Gilbert 2011

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International Journal of Science

Education
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Concept Development and Transfer in

Context‐Based Science Education
a b b
John K. Gilbert , Astrid M.W. Bulte & Albert Pilot
a
School of Education, University of Reading, Reading, UK
b
Department of Chemistry, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The
Netherlands
Published online: 13 Aug 2010.
To cite this article: John K. Gilbert , Astrid M.W. Bulte & Albert Pilot (2011) Concept Development
and Transfer in Context‐Based Science Education, International Journal of Science Education, 33:6,
817-837, DOI: 10.1080/09500693.2010.493185
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International Journal of Science Education
Vol. 33, No. 6, 1 April 2011, pp. 817–837
RESEARCH REPORT
Concept Development and Transfer in

Context-Based Science Education
John K. Gilberta*, Astrid M.W. Bulteb and Albert Pilotb
aSchool of Education, University of Reading, Reading, UK; bDepartment of Chemistry,
Downloaded by [Moskow State Univ Bibliote] at 16:56 28 July 2013
Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

j.k.gilbert@reading.ac.uk
JohnGilbert
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10.1080/09500693.2010.493185
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Journal of Science
(online)
Education
‘Context-based courses’ are increasingly used in an address to the major challenges that science
education currently faces: lack of clear purpose, content overload, incoherent learning by students,
lack of relevance to students, and lack of transfer of learning to new contexts. In this paper, four
criteria for the design of context-based courses that would be successful in meeting these chal-
lenges are rehearsed. It is concluded that only a model based on ‘context as social circumstances’
would meet the four criteria for success. From this, the notion of concept development is
presented based on the idea of the production of coherent mental maps. The notion of transfer is
discussed in terms of how such mental maps may be useful for understanding other contexts. The
definitions of concept development and transfer give a clearer view of how exemplars of existing
context-based approaches may be analysed to show their degree of facilitation of worthwhile
science education. Research questions to be addressed in such analyses are presented.
Keywords: Context-based; Conceptual development; Transfer
Introduction
Context-based approaches, currently considered as an important development in
curriculum design, claim to address five major problems in science and mathematics
education (Gilbert, 2006). First, there is widespread curriculum overload. Too
many isolated facts and concepts of varying significance are included for students to
be able to get a mental overview of the science or sciences being studied (Millar &
Osborne, 2000). Second, the content of the curriculum is so fragmented that there is
incoherence within and between the conceptualisations attained by students—a
worthwhile ‘mental map’ is not achieved. Third, students often cannot transfer
knowledge to situations other than the one in which it was learned. Fourth, the
*Corresponding author. School of Education, University of Reading, Reading RG6 1HY, UK.
Email: j.k.gilbert@reading.ac.uk
ISSN 0950-0693 (print)/ISSN 1464-5289 (online)/11/060817–21

© 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09500693.2010.493185
818 J. K. Gilbert et al.
knowledge taught is too often not relevant to students’ everyday lives (Laugksch,
2000). Fifth, there is confusion about the reasons why science should be learned by
students (Roberts, 1982). These problems must be addressed, for, without that, the
decline in interest in science in society, in general, and in the further study of the
sciences, in particular, may continue (Osborne & Dillon, 2008; Sjoberg & Schreiner,
2005) with consequences for admissions to study science/engineering at university
level (The Royal Society, 2006).
There are two major challenges to be faced if these five problems are to be
addressed, as was shown in the analysis of five chemistry context-based courses
(Pilot & Bulte, 2006). They centre on the core issues of how knowledge is
created and adapted for subsequent use. First, there is insufficient evidence-based
knowledge about how the development of a coherent mental map of knowledge
of a science subject by students should be facilitated. Second, there is also a need

for a deeper understanding of how the transfer of knowledge between contexts
takes place following initial learning. An appreciation of the relations between
contexts, the development of a good understanding of concepts, and the transfer
of such knowledge is crucial if context-based approaches are to effectively address
the recurring problems of science education. It is only with a better understand-
ing of the issues of ‘coherent conceptualisation and ‘transferable knowledge’
(problems nos. 2 and 3) that we can address the issue of curriculum overload
(problem no. 1). It is only when we are able to make a parsimonious selection of
suitable contexts that we are able to address appropriate sets of curriculum
purposes (problem no. 5).
This paper therefore focuses on a theoretical argument about how the learning of
science knowledge can be facilitated by general context-based frameworks. Although
both issues, conceptualisation and transfer, have been discussed extensively, for
example, (Chi, 2008; Van Oers, 2004), a systematic approach from the particular
perspective of context-based learning is necessary. This paper aims to develop a
better understanding of how students can be expected to develop a map of scientific
knowledge from contexts and how to make this knowledge useful for other contexts
by transfer. This theoretical perspective is necessary before an in-depth analysis of
the potential value of exemplars, a representative of the major approaches to
context-based course design currently in use, can be undertaken. Such an analysis of
an exemplar is in preparation.
This analysis will be approached from a course designers’ point of view: what is
intended in the ‘formal curriculum’ (Van den Akker, 1998). An understanding of the
intended mechanisms for concept development and transfer is necessary to explicitly
design improved and new context-based units and approaches. Such information is
relevant to the designers of individual units, as these comprise an entire curriculum
programme, and to the potential users of such courses as they decide whether to
adopt a particular course. The questions addressed here are:
(1) What notion of ‘concept development’ might underpin context-based courses?

(2) What notion of ‘concept transfer’ might underpin context-based courses?
Concept Development and Transfer in Contexts 819
An address to these questions is particularly important in respect of secondary (high

school) science education, which is where student alienation is the most evident.
However, they are equally applicable at high education level, so our examples are
chosen from post-compulsory science education.
The Perspectives of ‘context’ and of ‘learning within a context’ Used

in Course Design
The original idea of context-based science education was to involve both the
contexts in which concepts were used and the relations between those concepts in
a more explicit way. This would make subject matter more relevant for students.
In the design of such programmes, examples of applications, daily life experi-
ences, experiments in the laboratory, and specific problem-solving tasks were

included in a structured way in the learning materials in order to show the rela-
tion between the concepts and the context (however defined). This approach was
thought as likely to provide an answer to the student question: ‘Why should I
learn this subject?’ Essential to such approaches is the claim that these courses are
designed according to a ‘need to know’ principle. That is, it is the designers’
intention that the students’ learning of science starts with and is framed within a
context which is expected to be relevant to the students. The involvement in the
context(s) is expected to legitimise the learning and attainment of formal science
by students.
There is a need to define criteria for what actually constitutes a context-based
course (Gilbert, 2006). This must be based on a clear notion of ‘context’. Although
Duranti and Goodwin (1992) concluded a few years ago that:
It does not seem possible at the present time to a give a single, precise, technical defini-
tion of context—eventually we might have to accept that such a definition may not be
possible. (p. 2)
They do give us some ideas about the scope of the idea. In their view, a context is
formed around some ‘focal event’—an important or typical event—that draws the
attention of learners while remaining imbedded in its cultural setting. They thus see
an educational context to have four attributes (Duranti & Goodwin, 1992, p. 6/8),
which are capable of facilitating the four changes to curriculum design outlined earlier.
First, the inclusion of a specific setting, that is a social framework (the building of
a waste-disposal incinerator), a spatial framework (the distribution of such incinera-
tors across a nation), or a temporal framework (the changes in waste disposal over a
period of time; Gilbert, 2006). These are situations within which mental encounters
with particular focal events are situated.
Second, a behavioural environment for the learning tasks within which the focal
events are addressed enables discussion among the participants to take place.
Third, the use of specific language for the talk that takes place in respect of any
focal event. The participants must be able to communicate with each other, the
‘talk’ (in its most broad interpretation including specific use of graphs, drawings,
visuals, etc.) being concentrated on the task. This would provide a close attention to
the specific key concepts involved and so enable participants to readily form mental
maps that include them.
Fourth, this would enable the broader language register of science (extra-
situational background knowledge) associated with the widening range of experiences
to be systematically related and utilised where relevant. The formation of linkages
between new and existing knowledge would enable mental maps to be both invoked
and extended while enabling participants to perceive the relevance of the work being
undertaken.
For example, a suitable situation might be the public discussion of the possible
construction of a waste disposal incinerator in the neighbourhood of a school. The
behavioural environment might be provided by a class preparing a submission on the
issue to the planning authority, to be delivered in a public meeting. The specific

language to be used would be drawn from chemistry (e.g. combustion, effluent
gases, by-products), economics (e.g. plant cost, benefit and drawback identification,
cost–benefit analysis), and ecology (e.g. environmental impact).
While this specification can identify context-based approaches, it is clear that
there can be many different interpretations/models of ‘context’ that underlie them
(Gilbert, 2006). In his analysis of what is meant by ‘context’ in the learning of
science, Gilbert arrived at four criteria for the attainment of context-based learning
of chemistry that can be transferred to the learning of science in general. This more
normative prescription of how to use ‘contexts’ for the purposes of designing
learning environments has been revised and is outlined below:
(1) Setting of focal events: Students must value the setting as a social, spatial, and
temporal framework used by a community of practice, whether composed of
scientists, technologists, industrialists, the ‘public’, or a mixture of all those
stakeholders. They must value their participation—whether real or virtual—in
that community of practice through productive interactions and develop
personal identities that include the perspective of that community. The commu-
nity of practice thus must provide a framework for the setting of focal events, as
described by socio-cultural theory (Greeno, 1998). In terms of activity theory,
the setting provided must lie within the zone of proximal development of
students (Vygotsky, 1978). A well-chosen focal event should provide a frame-
work within which explanatory concepts can be inter-related; relate directly to
some personal or social aspect of the students’ lives; and hence elicit motivation
to learn.
(2) Behavioural environment: In order to be of high quality, all learning tasks must
clearly bring a specifically designed behavioural environment into focus, as the
way the task is being addressed, and the type of activity engaged in, is used to
frame the talk (discourse) that then takes place (Greeno, 1998; Vygotsky, 1978).
Such discourse will engage students’ attention and hence facilitate their learning.
(3) Specific language: Learners should be enabled to develop a coherent use of
specific (scientific) language (in it most broad interpretation including specific
use of graphs, drawings, visuals, etc.). Through the talk associated with the
focal event that takes place, students should reach an explicit understanding of
the concepts involved. They should also come to acknowledge, in accordance
with the general ideas of constructivism, that such specific language is a
creation of human activity for a particular purpose. Learning the specialist
language of science is the key to an active understanding of and participation
in it.
(4) Extra-situational background knowledge: Learners must be able to relate any one
focal event to relevant extra-situational background knowledge, thus building
productively on prior knowledge that is, partially at least, composed of the
learner’s own ideas. In this way, the extended knowledge should be coherently
and productively related to the conceptual structure(s) and mental maps
intended by the curriculum.

An effective context-based course design must have embedded within it a clear
presumption of how learning occurs. The assumption that knowledge is actively
constructed by students offers the best route forward. In general terms, ‘constructiv-
ist’ approaches to learning and teaching (Ogborn, 1997) assume that a student only
effectively learns that which is of interest for some reason (intrinsic or extrinsic) and
that learning is mediated by what is already known. Context-based courses would be
effective in supporting learning if the student both recognised, was interested in, and
valued the situation within which tasks were set, and if the learning environment
(e.g. the class) was such that the discussion of ideas and their inter-relationship
could readily take place.
Of the range of constructivist approaches that are on offer, ‘situated learning’
(Greeno, 1998) should meet these criteria for the effective exploitation of the
learning potential of context-based courses, that is it is a theory that provides an
understanding of what is going on during learning. Situated learning assumes that it
is the nature of the physical, social, and psychological environment (both internal
and external) of the students that governs the quality of the learning that takes
place. That environment is at its most effective when the teacher and students feel
themselves mutually engaged with a ‘community of practice’, such that all the
parties can develop their understanding through critically supportive interactions of
the discourse built around tasks that are perceived by all to have merit in themselves.
In activity theory (Vygotsky, 1978), the learner and the object being studied mutu-
ally define each other during human activity. The learner makes meaning for an
object by the use of a particular interpretation of the current/circumstances/
conditions of her/his life. Here, the object is the focal event that is being studied.
The learner enters into a ‘cognitive apprenticeship’ with the teacher who is an expert
in interpreting the setting (the focal event). The teacher’s task is to bring together
the socially accepted understanding of the focal event being studied and the ideas
about it that the students have. The socially accepted attributes of a context and
those that are initially recognised by the students should be brought together by the
teacher. Inevitably, the greater experience and knowledge of the teacher leads to
him/her taking a position of authority, but not one of being an authoritarian, in these
interactions. In these circumstances, the general conditions for learning are
augmented by the opportunities for ‘cognitive apprenticeship’ in which the teacher
demonstrates how a focal event may be interpreted, taking care to work within the
‘zone of proximal development’ of each of the students (Becker & Varelas, 1995;
Vygotsky, 1978).
Models for Context-Based Courses

The use of the criteria above can reveal the assumptions and principles on which
actual context-based courses are designed. These enable the implication for future
designs to be worked out. As a starting point, it would be possible to identify the
formal representations (Van den Akker, 1998) of such courses: those committed to
paper by the course designers. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it does
seem likely that no recent context-based course has been designed with a set of
explicit guiding principles such as was described earlier. What the analysis of exem-
plars needs to set out, as case studies, are the ideal representations of recent context-
based courses, derived from documentary analysis and extensive interviews with the
course designer or design team. In order to facilitate this analysis, using the above
assumptions about ‘good practice’ in context-based course design, we describe four
canonical models for context-based course design, that seem to be used, or which might
be used, in science education. These models were presented elsewhere (Gilbert,
2006) and are here presented in a revised form. They are: (1) context as the direct
application of concepts; (2) context as reciprocity between concepts and applica-
tions; (3) context as provided by personal mental activity; (4) context as the social
circumstances.
Model 1: Context as the Direct Application of Concepts

When a course is based on this model, the concepts being taught are presented as
abstractions. At the end of that process, for whatever reason, their application in
technological processes and/or everyday life is presented. These presentations are
usually brief, often divorced from a consideration of their cultural significance, and
not assessed in any end-of-course examinations. They are, to put it bluntly, appar-
ently included for decorative purposes only.
This model is widely used, even in courses that make no pretence of being
context-based. It does not meet the criteria for context-based courses set out earlier
in that: students are not introduced to the social, spatial, temporal framework of a
community of practice that is overtly relevant to them; the treatment of the applica-
tion is usually so sketchy as not to constitute a high-quality learning task; the treat-
ment is not conducted in such a way and for such a time as to allow students to
explore the meaning of concepts in the situation presented to them; and what is
done does not usually relate to their general background knowledge, beyond that of
the concepts that are under immediate consideration.
Model 2: Context as Reciprocity between Concepts and Applications

In this model, a situation is selected (by the teacher or course designer) as a vehicle
through which key concepts can be taught. The assumption is that there is a cyclical
relation between concepts and context throughout the teaching, that is after the
concepts are taught, their application in the context is presented, and then a new
aspect of the context is focused upon as a prelude to the teaching of new concepts.
There are two problems in the reality of the science classroom with this approach.
First, does the status of the situation remain the focus for attention throughout the
series of tasks addressed during the teaching sequence, or is it largely forgotten after
a time, the science concepts becoming the sole focus of attention? For example, the
design of a nuclear power plant could be introduced as the theme of a series of
lessons where the key concept would be the nature of radioactivity. However, rather
than repeatedly recontextualising the discussion into that of nuclear plant design, the
teacher might just concentrate on the science and ignore its application in plant
design. Second, Layton (1993) has pointed out that the meaning of concepts change
as they are used in their applications to specific contexts. For example, although
science conceptualises energy as the consequences of the kinetic properties of atoms
and molecules, technology often finds the notion of ‘energy as fluid flow’ more
convenient to use. The implication here is that any one concept may acquire any
number of different, often subtle, meanings in different situations. Thus, the selec-
tion of the situation for study would be critical if students were to be subsequently
able to transfer their learning to new, unanticipated, situations.
Given the scope for various degrees of relatedness between concepts and situation,
courses based on this model may encompass a wide range of ‘context-relatedness’.
Consequently, students may or may not value the framework for a community of
practice that is presented to them. The behavioural environment that is created may
or may not facilitate the ready exchange and development of ideas, as a consequence
of which specialist language may or may not be used so as to support the develop-
ment of mental maps. Lastly, the new knowledge acquired may or may not be
overtly related to the students’ prior knowledge.
Model 3: Context as Provided by Personal Mental Activity

This model stems from a period in the evolution of theory about cognitive psychol-
ogy when the development of knowledge by an individual was seen to reside solely
within that person (Pope & Keen, 1981). A person was considered to have an under-
standing of a concept that, when expressed—say through speech, enabled another
person to form their own—perhaps different—interpretation of it. This model of
learning has fallen into relative disuse with the growing popularity of socio-cultural
views of learning, with their basic tenet that knowledge is co-constructed by interloc-
utors. Today, this approach is perhaps most useful in considering the learning by an
individual working entirely on their own, say from textbooks. While situations and
focal events could readily be provided for students, considerable efforts would have
to be made to ensure that these were seen as intrinsically or extrinsically relevant to

the students. Perhaps the greatest limitation of the use of this model is entailed in
the fact that all the discussion that took place would have to be internal to the
individual student. It is not surprising that, in an implicit attempt to overcome these
weaknesses, the designers of such courses provide access to other students and to a
teacher/tutor via ICT interaction or telephone link-ups.
Model 4: Context as Social Circumstances

This model is realised when the conditions for the social construction of knowledge,
outlined earlier, are fully met. A context is situated as a cultural entity in society. It
relates to topics and people’s activities which are considered of importance to the
lives of communities within that society. The students and the teacher would see
themselves as a ‘community of practice’, jointly working on a (series of) focal
event(s) in a problem-centred way over a sustained period, for example several
weeks. These interactions would enable relevant zones of students’ proximal devel-
opment to be identified and acted upon by the teacher. The task must include prob-
lems that are clear exemplifications of important concepts, to enable students to
develop a coherent use of specific scientific language and transferable knowledge
(from one focal event to another). The learning environment provided by a task of
such a nature can facilitate the communal engagement of the teacher and students in
a genuine enquiry.
Models and the Study of Case Studies of Context-Based Courses

In our view, in Models 1 and 2, the notion of ‘context’ is largely decorative: it is
certainly not central to the learning that takes place. Both Models 3 and 4 seem
viable because ‘context’ is used in a more coherent way and because the most prom-
inent examples of context-based programmes in use comply to a large extent with
them (Pilot & Bulte, 2006). In Model 3, three elements have a key function in the
design: ‘Situations’ (the ‘settings’ for ‘focal events’); ‘Contexts’ (produced by the
transformation of ‘situations’ through personal mental activity, using existing mental
models to impose meaning on the settings by intra-personal ‘talk’); and ‘Narratives’
(links between ‘contexts’ and some on-going theme in the life of the learner, aiming
at transfer of learning from the immediate setting to other settings).
Model 4 most effectively addresses the current problems that science education
faces. A careful selection of contexts would lead to a focus on key concepts and
hence avoid the issues of excessive content load. It would provide the learning
conditions under which coherent mental maps can be developed by students. The
selection of contexts should be such as to facilitate the capacity to transfer knowl-
edge to other contexts. Those contexts could be selected as to relate more closely to
the interests of students and hence be seen as relevant to them. From the teacher’s
point of view, the approach could enable a balance of address to ‘science education
as a preparation to be a scientist’ and ‘science education for citizenship’ to be
achieved, hence clarifying the purposes of such an education (Roberts, 2007). In

Model 4, the social dimension of a context is fully recognised, and this is essential.
Thus, a context is taken to mean the existence of a cultural entity in society.
Examples of cultural entities are topics and people’s activities which are considered
of importance to the lives of communities within the society. A context can, for
example, be a specific example of ‘genetic modification’, which is based on the
concepts of genetics, and which can be framed by the debate about the social
implications of that technology.
Exploring the Applicability of Model 4

In this section, we explore how the four criteria for context-based science education
can be manifested in Model 4-based courses so as to address the issues of concept

development and transfer. We do so in respect of two examples, each referring to a
different set of educational aims: the first example being related to a course of
‘science for a trainee cook’ and the second to ‘science for food technologist’. They
are presented here from a perspective of a ‘learner’, a new participant who starts to
participate in a new enterprise and is about to acquire the meaning of the specific
language within this social interaction.
Example 1 Focal Event: Making Ice Cream in a Laboratory

This example is positioned within an everyday life setting, say within a ‘science of
cooking’ course. A trainee cook without much experience will make a food product
under the supervision of a more experienced cook, using the typical documentation
available: recipes and manuals for kitchen machines. The behavioural environment,
making/preparing food/cooking, consists of collecting ingredients, working through
the successive steps of the recipe, while ‘analysing’ the (intermediate) products of
this making.
During the social encounter between the trainee cook and the more experienced
cook while using the relevant documents, a specific language is used. For example,
when using the eggs, he/she needs to know which parts of the eggs are ‘egg yolk’,
how to separate the egg yolks from the egg white and what effort is needed to beat
the yolks sufficiently for their effective further use. Other specific words (labels) are
used: ‘sugar’, ‘vanilla sugar’, ‘whole milk’ as ‘ingredients’, and ‘ice-making
machine’, ‘cooling device’, etc., as ‘kitchen utensils’. These words label more
precisely what things are to be selected: ‘sugar’ indicating a specific sweet crystalline
powder, and ‘whole milk’, milk produced in the food industry containing 2% of fat.
These words’ labels have come into use during historical discourse about food
preparation, and therefore have their meaning connected to an established extra-
situational cultural enterprise.
After the trainee cook’s experience, a concept map may be drawn (Figure 1). This
is a figure that shows both the main ‘labels’ that are mentioned in the recipe
and their schematic relations around the relevant actions of the behavioural
Figure 1. A representation of a mental map for making ice cream in the laboratory
environment. Such a map is not an aggregation of isolated facts; it expresses a

process of meaning-making when studying the recipe in the manual of the ice-
making machine (Philips, 2006, pp. 102–107) and performing the task of this
behavioural environment.
Such a context is suitable for inclusion in a science course for trainee chefs
Figure 1. A representation of a mental map for making ice cream in the laboratory
because it provides a suitable introduction to scientific knowledge and processes. It

meets the criteria for Model 4 in that the setting is clearly relevant to the task of
becoming a chef, the education is provided interactively, suitable specific language is
used in a way that makes its meanings clear, and existing knowledge is drawn
together into a mental map while new items of knowledge are introduced into it.
Example 2. Focal Event: Understanding Physical Chemistry of Low-Fat Ice Cream

Manufacture
In this second type of setting, the example refers to the situation/perspective of an
R&D professional at a food company who wants to understand the food physical
chemistry of ice cream for developing commercial low-fat ice cream.
Imagine the discourse between a newcomer and again a more experienced special-
ist while using or producing relevant documents. The discourse takes place at a
more overtly scientific level than in Example 1: see, for example, the description of a
journal abstract given in Figure 2. Typical actions in such a behavioural environ-
ment consist of problem analysis, selecting relevant theory, systematic planning of
experiments, synthesis/preparation, using specific techniques for analysis (such as
Figure 2. Abstract of article by Alvarez, Wolters, Vodovotz, and Ji (2005), © American Dairy
Science Association, 2005. Reprinted with permission.
differential scanning calorimetry), drawing conclusions, discussing outcomes, and

formulating implications. While using such a ‘structured’ type of actions, specific
labels indicate precisely the use of substances, the description of typical structures
and physical properties (milk protein concentrates, polydextrose, MPC, ice-melting
curves, etc.). The whole activity may be represented in a ‘mental map’ as given in
Figure 3.
Figure 3.
2. A
Abstract
representation
of articleofbya mental
Alvarez,map
Wolters,
of understanding
Vodovotz, and
physical
Ji (2005)
properties of ice cream
Figure 3. A representation of a mental map for understanding physical properties of ice cream
In this case also, such a context is suitable for the science education of an R&D
professional in the food technology industry. It also meets the criteria for a Model 4
use of the notion of context. In this case, the language used is more closely ‘scien-
tific’, that is, abstract. Concept development would involve the insertion of such
language into an evolved and more elaborate mental model.
Summary of the Two Exemplar Contexts

The two contexts can be summarised in terms of the four criteria for a context-based
course. Example 1 shows:
(1) setting: twenty-first century, first world applied science laboratory
(2) behavioural environment: the making of food for personal or commercial life
(3) specific language: that expressed in the real-world situation of making ice cream
(4) extra-situational background knowledge: that commonly associated with cooking/
preparing food.
Example 2 shows:
(1) setting: twenty-first century, R&D laboratory of the food industry or the food
science/technology department of a university
(2) behavioural environment: developing understanding how to produce new
commercial food products
(3) specific language: expressed in terms of physical chemistry as applied to the case
of ice cream
(4) extra-situational background knowledge: that of (physical) (food) chemistry or
biochemistry.
Developing a Mental Map

For the further in-depth analysis of the context-based exemplars, the notion of the
‘development of a coherent mental map’ can now be connected to the Criteria (1)–
(4) above. We define a coherent mental map as the representation of a specific pattern
of actions necessary to perform a task within the selected situation and its associated
cultural setting (Criterion 1). This takes place within its behavioural environment
(Criterion 2). Embedded within this pattern is a set of interconnected labels, for
example ‘differential scanning calorimetry’ (Figure 3). Coherency means that all
components of the map are linked and not isolated, such that there is a meaningful
whole. The term ‘mental map’ is used to indicate a possible pattern internalised within a
learner, as a result of the social discourse (language and talk) in the social setting.
A simplistic but accessible way of thinking about a mental map is to tie together
nodes, each identified by a unique label. Thinking about a phenomenon can then be
represented as forming and using a network of such nodes. The links between the
nodes consist of propositions of various kinds, for example ‘such as’, ‘has’, ‘leads to’,
‘causes’, ‘results from’. While the exact nature of such networks, or mental maps
(Johnson-Laird, 1983), is not currently directly accessible—although cognitive

neuroscience is heading in that direction—pictorial representations produced by
individuals through self-report techniques can be obtained. Ways of generating and
using these ‘concept maps’ have been explored extensively by Novak (1998).
The terms ‘concepts’, ‘conceptualisation’, ‘conceptual structures’, ‘schemas’, and
‘mental map’ are often used interchangeably in the literature when discussing ‘concept
development’ or ‘conceptual change’. The volume International Handbook of Research
on Conceptual Change (Vosniadou, 2008) provides eloquent testimony to the complex
demands of bringing about conceptual change, whatever terminology is used.
This nested set of ideas has a long history. Driver, for example, describes
knowledge construction as follows:
The process by which knowledge is constructed by the learner is broadly surmised to

involve a process of hypothesis testing, a process whereby schemes [italics by authors] are
brought into play (either tacitly of explicitly), their fit with new stimuli is assessed and,
as a result, the schemes may be modified. (Driver, 1988, p. 139)
The word ‘schemes’ in this quotation can be equated with ‘mental maps’ as shown
in the examples presented above (see Figures 1 and 3), as these implicitly presented
schemes may be tested and modified in new situations. Furthermore, Driver quotes
Von Glasersfeld:
What determines the value of conceptual structures is their experimental adequacy,
their goodness of fit with experience, their viability as means for solving problems
[authors: ‘performing a task within a behavioural environment’], among which is, of
course, the never-ending problem of consistent organisation that we call understanding
… Facts are made by us and our way of experiencing.
This quotation discusses the term ‘conceptual structures’ in terms of their adequacy
in solving problems, with the ‘consistent organisation of conceptual structures’
producing ‘understanding’. This is congruent with our definition of mental maps as
being meaningful wholes and not just being collections of isolated facts.
The quotation also stresses the active construction of ‘understanding’. In the exam-
ples, we have referred to specific ‘label-use’ in a certain cultural discourse as having
developed over a longer period of time. The function of ‘label-use’ is essential for
communication, the members of the discourse community having ‘invented’ the labels
over the course of time. The function of such specific language use makes communi-
cation more efficient, faster, and more precise, for example ‘sugar’ is more precise
than ‘white grains that taste sweet’, and ‘whole milk’ is more precise than ‘the white
liquid that tastes the most creamy’. The manual of the ice-making machine would be
at least 10 times its size, and the chance of successfully making ice cream would be
considerably reduced, without these cultural-historical artefacts. This gives a clear
motive for action to support the development of specific language use by students.
The notion of ‘concept development’ is equally complex. The phrase is used
instead of ‘concept formation’, when referring to the initial learning of young chil-
dren. The ‘concept development’ of the concept X in young infants is described by
Luntley:
We need a notion of a kind of purposeful activity with respect to things that … captures
the idea that [a] subject is putting her life in order in acting with respect to X and yet
lacks concepts for discriminating X. If both conditions are met [purposeful activity with
respect to X and the lack of concept X], there will then be scope for explaining the
conceptual development of acquiring a concept for X out of this more basic purposeful
activity. (Luntley, 2008, p. 7)
Such a definition of concept development is useful in respect of individual concepts,

however, but difficult to interpret in relation to even preliminary science education
where many concepts are cross-linked: there is usually a more ‘nested’ structure
of concepts within overarching concepts. Indeed, Chi (2008) has suggested that
there are three different routes to ‘concept development’, but it is not clear which
route is relevant to which concept or set of concepts. We will continue therefore
to use the term ‘development of coherent mental maps’ as is given above. The
ideas behind such a definition can be related to relevant notions from theory,
although, if wished, can be expressed in different words and phrases such as
‘schemes’, ‘conceptual structures’, ‘understanding’, ‘consistent organisation’, and
‘concept development’.
As becomes clear from all the above descriptions, it is the motives, the affective
component, the purposefulness, and the usefulness that drives the development of
mental maps. Herein is the essence of context-based learning.
The Transferability of Knowledge

In general, to transfer can be considered as the learner’s use of parts of a mental map,
derived in relation to one focal event, meaningfully in another focal event. Transfer,
as defined in this way, is related to the difference in the conceptual structures that are
involved in the two or more focal events. These should be specified when ‘transfer’ is
discussed for concrete cases. ‘Transfer’, considered from the perspective of the four
criteria above for context-based courses, can be distinguished into three broad sub-
types of transfer: near transfer, further transfer, far transfer (Gentner, 1983, 1988,
1989; Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Schwartz, Varma, & Martin, 2008).
Two focal events (and their related conceptual structures) may be ‘analogically
close’ when the behavioural environment is more or less the same. We will illustrate
this near transfer in the case of making ice cream. Related to Example 1, the distance
of transfer gets a little larger in the sequence of making of cinnamon ice cream,
strawberry ice cream, and yoghurt ice, because the list of ingredients increases, and
new actions and more kitchen utensils are necessary, but the behavioural environ-
ment stays the same: making ice cream in the kitchen or applied science laboratory.
One step further, such near transfer can also take place when considering the making
of other desserts such as sponge puddings. Cooking in the more general sense of
preparing any regular meal, and when cooking ‘exotic’ meals, such as ‘sushi’, also
involves the near transfer of ideas. These ‘transfer occurrences’ all relate to the same
type of behavioural environment: the preparation of food in a life-world situation. In
all cases, the learner’s mental map will be extended with a number of labels, very
likely organised into a conceptual structure that is similar to that for the first exam-
ple. These are all related to one type of coherent extra-situational background: the
‘mental mapping’ of cooking in a life-world setting that involves kitchen utensils,
ingredients, measures, and actions, typically starting with preparation. To reiterate
the point in relation to Example 2: Near transfer takes place when the mental map
connected to one focal event gives a recurrent pattern for another focal event. The
behavioural environment is very similar: research and development of a low-fat ice
cream and research and development of low-fat cheese are both exemplars of the
behavioural environment of research and development for low-fat dairy products in
the field of food engineering science. Near transfer is possible when the mental map
of one focal event can be extended with only a few additional details, for example
labels that indicate, for example, ‘protein crystals’, ‘whey’, etc. connected to the
mental map of cheese manufacture.

We define further transfer as follows. There is a specific setting, for example a
production plant for antibiotics. However, there are multiple but allied behavioural
environments in the plant overall: the activities of the research and development
department, the activities of the production team, the activities of the marketers, etc.
There is one situational setting, but the different behavioural environments, however,
are close to each other. There will be not only apparent similarities between the mental
maps of all the workers but also clear differences between them. There is a general
overlap, but each group has its own specialised actions. Learning how to undertake
such further transfer could, for example, take place when groups of students working
within different behavioural environments need to report their work to each other.
Students in the various groups will have developed different types of mental maps as
a result of the central activity being somewhat different. For one group to engage in
‘further transfer’, when seeking to understand the work of another group, will require
considerable change to the common mental maps of each of the groups.
An example of far transfer involves using the mental map of the R&D person in
food engineering science within the focal event of biochemical research on DNA.
Within the mental maps found, there will be similarities between the two at the level
of labels, for example proteins, micels, molecules. There will be more differences
between what is found in the two types of activity, consequently there will be a
significant number of differences in detail. When the behavioural environment of a
focal event is essentially different from the one in which a mental map has been
developed, the conceptual structure of the extra-situational background knowledge
changes considerably. Consequently, the coherency of concepts is lacking, and
confusingly similar labels that are used in the two different focal events and concep-
tual structures will relate to different meanings.
Let us consider the focal event of DNA research and the focal event of preparing
ice cream in a daily life setting. In both focal events, the mental maps contain the
same labels, for example sugar. This label, however, is connected to a completely
different focal event, with a completely different behaviour environment, and a
completely different meaning of the label: a specific group of carbohydrates
(biochemical research) and a sweet white substance (in daily life/kitchen). ‘Sugar’ in
a life-world focal event consists of white grains that taste sweet, while ‘sugar’ in food
chemistry refers to a class of carbohydrates with a related molecular structure.
The category label transfer is defined from this argument as being where one word
has two significantly different meanings. For example, the use of ‘energy’ in the
example of ‘ice melting curves’, which is a focal event of the ice cream R&D and
which refers to the diagram of an analytical technique, while ‘ice melting curves’ will
have a completely different meaning in the field of climate change.
Challenges in Design: Students’ generation of coherent mental maps that

are ‘transferable’ to other contexts
After this theoretical argument about the development of coherent mental maps and
transfer, we return to the challenges of the design of context-based units. We will

therefore focus on the way that specific teaching and learning sequences within learning
phases are designed such that students may develop coherent mental maps of transfer-
able knowledge. We define the term ‘course-design framework’ as ‘a specific sequence
of building blocks in which teaching and learning activities, assignments, etc., of one
unit are framed’. These building blocks have the function of being learning phases,
such as those for ‘orientation’, ‘acquiring knowledge’, or ‘to provide domain specific
teaching and learning sequences’ (Meheut & Psillos, 2004). This means that we
have to focus on a detailed level at the learning phases that are provided: on the
kinds of learning and teaching activities present; on the kinds of ‘objects’ employed
within these activities; on the content of the communication between the teacher,
the learning materials, and the students.
We need to understand how the ‘need’ for and the development of new specific
language is generated in students, how the task is embedded in a social setting, what
the type of behavioural environment is, what coherent mental maps are desired, and
how these can become transferable. The explicit identification by the designer and
teacher of key patterns of thinking and of the links between them in the production
of explanations is a necessary prerequisite for success. Opportunities for students to
explicitly construct and manipulate their personal mental maps are necessary. The
use of problem-solving approaches within a certain specified behavioural environ-
ment for structuring of teaching will also be helpful because students are required to
activate and use their mental maps in an address to new problems.
A major issue in generating coherent mental maps is how to develop those partial,
incomplete, or even misguided, ‘conceptions’ and understandings that students have
been widely shown to have towards scientifically acceptable mental models
(‘concepts’) (Gilbert & Watts, 1983). Three approaches have been taken to this task.
The first is the epistemological approach, in which learners’ grounds for belief in a
particular conception are brought into question (Posner, Strike, Hewson, &
Gertzog, 1982). The second is the ontological approach, which seeks to bring about
changes in the way that knowledge is categorised (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). The
third, the affective approach, asserts that mental model change depends on the
learner having a satisfactory level of self-efficacy that is manifested in a supportive
social environment when personal needs are addressed (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle,
1993). Methodologies that draw on all three approaches have been successfully used
(Tyson, Venville, Harrison, & Treagust, 1997).
Developing new meaning and new coherent mental maps is difficult for a learner
even within two apparently closely related topics. For example, a well-experienced
food scientist may be able to readily shift from one (hypothetical) mental map to
another, or may even have a (implicit) well-interconnected integrated web of
thinking (e.g. for ice cream in Example 1 to ice cream in Example 2). From a new
learner’s perspective, however, the acquisition of new thinking patterns may be
confusing when she/he is confronted with both focal events simultaneously because
focal events may differ as well in the setting, the behaviour environment, and conse-
quently in the extra-situational background knowledge. When, in the sequence of
learning activities, there is also a change in topics (ice cream to the use of different
materials, e.g. plastics, metals, composites, etc.) that takes place, transfer becomes
even more challenging. For example, when the idea of ‘hydrogen bonding’ is learned
as being important for relating the properties of plastics to the selection of a particu-
lar polymeric material and hence to the properties for their use in auto-parts, then
transfer of the use of hydrogen bonds to the selection of the temperature at which to
iron clothes in a life-world situation is of the ‘far transfer type’.
A life-world example is related to its scientific counterpart by the notions of
abstraction and generalisation. In general, mental maps should be developed
through an intentional, deliberate, sequence of contexts: from life-world schemes of
focal events, through intermediate focal events with related mental maps, to far
transfer into the mental maps and language use that are acceptable in the scientific
community. This process to the learning of abstractions is discontinuous such that a
new mental map is developed next to the old one. For example, the mental map of
the physical chemistry of ice cream is developed next to that of making ice cream in
the kitchen.
Moving across the discontinuity between the two different structures of the
mental maps is an important issue in the design of context-based education because
both the context (as shown by the application of the four criteria) and the actual
mental map often change drastically in the learning process. The motive of the
learner—why the move across the discontinuity should be made—is important in the
analysis of context-based education because we might expect that going from a life-
world mental map to a more advanced scientific mental map is an important issue in
joining the ‘community of practicing scientists’. The learning of new concepts in
context-based science education thus involves the process of development of new
mental maps, in which a student or the ‘learning community’ is coming to see the
relevance of a new structure (affectively considering this as meaningful) and takes
the decision to start using the (new) labels for communication (the specific
language) within this structure.
Transfer can only be attained when a student sees a new context as being analo-
gous—alike in some ways—to the one in which thinking patterns have been initially
learned. Analogies are drawn when a similarity is seen between a familiar context
and the newly encountered one. The entity and the structural relationships between
a source and a target have been divided into three sectors (Hesse, 1966). The posi-
tive analogy is where some similarities seem to exist. The negative analogy is where
no useful analogies can be perceived. The neutral analogy is where no clear decision,
positive or negative, can be taken. Where positive analogies are identified, there still
remains the problem of judging the degree or strength of the analogy (Gentner,
1983). It seems evident that, if we want students to achieve transferability of
thinking patterns between contexts, we should provide students with different
contexts in which the use of thinking patterns is analogous to a degree that is
congruent with their zones of proximal development. Even where such analogous
thinking patterns may exist in theory, the core problem remains of how to give
students a broad enough bank of experiences with different contexts such that they
can actually identify one as being potentially relevant and worthy of Hessian analog-
ical analysis. In terms of the four criteria for the selection of contexts, the attainment
of transferable mental maps will be facilitated by the use of contexts for which a
series of readily perceived analogues exist, where activity to explore the operation of
analogy is organised, where the ideas of analogue-drawing can be mapped onto the
phenomenon, and for which the students have worthwhile, preferably extensive,
experience. An excellent introduction to the literature on the use of analogy (and its
cousin, metaphor) in science education is provided by Aubusson, Harrison, and
Ritchie (2006). There is extensive evidence that students do make use of analogy in
their learning and that this capacity can be developed in science education
(Treagust, Harrison, & Venville, 1998; Treagust, Harrison, Venville, & Dagher,
1996).
Implications: The selection and analysis of exemplar courses

While Model 4 would seem to represent the basis for future context-based courses
that meets the four criteria outlined above most fully, the extent to which existing
courses conform to it is unclear. The adoption of the other three models may result,
to a greater or lesser extent, in the continuation of traditional designs for teaching
and learning. Evidence is needed from the analysis of existing courses about how far
Model 4 is actually the basis for context-based courses currently in classroom use.
We can formulate questions for the analysis of exemplars of context-based
approaches more precisely in terms of our theoretical arguments given above. Such
an analysis focuses on the transformation in the design process, only from the
perspective of the course designers and only from the Ideal to the Formal representa-
tions of the curriculum, that is from philosophical aspirations to what is written for
teachers and schools (Goodlad, 1979; Van Berkel, De Vos, Verdonk, & Pilot, 2000).
The questions are:
(1) What framework is used to sequence the teaching and learning activities?
(2) What aspects of the framework are intended to facilitate the students’ acquisi-
tion of coherent mental maps?
(3) What aspects of the framework are intended to facilitate the transfer of
knowledge by students?
(4) On what notion of context is this approach based?
The answers to these questions will then enable us to ask a series of supplemen-
tary, evaluative questions. Are the settings for focal events chosen likely to support
the engagement of students in a ‘community of practice’ whose social/economic/
cultural value they will appreciate? Is the behavioural environment in which a
learning task will be set likely to actively engage the involvement of students? Will
the students be able to acquire and use relevant specialist language such that they
will be able both to form coherent mental maps and to transfer their knowledge to
other situations and events?
Where positive answers are given to these questions, it is likely that a course that
has been so analysed will contribute to meeting the five challenges, summarised at
the start of this paper, which science education currently faces. The degree to which
the answers are not fully positive will indicate the degree of loss of opportunity that
will be entailed, the degree to which ‘innovation without change’ will have taken
place. However, our greatest hope is that the form of analysis we have given here will
be used at the outset of a new course development, a guide to its structure, content,
and processes.
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Concept Development and Transfer in

Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Keywords: Context-based; Conceptual development; Transfer

ISSN 0950-0693 (print)/ISSN 1464-5289 (online)/11/060817–21

of a science subject by students should be facilitated. Second, there is also a need

(1) What notion of ‘concept development’ might underpin context-based courses?

An address to these questions is particularly important in respect of secondary (high

The Perspectives of ‘context’ and of ‘learning within a context’ Used

ences, experiments in the laboratory, and specific problem-solving tasks were

issue to the planning authority, to be delivered in a public meeting. The specific

intended by the curriculum.

Models for Context-Based Courses

Model 1: Context as the Direct Application of Concepts

Model 2: Context as Reciprocity between Concepts and Applications

Model 3: Context as Provided by Personal Mental Activity

to be made to ensure that these were seen as intrinsically or extrinsically relevant to

Model 4: Context as Social Circumstances

Models and the Study of Case Studies of Context-Based Courses

achieved, hence clarifying the purposes of such an education (Roberts, 2007). In

Exploring the Applicability of Model 4

can be manifested in Model 4-based courses so as to address the issues of concept

Example 1 Focal Event: Making Ice Cream in a Laboratory

environment. Such a map is not an aggregation of isolated facts; it expresses a

because it provides a suitable introduction to scientific knowledge and processes. It

Example 2. Focal Event: Understanding Physical Chemistry of Low-Fat Ice Cream

differential scanning calorimetry), drawing conclusions, discussing outcomes, and

Summary of the Two Exemplar Contexts

Developing a Mental Map

(Johnson-Laird, 1983), is not currently directly accessible—although cognitive

The process by which knowledge is constructed by the learner is broadly surmised to

Such a definition of concept development is useful in respect of individual concepts,

The Transferability of Knowledge

mental map of cheese manufacture.

Challenges in Design: Students’ generation of coherent mental maps that

transfer, we return to the challenges of the design of context-based units. We will

Implications: The selection and analysis of exemplar courses

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