Anti Piracy Awareness Training Online (Revised - 2023.03.08)

ANTI-PIRACY
AWARENESS
TRAINING TIME: 0800H-1200H
1. Make sure you “JOIN AUDIO” for you to hear
and to be heard during the online training.
2. Change your display name appearing on the
screen with this format. (COMPANY- Last
name, First name, Middle Initial)
3. Kindly wear polo shirt/ T-shirt while the online
instructions/ training is ongoing.
4. Make sure your device is sufficiently charged/
connected to a power supply to avoid
interruption.
ANTI PIRACY
AWARENESS TRAINING
Astra Marine International Inc.
LEARNING OUTCOMES:
At the end of the session, the trainees
would be able to:
•identify piracy threats and current patterns
as per reports by the IMB-PRC
•enumerate proper procedures for security
risk assessment
•list down different security measures to be
done before, during and after transit in high
risk areas and/or piracy attack.
ASTRA MARINE INTERNATIONAL INC. TRG-VR-APP-01

Introductory Concepts and Issues
Why is there a need for Anti Piracy Awareness Training?
POEA MEMORANDUM
CIRCULAR NO .02, SERIES OF
2010

THREATS TO SECURITY
❖ Piracy
❖ Armed Robbery
❖ Stowaway

Piracy is defined in Article 101 of the 1982 United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed-
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State (HIGH SEAS);
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge
of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

Armed Robbery is defined by the IMO in its 26th

Assembly session as Resolution A.1025 (26).
1. any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or

threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends
and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board
such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters
and territorial sea;
2. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
above

IMB PRC reports incidents as follows:

1. Boarded: An illegal act of perpetrators successfully gaining access onto the vessel.
2. Hijacked: An illegal act of perpetrators successfully gaining access onto the vessel and taking
over the control of the vessel from the Master and crew.
3. Fired Upon: An illegal act of perpetrators discharging weapons towards the vessel while
attempting to gain access onto the vessel.
4. Attempted: An illegal act of perpetrators attempting to approach a vessel with possible

intention to board but remain unsuccessful due to the timely actions of the crew.

Region specific severity of incidents on Crew, Vessel and Cargo:
Severity Level I: Any incident which has a direct impact on the crew. To
include:
a. Crew being taken hostage, assaulted, injured, killed, kidnapped,
missing, threatened.
b. A hijacking where the command of the vessel is taken over by
those boarding. c. An incident where the crew retreats into the citadel.
Severity Level II: To include a vessel being fired upon, security teams firing on
approaching threat, robbers / pirates identified with weapons of any type
(violence is offered) whether boarded or otherwise.
Severity Level III: To include an incident that does not fall into either Level I or
Level II

Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships

132 piracy
incidents
reported in
2021– the
lowest
recorded
level since
1994.
https://twitter.com/IMB_Piracy

Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 2022
News - No room for complacency, says IMB, as global piracy incidents hit lowest levels in decades (icc-ccs.org)


2022
Perpetrators were successful in gaining access to vessels
in 95% of the reported incidents broken down as 107
vessels boarded, two vessels hijacked, five attempted
attacks and one vessel fired upon. In many cases
vessels were either anchored or steaming when boarded,
with nearly all the incidents occurring during the hours of
darkness.




These criminal acts may result in the loss
of life, physical harm or hostage-taking of
seafarers, significant disruptions to
commerce and navigation, financial losses
to ship owners, increased insurance
premiums and security costs, increased
costs to consumers and producers, and
damage to the marine environment.

The consequences to the crew, vessel or the
cargo, as a result of these illegal acts as
follows:
1. Crew: Kidnap, hostage, death, threat,
assault, injury, missing
2. Cargo: Theft or damage to cargo

The consequences to the crew, vessel or the
cargo, as a result of these illegal acts as
follows:
3. Vessel: Damage, especially due to the
discharge of weapons or when
perpetrators willfully damage vessel,
equipment and property


AGENCIES AND
CONVENTIONS RELEVANT
TO ANTI-PIRACY CAMPAIGN

United Nations Convention on the Law of

the Sea (UNCLOS)
Article 100 of UNCLOS provides that “all

States shall cooperate to the fullest possible
extent in the repression of piracy on the high
seas or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State.”

United Kingdom Maritime Trade

Operations (UKMTO)
Acts as the primary point of contact for

merchant vessels and liaison with military
forces.

Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa

(MSCHOA)
Dedicated to safeguarding legitimate

freedom of navigation in light of the risk of
attack against merchant shipping in the Gulf
of Aden, Somali basin and off the Horn of
Africa.

Maritime Domain Awareness Trade - Gulf

of Guinea (MDAT-GOG)
The primary output from the MDAT-GoG is to
contribute by maintaining coherent maritime
situational awareness in the central and western
African Maritime areas, with the ability to inform
and support industry. It contributes to the safety
and security of the Mariner in the regional maritime
domain.

IMB Piracy Reporting Center (IMB-PRC)
An independent and non-governmental

agency aimed at raising awareness of areas
at risk of piracy and armed robbery attacks.

International Convention for the Safety of

Life at Sea
Chapter XI-2 (Special measures to enhance

maritime security)

In compliance with the STCW 2010

Manila Amendments
•Section A-VI/5 (Mandatory minimum

requirements for the issue of certificate of
proficiency for the ship security officers)
•Section A-VI/6 (Mandatory minimum
requirements for security-related training
and instruction for all seafarers)

Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration
In compliance with Memorandum Circular

No. 02 series of 2010, Mandatory Anti
Piracy Awareness Training for Seafarers

PUBLICATIONS RELATED
TO ANTI-PIRACY CAMPAIGN
IN SPECIFIC REGIONS

BMP 5 - Best Management

Practices to Deter Piracy and
Enhance Maritime Security in
the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden,
Indian Ocean and Arabian
Sea

• BMP 4 - Best
Management Practices for
Protection against Somali
Based Piracy

• BMP WA - Best
Management Practices to
Deter Piracy and Enhance
Maritime Security off the
Coast of West Africa
including the Gulf of
Guinea

Facts about how and why

MODERN DAY PIRATES
occur and operate:

1. Geographical Occurrences
Currently, piracy takes place at
different areas in the world, East and
West Africa, Southeast Asia and South
America.

Geographical Occurrences

2. Weapons Used
Types of Arms used during incidents

Types of Arms 2021 Jan-Dec 2022
Guns 24 11
Knives 29 32
Other weapons 4 1
Not stated 40 46

2. Weapons Used
Pirates are also often equipped with
cell phones and other tech gadgets to
keep in contact with organizers who
feed them information about ships and
their locations.

Typical Pirate Attacks
Pirates frequently use long lightweight
ladders and ropes, or a long hooked pole with
a knotted climbing rope to climb up the vessel
being attacked.

Increasingly, pirates use small arms fire and

Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) in an
effort to intimidate Masters of ships to reduce
speed and stop to allow the pirates to board.

Pirate Action Groups operate in a number of

different boat configurations.
To date whatever the configuration the

attack phase is carried out by skiffs.

Pirate Action Group boat configurations
include:
• Skiffs only - usually two.
• Open whalers
~carrying significant quantities of fuel
often towing 2 or more attack skiffs.
• Motherships
~included the very largest of merchant
ships, fishing vessels and dhows.

Commonly, two small high speed (up to 25
knots) open boats or ‘skiffs’ are used in
attacks, often approaching from either
quarter or the stern.
Skiffs are frequently fitted with 2 outboard

engines or a larger single 60hp engine.

Attacks have taken place at most times of the

day.
However, many pirate attacks have taken

place early in the morning, at first light.
Attacks have occurred at night, particularly

clear moonlit nights, but night time attacks
are less common.


3. Anchored Ships vs. High Seas

Kidnapping
Report suggests that 72% of pirate
attacks occur on anchored ships where
the pirates either steal the ships or
take cargo and crew members’
belongings.


Kidnapping

Kidnapping

4. High Ransom
Ransoms average around $120,000.
Some owners will hire security
organizations to escort their ships, at
costs of around $120,000 per trip to
avoid the high ransom payments,
danger to their crew, and potential loss
of the ship and its cargo.

SOUTHEAST ASIA/ INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT

Geographical Occurrences - Southeast Asia
INDONESIA
Belawan and Tanjung Priok / Jakarta
anchorage and surrounding waters. Pirates
/ robbers are normally armed with guns /
knives and / or machetes. Generally, be
vigilant in other areas. Many incidents may
have gone unreported.

INDONESIA
Pirates / robbers normally attack vessel
during the night. When spotted and alarm is
sounded, the pirates / robbers usually
escape without confronting the crew.
Therefore, a strict anti-piracy watch is
recommended.

14.10.2022: 2100 UTC
Panjang Anchorage, Indonesia
Unnoticed, robbers boarded an anchored
bulk carrier and escaped with ship’s
properties. The theft was noticed by the
duty crew on routine rounds. Incident
reported to the local agent.

Malacca Strait
Although the number of incidents have dropped
substantially due to increased and aggressive
patrols by the littoral states’ authorities since July
2005, vessels are advised to continue
maintaining strict anti-piracy / robbery watches
when transiting the Straits.

MALAYSIA
Bandar Penawar, Johor - vessels
attacked at anchorage. Off Tanjung Piai
– vessels attacked while underway.
Attacks have stopped and IMB PRC is
monitoring and liaising with Malaysian
Authorities/MMEA.

11.08.2022: 2020 UTC
Sandakan Anchorage, Sabah, Malaysia
Four robbers in a speed boat approached and
boarded an anchored tanker. Duty officer
noticed some movements near the bosun store
and immediately raised the alarm, sounded
ship’s whistle and made PA announcement.
Hearing the alarm and seeing the crew
alertness, the robbers escaped with stolen ship
stores. Incident reported to the local agent.

WHAT MAKES THE FORWARD

PART OF THE VESSEL
(FORECASTLE) THE MOST
VULNERABLE TO ROBBERY
ATTACK WHILE AT ANCHOR?

PHILIPPINES (Manila/ Batangas)

Be vigilant. Several past and recent
incidents/ robberies have been reported.

PHILIPPINES
Pirates / militants in the southern Philippines
conduct attacks on vessels in / off Sibutu
passage / off Sibutu island / Tawi Tawi / Sulu
sea / Celebes sea / off eastern Sabah. They
attacked tugs / barges / fishing vessels / yachts
/ merchant ships to rob and kidnap crews for
ransom.

30.08.2022: 2330 UTC
Batangas Port, Philippines
Unnoticed, robbers boarded a berthed
vehicle carrier and escaped with ship’s
properties. The theft was noticed by the
duty crew on routine rounds.

SINGAPORE STRAIT
A third of all incidents reported globally in 2022 have been in
the Singapore Straits with underway vessels successfully
boarded in all 38 incidents. The majority of vessels boarded
were over 50,000 DWT, including six laden vessels over
150,000 DWT.
In the 38 reported incidents, two crew were threatened and four

were taken hostage for the duration of the incident.
It has also been reported that in at least three incidents a gun

was used to threaten the crew.

16.10.2022: 1705 UTC
Singapore Straits
Three robbers armed with knives boarded a
bulk carrier underway and entered the
engine room. The robbers were spotted by
the duty watchman who immediately
informed the Bridge. General alarm raised,
PA announcement made, and crew
mustered. Upon hearing the alarm,

16.10.2022: 1705 UTC
Singapore Straits
the robbers escaped with stolen engine
spares. Incident reported to the Singapore
VTS. Marine Police boarded the vessel for
investigation.

SINGAPORE STRAIT
Authorities have been notified and are
aware of the situation. Vessels are advised
to remain vigilant and to continue
maintaining adequate anti-piracy / robbery
watches and measures. Pirates / robbers
attack ships while underway or while at
anchor especially during the night.

SINGAPORE STRAIT
Pirates / robbers will abort the attempted
attack once spotted and alarm sounded,
and Authorities notified. Therefore, a strict
watch is necessary.

23.10.2022: 1600 UTC
Singapore Straits
Five robbers boarded a bulk carrier underway.
Duty Engineer sighted the robbers and
informed the Bridge. Alarm raised and crew
mustered. Seeing the crew alertness, the
robbers escaped empty handed. Incident
reported to the Singapore VTS. Marine Police
boarded the vessel for investigation.

INDIAN
SUB-
CONTINENT

Geographical Occurrences – India
31.10.2022: 1630 UTC
Kandla Anchorage, India
Around six robbers armed with knives and
rods boarded an anchored chemical tanker.
Alert duty crew spotted the robbers and
immediately informed the Bridge. General
alarm raised, PA announcement made, and
crew mustered. Upon hearing the alarm, the
robbers escaped with stolen ship properties.
Incident reported to the Kandla Port Authority.

BANGLADESH
Robbers continue to target ships at anchor.
Most incidents reported are at Chittagong
anchorages and approaches. Incidents in
Bangladesh have fallen significantly over
the past few years because of the efforts by
the Bangladesh Authorities.

11.07.2022: 1505 UTC
Pussur River, Mongla, Bangladesh
Robbers armed with knives and sticks
boarded an anchored heavy load carrier
three times within a 24 hours period. On
each occasion, the alert crew noticed the
robbers and raised the alarm resulting in
the robbers escaping empty handed.
Incident reported to the coast guard.

AFRICA and
RED SEA

Geographical Occurrences – Africa and Red Sea
GULF OF GUINEA

GULF OF GUINEA
As a general rule:
(i) Follow recommendations and guidelines
presented in the BMP WA.
(ii) All crews to keep a vigilant lookout using
all available means. Ships to adjust ETA for
direct berthing or wait / drift / transit more
than 300 nm from coast, if appropriate and
agreed by all in venture. Incidents reported
up to 261 nm from coast.
. ASTRA MARINE INTERNATIONAL INC. TRG-VR-APP-01

GULF OF GUINEA
Benin (Cotonou): Incidents reported in / off
Benin. Vessels attacked and crews
kidnapped. Incidents showed that the
pirates / robbers in the area are well armed
and violent. Currently pirates robbed
vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom.
In the past, tankers were hijacked, and part
cargo stolen (gas oil).
.
GULF OF GUINEA
Angola: Luanda : Incidents of robberies
reported.
Cameroon (Douala): Incidents dropped. Past
incidents involved kidnapping of crews.
Equatorial Guinea: Incidents dropped. Past
incidents occurred around 40nm from Luba.
One incident involved hijacking and the other
boarded with criminal intentions.


24.08.2022: 0120 UTC
Soyo Anchorage, Angola
Two robbers armed with bolt cutter and
knives boarded an anchored container ship.
Duty AB on routine rounds noticed the
robbers and informed bridge. Alarm raised,
ship’s whistle sounded, and PA
announcement made. Hearing the alarm,
the robbers escaped. Crew mustered and a
search was carried out.
24.08.2022: 0120 UTC
Soyo Anchorage, Angola
It was reported that one container was
forced open, and some cargo contents
were stolen. Incident was reported to the
Port Authorities through local agent.

GULF OF GUINEA
Gabon:(Port Gentil): Incidents / kidnapping
of crews occurred more than 70nm offshore.
Ghana (Takoradi/Tema): Robberies have
been reported at the anchorages.
Guinea (Conakry): Robberies have been
reported at the anchorages.
Ivory Coast (Abidjan): Incidents dropped but
remains risky.

19.09.2022: 0250 UTC
Takoradi Anchorage, Ghana
Four unauthorised persons boarded an
anchored refrigerated cargo ship, stole
ship’s stores and escaped. Incident
reported to Takoradi port control and coast
guard. A patrol boat was dispatched to
search the waters around the ship and
remained in the vicinity of the ship until
daybreak.
03.04.2022: 1848 UTC
Around 261nm SE of Accra, Ghana
A bulk carrier was boarded by an unknown
number of pirates and the crew retreated
into the citadel. On being notified of the
incident, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre
immediately alerted and liaised with the
Regional Authorities and international
warships to request their assistance.

03.04.2022: 1848 UTC
Around 261nm SE of Accra, Ghana
An Italian Navy warship and its helicopter
responded and proceeded to render
assistance resulting in the crew and ship
being safe. The vessel proceeded to a safe
port under the escort of the warship.

NIGERIA
Pirates / robbers are often well armed,
violent and have attacked and hijacked /
robbed ships / kidnapped crews along / far
from the coast, rivers, anchorages, ports,
and surrounding waters. Incidents have also
been reported up to about 212 nm from the
coast. Generally, all waters in / off Nigeria
remain highly risky.

NIGERIA
Vessels are advised to be vigilant, as many
incidents may also have gone unreported.
Kidnapping for ransom remains the biggest
risk for crews. Vessels are advised to take
additional measures in these high-risk
waters. In the past, tankers were also
hijacked, and part cargo stolen (gas oil).

RED SEA/ GULF OF ADEN/
SOMALIA/ ARABIAN SEA/
INDIAN OCEAN
From 1 January to 31 December 2022, no incident
reported to the IMB PRC for Gulf of Aden.
The international navies patrolling these waters

continue to coordinate and liaise with merchant
and fishing fleets to identify and apprehend pirate
action groups.

RED SEA/ GULF OF ADEN/
SOMALIA/ ARABIAN SEA/
INDIAN OCEAN
All vessels are advised and encouraged to adhere to the BMP 5
recommendations while transiting these waters. Vessels employing
Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) should be
cautious and not mistake fishermen for pirates in some heavy fishing
areas.
As the IMB PRC continues to monitor the situation in the region, it

cautions vessel owners and masters against complacency. Somali
pirates still retain the capability and capacity to carry out
attacks.

SOUTH
CHINA SEA

Geographical Occurrences – South China Sea
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Several hijackings of small product tankers
occurred off the coast of Malaysia, Indonesia,
Singapore and in the South China Sea area.
This trend started in April 2014, but the
hijackings stopped abruptly in late 2015. It
has been reported that some criminals have
been arrested by local Authorities both in
Malaysia and in Indonesia.

SOUTH
AMERICA

Geographical Occurrences – South America
South America

South America
Despite a noticeable decrease in the number of reported incidents in

Central and South American waters, ports in Brazil, Guyana, Peru,
Venezuela, Mexico and Haiti continue to be affected by the crime of
armed robbery.
The reduction is partially attributed to the decrease in reported

incidents in Callao anchorage in Peru which saw a 33% decrease
compared to 2021.

South America
Brazil (Macapa): Incidents increasing. Waters remain risky. Stay

vigilant.
Colombia (Cartagena): Incidents have dropped. Past incidents

reported at anchorages, river passage and pilot boarding
ground. Stay vigilant.
Ecuador (Guayaquil): Incidents have stopped. Past incidents

reported at anchorage / river passage with pilot. Robbers
well-armed. Fired upon.

South America
Haiti (Port Au Prince/Lafiteau): Incidents dropped. Advised to
continue maintaining watch and to stay
Vigilant.
Mexico (Puerto Dos Bocas): Incidents dropped. Past reported

incidents - pirates / robbers in this area
armed with guns.
Peru (Callao): Incidents are continuing. Maintain vigilant watch

and employ anti-piracy measures.

South America
Venezuela (Puerto La Cruz / Puerto Jose): Although incidents

have stopped, vessels are still reminded to maintain strict
anti-piracy watch and measures especially at anchor.

30.08.2022: 0400 UTC
Macapa Anchorage, Brazil
Twenty persons wearing black face masks,
armed with a gun and long knives boarded
an anchored bulk carrier. Six local security
guards and duty crew were beaten by the
robbers who then tied their hands and feet.
Master raised the alarm and called port
control via the VHF channel.

30.08.2022: 0400 UTC
Macapa Anchorage, Brazil
Hearing the VHF calls, the robbers aborted
their attempt to enter the accommodation
and escaped with stolen ship’s stores.

14.10.2022: 0630 UTC
Callao Anchorage, Peru
Duty crew onboard an anchored tanker
heard noises from the forward store and
raised the alarm resulting in the
unauthorised persons escaping with ship’s
stores. Incident reported to TRAMAR port
control and harbour master. Port police
boarded the vessel to investigate the theft.

WHAT CAN BE DONE BY THE
VESSEL TO STRENGTHEN
SECURITY MEASURES WHILE
AT ANCHOR/UNDERWAY?

Ship Protection Measures

Lighting
● Weather deck lighting around the

accommodation block and rear facing
lighting on the poop deck to
demonstrate awareness.
● If fitted, search lights ready for
immediate use.

Lighting
● At night, only navigation lights should

be exhibited.
● Navigational lights should not be switched
off as this is a contravention of
international regulations and the risk of
collision is higher that that of being
attacked.

Lighting
● At anchor, deck lights should be left on as well-lit ships

are less vulnerable to attack.
● The ability to turn off all internal accommodation lights to

deter pirates from entering or disorientate those who may
already have entered.
● Once attackers have been identified or an attack

commences, over side lighting, if fitted, should be
switched on. This will dazzle the attackers and help the
ship’s crew to see them
Control of Access to Bridge,
Accomodation and Machinery Spaces

● All doors and hatches providing

access to the bridge, accommodation
and machinery spaces should be
properly secured to prevent them
being opened by pirates.

● It is recommended that once doors and

hatches are secured, a designated and
limited number are used for routine access
when required, their use being strictly
controlled by the Officer of the Watch.

● Block external stairs or remove

ladders on the accommodation block
to prevent use and to restrict external
access to the bridge.

● Removable barriers should be used

around pilot boarding points so that a
ship does not need to de-rig large
areas prior to arrival at ports.

● Pirates have been known to gain access through
portholes and windows. The fitting of steel bars
to portholes and windows will prevent this.
● Procedures for controlling access to
accommodation, machinery spaces and store
rooms should be briefed to the crew.
● The attackers must be denied access to ship
propulsion.

WHILE UNDERWAY, WHAT

SECURITY MEASURES CAN BE
DONE TO DETECT ILLEGAL
BOARDING AS EARLY AS
POSSIBLE?

Watchkeeping and Enhanced Vigilance
● Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor

all navigational warnings and
communications, particularly VHF and
GMDSS alerts.
● Provide additional lookouts for each
Watch. Additional lookouts should be fully
briefed. Maintain an all-round lookout from
an elevated position.

● Consider a shorter rotation of the Watch

period in order to maximize alertness of
the lookouts.
● Ensure sufficient binoculars for the
Enhanced Bridge Team, preferably anti
glare.

● Consider placing well-constructed

dummies at strategic locations around the
ship to give the impression of greater
numbers of crew on watch.
● Consider use of thermal imagery optics
and night vision aids as they provide a
reliable all-weather, day and night
surveillance capability.
● Consider using CCTV and fixed search

lights for better monitoring. Fixed search
lights can deter approaches from the stern.
● Mount anti-piracy mirrors on the bridge

wings to make looking aft easier.

A proper lookout is the single most effective method of ship

protection where early warning of a suspicious approach or attack
is assured, and where defences can be readily deployed.

Safe Muster Points & Citadels

Safe Muster Point - designated area
chosen to provide maximum physical
protection to the crew, preferably low down
within the vessel.
Citadel - a designated pre-planned area

purpose built into the ship where, in the
event of imminent boarding by pirates,
all crew will seek protection.
Citadel
A citadel is designed and constructed to
resist forced entry. Well-constructed
citadels with reliable communications
(ideally satellite phone and VHF) must be
supplied with food, water and sanitation.
Control of propulsion and steering can
offer effective protection during an attack

Unarmed Private Maritime Security
Contractors
The use of unarmed Private Maritime

Security Contractors is a matter for
individual ship operators following their own
risk assessment.

Private Maritime Security Contractors

Physical Barriers
Before constructing any physical barriers, it is

recommended that a thorough survey is conducted to
identify areas vulnerable to pirates trying to gain access.
Physical Barriers
❖ Razor Wire
➢ Secure razor wire to the
ship properly, to prevent
attackers pulling the wire
off. For example, attach
at least every third wire
ring to ship’s railings and
rig a steel cable through
its core.

Water Spray and Foam Monitors

Water Spray and Foam

Monitors
● Fire hoses and foam

monitors
● Water cannons
● Ballast pumps
● Steam
● Water spray rails

The use of water spray and/or foam

monitors is effective in deterring or
delaying any attempt to illegally board a
ship. The use of water can make it difficult
for an unauthorized boat to remain
alongside and makes it significantly more
difficult to climb aboard.

It is recommended hoses and foam

monitors (delivering water) are fixed in
position to cover likely access routes and
are remotely operated. Manual activation
is not recommended as this may place the
operator in an exposed position.

Alarms
● Crew members are familiar with each

alarm, including the signal warning of an
attack and an all clear, and the
appropriate response to it.

Alarms
● Drills are carried out to ensure that the

alarm is heard throughout the ship. The
drill will confirm the time necessary for all
crew to move to a position of safety.

Maneuvering Practice
Practicing maneuvering the vessel prior

to entry into the High Risk Area will be very
beneficial and will ensure familiarity with the
ship’s handling characteristics and how to
effect anti-piracy maneuvers whilst
maintaining the best possible speed.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

● Consider the use of CCTV cameras to

ensure coverage of vulnerable areas,
particularly the poop deck.
● Consider positioning CCTV monitors at

the rear of the bridge in a protected
position.

● Further CCTV monitors could be located

at the Safe Muster Point/Citadel.
● Recorded CCTV footage may provide

useful evidence after an attack.

Deny Use of Ship’s Tools and Equipment
Tools and equipment that may be of

use to the pirates should be stored
in a secure location.

Protection of equipment stored on the
upper deck
Consideration should be given to
providing ballistic protection to protect
gas cylinders or containers of flammable
liquids.
Excess gas cylinders should be stored in

a secure location or, if possible, landed
prior to transit.
Enhanced bridge protection
The bridge is usually the focal point of an

attack. In some situations, attackers direct
their weapon fire at the bridge to intimidate the
ship’s crew to slow or stop the ship. If pirates
board the ship, they usually make for the
bridge to enable them to take control.

The following enhancements may be considered:
Bridge windows are laminated but further protection against flying
glass can be provided by the application of blast resistant film.
Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates for the side and rear

bridge windows and the bridge wing door windows, which can be
quickly secured in place in the event of an attack can greatly
reduce the risk of injury from fragmentation.
Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG.
Sandbags can provide additional protection on the bridge wings.

They should be regularly checked to ensure that they have not
degraded.

Risk Assessment
RISK
ASSESSMENT

Risk Assessment
Threat assessment
A threat is formed of capability, intent and
opportunity.

Risk Assessment
Capability - means attackers have the
physical means to conduct an attack.
Intent - is demonstrated by continued

attacks
Opportunity - is what is mitigated by the

company, ship and crew through application
of the measures described in the guidance.

Piracy Threats and Current Patterns
❖ High Risk Area

▪ an industry designation where it is
considered to be a higher risk of piracy
and within which self-protective measures
are most likely to be required.

HRA
(area highlighted
in red)

❖ Voluntary Reporting Area

Ships entering and operating in the VRA are
encouraged to register with the UKMTO
which will establish direct contact between
the reporting ship and the UKMTO.

VRA
(area inside the
yellow line)

MARITIME SECURITY TRANSIT CORRIDOR
(MSTC)
A military established
corridor upon which
naval forces focus their
presence and
surveillance efforts.

Internationally Recommended Transit
Corridor
- The IRTC is not a Traffic Separation Scheme
(TSS) but an established transit corridor in the
Gulf of Aden where naval forces focus their
counter piracy patrols. Within the IRTC, group
transits and national convoys may be offered.

The presence of Naval/Military forces in the

Gulf of Aden, concentrated on the
Internationally Recommended Transit
Corridor (IRTC), has significantly reduced
the incidence of piracy attack in this area.

Risk Assessment
CREW SAFETY
The primary consideration should be to
ensure the safety of the crew. Care should be
taken, when formulating measures to prevent
illegal boarding and external access to the
accommodation, that crew members will not
be trapped inside and should be able to
escape in the event of another type of
emergency, such as, for example fire.

Risk Assessment
CREW SAFETY
Where the door or hatch is
located on an escape route
from a manned
compartment, it is essential
it can be opened from the
inside. Where the door or
hatch is locked it is essential
a means of opening the door
from the inside is available.
Risk Assessment
FREE BOARD
Experience suggests that vessels with a

minimum freeboard that is greater than 8
metres have a much greater chance of
successfully escaping a piracy attempt than
those with less.

Risk Assessment
SPEED
One of the most effective ways to defeat a

pirate attack is by using speed to try to
outrun the attackers and/or make it difficult to
board.
To date, there have been no reported
attacks where pirates have boarded a ship
that has been proceeding at over 18 knots.

Risk Assessment
SPEED
Ships are recommended to proceed at Full

Sea Speed, or at least 18 knots where they
are capable of greater speed throughout their
transit of the High Risk Area.

SECURITY
MEASURES

Before Transit in High Risk Area

Ship’s Master’s Planning
Prior to entering the High Risk Area
1 Brief crew and conduct drill.
❖ The crew should be fully briefed on the
preparations and drills should be conducted with
the Ship Protection Measures in place.

❖ The plan should be reviewed

and all crew briefed on their
duties, including familiarity
with the alarm that signals
an attack, an all-clear
situation and the appropriate
response to each.

The drills should test:
▪ The SPM, including testing the security of all access
points.
▪ Lock down conditions, including crew safety
considerations.
▪ The bridge team’s security knowledge.
▪ The crew’s understanding of any different actions
required in the event of a pirate attack compared to
other types of attack.
2 Prepare an Emergency Communication Plan.
❖ Masters are advised to prepare an emergency

communication plan, to include all essential
emergency contact numbers and prepared
messages, which should be at hand or
permanently displayed near all external
communications stations including safe muster
point and/or the citadel.

2 Prepare an Emergency Communication Plan.
❖ Communication devices and the Ship Security
Alert System (SSAS) should be tested.

3 Define the ship’s AIS policy.
❖ It is recommended that AIS should remain

switched on throughout passages through
passages through the VRA and HRA, to ensure
militaries can track the ship, but restrict data to
ship’s identity, position, course, speed,
navigational status and safety related information.

Implement security measures in accordance
4
with the Ship Security Plan.
If Company has not submitted ‘Vessel
5
Movement Registration Form’ to MSCHOA.

Prior to entering the Voluntary Reporting Area
1 Obtain the latest threat information.
2 Check the latest NAVAREA warnings and alerts.
Implement VRA/MSCHOA registration and
3
reporting requirements.
4 If used, confirm PCASP embarkation plan.
5 Confirm propulsion can operate at full speed.

Prior to entering the International
Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)
Use IRTC ‘Group Transit Scheme’ while
1
transiting through Gulf of Aden
Make adjustments to passage plans to
2
conform to MSCHOA advice
3 National Convoys
Ships should avoid entering Yemeni territorial waters (12 miles) while on
transit as it is very difficult for international Naval/Military forces
(non-Yemeni) to protect ships that are attacked inside Yemeni territorial
waters.
During Transit in High Risk Area

Upon entering the High Risk Area
Submit ‘Vessel Position Reporting Form’ -
1
Initial Report to UKMTO
Reduce maintenance and engineering work to
2
minimum
Daily submit ‘Vessel Position Reporting
3
Form’ to UKMTO
4 Carefully review all warnings and information

5 Monitor latest threat information.
Ensure all access points are limited and
6
controlled.
Avoid drifting, waiting, anchoring and slow
7
steaming, particularly in the MSTC.

Minimize use of VHF and use email or a
secure satellite telephone instead. Where
8 possible only answer known or legitimate
callers on the VHF, bearing in mind that
imposters are possible.

After Transit in High Risk Area

After Transit in High Risk Area
After transit in High Risk Area
Submit ‘Final reports’ (upon departure from
1
VRA or arrival in port) to UKMTO.
Continue enhanced vigilance on lookout for
2
possible suspicious activities outside VRA.
When departing the VRA, ships should be
3 aware of adjacent regional reporting
requirements.
4 Assess crew and ship condition.

Before Piracy Attack

Pirate Attack
Approach Stage
❖ If not already at full speed, increase to

maximum to open the distance.
❖ Steer a straight course to maintain a

maximum speed.
❖ Initiate the ship’s emergency procedures.

Pirate Attack
Approach Stage
● Activate the Emergency Communication

Plan
○ Sound the emergency alarm and make
an attack announcement, in accordance
with the ship’s emergency
communication plan.
○ Report the attack immediately to
UKMTO

Pirate Attack
Approach Stage

Plan
○ Make a mayday call on VHF Ch. 16.
Send a distress message via the Digital
Selective Calling (DSC) system and
Inmarsat-C, as applicable.
○ Ensure that the Automatic Identification
System (AIS) is switched ON

Pirate Attack
Approach Stage

Plan
○ Activate the Ship Security Alert System
○ Report the attack immediately to
UKMTO (+44 2392 222060) by
telephone.

Pirate Attack
Approach Stage
● All crew except those required on the

bridge or in the engine room, should
muster at the Safe Muster Point or Citadel.
● Alter course away from the approaching

skiffs and/or Motherships.

Pirate Attack
Approach Stage
● Activate water spray and other appropriate

self-defensive measures.
● Ensure that all external doors and, where

possible, internal public rooms and cabins,
are fully secured.

Pirate Attack
Approach Stage
● When sea conditions allow, consider
altering course to increase an approaching
skiff’s exposure to wind/ waves.
● Check Vessel Data Recorder (VDR) is
recording.
● PCASP, if present, will take agreed actions
to warn off attackers.

Pirate Attack
Approach Stage
● Sound the ship’s whistle/foghorn

continuously to demonstrate to any
potential attacker that the ship is aware of
the attack and is reacting to it.

During Piracy Attack

Pirate Attack
Attack Stage
● Reconfirm that all ship’s personnel are in

a position of safety.
● Ensure the SSAS has been activated.
● If not actioned, report the attack
immediately to UKMTO (+44 2392
222060) by telephone.

Pirate Attack
Attack Stage
● As the attackers close in on the ship,

Masters should commence small
alterations of helm whilst maintaining
speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside
the ship in preparation for a boarding
attempt. These maneuvers will create
additional wash to impede the operation of
the skiffs.

Pirate Attack
Attack Stage
● Substantial amounts of helm are not

recommended, as these are likely to
significantly reduce a vessel’s speed.

After Piracy Attack

ON A HOSTAGE SITUATION,
WITH ARMED PIRATES, WHAT
SHALL BE THE BEST ACTION/S
BY THE CREW MEMBERS?

If the Pirates Take Control

Hijack – hostage situation

The model of pirate action off Somalia is to
hijack the ship and hold the crew for ransom. It
should be remembered it is in the interests of
the pirates to keep the ship and crew safe.
Each company or organisation should have a

policy in place to cover the eventualities of
kidnap and ransom. The following principles
serve as guidelines to surviving a kidnapping



● Try to remain calm.
● Experience has shown that the pirates will

be aggressive, highly agitated and
possibly under the influence of drugs or
alcohol.
● Offer no resistance to the pirates once

they reach the bridge.

● If the bridge/engine room is to be
evacuated, the main engine should be
stopped and all the way taken off the
vessel if possible (and if navigationally safe
to do so). All remaining crew members
should proceed to the designated Safe
Muster Point with their hands visible.
● Leave any CCTV running.



In the Event of Military Action
● All personnel should keep low to the deck
and cover their head with both hands,
with hands visible. On no account should
personnel make movements which could
be misinterpreted as being aggressive.

• .

● It is important that seafarers receive
timely and proper medical assessments,
both physical and mental, and care
following an attack or hostage situation.

● Plans on the management of a long,
drawn-out hostage negotiation situation,
including support for the families of the
kidnapped crew.

Post Incident Reporting
● Provide detailed report to UKMTO and
MSCHOA.
● Provide a copy to the IMB.

Post Incident Reporting
It is important that the report contains

descriptions and distinguishing features of
any suspicious vessels that were observed.
This will ensure full analysis and trends in
piracy activity are established and will enable
assessment of piracy techniques or changes
in tactics, in addition to other merchant
shipping in the vicinity.

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ANTI-PIRACY

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Why is there a need for Anti Piracy Awareness Training?

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Piracy is defined in Article 101 of the 1982 United

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Armed Robbery is defined by the IMO in its 26th

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IMB PRC reports incidents as follows:

4. Attempted: An illegal act of perpetrators attempting to approach a vessel with possible

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