See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/322404565

Climate skepticism

Chapter · January 2015

DOI: 10.4337/9781783470600.00025

CITATIONS READS

2 708

1 author:

Reiner Grundmann
University of Nottingham
113 PUBLICATIONS   2,485 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

The rightful place of expertise View project

Urban sustainability View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Reiner Grundmann on 30 October 2018.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 16.  Climate skepticism*
Reiner Grundmann

Climate skepticism has caused much interest in the climate change debate, especially
among those who want to foster ambitious climate policies. The presence of skeptical
voices in the media has been identified as a cause for timid policy responses (see, for
example, Cook et al. 2013). Climate activists and mainstream climate scientists criticize
what they perceive as over-­representation of skeptics in the mainstream media. One
could argue that climate change skepticism has become a scapegoat for failed climate
policies. In this chapter I demonstrate how the noble principle of scientific skepticism has
become a bad word in the context of climate change.
I present data about the changing use and meaning of the term ‘skeptic’ in the English
language press, focusing mainly on the US. I will use the New York Times (NYT) as the
main source for the empirical analysis. The NYT is the newspaper of record in the US
(Martin and Hansen 1998) and an important opinion leader, politically lending towards
the left-­liberal spectrum. My focus is on the US because this is an important country in
the industrialized West in which climate science and policy were discussed relatively early
(Grundmann and Krishnamurthy 2010, p. 131) and in which skeptical voices have been
heard in the media for a long time (Grundmann 2007). The US has also been reluctant to
embrace global climate policy targets. The reason for this is often seen in the strength of a
Republican Party that resists climate change mitigation policies. The association between
party support and climate change concern is well documented (see, e.g., Saad 2014). The
US shows an adversarial style of policy making (Löfstedt et al. 2001) in which the two
main parties mobilize experts at Congress hearings where they are cross-­examined. Many
issues about health and the environment have thus seen a contestation of the scientific
knowledge base, with witnesses lined up according to political platforms. Climate change
is a prime example for such a politicization of science (Fisher et al. 2012). This suggests
that the political sphere structures the debate, even reaching into scientific practices.
This structure, established in the US, has influenced contemporary climate change dis-
course suggesting a rift between those who think there is serious cause for concern and
those who think there is no real threat and that we should wait and see. However, there are
many shades in between where science, politics and values do not line up neatly (Hulme
2009). The antagonistic nature of the debate makes these voices seem less important.

TERMINOLOGY

An important aspect is the terms we attribute to the protagonists. There seems to be

no commonly accepted way of labeling the groups in the debate. Not everyone criti-
cal of mainstream climate science and/or policy would wear the skeptic badge with
honor. Skeptics, in turn, call some mainstream positions ‘alarmist,’ which again is often
rejected as an insult. There are skeptical views about climate science (e.g., attribution

175

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 175 18/09/2015 11:34

 176  Research handbook on climate governance

and ­predictions about anthropogenic warming), about the institutionalization of expert

advice (e.g., the role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC), and
about the politics of climate change (e.g., the Kyoto Process). However, the term ‘skeptic’
seems to be used in a rather undifferentiated way, often implicitly assuming that being
skeptical about one aspect means being a skeptic about all (Capstick and Pidgeon 2014).
As Victor (2014, p. 1) points out, ‘calling people who disagree “denialists” is clouding
our judgment. If you really want to understand what motivates these people and what
motivates the captains of industry and voters who listen to them, stop calling them
­denialists.’ He then distinguishes three types of denial: industry shills, skeptics, and
­hobbyists. Shills are professional policy delayers, skeptics are scientists like Freeman
Dyson (the eminent physicist), and hobbyists are mainly active in the blogosphere.
Inspired by this typology I show that the skeptical discourse as represented in the NYT
unfolds in four different stages, which can be labeled benign skepticism (before 1997),
shilling (1997–2002), denial (after 2001) and hobbyism (after 2005). I argue that political
events were associated with these discursive shifts.
Before my in depth qualitative examination of the NYT, I first present summary quan-
titative data from English language newspapers and the NYT in the LexisNexis database.

NEWSPAPER REPORTING

Let us start with a frequency distribution of the terms ‘skeptic’ and ‘denier/denial’ in the
English language newspaper archive LexisNexis from 1970 to 2013. On average, about 6
percent of articles about global warming or climate change mention the term ‘skeptic,’
mostly in Australian, UK, Canadian and US papers (3.5 percent use the term ‘denier/
denial’).1 About 5 percent of NYT articles on the subject make reference to skeptics, 2.6
percent to ‘denier/denial.’
Figures 16.1 and 16.2 show levels of reporting about ‘global warming’ or ‘climate
change’ in major papers and the NYT. While stories in major papers peak in 2007, the
NYT peaks in 2009. The terms ‘sceptic*/skeptic*’ were on the rise until 2009 and then
diminished in line with the general level of reporting on this issue. Similar trends are seen
with ‘denial’ which rose from 2005–2010.
Unfortunately LexisNexis does not hold a reliable archive as it contains many
­duplicates and misses others. There were 89 occurrences of ‘skeptic*’ and 39 ‘denier*/
denial*’ in NYT-­Lexis, but 166 and 29 respectively in the NYT archive.
I therefore decided to access the NYT archive (using ProQuest, despite its shorter
coverage, which stops in 2010), searching for stories containing the terms ‘global
­
warming’ or ‘climate change.’ This search yielded 6,352 articles between 1970 and 2010,
of which 425 carried one of the terms in the headline and 57 of those appeared on the
front page. Eight articles mentioned ‘skeptic’ in the headline, three on the front page.
I selected articles that appeared at key junctures, giving special attention to the early
years of the debate (1981–1997), which arguably influenced later developments.2 In what
follows I shall describe the semantic change that occurred over time and offer some
explanatory speculation in the conclusion.

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 176 18/09/2015 11:34

 Climate skepticism  ­177

GW/CC Major World Newspapers (English) Skeptic/denier

7,000 700
Global Warming/Climate Change
6,000 600
GW/CC + skeptic*/sceptic
5,000 GW/CC + denier*/denial* 500

4,000 400

3,000 300

2,000 200

1,000 100

0 0
1970–1990

1991–2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013
Note:  Major world newspapers (English), LexisNexis. Moderate similarity setting for duplicates. Excluding
newswires, articles with fewer than 500 words, websites, non-­business articles.

Figure 16.1 Major world newspapers: frequency of ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’

(at start of article) and ‘skeptic*/sceptic*’ or ‘denier*/denial*’ (anywhere)

‘BENIGN’ SKEPTICISM (PRE-­1997)

The Oxford English Dictionary defines a skeptic as someone

who doubts the validity of what claims to be knowledge in some particular department of
inquiry (e.g. metaphysics, theology, natural science, etc.); popularly, one who maintains a doubt-
ing attitude with reference to some particular question or statement. Also, one who is habitually
inclined rather to doubt than to believe any assertion or apparent fact that comes before him; a
person of sceptical temper. (OED 2015)

My news analysis shows that a change in meaning occurred slowly over time. In the early
period (1981–1997), the OED definition is very much present. In 1981 the NYT science
writer Walter Sullivan covered a report by seven ‘federal scientists’ who claim to have
found a warming trend in the earth’s temperature extending back to 1880 (NYT, August
22, 1981). They predict a global warming of almost ‘unprecedented magnitude’ in the
next century. This might even be ‘sufficient to melt and dislodge the ice cover of West
Antarctica . . . eventually leading to a worldwide rise of 15 to 20 feet in the sea level.’
The forecast is based on computer simulations projecting a temperature rise by 5–9°F in
the twenty-­first century.
Sullivan mentioned that the scientists countered an outspoken skeptic regarding the
carbon dioxide threat, Dr. Sherwood B. Idso who believes ‘that a doubling or tripling of

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 177 18/09/2015 11:34

 178  Research handbook on climate governance

GW/CC New York Times skeptic/denier

300 35
NYT “Global warming”/ “Climate Change”
NYT GW/CC + skeptic* 30
250
NYT GW/CC + denier
25
200

20
150
15

100
10

50
5

0 0
1970–1990

1991–2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013
Note:  New York Times, LexisNexis. Moderate similarity setting for duplicates. Excluding newswires, articles
with fewer than 500 words, websites, non-­business articles.

Figure 16.2 The New York Times: frequency of ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’ (at
start of article) and ‘skeptic*/sceptic*’ or ‘denier*/denial*’ (anywhere)

atmospheric carbon dioxide would have little effect except to increase agricultural pro-
ductivity by 20 to 50 percent.’ The term ‘skeptic’ is used in a neutral way, denoting doubt
about the validity of a knowledge claim. We can see some early markers for the debate
which came to stick around until the present day: the question of a temperature trend; the
role of CO2 and the consequences of continued, perhaps increased emissions; the com-
puter models that predict impacts; the possible dissolution of Antarctic ice and its effects
on sea-­level rise. Even the question of CO2 uptake by plants has not been laid to rest, as
recent studies illustrate (McGrath 2014). In sum, the term ‘skeptic’ was not only not used
pejoratively but also had not yet settled into meaning skepticism towards anthropogenic
global warming as noted above.
On October 23, 1983 the NYT reported that the ‘greenhouse effect has still its skep-
tics. A major embarrassment for the theory is that the carbon dioxide content in the
atmosphere has been steadily rising for the last 25 years, yet the predicted warming
has not definitely appeared.’ The article makes reference to two reports, one from the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS), co-­authored by economists William Nordhaus
and Thomas Schelling (who emphasize the potential for adaptation with regard to sea

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 178 18/09/2015 11:34

 Climate skepticism  ­179

level rise and crop growth), the other by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
which said that ‘a soberness and sense of urgency should underlie our response to a
greenhouse warming.’ The NAS by contrast stated: ‘There is little urgency for reductions
in CO2 emissions below an uncontrolled path before ad 1990’ (NYT, October 21, 1983).
President Reagan’s science advisor welcomed the NAS report but called the EPA report
‘alarmist’—one of the first instances of this term in news reports about climate change.
A few weeks later, geoscientist Michael Oppenheimer takes both reports to task,
arguing that both assume ‘little can be done to forestall this climatic change and that
Government efforts should focus on adaptation.’ He thinks this amounts to ‘throwing in
the towel in round one’ (NYT, November 9, 1983). Oppenheimer uses the word ‘skeptical’
in connection to the NAS report as follows: ‘The Academy report is skeptical about the
desirability of fossil fuel substitutes but it presents no analysis of the cost of not prevent-
ing climate change’ (emphasis in original). Oppenheimer was to become an influential
voice in the unfolding debate, and IPCC lead author. He points to the desirability of a
full cost–benefit analysis, which arguably reached peak attention only 23 years later with
the publication of the Stern Review in 2006.
On June 24, 1988, James Hansen of NASA made his famous witness statement at a
Congress hearing saying that that global warming caused by increasing concentrations
of greenhouse gases was already underway. The NYT reported this on the same day in
its late edition, giving no space to skeptical voices, only mentioning that ‘[s]ome scientists
still argue that warmer temperatures in recent years may be a result of natural fluc-
tuations rather than human-­induced changes’ (‘Global warming has begun, expert tells
Senate’). Patrick Michaels, then a professor of environmental sciences at the University
of Virginia and still a leading climate skeptic today, countered in the Washington Post six
months later (January 8, 1989) that ‘of the hundred-­odd scientists in the world actively
involved in the study of long-­term climate data, only one—James Hansen of NASA—
has stated publicly that there is a “high degree of cause and effect” between current tem-
peratures and human alteration of the atmosphere.’
Meanwhile Philip Shabecoff wrote (NYT, July 19, 1988) that ‘[s]ome Government
officials and scientists are skeptical about the human ability and will to make the kinds
of broad adjustments necessary to make a substantial reduction in the pace of global
warming.’ The focus is on two different positions, laid out by Irving Mintzer and Lester
Lave, who advocate no-­regret policies and caution that policies would need public
support. The skepticism expressed here refers to the technological and economic dimen-
sions of climate change, the emphasis on public support being another mainstay of
the debate ever since.
In early 1989, Stephen Schneider was quoted as saying ‘All the scientists look at the
same data, provided by each other’s models and by climate records. But some read the
data more cautiously than others. Different scientists will retain or shed their scepticism
in different degrees and at different times’ (NYT, February 7, 1989). Again, the skeptical
attitude is seen as legitimate, not a worrying or devious proposition. In late 1989, NYT
journalist William Stevens focused on the dissent amongst scientists, noting that of an
estimated 300 scientists engaged in ‘serious climatic research,’

many of them, perhaps the majority, have not taken a firm position in the debate; they say that
while the greenhouse theory is valid in general, there are too many uncertainties about its future

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 179 18/09/2015 11:34

 180  Research handbook on climate governance

effects. Both of the other factions – those who believe global warming to be a clear and definite
threat and those who say there is likely to be no significant warming – appear to be in a minority.
Authorities [. . .] can be found in all three groups. (NYT, December 13, 1989)

The article sets the arguments of the group Stevens termed ‘dissenters’ (such as
Patrick  Michaels and Richard Lindzen) against those he called ‘defenders’ (James
Hansen, Michael Oppenheimer and Stephen Schneider). For instance, when Michaels
emphasized uncertainty and expense—‘If the policy is going to be that expensive, the
science should be much less murky than it is now’—the opposite view was also given:
‘“My feeling is that the uncertainty will always remain,” said Syukuro Manabe. “We have
to make decisions based on uncertain information . . . I don’t think we have any other
choice”’ (NYT, December 13, 1989).
This position, despite its obvious truth in virtually all policy arenas, turned out to
become marginal in the developing climate debate where both believers and skeptics
assumed that more research could resolve major uncertainties. But as time went on, they
were neither able to resolve the uncertainties nor to overcome their disagreements. If
anything, disagreement became more pronounced (see Sarewitz 2004).
In April 1990, the NYT reports about a ‘team of scientists’ that sees ‘substantial
warming of Earth’ and writes: ‘Assembled by the United Nations in an attempt to arrive
at an international consensus on global warming, a team of scientists says it is a “virtual
certainty” that the temperature of the earth’s surface will rise substantially in the next
century’ (NYT, April 16, 1990). This is a reference to the first report of the IPCC:

The scientists generally agree with the theory that has been largely accepted by other national
and international panels: that energy trapped in a greenhouse effect by industrial gases will
warm the earth by 3 to 8 degrees Fahrenheit within the next 60 years. A number of scientists,
though, have raised doubts about the theory and about models of climatic change on which it is
based. Skeptics call the model inaccurate or incomplete. (NYT, April 16, 1990)

Reporting on the second IPCC report, Stevens returns to the issue of mainstream versus
skeptic camps, saying:

While some environmentalists and their allies have long believed potentially catastrophic
human-­induced climate change to be a fact, and some political conservatives and industry
groups have been skeptical, experts in the mainstream of climate science have never confirmed
either view. (NYT, September 19, 1995, emphasis added)

Early in 1996, Stevens covers the issue of record global temperatures on the front page
(‘95 is hottest year on record as the global trend resumes,’ 4 January 1996). Interestingly,
he describes James Hansen as ‘one of only a few scientists to maintain steadfastly that
a century-­long global warming trend is being caused by human influence.’ The IPCC
panel and other scientists quoted in the article (Tom Wigley and Phil Jones) are fairly
circumspect with regard to the question if a trend has been established and what could
have caused it. The article quotes satellite data analysis by Roy Spencer and John Christy,
two scientists usually located in the ‘skeptical camp,’ in a non-­judgmental way. The article
does not refer to them as skeptics; in fact Christy is quoted countering skeptical views.
Just before the Kyoto summit, another front page piece covered the solar influence on
climate under the headline ‘Is global warming tied to solar storms?’ (NYT, September 23,

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 180 18/09/2015 11:34

 Climate skepticism  ­181

1997) quoting skeptical scientists Brian Tinsley and Sallie Baliunas, among others. The
article presents their views in a fairly detailed way, without any recrimination. This period
(1981–1997) featured several themes that were defined in the earlier stages of the debate:
the temperature trend; the role of increased CO2 emissions; computer models; growing
or shrinking ice caps; sea level rise; CO2 uptake by plants; economic cost; and feasibility
of alternatives. Record temperatures and the role of the sun can be added to the list. The
path-­dependent nature of the debate is vindicated by the presence of early protagonists
who remained visible in the coming decades: Stephen Schneider, James Hansen and
Michael Oppenheimer, and the skeptical Richard Lindzen and Patrick Michaels. The
legitimacy of skeptical scientists was not called into question in any of the articles up to
this time.

SHILLS: SKEPTICISM AS INDUSTRY PR (1997–2002)

Perhaps the first prominent example of equating skeptics with industry shills comes in
the book The Heat is On, written by Ross Gelbspan (1997), an American writer and
activist. Mark Hertsgaard reviewed it under the headline ‘Hot air: the debate over climate
change, the author says, stems from a strategic PR campaign’:

Step 1 in the industry campaign was to offer financial backing to a handful of academics who
have disputed the conclusions of the 2,500 scientists of the United Nations’ Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Step 2 was to demand, on grounds of equal time, that these so-­called
‘greenhouse skeptics’ be allowed to make their case before Congressional committees and
news organizations. [. . .] Gelbspan ably dissects the flimsy sophistry employed by greenhouse
­skeptics. He rightly wonders, given substantial evidence that the skeptics are wrong, why so
many news stories still quote them.3 (NYT, August 3, 1997)

This article raised the stakes considerably. Here we see the term ‘skeptic’ taking on a new
meaning. They are ‘so-­called skeptics,’ not real skeptics.4 They are funded by industry and
thus have a monetary interest in spreading misinformation. They have nothing to con-
tribute on the level of knowledge creation and are simply ‘wrong.’ This line of reasoning
has become another staple of contemporary debate where the association of individuals
with specific organizations or funding sources is seen as a good enough reason to devalue
the arguments put forward.
The issue of equal amount of media attention has also become a mainstay ever since,
especially as these skeptics are only a ‘handful’ compared with the 2,500 scientists of the
IPCC. This is in contrast to Stevens’ comments cited above (which appeared in 1989 and
1995) in which the ‘majority’ had no firm view. Now almost everyone is on the consen-
sus side. The minority is now delegitimized, rather than seen as similar in numbers to
the ‘convinced.’ The book review also finds this kind of skepticism to be without any
legitimacy and urges that media should pay no attention. The issue of creating ‘false
symmetry’ has become another topic which has not gone away (see Boykoff and Boykoff
2004; Boykoff 2007; Grundmann and Scott 2014). The book review deplores the fact that
skeptics are ‘allowed to make their case before Congressional committees,’ oblivious of
the fact that this is the US style of policymaking.
How to explain this escalation? It seems obvious that the stakes became higher in the

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 181 18/09/2015 11:34

 182  Research handbook on climate governance

run up to the UN climate conference in Kyoto when the US pondered its options. Climate
change became subject to an intensifying partisan political debate with the Democrats
and Republicans using this issue to gain political capital. While the Clinton govern-
ment signed the Kyoto Protocol, this meant little in practice. In July 1997 the US Senate
had adopted a resolution brought by Republican senator Charles Hagel and Democrat
Robert Boyd demanding that the US should not sign a treaty that does not require devel-
oping countries to reduce their GHG emissions. This bipartisan initiative, despite its
non-­binding nature, was unanimously adopted. It defined the stance of the US in global
climate policy until today.
A cover story on April 26, 1998 entitled ‘Industrial group plans to battle climate treaty’
revealed industry documents obtained by the NYT showing plans by a fossil fuel lobby
group to undermine the official IPCC reports. They perceived the Clinton administration
as trying to implement Kyoto policies. Frederick Seitz and Fred Singer are mentioned as
the ‘plan’s advocates’ with an aim to ‘identify, recruit and train a team of five independ-
ent scientists to participate in media outreach’ (NYT, April 26, 1988). Their detractors
hoped that this plan would be undermined by its publication, and people would associate
the fossil fuel lobby tactics with that of the tobacco industry.
One could see the activity of critics of the mainstream science as an important element
of the scientific endeavor, following the norms of science as postulated by Robert Merton
(1973).5 This role is widely accepted during this time period and mainstream scientists
and journalists often use the term ‘so-­called skeptics’ to indicate that these people are not
really performing the role as envisaged by Merton but have a non-­scientific agenda. Of
course, such a claim will, sooner or later, draw the attention to hidden political agendas
on the ‘other side’ in the debate as well.
Lobby groups have also organized skepticism, which is evident from groupings such
as the Global Climate Coalition (1989–2002), the Heartland Institute (founded in 1984)
or the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change  (NIPCC, founded in
2004). Fred Singer, a passionate skeptic in many environmental disputes (Oreskes and
Conway 2012) prepared an NIPCC report called Nature, Not Human Activity, Rules the
Climate, which was published in 2008 by the Heartland Institute. There are several other
skeptical outfits, often called ‘think tanks,’ such as the Cato Institute or the Heritage
Foundation.
McCright and Dunlap (2003) documented the lobbying activities of such conserva-
tive think tanks in the USA. Dunlap was quoted in the NYT with a statement about the
Heartland conference in 2008:

[S]uch events were designed to foster the impression of ‘little Davids battling the Goliath of
the environmental establishment.’ But Dr. Dunlap said such activities were well financed and,
“When you have the full support of some of the wealthiest and most powerful political actors in
the nation, you can hardly be considered to be underdogs. (NYT, March 4, 2008)

Comments like Dunlap’s are mirrored on the other side. In 2005 Republican US
congressman Joe Barton wrote to three leading climate researchers, the head of the
National Science Foundation and Rajendra Pachauri, chairman of the IPCC. Barton
asked for extensive information about their careers, funding and research (Pachauri
2005).

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 182 18/09/2015 11:34

 Climate skepticism  ­183

DENIAL (2001 AND AFTER)

The term ‘denial’ in association with climate change or global warming was used occa-
sionally in the 1990s. Things changed in 2001 after the publication of Bjorn Lomborg’s
book The Skeptical Environmentalist (Lomborg 2001). The NYT printed a largely sym-
pathetic feature on August 7, 2001 under the headline ‘From an unlikely quarter comes
a rare sighting: the eco-­optimist.’ The New Statesman (June 30, 2003) called it ‘perhaps
the most important book about the environment since Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.’
Nature’s book review was less enthusiastic:

The text employs the strategy of those who, for example, argue that gay men aren’t dying of
AIDS, that Jews weren’t singled out by the Nazis for extermination, and so on. ‘Name those
who have died!’ demands a hypothetical critic, who then scorns the discrepancy between those
few we know by name and the unnamed millions we infer. (Pimm and Harvey 2001, p. 149)

The context of the remark is the rate of species extinction, not global warming directly.
Nevertheless, invoking ‘Holocaust denial’ in the debate about Lomborg’s book is cer-
tainly noteworthy.6
This analogy became quite common in the following years, with several high-­profile
commentators putting climate change denial in the same moral category as defending
racism or slavery (O’Neill 2006). Mark Lynas (2006) wrote that climate denial is ‘in a
similar moral category to Holocaust denial’ and envisioned Nuremberg-­style interna-
tional criminal tribunals on those who will be partially but directly responsible for mil-
lions of deaths from starvation, famine and disease in decades ahead.7 The other side
reacted, using again scientific studies to justify their position of wait and see. In a two-­
hour speech on July 28, 2003 on the Senate floor, senator Inhofe famously said: ‘With all
of the hysteria, all of the fear, all of the phony science, could it be that man-­made global
warming is the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people? It sure sounds like
it.’ Inhofe (2003) used a controversial research paper by Willie Soon and Sallie Baliunas
about temperature reconstructions to cast doubt on the rationale for a new climate bill
(the 2003 Climate Stewardship Act, introduced by congressmen McCain and Lieberman,
and modified in 2005 and 2007).
In 2005 congressman Joe  Barton initiated an inquiry into the integrity of Michael
Mann’s influential reconstruction of historic temperature trends (the so-­called ‘hockey
stick’) ‘after two Canadians with no expertise in climate change published academic papers
and opinion articles challenging the study’s methods,’ as NYT journalist Andrew Revkin
put it (NYT, July 18, 2005). Those critics were named as ‘Steven McIntyre, an amateur
statistician and mining consultant, and Ross McKitrick, an economist at the University
of Guelph.’ Barton’s inquiry was termed ‘misguided and illegitimate’ by scientists and
policymakers alike (NYT, July 18, 2005). The following year a panel convened by the
National Academies also investigated the issue. This panel’s report was said to largely
endorse Mann’s assertion ‘that recent warming in the Northern Hemisphere was prob-
ably unrivalled for 1,000 years,’ as the NYT reported under the headline ‘Science panel
backs study on warming climate’ (NYT, June 22, 2006).
This endorsement did not silence the critics, partly because of the development
described in the following section, the emergence of the blogosphere in the mid-­2000s.
At this stage, a large part of the debate moved away from the traditional media where the

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 183 18/09/2015 11:34

 184  Research handbook on climate governance

voices of scientists and skeptics were mediated by journalists to forums where they could
speak directly to their audiences.

‘HOBBYISTS’ AND NEW SOCIAL MEDIA (POST-­2005)

The above newspaper analysis has shown how several points in the debate have been
constant themes over time, and how the issue escalated when international and national
climate policies emerged. It also showed that visible protagonists have remained constant
reference points for news reporters. Others have joined them, some have dropped out
of the frame. The partisan nature of the controversy in the US is a specially enduring
feature.
With the emergence of the blogosphere in the mid-­2000s, skeptical voices found a plat-
form that they could control, becoming in a sense more visible though much less present
in the mainstream press compared to the IPCC and its advocates (Grundmann and Scott
2014).8 Among the most widely read skeptical blogs are Steve McIntyre’s Climate Audit,
Anthony Watts’ Watts Up With That, Joanne Nova’s JoNova and Andrew Montford’s
Bishop Hill—based respectively in Canada, the US, Australia and the UK (mainstream
scientists were at least as early into this space, most notably Realclimate). Many other
skeptical blogs followed; Amelia Sharman (2014) identified 171 such in her mapping
study. These blogs became a focus for the critical evaluation of climate science and
particularly for the dissemination and discussion of ‘climategate’ in 2009 (Grundmann
2012). In David Victor’s typology, the bloggers can be identified as ‘hobbyists.’ But is
that label too an attempt to delegitimize these voices? One could interpret their role
as being part of a ‘citizen science’ project, exemplifying the state of climate science as
post-­normal (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990). But the climate bloggers are not welcomed
as co-­producers of knowledge in the way that, for instance, amateur astronomers or
ornithologists are.
Some mainstream scientists have instead reacted angrily to these bloggers, using
the labels of shills and denialism, also calling them anti-­science (Mann 2014). Other
mainstream scientists, journalists and consensus defenders have set up blogs and use
social media platforms for public outreach, some trying to reclaim the word skeptical
for mainstream science (e.g., www.skepticalscience.com). The more frequent use of the
term ‘denier’ could be a result of this effort. The question of who has a right to comment
and who should be listened to is ubiquitous, and the legitimacy of skeptical voices is
contested. In turn, many skeptical commenters try to delegitimize mainstream science
(Jaspal et al. 2012).

CONCLUSIONS

The climate change discourse shows various stages and forms of dissent. The origins
have been located in the USA of the 1980s, where important frames were defined that
were to shape the unfolding discourse. The meaning of the word ‘skeptic’ changed from a
synonym of legitimate critic to an illegitimate form of dissent. Later the term ‘denier’ was
added, sometimes replacing the label ‘skeptic.’ When new groups of dissenters emerged in

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 184 18/09/2015 11:34

 Climate skepticism  ­185

new social media platforms in the mid-­2000s, one of the most important industry lobby
groups (the Global Climate Coalition) had been disbanded. Ironically, the emphasis on
shilling (and willful denial) became more pronounced as the ‘hobbyist’ movement spread.
Some skeptical climate bloggers have applied the same tactic of questioning the funding
sources of their opponents, the climate change mainstream, accusing their antagonists
of alarmism and fraud, and of pushing a political agenda in the name of science. Much
of the debate therefore revolves around questions such as: who is a legitimate expert on
climate science and who is merely an interested party? Where are the lines drawn between
real expert and fake expert, and who draws them?
And above all, we must ask why this escalation has happened. At this point I can only
offer a speculation. As the dominant discourse gained momentum, attempts increased
to delegitimize skeptical views. The more expert consensus was achieved, the more it was
felt necessary to ostracize the outliers, arguably because the emerging science consensus
achieved little in terms of policy. The NYT came to align much more openly with the
Democrats’ climate policies, as is apparent in several op-­eds after 2006 Nobel laureate
and public intellectual Paul Krugman used the d-­word in connection with the Republican
Party and its climate policy.
Each new escalation—from a benign meaning, to industry shill, to denial—was asso-
ciated with political events. The Kyoto Protocol and its echo in domestic US politics
led to ever more polarization. This became evident in 1997, and again in 2001 when
the Bush government retreated from the Kyoto process. It also appeared after 2005
when Republicans questioned the validity of historical temperature reconstructions for
policymaking. The partisan mobilization of science created a heated public debate where
scientific arguments were often used as proxies for policy arguments. A cross-­national
discourse formation in the English language press ensued, mainly in Australia, the UK
and Canada who also witnessed domestic policy disputes about climate change. It is an
open question if this polarized structure will be replicated through party politics in these
countries too.

NOTES

* I would like to thank Markus Lederer, Brigitte Nerlich, Ruth Dixon, Warren Pearce, Hans von Storch,
Stephen McIntyre and the editors for very useful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this
chapter. All remaining errors are my own.
1. There is another word used for dissenting voices in the climate discourse, ‘contrarian.’ However, only eight
articles in the NYT archive mention the term. My analysis does not include it.
2. For the importance of path dependency in the climate change discourse, see Grundmann and Scott (2014).
3. O’Neill and Boykoff (2010) suggest to reserve the term ‘contrarian’ to this kind of ideological, industry
funded skepticism.
4. ‘So-­called skeptics’ has another meaning, indicating this term is used for the lack of a better word.
5. Interestingly, there is not a single reference in the entire English-­language news archive of LexisNexis to
Robert Merton’s norms of science in articles about climate change/global warming.
6. ‘Denial’ is also used in a less morally laden way, denoting rejection of mainstream science.
7. Lynas has taken down the original webpage where the quote appears but it is still available in the web
archive.
8. There are very few news stories in the NYT archive that mention these blogs (one for McIntyre and three
for Watts. Andrew Montford’s blog Bishop Hill is not mentioned but gets about 80 in the British Daily
Telegraph).

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 185 18/09/2015 11:34

 186  Research handbook on climate governance

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boykoff, M. (2007), Flogging a dead norm? Newspaper coverage of anthropogenic climate change in the
United States and United Kingdom from 2003 to 2006, Area, 39(4), 470–481.
Boykoff, M. and J. Boykoff (2004), Balance as bias: global warming and the US prestige press, Global
Environmental Change, 14, 125–136.
Capstick, S.B. and N.F. Pidgeon (2014), What is climate change scepticism? examination of the concept using a
mixed methods study of the UK public, Global Environmental Change, 24, 389–401.
Cook, J., D. Nuccitelli, S. Green, M. Richardson, B. Winkler, R. Painting, R. Way, P. Jacobs and A. Skuce
(2013), Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic global warming in the scientific literature, Environmental
Research Letters, 8(2).
Fisher, D.R., P. Leifeld and Y. Iwaki (2012), Mapping the ideological networks of American climate politics,
Climatic Change, 116(3–4), 523–545.
Funtowicz, S.O. and J. Ravetz (1990), Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy, Berlin: Springer.
Gelbspan, R. (1997), The Heat is On: The Climate Crisis, the Cover-­Up, the Prescription, New York: Perseus
Books.
Grundmann, R. (2007), Climate change and knowledge politics, Environmental Politics, 16(3), 414–432.
Grundmann, R. (2012), ‘Climategate’ and the scientific ethos, Science, Technology & Human Values, 38(1),
67–93.
Grundmann, R. and R. Krishnamurthy (2010), The discourse of climate change: a corpus-­based approach,
Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines, 4(2), 113–133.
Grundmann, R. and M. Scott (2014), Disputed climate science in the media: do countries matter?, Public
Understanding of Science, 23(2), 220–235.
Hulme, M. (2009), Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and
Opportunity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Inhofe, J. (2003), The Facts and Science of Climate Change, Senate Floor Statement by James M. Inhofe, chairman,
Committee on Environment and Public Works, July 28, www.inhofe.senate.gov/download/?id513658e13-­
daf3-­4012-­aca9-­0a2ac379a1bb&download51 (accessed June 14, 2015).
Jaspal, R., B. Nerlich and N. Koteyko (2012), Contesting science by appealing to its norms: readers discuss
climate science in the Daily Mail, Science Communication, 35(3), 383–410.
Knox-­Hayes, J. (2012), Negotiating climate legislation: policy path dependence and coalition stabilization,
Regulation & Governance, 6(4), 545–567.
Löfstedt, R.E., D. Vogel, O. Renn, D. Slater and M.D. Rogers (2001), The changing character of regulation: a
comparison of Europe and the United States, Risk Analysis, 21(3), 399–405.
Lomborg, B. (2001), The Skeptical Environmentalist, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lynas, M. (2006), https://web.archive.org/web/20080512154243/http://www.marklynas.org/2006/5/19/climate-­
denial-­ads-­to-­air-­on-­us-­national-­television (accessed June 30, 2015).
Mann, M.E. (2014), If you see something, say something, New York Times, January 17, www.nytimes.
com/2014/01/19/opinion/sunday/if-­you-­see-­something-­say-­something.html?_r50 (accessed June 14, 2015).
Martin, S.E. and K.A. Hansen (1998), Newspapers of Record in a Digital Age: From Hot Type to Hot Link,
New York: Greenwood Publishing Group.
McCright, A.M. and R.E. Dunlap (2003), Defeating Kyoto: the conservative movement’s impact on US climate
change policy, Social Problems, 50(3), 348–373.
McGrath, M. (2014), Climate change: models ‘underplay plant CO2 absorption,’ www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-­
environment-­29601644 (accessed October 21, 2014).
Merton, R.K. (1973), The normative structure of science, in N.W. Storer (ed.), The Sociology of Science:
Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 267–273.
O’Neill, B. (2006), Global warming: the chilling effect on free speech, Spiked, www.spiked-­online.com/newsite/
article/1782 (accessed June 14, 2015).
O’Neill, S.J. and M. Boykoff (2010), Climate denier, skeptic, or contrarian?, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(39), E151; author reply E152.
OED (2015), Sceptic | Skeptic, Adj. and N., Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com/view/Entry/172249?redir
ectedFrom5sceptic (accessed April 1, 2015).
Oreskes, N. and E.M. Conway (2012), Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on
Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, London: Bloomsbury.
Pachauri, R. (2005), Climate change: is the US Congress bullying experts? Rajendra Pachauri interviewed by
Quirin Schiermeier, Nature, 436(7047), 7.
Pimm, S. and J. Harvey (2001), No need to worry about the future, Nature, 414(6860), 149–150.
Saad, L. (2014), Republican skepticism toward global warming eases, www.gallup.com/poll/161714/republican-­
skepticism-­global-­warming-­eases.aspx (accessed October 22, 2014).

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 186 18/09/2015 11:34

 Climate skepticism  ­187

Sarewitz, D. (2004), How science makes environmental controversies worse, Environmental Science and Policy,
7(5), 385–403.
Sharman, A. (2014), Mapping the climate sceptical blogosphere, Global Environmental Change, 26, 159–170.
Victor, D.G. (2014), Why Do Smart People Disagree about Facts? Paper given at Scripps
Institution  of  Oceanography, January 29, http://ilar.ucsd.edu/assets/001/505666.pdf (accessed June 30,
2015).

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594 PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 187 18/09/2015 11:34

BACKSTRAND 9781783470594
View publication stats PRINT (M3801) (G).indd 188 18/09/2015 11:34