A Relational Theory of Risk

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A relational theory of risk

a b
Åsa Boholm & Hervé Corvellec
a
CEFOS , University of Gothenburg , PO Box 720, Gothenburg SE
405 30, Sweden
b
Department of Service Management , Lund University , PO Box
882, Helsingborg SE 25108, Sweden
Published online: 13 Dec 2010.
To cite this article: Åsa Boholm & Hervé Corvellec (2011) A relational theory of risk, Journal of Risk
Research, 14:2, 175-190, DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2010.515313
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Journal of Risk Research
Vol. 14, No. 2, February 2011, 175–190
A relational theory of risk

Åsa Boholma* and Hervé Corvellecb
a
CEFOS, University of Gothenburg, PO Box 720, Gothenburg SE 405 30, Sweden;
b
Department of Service Management, Lund University, PO Box 882, Helsingborg SE 25108,
Downloaded by [b-on: Biblioteca do conhecimento online UFP] at 08:32 14 May 2014
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(Received 21 April 2010; final version received 6 August 2010)
Taylor and Francis
RJRR_A_515313.sgm
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10.1080/13669877.2010.515313
1366-9877
Original
Taylor
2010
Professor
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asa.boholm@cefos.gu.se
Francis
ÅsaBoholm
Risk
(print)/1466-4461
Research (online)
This paper outlines a relational theory of risk. According to this theory, risk
emerges from situated cognition that establishes a relationship of risk between a
risk object and an object at risk, so that the risk object is considered, under certain
contingent circumstances and in some causal way, to threaten the valued object at
risk. This relational theory of risk is a theory about the interpretative nature of risk
that answers the key theoretical and practical questions of why and how something
is considered a risk. The relational theory of risk allows for the interpretation of
risk situations as culturally informed, and thereby suggests new ways to approach
risk communication, risk governance, and risk management by taking into account
bounded rationalities of thought and action.
Keywords: culture; risk theory; social practice; value
1. Introduction
Not all innovative scientific contributions receive the attention they deserve. A case
in point in risk research is Hilgartner’s (1992, 40) observation that ‘definitions of
particular risks include at least three conceptual elements: an object deemed to “pose”
the risk, a putative harm, and a linkage alleging some form of causation between the
object and the harm’ (emphasis in original). This observation is not merely an analysis
of risk definitions; it is a framework for understanding risk as a social phenomenon.
Although the framework describes neither the social construction of the object that
can be harmed nor the nature of the relationship between the two objects involved, it
innovatively answers the following questions: ‘Why do different individuals perceive
the risks of the same technology differently? Why do different social groups develop
conflicting definitions of the same technological risks?’ (Hilgartner 1992, 39). More
generally, the framework addresses the question of why something is or is not defined
as a risk.
Hilgartner’s contribution to the theory of risk has received some attention; for
example, Google scholar finds 52 references that quote it (as of 5 February 2010). A
look at these references indicates that Hilgartner (1992) is credited, though rather
tangentially. For example, Rosa (1998) cites Hilgartner (1992) to claim that ‘our
perceptions of risk, our choices of which risks to be concerned about, are equivalent
to risk itself’; Klinke and Renn (2002) briefly mention Hilgartner (1992) (wrongly
*Corresponding author. Email: asa.boholm@cefos.gu.se
ISSN 1366-9877 print/ISSN 1466-4461 online

© 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2010.515313
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176 Å. Boholm and H. Corvellec
spelled as ‘Hillgartner’) as representative of a ‘pronounced constructivist approach’;

Power (2007, 25) refers to Hilgartner (1992) to point out that a risk object ‘inhabits a
different and dynamic socio-technical network of ideas, resources, experts, regula-
tions, and organizations in which practice is constructed’; and Horlick-Jones and Sime
(2004) use Hilgartner’s notion of ‘risk object’ to build an objective–constructionist
axis with which they map social science perspectives on risk.
A few researchers have actually noted that Hilgartner’s framework is more than a
constructionist approach to risk inspired by science and technology studies. His
framework indeed suggests that one should replace the question ‘What is risk?’ with
‘How do people understand something as a risk?’. This marks a substantial shift in
research focus that redirects our attention from the ontology of risk to its epistemol-
ogy, in other words, from the nature of risk per se to risk as a social phenomenon.
The present paper builds on Hilgartner (1992) and other researchers, such as
Rescher (1983), Rosa (1998), and Boholm (2003), to present a relational theory of
risk. In brief, this theory conceives of risk as resulting from situated cognition that
establishes a relationship of risk linking two objects, a risk object and an object at risk,
in a causal and contingent way so that the risk object is considered, in some way and
under certain circumstances, to threaten the valued object at risk.
The relational theory of risk is an interpretive theory that aims to answer to the
key theoretical and practical questions of why and how something is considered a
risk. The relational theory of risk also has consequences for how fields such as risk
communication (Å. Boholm 2009), risk management (Corvellec 2010a), and risk
governance can be understood as specific modes of culturally situated cognition and
social practice.
The next section introduces some essential conceptual components of a relational
theory of risk. The third section presents the analytical notions of risk object, object at
risk, and relationship of risk. The fourth section presents a rereading of selected case
studies that illustrates the heuristic potential of the proposed theory. Following these
examples, the fifth section discusses the connection between risk and situated cogni-
tion. The concluding remarks identify how a relational theory of risk can advance our
understanding of risk governance, risk communication, and management.
2. Steps toward a relational understanding of risk

Theoretical perspectives in the humanities and social sciences have underscored the
relational nature of meaning: words partly derive their meaning from being positioned
in relationship to other words (Saussure 1916), and a sign is the triadic relationship
between signifier, signified, and interpreter (Peirce 1998). Likewise, texts derive
meaning from their relationships to other texts (Kristeva 1986). Social life can indeed
be regarded as a texture of connective relationships, practices, and symbols (Geertz
1973; Latour 2005; Mol 2002). Therefore, the relational understanding of risk is not a
creation ex nihilo, but builds on certain converging theoretical trajectories. In the
following, we will identify and discuss some of these trajectories.
2.1. A theory of risk object

From a background in science and technology studies (e.g., Latour and Woolgar 1986),
Hilgartner (1992) notes that the conceptual structure of social definitions of risk needs
to be clarified. He identifies an antiquated artifact-centered view of technology as an
Journal of Risk Research 177
obstacle to understanding risk as social. To extend the work of those who approach
risk as a social construct (e.g., Bradbury 1989; Clarke 1989; Douglas and Wildavsky
1982), to mention three of his references, Hilgartner presents a thoroughly construc-
tivist perspective on risk.
Hilgartner’s (1992, 40) key observation is that ‘definitions of particular risks
include at least three conceptual elements: an object deemed to “pose” the risk, a puta-
tive harm, and a linkage alleging some form of causation between the object and the
harm’ (emphasis in original). Focusing on risk objects, he also observes that an object
cannot be defined as risky unless, first, this object is first constructed as an object and,
second, a linkage is established between this object and a putative harm. The issue,
then, if we want to understand how people conceive of risk, is to understand how

people construct and develop meaningful networks of causally linked risk objects, a
point finely illustrated by Kendra (2007).
A point to underscore is that ‘object’ here and in the rest of the paper is not to be
understood in a mere material sense. Object refers to any kind of physical, cultural, or
social artifact that can be delineated and singled out. It can be a natural phenomenon,
such as lightning, or a manufactured product such as a gun. But it can also be a
cultural, representation such as a nationalist ideology, or a social behavior such as a
drinking alcohol.
2.2. When value is at stake

However, Hilgartner (1992) remains vague about how this putative harm is socially
constructed and about the role it plays in identifying risk. On this particular point, he
reminds us of others who also attribute a central role to harm when defining risk, but
without theorizing this role. A few sample definitions are: Kaplan and Garrick (1981)
posit ‘Risk = uncertainty + damage’; Hohenemser, Kates, and Slovic (1985, 67–8)
define risk as ‘quantitative measures of hazard consequences expressed as conditional
probabilities of experiencing harm’; the Royal Society (Royal Society 1992, 2–3) sees
risk as ‘the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of
time’; and the Society for Risk Analysis (2008) defines risk as ‘the potential for real-
ization of unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, health, property, or the
environment’ (all emphases added). In general terms, harm, damage, and adverse
consequences are all essential to the construction of risk, but why this is the case still
needs theoretical clarification.
This takes us to the crucial component of value, since phenomena such as harm,
damage, or adverse consequences, explicitly or not, presuppose value. As Rescher
observes, risk assessment always involves a normative side of ‘evaluative’ issues so
that ‘there is no risk assessment without normative evaluation’ (1983, 31) (emphasis
in original). Rosa (1998, 28) makes a key contribution to a comprehensive understand-
ing of risk as a cognitive construct by defining risk as ‘a situation or event where
something of human value (including humans themselves) has been put at stake and
where the outcome is uncertain’. This contribution is acknowledged by Aven and
Renn (2009, 2), who state that ‘risk refers to uncertainty about and [the] severity of
the consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that humans
value’. Even Hansson (2010) concludes that there can be no risk unless something of
value is involved.
Simply stated, for an object to be considered ‘at risk’, it must be ascribed some
kind of value. Paradoxically, little is known about how or why value is established in
a risk relationship. Corvellec (2010a) is an exception who indicates how value derives
from organizational practice.
2.3. Value and relationships are culturally situated

What is deemed of value is not universally agreed on. In fact, value has innumerable
and incongruous sociocultural determinants and manifestations. In anthropology, the
notion of culture refers to structured, practice-based systems of situated collective
knowledge and understanding used to organize and manage life (Ingold 2000).
Culture is a basic prerequisite for coordinated social action and collective projects,
and should be understood as a dynamic open system for information processing and
making associations, for producing, contesting, and negotiating meaning. This
involves, not least, the beliefs and practices according to which value and relation-
ships are defined and articulated, and how people understand contingency and
causality.
Notably, a relational understanding of risk draws on the insight that human social
systems are conventionally established and are symbolic in nature (Rappaport 1996).
That risk varies according to social structure, institutions, values, and belief systems
was first mentioned by the social anthropologist Mary Douglas in her critique of
psychological studies of risk perception (Douglas 1985, 1992). She argues that how
people understand and react to various risks can be explained neither by personality
traits nor by the fact that human beings generally act according to any given hierarchy
of psycho-physiological needs and preferences; conceptions of risk are instead cultur-
ally ‘biased’ by socially embedded values and beliefs.
Since the launch of cultural theory, sociologists and anthropologists have
demonstrated, albeit from other theoretical perspectives, that uncertainty and risk
are identified, assessed, and understood in terms of knowledge, values, and
concerns situated in forms of livelihood, social institutions, historical experience,
and collective identity (e.g., Caplan 2000; Grätz 2003; Mairal 2003; Sjölander-
Lindqvist 2004; Stoffle and Arnold 2003; Stoffle and Minnis 2008). Situated risk
(Boholm 2003; Å. Boholm 2009) is embedded in specific practice-based social
contexts in which various actors’ perspectives on and interpretations of risk can
vary considerably, even though it is the same external phenomena that are being
addressed.
Hilgartner (1992) does not explicitly address the cultural dimension of risk.
Though he notes that risk definitions involve a linkage between risk objects and
harms, he does not elaborate on the cultural embeddedness of this linkage. A decisive
contribution of anthropological studies to a relational understanding of risk is thus to
underscore that risk definitions are culturally bound. Understanding risk therefore
requires knowledge of the cultural characteristics that subtend how risk is analyzed
and defined. Having presented some of the key steps that have led us to a relational
understanding of risk, we introduce the relational theory of risk proper, detailing its
constituent elements.
3. Elements of a relational theory of risk

The relational theory of risk regards risk as a product of situated cognition positing a
relationship of risk linking a risk object and an object at risk. Schematically, it defines
risk as:
[ Risk object] ← ( Relationship of risk ) → [ Object at risk]
This section characterizes the elements of a relational theory of risk.
3.1. Risk objects

Risk objects resembles hazards in the sense that they refer to something that is identi-
fied as dangerous. However, a crucial assumption of a relational theory of risk is that
designating an object as ‘dangerous’ does not simply entail affixing a label of danger-
ousness to something that exists already. Designating something as of one kind rather
than another is a constitutive act that outlines the object’s contours. The emphasis on
characteristic traits provides the object with an identity; correspondingly, this empha-
sis involves downplaying other traits of the object and considering them less signifi-
cant. A double process of selection and conceptualization is at work. This is why we
prefer here to speak of ‘risk objects’ rather than ‘hazards’ as the former refers explic-
itly to something that is produced whereas the latter tends to refer to something that
more plainly exists.
As mentioned earlier, risk objects can be natural phenomena, manufactured prod-
ucts, cultural representations or behaviors. The single example of ‘dangerous dogs’
illustrates our point. Designating a specific animal or dog breed as potentially danger-
ous is a definitional act attributing to it the trait of being ‘risky’. An imaginary perim-
eter is drawn around certain animals that exclude them from the category of ‘nice’
dogs by including them in the contrary category of ‘dangerous’ ones. Designating a
dog type (e.g., pit bull) or dog breed (e.g., Tosa Inu, Dogo Argentino, and Fila
Brasilero) as potentially dangerous involves drawing a genetic-cum-behavioral
boundary between non-dangerous dog types or breeds and dangerous dogs. Individual
animals can then end up being indexed and put on a separate list of ‘risky’ animals,
designated as embodied, objectified sources of potential harm.
Designating an object as risky is a creative act, in the sense that it introduces risk
into the social space. However, it is not an act that exists in a social vacuum. The
designation of a risk object depends on conditions of possibility in the natural and
social world. It cannot run counter to acknowledged natural laws or ignore established
principles of scientific discovery, rules of media representation, or the game of social
forces. The designation of risk objects is culturally constrained, which is why there is
no point in claiming today in modern western culture, outside the world of fiction, that
humans run the risk of turning into werewolves at full moon.
However, once a risk object has been constituted, it enjoys a certain indepen-
dence from its context of creation. It stands open to new interpretations, definitions,
or contextualizations (Latour 1996), and to a corresponding range of risk-related
uses. Dangerous dogs can, for example, figure as arguments in debates about reptiles
as pets, as weapons for criminals, or in storylines, for example, in a Hollywood
movie about a family dog turning into a rabid monster, as in the film Cujo (1984).
Risk objects are social in the sense that they are part of social practices and represen-
tations, both by being influenced by them and by participating in creating and
sustaining them.
The capacity of objects to evade the conditions of their production makes it possi-
ble to ascribe them varied identities, depending on the context and who is asked. For
example, from being considered a living weapon, a dog can come to be viewed as an
innocent victim of human wickedness. The identity of a risk object is fluid (Bauman
2005) rather than fixed. Being risky is a trait that evolves as new dangers are identified
and new values are considered at stake. This brings us to a presentation of the second
term of the relational theory of risk, namely, the object at risk.
3.2. Objects at risk

The key characteristic of objects at risk is to be endowed with a value that is consid-
ered at stake. Value does not refer here to some basic principle according to which one
tells the good from the bad based on moral judgments about, for example, freedom or
solidarity. Value instead refers to the related but broader notion of something that is
held to be of worth, be it life, nature, principles, or a state of affairs. In late modern

societies, though, value is increasingly defined in monetary terms (Bourdieu 2003).
Like risk objects, objects at risk are delineated and indexed. However, rather than
being assigned an identity of danger and threat, objects at risk are constituted around
traits such as value, loss, vulnerability, and need for protection. To put it in an overly
dualistic way, objects at risk and risk objects are the complementary figures of Eros
and Thanatos: threatened life facing threatening death in the most classic of all
dramas.
The act of designating an object as at risk is an act of implicating value. The object
at risk is understood as something that ought to be allowed to last, and therefore
deserves attention and care. For example, children should be protected from the risk
of being assaulted, hurt, or killed by dangerous dogs, and dogs should be protected
from careless owners. If designating a risk object is a double act of selection and
exclusion, then designating an object at risk is a double act of selection and inclusion.
Risk management and governance strive to keep the risk object out and the object at
risk in by developing an adequate risk management regime.
There is sometimes agreement in a group or in society as to what is valued and
consequently as to what objects should be considered at risk and how they should be
protected. Attempts to legislate the presence of dogs in parks can be met with claims
that such legislation threatens the legitimate right of dog owners to use parks. Likewise,
attempts to control the aggressiveness of dogs can be considered to violate the animal’s
biological right to lead a life according to its nature. Like risk objects, objects at risk
can always be set in new contexts, the value they embody creating room for reinter-
pretation and negotiation; what is deemed of value here and now will not necessarily
be of value there and then.
3.3. Relationships of risk

Relationships of risk are the third and last constituent of a relational theory of risk. A
relationship of risk refers to the relationship an observer establishes between a risk
object and an object at risk, the former being held to threaten the value of the latter.
This relationship is, again, a social construct. A relationship of risk does not
simply occur; rather, it is a semantic association between objects (van Loon 2002) that
must be imagined, crafted, and established. This is done by an observer (e.g., a scien-
tist, local resident, or journalist) subtended by the viewpoints, assumptions, interests,
or concerns of the observer. It can be established in as diverse ways as probabilities,
models, laboratory tests, narratives, or else. Embedded in the observer’s cultural idio-
syncrasies, a relationship of risk reflects an observer’s knowledge and understanding
of risk objects and objects at risk (Shaw 2000). The relationship encapsulates the
properties the observer considers prominent, rather than reflecting the properties of
these objects as such. One could therefore say that relationships of risk are expressions
of cultural preferences.
That a relationship of risk is socially constructed does not mean that it is arbitrary
or lacks correspondence with the external world. A relationship between two objects
juxtaposed as a relationship of risk must satisfy certain constraints. First, a relation-
ship of risk is contingent, starting with the question ‘What if?’ (Ravetz 1997). The
rationale of a relationship of risk is to hypothesize that imagined unfavorable condi-
tions can be met – for example, a dog jumps over the fence into the children’s play-
ground or the H3N8 canine flu virus proves more virulent than expected – and to
forecast the consequences of these conditions. Relationships of risk are not descrip-
tions of actual dramas; they are hypothetical or imaginary accounts of dramas that
might occur if certain conditions are met. They tell about potential states of things, not
actual ones. Risk is a proposition about a change that could take place, but does not
necessarily do so.
Second, relationships of risk are causal. A relationship of risk is not a relationship
of convenience, similarity, or proximity. A relationship of risk must establish that it is
the risk object that threatens the object at risk, how, and possibly why. It must indicate
a causal link between precisely these two objects; for example, the dog may jump over
the fence into the children’s playground and bite a child, who may then suffer from
her wounds. In narrative terms, a relationship of risk establishes a plot conveying that
the risk object could affect and modify the object at risk (Corvellec 2010b). Scientific
evidence therefore has a privileged position in the creation of risk accounts.
Third, relationships of risk are bound to action and decisions to act (Luhmann
1993). Historically, the notion of risk has been linked to the social institution of high-
stakes gambling (David 1962; Gigerenzer 1989; Kavanagh 1993), practices of long-
distance trade, maritime ventures, insurance (Luhmann 1993), and an increasingly
mathematical understanding of hazard and chance (Bernstein 1996; Hacking 1999).
Risk is conditioned by a modern will to know that remains welded to a will to decide
and act under conditions of uncertainty. Knowledge about risk serves action, and as a
result, a relationship of risk serves the vita activa rather than the vita contemplativa
(Arendt 1958). Such knowledge contributes to the capacity to assess, decide on, and
govern life, even under conditions of uncertainty.
3.4. Meaningful and changing configurations

One should not be misled by the above characterization of risk objects, objects at risk,
and relationships of risk to assume that these terms have a predefined nature waiting
to be assembled according to a predefined order. On the contrary, it is only when
assembled that risk objects, objects at risk, and relationships of risk receive their iden-
tity. An object becomes a risk object only in relation to an object at risk; reciprocally,
an object at risk emerges only in conjunction with a risk object, through a causal–
contingent relationship of risk that brings the two together. Risk objects, objects at
risk, and relationships of risk are not constructed one by one, but simultaneously.
Their identity is relational in the sense that it is codetermined when objects and rela-
tionships are assembled as a risk construct.
The identity of risk objects, objects at risk, and relationships of risk is also vari-
able. Cultural categories such as danger, value, harm, victim, actor, purpose, decision,
cause, and effect are subjected to habitual reframings and reassessments. Moreover,
understandings of risk can lead to action, creating new situations in which new under-
standings of risk can develop. The semantic networks of meanings within which risk
definitions are embedded are therefore continually changing. As a result, there are
never risk objects, objects at risk, or relationships of risk per se. Instead, the identities
of risk objects, objects at risk, and relationships of risk are continually reframed and
redefined. Several identities can even coexist as various people or groups entertain
various views in parallel. It is not a fixed ontological feature of a phenomenon to be a
risk object, an object at risk, or a relationship of risk. The ontology of a risk object,
object at risk, or relationship of risk is variable, as Latour (1996) puts it. What is a risk
object for some can be an object at risk for others. Likewise, the risk objects of today
may easily become objects at risk tomorrow.

Consider the example of a dog as a threat to a child. One could simply consider
the child as an object at risk and the dog as a risk object. However, one could also take
into consideration that the dog owner has a responsibility to educate and train the dog
so that it does not inflict harm. According to such a view, the dog owner becomes the
principal risk object and the dog becomes a secondary one. One could even consider,
from an animal rights perspective, that a faulty dog owner is a risk to his or her ill-
behaved dog. In this risk definition, the dog is positioned as an object at risk because
it is understood as being harmed by the dog owner’s negligence. From another
perspective, the commercial promotion of fighting dog breeds can be considered a
cause of the propensity of aggressive dogs to attack children. In such reasoning, dog
breeders can be considered the primary risk objects, turning both dog owners and dogs
into secondary risk objects. Still, these shifts of perspectives and definitions and the
resulting changes in semantic network configurations keep the child as a primary risk
object. This example illustrates how elements such as dog, dog owner, dog breeder,
and child, depending on how a complex causal relationship is profiled (M. Boholm
2009), can be arranged differently depending on the definitions of risk objects, objects
at risk, and relationships of risk.
That the apparently simple example of a dog threatening a child can lead to so
many risk definitions explains the difficulties and ambiguities pertaining to risk
management and governance. If the risk object is the dog owner, risk regulators might
introduce dog-owning licenses, or they could introduce high liabilities in cases of dog-
induced harm, to make dog owners financially aware of their responsibility. If the risk
object is dog breeding, however, regulators could instead attempt to direct the indus-
try, for example, by relying on the directive capacity of kennel club associations or by
cataloging and banning certain breeds. Correspondingly, if the emphasis is on children
as objects at risk, park authorities might produce elaborate rules of conduct and
restrictions on the presence of dogs in public space. However, if the emphasis is on
the dog as a risk object, risk regulators could instead demand protective measures,
such as dogs wearing muzzles and being kept on leash in public places. Public policies
concerning dangerous dogs can combine several of these measures, and the lack of
regulatory harmonization between countries, even within the EU, is a clear indication
that the framing of the dangerous dog risk is permeated by cultural assumptions about
the nature of dogs and their relationships with humans (Lodge and Hood 2002).
A relational theory of risk explains why the social and semantic order of risk is a
changing one. More generally, it explains that risk is an epistemic construct that serves
to categorize external objects in relation to other objects depending on what we know
and believe regarding the contingent character of the potentially harmful causal rela-
tionships involved. Risk definitions function as a semantic frame for relationships,
objects, and categories (Fillmore and Atkins 1992), creating the possibility of assess-
ing projected outcomes (Hilgartner 1992; Luhmann 1993). A risk is always a danger
of something (sometimes natural, sometimes social) to somebody in a given social
nexus (Gregersen 2003). Risk definitions introduce moral orders of blame (Douglas
1992) and a corresponding order of governmentality (Dean 2010; Foucault 1991). It
is therefore not an essential feature of phenomena as such to be either risk objects or
objects at risk (Ewald 1991), and a crucial implication is that any single phenomenon
can simultaneously be regarded as a risk object, as an object at risk, or as having noth-
ing to do with risk, by observers operating under different assumptions.
Some examples are cited below to illustrate the heuristic potential and implications
of a relational theory of risk for new understandings of risk communication, risk

governance, and risk management.
4. Examples
The heuristic potential of a relational theory of risk can be illustrated by rereadings of
some case studies. To begin with, Mairal’s (2008) reading of Daniel Defoe’s A Jour-
nal of the Plague Year (1998) illustrates how risk accounts have long been relational.
Defoe’s book is about the plague that lashed London in 1655. It is a novel, but one
based on careful research (including Defoe’s firsthand experience as a child survivor
of an epidemic), delivered as a first-hand account. A Journal of the Plague Year was
published in 1722; several years later it was confirmed that the plague had returned to
Marseille in Southern France, triggering massive popular uncertainty. With A Journal
of the Plague Year, Defoe wished to help prevent a new plague from reaching London.
For Mairal, it is telling that Defoe did not use mathematical calculations but a
sophisticated narrative to convey the risk that England could be hit again. For Mairal,
A Journal of the Plague Year is a landmark indication that the emergence and diffu-
sion of the notion of risk in European culture might owe less to the development of
probability and statistics for decision-making, than to the production and diffusion of
non-quantified narratives about the possibility of negative events.
Examining the case from the theoretical perspective of relational risk would add
the insight that Defoe’s work provides an early example of the understanding that
risk is a matter of connecting things. Connecting the plague of 1655 to the plague
rumors of 1722, Defoe creates a persuasive tale about a dreaded risk object threaten-
ing public health. This emphasizes the need for appropriate measures to be taken,
explicitly illustrating the relational nature of risk communication, risk management,
and risk governance.
Rereading other cases in light of a relational theory of risk can highlight how risk
definitions hinge on the relational construction of objects at risk and risk objects.
Stratman et al. (1995) provides a first example. This study of how residents of Aspen,
Colorado, opposed the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plan for a
massive cleanup of toxic lead mine wastes illustrates the failure of authorities, and
refusal of audiences, to create a common object at risk, namely, the health of Aspen
residents threatened by lead found in contaminated ground. The authors refer in their
analysis to disagreement over the rhetorical stases to be debated, that is, differences in
views among the actors as to what constitutes a problem. The EPA has a governmental
mission to protect public health, and was concerned that the public could be harmed
by lead contamination; Aspenites, however, lacking actual evidence of lead in blood
samples, disputed this risk. For Stratman et al. (1995, 21), the two parties were
involved in a ‘rhetorical competition for control of the stases, the ownership of the risk
communication protocol and risk expertise’. Without challenging this claim, we can
add, on the basis of a relational theory of risk, that the EPA risk communication failed
because it did not convince Aspenites that their health was threatened by lead. In this
case, no stable relationship was established between an object at risk and a risk object.
Stoffle et al. (2004) describe a similar case but with reversed roles. Their study
concerns a proposed bridge across the Colorado River to reduce risks related to vehic-
ular traffic crossing the river via Hoover Dam, which met with resistance from the
Southern Paiute, Hualapai, and Mohave peoples. Hoover Dam is located in the midst
of a landscape of great ceremonial significance to these peoples, namely, where the
Creator saw the creation occur. While the planning authorities identified no significant
heritage at the intended project location, representatives of these peoples argued that
the bridge would adversely affect cultural and religious values important to them. The
tribes eventually managed to have the location officially listed in the National Register
of Historic Places, but to no avail, since registration came well after bridge construc-
tion was underway. For Stoffle et al. (2004), the case is representative of the arrogance
with which Native American cultures are forced to suffer irremediable losses. The
case also illustrates how definitions of what constitutes a risk depend on what is
considered of value. A relational theory of risk reading of the case suggests that Native
American people did not succeed in convincing public authorities of the value of their
ceremonial landscape and therefore failed to construct the site as an object at risk in
the official planning process. The authorities, on their part, managed to constitute
motor vehicle accidents as a risk object worth risk management attention. This brings
us to the fascinating issue of the political and administrative dynamics of risk objects
and objects at risk.
Studies by Boholm (2005, 2008; Å. Boholm 2009), Boholm and Löfstedt (1999;
Löfstedt and Boholm 1999), and Sjölander-Lindqvist (2005) on the protracted and
troublesome building of a railway tunnel through a ridge in southern Sweden provide
telling narratives of the changing nature of risk objects and objects at risk. This ridge
is situated in a pastoral agrarian landscape with high nature values. It has a complex
geology, due to high groundwater pressure, porous rock, and unstable clay, giving rise
to major construction difficulties for engineers, builders, and officials from the
National Rail Administration. At one point, water leaking through the tunnel walls
turned out to be particularly problematic. Such leakage noticeably reduced the
groundwater that has made the soil fertile and the land suited for animal husbandry,
permitting agriculture on the top of the ridge. Leaking water became a source of major
conflict between, on the one side, the local farming community and other affected
local residents and, on the other side, the tunnel builders, contractors, and Rail Admin-
istration officials. This conflict resulted from two disparate constructions of the risk
(Boholm 2008; Å. Boholm 2009). The tunnel builders framed the tunnel under
construction as a complex, expensive, and vulnerable technical artifact – and thus as
the object at risk – whereas they regarded the ridge and its geological characteristics,
such as an extremely high groundwater pressure, as a risk object. Local residents,
however, held a different view. For them, the tunnel was not an object at risk but a
risk object. Since groundwater leakage was construed as an effect of tunnel construc-
tion, residents considered the tunnel under construction as a threat to the ridge, its
fertility, its sensitive ecological system, and its favorable conditions for agriculture.
Adopting specific situated perspectives (Ingold 2000) and considering different things
as valuable, tunnel builders and residents constructed opposing views of the tunnel
and the ridge as object at risk and risk object. That actors can change the identity of
risk objects and objects at risk so radically so as to invert their identities, each identity
being as real as the other, is a valuable finding that explains, among other things, the
duration of the controversy that subsequently arose.
These examples illustrate how a relational theory of risk can enhance our under-
standing of risk, and therefore of the conditions of risk communication and gover-
nance. To further this understanding, we will briefly discuss risk as a product of
situated cognition.
5. Risk as emerging from situated cognition

A central tenet of the relational theory of risk is that, for the world to make sense,
people need to differentiate and categorize events, objects, and beings in time and in
space. As Lakoff (1987) observes in the opening of his brilliantly entitled Women,
Fire and Other Dangerous Things, the idea of categories has been with us for more
than 2000 years. Categorizing is one of the most basic things we do, and we learn from
early childhood how to see things as kinds of things. We categorize without even
thinking of it (except in problematic cases), and could not function without categori-
zations. Considering that we reason more in terms of categories than of particular
things, we need to work out how categories act.
To categorize and classify is indeed human, as Bowker and Leigh Star (1999)
observe. Classifications express historical views, moral judgments, political priorities,
and, not least, practical needs. Classifications create and maintain social orders. Even
when their origins and rationale have been forgotten, classifications keep structuring
individual and collective understandings of what should be done, and how and why.
Without categories and classifications, indeed distinctions, the world would appear
a mere undifferentiated flow of meaningless sensory impressions (Hanson 2000). The
distinctive contribution of a relational theory of risk is to offer a framework for exam-
ining how people produce, elaborate, and act on categories and classifications pertain-
ing to risk. It provides a tripartite deconstruction of risk elements that rest on notions
of value, harm, and contingent causality. Moreover, it invites us to use this tripartite
deconstruction to analyze how individuals and groups build semantic networks
comprising objects at risk, risk objects, and relationships of risk, and how these
networks evolve over time.
All humans have similar sensory–neural faculties, but how they frame and
understand what they observe depends on a combination of their personal histories,
functional positions as observers, and surrounding circumstances (Goffman 1974).
Psychometric studies of risk (Slovic 2000) offer abundant evidence that the context
dependency of perception is particularly true of risk perception. The categories and
classifications that we use to interpret, produce, and share information entail analyti-
cal abstractions and conceptual schemata that order concepts in relation to other
concepts. However, to be viable in practical life and allow for adaptation under
shifting circumstances and changing environments, categories and classifications
must have a certain cognitive flexibility (Ingold 2000). Assumptions deriving from a
variety of sources – for example, personal experience and practice, second-hand
information (what we hear or read), rumor, tradition, common sense, or scientific
exploration – provide new input into the categories we use. In philosophical terms,
there is therefore no absolute difference between analytic and synthetic knowledge
(Quine 1951).
Cognition takes place in practical life (Mol 2002). It is contextual and embedded
in practical engagement, actions, and interactions in the lived-in world (e.g., Lakoff
1987). Categories and classifications are, for example, not merely conceptual, in the
sense of being abstract cognitive modules, but also practical, in the sense of issuing
from and being dedicated to actual activities, and therefore often material, in the sense
of being inscribed, transported, and affixed to ‘stuff’ (Bowker and Leigh Star 1999).
A major thrust of the relational theory of risk is to focus on the ‘social actor in
action in the lived-in world’ (Lave 1988, 13), to explain how risk definitions are
cognitive operations that emerge not in the intangible world of concepts, but in the
lived-in world of livelihood, dwelling, skill, and engagement (Ingold 2000). Risk defi-
nitions are situated expressions of individual and collective understanding. As our

rereading of the case studies above reveals, risk definitions are practical outcomes of
actual engagements with the world, and concern agency and planning, intentionality
and action, decision-making, and any other matter that constitutes the social.
Risk definitions are socially situated cognitive outcomes, so risk researchers
should examine the individual and social practices that constitute the social. To under-
stand risk definitions, risk researchers should delve into the logic of practice (Bour-
dieu 1992), analyze how people organize their experience (Goffman 1974), and follow
how they navigate their everyday lives (de Certeau 2002). One must concretize the
study of risk objects, objects at risk, and relationships of risk from where these are
imagined, described, discussed, stabilized, and (in some cases) naturalized, for exam-
ple, in communities of practice (Wenger 1998) or organizational contexts (Nicolini,
Gherardi, and Yanow 2003; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny 2001). To address
the socially shaped cognitive construction of risk, risk research should address how
risks are assessed, investigated, managed, and communicated, taking account of all
possible perspectives and assumptions that plural and complex societies harbor. Our
contention is that a relational theory of risk, because it provides a clear analytical
focus, can provide substantial new insight.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents a relational theory of risk. According to this theory, risk is a prod-
uct of situated cognition that establishes a causal and contingent relationship of risk
between a risk object and an object at risk so that the risk object is considered, in some
way and under certain circumstances, to threaten the value attached to the object at
risk. The paper outlines the main sources of inspiration for a relational theory of risk,
describes its key elements, demonstrates how it provides new insights into risk
communication, management, and governance, and emphasizes that the theory
approaches risk as socially situated.
To close, we identify a few contributions that a relational theory of risk can make
to risk communication, risk management, and risk governance. Common to all these
contributions is that a relational theory of risk can explain the dynamic of the social
construction of risk objects, relationships of risk, and objects at risk.
To begin with, a relational theory of risk suggests that risk is a semantic creation
that occurs within the communication context. A relational theory of risk also suggests
that effective risk communication hinges on an understanding of the dynamic of
objects at risk, relationships of risk, and risk objects. In particular, it depends on the
understanding that this dynamic is not merely a matter of one party (e.g., experts)
convincing another (e.g., the public) on rational, emotional, or cultural grounds of the
actual state of things. The heuristic scope of such a conduit view of communication is
limited, as it ignores the fact that signs and audiences are actually active participants
in the communicative act. Risk communication is a matter of fitting the cognitive
systems of the parties involved into a specific way of causally relating a contingent
threat to a possible loss of value. Put plainly, successful risk communication (if such
a thing exists) depends on a common understanding of what constitutes a threat, a
value, a contingency, and a causal relationship. Understanding, not convincing, is the
key. The crux of risk communication is for one party to understand how the other
conceives of a risk object, an object at risk, and the relationship of risk between the
two (Å. Boholm 2009). A relational theory of risk therefore implies both a research
and a practical agenda.

To continue, the theory’s contributions to risk management and risk governance
are indeed quite similar. Risk management at an organizational level or risk gover-
nance at an institutional level should start with the same tasks of identifying what is
at stake, what is a threat, how one relates to the other, and why (Corvellec 2010a). This
can be done with the help of probabilities, modeling, experiences, narratives, or else.
Again, understanding is the key, although it now serves as a springboard for decision
and action. We cannot address here how risks should be assessed, investigated, and
managed in a complex society. However, we suggest that, informed by a relational
theory of risk, it would be vital to look at value before looking at threat, look at vulner-
ability before resilience, stay critically focused on the dynamic of human creativity,
and be as aware as possible of the social conditions of cognition of the parties
involved. Again, this is as much a research agenda as a practical one, which is an indi-
cation of a robust theory.
Acknowledgments
We acknowledge the financial support of the Swedish Transam research program ‘Decisions
on risk within public transportation’, co-financed by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the
Swedish Emergency Management Agency, the Swedish Maritime Administration, the Swedish
Road Administration, and Vinnova (research grant: SRV dnr 621-6092-2005). We also
acknowledge the insightful comments that we have received from Max Boholm, Christer Eldh,
and the two anonymous reviewers on previous versions of this text.
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A relational theory of risk

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spelled as ‘Hillgartner’) as representative of a ‘pronounced constructivist approach’;

2. Steps toward a relational understanding of risk

2.1. A theory of risk object

then, if we want to understand how people conceive of risk, is to understand how

2.2. When value is at stake

2.3. Value and relationships are culturally situated

3. Elements of a relational theory of risk

[ Risk object] ← ( Relationship of risk ) → [ Object at risk]

This section characterizes the elements of a relational theory of risk.

3.1. Risk objects

3.2. Objects at risk

held to be of worth, be it life, nature, principles, or a state of affairs. In late modern

3.3. Relationships of risk

3.4. Meaningful and changing configurations

may easily become objects at risk tomorrow.

of a relational theory of risk for new understandings of risk communication, risk

5. Risk as emerging from situated cognition

nitions are situated expressions of individual and collective understanding. As our

and a practical agenda.

Bourdieu, P. 1992. The logic of practice. Cambridge: Polity Press.

York: Columbia University Press.

tion, metacommunication, and rhetorical stases in the Aspen-EPA superfund controversy.

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