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The Generative Learning Model

and its Implications for Science
Education
a b
Roger Osborne & Merlin Wittrock
a
Physics Department , University of Waikato
b
Department of Education , University of
California , Los Angeles
Published online: 26 Mar 2008.
To cite this article: Roger Osborne & Merlin Wittrock (1985) The Generative Learning
Model and its Implications for Science Education, Studies in Science Education, 12:1,
59-87, DOI: 10.1080/03057268508559923
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Studies in Science Education, 12 (1985) 59-87 59
The Generative Learning Model

and its Implications for Science Education
ROGER OSBORNE
Physics Department, University of Waikato
MERLIN WITTROCK
Department of Education, University of California, Los Angeles
BACKGROUND
During the last decade there has been a major upsurge in interest, within science
education, in children's ideas (Driver, 1984; White and Tisher, in press). Of parti-
cular interest are;
(i) the conceptions of the natural and physical environment which children
bring with them to science lessons; and
(ii) the impact of science lessons on those ideas.
Conferences have been organised to discuss and report on findings (Archenhold,
Driver, Orton and Wood-Robinson 1980; Helm and Novak 1983; and Pines and
West 1984); team research projects have been based on these issues (e.g. Bell and
Driver 1984; Osborne and Freyberg 1985); and reviews of the research have been
produced (Driver and Erickson 1983; Gilbert and Watts 1983). The findings from
this research as summarised by Osborne and Wittrock (1983), and Champagne,
Gunstone and Klopfer (1983) are:
(i) children have views about a variety of topics in science from a young age
and prior to the formal learning of science;
(ii) children's views are often different from scientists' views; they are fre-
quently not well known by teachers, and to children they are often sen-
sible and useful views;
(iii) children's views can remain uninfluenced or be influenced, sometimes in
unanticipated ways, by science teaching.
The research is significant for a number of reasons:
(i) The research rests comfortably within the constructivist tradition of educa-
tional psychology and has the potential to draw on, and contribute to, this
field. The research also contributes to, and draws on, similar research
undertaken in other subjects of the school curriculum (Driver 1982).
(ii) The philosophical orientation of the research work complements some of
the well known views on the nature of scientific enquiry (for example due
60 R.J. Osborne and M.C. Wittrock
to Kuhn (1970), Lakatos (1970), Popper (1972a) and Feyerabend (1978)).
Links can be established between the ways children learn and the ways
science develops, particularly in terms of the importance of existing ideas
in the process (Pope and Gilbert 1983). These considerations have implica-
tions for science teaching (Finley 1983).
(iii) The research leads directly to investigations about how children acquire
their ideas and how children's existing ideas can be changed or modified
(Hewson 1980a, 1980b, 1981; Posner, Strike, Hewson and Gertzog 1982;
Claxton 1984; Hewson and Hewson 1984; Cosgrove and Osborne 1985).
(iv) The research has used methods, and produced findings, which are com-
municable to curriculum developers and teachers (see for example Driver
1983; Osborne 1982). As a result the research has direct application to
science teaching in terms of considering aims (Fensham 1983), discussing
assumptions (Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham 1982) and thinking about
classroom practice (Osborne and Freyberg 1985).
The motivation for much of the research has been a general unease amongst science
educators. Science teaching and learning over the last two decades has not always
been successful in developing concepts in children which are acceptable and useful
to children and which are also soundly based on our scientific culture and heritage
(Ausubel 1968; Novak 1978). This has led to a problem-orientated research approach,
and the development of a strong empirical research base. Not only is there a breadth
of complementary research techniques being used to explore children's ideas — both
within and beyond the classroom (Driver and Erickson 1983) — but there is a
remarkable consistency in the findings about children's ideas across a range of coun-
tries and research methodologies (Gilbert and Watts 1983).
Most of the research on children's ideas in science has not then been theory driven.
Yet, as Driver and Erickson (1983) have pointed out, the researchers tend to share
certain assumptions about the nature of knowledge and the nature of learning. In
our view theoretical issues are important. They can focus thinking and facilitate
discussion amongst researchers and teachers. Theories and models can have
explanatory and predictive powers with useful implications for future research and
for instruction and learning.
In an earlier paper (Osborne and Wittrock 1983) we proposed that a useful
theoretical position was to consider learning as a generative process. In this paper
we have attempted to place those generative learning ideas in the context of other
viewpoints on learning, to explicate in more detail the key postulates of the generative
learning model, and to more clearly set out the implications of these theoretical
ideas for teaching, learning, curriculum development and research. It is our view
that the model provides one useful theoretical framework for aspects of work in
the field.
The Generative Learning Model 61
THE CONSTRUCTIVIST TRADITION

Driver (1982) cites three traditions in educational psychology which have had a
major impact on the teaching of science in recent decades. These are:
(i) the developmental tradition. This tradition has emphasised age related
restrictions on what learning can be expected of a child at a certain age
(Lovell 1980; Shayer and Adey 1981).
(ii) the behaviourist tradition. This tradition has emphasised reinforcement and
learning in small steps, in which increasingly complex skills and patterns
of behaviour can be built up through carefully designed instruction based
on learning hierarchies (White 1973). No age limitations on learning are
proposed.
(iii) the constructivist tradition. This tradition rests on the view that a learner's
existing ideas are all-important in responding to, and making sense of,
stimuli. The learner makes sense of experience by actively constructing
meaning (Magoon 1977; Pope, Watts and Gilbert 1983).
A fourth tradition in educational psychology with potential impact on science
teaching is the information-processing tradition (see Larkin and Rainard 1984). This
tradition is concerned with learners undertaking complex tasks and with develop-
ing component orientated, often computer based, models of cognition in human
performance (see Newell and Simon 1972; Lochhead and Clement 1979; Gentner
and Stevens 1983).
Recent research in many areas has led to an increasing enthusiasm for a con-
structivist orientation to the interpretation of research findings on learning (Pope
and Keen 1981; Wittrock 1982; di Sibio 1982; Driver 1982). Research in the fields
of learning disabilities, mathematics education, science education, and reading
indicates the usefulness of a constructivist view (Wittrock 1974a, 1981a, 1982, 1984,
in press a, in press b). Driver and Erickson (1983) suggest that amongst science educa-
tion researchers interested in children's ideas there is a shared commitment to some
form of constructivist psychology. Beyond this, however, there would appear to
be little real agreement as to the likely views or models of learning which will make
the most useful contributions to the research field.
While the origins of the constructivist traditions date back to the Greeks, one
of the major influences on the constructivist tradition in recent times has been the
writings and research of Piaget (Magoon 1977). Although Piaget is frequently cited
for his work on child development, Kamii and de Vries (1978) point out that Piaget
was a constructivist because he considered that:
(i) all knowledge is constructed by the individual as he or she interacts with
the environment and tries to make sense of it; and
(ii) all knowledge is acquired not by the internalisation of some outside given
meaning but by construction from within, of appropriate representations
and interpretations.
White and Tisher (in press) suggest that researchers following the constructivist
tradition in science education are more closely following a Piagetian tradition than
the present advocates of stages of development (developmental tradition). Certainly
Piaget's interviews, and his ideas about assimilation and accommodation fit very
comfortably within what has become the constructivist tradition (West and Pines
1984).
Pope and Gilbert (1983) have drawn attention to the work of Kelly (1955). They
argue that Kelly's constructivist ideas are particularly appropriate for science educa-
tion as Kelly bases his whole approach to the development of a person on the
metaphor of man-the-scientist. Kelly's view is that each person constructs for him-
or herself representational models of the world which enable that person to chart
a course of behaviour in relation to it.
This model is subject to change over time since constructions of reality are
constantly tested out and modified to allow better predictions in the future.
Thus for Kelly the questioning and exploring, revising and replacing, in the
light of predictive failure, which is symptomatic of scientific theorising, is
precisely what a person does in his attempts to anticipate events. The person
can be seen as a scientist constantly experimenting with his definition of ex-
istence'. [Pope and Keen 1981, p.26].
Pope and Gilbert (1983) argue that Kelly's emphasis on 'the uniqueness of each
person's construction of the world and the construct systems each will evolve' when
placed in an education context 'lends support to teachers who are concerned with
the investigation of student views, who seek to incorporate these views within the
teaching-learning dialogue, and who see the importance of encouraging students
to reflect upon, and make known their construction of some aspects of reality' (Pope
and Gilbert 1983, p. 197).
Kelly's position as outlined above is indeed an important and relevant view for
science educators, and is one which would be widely accepted by those working
within the constructivist tradition. The position is supported by a complex, carefully
reasoned, and articulated theory known as Personal Construct Theory (Kelly 1955).
The representational models of the world that each person develops are composed
of a series of interrelated personal constructs according to Kelly. These constructs
are used by a person to describe present experiences and forecast events (theory
building) and to assess the accuracy of previous forecasts in hindsight (theory testing).
A practical outcome of Construct Theory is manifest in a specific research tech-
nique for determining an individual's constructs; the Repertory Grid Technique
(Pope and Keen 1981).
While the Personal Construct Theory and Repertory Grid Technique indicate the
substantive nature of Kelly's ideas, they also highlight one of the difficulties with
any psychological theory in the context of science teaching and learning. As we have
already mentioned much of the recent science education research on children's ideas
has been largely driven by a problem orientated approach and by a real desire to
be able to communicate to teachers not only what has been found out but also the
way it has been found out. Moreover, the desire to provide teachers and teacher-
educators with an easily understood theoretical basis to the work has been a prime
concern of many of the researchers working in the field. Unfortunately Kelly's Con-
struct Theory (Kelly 1955) is not easy to comprehend without detailed study because
he uses specialised terminology. In our experience the technical complexities of
Personal Construct Theory, particularly where Kelly purports to be theorising on

the requirements for successful communication, are not easily accepted by busy
science teachers nor even by a number of pragmatic science education researchers.
The translation of Kelly's ideas into language interpretable by teachers has begun
and will be helpful (for example Pope 1982).
The Repertory Grid technique with its heavy reliance on Principal Components
Analysis (Pope and Keen 1981) is also not easily accepted by science teachers. In
our experience teachers of physical science in particular are suspicious of research
which requires complex statistical analyses to make sense of the data. Finally while
Kelly does not distinguish between cognitive and affective domains, the repertory
grid techniques would appear to be of most value in analysing people's feelings and
less useful in analysing people's thoughts, such as learners' theories about force
and motion. It must be kept in mind that Kelly's major domain of concern was
therapeutic practice (Pope 1982).
The work of Claxton (1984) modifies and extends Kelly's ideas, particularly about
constructs, in a manner communicable to teachers (Osborne 1984). Claxton
subscribes to Kelly's (1955) view that all the actions, and intuitions, of each individual
arise out of personal theories about the world. Such theories underline and pro-
duce the descriptions and explanations a person provides about the world. He argues
that a child's theories are a whole host of 'mini-theories' which start as an attempt
of the child to make sense of a particular kind of experience. This initial domain
of experience — which Kelly (1955) calls 'focus of convenience' — expands to include
other kinds of situations where it has been successfully applied by the child. Claxton
(1984) suggests that the most powerful stimulus for the extension, modification or
abandonment of a theory is its failure and that the level of commitment of a child
to a particular mini-theory will determine the fate of the mini-theory. Mini-theories
exist to cope with circumstances, and if circumstances are shifting fast, so will mini-
theories. Any particular theory or theory domain will last as long as it is successful.
Claxton (1984) considers Kelly's constructs (Kelly 1955) to be less general than
mini-theories, but he feels that much of what Kelly has to say about constructs can
be applied to mini-theories. In Claxton's view mini-theories apply to, and are
activited by, a set of specific situations and result in certain predictions and actions.
All this use of mini-theories may be unconscious, unarticulated, spontaneous and
intuitive. However, after a child has developed a language he or she acquires the
ability to describe and explain things to others in terms of mini-theories. Unfor-
tunately, and of real significance for science education, the descriptions and
explanations offered for a phenomenon often arise out of a different, but over-
lapping, mini-theory from the one that generates intuitions and spontaneous reac-
tions. Gut science, based on intuition and spontaneous reaction; lay science, based
on the everyday use of language and media images and school science, based on
the symbolic and idealised world of the science classroom may result in three dif-
ferent and distinct sets of mini-theories in the mind of the school pupil. Osborne
(1984) has exemplified these issues for the teaching of force and motion in physics.
GENERATIVE LEARNING
Generative learning (Wittrock 1974a, 1977; Osborne and Wittrock 1983) is central
to the construedvist tradition (Hewson and Hewson 1984). The fundamental premise
of generative learning is that people tend to generate perceptions and meanings that
are consistent with their prior learning. These perceptions and meanings are
something additional both to the stimuli and the learner's existing knowledge. To
construct meaning requires effort on the part of the learner and links must be
generated between stimuli and stored information (Wittrock 1974b).
The empirical research which, in part, led to the idea of generative learning
emphasised the importance of the learner in the interpretation and processing of
stimuli. This research included the work on organisation (Ausubel 1960; Tulving
and Thompson 1973), imagery (Paivio 1971) and cognitive re-interpretation of
attribution in motivation (Weiner, Heckinhausen, Meyer and Cork 1972).
The idea of generative learning, together with some ideas from information-
processing psychology, leads to the generative model of learning (Wittrock 1974b;
Osborne and Wittrock 1983). This model attempts to illustrate the components
involved in generative learning for the purposes of focusing thinking and encouraging
discussion. However it needs to be kept in mind that any model of learning has
certain aspects which form the central core of the model, and other aspects which
are more peripheral. Also in specifying details of a model, there has to be a com-
promise between clarifying the unique and central features of the model and pro-
viding supportive detail which may simply confuse.
The generative learning model is centrally concerned with the influence of existing
ideas on what sensory input is selected and given attention, the links that are
generated between stimuli and aspects of memory store, the construction of mean-
ing from sensory input and information retrieved from long-term memory, and
finally the evaluation and possible subsumption of constructed meanings. This pro-
cess is discussed in more detail through a consideration of the key postulates of
the model, and set out diagramatically in Figure 1.
The key postulates of the model are:
(i) the learner's existing ideas influence what use is made of the senses and
in this way the brain can be said to actively select sensory input. For example
a pupil may be asked to look for animals in a forest. His or her meaning
for the word animal will influence where the pupil will look. If birds are
not considered animals — and for many children they are not (Bell 1981)
— then it is less likely pupils will look skywards.
(ii) the learners' existing ideas will influence what sensory input is attended
to and what is ignored. For example, much of what we hear is considered
irrelevant to our immediate interests and focus of attention. Such sounds
are heard but ignored; whether they be from the birds outside the classroom
window or the noises from the class in the adjacent room.

(iii) the input selected or attended to by the learner, of itself, has no inherent
meaning. For example, a teacher states that There is a force on a ball rolling
down a hill'. To the teacher this statement has a certain meaning but this
meaning cannot be conveyed directly to the learners; only the sounds are
conveyed to the learners' brains.
(iv) the learner generates links between the input selected and attended to and
parts of memory store. A learner unfamiliar with physics is unlikely to
generate links to a uniform slope, or to the idea of gravity acting on the
ball, when he or she hears that There is a force on a ball rolling down
a hill'. He or she might link the sensory input to a specific experience of
a ball rolling and bouncing down a grass hillock, for example. Unfor
tunately such links generated may be quite inappropriate if the learner is
to construct a meaning similar to the teacher's meaning.
(v) the learner uses the links generated and the sensory input to actively con
struct meaning. For example, from the sensory input heard from the
teacher, and the specific experience in memory to which links have been
generated, a meaning can be constructed for There is a force on a ball
rolling down a hill'. Our non-physics learner may think of the force as
the jolting of the ball against the rough hillside or a force within the ball
by virtue of its speed (see Gilbert, Watts and Osborne 1982). Neither con
struction is likely to be similar to the teacher's meaning.
(vi) the learner may test the constructed meaning against other aspects of
memory store and against meanings constructed as a result of other sen
sory input. Testing constructed meanings involves generating links to other
aspects of memory store. Does the newly constructed meaning relate well
to other related ideas that can be constructed from memory store. Is the
newly constructed idea compatible with prior constructions? As an example,
let us assume the next sentence stated by the teacher was The greater the
slope of the hill the greater the force'. Our non-physics student might con
struct a meaning from this which tests out well against his or her earlier
construction. With a greater slope, a steeper hill, the jolting of the ball
will be greater and/or the speed the ball acquires will certainly be greater.
However, if the next sensory input was a visual stimulus from the blackboard
'F = mgsinθ' our non-physics student might (possibly?) suspect that his
or her constructed meaning for the earlier statements was different in some
unaccountable way from the teacher's ideas. Alternatively, and possibly
more likely, he or she may simply feel unable to construct anything mean-
ingful from the blackboard statement but remain relatively happy with his
or her construction from the first statements.
(vii) the learner may subsume constructions into memory store. If the con-
structed meaning makes sense in terms of its evaluation with other aspects
of memory store then it may be incorporated into memory, influencing

and possibly altering the memory-store itself in the process. The greater
the number of links generated to other aspects of memory store, and the
greater the number of these links that reaffirm a useful constructed mean-
ing has been made, the more likely the idea will be remembered and make
sense to the learner.
(viii) the need to generate links and to actively construct, test out and subsume
meanings requires individuals to accept a major responsibility for their own
learning. All the activities involved in learning with understanding require
intellectual effort on the part of the learner. Learners and teachers have
distinctive responsibilities in science education. No learner can read a book,
listen to a talk, see a demonstration or a film, and learn with understanding
without actively taking responsibility for that learning (Wittrock and Lums-
daine 1977). When students accept that they, rather than their teachers,
their parents, other people, or other factors, are primarily responsible for
constructing the meanings that represent their success or failure in school,
their learning is likely to increase. Teachers, parents, and other people have
a distinctive responsibility for facilitating learning by teaching. But good
teaching is not sufficient to attain good learning, which requires active
intellectual effort by the learner.
Any model to do with human learning is an oversimplification of reality. The

generative learning model is no exception. Further elaboration of the model may
be useful in particular contexts. Distinctions between long and short-term memory,
and various possible ways information is stored, e.g. images, episodes and so on,
have been discussed at various times in association with the model (Osborne and
Wittrock 1983; Wittrock 1981a) but are not considered core elements of it. Moreover
the ways initial constructions are tested against criteria such as plausibility,
intelligibility and fruitfulness (Hewson 1981) or against less rational criteria (West
and Pines 1983; Feher 1983) can fit or be accommodated by the model but need
not be seen as an essential part of the model.
GENERATIVE LEARNING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRADITION

It is not our intention to set out a comparison of generative learning with other
models of learning within the constructivist tradition. Researchers and educators
Figure 1: Schematic representation of the generative learning model
THE ACTIVE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING
will find different models useful for different purposes. We find the idea of
generative learning, and the model in particular, useful for communicating ideas
about learning and instruction, useful for explaining what we know about children's
ideas and learning, and useful for guiding aspects of research from a predictive point
of view. However, before considering some of these aspects further we wish to
distinguish the generative aspects of the model from non-generative ideas within
the constructivist tradition. We will consider this distinction in the context of research
on reading comprehension (see Collins. Brown and Larkin 1980; Bell 1985).
Within the constructivist view of reading, whether it be considered generative
or non-generative, the reader is assumed to construct meaning for the presented
word using his or her knowledge (Brandsford, Barclay, Franks 1972; Anderson 1977,
Rumelhart and Ortony 1977; Collins, Brown and Larkin 1980). This constructed
meaning is something additional to both the stimulus (e.g. text) and the learner's
existing knowledge. In fact it can be argued (Wittrock 1974b) that the visual stimuli
obtained from reading-a-text have no inherent meaning; the meaning of a word,
sentence or paragraph is not in the words themselves but the reader must construct
meaning for him- or herself.
In the non-generative view of reading the reader's existing knowledge directly
determines, and provides the outline structure and details used to construct, mean-
ing. The comprehension process is viewed as one of selecting existing knowledge
(schema) from memory and making inferences about aspects of the situation not
specified by the text data. Whether the existing knowledge selected is considered
as a frame (Minksy 1975; Wingograd 1975), a script (Schank and Obelson 1977),
or a schema (Anderson 1977; Spiro 1977, 1980) it is considered to embody the
appropriate knowledge framework and comprehension only requires in addition
the assigning or inferring of specific details; a slot-filling activity.
In the generative view of reading (Wittrock 1974a; 1981c) the reader's existing
knowledge is considered to be modified and re-organised while it is being used to
construct a meaning from the text stimuli. Not only is this considered a construc-
tive process but also a generative one. The reader must actively, and with effort,
creatively construct meaning by generating links between different aspects of existing
knowledge, different aspects of the incoming stimuli, and different aspects of the
initially fragmentary constructions. The text stimuli are seen as nothing more than
a guide to the construction of meaning. A constructed meaning will be considered
useful and acceptable to the reader if it makes sense in terms of his or her existing
ideas.
Although the importance of the generative aspects of learning can readily be
illustrated — and contrasted with non-generative ideas — in the context of reading
comprehension, the idea is widely applicable (Wittrock 1977). Whatever the source
of the stimuli and whatever the sense stimulated (e.g. sight, hearing, taste, touch
or smell) links must be generated to aspects of long term memory if meaningful
learning is to occur. Historically, generative learning fits well within the mainstream
of thought about learning, memory and their facilitation through teaching (Wittrock
1982). Since the days of the Greeks constructing relations between experience and
new information by generating interactive images between the old ideas and new
events, has been a favourite and effective pedagogical technique.
Finally it needs to be remembered that ideas about generative learning refer to
learning with understanding and to the consequent implications for instruction. In
the context of learning and instruction there is more concern with the construction
process than with the exact ways the links might be represented and knowledge stored
in memory — for example the 'constructs' of Kelly (1955) or the 'images, episodes,
propositions and skills' of Gagne and White (1978). Long-term memory can be
viewed simply as a source of plans, intentions, goals, ideas, memories, strategies
and emotions actively used to attend to, select, and construct meaning from stimuli
(Wittrock 1982).
THE MODEL AND RECENT RESEARCH IN SCIENCE EDUCATION

The generative learning model is consistent with the recent research findings on
children's ideas in science, and the modification of those ideas (Osborne and
Wittrock 1983; Wittrock, in press a). In terms of the model it is inevitable that
children will construct ideas about their world which are determined by their prior
experiences and existing ideas. Children's self-centred and human-centred points
of view, their limited experiences and everyday use of language and their interests
in mini-theories to explain specific events, ensure that they develop ideas distinctly
different from those of scientists. After all, scientists are interested in coherent
macro-theories which explain a wide range of phenomena (Layton 1973; Osborne,
Bell and Gilbert 1983) using a linguistic and mathematical super-structure specifically
designed for the job (Claxton 1984).
The model also accounts for the frequency that children's ideas are not influenced,
or influenced in unanticipated ways, by classroom experiences (Tasker 1980, 1981).
The inordinate influence of existing ideas in determining
(i) what sensory input is selected and attended to,
(ii) what links are generated to existing ideas,
(iii) what meanings are constructed,
(iv) what evaluations of new constructions occur, and
(v) what constructions are subsumed into long-term memory
re-emphasises the complete lack of direct control a teacher has in ensuring that
specific constructions occur and in ensuring existing ideas are influenced in hoped
for ways. Both no-learning and unanticipated-learning can be accounted for.
Frequently no learning occurs for a range of reasons. These include:

(i) children are often satisfied with their current explanations of phenomena
so that there can be little or no motivation to change existing ideas;
(ii) it is surprisingly easy, as we have seen, for a learner to generate links and
construct meanings from sensory input to fit into his or her current ideas;
(iii) it is very easy not to test constructions against other existing ideas; with
few links generated to existing ideas in memory by the learner, these ideas
can be minimally influenced by new constructions; and
(iv) major restructuring where necessary, can be resisted by a learner for a range
of reasons (Claxton 1984).
The relevance of the generative aspects of the model are perhaps most clearly
demonstrated in the unanticipated learning that does occur in classrooms. It would
appear that pupils have no difficulty generating links from sensory input to existing
ideas (Tasker 1981; Edwards and Marland 1982). However the problem is that the
links generated are not always to the ideas which teachers anticipate; frequently
they are to existing ideas which would be considered quite irrelevant by the teacher.
As a consequence the perceived purpose of a lesson, how it links to a previous lesson,
what learning activities are appropriate, the sensory input to be selected and attended
to, and the conclusions to be drawn from a learning activity can be quite different
from those intended by the teacher. Also, all humans are aware of how one's
thoughts can digress from the immediate task in hand and this certainly occurs in
the science classroom (see Edwards and Marland 1982). Finally we need to remember
that the links which a teacher would like generated are not always possible because
the appropriate knowledge may not exist in the pupils' long-term memory.
The generative learning model with its emphasis on the control that the learner
has of his or her own learning, relates to the research on metacognition (Wittorck
1982; Baird 1984). Baird's detailed review of the research in this area, and his
empirical findings, point out the importance of the learner accepting responsibility
for his or her own learning, and the learner understanding that learning science
is something only the learner can do. He argues that there is a lack of explicit teaching
of pupils about learning and about taking responsibility for their own learning in
most science classrooms. Baird has shown that such teaching can have a very real
influence on pupils' learning. Unfortunately, however, we suspect that many
activities prescribed for pupils in science classrooms and the typical assessment pro-
cedures which follow are such that pupils are not really encouraged, or find it
profitable
(i) to attempt to generate multiple links between sensory input and existing
knowledge, and
(ii) to construct meaning, and to critically evaluate this meaning against other
aspects of existing ideas and meanings which could be constructed from
other sensory input available.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING SCIENCE

Let us now turn to the implications of the constructivist tradition, and the
generative learning model within that tradition, for the teaching and learning of
science. From a constructivist viewpoint it can be argued that it is desirable to take
a holistic view of a person (Pope and Keen 1981), although the information-
processing aspects of the generative learning model maintain a compartmentalised
view of learning to some extent. While accepting the interdependence of factors
such as selection, attention, and so on — and the importance of maintaining a holistic
viewpoint — we consider that in teasing out aspects of learning, using the key
postulates of the model, specific implications for teaching and learning can be
isolated and focussed on.
Selection. One of the problems for teachers, and a source of joy for pupils, of activity
based science lessons is the immense amount of sensory input that is available. Sights,
sounds, smells, as well as tastes and tactile sensations are all available to the pupil-
as-scientist. While a teacher may wish, or simply expect, pupils to select certain
sensory inputs and ignore others in the science classroom this is frequently not the
case, particularly with younger pupils. Pupils need the opportunity to select sen-
sory input for themselves at least initially. For example while to a teacher set on
a particular teaching task there may be no need for pupils to touch a certain object,
apparatus or event, to the pupils this can become an overwhelming desire as they
attempt to make sense of a new experience in their own terms. Once this initial desire
has been fulfilled, children may well be prepared to accept suggestions as to the
sensory input they now select — what to look for, what to listen for — if they are
to further make sense of phenomena. The need to give pupils the opportunity to
explore a new situation for themselves initially is present in may recent models of
science teaching which are based on the constructivist tradition (Karplus 1975;
Erickson 1979; Renner 1982; and Nussbaum & Novick 1981, 1982).
Attention. The sensory input selected and attended to by a learner involves arousal,
activation and effort (Wittrock, in press b); all of which are determined by learners'
existing plans, intentions, and other forms of knowledge. A teacher needs to
influence the learners' voluntary control over attention if he or she is to ensure that
pupils attend to specific aspects of the learning experience. The stimulation of
attention might involve modifying a learner's goals and intentions, through, for
example, novel instructional stimuli, subject matter, and textbooks (Wittrock 1978).
While discrepant, novel, original and challenging stimulation, will not of itself
inevitably result in learning, it is likely to excite at least transitory attention. Further
attention can be influenced by the questions teachers ask pupils, or learners ask
themselves. While pupils are in general dencient in sell questioning skills (Brown
1980), pupils can be taught to ask questions; of themselves, of each other, and of
teachers and other adults (Fraze and Schwartz 1975; Biddulph and Osborne 1982).
Pupils can also be encouraged to develop, or be explicitly taught, strategies to direct
their own study (Novak 1981; Baird 1984).
Teachers can influence the learners' control over attention by ensuring that,
(i) written material has carefully worded headings, subheadings and focus
questions;
(ii) substantive and key objectives clarify the intent of a lesson; and
(iii) instructions encourage pupils to attend to the key purpose and important
design features of an experiment.
Sensory Input. In our view, teachers need to reflect constantly on the fact that the
sensory input selected and attended to by their pupils has, of itself, no inherent
meaning. For example even a spoken answer by a teacher to a pupil's specific ques-
tion can only be given meaning by the pupil using his or her existing knowledge.
Where such existing knowledge involves meanings for words, such as 'animal', which
are subtly different from the teacher's meanings neither pupil nor teacher may be
aware of the small but really critical differences in meanings beween what the teacher
meant and what the pupil constructed (Freyberg and Osborne 1981).
Baird (1984) has argued that learners, as they get older, need to become increas-
ingly responsible for their own learning. As a part of this process there is a need
for learners to become aware that meaning is something that they construct, and
that meaning is not something that can be transferred from the teacher by the teacher.
Generating links. In terms of the generative learning model the links that are
generated between sensory input and existing knowledge are a critical aspect of learn-
ing. As we have discussed, in many learning situations it is not difficult to generate
links to what are considered by the learner to be appropriate aspects of existing
knowledge in memory store. However these links may often be deemed inappropriate
by the teacher if he or she was aware of them. For example, it is easy for a teacher
familiar with a subject such as physics to do all his or her teaching while locked
into a certain 'physics' mental set, which to the student represents a strange fan-
tasy world containing frictionless pulleys and massless ropes (Claxton 1984). In this
framework the question, 'What work does a boy do if he has a mass of 50kg and
climbs up a ladder a vertical distance of 5m?' might be expected by a physics teacher
to generate links to W = Fd and F = mg. Instead it may generate links to 'window
cleaner' or 'painter' in the mind of a novice physics student! More subtle distinc-
tions between different physics problem solvers have been identified by Larkin (see
for example Larkin 1983). Where the inappropriate nature of the links generated
is not identified, by pupil or teacher, subsequent successful learning is jeopardised
and the exact nature of any remedial teaching which is needed is difficult for either
to determine.
Teachers can provide sensory input which will help pupils generate links to
appropriate aspects of their memory store. For example, teachers can:
(i) remind pupils of the important and relevant aspects of the previous lesson
and the implications for today's lesson;
(ii) exemplify how the topic to be taught, or the scientific principle being discussed,
relates to the pupils' prior experiences both in, and beyond, the classroom;
(iii) ensure that an explanation contains what to the teacher are redundancies, (for
example repeat the explanation in visual as well as oral form, and/or in verbal
as well as diagrammatic form); and
(iv) provide a large number of exemplars, and non-exemplars, of concepts and
definitions.
While inappropriate links to memory store are frequently generated, and this has
been discussed, there are occasions when the teacher fails to provide any sensory
input which the learner can link in any sensible way to any aspect of memory store;
no sensible meaning can be constructed by the learner. In some ways such situa-
tions are of less concern in the teaching-learning context. The pupil knows, in these
cases, that he or she needs to reflect further on the sensory input already acquired
and/or seek additional information.
Constructing meanings. The generative learning model, as represented in Figure

1, may imply to some readers that the processes for the selection of, and attention
to, sensory input and the processes by which meaning is constructed, are relatively
straightforward. While Figure 1 sets out the basic components of the learning model,
the actual construction of meanings — of the nature and complexity inherent in
learning science — involves much more than a single-path or single-loop process.
In terms of the model, a multitude of links may be generated between sensory input
and existing ideas, between different aspect of memory store, and between different
aspects of sensory input.
The process of constructing complex meanings — as well as restructuring existing
ideas — may be helped by the learner representing his or her tentative construc-
tions on paper as verbal summaries, pictures, tables, diagrams, headings and
subheadings, flow charts and/or concept maps (Novak, Gowin and Johansen 1983).
Thus we need to acknowledge that not only can sensory input be selected and
attended to by the learner, but it can also be produced by the learner.
Evaluation of constructions. The evaluation of constructions is a critical aspect of
learning in that insufficient testing of inappropriate constructions can lead to
inadequate learning. There are, at least, three possibilities.
(i) A construction may be accepted simply without evaluation on the assump-
tion that as a meaning has been constructed it must be the intended mean-
ing. This is likely to occur when the learner has little real interest in the
topic or where he or she believes that what is being taught is already familiar
material and old constructions will be adequate. Often imposed evalua-
tions provided by tests and examinations are necessary for learners to be
aware of problems but at that stage the original constructions which gave
rise to the learning problems are no longer identifiable.
(ii) A construction may be evaluated to some extent by the learner but the
evaluation may be insufficiently comprehensive for the learner to detect
any inadequacies in his or her constructions. For example, sometimes the
sensory input available to the learner is not sufficient for distinctions
between learner's construction and teacher's intention to be identifiable.
Where words have subtle differences in meanings in an everyday and a
scientific sense (e.g. force, animal, power, reaction, community) and where
ways of viewing the world differ (e.g. Intuitive versus Newtonian Dynamics
(McCloskey 1983)) it is surprisingly easy for statements which are correct
in a scientific sense to be interpreted and 'successfully' evaluated by the
learner in terms of everyday meanings and views of the world.
(iii) A construction may be adequately evaluated and, if found to be
inappropriate, rejected.
Teachers need to make available a range of models, experiences, demonstrations,
worked examples and analogies to enable pupils to test out their constructions. Pupils
74 R.J. Osborne and M.C Wittrock
also need to be encouraged to ask questions, identify and pursue what appear to
them to be inconsistencies in what they see or hear, and to undertake the routine
problems found in science textbooks. Baird (1984) also argues that pupils need to
monitor their own learning in the evaluative sense; to think more about what they
know and do not know, and what they are learning and why they are learning it.
This type of monitoring needs to be encouraged by teachers.
Subsumption. To subsume constructions into memory store may occur without

significant changes in existing knowledge structures because the construction relates
perfectly well to existing ideas. On the other hand significant changes or restruc-
turing may be required. For example, to reformulate one's pre-Newtonian view of
force and motion, and to reinterpret all past and future experience from a New-
tonian perspective, requires a major restructuring of existing knowledge (Cham-
pagne, Klopfer and Anderson 1980).
Whenever existing ideas have been found to apply successfully to a wide range
of situations and to be firmly embedded in a wealth of personal experience and
everyday language (Claxton 1984) it is likely that a pupil will tend not to restruc-
ture those ideas, unless he or she is dissatisfied with a whole host of constructions
and with the way he or she has been able to subsume these constructions into existing
ideas. Even then major restructuring may not occur as the idea of giving up an
existing knowledge structure can be threatening (Claxton 1984). For example:
(i) it may be a threat to the pupil personally in that if a pupil identifies him
or herself with a particular view then to give up that view is to give up
something of oneself;
(ii) it may be a threat to a pupil's knowledge structure because it may be seen
as likely to lead to an upheaval in everything that pupil believes in;
(iii) it may be a threat to the pupil's social stability in that to give up an existing
theory may put the pupil in conflict with society, family and friends.
Sometimes the learner develops a second, somewhat independent, knowledge struc-
ture for science. This may occur as a solution to the above problem or simply because
the learner is unable to make any substantive links between new constructions and
existing ideas. This independent knowledge structure, or structures, can have a
domain of experience, or applicability, which is a strange idealised world somewhat
remote from the real world which pertains to the science classroom. Elsewhere
intuitive ideas work well and the pupil sees no point in attempting to integrate the
two knowledge structures in any fundamental way. From a constructivist view of
education such a solution is undesirable certainly in the long term and does little
to help pupils develop a unified and coherent view of how and why things in the
real world behave as they do. Further, pupils with a two-world perspective (Gilbert,
Osborne and Fensham 1983; Solomon 1983) may not be interested in and can even
be threatened by, attempts by teachers to link scientific principles to real world
applications.
Whether or not major restructuring of a learner's ideas occurs, it can be argued
(Wittrock and Lumsdaine 1977) that when newly constructed ideas are related or
relatable in a whole variety of ways to existing knowledge, or restructured knowledge,
the subsumption process will be most successful; ideas are likely to be remembered
best if they are linked to, and embedded into, existing ideas in useful and sensible
ways from the learner's point of view.
For successful subsumption, then, instruction needs to encourage learners to
generate firm links between constructed meanings and a variety of appropriate

aspects of the knowledge structures in memory. Scientific ideas have historical,
philosophical, technological, mathematical, experimental and everyday aspects to
them and learners should be actively encouraged by teachers to generate links from
newly constructed ideas to existing ideas in as many of these areas as possible.
Gunstone (1981) and Mackenzie and White (1981) have both designed instruction
with this explicitly in mind. Compared with teaching situations where such links
are not encouraged, their procedures did lead to pupils being able to retain ideas
in memory more successfully.
Motivation. The constructivist tradition is oriented to the view that all individuals
constantly strive to erect knowledge structures which will enable them to act on,
predict, describe and explain their environment. To Kelly (1955) each person is con-
stantly experimenting with his or her definition of existence by questioning, explor-
ing, revising ideas and replacing theories so as to better anticipate events. In this
view there is no need for a 'carrot and stick' or 'impulse-driven' theory of motiva-
tion (Pope and Keen 1981). While Kelly's ideas do not eliminate the need for science
teachers to motivate pupils — after all teachers and pupils may differ on which
events most urgently need to be anticipated — they do give some indications as to
how learning can be encouraged. Where pupils genuinely feel that classroom learn-
ing is helping them make better sense of their world, and the assessment mechanisms
rewards their endeavours to do this, they are likely to be well motivated.
Wittrock (1981b) also considers how learning can be encouraged. Students need
to understand that effort is required to construct meanings and to successfully embed
new ideas in memory, and need to feel that the effort involved in the process is
worthwhile. This not only requires students to be successful in their own terms but
to perceive this success as largely a result of their own efforts.
The above ideas lead to suggestions for encouraging pupils to learn science. A
teacher needs to:
(i) provide opportunities for pupils to consider, contemplate, and expand their
views of the world and develop their language whereby they can describe
and explain their views;
(ii) encourage, challenge, and/or reflect back to pupils the views they expound
so that they can better understand their own views, the views of others
and the basis for those views;
(iii) engender in pupils the view that success or failure in making better sense
of experience, and in understanding the ideas of others, is dependent on
the pupils' own actions and is not solely attributable to heredity, to teachers
and to others; and
(iv) ensure that pupils who genuinely make an effort do meet with some
success and that this success is perceived to be largely a consequence of
their own efforts.
The above analyses have considered various aspects of the generative learning
model, and the implications for teaching and learning. In addition to these implica-
tions, however, the main ideas of generative learning have led to suggested teaching
models or frameworks for lesson planning and execution.
These models for science teaching at the 11-14 year old age level (Cosgrove and
Osborne 1985) and at the 7-10 year old age level (Harlen and Osborne, 1985) are
based on the importance of providing children with the opportunities
(i) to have new experiences and to ask questions, of themselves and others,
about these experiences;
(ii) to select and attend to the sensory input in useful ways;
(iii) to construct ideas related to specific aspects of the phenomena;
(iv) to have these constructions challenged by the ideas and criticisms of others,
and by experimental evidence; and
(v) to test out the practicalities of new constructions — for example by predic-
ting solutions to problems.
Both teaching models are centrally concerned with helping children make better
sense of their world.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

The constructivist perspective suggests that curriculum developers as well as
teachers need to see pupils as struggling to impose meaning on their experience and
curricula should be planned to enable pupils to consider, contemplate, expand,
modify or change their views of the world and meanings for words. As we have
indicated, this has led to a range of theoretical analyses on how conceptual develop-
ment and change might be encouraged (see Hewson 1980a, 1980b, 1981; Posner,
Strike, Hewson and Gertzog 1982; Claxton 1984; West and Pines 1984) as well as
a range of proposed models for teaching science (Karplus 1975; Erickson 1979;
Nussbaum and Novick 1981, 1982; Renner 1982; Rowell and Dawson 1983; Dawson
and Rowell 1984; Cosgrove, Osborne and Tasker 1983; Harlen and Osborne 1985).
At a more fundamental level, acceptance of constructivist ideas about teaching
and learning by curriculum developers and teachers leads to a review of both the
content and objectives of present science courses (Fensham 1983; Osborne, Gilbert
and Bell 1983; Harlen and Osborne 1983).
At the level of primary science there is a need to choose topics carefully (Sym-
ington 1984). According to Harlen and Osborne (1985) the ideas that children
generate should
— have significance for making sense of everyday events at a level meaningful
to the children,
— be relatable by children to prior experiences and prior knowledge in a range
of ways to both the children's own needs and the needs of society, and
— be testable by children through simple investigations (including references
to books and experts about the findings of others).

At the junior secondary school level, and possibly in the senior primary school,
emphasis needs to shift toward challenging the ideas that children have which are
not compatible with further learning in science. Certain key ideas, for example about
animal, plant and living (Bell 1981; Bell and Barker 1982); about photosynthesis
(Barker 1985); about force and motion (Watts and Zylbersztajn 1981; Clement 1982);
about the states of matter and changes of state (Osborne and Cosgrove 1983; Stavy
and Stachel 1984); and about floating and sinking (Biddulph 1984), all need challeng-
ing to ensure that children have suitable pre-concepts by which more advanced science
teaching can be interpreted by children in the way intended by the teacher and by
which later ideas compatible with the views of scientists can be constructed. For
example, if a significant number, even a majority, of pupils entering secondary school
consider spiders not to be animals, assume that energy for plants comes from the
soil, consider force to be an inherent property of motion, do not view powders as
solids, and consider the cross-sectional level of flotation of a uniform rod is depen-
dent on its length, then the teaching of more advanced ecology, photosynthesis,
dynamics, and material concepts related to the above ideas is unlikely to be
successful.
In terms of objectives, the generative learning model reinforces the view that the
development of children's questioning skills should be of prime importance in science
education at all levels. This is a lost objective of science teaching according to White
(1977). The value of children's questions in helping children make sense of their
world has been recognised by a number of educators and researchers (Isaacs 1930;
Duckworth 1974; Holt 1976; Barnes 1976) and a number of suggestions have been
made as to how children's questions and questioning skills can be fostered (Bid-
dulph 1984). A teacher can:
(i) provide stimulus events (see Suchman 1977; Duckworth 1974; Victor 1975;
Elstgeest 1985);
(ii) demonstrate the skill as a learner amongst learners (White 1977); and
(iii) ensure that there is a receptive classroom environment for children's ques-
tions (Suchman 1971; Baker 1969; Blough 1975).
Learning science also requires learners to ask critical questions about their own
ideas and the ideas of others. For this to occur in a receptive classroom atmosphere
children need to learn how to separate ideas from personalities; something not all
adults can do.
As we implied earlier the activities of children as they make sense of their

experience and gradually develop their ideas parallel in some limited ways the
activities of scientists and the gradual development of our presently accepted scien-
tific ideas. As Popper (1972b) states, Babylonians and Greeks — in fact all people
that invented cosmological myths — told tales which dealt with the beginning of
things and in which they tried to understand or explain the structure of the Universe
in terms of its origins. Popper suggests that development of science, as we now

know it, not so much began with the replacement of myths by something more scien-
tific but with a new attitude toward myths; a critical attitude. People began to ask
questions about the doctrines. He states,
Thus it seems to me that it is the tradition of criticism which constitutes what
is new in science, and what is characteristic of science. On the other hand
it seems to me that the task which science sets itself [that is, the explanation
of the world] and the main ideas which it uses, are taken over without any
break from pre-scientific mythmaking'.
We would argue that the historical development of the views of our culture parallels
in some ways the development of a child's ideas (see for example Wandersee 1984).
Children do have ideas about how and why things behave as they do, which at a
young age are a mixture of fact and fantasy. If children are to develop and accept
as valuable scientists' ideas, then they need to develop the critical attitude by which
these ideas were developed and accepted by scientists. We need to develop the
children's abilities to not only question ideas, but to develop an awareness of the
important criteria for judging the value of a certain idea in a scientific sense through
experimental evidence.
Finally a comment needs to be made about assessment. Assessment is the 'tail
that wags the dog' in most educational systems, both for teachers and pupils. The
implications of constructivist views for assessment are far reaching and have yet
to be squarely faced. Cosgrove, Osborne and Tasker (1983) describe an 11 year old
girl who had struggled with her ideas about current flow in a simple electric circuit.
Through her classroom experiences she had become aware of four different views
about current flow. Her view was not the scientifically acceptable view, and as a
result of a class experiment she became aware of the validity of the scientific view
in terms of that experiment. Nevertheless some months later she had adopted neither
her original view nor the scientists' view. Her view was an intermediate one between
the above two which after some thought she had adopted as the one that made best
sense to her for the moment. She remained aware that this was not the scientists'
view and she remained aware of what was the scientists' view and the experimental
evidence for that view. How are we to assess this pupil? She had really struggled
with the ideas involved; she had changed her view to best account for all she
understood about current flow; she was aware of the scientists' view and the evidence
she had been presented with to support that view, albeit insufficient for her. Should
she be given a high mark for her intellectual efforts? We think so. Should she be
given a low mark because she has yet to fully accept the scientists' views? Many
assessment systems would do this and so encourage the student to pay lip service
to the scientists' view irrespective of her level of understanding or acceptance of
it. There is no simple solution to this assessment problem but it is one that requires
considerable thought and debate.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH IN SCIENCE EDUCATION

Halff (1980) implies that if models of learning are to be useful in education they
must be something that can be examined, tested under various conditions, and
mapped onto a wider variety of situations than those that led to the original for-
mulation. The generative learning model originated largely in the context of reading
research (Wittrock 1974a) and was first extensively considered with respect to science
education by Osborne and Wittrock (1983). In that paper we attempted to show
that the model is pertinent as an aid in understanding the processes of learning science
and provides a sound and useful base for future science education research on lear-
ning, curriculum development and classroom practice. For a recent review of
students' thinking and teaching research see Wittrock (in press b). Some additional
considerations are provided here.
Learning. In terms of research on learning, the key postulates of the generative
learning model lead to some research questions which can be used to test out the
validity, the usefulness, and the domain of applicability of the model. These research
questions include the following.
(i) How much do the learner's existing ideas influence what use is made of
the senses in learning science informally and/or formally in specific
contexts?
(ii) How much do the learner's existing ideas influence what sensory input is
attended to and what is ignored in various learning situations?
(iii) Which aspects of memory store do links tend to be generated to, and how
much and in what way, are these influenced by the nature of the sensory
input and the existing ideas in memory store?
(iv) How do the constructed meanings compare and contrast with ideas existing
in memory for a given sensory input?
(v) On what basis do pupils decide whether a constructed meaning is to be
accepted and, if it is accepted as valid, whether it will be assimilated,
accommodated or stored somewhat independently of existing ideas?
(vi) How much can an understanding of the key postulates of the generative
learning model by teachers and pupils influence teaching and learning
behaviours?
Such research need not be restricted to the teaching and learning of science. Never-
theless the clarity, richness and range of scientific ideas and teaching methods in
science enable science education to provide an excellent research context. For

example:
(i) The specificity of scientific ideas as shared by scientists and teachers enables
the researcher to establish relatively unambiguously the author's or teacher's
intended meaning.
(ii) The sensory input can be clearly specified (e.g. reading a scientific text),
or consist of a full range of sensory input (e.g. the science laboratory
experiment), depending on the nature of the particular research study.

(iii) The ideas to be taught can range from those compatible with a student's
existing ideas, to those subtly different to existing ideas, to those substan-
tively different from existing ideas, to those which are almost unrelatable
to a student's existing ideas.
(iv) Many ideas constructed by a learner in science can be linked to diverse
realms of meaning including historical, technological, mathematical, and
philosophical ideas as well as a range of everyday personal experiences.
(v) The learning of science includes a wide range of intellectual activities all
of which involve generative learning. These include theoretical and
experimental problem solving, rote and meaningful learning of informa-
tion, computer based learning and analyses, mundane and highly complex
manipulative skills, as well as emotionally rich and emotionally barren
learning contexts.
The depth of analysis of children's ideas and learning required to test the generative
learning model in specific situations is likely to require in-depth interview analysis.
The level of analysis used by Lawler (1981) exemplifies the depth of interview analysis
possible. The work of Bell (1985) exemplifies research into learning based largely
on the generative learning model.
Curriculum Development and Classroom Practice. The theories of conceptual
change, and the teaching models discussed earlier, all need critical research evalua-
tion. While research into the effectiveness of some of these models is continuing
(for example Cosgrove, Osborne and Carr 1983) much research remains to be under-
taken on the effectiveness of these theoretical and practical models both under ideal
laboratory conditions and in the typical teacher-class situation.
Further new content and new objectives for science teaching which can and will
emerge from a constructivist perspective will need evaluation.
The implications of the generative learning model for research into curriculum
development and classroom practice relate both to the teacher and to pupils. In
terms of the use of teacher resource materials, for example, the teachers' existing
ideas influence the way teachers selectively attend to the resource materials, the way
they generate links to existing ideas that they perceive as pertinent to the impen-
ding teaching task, and their construction of what the curriculum writer intends
them to do (see for example Smith and Sendelbach 1982). Teachers' existing ideas
about how children learn, about the nature of desirable science teaching, and the
constraints they see in their role in the classroom all influence their construction
of meaning from curriculum materials and their subsequent classroom practice (Sym-
ington and Osborne 1984). The differences in interpretation of curriculum materials
written from a constructivist position by teachers who share that perspective com-
pared with teachers who do not share that perspective is clearly identifiable (see
Appleton, Hawe, Biddulph and Osborne 1984; Biddulph, Appleton, Faire, Duncan
and Roger 1984). We consider much profitable research based on the generative
learning model, and constructivist ideas in general, could be undertaken into the
problems of generating conceptual change about teaching in teachers both through
curriculum materials and through teacher education programmes.
Irrespective of the impact of curriculum materials and teacher education on the
classroom practice of teachers, research into curriculum development and classroom
practice must in the final analysis focus on the individual learner.
'Critical to curriculum development is ascertaining what is happening to the
individual child as he interacts with persons, materials, time and space within
the context of the school and the classroom'.
[Berman and Rodrick, 1973, p.3]
In depth classroom observation work (see for example Tasker and Osborne 1983)
lies at the heart of the constructivist view of research into curriculum development.
The generative learning model can, we consider, provide guidelines for the plann-
ing, execution and interpretation of that research. For example a consideration of
what sensory input is being selected and attended to by the learner, what ideas these
sensory inputs are linked to, what meanings are constructed in the classrom, how
these constructions are evaluated and what impact they have on existing ideas can
provide a framework for analysis at each phase of the research.
CONCLUSION
Generative learning is centrally concerned with the strategies by which all learners
— including children and scientists — construct ideas about the world. The generative
learning model incorporates aspects of both the constructivist and information-
processing traditions of cognitive psychology. The model stresses the importance
of identifying children's ideas and exploring further the strategies that pupils use
to learn.
The formal learning of science can be viewed as involving, at least in part, a shift
from one set of beliefs about the physical world to another, one set of concepts
to another, one set of problem solving capabilities to another by generating new
ones from the prior ones and from experience. From this perspective the generative
learning model, in our view, provides a useful theoretical framework for consider-
ing teaching, learning and curriculum development in science education.
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Studies in Science Education

The Generative Learning Model

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057268508559923

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The Generative Learning Model

THE CONSTRUCTIVIST TRADITION

Personal Construct Theory, particularly where Kelly purports to be theorising on

window or the noises from the class in the adjacent room.

of memory store then it may be incorporated into memory, influencing

Any model to do with human learning is an oversimplification of reality. The

GENERATIVE LEARNING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRADITION

THE ACTIVE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING

THE MODEL AND RECENT RESEARCH IN SCIENCE EDUCATION

Frequently no learning occurs for a range of reasons. These include:

IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING SCIENCE

Constructing meanings. The generative learning model, as represented in Figure

Subsumption. To subsume constructions into memory store may occur without

generate firm links between constructed meanings and a variety of appropriate

IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

to books and experts about the findings of others).

As we implied earlier the activities of children as they make sense of their

in terms of its origins. Popper suggests that development of science, as we now

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH IN SCIENCE EDUCATION

science enable science education to provide an excellent research context. For

experiment), depending on the nature of the particular research study.

NUSSBAUM, J. and NOVICK, S. (1982) Alternative frameworks, conceptual accommodation: toward

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