AntiPiracy 3.0 Aug-2018 PDF

CREW MANAGEMENT
ANTI – PIRACY
AWARENESS .
TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS.
August, 2018
PARTNER.SHIP.REDEFINED 1
INTRODUCTION:
The advice and information PLEASE ALWAYS REFER TO:

given in this training is • the specific situation on the ship
intended purely as guidance you are assigned to;
only.
• the recommendations and
instructions issued by vessel’s
Circumstances can differ for DOC holder;
each vessel in respect to • the instructions from the Master on
trading area and for each board and/or the Ship Security
ship-owner. Officer;
• the respective Ship Security Plan.
ENTRY STANDARDS
TARGET GROUP AIM
• The Anti-Piracy Awareness

Training for Seafarers aims to
provide training for all
departing seafarers to
• All crew address issues that may
relate to piracy, armed
robbery on ships and
maritime security threats,
other than piracy
SCOPE
The course adopts the guidelines suggested by major international

maritime industry organizations like BIMCO, ICS and INTERTANKO on
the Industry Best Management Practices (BMP) for Protection Against
Somalia Based Piracy, Gulf of Guinea; Global Counter Piracy
Guidance for Companies, Masters and Seafarers; the Interim Guidance
on Maritime Security in the Southern Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandeb and
on the Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters,
complementing the recommendations contained in the IMO MSC
Circular MSC.1/Circ.1334, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”
meeting the requirements of Tables A-VI/6-1 and A-VI/6-2 of the STCW
Code, as amended (2010 Manila Amendments).
LEARNING OUTCOMES
On completion of this presentation you should be able to:
• determine piracy areas and piracy • identify the precautions to be taken;

threats; − if boarded by pirates
• recognise additional maritime
security intimidations other than
− if taken hostage
piracy, • conduct a threat assessment in
• define collateral damages due to respect of transits through the war
military conflicts between groups in risk areas
particular regions and a potential • identify the precautions to be taken
deliberate targeting of ships. in the event of a military action;
• identify ship protective measures • state the importance of post-
to: incident actions and reporting.
− reduce the risk, avoid and deter
and/or delay piracy attacks;
Defining Piracy
“….any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed…

on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property
on board such ship or aircraft…”
Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
TERMINOLOGY
Piracy & Maritime Security Threats
Kidnapped • PCASP - Privately Contracted Armed

Security Personnel
• to illegally take a person away by force, • MSTC - Maritime Security Transit Corridor
usually in order to demand money in • IRTC - Internationally Recommended
exchange for that person’s release: Transit Corridor
• Synonyms - abduct, capture, make off • EUNAVFOR - European Naval Forces
with, seize Maritime
• MSCHOA- Security Centre Horn of Africa
Hostage • CMF - Combined Maritime Forces
• someone who is taken as a prisoner by • UKMTO - United Kingdom Maritime Trade
an enemy in order to force the other Operations
people involved to do what the enemy • IRTA - Industry-Releasable Threat
wants Assessments
• IRTBs - Industry Releasable Threat
Hijack Bulletins
• to force someone to give you control of
a vehicle, aircraft, or ship that is in the
• MEZ - Maritime Exclusion Zone
middle of a trip • SAA - Secure Anchorage Area
• STS - Ship-to-Ship Zone
TERMINOLOGY
Piracy & Maritime Security Threats, other than piracy
Missiles
• Long range, accurate and powerful Sea (naval) Mines
self-propelled system with a • Naval mine is a self-contained
warhead. Anti-ship missiles are explosive device placed in water to
guided missiles that are designed damage or destroy surface ships or
for use against ships and large submarines. Unlike depth charges,
boats mines are deposited and left to wait
until they are triggered by the
Water-Borne Improvised Explosive approach of, or contact with, an
Devices (WBIED) enemy vessel
• is a bomb constructed and deployed in
ways other than in conventional military BAM TSS
action. It may be constructed of • The Bab al-Mandeb Traffic
conventional military explosives, such as Separation Scheme and the TSS
an artillery shell, attached to a detonating West of the Hanish Islands
mechanism. They can also be detonated
from a remote location and carried out by
a boat.
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS:
This training is in accordance with the
recommendations contained in the:
• IMO Maritime Safety Committee • STCW Code, as amended,
(MSC).1/Circ.1334, (2010 Manila Amendments)
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
AGAINST SHIPS Guidance to • Regulation VI/6 Mandatory minimum
shipowners and ship operators, requirements for security-related
shipmasters and crews training and instruction for all seafarers
• Best Management Practices (BMP • Table A-VI/6-1 Specification of

5) to Deter Piracy and Enhance minimum standard of competence in
Maritime Security in the Red Sea, security awareness
Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and
Arabian Sea • Table A-VI/6-2, Specification of
minimum standard of competence for
• Interim Guidance on maritime seafarers with designated security
security IN THE SOUTHERN RED duties
SEA AND BAB AL-MANDEB
Best Management Practices (BMP 5) to Deter Piracy and
Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden,
Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea
• BMP is provided as guidance for ship owners

and ship operators, Masters and their crew.
• Nothing in this BMP detracts from the Master’s

overriding authority and responsibility to
protect their crew, ship and cargo.
• Not all may be applicable for each ship
• Master’s or DOC holders discretion !
• BMP piracy measures are effective, but

differences in attack methods from other
threats may require other forms of mitigation.
• For example, attacks carried out by extremists

may be more determined, as they may be
willing to risk their lives.
BMP 5 link
Global Counter Piracy Guidance for
Companies, Masters and Seafarers
The fundamental requirements of BMP to
avoid attack by pirates and armed robbers
• Conduct ship-specific pre-voyage
threat and risk assessments to identify
appropriate Ship Protection Measures
(SPMs).
• Implement SPMs as identified in the
pre-voyage risk assessment.
• Register in accordance with the
requirements of any Voluntary
Reporting Area (VRA)
• Report daily when operating in a VRA
using the relevant Ship Position
Reporting – Daily Position
• Set a proper, visible lookout - the most
effective method of ship protection.
 Do Not Be ALONE
 Do Not Be DETECTED
 Do Not Be SURPRISED
 Do Not Be VULNERABLE
 Do Not Be BOARDED
 Do Not Be CONTROLLED
IF ATTACKERS CANNOT BOARD A SHIP Authors: BIMCO, ICS, IFSMA, IGP&I, INTERTANKO,
INTERCARGO, INTERMANAGER and OCIMF
THEY CANNOT HIJACK IT
Local Regulations
International Bargaining Forum (IBF) High Risk Area
(as of 1 March 2018)
• IBF Warlike Operations Area – 12 nm. • IBF High Risk Area” – Gulf of Guinea:
off the mainland Yemeni Coast, territorial waters (12 n. m.), ports and
excluding Maritime Security Transit inland waterways of Nigeria and Benin,
Corridor (MSTC) in the Red Sea excluding the Maritime Exclusion Zone
(MEZ), the Secure Anchorage Area (SAA)
• IBF Warlike Operations Area – all ports and the Ship-to-Ship Zone (STS) which are
in Yemen to be treated as IBF Extended Risk Zones
• “IBF High Risk Area” – Gulf of Aden +

400 nm. off Somali East Coast
• “IBF Extended Risk Zone” – West Indian

Ocean and the Red Sea, up to the
Yemen/Saudi Arabia border at 16: 22’N
and including the MSTC but excluding
the Warlike Operations Areas and the
High Risk Area as defined above
Local Regulations
Warlike Area 12nm off the Yemeni Mainland coast
As of 1st March 2018

http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/seealsodocs/33553/IBF%20WARLIKE%20ANDHIGH%20RISK%20AREAS.pdf
Local Regulations
“IBF High Risk Area” – Gulf of Aden + 400 nm. off Somali East Coast
Local Regulations
Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Straits
Local Regulations
Gulf of Guinea
“Q1’18 report from the

International Maritime Bureau
(IMB) - 107 incidents recorded in
the first six months of 2018
compared to 87 in the same
period in 2017.
Most alarming is the increase in
the number of incidents recorded
in the Gulf of Guinea region,
which has gone from 16 in the
first half of 2017 to 46 in 2018,
with 31 incidents recorded in
Nigeria’s territorial waters alone.
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/08/pir
IBF High Risk Area” – Gulf of Guinea: territorial waters acy-nigeria-waters-now-worse-than-
(12 n. m.), ports and inland waterways of Nigeria and somalia/
Benin, excluding MEZ; SAA ; STS
Piracy Risk Areas
IBF
Worldwide Incidents 2016: 191; 2017 - 180

2018: 66 (01 Jan. – 31 Mar.)
Updated in Apr. 2018 Source: ICC – IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships report – First quarter 2018
Typical Pirate Attacks
Latest Tactics
Gulf of Aden
“Soft-approaches”:
- a skiff will often approach a vessel in order to probe the

reactivity of an embarked security team, if present.
- If no response, the pirates may proceed with an attack,

sometimes accompanied by a second or more skiffs.
Pirate Attack Profiles
Types of dhows and skiffs project
SHU’AI 5-15m JELBUT (or JALIBUT) 15m
SAMBUQ Approx. 38m
YEMENI 15m BOUM 15-35m

Types of vessels used as “mother ships”
Source: 2009 MARAD, Somali Pirate Tactics

Types of vessels used as “mother ships”
for smaller assault crafts…
Gulf of Guinea
1. Armed Robbery – when vessels 3. Kidnapping – started with offshore

are approaching, drifting or oil industry and now spreading to
anchored off ports cargo ships approaching the ports.
Kept crew in Niger Delta – about 3-5
2. Cargo theft – tanker vessels are weeks.
hijacked for several days and
cargo is transferred to a smaller
vessel – lately decreasing.
.
Maritime Security Threats, other than piracy
Attack Profiles
Southern Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb (BAM).
• Military ships in the region have been targeted with anti-
ship missiles, there is no indication that merchant
shipping is likely to be deliberately targeted.
• There is however a risk of misidentification or collateral

damage to merchant shipping and as such it is strongly
recommended that ships utilise the Maritime Security
Transit Corridor (MSTC) and maintain an awareness of
the other vessels around them.
• An attack involving a WBIED is likely to involve one or

more skiffs approaching the merchant ship at high speed
firing both small arms and Rocket-Propelled Grenades
(RPGs).
• One or more of the boats may be laden with explosives. a Yemeni missile being fired at a Saudi target (Photo by al-Masirah)
On the basis of current understanding it is assessed that
merchant shipping is unlikely to be directly targeted by a
WBIED, however the risk of collateral damage or
misidentification remains.
• Counter-piracy mitigation measures contained in BMP

including, but not limited to, increasing speed,
manoeuvring, etc., should be applied to prevent the
skiffs from attaching to or making contact with the ship’s
hull. Information on changes in modus operandi in
WBIED tactics will be provided in the Industry
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/
Attack Profiles
Southern Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb (BAM).
Sea Mines
• Sea mines have been used to deter
and deny Saudi-led coalition forces
access to key ports in Yemen’s
southern Red Sea area.
• Whilst merchant shipping is not the
target, sea mines may affect
commercial ships using these ports
or routeing close to the Yemeni
Coastline.
• It is strongly recommended that
ships utilise the MSTC when
transiting through the area to
minimise the threat from sea mines.
Photos posted to a pro-Saudi twitter account appear to show improvised
mines found in Yemeni waters (@mohmad15541 / March 2017)
MARITIME SECURITY THREATS,
OTHER THAN PIRACY
THE SOUTHERN RED SEA AND BAB AL-MANDEB
INTERIM GUIDANCE ON MARITIME SECURITY by BIMCO, ICS and

INTERTANKO
•The guidance stresses the importance of using the Maritime Security
Transit Corridor, registration with MSCHOA and reporting to UKMTO, as
well as reviewing and updating risk assessments and plans to include
these new threats.
•The conflict in Yemen has introduced additional maritime security
threats, other than piracy, to the Southern Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb;
these include collateral damage due to conflict between groups in the
region and a potential deliberate targeting of ships.
•The guidance also includes advice specific to identified threat types,
including naval mines and WBIEDs and complements the guidance
provided in BMP 4.
Typical Pirates’ Attack
Time of Attacks
Gulf of Guinea and SE Asia
• High risk at night for ships at anchorage and drifting off the port
• Gulf of Guinea kidnapping

occurs during the day
providing time to reach
and hide in the delta before
the night time.
. https://www.premiumtimesng.com
Time of Attacks
Gulf of Aden
• Mostly during the day

• Early in the morning, at first light
• Less common in clear moon night
Latest updates for GoG piracy tactics:
• Now targeting cargo ships about • Living in the Niger delta bushes
20-30 miles off the shore during with the hostages in primitive
day time conditions. Prolonged stay is
• Armed with guns targeting only difficult also for the pirates
part of the crew, which is taken off • Military intervention could be
the ship dangerous for the hostages – seek
• Using very fast boats and trying shelter
to arrive at the delta before night
time
• Rather short duration of 3-5 weeks
in unhealthy environment
• Different rival groups
(mosquitos; poor food & water
• Usually not aggressive to the
supply)
hostages
Best Management Practices for protection against Somalia based Piracy (BMP)
BMP is provided as guidance for Although primarily aimed at protection

ship owners and ship operators, against Somali piracy the majority of
Masters and their crew. worldwide attacks have been repelled by
application of BMP.
1. Not all may be applicable for
each ship Other guides – should be read in relation
to BMP:
2. Master’s or DOC holders
discretion ! 1. Regional Guide To Counter Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships
in Asia
. 2. Guidelines for Owners, Operators and

Masters for Protection against Piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea Region
Risk Assessment
FACTORS:
Low freeboard
compared to…
High free board increases the

chance to escape an attack
Risk Assessment
FACTORS:
Speed
No successful attacks have occurred on

Slow speed compared to -> ships at 18 knots and above
Risk Assessment
FACTORS:
State of alert
Visibly low state of alert and no evidence

of self protective measures compared to -
>
Risk Assessment
FACTORS:
Sea state
Sea state below 3 Beaufort compared to ->
Risk Assessment
FACTORS:
Season/Weather
GoA - Successful pirate attacks are more likely in monsoon
transitional months:
- April to May
- October to November
Risk Assessment
FACTORS:
Planning
The ship is more vulnerable

to pirate attacks when there is:
• Inadequate planning and

procedures
• a slow response by the crew
FUNDAMENTALS
1. Register with 3. Implement the ship

corresponding piracy protection measures
reporting centre for the • Prior High Risk Area
area (HRA) entry
• During HRA entry
2. Report as applicable • During pirate attack
(initial; daily; final) • After the attack
.
Point of Contact
Gulf of Aden Gulf of Guinea Asia

United Kingdom Maritime Nearest Maritime Rescue •Indonesia
Trade Operations –UKMTO Co-ordination Center Badan Keamanan Laut Republic
Point of contact for Lagos Regional Maritime Indonesia
industry liaison with the CMF Rescue Coordination (BAKAMLA)
Send daily reports Centre (RMRCC)
Maritime Security Centre – Maritime Trade •Malaysia
Horn of Africa (secondary) Information Sharing Malaysien Maritime
provide service to mariners Centre for the Gulf of Enfoncement Agency (MMEA)
coordination centre Guinea to
compared
NATO Shipping Center – NSC administers a voluntary •Singapore (ReCAAP Focal Point)
Provides the link between reporting scheme for Maritime and Port Authority of
the maritime community and merchant vessels Singapore
the NATO’s Maritime Forces. operating within a defined Port Operations Control Centre
Voluntary Reporting Area (POCC)
(VRA)
Point of Contact
Gulf of Aden Asia

Maritime Liaison Office Information Fusion Centre (IFC)
(MARLO-Bahrain) 24/7 regional Maritime Security (MARSEC) information-
Facilitate exchange of sharing centre
information between the US
Navy, CMF and the
commercial maritime
community
International Maritime Bureau compared

- IMB to
24-Hour Anti Piracy Helpline

 receives reports from ships
 issues regular status reports of piracy via INMARSAT-C
Point of Contact
THE SOUTHERN RED SEA AND BAB AL-MANDEB

UKMTO (United Kingdom MSCHOA USN Naval Control and
Maritime Trade Operations) Email Guidance to Shipping
Email: postmaster@mschoa.org Email CTF55.BWC@me.navy.mil
watchkeepers@ukmto.org Tel +44 (0)1923 958 545 Tel (24hrs) + 973-1785-3434
Tel: +44 2392 222060 Fax +44 (0)1923 958 520
+971 50 552 3215 Website www.mschoa.org
NATO Shipping Centre compared

IMB PiracytoReporting
Email info@shipping.nato.int Centre
Tel +44 (0)1923 956 574 Email piracy@icc-ccs.org
Fax +44 (0)1923 956 575 imbkl@icc-ccs.org
Website Tel +603 2031 0014 (24hr
www.shipping.nato.int Helpline)
Fax +603 2078 5769
Website www.icc-ccs.org
Reporting Procedures
Reference should be made to:
1. Admiralty publications such as:
• Mariner’s handbook
• Admiralty Lights & Radio
Signals Vol 1 (part 1 & 2)
• Admiralty Maritime Security
Planning Charts (Q series)
2. Ship’s security plan
3. Company instructions and

provided materials
Ship Protection Measures
Proper Lookout
Controlled access
Secure and
control access to
Bridge, ER,
accommodation and
steering gear
room
Accommodation and open deck
1. Accommodation always locked and the access for the crew limited to
one entrance only.
2. Crew cabins locked – against ransacking (when pirates are in hurry
might not have time to deal with locked cabins)
3. Secure all storage areas on open deck with combination padlocks
Accommodation and open deck
1. When using chain blocks the weakest link of the arrangement

should be considered.
2. Securing of the dogs (i.e. by pipes) might provide stronger
holding force.
.
1. Deny use of ship’s tools and

equipment that might be used to gain
entry to the ship or the
citadel/secured areas.
2. Those should be locked in secure
locations.
• Consider the use of
• Considering use of night vision CCTV cameras
optics .
Consider use of dummies placed at strategic locations
.
.
Follow the procedures laid down in your Ship
Security Plan!
Ensure sufficient watch keepers
• Increase lookouts • Man the E/R
• Minimize external communication

• Establish radio silence 18 hours prior entry
.
Increase readiness and redundancy by running auxiliary

machinery
.
.
Consider reinforcing accessible portholes
Steel plate cover welded over

a port hole
Grates on external stairways

.
• Use “crazy fenders” hanging over the side of the

vessel
. PARTNER.SHIP.REDEFINED 54
Double or triple roll of razor wire or Rail Guard
.
On one case pirates have overcome just one

layer of not very densely set wire.
REPEL™ is an anti-piracy Rail Guard to be fitted around the perimeter of a Vessel, over external hand rails
and fitted to cover any openings restricting access to unwanted boarders. http://www.globalshieldtech.org/
Fire pumps and/or hoses to be pressurized around the stern
and the sights ready for discharge overboard
• Water spray
• Water cannons
Prior entry to high-risk areas:
• Where possible it is recommended to practice manoeuvring.
• It helps to establish which series of helm orders present most

difficult sea condition for boarding minimum loss of speed.
• Drills, review of SSP procedures and briefing – prepare and

alert the crew
Preparation & Ship Protection Measures
• Obtain Information
• Reporting Suspicious Activity to
• Review Existing Plans UKMTO and MSCHOA
• Vessel security hardening • Use the Maritime Security Transit

assessment Corridor (MSTC)
• Protection against • Privately Contracted Armed

explosions Security Personnel (PCASP)
• Register with MSCHOA

and Report to UKMTO
Vessel security hardening PLAN
1. Immediate measures 2. Longer term measures

• Ensure that bridge windows do not shatter • Add armour protection to the bridge.
upon impact causing secondary Protection against 7.62mm bullets can be
fragmentation. afforded by an equivalent of 15mm of
• Check that the glass is either laminated to Rolled Homogeneous Armour (RHA).
a minimum Standard,(EN 1063 BR6 or its • This might be achieved by bolting 10-
equivalent) 12mm of RHA to the outer faces of the
• a shatterproof film is attached to reduce existing bridge structure. If armour is
the likelihood of glass fragments, this added to the bridge there will be a risk of
being of a comparable Standard spall,(fragments of plating), from the
armour if it is attacked by a more severe
• Fit RPG protection to the bridge wings, threat than the protection is designed to
either using proprietary net technology or defeat.
a double chain link fencing arrangement. • This can be mitigated using a spall liner
• This must be used in association with a as the innermost layer of material inside
policy of keeping crew protected inside the the bridge.
superstructure to limit injuries caused by • Overall the additional weight of armouring
fragments from externally detonating the bridge of a vessel in this way could
rockets. amount to between 4-6 tonnes and cost
between 25,000 and 40,000 to purchase.
*OCIMF Information Paper on Bridge Vulnerability
Enhanced Bridge Protection
https://www.compositestoday.com
Application of security glass film Shatterproof film

often called Blast Resistant Film by the, to the
windows or nano-enhanced –carbon-fibre glass to
reduce the likelihood of glass fragments
Sand bags to protect bridge wings, helm and

command area port holes in the wheelhouse
Vessel security hardening PLAN
Recommendations for New Build Tonnage
Recommendations for Existing Ships
• the simplest and most effective protection for the bridge • For a new build vessel the following protective
is the installation of shatterproof film to the windows. As measures should be considered at the design
a guide it would cost in the region of 2,000 to protect the stage.
bridge windows of a single vessel. • Bridge windows, bridge wing doors and all
• Only marginal improvement of protection if the accommodation portholes could be fitted with
superstructure bulkheads are hardened.
windows that are protected to EU Standard
• Bolting on of 10mm RHA plating to a ballistic standard
that would defeat an AK47, (EU Standard 1522 – FB6) EN 1063 BR6.
would cost in the region of 25,000 – 40,000, and would • The bridge superstructure could be designed
incur additional weight of approximately 4-6 tonnes. to provide ballistic resistance standards
• Full protection may not be cost effective. However a offering protection against rounds up to
partial installation, carefully sited may be beneficial, for 7.62mm x 39 (EU Standard 1522FB6). This
example on the bridge wing area where it may provide
would involve 15mm RHA in lieu of the
additional protection from incoming projectiles on the
beam of the vessel. existing 7mm mild steel.
• Existing vessels may provide additional protection • Should weight considerations make this
against an RPG by fitting either proprietary net undesirable then Kevlar could be used, but
technology around the outer edges of the superstructure weight savings would be countered by
deck, or by fitting double chain link fencing. additional cost.
• The former is available from the majority of defence
• Bridge wings and the bridge front could be
manufacturing companies but is expensive. The latter is
effective and cheap to install. constructed with the ability to ensure that
fitting of either RPG netting or double chain
link fence is made simple and portable.
*OCIMF Information Paper on Bridge Vulnerability
Enhanced Bridge Protection
The bridge can be protected from bullets by

Protection against 7.62mm bullets an equivalent
of 15mm of Rolled homogeneous Armour
(RHA),
or 100 mm double chain link fencing to

surround /protect the bridge against launched
grenades
The Citadel Concept
• Citadel - safe place for retreat,

ideally away from external
bulkheads and portholes, when
pirate boarding is imminent.
• Citadel complements other BMP

measures and is the last defence
after all other evasive measures
have been taken.
• Citadel must be implemented
properly
a transportable armoured citadel as a safe refuge for crews
threatened by piracy – www.crewshield.com
The Citadel Concept
• Recommended items should be

stored in the citadel.
• Communication using satellite and

VHF connection emergency
contacts should be considered.
• All ship’s tools that could be used

by the pirates to break in should
be secured in safe area.
• The whole concept of the citadel is

lost if any crew is left outside.
The Citadel Concept
• Safe spaces adjacent to citadel may be made

accessible to provide more space for the crew;
• Make sure you do not have weak points like thin

wires when connecting the chain block;
• Water should be rationed properly.
• Avoid salty food that encourages more water

consumption
.
Privately Contracted Armed Security
Personnel (PCASP)
• Not a single vessel with armed guards on board has been hijacked
• Privately contracted security companies are prevented by law from

operating inside territorial waters. Authorities are known to enforce
these regulations vigorously.
. PARTNER.SHIP.REDEFINED 66
Pirate Approach
• Increase the speed if not at full • Put ship’s whistle on automated

speed yet mode
• Try to increase CPA • Confirm designated entry point
• Sound the alarm and make a secured and activate planned
pirate attack announcement defensive measures
• Activate the Ship Security Alarm
• If possible alter course to expose
System (SSAS)
skiffs to wind and waves
• Send distress message
• Ensure that AIS is turned on • Report to the appropriate contact
• The crew should muster point, inform CSO
according to the procedure
Pirate Attack
• Evasive manoeuvre – zig zag to affect boats in the

ship’s wake wave
• Manoeuvre to enhance efficiency of protective

measures – spraying jets, crazy fenders…
• The crew is in a position of safety
• Constant assessment of the situation
Pirate Boarding
• Act as per the predesigned SSP scenario
• Consider retreat in the citadel if available
• Stay in control of the ship, if possible from the citadel
• If retreating to citadel consider to disable the ship’s

propulsion depending on the situation
If the Pirates Take Control
• Try to remain calm
• Offer no resistance to the pirates
• Stay together in one location
• Avoid physical contact with pirates
• If possible, maintain a log of events
If Taken Hostage by Pirates
• All the crew should stay assured that • Piracy is business

the owners and crew managers will be
aware of the situation and will take
• Remain calm
appropriate measures. • Avoid drugs and alcohol
• Master to retain leadership position for • Be aware that pirates might be under
the crew influence of drugs or alcohol
• Be patient
• Master could negotiate some freedom
and better conditions for the crew • Do not interfere with pirates’ internal
business
• Establish some routine, if it is possible • Cooperate whenever possible
at all
If Taken Hostage by Pirates
• Somali pirates could keep the crew on board or ashore
- Keep the crew for few months in the Gulf of Aden
• In the GoG usually only part of the crew is taken hostage
- Transported by boats and kept in the Niger Delta
- Moved from camp to camp. Duration 3-5 weeks
In the Event of Military Action
• Keep low to the deck, with

hands
covering the head ->
.
• DO NOT use flash photography!

.
• Be prepared to identify yourself
Post-Incident Actions & Reporting
MNUA Odessa MNPI Manila
• The Company will take care and will help you and your family through the
whole process upon hostages release.
• A Company representative will be at the point of release and will assist with
further arrangements
ANTI PIRACY AWARENESS TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS
• The situation is dynamic.
• The pirates will routinely operate in major shipping lanes.
• Therefore study the latest reference materials:
https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map
http://www.safety4sea.com/category/security/
ANTI PIRACY AWARENESS TRAINING FOR
SEAFARERS
https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map
ANTI PIRACY AWARENESS TRAINING FOR
SEAFARERS
http://www.safety4sea.com/category/security/
WORLDWIDE CREW & SHIP MANAGEMENT
THANK YOU
MARLOW MANAGEMENT
Marlow Navigation Co. Ltd.
13 Alexandrias Street, 3013
P.O. Box 54077, CY-3720

Limassol, CYPRUS
Tel: +357 25882588 | Fax: +357 25882599

E-Mail: marlow@marlow.com.cy
Website: marlow-navigation.com

AntiPiracy 3.0 Aug-2018 PDF

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AntiPiracy 3.0 Aug-2018 PDF

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CREW MANAGEMENT

The advice and information PLEASE ALWAYS REFER TO:

TARGET GROUP AIM

• The Anti-Piracy Awareness

The course adopts the guidelines suggested by major international

On completion of this presentation you should be able to:

• determine piracy areas and piracy • identify the precautions to be taken;

“….any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed…

Kidnapped • PCASP - Privately Contracted Armed

• Best Management Practices (BMP • Table A-VI/6-1 Specification of

• BMP is provided as guidance for ship owners

• Nothing in this BMP detracts from the Master’s

• Not all may be applicable for each ship

• Master’s or DOC holders discretion !

• BMP piracy measures are effective, but

• For example, attacks carried out by extremists

• “IBF High Risk Area” – Gulf of Aden +

• “IBF Extended Risk Zone” – West Indian

As of 1st March 2018

As of 1st March 2018

As of 1st March 2018

“Q1’18 report from the

Worldwide Incidents 2016: 191; 2017 - 180

- a skiff will often approach a vessel in order to probe the

- If no response, the pirates may proceed with an attack,

SHU’AI 5-15m JELBUT (or JALIBUT) 15m

SAMBUQ Approx. 38m

YEMENI 15m BOUM 15-35m

Source: 2009 MARAD, Somali Pirate Tactics

for smaller assault crafts…

1. Armed Robbery – when vessels 3. Kidnapping – started with offshore

• There is however a risk of misidentification or collateral

• An attack involving a WBIED is likely to involve one or

• Counter-piracy mitigation measures contained in BMP

INTERIM GUIDANCE ON MARITIME SECURITY by BIMCO, ICS and

Gulf of Guinea and SE Asia

• Gulf of Guinea kidnapping

• Mostly during the day

BMP is provided as guidance for Although primarily aimed at protection

. 2. Guidelines for Owners, Operators and

High free board increases the

No successful attacks have occurred on

Visibly low state of alert and no evidence

Sea state below 3 Beaufort compared to ->

The ship is more vulnerable

• Inadequate planning and

• a slow response by the crew

1. Register with 3. Implement the ship

Gulf of Aden Gulf of Guinea Asia

Gulf of Aden Asia

International Maritime Bureau compared

24-Hour Anti Piracy Helpline

THE SOUTHERN RED SEA AND BAB AL-MANDEB

NATO Shipping Centre compared

1. Admiralty publications such as:

2. Ship’s security plan

3. Company instructions and

1. When using chain blocks the weakest link of the arrangement

1. Deny use of ship’s tools and

Ensure sufficient watch keepers

• Increase lookouts • Man the E/R

• Minimize external communication

Increase readiness and redundancy by running auxiliary