Operation Trikora

Operation Trikora was an Indonesian military

Operation Trikora
operation which aimed to seize and annex the
Dutch overseas territory of Netherlands New Part of the West New Guinea dispute and Cold War
Guinea in 1961 and 1962. After negotiations, the
Netherlands signed the New York Agreement with
Indonesia on 15 August 1962, relinquishing control
of Western New Guinea to the United Nations.

Contents
Background Indonesian stamp commemorating the Battle of
Arafura Sea
Preparation
Military Date 19 December 1961 – 15 August 1962
Airbases Location Western New Guinea
Soviet involvement Result Military stalemate
Diplomacy
Political gains for Indonesia
Economy
General Strategy Territorial Western New Guinea ceded to the
changes United Nations then to Indonesia
Indonesian military operations
Belligerents
Aftermath
Indonesia
References Netherlands
Soviet Union
Bibliography
(air & naval support)
Dutch New
Guinea
Background
Commanders and leaders
When the rest of the Dutch East Indies became C.J van
fully independent as Indonesia in December 1949, Soekarno Westenbrugge
the Dutch retained sovereignty over the western Abdul Haris W.A. van Heuven
part of the island of New Guinea and took steps to Nasution
prepare it for independence as a separate country. Ahmad Yani
The Dutch and West Papuan leaders argued that Soeharto
the territory did not belong to Indonesia because Soerjadi
the West Papuans were ethnically and Soerjadarma (id) (until
geographically separated from Indonesians, had January 1962)
always been administrated separately, and that the Omar Dhani
West Papuans did not want to be under (from January 1962)
Indonesian control.[2] From its independence in Eddy Martadinata
1949 until 1961, Indonesia attempted to gain
control of Western New Guinea through the Yos Sudarso †
United Nations without success. Since the Leonardus Benjamin
Indonesian National Revolution, Indonesian Moerdani
nationalists had regarded Western New Guinea as Strength
an intrinsic part of the Indonesian state.[3] They
also contended that Western New Guinea (Irian Indonesia:
Barat) belonged to Indonesia and was being 13,000 soldiers 10,000 soldiers
illegally occupied by the Dutch.[4][5] 7,000 paratroops 1,400 marines
4,500 marines 1,000 volunteers
Since 1954, Indonesia had sporadically launched
139 aircraft 5 destroyers
military raids into Western New Guinea. Following
the failure of negotiations at the United Nations, Soviet Union: 2 frigates
the president of Indonesia, Sukarno, escalated 3,000 soldiers 3 submarines
pressure on the Netherlands by nationalising 6 submarines 1 Aircraft Carrier
Dutch-owned businesses and estates and 3 Tu-95 strategic
repatriating Dutch nationals. These actions bombers
increased tensions between Indonesia and the
Casualties and losses
Netherlands led to a sharp reduction in trade
between the two countries. Following a sustained 94 killed 9 killed[1]
period of harassment of Dutch diplomats in 1 motor torpedo boat Unknown papuan
Indonesia, Indonesia formally severed ties with the sunk volunteer casualties
Netherlands in August 1960. Indonesia also 2 motor torpedo boats
increased its military pressure on Dutch New damaged
Guinea by purchasing weapons from the Soviet
Union and the Eastern Bloc. Over the following years, the Sukarno government would become
dependent on Soviet military support.[6]

On 19 December 1961, Sukarno decreed the establishment of the People's Triple Command or Tri
Komando Rakyat (Trikora) in order to annex what Indonesia called West Irian by 1 January 1963.
Trikora's operational command was to be called the Mandala Command for the Liberation of West
Irian (Komando Mandala Pembebasan Irian Barat) with Major-General Suharto (the future
President of Indonesia) serving as its commander. In preparation for the planned invasion, the
Mandala command began making land, air, and sea incursions into West Irian.[4][7] As a result,
Indonesia began a policy of confronting the Dutch over control of Western New Guinea.[6] Sukarno
also embarked on a policy of "progressive mobilization" to prepare the nation to carry out his
commands.[8]

While the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia sided with the Netherlands' claims to
Western New Guinea and were opposed to Indonesian expansionism, they were unwilling to commit
military support to the Dutch. The Netherlands was unable to find sufficient international support for
its New Guinea policy. By contrast, Sukarno was able to muster the support of the Soviet Union and
its Warsaw Pact allies, and the Non-Aligned Movement. In response to Indonesian claims, the
Netherlands to sped up the process of implementing West Papuan self-rule from 1959 onward. These
measures included the establishment of a legislative New Guinea Council in 1960, establishing
hospitals, completion of a shipyard in Manokwari, development of agricultural research sites and
plantations; and the creation of the Papuan Volunteer Corps to defend the territory.[9][10]

Preparation

Military

Indonesia began seeking weapons from abroad in response to the conflict with the Netherlands.
Having failed to secure anything from the United States, General Nasution went to Moscow in
December 1960 to negotiate what eventually turned out to be a US$2.5 Billion arms package with the
Soviet government. The subsequent deliveries that arose from this deal led the Indonesian National
Armed Forces (TNI) to boast that Indonesia had the strongest air force in the southern hemisphere.
The United States did not support the surrender of West Irian to Indonesia, since the Bureau of
European Affairs considered it an act of trading one occupying power for another. However, in April
1961, Robert Komer and McGeorge Bundy began to prepare plans for the United Nations to give the
impression that surrender to Indonesia was legal. Although reluctantly, President John F. Kennedy
finally supported these plans, fearing that, without U.S support, the Indonesians would become
further entrenched into the Soviet-bloc.

Indonesia bought various kinds of military equipment, including 41 Mi-4 and nine Mi-6 helicopters,
30 MiG-15, 49 MiG-17, ten MiG-19 and 20 MiG-21 fighter jets, 12 Whiskey-class submarines, 12
Komar-class missile boats, and one ex-Soviet Navy Sverdlov-class cruiser which was renamed the
KRI Irian). Of the types of bombers, there were 22 Ilyushin Il-28 light bombers, 14 Tu-16 long-range
medium bombers, and 12 maritime versions of Tu-16 aircraft equipped to launch the AS-1 Kennel
anti-ship missiles. Of the types of transport aircraft, there were 26 IL-14 and AQvia-14 light transport
aircraft, six Antonov An-12 heavy transports, and ten C-130 Hercules tactical transport aircraft.[11]

Airbases

To achieve air superiority, the first preparations undertaken by the AURI were to repair war-
damaged airbases, which would be used for infiltration operations and normal operations on the
West Irian mainland. Air bases and landing strips which were common along the borders of Maluku
and West Irian, were relics of imperial Japanese presence. Such airbases and landing strips were last
used in 1945, and had since fallen into disrepair.

Soviet involvement

Soviet support of Indonesia played a crucial role in ending the conflict over New Guinea. Due to the
support of Soviet submarines and bombers, Indonesian military forces could confidently launch an
attack on Dutch troops. In response to Soviet presence, the United States put pressure on the
Netherlands to relinquish control of West Papua. At the height of the Cold War, it was strategically
critical that Indonesia remain outside the U.S.S.R's sphere of influence, which made the U.S willing
to take action to ensure a neutral or friendly relationship with Indonesia. By enforcing the transfer of
New Guinea, the United States could keep the regime of Sukarno friendly, despite not supporting the
Netherlands which eventually gave way to American pressure and the threat of an attack on New
Guinea. The Soviet support was secret - the "volunteers" wearing Indonesian uniforms - however, the
Indonesian Foreign Minister Soebandrio let the Russian willingness to actively provide military
support leak to the American ambassador in Jakarta, according to Khrushchev’s memoirs.[12][13]
Admiral Sudomo revealed in a newspaper article in 2005 that 6 six Russian submarines supported
the amphibious operations while stationed Bitang, East Sulawesi with tasking to attack the Dutch
fleet in Manokwari.[14] Submarine commandor Rudolf Ryzhikov recalled in an Russian article he
received orders on 29 July from Admiral Sergey Gorshkov to patrol a combat zone West of New
Guinea and sink any shipping after midnight on 5 August.[15][16][17] Naval officer and Historian
Matthijs Ooms has shown in his masterpaper that the Dutch naval intelligence service, MARID
(Marine Inlichtingendienst), received information in the summer of 1962 that Soviet crews were
manning Indonesian submarines and Tupolev bombers.[18][19] In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev
freely admitted that during the West New Guinea crisis Soviet personnel had been commanding
Indonesian submarines and piloting Tu-16s.

Diplomacy

Indonesia approached countries like India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, United
Kingdom, Germany, and France to ensure that those countries would not support the Netherlands in
a potential Dutch-Indonesian conflict. In the United Nations General Assembly in 1961, the UN
Secretary General U Thant asked Ellsworth Bunker, an American diplomat, to submit proposals on
solving the problem of the status of West Irian. Bunker proposed that the Netherlands submit West
Irian to Indonesia through the United Nations within a period of 2 years.

Economy

On December 27, 1958, President Sukarno issued Law No. 86 of 1958 concerning the nationalization
of all Dutch companies in Indonesia. Nationalized companies included:

1. Plantation companies
2. Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij
3. Electricity companies
4. Petroleum companies
5. Hospital (CBZ) becomes RSCM

While other policies were implemented, including:

1. Moving the Indonesian tobacco auction market to Bremen, West Germany

2. Dutch workers strike in Indonesia
3. Prohibiting KLM (a Dutch airline) from entering Indonesian airspace
4. Prohibiting the screening of Dutch films

General Strategy

In accordance with the development of the Trikora situation, instructions were given by the
Commander in Chief of the Highest Commodity of Liberation of West Irian No. 1 to the Commander
of the Mandala, which were the following:

Plan, prepare and conduct military operations with the aim of returning the territory of West Irian
to the Republic of Indonesia.
Developing the situation in the Province of West Irian in accordance with the struggle in the field
of diplomacy and in the shortest possible time in the West Irian Region creating de facto regions
of Indonesian control.

Strategies developed by the Commander of Mandala to carry out these instructions included:

Infiltration (until the end 1962), namely by deploying infantry units around certain targets to create
a strong de facto free area that is resistant to destruction by the enemy and to develop territorial
control by unifying the local populace.
Exploitation (early 1963), namely carrying out an open attack on the enemy military host and
occupying all important enemy defense posts.
Consolidation (early 1964), namely by demonstrating the power and absolute sovereignty of the
Republic of Indonesia throughout West Irian.

Indonesian military operations

In 1962, Indonesian incursions into the territory in the form of paratroop drops and the naval
landings of guerrillas were used to step up Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio's diplomatic
confrontation with the Dutch.[10] Operation Trikora was to unfold in three phases: infiltration,
exploitation and consolidation, all under cover of the Indonesian Air Force. The plan called first for
the insertion of small bands of Indonesian troops by sea and by
airdrop, who would then draw Dutch forces away from areas
where the exploitation phase would stage full-scale amphibious
landings and paratroop operations to seize key locations. The
consolidation phase would then expand Indonesian control over
the whole of Western New Guinea.[4]

On 15 January 1962, the infiltration phase of Operation Trikora

began when four Indonesian Navy motor torpedo boats The disputed territory of West New
attempted to land a unit of 150 marines on the south coast of Guinea
New Guinea near Vlakke Hoek. The force was detected by a
Dutch Lockheed P2V-7B Neptune aircraft and the Indonesian
boats were intercepted by three Dutch destroyers. During the subsequent Battle of Arafura Sea, one
Indonesian boat was sunk and two others were badly damaged and forced to retreat. Thus, this
planned Indonesian amphibious landing ended disastrously with many crew members and marines
being killed, among them Commodore Yos Sudarso, the Deputy Chief of the Indonesian Navy Staff.
Some 55 survivors were captured. Over the next eight months, the Indonesian forces managed to
insert 562 troops by sea and 1,154 by air drops. The inserted Indonesian troops conducted guerrilla
operations throughout Western New Guinea from April 1962 onwards, but they were largely
militarily ineffective. At least 94 Indonesian soldiers were killed and 73 were wounded during the
hostilities. By contrast, the Dutch suffered only minimal casualties.[4][5]

Indonesian military activity continued to increase in the area through mid-1962 in preparation for
the second phase of the operation. The Indonesian Air Force began to fly missions in the area from
bases on surrounding islands, with Soviet-supplied Tupolev Tu-16 bombers armed with KS-1 Komet
anti-ship missiles deployed in anticipation of an attack against the HNLMS Karel Doorman.[4][5]

By the summer of 1962, the Indonesian military had begun planning a large-scale amphibious and air
assault against Biak, the Netherlands' main power base in West Irian. This operation would have
been known as Operation Jayawijaya ("Victory over Imperialism") and would have included a
substantial task force of 60 ships including several which had been supplied by Sukarno's Soviet and
Eastern Bloc allies.[5][7] On 13 and 14 August 1962, air drops of Indonesian troops were staged from
Sorong in the northwest to Merauke in the southeast as a diversion for an amphibious assault against
the Dutch military base at Biak Island by a force of 7,000 Army (RPKAD) and Air Force (PASGAT)
paratroopers, 4,500 marines and 13,000 army servicemen, from various military districts
(KODAMs). However, the Dutch Navy's Marid 6 Netherlands New Guinea (Marid 6 NNG) signals
intelligence section and Neptune aircraft detected the invasion force and alerted their command.[4][5]

According to Wies Platje, the Royal Netherlands Navy was responsible for the defence of Western
New Guinea. In 1962, the Dutch naval presence in New Guinea consisted of five anti-submarine
destroyers, two frigates, three submarines, one survey vessel, one supply ship and two oil tankers.
Dutch air power in Western New Guinea consisted of eleven Lockheed P2V-7B Neptune aircraft from
the Royal Netherlands Navy[20] plus 24 Hawker Hunter jet fighters from the Royal Netherlands Air
Force. In addition, Dutch ground forces consisted of several anti-aircraft artillery units, five Royal
Netherlands Marine Corps companies and three Royal Netherlands Army infantry battalions. As part
of the planned defence, the Dutch had considered using Marid 6 NNG to disrupt the Indonesian
military's communication systems.[5]

Aftermath
On 15 August 1962, the Netherlands recognized Indonesia's resolve to take Western New Guinea.
Since it was unwilling to be drawn into a protracted conflict on the other side of the world, the Dutch
government signed the New York Agreement, which handed the colony to an interim United Nations
administration. Consequently, Operation Jayawijaya was called off and Western New Guinea was
officially acquired by Indonesia in 1963. The Dutch decision to
hand over Western New Guinea to Indonesia had been
influenced by its main ally, the United States. While the
Netherlands was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and thus an ally of the Americans, the
Kennedy administration was unwilling to antagonize Indonesia
since it was trying to court President Sukarno away from the
Soviet orbit.[5] The Indonesian military's incursions into West
Irian, plus the substantial Soviet military assistance to the
Indonesian military, had convinced the United States The West Irian Liberation Monument
government to pressure the Dutch to seek a peaceful solution to in Jakarta
the conflict.[21]

The New York Agreement was the result of negotiations that were spearheaded by the American
diplomat Ellsworth Bunker. As a face-saving measure for the Dutch, Bunker arranged for a Dutch-
Indonesian ceasefire which would be followed by the handover of Western New Guinea on 1 October
to a temporary United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). On 1 May 1963, Indonesia
formally annexed Western New Guinea. As part of the New York Agreement, it was stipulated that a
popular plebiscite, called the Act of Free Choice, would be held in 1969 to determine whether the
West Papuans would choose to remain in Indonesia or seek self-determination.[22] However,
American efforts to win over Sukarno proved futile and Indonesia turned its attention to the former
British colony of Malaysia, resulting in the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. Ultimately,
President Sukarno was overthrown during the Indonesian coup d'état in 1965 and was replaced by
the pro-Western Suharto.[4][5] The American mining company Freeport-McMoRan began exploiting
Western New Guinea's copper and gold deposits.[23]

Following the Act of Free Choice plebiscite in 1969, West Irian was formally integrated into the
Republic of Indonesia. While several international observers including journalists and diplomats
criticized the referendum as being rigged, the United States and Australia supported Indonesia's
efforts to secure acceptance in the United Nations for the pro-integration vote. In all, 84 member
states voted in favor for the United Nations to accept the result, with 30 others abstaining.[24] Due to
the Netherlands' efforts to promote a West Papuan national identity, a significant number of West
Papuans refused to accept the territory's integration into Indonesia. These formed the separatist
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement) and have waged an insurgency against the
Indonesian authorities, which still continues to this day.[7][25]

References
1. "Nederland stuurt militairen naar Nieuw-Guinea" (https://isgeschiedenis.nl/nieuws/nederland-stuur
t-militairen-naar-nieuw-guinea). IsGeschiedenis. 27 April 2016.
2. Ron Crocombe, 282
3. Audrey and George McTurnan Kahin, p. 45
4. "Operation Trikora – Indonesia's Takeover of West New Guinea" (http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/p
ublications/Details/443/150-Operation-TRIKORA---Indonesias-Takeover-of-West-New-Guinea.as
px). Pathfinder: Air Power Development Centre Bulletin (150): 1–2. February 2011. Retrieved
19 September 2013.
5. Platje, Wies (2001). "Dutch Sigint and the Conflict with Indonesia 1950–62". Intelligence and
National Security. 16 (1): 285–312. doi:10.1080/714002840 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F7140028
40).
6. J.D. Legge, 402
7. Bilveer Singh, West Irian and the Suharto Presidency, p.86
8. Soedjati Djiwandono, p. 131
9. Wies Platje, 297–299
10. J.D. Legge, 403
11. Sibero, Tarigan (3 May 2006). "Heroic Story of Seizing West Irian (1)" (http://www.tni.mil.id/news.p
hp?q=dtl&id=113012006111078). TNI.
12. Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 3: Statesman (1953-1964), ed. Sergei
Khrushchev, trans. George Shriver (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Press, 2007)
13. "How Russia helped Indonesia annex Western New Guinea" (https://www.rbth.com/international/2
017/01/21/how-russia-helped-indonesia-annex-western-new-guinea_685151). www.rbth.com. 21
January 2017.
14. https://www.historischnieuwsblad.nl/nl/artikel/32211/russische-duikboten-voor-nieuw-guinea.html
15. “Topi ikh vsekh!”, Tekhnika Molodezhi, No. 11 (1995)
16. “Perebutan Irian Barat: Di Balik Konflik RI-Belanda 1962”, Suara Pembaruan, 2005
17. Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali: Between Learning and Law,
T.M.C. Asser Press, 21 Jul 2017, page 91
18. Matthijs Ooms, “Geheime Sovjetsteun in Nieuw-Guinea”, Marineblad, Vol. 122, No. 5 (2012), 26.
19. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/45249388/Active_Soviet_military_support_for_Indonesia_durin
20. "Maritime-sar – Militaire Luchtvaart Nederland" (http://militaireluchtvaartnederland.nl/planes/mariti
me-sar/58/lockheed-neptune-p2v-7-sp-2h-in-behandeling/). militaireluchtvaartnederland.nl.
Retrieved 23 May 2016.
21. Soedjati Djiwandono, Konfrontasi Revisited, p. 135.
22. J.D. Legge, 403–404
23. Ron Crocombe, 285
24. Ron Crocombe, 284
25. Ron Crocombe, 286-91

Bibliography
Crocombe, Ron (2007). Asia in the Pacific Islands. Suva, Fiji: IPS Publications, University of the
South Pacific.
Djiwandono, Soedjati (1996). Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soekarno.
Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
Kahin, Audrey; Kahin, George McTurnan (1995). Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret
Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. New York: The New Press.
Legge, John D. (2003). Sukarno: A Political Biography. Singapore: Archipelago Press, Editions
Didier Millet. ISBN 981 4068 64 0.
"Operation Trikora – Indonesia's Takeover of West New Guinea" (http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/p
ublications/Details/443/150-Operation-TRIKORA---Indonesias-Takeover-of-West-New-Guinea.as
px). Pathfinder: Air Power Development Centre Bulletin (150): 1–2. February 2011. Retrieved
19 September 2013.
Platje, Wies (2001). "Dutch Sigint and the Conflict with Indonesia 1950–62". Intelligence and
National Security. 16 (1): 285–312. doi:10.1080/714002840 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F7140028
40).
Singh, Bilveer (2001). "West Irian and the Suharto Presidency: a perspective" (http://resources.hu
ygens.knaw.nl/indonesischebetrekkingen1945-1969/DekolonisatieVanIndonesieEnHetZelfbeschik
kingsrechtVanDePapoea/papers_pdf/singh). The Act of Free Choice: 73–93. Retrieved 26 May
2014.

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Operation_Trikora&oldid=1003461908"

This page was last edited on 29 January 2021, at 02:29 (UTC).

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply. By using this
site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia
Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.