 3.45 - - - - - - - - - - - - - Total B1 100.00
-----------~--------------------------------------------- Without management co-operation in
particular, no agreement can be implemented. But, here the question is about their full co-
operation. The fact that managements recognise all unions and successfully conclude
 131

agreements and settlements over many years is itself clear indication of their faith in the
process. The data in table 25 is not a real reflection of realities. 1.6 Different 5te~ Collective
bargaining is a continuous process for the entire operetional period of agreement cycles. 1he
bargaining process or preparation for it starts with 295 • • termination of agreements,
settlements or awards. Conelusion of bargaining agreements constitutes only the first half of
the whole process, the second half being the implementation with continued bilateral
consultations and joint decisions on matters of common concern. Earlie~ :i~' this chapter, we
have eeen various stages of collective bargaining process. Anyone such stage is the direct
result of joint efforts of participants or an action by one party and reaction of the other(sl. ,
Steps in collective bargaining differs from stages. Steps fall within stages. But they need not
be joint efforts. Action by one participating party need not even be known to the other(s). In
the collective bargaining process. different steps are taken both by manegements and unions.
They need not be in the same direction in the Same stages or even in different stages. Stages
are those distinct phases in the progress of the process, which the participating parties
generally pass through without exception. Steps, on the other hand, depend primarily on an
individual party's choice within the total performance. It means that employers may charter a
path and follow a course to achieve their ends. The case of trade unions is similar. There may
not be complete uniformity in steps either among employers or trade unions. However, o~er
the years, certain patterns have emerged. It is these different units of &ctions by employers
end trade unions 29G that are treated here as steps. Since Government is the third party
concerned with peaceful settlement of industrial disputes, they also come into the picture.
They play their role, at times from behind scenes and et other time~, very directly. 7.7 Steps
by Employers Collective bargaining is a major event in industry and business. The share of
direct labour cost in relation to the total production cost differs in different industries.
However, any additional increase in labour cost per unit of production may warrant. upward
revision of the unit price, unless such an increase is nominal or industries have financial
capacity to absorb such additional liability. Employers, therefore, try their utmost to keep
~abour cost 85 low as possible for higher profit. At the same time they want a contented
labour force to maintain their productivity level and to improve it. It is also difficult for them
to offer compensation to their employees at a rate less than those prevailing in the same
region and industry. Employers, thus, have multiple goals in relation to labour. It is partly due
to these reasons that industrial orgenizations have set up special depart- ~ ments with
competent experts to deal with industrial relations matters. Collective bargaining falls under
this category. 297 7.7. 1 Competent Experts ~----- .. ---------- In all the units covered under
 132

this study, industrial relations functions are handled by senior management personnel. Among
the 36 management experts, 30 are industrial relations specialists. All have postgraduate
training in industrial relations. In addition, 30 also have a master's degree in business
management? Those included in management teams in collective barg ainin9 had experience
ranging from 10 to more than 20 years in medi~•m and large industrial and business
organisations. The very fact that industrial organisations sought the services of such
competent personnel itself speaks of foresight by managements in dealing with workers and
their organisations. Inclusion of such personnel in collective bargaining teams and entrusting
them with the responsibility of initial rounds of negotiation meetings is conclusive evidence
of management's faith intheir competence and sincerity for meaningful negotiations. 7.7.2
Discussion with Professionals ---------------------------~- Management personnel in the
industrial relation • area studied are without exception all associated with one or more
professional bodies in their profession. Their organisations are institutional members of local,
regional and national management associations and bodies. This member298 ship offers wide
scope for contact with fellow professionals in any part of the country. Members of the local
units or chapters of such professional associations do meet frequently and discuss problem
Breas, in general, and major problems, in particular, in any unit in the local area. This liaison
provides benefits of expertise from a wide range of prOfessionals Collection of Data
Regarding -C-o-l~l-e-c-t-iv-e- --B-a-r-g-a-in--in-g- --A-g-r-e-e-ments
-------------------------------- ~) Any successful collective bargaining requires data ~n respect of
several areas. Data from units in the same local area and in the same industry are crucial in
this process. Wage structure, additional financial benefits enjoyed by workers, indirect labour
cost, etc. are all important. Industries generally cooperate with each other in providing these
data to any particular management. Professional contact of managements makes it further
easier to obtain it. In fact, all the units under study have copies of collective bargaining
agreements of all major units in the region. 7.7.4 -A-n-t-i-c-i-p-a-ti-o-n- --o-f --D-e-m-a-n-d-s
--b-y --T-r-a-d-e --U-n-i-o-n-s Each successive collective bargsining'agreement, settlement or
award brings additional benefits to workers. As operational life of agreements is near
completion, managements exercise their mind to figu~e out the next pos.ible 299 charter of
demands. This incl~des both range of demands and their quantum. Tables 26 and 27
hereunder indicate the extent of accuracy in their anticipation of probable demands by unions.
TABLE 26 ANTICIPATION OF THE NATURE AND QUANTUM OF UNION DEMANDS
------------------------------------------------------- Anticipate Frequency (Nos) Percentage - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Always 30 83.33 6 16.67 Never o 0.00 ---------~-------------------
 133

Total 36 100.00 ---~-------------------------------~------------------ -- All management

respondeMts agreed that they did forecast out possible future demands. In 83.33 per cent of
cases they did this exercise always. Only 6 respondents, i.e., 16.67 per cent have said that
they do so only sometimes. Checking the questionnaires, we found that those 6 managements,
respondents who said that they figure out anticipated demands only sometimes ere those
which did not have industrial relations departments. Their counterparts in industrial relations
departments, on the other hand, have categorically stated that they do • try to predict the
likely future demands. ; It can thus be • 300 categorically assumed that
managaments.invariably try to • anticipate the unions likely demands ~nd their nature.
TABLE 27 ANTICIPATED Vs. ACTUAL NATURE OF DEMANDS --------------------------
~---------------------------- Results Frequency (Nos.) Percentage - - - - - - - - - Always identical
8 22.22 Sometimes identical 24 66.66 Never identical 4 11 • 1 2 - . - - - - - - - - - - Total 36
100.00 --------------------------------------~---------------- Eight-respondents have correctly
anticipated union demands. This eight respondents are from four units, two from each. This
meanS that four industrial unit's • anticipation of union demands always happen to be identi.
cal to real demands. In others too, except in two units management anticipation of union
demands come true. JUl • TAELE 28 ANTICIPATED Vs. ACTUAL DEGREE OF
DEMANDS -----------------------------------------~-----.------ -- Results Frequency (Nos.)
Percentage - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • . ~ Always of the same degree 4 11.12
Sometimes of same' degree 16 44.44 Never of same degree 16 44.44 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Total 36 I 100.00 ------------------~------------------------------------ Those who figure out
correctly the nature of demands do not figure out correctly the degree of demands. Those
from managementtrespondents who claim that they figure out the degree of demands
correctly are those from the eight who have claimed that their anticipation of the nature of
demands are identical with the actual demands. One is tempted to think that this data is
biased. Checked with the industrial relation climate in general, those two units to which these
four re~pondants belong do enjoy more peaceful and healthy industrial relations than all the
rest. 7.7.5 Financial Liability of Anticipated Demands ---~--------------------------------------
Once there is a consensus of opinion among management personnel about anticipated
demands, they work on their financial liability. It is universally true that , unions demand
much more than what they themselves would are give if they themselves/managementsl
ManagBments, therefore, break demands into several percentage slabs. Then the~ calculate
both direct and indirect additional labour cost at the lower and upper level of percentage slabs
and i.n bej;ween. This way, they come to know tota~ financial l"iability to industry ·~t ..
 134

various percentage levels • • 7.7.6 Analysis of Data in Respect of Demands ------------

~------------------------- Every charter of demands contains a few additional benefits not
enjoyed by workers until then. When demanded for the first time, trade unions are also not
very serious about them. Similarly. the charter of demands includes several items on which
trade unions may not insist upon for upward revision or modification at actuel bargaining
sessions for agreements. Yet, some managements consider it rewarding to project the precise
finencial implication in balance sheets of enterprises at conditions prevalent at the relevant
time of negotiation and also on a long term basis. This data analysis helps industrial units in
two ways 1 (i) to convince trade unions of the eKCeSsive nature of their demands even if
they are commonly aveilable to other workers ( ii) . in the locality, and to precisely
themselves understand the . additional financial liability on and its impact on produce price;'
whether it can be passed 9n to cohsumerj, This helps the board of directors to estimate to
what extent they· can make total financial commitments in the bargaining process, 303 7.7.7
Counter~Demands Vs. Charter of Demands -------------------------------------- Every time
workers make a charter of demands, some employers make counter demands. This is don e to
gain to some extent or even fully set off the possible financ.i. al liability man.a. gements
would need to accept under new agreements. Some employers offer package plans in which
workers will be offe'red higher compensation than their existing rate but at a committed
increased producti- • vity rate. Management also assess the chances of trade unions accepting
c~unter demands. Table 29 gives data on the counter demand practice. TABLE 29
COUNTER DEMANDS BY EMPLOYERS ----------------------,----------------------------------
frequency (General) frequency (Nos.) Percentage - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
Always 6 16.67 Sometimes 28 77.77 Never 2 5.56 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Tot al 36 100. 00
-------------------------------------------------------- Only one out of 16 units has never made
counter demands. However an overwhelming majority do not make counter demands always.
Among those which make counter demands. four units have made package qffefs, ie •• offer
for productivity bargaining. 7.7.8 Political Lobbying ------------------ No employer would
openly admit that they do political lobbying for their self-interest in relation to labour's.
While generally, employers are not against giving additional benefits to workers, they would
like to do it without disturbing industrial peace and without significantly sacrificing their
profits. This, they belie~e, is possible if they cultivate close relations with those political p•
arties 1n power. Since all the parties which formed a Coalition Government (with one
exception) • had trade union wings operating in the Cochin-Alwaye industrial belt, the need
for political lobbying has been all the more. Even after conclusion of bargaining agreements,
 135

political lobbying is necessary and is done for faithful implementation of agreements.

Resources spent on this account are not a waste but an investment. 7.7.9 Public Relations
---------------- Political lobbying can be considered to be a part of public relation. The need for
public relatidn is greater in Kerala than many other geographical areas in the country. This is
so because every political party has its own press and publications and as sue h trade '.
un10ns get due news coverage. Peaceful settlements are hardly news items. But work-
stoppages and agitation etc. get headlines in press. Editorials too appear in the press in
respect of major industrial disputes. In public announcements, the Government lead8r~
seldom rebuke labour even if it so deserves. Employers make their own efforts to counteract
all this propaganda. Employers generally keep the uncommitted press in good humour so that
adverse publicity about them may be kept, a mln~mum. Employment offers to nearones of
those in position in Government and public life, to some extent, keeps such leaders from
being anti-employers. Inspired articles in the press glorifying the position of industrial
workers in reletion to rural • labour are also not uncommon. Every time new agreements are
signed. the brighter aspects are covered as news items for the public consumption. 7.8 Steps
by Trade Unions Steps taken by workers are different from what managements do. While
managements are on the defensive during the first half of the collective bargaining process,
they make trade unions take the defensive during the second half. This means that trade
unions have to prepare themselves to play their role throughout collective bargaining cycle.
The very fact that collective issues invariably go for bargaining and are rarely referred for
arbitration, is testimony to prove that trade unions are effective in their steps as well. aOG 7.
B. 1 -P-r-e-p-a-r-a-ti-o-n-- -o-f- -D-e-m-a-n-d-s Preparation of a charter of demands is the
first and major step that trade unions take initially. To do that job unions require data. Collect
ion 0 f data regarding prevailing practices in units near-by is no problem as the trade union
fraternity always obliges on a reciprocal basis. Unions are also successful in getting data from
managements though not in all cases and in all areas. Once the required data is gathered,
trade un10n officials start work on them. The charter of demands is generally the brain child
of the executive com· mittee members and a few active members. However, such prepared
documents are presented to the general body of workers before being presented to
managements. Table 30 gives data regarding methods of decision-making including a charter
of demands. UBlE 30 METHOD OF UNION DECISION MAKING
-------------------------------------------------------- Method Executive Committee General Body
Bot h ways Total Frequency (Nos.) Percentage 24 36 27 -- - - - - - - -- 27.59 41.36 31 .05
-------------------------- 67 1 00.00 -------------------------------------------------------- 307 The
 136

table 30 clearly indicates that decisions are g6nerally taken democratically. 7.6.2 General
Body - Approval ----------------------- The charter of demands prepared by executive
committees is brought before general b,o dies for their approval. The precise quantum of
demands is not discussed in all cases. The executive committees go to the GEneral Body
again for approval of draft agreements. While it is true that union leaders have influence on
workers to make them fall in lines with their offical stand, there are also instanCEs that
general bodies have refused to approve executive committee's proposals in toto. A decision to
callan strike is another major issue which is provisionally decided on by the executive
committee. The rank and file are constantly consulted at all major stages and steps. 7.6.3
Formation of Joint Fronts ------------------------- A formation of joint fronts of unions is quite
common. Until the submission of charter of the demands, unions operate separately in their
collective bargaining efforts. Except for a small percentage of 13.45 without joint fronts, .all
other respondents reported that joint fronts are common. From experience, unions have found
that joint f~onts a~e mo~e effective in bargaining than individual unions bargai~ing
separately. Managements too find it easier to bargain with a common agency than several
unions. Once united fronts are formed, the unions further create action councils • • From
among action council members, negotiating teams are then selected. Each union will have not
less than two representatives in negotiating teams. While action council will engage
themselves in public relations, propaganda, fund raising, agitation, etc., ~ negotiating teams
concern themselves with negotiation. Negotiation teams derive their strength and reEeive
guidance from action councils. If negotiation teams feel it imperative to depart from the
directives from action councils, they have to obtain prior approval from them. 7.9 Steps by
State Government: Government's interest in labour-management relationship arises from their
responsibilities (i) to maintain law and order, (ii.) to creete a climate for speedier economic
grwoth, and (iii) guarantee justice to participating parties. The Government of the relevant
period covered • under the study was a coalition of five;political parties. '. . All except one
had their trade union wing, operating in the region. The exception was CITU under the
influence of CPI (M). Besides these, there were several independent unions not affiliated to
any national centres. The Go vernment responsibilities mentioneddand the political parties in
the coalition Government's dependence on their trade unions for mass support, have had their
influence ,on Government steps in collective bargaining. :109 -L-aw- --an-d- --O-r-d-e-r
Employers in earlier decades were used to have police intervention in industrial disputes. On
complaints made by them, the police used to arrest active trade union officials on the pretext
of apprehended violence by workers. It is true that violence of very minor· nature had taken
 137

place in the past, but very sparingly. This is now just a record of history. Police force no more
interferes in industrial disputes. Only in the case of actual violence committed by workers,
police take any action. The police makes its own judgement. Whether their intervention is
necessary at all. This is a major departure from the practice a decade ago. It is not due to any
enlightened thinking of police force as such. On the contrary, clear orders are given to them
to keep away from normal industrial disputes. The result is that no violence now occurs in the
ordinary course. If management and their agents provoke workers, which is also very rare,
workers do re.ai:::t, but in ... T • ~ - • • always not amounting to violence which might
demand police action to maintain peace, For outsiders, even demonstrations processions and
slogan shouting may appear to be violence ox brute force, But in reality, they are not violent.
Their demonstration is not very different from that adopted by University students, teachers
or even religious who normally confine themselves to silent social welfare work, but at times
are driven to demonstrate their feelings and strength. This trait seems to be more of a cultural
peculiarity of the population in the region in general. 7.9.2 Climate for Industrial Peace and
Growth ~-------------~--------~--------------- In the ordinary course, the Government including
the labour department do not interfere in labour disputes, unless requested to do so by the
involved parties or on issues of noticES for strikes or lockouts. The intention behind this
Government attituoe is to encourage the parties to settle disputes themselves. In recognition
of trade unions, State Government owned establishments took the lead in negotiating with all
unions rather than limiting themselves to majority unions on ly. This was at the instance of
the Governmen't and in keeping up the tradition of industrial committees. The State
Government'~_ concern 1n presevving industrial peace is understandable for reason more
than it being the Government. In fact the State Government owns a number of industrial
units. Thus, the Government is also an industrial employer. In Governmen.t of India
undertakings and those in private sector too, the Kerala State Government's financial
participation is substantial. In the private sector, financial assistance takes the form of loans,
subsidies, etc. so that their interest is more than mere governanc e. These background facts
further make the State Government very alert in industrial disputes.. While on the one hand,
they have to satisfy those who give them political support, on the other, they want a return on
their own investment in t heir own establishments and· HPse owned by oth ers. , 3tl In these
circumstances, any industrial dispute ~n the region or for that matter in any part of the State
gets the prompt attention of the Government. Although no formal intervention is made,
informal contacts with dis~ puting parties are always made. As the unions (except CITU and
the independents) in the industrial establishments belong to the very same political parties in
 138

the coalition, they enjoyed direct access up to the highest Governmental level. Employers too
have their channel of political contacts. This may not be with all political parties. In the
circumstances, the Government establish informal contacts with both the parties. If necessary,
Ministerial level mediation is also offered. The study has shown that reference of industrial
disputes of a collective nature is very seldom done for adjudication. Even strikes or lockouts
do not alter Government's policy in the matter 8S far as possible. The parties thus realise that
they have to settle their issues mutually or though the services of the conciliation machinery.
7.9.3 -G-u-e-r-a-n-t-e-e-in-g-- -J-u-s-t-ic--e Least Governmental intaTvention in industrial
disputes is itself a guarantee for justice if both employers and employees are well organised
and are capable of protecting their interests. Workers are the weaker in organisational
strength. However, they compensate for this by , , 312 combining together or working as
united' fronts. Governments attitude in general hes been One of helping the weaker sections.
Fixation of minimum wages in agricultural operations as one of the highest in the country, the
Government indirectly helps industrial labour to get higher wage levels.
 139

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS In this chapter the broad based findings and
conclusions emanating from the study are presented. Suggestions are also given with a view
to correcting situations and improve the practices in the Organizations in regard to health,
safety and welfare measures. As mentioned in the chapter-Ill the main objective is to make a
study of selected private sector Organizations in Andhra Pradesh with regard to their health,
safety and welfare provisions. It helps the Organization to review these provisions 1. It is
observed that the sample Organizations which the researcher has selected for the purpose of
his study containing a majority of senior personnel. It is further observed that the majority of
the respondents from all the sample Organizations of the study are with in the age group of
35-45yrs and their percentage in the total sample is 47.5. 2. The study revealed that the
respondents possess requisite technical and other required qualifications which are according
to norms prescribed by the concerned Organizations 3. It is observed from the analysis that
people favouring joint families and those who prefer nuclear families are almost equal in
number and this exemplifies the present family trend in vogue in the present day society. 341
Andhra University, Visakhapatnam 4. Majority (67%) of respondents are care-taker of less
than 5 dependents in their respective families and this further indicatesthat growing
awareness among the respondents about the valuable concept of family-planning. 5. A
Majority (65%) of respondents are in the income group Rs.1.0 lakh to Rs.3 lakhs per annum.
This might be due to their experience and positions held in their respective organizations. 6. It
is also observed from the analysis that almost all the respondents of the total sample are
satisfied with the ventilation provided at their work place by their respective organizations.
However, a negligible 2.8 % of the respondents from GSKCH Ltd are unhappy with the same
in their Organization, and the Organization should rectify any short-comings with regard to
the provision of ample ventilation at the work place. 7. It can be concluded that all the five
organizations under study are providing their employees with conducive working conditions
by allotting appropriate shift-timings in order to reduce over-crowding in the factories. 8. It is
further observed that all the Organizations selected for the study are careful enough in
providing sufficient lighting at the work place so that the employees can carry out their tasks
without difficulty. 342 Andhra University, Visakhapatnam 9. The study revealed that all the
selected Organizations have succeeded in fulfilling the expectations of their employees by
providing the First Aid boxes with trained staff so as to cater to the immediate and urgent
medical needs of their employees. 10. All the five organizations taken up for the present study
have taken care of the medical requirements by providing basic medical facilities to their
employees by providing the dispensaries with sophisticated riedical equipment and by
 140

appointing trained and dedicated medical staff. 11. It is further observed from the data that a
majority of (97.6%) the respondents out of the total sample (518) are satisfied with the
facilities available to them in their respective organizations and opined that the concerned
Organizations are implementing better medical provisions. 12. The respondents in all the
selected Organizations expressed that proper drinking water facilities are being provided. 13.
It can be observed from the analysis that all the five organizations are cautious enough in
taking suitable measures to keep their premises clean and hygienic. 14. The respondents
further opined that the concerned Organizations are providing washing facilities and toilets at
convenient places separately for male and female employees. 343 Andhra University,
Visakhapatnam 15. An overwhelming majority of 99.4 per cent respondents out of the total
sample of 518 stated that the dangerous machinery at their place of work is fenced. They also
expressed that the concerned managements of the selected Organizations for the study are
more cautious about the safety of their employees and having necessary precautions and
preventive measures for the well being of their employees. 16. Out of ti'.e total sample 518,
517 respondents are unanimous in their opinion with regard to Personal Protective
Equipment. Therefore, it can be stated that all the five organizations that figured in the study
really taken care of the safety of their employees. 17. It is further observed that all the five
organizations selected for the study are taking appropriate precautions while dealing with
dangerous fumes , abnoxious gases etc, at the work place 18. It can be seen that the rate of
accidents in the five organizations study is 7.6 which is very less and this fact exemplifies the
effective safety measures implemented in them. 19. The study revealed that the respondents
of the five organizations figured in the sample are safety-conscious and they not only make
efforts in learning safety techniques but also implementing them. 344 Andhra University,
Visakhapatnam 20. It is observed from the analysis that out of the total 518 respondents
selected for the study, an outstanding majority (99.4%) of respondents are happy with the
facilities provided in the canteens of their respective organizations. 21. The study also
revealed that out of the total sample of 518, maximum percentage (97.3) of the respondents
are satisfied with the quality of food in the canteens of their respective organizations. .22.
Almost all t'le respondents figured in the total s.ample of 518 expressed that lunch rooms are
provided in their respective Organizations and the necessary facilities are provided in lunch
rooms. 23. It is observed that out of the total 518 respondents of the sample, a vast majority
of 97.9% respondents viewed that the housing accommodation in their respective
organizations to be good while a negligible number of 0.9 per cent respondents are not
satisfied. 24. The study revealed that only 2.7 per cent respondents of the total sample (518)
 141

found fault with the educational facilities for the children of the employees provided by their
respective organizations. However, it is interesting to observe that there is no negative
opinion from the respondents of Coromandal International Ltd. By considering the majority
opinion which is in favor of the efforts of the organizations that figured in the study it can be
345 Andhra University, Visakhapatnam inferred that the concerned managements are doing
their best to provide adequate educational facilities to the children of the employees. • 25.
The study revealed that only 3.1 per cent respondents of the total sample (518) found fault
with the recreation facilities provided by their respective organizations. However, 1.2 per cent
respondents did not express their opinion. By considering the majority opinion whiich is in
favour of the efforts; of the organizations that figured in the present sample it can be inferred
that the concerned managements are doing their best to provide adequate recreation facilities
to their employees. SUGGESTIONS: 1. The organizations selected for the study should look
into the causes of the dissatisfaction of the employees and should redress their grievances
wherever feasible. The staff of the hospitals, who are rude towards the patients should be
punished as per the procedure laid down. It may not be possible for the organizations selected
for the study to construct dispensaries at the convenient places to all the employees.
Sometimes the employees will have to bear with the inconvenience if it is inevitable. 2. It is
observed from the data that all the five organizations taken up for the present study are good
at providing their employees with adequate toilet facilities. However, the three 346 Andhra
University, Visakhapatnam organizations where some of the respondents are not satisfied viz.,
Andhra Pradesh Paper Mills Limited, Nagarjuna Fertilizers and Chemicals Limited and
Coromandal International Ltd., Limited and necessary action should be taken at the earliest to
see that the problems with regard to toilet facilities are redressed. 3. It suggested that the
organizations selected for the study should follow some standards of quality while taking care
of the needs of their employees. 4. The analysis indicates that the employees in the five
organizations are facing some problems at the time of taking loans from their PF accounts.
The respective managements should look into the matter and see that the loan process linked
with PF accounts is smooth and hassle free to the employees. On the other hand, the
employees also should take proper care in submitting all relevant and necessary details and
documents to the concerned PF sections concerned in their respective organizations. 5. It is
observed from the present study that a majority, 27.2 per cent respondents of the total sample
(518) are not covered by ESI and all the five organizations taken up for the study should take
immediate necessary measures in extending this ESI coverage to the rest of their employees
so that the latter derive benefits in case of diseases, accidents and other ailments. 347 Andhra
 142

University, Visakhapatnam 6. It can be seen that four out of the five organizations selected for
the study have set up recreational clubs for their employees except Glaxo Smith Kline
Consumer Health Care limited. The management of Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health
Care Limited should make proper arrangements to establish recreational club to its employees
at the earliest possible. 7. The findings of the study indicate that, to some extent, all the
organizations are compelling their employees to lift weights beyond the permissible levels
and this should be stopped as it is violation of the rules. More workers have to be engaged to
get the required work done. 348 Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 8.1 Summary 8.1.1 -I-n-d-u-s-t-r-i-a-l- -R-e-l-a-

t-io-n--s --S-y-s-te-m-- -C-o-n-c-e-p-t-s 'Industrial Relations' means the ielations between
employers and employees, employers and employers, ~ employees end employees end
between employe~s end Gove~nment and employees and Government.- This relationship
exists at different levels, namely undertaking, company, region, state, inpustrial and national.
A system is an assembly of interdependent parts which interact in a socio-cultural political
enviror ment. It is open, organic and dynamic and is with multipIe goals. It readjusts itself to
maintain the equilibrium based on the feedback which it receives. A system may have four
elements, name~y actors, rules, idemlogy and environmental context. A system has three
stages, namely input, transformation element and control element. Inputs are data absorbed
by organisations from the environment for use. Those data already with the organisations
stored in the memory are also updated and used when fed back as crucial ones. The control
element provides directions of policies and decisions at the transformation stage for the
desired result. An open, organic and dynamic industrial relations system·is, therefore, one in
which the internal elements are interdependent and constantly admitting inputs from external
environments, transforming those inputs into useful form and generating the desired outputs. \
If managements and unions are treated as fullfledged systems interacting between each other
and with a super system, Industrial Relations can be explained as an inter-system model as
well. Induetrial Relations Climate -----------~---------------- India, the second most populous
 143

country and the largest democracy in the world, presents diversities and complexities, which
no other country.in the free world is experiencing to-day. In her march towards
industrialisation and economic development, she has made made notable ,achievements, but
the economic condition of the working class has not improved commensurate with their
legitimate expectations. In a substantial number of cases, the conditions have actually
deteriorated. The normally dynamic social scene in India is becoming all the more dynamic.
315 The State is concerned with stepping up the tempo of industrialisation. However,
transformation of en sgrarian and commercial society into an industrial one is not always
sudden, smooth and without pain. .; The Indian worker today is more committed to his work
and he has acquired an identity not even cherished by his predecessors. He is politically
conscious of and sensitive to his con~ ditions and hardships. He is getting interested in the
trade union movement. Collective bargaining is being attempted wherever conditions for it
are favourable • .. Today's management personnel are pro'fessionally trained and more
rational in their outlook than ever before. Their decisions are more often based on hard data
than on guesswork or notional parameters. Ownership of industries has become more
dispersed and th~ State 1S playing a dominant role in the production and distribution o~
goods and services. Labour is increasingly permitted to associate itself with decision making
in industry. State intervention in industrial relations is a reality. However. if the parties so
desire, they cankeep the State out, except in situations where statutory . . regulations preclude
it. Trade unions have not grown in proportion to their potential membership. Where workers
are organised, they are divided into several small unions led by outsiders, often by political
leaders: :HG As the membership is small, the un10ns are weak in finance and in their
bargaining capacity. Rivalry among unions ~s very widespread. Employers' organisations are
also divided, but not on the basis of political ideologies. The public sector undertakings keep
themselves outside employers! organisations. Thus, the structural framework necessary for
national collective bargaining is abse~t except in a small number of organisations. Labour
policies are formulated by the Government of Indie in consultation with both employers' and
workers' organisations. Both bipartite and tripartite forums are used for the purpose. While
the Government has legislated on all conceivable subjects on labour, it has been shy to
legislate on a crucial area, namely 'union recognition' as a first step for the creation of a
structural framework for collective bargaining. Recognition is still either left to the sweet will
of employers or regulated by the Code of Discipline. Grievance machinery is established by
employers on.a voluntary basis. Works committee, .~though compulsory, has proved to be a
dismal failure. Kerala's geography, climate, agricultural crops, people, their life style,
 144

industrial potentiality, etc. are all very favourable for a breakthrough in indus_ trialisation.
But her people do not have adequate capital 317 resources for setting up large industries.
Those with capital prefer to invest their resources Ln developing plantations and fishing, their
traditional economic Bcti~ vity. Those with entrepreneurial tale.. nts invest their capital
outside the State partly because of their disinclination to face the recurring labour unrest
within the State borders. However, the trend is changing, and more and more industrial
ventures are being set up in the State as it now enjoys relative stability in the industrial arena.
Political parties have a high influence on trade unions in the State. Multiplicity of-unions
organised on political lines is the rule of the day. In spite of the general discouraging factors,
the trade unions join hands for espousing a common cause. They even make joint fronts to
practise collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is gradually becoming the most
prevalent method for settlement of industrial disputes in Kerala. 8.1.3 Conflict Resolution
------------------- Simultaneous conflict and co-operation is universal in labour-management
relations, although scope for co-operation is greater in socialist countries. Profit and growth
orientation motivate employers to minimise the cost of production. Oince labour is the
only :H8 factor of production where cost fl~xibility is readily possible, employers try to
reduce its cost per unit ef production. But with the advent of trade unions, ma~agements have
now ceme to realise that they cannot fi·x arbitrarly the share of labour in the gains of industry
•. Work-stoppages resulting frem labour-management conflicts hurt both parties; the society
and the Government also get affected. The Government is, therefore, concerned about them
and thus regulate the labourmanagement relationship. The Government do.this mostly
through statutory reguletions. Statutory benefits such as provident funds, gratuity. etc. have
eliminated the sCope for conflicts in such areas. In others, the Government ~aid down
procedures anq set up machinery for settlement of industrial disputes. Labour-management
conflicts are resolved through prOCesses such ~s Works CO~mittee. Collective Bargaining,
Conciliation, Court of Enquiry, Adjudication and Arbitration. Works Committee, as an
institution fostering amity and good relations between labour and management, has not been
found to be quite effective during the last thirty years. Although Col_ lective Bargaining has a
histor~ of about fifty years, it is yet to become the popular method in Indian industries.
ConciliotiGn has recorded a meeau.r.e of success. Industrial Adjudication has become the
ultimate remedy in labour-management conflict resolution. Inspite of the Governments'
encouragement and the parties' reiteretion of their faith in Arbitration at national tripartite
conferences, Arbitration ~as yet to get a spontaneous acceptance from both labour and
management. In this general all India background, Kerals presents a different picture.
 145

Collective bargaining is becoming the preferred method far settlement of collective industrial
disputes. All disputes of a collective nature are settled by collective bargaining or by
conciliation in spita of the prevailing multiplicity of unions and the consequent inter-union
rivalries. Rival unions co~operating at the collective bargaining stage of industrial conflicts is
becoming 8 common practice in Kerala. Adjudication of disputes of a collective nature is
seldom resorted to in Kerala. Inter-union co-operation has a history of 35 ~. years ~n lRSia. .
The first industrial relations committee set up in 1940 was a bipartite agency to resolve
industrial disputes on an industry basis. Rival unions representing the workers in the Coir
Industry participated in it. Later, the industrial committees became tripartite in character. The
industrial committee played mUltiple roles 85 conciliation. arbitration, court of enquiry, and
adjudication 320 bodies free from the usual statuto~y constraints. Recognition of all unions
was another principle they had adoptee Under the present collective bargaining practices, all
unions in the units are represented in bargaining. This practice may appear to be anti-
collective bargaining in the birth place of collective barg$ining. However, the Kerala practice
may be the most pr$gmatic alternative in the situation prevailing there. 6.1.4 Concepts --------
All in industry and government.agree that col- 1ective bargaining is the best method to
resolve industrial conflicts because of its numerOUs edvantages over others. In simple terms
collective bargaining is a method oi process of determining the specific conditions of a labour
contract _ particularly the details of wages, hours of work and working conditions - by direct
negotiation between the representatives of one or more unions on the one hand, and an
employer or association of emplayers on the pther, and culminating in a collective agreement
between both parties. The Webbs who coined the terms 'Collective Bargeining' did not give
any precise definition for it. But they have explained the concept by giving examples. They
have distinguished between collective bargaining and individual bargaining between an
employer and a worker 321 at the market place. If such an employer, instead of making
a'series of separate contracts with isolated workers meets workers collectively and settles the
terms and con- • ditions of employment, that process is collective bargaining. Allen
Flaunders. a critic of Webbs, contends that collective bargaining referred to by Webbi is not
collective bargaining at all, but collective negotiation. According to him, individual worker
bargains with his employer, but the collective contract is a rule-making process. A much
recent theory given by Chamberlain is that collective bargaining is: (1 l a means of
contracting for the sale of labour, (2) a form of industrial government, and (3) a method of
management. He named them respectively the Marketing, the Governmental and Managerial
theories. Chamberlains theories propound concepts which are very close to those of Webbs.
 146

The ILD has given its own definition which takes into account the present day realities and it
is broader than any other definitions. According to this definition apart from bilateral
negotiations, tripartite conciliation as per the national laws are also brought in the ambit of
the term 'collective bargaining', Collective bargaining practices do not take roots in all
environmental conditions, but only in favourable ones. An industrially underdeveloped region
is • 322 not likel~ to provide scope for collective bargaining. Size and qualit~ of the labour
force, freedom of Bssociat ion of workers as per national laws, stability and stren- • • • gth of
workers' and employers' organisations, recognition of the parties as representing the interest
groups, willingw ness of the parties to bargain, avoidance of unfair labour practices,legal
framework, political climate, etc. are important factors that encourage or retard the collective
bargaining process. Negotiation for an agreement starts with a charter of demand; put forth by
unions, and those dem"ands are often met with counter demands by employers. Both form
parties consider each other's demands/which the basis for bargaining. Bargaining can be unit-
wise, company-wise, industry-wise or even on a national basis if the necessary cdnditions
prevail. In bargaining, data regarding the industry, wage structure in other units, other
prevailing practices, etc. are used. Strike and lockout threats • are made at times to pressurise
the opposite parties. The bargaining process culminating in an agreement is only first stage of
collective bargaining. Implementation of the provisions in the agreements, removal of
anomalies, settlement of grievances, etC. demand a series of joint discussions and negotiati
ons throughout the life-time of such agreements. B. 1 .5 -O-r-g-a-n-i-s-a-t-io--n-a-l- -C-o-n-t-
e-x-t ",j' 23 Industrial relations are influenced by envi- • ronmental factors which are subject
to dynamic fluctu~ • ations. As a result, the q~ality of industrial relations at any given time is
largely the Product of the prevailing environmental f~ctors. Similarly, the industrial relations
climate favours or retard COllective bargaining practices. Collective bargaining normally gets
accepted in units which enjoy a measure of industrial peace. In • addition to the
environmental factors and industrial relations climate, there are certain Organisational aspects
which are generally independent and have·a bearing on collective bargaining practices. These
factors in the organisational context are those related to: (i) industry and • management, (ii)
workers and thei:r organisations, and (i'ii I the Government. The area under study is a ~ew
growth centre with around 30 years of history. Both management and labour are first
generation industrial personnel. The industrial units are widely disp~rsed over a large
geographical area so that 'there ~s no possibili ty for a high concentration of workers at one
place. In betWeen two units, the topography generally gives a rural lOOk. Major units
provide • their employees housing, transport, school and hospital facilities, and encourage
 147

games, 5~Drt5and cultural activities. The vorkers_in the region thus enjoy all the major
benefits enjoyed by workers in any other major industrial city; but they do' no't sllfferf~omthe
i11- . effects of overcrowding, pollution, ,urban tension and other consequences of city life.
Most of the workers live in their ancestral houses enjoying healthy social life and B large
measure of social esteem n~t en~oyed by workers in major industrial centres in the rest of
India. Their PQLI is the highest in the country. The small industrial base of the area under
study does not"· afford enough. potenclaL for the develop~ ment of ancillary units. The
predominance of ' chemical units further restricts the scope for development of such units,
which normally thrive in the vicinity of engineering industries. The small base of the indus- .
trial towns of Kerela also permits Ministcr-level interventio. n in resolving
industrial;~relatCions problems, The , . capital intensive nature of the indus.t ry allows the
attain- ment ,o~a higher pr6ductivity level, althou'.g h it calls for a_constant vigil on. the part
of-managemerit to prevent po\ential work-stoppage, machirie idleness and consequent loss to
the organisation, The ownership p~ttern and orga~ization structure do not ~~tider collective
barg, aining,-.process. In the Government of India undertakings of the area, delays 325 ~n
decision making do occur. The inevitability of , . such delays i. however understood ~y the
local trade unions. Trade-unions are organi~ed unit-wise, and their structure is very
favourable for collective bar_ gaining. Both the management and trade unio~ personnel are
highly educated and have consiOerable years of experience in collective bargaining. The
management personnel of 'thS"!ndustrial Relations Department and the • , . inside leadership
of "trade unions ~enerally make the Workers of the, region a@ individuals and members of
groups are distinctly different from those in the rest of India in many respects.. Highly
individualistic and idealistic. they respect others for their sincerity and competence. Th'ey ate
disciplined and commi,tted to the organisations to .~ hich they belong, including trade unions
of which they are members. Therefore •. individuals manacing or representing.~heir organi-
The workers in general.~re argumentative but rationaL end are influenced by reason rather
than by personalities. They are st ubbornly vociferous, but their highly vocal postures do not
deteriorate into physical violence. The trade union leaders of the units are largely outsiders.
They are leaders but seldom control , the workers. They are in effect ceremonial heads who
perform certain assigned duties. The workers to a certair extent appear to be exploiting their
union leaders. M~jority of the unions remain unaffiliated to central trade union organi~ations.
It is so. because the workers are reluctant to'.accept the leadership of tho'e in whom they have
little·fait~. T!Je trade. unions often form united fronts to fight for "a common' cause. The
outside leaders; ~al:t.icI.LLat.L\J t.hose ft:4m ~olit.ic:a1. ~ar:ties, and the working of the
 148

C_oalition Min'istry in the State have influenced the un. .io ns in forming united fronts • The
State Government appears to have created an image for itself of impartiality between rival
unions. It has refrainted from referring collective ~isputes routinely to adjudication. Instead,
it has encouraged bilateral discussions. In . . - . major ,disputes where.,bilateral discussions
have failed the Labour Minister of the State haS intervened and held d);'-scussion' with the
parties, ,and has tried to sattle them amicably. All these have had their influence both on the
labour and the management. Th~ state has thus witnessed a new era of industrial peace. The
Cochin-Alwaye region has been in the forefront of this salutary movement. Thus collective
bargaining has become the preferred choice for the settlement of all collective"'disp'utes 327
in medium and la~ge industrial units of the a~ea. B. 1. 6 Factors that Decide Collective
Bargaining ----------------------------------------- Strikes, lockouts and mandeys lost therefrom
are the negative aspects of industrial relations. A.bsenc e or p~esence of' work-stoppage need
not necessarily be the . ~eal indication of aither industrial peace or unrest. Organised
behaviour of any cla~s of people is conditioned by thei~ culture. Therefore, in Kerala if the
educated, • politicallY conscious', voc~l but non-vitllent working population with • a low
tol~~ance limit and little or no social distance from othe~.st~ata.of~society have reacted
differantly from the workers in other industrial centres, .theee ." . , ... a~e reason~ for such
behaviour. Work-stoppages do occur occasionally as part of pressure tactices employed
against victimizat~on and to shift the stand of the .. opposite party in collect~ve bargaining,
or they may be_on political issues. Tnese worK, 's'toppegas 00 nD't unouiy in'ter'i'era wi 1;'Ii
'l:ne laooilJ: management co-operation nor do they hamper the development ~t healthy
collective bargaining practices. The external factors that influence industrial ~elations ~re
such that the direct parties have little influence on them. The Government during ·the period
covered under the study has baen a pro-labour one due to several reasons. The small
industrial base of the State allowed Mirister level mediation in all major industrial disputes in
the area. The Government during the relevant period, being a Coalition Government of five
political . " . parties, enjoyed the confidence "Of atl tne trade unions operating in the units
under study, except those belonging to the CITU and independent unions. The politic~l
parties influenced'the unions to have tolerance towards rival unions. At times the unions co-
operated and even collaborated with each other. Employers· recognition of all the unions
operating in their ~nits "resulted in evin the trivial issues getting adequate attention.
Enlightened public opinion also influenced the Government, the trade un~ons and the
employers in their attitudes and approach to solvin~ industrial relations problems • .. Just as
the external influences decide to an extent the chara~ter of industrial relations ~nd the scope
 149

for collective bargaining, the internal needs and pressures compel the organisations to charter
their course of action • • In fact the external influences provide the background, while the
internal factors determine the ultimate choice ~n respect of organizational objectives and
practices. The relationship among rival unions of the area is not strained or distant. This is
true ~n the case of • crTU and even the independent unions. On the contrary, the relationship
is consultative, co-operative and at times collaborative. Even in areas outside the normal
trade '; .) (\ l ,"", ... 1 un~on work, members of rival ~nions do co-operate one another
wit~out much reservations. When strikes are organised, they are conducted in a~ orderly
manner without indulging in violence. Both the labour and management attempt to settle all
collective issues by negotiation. In addition, they participate in a variety of jOint committees,
including thosel i) ii) j13) iv) meant for removal of conflicts designed to prevent conflicts
entrusted with the ~esponsibility for administration of p~rsonnel services intended to bring
about co-operation between the parties. On the whole, the performance record of these joint
committees indicates that both labour and management make efforts to attain the purpose for
which the committees are established. 8.1.7 -T-he- --P-r-o-c-e-s-s The term 'collective
bargaining' refers to the following sets of labowr-management activities: a) Netotiation and
agreement on the terms and conditions of service b) Administration or implementation of
agreements. c) Consultation on matters of mutual interest. 330 The collective bargaining
process, therefore, does nat terminate with the signing of negotiated agreements but runs
through, out the whole validity period of such agreements. Labour-management negotiations
which settle the terms and conditions of work and services are conditioned by the framework
of existing law, customs 'and industrial struc t ure. Further, they are influenced by economic •
and political forces that operate on the industrial relations scene at the time. Collective
bargaining in the geographical area covered under the study is distinished by the following
features. 1. Industrial relations are decentralised at the unit level and consequently collective
bargaining takes place at the unit level. 2. Multi-union participation in collective bargaining is
a common practice. 3. Collective bargaining agreements are comprehensive. 4. Generally
long-term agreements are more common than short-term ones, except on the bonus issue. 5,
Trade unions are highly influenced by political parties and their rivarry is not intense ~t the
collective bargaining stages, and therefore, consultation, co-operation and coliaboration
between unions frequently take place. • 6. The Government plays a major role in facilitating
collective bargaining. The nature of negotiation for a new agreement varies considerably
from one unit to another. But there are similarities in this ,respect among: (1) old
establishments with a collective bargaining tradition, ... (2) lar.ge establishments without ,a
 150

collective bargaining tradition and (3) small establishments. There is uniformity in the stages
of collective bargaining undergone by the various participants. Those stages a~e: (1) mutual
recognition of organisations, (2) termination of existing agreements and settlements.
(3) ,subm.i.ssion of demands, (4) clarification of clauses, (5) study group reports, (6) holding
of preliminary meetings (7) understanding each others stand, (8) holding separate and joint
bi-partite negotiations. (9) organisation of separate and joint meetings in conciliation, (10)
signing of agreements and settlements, and (11 l implementation of agreemerts and
settlements. Besides the stages, there are different steps taken by t,he parties in collective
bargaining. While stages a~e those distinct phases in the progress of the collective bargaining
process, steps are 'pri'rnarily the • course of action taken, by the parties separately. Employers
entrust the task to competen-t officers-, consult professionals, collect data regarding
bargaining • agreements in the industry and locality, anticipate possible trade union demands,
consider the financial • liability under the anticipated demands, ana~yse the data in respect of
actual demands, make'counter demands, carryon with political lobbying and manage public •
re'lations etc. - 'The unions on their part prepare a list of demands, get the demands approved
by the general body, make joint fronts with other unions and generally maintain vigilant
attitude. The Government keep a watchful eye on the developments, take steps to keep law
and or•d er, create conditions for peaceful ssttlement of disputes by the parties thamselves,
refrain from referring collective dispute in a routine. manner - - to adjudication and if
necessary, interfere in conflict resolution directly tl:lrough its Labour Department and •
indirectly through its political leadership. '.) .) J t.J ... 1 PART II , B.2 Conclusions -----------
We embarked on this study with certain defi- 'nite objectives. from our first hand knowledge,
as well as from readings and study of published data, we had noted'that in Kerals, unlike in
the rest of India, the collective bargaining practice was gaining ground in settling industrial
disputes. We therefore set our objectives: (1) to investigate and explain the factors
responsible for stable collective bargaining system in the CQchin-Alwaye industrial be}'!; of
'~eralaJ (2) to ident~fy and outline the distinguishing " features of the collective bargeining
process in that geographical area; .and :3) to understan.d, collective bargaining BS a model -
in social dynamics • • In order to test the validity of our understanding of the phenomenon,
we developed four hypotheses in respect of the first objective. In respect of the second
objective, no hypothesis was considered necessary 'as it involved only matters of detail which
demand~d-8- " 33'': t depth study. The third objective was to emerge out of the ,study as a
whole and as such no hypothesis could have been developed at the initial stage of planning
the study • • The data available conclusively establish thet Collective Bargaining has been the
 151

method most widely , , employed by both labour and managements for industrial conflicts
resolution in the Cochin~Alwaye industrial belt during the period covered by the study. All
industrial units studied have an ininterrupted record of settling every collective dispute
through bipartite negotiations or tripartite formal conciliation by the officers of the labour
administration machinery or through informal intervention by the leaders £~ Government.
Since the definition of the termS, 'Collective bargaining' accepted for this study also includes
bipartite agreements. and 'settlements' with and without participation of conciliation
lIlachinery Bnd the fact that there is complete absence of adjUdication and voluntary
arbitration in collective dioputes, it brings all dispute settlements in the category of collective
bargaining agreemen,ts. 8.2.2 ~~:E~~~_~~:e~~~~~!~_!~:_E~!!~=!!~~_~~E2~!~!~2 -in- --G-
e-n-e-r-al ~ No single factor by it&elf is responsible for the prevailing stable collective
bargaining practice in the aree, The presence and influence of multiple factors both in favour
and against collective bargaining have been found to have operated in the context, The
healthy tradition in Collective Bargaining in the area has emerged out of a variety of
circumstances and factors such 5S predominantly rural economy and culture of the area, a •
relatively recent origin of the industrial growth centre. the first generation workers and
~anagemant personnel of the units the low tolerance level of the workers, their tendency for
agitation even at the least provocation their sense of loyalty to social organisations more than
to industry as such, the highly politicalis5d but divided trade unions with outside leader~hip,
etc. Among the positive factors found to have promoted the avolution and stabilisation of
Collective Bargaining in the geographical area, the following are UPPIZmost: a1 The cent
percent literacy of workers; b) The cant percent trade union membership - with little or no
fluctuation; c) The degree of workera' commitment to trade unions; dl The ardent desire of
both labour and manageMent to .avoid adjudication on collective issues; 33G el The
management practice of dealing with all unions irrespective of membership strength; fl The
managements inclination to recognise all unions in one unit; gl The trade union tolerance of
and even co-operation with rival unions due to expediency of prevailing industrial relations
and political situation; h) The formation of joint fronts during presentation of charter of
demands, agitations as well as negotiations •. The trade unions' own realisation that constant
struggle with managements and rival unions have not been beneficial to them in the past, and
that their approach had only frightened away the p6tential investors and discouraged
expansion of existing units in the region, made them adopt less radical methods in conflict
resolution than in the past. The managements have also come to realise that their earlier
'divide and rule' policy does not give any dividends any longer and that they can achieve their
 152

organisational goals only in a tension free atmosphere. The multiunit organisations with
operations elsewhere in the 'country have given a lead in demonstration the efficacy of
collective bargaining in dispute settlement. The coalition governments of the state since 1969
have geined an image of being more progressive and •• OJ I ,) , pro-labour than any
Governments in the past. Participation of all majo~ political parties, except one, in these
Coalition'Governments had a definite moderating influence on all but one state-wide trade
union organisation. Even those unit-wise trade unions with no • explicit official political
commitment could not go beyond their radical counter-parts which had to operate as per
broad directives from their political masters. 8.2.3 !~~=~~~!=_f~=~~:~_~~~~~~!~~~~_!
~:_E~!~=:~~~~ ~!!:2~!1]'!1]~ Trade unions have reacted to managements actions and
inactions. This means that there would be no trade union activity quite independently of
managements as without any specific stand by managements trade unions would have little
scope for any action. The managements of tha geographical area have altered their earlier
concept and practice in respect of their relationship with trade unions. From a policy of
'divide and rule', they have moved away to accept trade unions as inevitable and even
necessary agencies for maintaining positive labour management relationship. This
transformation of thinking and practice has occurred in the background of the prevailing
industrial relations environment, due to two immediate factors: i) the professionalisation of
management,. and the consequent changed management culture and style in their relations
with workers, in general and trade unions in particular; and iil the managements' realization
of the political power behind the workers and their organizations. 8.2.3.2 Influance ~f the
Coalition Government ____________________________ M _______ _ The working of the
Coalition Governments in the State has proved that political parties with divergent, end often
opposing political ideologies at times need and do co-operate and work together in running
the Government with the minimum accepted policies and programmes, without sacrificing
their separate identity and political faith provided they have broad common interests. The
trade unions belonging to the partners in the Coalition Gov~rnment have learned a lesson
from their political experiments at Government level and have extended it to trade union
acti~n programmes fOr the benefit of all parties: the politicel parties and the trade union
organisations to which they belong as well as their own members and the industry as a whole.
formation of joint fronts could have been a possibility even in the absence of Coalition
Governments as it has been a historical truth since 1940. However, working of the Coalition
Government and the tacit encouragement given by its constituent political parties to their'
respective trade unions has created a new situation favourable for collective bargaining.
 153

Several trade unions seeking co-operation among themselves had their political organizations
participating in the Coalition Governments. Their formation of joint fronts, in several cases,
created a one bargaining agent situation. In others tao, though the trade unions operated as
separate entities, in effect, they followed a uniform or near-uniform approach in matters of
common interest, which facilitated collective bargaining. Recognition of any single union as
the sole collective bargaining agent in a multi-union situation had created intense trade union
rivalry and consequent labour unrest as a perennial problem. In the past even where collective
bargaining was attempted between the management and their unions with the l.argest
membership as the recognised unions, the minority 'unions in the units had created labour
crisis. Such labour unrest became more intense where the minority unions together enjoyed
majority membership in relation to the total work-force. In such cases, the employers
invariably favoured the trade unions which enjoyed the political patronage of the party in
power. In the situation which obtained during the study period, the managements could not
unduly displease any of the political p~rties which were partners in the Coalition
Governments. The·union leaders always enjoyed more stronger political contact than the
management. In the circumstances, the management found it more advantageous to deal with
all unions than dealing exclusively with one union, the largest one which in majority of cases
had only a minority followin~. In addition, the tradition of forming joint fronts by unions at
some stage demanded managements to deal with all the unions. 8.2.3.4
G__o_v_e_rn_m__e_n_ts_ _R__e_lu__c_ta_n_c_e_ _i_n_ __R_e_f_e_r_ri_n_g_ __D wi
_sp__u_te_s_ __fo_ r_ The coalition governments of the relevant period had refrained from
referring collective industrial disputes for adjudication. This, in effect, made adjUdication
almost non available in collective disputes. 9.2.3.5. Government Intervention in Industrial
Disputes. ---------.--------------------------------~---- The labour administrative machinery
invariably intervenad in all real and apprehended disputes. Its efficient service as recorded by
the National Labour Commission helped to settle the majority of those disputes which evaded
bipertite agreements. In the remaining disputes the leaders of the GOvernment personally
intervened • This he s become . possible due to the small industrial base of Kerala. Besides,
such timely intervention had become a necessity because the leaders wanted Kerala to gain a
new image of a state free of labour troubles. The influence these leaders enjoyed, both with
trade unions and managements, to a great extent, helped in settling disputes of the worst
types. 8.2.4 Main features of the Collective Bargaining Process
------------------------------------------------~~ The collective bargaining process in the
geographical area covered under the study is distinguished by the following features: 1 • 2. 3
 154

• 4. 5. 8.2.5 Industrial relations arE decentralised at the unit level and consequently
bargaining takes place at the unit level. Multi-union recognition is common in the region for
the purpose of collecti've bargaining. Multi-union participation in collectiv~ bargaining is a
common practice in the area. Collective bargaining agreements Bre comprehensive. General
long-term agreements are more common than . short term ones (except in the bonus issue). -
C-o-l-l-e-c-ti-v-e- --B-a-r-g-a-in-i-n-g- -a- --S-y-s-te-m-- -A-p-p-r-o-a-c-h It is almost
impossible to construct a general model of Labour-Management negotiation which would
apply to all bargaining situations. However, a framework of a model repliInputs General
Economic tonni. 't1on Power position and the parties relation Political situation ., General
Public Attitude Other basic settlement data
Control Target and Resistant point Labour Law Court Decisions Status and Role
Expectations Attitudinal Environment l!J :r. Political parties Transf 0 110 a ti on ten'tra),
'l:raae'ifn'l.tm 1;),elllBll't Organisations J Conciliation United Fronts ~ '\ Negotiation Union
Negotiating Team -:. 1 (Rank and Fil~ - . Management !sao ciation , Top Hanegement of the
Units 71 " J ~ • Company negotiw e.ting Team Staff and B u Lower Management • I Memor~
, Producti vi ty Labour Cost Ra~lo Cost of Employees Services Grievance record , ~ Output
~ Labour t\&Ilag~ll\~nt!l Structure of Attitudes ·r I :.l ..'." N ~~~' 3 eating the system that is
found to be operating in the CochinAlways industrial belt was sought to be constructed, and it
is discussed in the following paragraphs • figure 4 diagrama- • tically represents the
Collective Bargaining Negotiation Madel. formal negotiation between trade un~ons and
mana- • • gements do take place after the termination of the existing agreements/settlements
but only on submission of a charter of demands. But the model here is to be viewed as a
dynamic framework, largely the culmination of a host of prior inter- • actions. They include
previous administration agreements/ settlement and periodic consultation between
managements and trade unions on the one side. and consultation, cooperation and formation
of joint fronts,on the part of trade unions, preparation of the charter of demands, joint and
separate action programme plans including strikes, etc. on the other. The final hours give and
take sessions are the stages when the ultimate contracts are hammered out. 6.2.5.1 Input Both
the parties, the managements and the trade unions, attempt to evaluate the present and future
financial state of the country in general and that of the industry and unit in particular. The
managements consider their liability at each dose of increased benefits to workers. The
probable questions are; how much can they afford? What is the extent of deficit that can be
made up'by high in prices of goods or services? How much higher productivity can be
reasonably anticipated? How the deficit in one aree of operation made good by gains in
 155

another area. The trade unions also consider the trend in labour cost, the gap between the
actual wage and fair wage, the structure in Government departments and other comparable
industries, and units, capital profit ratio, scarcity of labour , (this is' a recent phenomenon due
to the large scale outflow of trained manpower in certain occupational sectors to the middle
east countrie0. etc ••. for both managements and labour a more important variable is their
relative power position and the power 5tructur~ in the State Government. All these variables
can be considered as inputs of the system.
Transformation Element: Inputs are absorbed initially by the transformation elements
of the system. It is at this stage of the model activity that negotiations take place.
Extra-organisational Bargaining: Bargaining during strikes can be seen as a
subsystem. Such bargaining may be due to the break down of the initial negotiations. At this
stage or even earlier the conciliation machinery steps in on its own or on the expressed desire
of one or both parties. Although the process is known as conciliation, in effect it is
negotiation facilitated by a third party.
Control Elements: Control sets boundaries and provides goals for the negotiations.
The negotiators generally think in terms of a range 1 to 5 of possible settlements rather than a
single contract. Neither the trade unions nor the managements are certain as to what their
opposite number is really striving for, and therefore they do not attempt to predetermine a
given course of action. However, they set guidelines which we record as 'targets and
resistence points'. These outside parameters act as decisive rules in evolving strategy. The
lower limit or resistant point for trade union teams the lowest of the management offers that
they can accept. On the other end of the continuum is the target, defined as the complete
success to the trade unions.
Attitudinal environment: It is composed of both the previous bargaining relationship
and the current feelings. The manifestations of their structuring is an atmosphere of hostility
or friendliness, trustor distrust. acceptance or non-acceptance. The attitudinal atmosphere
prevalent at the negotiation table influences and directe, the ultimate contracts reached.
 156

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1971. A STUDY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING QUESTIONNAIRE FOR
MANAGEMENTS . . . (For most questions, there are no correct or wrong answers. The data
collected are for academic purpose only. The name of the organisations will not appear in the
report that is planned to be made). Research Guide: Research Scholar: Dr.S.D. 'punekar C.M.
George Professor of Social Sciences Tata Inst. of Social Sciences, Bombay 400Q88 Tata
Institute of Social Sciences Bombay 400088 PART I 1.01 Name 1.02 Age 1.03 General
Education .. : 1.04 Professional education: 1~05 Job position and level 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09
1.10 1 • 11 1.1 2 of command in the Orgn.: No. of years of service: Income (Optional to
answer) No. of years of experience as collective bargaining negotiator: No.of collective
bargaining participation No. of successful bargaining participation : No. of organisations
represented in collective bargaining : Position in the bargaining teams: 1,13 Membership in
profes_ sional bodies: i) ii) iii) iv) 1.14 Official positbns held i~ ~rofessional btldi w~ t years
es . .i, ~ i~~) iv) Salary: Others R>l. 1. Leader of the team 2. member of the team 3. just a
signatory to the collective agreements · .. • •• • •• 1.15 Membership to other bodies: aJ
Statutory: i) 2. 2.01 2.02 ? PARr II Industrial relations climate in your unit has been peaceful
since 1970? If the answer to Qn.2.01 is IYes', what was it due to? ii) iii) iv) b) Non-statutory:
il - ii) iii) iv} Yes • • • No • • • a) less no. of dipustes bJ few stoppage of work c) settlement of
disputes by peaceful means d) quick reference of disputes for adjudication e) no intense inter-
union rivalry to disturb Yes • •• • • • • • • • • • • •• • peace .. •••• f) no/few violent provocation
by either side ••• 2.03 2.04 Are the unions in your unit committed to: Are the workers in
general committed to: , ) ,8 improve.efficiency b) high discipline tJ improve efficiency
b).maintain high discipline c) maintarn good relation with superiors d) grow within the
organi-sation • •• • • •• • ·• . •.• • • • •• • •• • 2.05 On the whole, has your 5atis- Somewhat Not
satis grievance machinery been factory satisfactory factory. functioning7 M gt. • . • •• wer
kers •• • •• 2.06 Do individual grievance turn out tQ be cause of industrial dispute? Quite fre-
Sometimes quently • • • ••• . .. • •• Never • •• 2 07 Individual grievances have Sometimes •
2.08 2.09 2.10 2. 11 been causes for stoppage of work: Have you ever got standing orders
modified by joint epplication lo·ith your trade union(s)? Do you have a Works Committee If
the answer to 2.09 is 'Yes' does it function to your satisfaction? What other labour-
management committees exist in your establishment and how they function? a) Production
committee ,. b) •. Safety committee c) Canteen committee d) Welfare committee e. \
5.)!.Cl"Ct.a cClw-lnit.t.e.e. f) Suggestion committee g) Any other.. •• • 0 0 • • • • • • , • • • • •
 160

it • • • • • • 2.l2 There has never been a strike on bonus issue since 19707 2.13 There has been
no strike on.a non-industrial issue? 2. 14 'If the answer to 2.13 is 'no' how many strikes on an
average per year since 1970? a) , , ,. Yes Yes • • 0 · .. Yes •• 0 Satisfactory • •• • •• • • • • •• • ••
• • • •• • • • Yes '" Yes •• , one per year two per year three per year Never No No ••• o • • • ••
No ••• Not satis factory • •• • •• • • • • •• • • • · .. • •• • •• No ••• N D ••• • •• • •• • • 0 b) c) d)
more than three per year 2.15 There has been no strike due to inter-union rivalry since 19707
2.14 There has been ~o violent demonstration in which injuries have be~n caused to
individualS since 19707 a) only unce b) hlice c) thrice d) faur times Yes -f', Ye 5 ••• · .. · . .
· .. · ."' • •• No '0' No ••• 2.1 7 There has been no violent clash between rival unions since
19707 Yes • • .. 2.18 2. 19 2.20 Only once twice thrice four times No criminal cases have
been instituted by the Manegement against the trade union members What is the labour
strength of your organization How many unions are in your organization? 3. PART III 3.01
Among the different methods of conflict resolution. which are those you frequently practice?
• , .. ,. . ••••• • ill •••• Yes • • • •••••• ...... Please rank them: Pt-eferenc e a) Collective
bargaining b) conciliation c)voluntary arbitration d I adj udicat ion 3.02 If your preference
and practice Bre not the same, in all cases, what could be the reasons? • • • • •• • • • • • • a)
you and the trade union(s) P~efer different methods Yes • b) circumstance demand sBcrific~
of your preference Yes. • • • • No • • • No • • • Practice ••• ... ••• ... No • • • 'No • • • 3.03 Has
there been any'ouiof court Bett lement? Yes . •• No... 3.04 What are the issues you refer for 3.
05 arbi tration? Do the you in al imp~emen~a~10n ot agr~ement b) individual cases c)
grievances political parties pressuris~ major dispute settlement? . Always /'It times Never
3.06 Is the State policy conduciva • •• • •• • •• • ••• · ... , • ••• 306- Is the State pOlicy
conducive for free collective bargaining 3.07 Do the Ministers directly Or indirectly influence
you in your decision in major dispute settlement? Yes • • • No • • • Always ••• at times • • • •
Never • •• 3.08 How do you recognise unions? a) By ballot • • • b") by verification of
membership ••• 3.09 Do you generally sign even bipartite agreements before DCO to make
them settlements? Yes. • • 3.10 Have you at any time reopened the subjects covered in the 4.
4.01 4.02 4.03 agreements before the expiriy of the stipulated period? • PART IV Even when
~ou g~ve voluntarily more than he workers expect, will they still insist for an agreement?
Alle you in favour of long-hrm or short-term agreemen ts? Do you prefer all comprehensive
Yes • .. • • Yes • • • a) Long-term b) short-term No .. • • No • • • No • • • • •• • •• or piece-meal
agreements? a) comprehensive • •• b"j piece~meal • •• 4.04 Do you think the union(s) are Yes
No as stron g as you are at the • • • • • bargaining table? ~ • 4.05 Do the trede union s
jointtogether to put up a united front during bargaining? • a) at times · ... b) always ••• c)
 161

never ••• 4.06 Do you want your unions to rema in divided and weak? • Yes • • • No • • • •
4.07 Do you think that your gains are more by bargaining than by other methods? Yes ••• No
••• • 4.08 • How is your relationship with minority unions at the bargaining stage? a)
indifferent b) consultative c) cooperative d) cpmpetitive • •• • •• • •• • •• 4.09 Do you think
that other forms of dispute settlement including wage board system do have Yes ••• the
elements of collective 4.10 4 • 1 1 bargaining? Between you and the union who is more
anxious for collective bargaining? What is the future prospects of free collective bargaining
in your uni t? PART V a) Trade union b') Management a) bright No • • • • •• • • • • •• b) ae it is
today ••• c) bleak • •• 5.01 The place of your industry in e) yours loS a basic the national
economy has some industry positive influence on collect- b) your prodUcts are love
bargaining due to: major inputs lon agric ulture c) yours are major mass consumption items
d) your products are • •• • •• • • • export items ••• 5.02 Does the nature of your industry
contribute in the success of collective bargaining? e) other industries and services depend on
your products '0' f) yours is a public utility industry a) job work b) product manufacturing cl
assembly line d) continuous processing • • • • • • • •• • •• • •• 5.03 Does the manufacturing a)
process as suc h demands b) collective bargaining? c) d) e) 5.04 Does the capita I-labour a)
ratio influence the mana-b) .gement in welcoming collee: ti ve bargaining? 5.05 Does the
technology used favour collective bar~aining1 5.Q6 Does the ownership pattern has any
influence? c) a) b) c) d) a) b) c) d) e) single product • • • multiple products • • • simple
process .' .. complex process • •• continuous processing • • • · • labour intensive • •• capital
intensive • •• highly cepital intensive • •• mechanical • • • semi-automatic • •• highly Butoma
tic ... ". remote control system o •• proprietary • • • public limited o •• private limited • • •
public sector • •• joint sector • •• 5.07 Does the organisation structure facilitate . bargain ing?
a) single unit organisation • •• 5.08 5.09 b) mUltiple units orgn • • • • c) single director
r~onsible to the board ••• d) several 'directors have What financial position helps for smooth
bargaining? Does the long-term good financial prospects of your organization encourage
bargaining? functional control a) when the industry declare normal dividend b) when the
industry declare high dividend • •• • •• • •• c) when the industry fails to declare dividend? •••
d) when the industry makes losses '0' a) good demand for the products b) anticipated full
capacity util~zat~Qn • •• PART VL 6 • 01 The Kerela Government has been pro-labour since
1910: 6.02 Around 1970 and thereafter, the Kerala Government has been liberal than other
State Governments in ~onferring benefits to workers by legislation: 6.03 Kerels's industrial
base being small, any major industrial dispute has attracted the attention of the Government
leaders: 6.04 The Government do not discrimi-. nate one union against another: 6.05 The
 162

public sector units are the wage-setters in the region: 6,06 The trade unions in general co~?~
rated eacn etner Q~d with the management in conflict resolution by collective bargaining7
6.07 The long time taken in adj udication has encouraged collective bergaining? PART VIr
7.01 Do the unions request for your company data be fore chartei of demands are submitted?
7.02 Yes ••• No • •• Yes • •• No • •• Yes • •• No • •• Yes • •• No • •• Yes • •• No • •• Yes • •• No
... Yes • •• No • •• a) always ••• b) sometimes • •• c) neller • • • al always and all data b)
always but some data Do you gille the unions the data requested? c) sometimas some data . dl
never 7.03 Do you think that the union demands are based on analysis of any data? 7.04 Do
you prepare/figure out the nature and quantum of union demands? 7.05 Do you think that
your anticipation of union demands and the actual demands are identical and of the same
degree? Yes ••• No • •• a ) always • •• b) sometimes • •• c) n"e ver • •• a) always almost
identical • •• b) sometimes slmost identical • •• c) never identical • •• d) sometimes of the
same degree • •• .. · .. • •• • •• • •• 7.06 7.07 7.De 7.1 Q ::JtiU e) sometimes of the same
degree f) never of the same degree What is your normal initialr~ ction to any charter of
demands? What is the time taken for union-management discussion after the submission of
demands? a} acknowledge receipt and keep quiet b} acknowledge receipt and ask for details
and clarifications c) acknowledge receipt end promise to give e reply later dl invite the union
for an initial discussion a} less than a month b) more than a month but less than' two months
c) more than three months • •• • •• • •• • •• • •• • •• • •• • •• • •• How many joint meetings may
• • • be required to conclude agreements? 8g~ less than five mOre than ten more than two
months • • • What would be the time gap between the submission of charter of demands and
conclusion of bargaining? How many bargainings you had since 1970? but less than three
months • •• c) more than three months ••• but less than four months dl more than four months
• •• ••• 7.11 How many among the bargaining have been successful? • • • 7.12 7.13 Who form
the negotiating team? Do you give consideration to the personal traints of the negotiatiog
body members? a l Senior most managers b r the chief of the I.R. Department c) a team
selected by the management because of the members' competence in such task Yes • • • No • •
• • •• • •• • • • :1 tJ 1 7.14 If the answer to Qn.No.7.11 is 'yes' how will you rank aggressive..
intuitive ••• the traits shown here against? p&ssive •• risk taking •• patient •• innovating •••
competitive.. assertive .••• eeliberate.. tenacious ••• situational.. loy-key ••• 7.15 Who decides
the items and quantum of benefits? a) board of directors b) the chief executive c) decided in
consult aations with senior Managerial personnal 7.16 Do you at times give in to unions to
purchase industrial peace? 7.17 Are your unions realistic at bargaining table? 7.18 Do you
make counter demands to your unions? Yes • • • a) always b) at times c) never a) always b) at
 163

times c) never 7.19" Do you give threats to unions a) like lay-off-retrenchment, b) closure,
lockout etc.? always at times 7.20 Are the unions peaceful in their demonstration? c) never
Yes a) often '0" .' No No 7.21 Do the Government influence you directly or indirectly in
dispute settlement? b) in stray cases c) never 7.22 What is the labour strength Iilf your
organization? ....... 7.23 What is the management strength? ......... 7.24 What is the lowest
wage rate in your o"rga~ization? • ••••• 7.25 What is the"capital investment of yo"ur
orgariization? · . . . . .. 7.26 What l.S the yearly turnovc-r-7 · ........ 7.27 Are you decl~ring
devidend above 10% • ••••• 7.28 What l.6 the extent of your capacity utilisation? • ••••• • eo
• . , ••• ... ••• • t' • • •• • •• • •• • ••. .. • •• " .. • •• · .... • •• • •• • •• • •• • •• • •• A STUDY OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAJNING (QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TRADE mlIo~ LEADERS) (For
most· of the questions, there are no oorrect or wrong answers', In 'majori ty cases, you have
to select one of the two or many alternatives given. The, data collected are for academic
purpose only. The name of 'org~nisations will not appear in the report that is pl,eJjIled to- be
made.) Research Gu.i.d e: Dr. S,D.·Punekar Professor of Social Sciences Tata, lnsh tute 'of'
Social Sciences Bombay - 400 088.' • 1.01 Name 1.02 Age 1.03 Educational level • 1.04
Speci~l trade union training, if any • 1.05 Company job title 1.06 Length of service with
Company PART I Research Scholar c,~j. George • Tata Institute of Social Sciences Bc~bay -
400 088. 1.07 Total income per month : a) Salary/Wage Rs. b) Othere Rs. 1.08 Position in
Union at Present 1.09 No. of years of union experi once 1 .10 No. of years of experience as: -
~ - a) Executivecommi tj:lle member • • • b) Office bearer ~ -. - i) President ii) Vice-President
iii) Secretary 1v) Joint Secret ary • • • v) Treasurer • vi) Any other • • • 1 • 11 • Time spent per
day on •• a) full day union work b) half day -- 0) two hours -- d) less tha!l two hours - 1.1 ~•
Are you paid for Union : Yes No Work • 1.13 If the answer to 1 .12 is 'Yes' what is the ·• P.s •
- present remuneration? 1.14 No. of years of experi- : a) More th811 20 years -- ence as a
collective b) Less th811 20 years but bargaining negotiatior ' . more than 15 years 0) Less
that! 15 years but more that! 10 ·years -- d) Less than 10 years but more that! 5 years 1. I 7
No. of bargaining situa- : a) More than 15 -- tions encountered b) Less than 15, but more than
10 oj Less than 10, but more thsn 5 d) Less than 5 - 1.1b Your status in bargaining: a) Chief
negot iator team nOwadays b) A negotiator c) A member of the team -- 1.17 Your status
in ,trade union a) Indus try level • · movement beyond the unit b) State level • • level 0)
National level • • • 1.18 PartiCipation in Seminars/ a) Local level • , - COnferences : b) State
level • · 0) National level • • • d) Inte rnat10 nlll level • • • 1.19 Membership to bodies 1.20
Political affiliation, if any : a) Statutory i) • ii) . . . iii) • . • b) Non-statutory i) • ii) • iii) •• iv}
•• : a) Ordinary member of a political party b) Office bearer at local level 0) Member/ Office
 164

bearer at District level d) Member/ Office bearer at State level e) Nember of municipali ty/
Corpna tion/State legislati vel Parliament <!. PART II 2.01 Industrial rel ations climate has
been peaceful since 1970 · Yes -- No -- 2.02 If the answer to Question : a) Less No. of
disputes Yes 2.Ul ia 'Xes', what wee it No due to? b) Few stoppage of work Yes No 0)
Settlement of disputes by Yes peaceful means No d} Q.uick Teference of dhrputss Yea 1" or
adj udichtio n No e) No intense inter union Yes rivalry to disturb peace No f) No/few violent
provocation Yes by either side No 2.0:; Axe the unions in general ·• a) Improve efficiency Yes
committed to - No b) High discipline Yes No - - - -- ~.U4 Are the majority of wrkers: commit
ted to 2.05 On the whole, has your •• grievance machinery been functioning? 2.06 Do
individual grievances : turnout to be causes of industrial disputes? 2.07 Individual grievances
have •• been causes for stoppage of work 2.08 Have you ever got your standing orders
modified by joint application with your manegemen t 2.09 Were you had a gratuity scheme
prior to 1970? 2.10 Does your provident fund scheme fall under the exempted category? e.)
b) 0) d) a) b) c) a) b) 2.1, Do you have a Works Committee? 2.12 If the answer to 2.09 is
'Yes', do es it function to your satisfsction? 2.13 What other labour-management committees
exist in your establishment and how they function? a) Production Committee b) Safety
Committee cJ Canteen Committee gd~l Welfare Committee Sports Commi tt ee Suggestion
Committee Any others •• . Improve efficiency Yes No Maintai~ high discipline Yes No Trade
upion movement Yes No Trade u)li ons to which they Yes belong No Satisfactory Somewhat
satisfactory Not satisfactory ... . ~ Quite frequently Sometimes Never Sometimes Never Yes
lio - Yes No - Yes No Yes No Yes No - Sati sfactory Non Satisfactory ~.14 th.r. haa up.r b .. n
a .trike * T •• - 10 - 0. bonu. 1Isue lIinC' 19701 2.15 There haa b ..n no IItrik. on •• T.II 10 -
non-industrial iseue ,ince 19701 '1...' \ ( :~ 2.16 If the anner to ~ Ie tlJo t. I One per year
how .an, .trik.s on en .verage Two per y.r per year aince 19701 :~ Three per year More then
three per year 2.17 'l'bere has been no strike due to inter-union ri"alry IIlnc. 19701 T •• - 1'10
- 2.18 file. htIB bee. no .. iolent demon- Yee - No - .tretion in which injuries haY. baen
ce.uasd to indiVidual •• ince a) Only onc. 1970? b) Me. o} '!brice d) FOUr tim. 2.19 fIl.re has
been no riohnt claah Tea - 10 beheen rbal union. dnct 19701 a) Only once b) Twice c) Thrice
d) FOUr Ua. 10 criaina1 caees hare been Til - Ho bati tut.d by the Manage_nt against the
trade union a.mb.re? a) Vel'y few b) Mall1 c) For thett .nd Violence oni,. 2.21 No trade Ulion
work.r ill vietiabed b,. the lIanqeaent tor trade union activities? '.01 AIIIOIll! the different
methode of conflict resolution, which are thoe. lOU pr.fer 1Il0at and which are thoe' lOU
frequently praeti ••• Tea - Ho - - -- -- - - - Pl.a.e rank theil, Pref.rence Pr/l.Ctic. a) Collective
bargaining 11) Conciliation 0) Voluntary arbitration d) U3udiceUon -- -- - -- 3.02 If your
 165

preference and practice are not the same, in all cesee, what could be the reasons? 3.03 Has
there been any out of court settlement 3.04 What are the issues you refer for arbi tra.tion?
3.05 Do the political parties pressurise you in major dispute settlement? 3.06 Is the state
policy condusive for free collective bargaining? ,.U·{ Do the ;·tinisters directly or indirectly
influence in your decision in major di spu te settlements? If you are very strong and justified
in your demands, will you yield at times for the sake of keeping peace in industry? 3.09 Do
you generally sign even bipartite agreements before D.L.O to make them settlements? 3.10
Have you at any time reopened the subjects covered in the agreements before the expiry of
the stipulated period? 4. PART IV 4.01 Even when your management give you volun tarily
more than you expect, will you still insiat for an agreement'? 4.-02 Al'e you i11 l'i:lvour of'
long-term or short-term agreements? a) You and your employer pl:'efer different methods Yes
No b) Circumstance demand sacrifice of your preference Yes No Y,es No : a) Implementation
of agreements b) Individual cases c) Grievances Always At times -- : Yes No Al ways At
times : a) At times without any condition 1 b) At times with condition c) Never Yes Yes Yes 1
a) Long term b) Short term No No No Never Never , 4.03 Do you prel"er all comprenensive
or piece-meal. agreements? 4.04 Are you singly or in combination with other unions in the
establishment enjoy equality with your 4.05 If you are weak, will you Jo~n with other unions
to put up a united front? 4.06 If yours is only one union and it a) Comprehensive bJ Piece-
meal Yes : a) At times b) Always c) Never No enjoys majority membership in the : Yes No
unit, do you consider yourself strong? 4.07 Does your union menbership remain steady or
fluctuate? 4.08 Is it not possible for you to have one union, getting the rivalor ones unified?
4.09 Do your management want you to remain a) Steady b) Fluctuate a) If inside leadership is
alIowed to develop b J If poll tical parties demand no support for their help cJ Not possible
for years to come diVided and weak? : Yes No 4.10 How is your relationship with your rival
unions at the bargaining stage? 4.11 Do you get the co-operation of your rival, if you are the
majority union? 4.12 If you are a minority union, are you consulted by the majority union in
collective bargaining1 : aJ Indifferent b) Consul ta ti ve c) Co.,.opera ti ve d) Competitive a)
At times on the basis of i SBues b) Always c) Never a) At times, depending on the reI stive
strength h) AI ways, irrespective of i:he strength cJ At times depending on the merit of the
position you take d) Never --. 4.1' If you are a minority union, will the managemen t consult
you bef ore the agreement is signed with the majori ty union? 4.14 Have you at any time! on
any issue established a relationship ;!i. th ri val unions, the way the diff erent political parties
work together in the Keral a Coalition Government? 4.15 Do you rule out the chances that
your management might corrupt the trade union officials by offering personal gains? 4.16
 166

Have you ever doubted the trade union leaders' integrity at bargaining table? 4.17 Do you
think that your gains are more by bargaining than by other methods? 4.18 Do you think that
other forms of dispute settlement including wage board system do have the elements of
collective bargaining? 4.19 Between you and the management who is more an.~ious for
collective bargaining? 4.20 What is the future prospects of free collective bargaining in your
unit? 5. PART 5.01 The placeof you r indu stry in the national economy has some positive
influence on collective bargaining due to .. v a) At times b) Always c) Never a) Tried and
succeeded on several issues b) Tried and succeeded on few occasions c) Tried and failed d)
Not tried at all Yes Yes Yes Yes a) Trade Union b J Managemen t a) Bright b) As it is today cJ
Bleak No No 110 No -. a) Yours is a be.sic industry b) Your products are major inputs in
agriculture c) Yours is a major mass consumption item d) Your products are export items e)
Vther industries and services depend on your products ~ - f) Yours is a public utili ty industry
5.02 Does the nature of your industry contribute in the success of collective oargain1ngY :nu
aJ Job lIork b) Product manufacturing c) Assembly line d) Continuous processing - 5.03 Does
the manufacturing process as : a) Single product such demands collective bargaining b)
Multiple products 5.04 Does the capital-labour ratio influence the manBgement in welcoming
collective bargaining? 5.05 Does the technology used favour collective bergaining? 5.06
Does the ownership pattern has any influence? 5.07 Does the organisation structure facilitates
bargaining? 5.08 6. "''hat financial position helps for smooth bargaining? Does the long-term
good financial ; prospects of your organisation enc ourage bargai ning? PART VI 6.01 The
Kerala Governm~nt hssbeen pro-labour since 1970 d c) Simple process ) Complex pro cess e)
Continuous processing a) Labour intensive bJ Capital intensive cJ Highly capital intensive a)
~!echanical b) Semi-automatic c) Highly automatic d) Remote control system a) Proprietory
b) Public limited c) Private limited d) Public sector e) Joint sector a) Single unit organisation
- - b) !·!ultiple unit organisation -- c) Single director responsible to the bo ard -- d) Several di
re ctors have functional control a) "'hen the industry declare normal di vi den t b) When the
industry declare high divident cJ When the industry fails to declare divident d) ilhen the
industry makes losses a) Good demand for the products b) Anticip ated full capa,ci ty
utilisation Yes 'No - 6.02 Around 1970 and thereafter, the Kerala Government has been liberal
than other state Governments in conferring benefits to workers by legislation 6.03 Kerala's
industrie.l base being small, any major industrie.l dispute has attracted the attention of the
Government leaders 6.04 The Government do not discriminate one union against another
6.05 The public sector units are the wagesetters in the region 6.06 The trade unions in general
co-operated each other and with the manegement in conflict resolution by collective
 167

bargaining 6.07 The long time taken in adjudication has Yes no Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No encouraged collective bargaining i 'Ies No 7. PART VII 7.01 Do you terminate the
agreements/settlements immediately after their stipulated lif e time? 7.02 Do you in the
meantime prepare yourself for a new agreement? 7.03 Who will prepare the fresh charter of
demands? 7.04 Will the charter of demands b";{ presented to the General body? 7 .05 i1hat
are the factors you consider in preparing fre,sh demands? a) Always b) Sometimes ~ a)
Always b) SOllletimes cJ Never ; a) Executive body b) A body specially consti tuted for the
purpose c J The general Secretary Yes No a) ProductiVity level attained in the unit b) General
wage increase in the country/local -- 0) Increase in the standard of living of people in general
t1 .... d) Higher profits of the uni t e) Wage level in comparable units in the indus try 7.06 Do
you calculate/give : a) consideration to the impaC\) of your demands on the Always calculate
and consider Always cal cuI at e but consider if advantageous 7.07 7.08 7.09 7.10 cost of
your products? Do you want your firm to declare normal divident to th e share-holders? Do
you want your unit to grow and expand? Will you accept lower wage in case your unit is in
financial difficulties? Will you accept for a reasonably higher output, compatible with higher
wage rate you demard? oj Sometimes d) Never : a) Yes, not at the cost of present employees
b) We are not concerned a) Yes, not at the cost of employees a) Yes, on condition that after
financial recovery, the difference is paid b) No a) Yes, if thet is easily achievable b) It is not
our concern 7.11 Do you accept job evaluation in fixation of wages and keeping adequate
wage differential? : a) Yes, if union is also associated with job evaluation 7.12 How much
tiDe elapses between the submission of demands and signing of agreements 7.13 Generally,
how m811Y sittings are required before arriving at agreements? - 7-.14- Do you seek
approval of the draft agreement by the general body? b) No : a) Less than two months b)
More than two months but less than three months c) I!ore than three months but less than
foul:' months d) Hore than four months a) Less than five b) ~!ore than five, but less than ten
c) liore :,han ten but less than fifteen Yes Ilo 7.15 Do you consul t the minori ty rival union(s)
if you are the majority union? 7.16 IIho forms the negotiating team? 7.17 Do you give
consideration to the personal trai ts of the 373 a) Yes, if we have working relationship b) At
times c) Never : a) Executive body member b) A special committee formed for the purpose cJ
President alone d) Gen. Secretary alone e) President and Gen. Secretary • negotiating body? :
Yes -- No 7.18 If the answer to question No.1.1'1 is 'Yea', how will you rank the traits as sho
1lIl here against? a) Aggressive b) Passive 0) Patient :) f) Competi ti ve Deliberate Situational
g) Risk-taking h 1 .l Intuitive Assertive j) Innovative k) Tenacious 1) Loy-key 6. PART VIII
8.01 Who decides the timing of demands? 8.02 What is the method of de6ision m~ing? 8.03
 168

Do you demand a percentage increase in the existing benefits or specify a defini te

quantum? : a) Office bearers b) Executive body cJ Any singl e person authorised for the
purpose a) Official recommendations get accepted by the gene ral body b J Th e general body
mee tings serve as a spring board 0) A mixture of both 'a' and 'b' above a) Percenta.ge b) Def'
ini t e quantum 8.04 On what basis additional bene1"i ts are d.emanded? 8.05 Have the
management at times concede demands even when they are not financially justified 8.06
Does the bargaining take place purely on financial considerations or as compro· mises? 8.07
Do you threaten to go on strike in case the negotiations fail? 8.08 ]0 you really go on strike, if
negotiations fail? 8.09 How often have you gone on strike since 19701 1.1-374 a) &Kisting
practice els.where b) They are the absolute necess ity and the uni t can affo rd to give Yes :
B;) AI ways on financial consideration No b) At times as compromises a) Always b) At times
a) Always b) At times a) Once in an year at least b) Once in two years at least c) Once in
three years at least 8.10 If your major demands are met,: a) Yes No will you drop the minor
ones for the sake of agreement? 8.11 Do you welcome arbitration Yes No to settle minor
disputes? 9. PART IX \ 9.1 How do you communicate the a) 'In general body meetings terms
of agreement to rank- b) By hand-outs and-file members c) On notice bo erds 9.02 Do you
find diff'icul ty in the impler.ientation of the agreements Yes No I 9.0S If the anSwer to 9.02
is in the affir~ative, do you have buiJ.t~ clauBesfor arbi8 tration in the agreement itself? Yes
No "" .. 9.04 Do the management generally co-operate in the imple- I:lentation? : Yes No
';1.0, lfuat is the frequency of a) Once in a week post-~greement meetings b) Once in a
fortnight with the management for c) Once in a month implement etion d) As and when
problems are noticed 9.06 If there ere radi cal changes in the ci~cumstances, do you reopen
the issue before the expiry of the agreement : Yes· No