ARTURO V. ESCALANTE vs.

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS PAULINO

SANTOS
G.R. No. L-36828, February 2, 1932

FACTS:
In 1928, Arturo Escalante was convicted of the offense of estafa under the
then-current Penal Code. He was sentenced to two years, eleven months, and
eleven days in presidio correccional, indemnification in the amount of P4,836.53,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and payment of expenses. In
January 1932, the Revised Penal Code went into effect, which punishes estafa of
less than P6,000.00 with a sentence ranging from arresto mayor in the
maximum degree to prison correctional in the minimum degree, which is four
months and one day to two years and four months in prison.
The Attorney-General submitted a petition for the release of the
petitioner along with computations comparing the terms the petitioner must serve
under the previous and revised penal code. Under the old penal code, the petitioner
should have served two years, five months, and seven days, not including
allowances for good conduct. Under the revised penal code, the petitioner should
have served two years and ten months, with allowances for good conduct deducted.
Escalante had been imprisoned from January 17, 1929, for a total of more than
three years. Therefore, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, the
petitioner is eligible for release for serving longer than the sentence imposed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arturo Escalante is entitled to the retroactive effect of the
Revised Penal Code pursuant to its provision in Article 22.

RULING:
Yes, Escalante is entitled to the retroactive effect of the Revised Penal Code.
The Supreme Court shed some light into the interpretation of Article 22 of the RPC
in relation to Article 366 of the same code, which stipulates that felonies and
misdemeanors that were committed prior to the enactment of the RPC shall still be
punishable under the penal laws existing during the time it is committed like in
Escalante’s case. Articles 22 and 366 respectively states:

ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of
article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
 laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving
the same. With referrence to the application of prior laws, the Code
provides the following:

ART. 366. Application of laws enacted prior to this Code. — Without

prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of this Code,
felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of
effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the
Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission.

The Supreme Court stated that, according to the RPC's drafters, Articles 22
and 366 must be interpreted not only in light of their literal meaning but also
because of the intent of the legislative body that approved Article 22, as understood
by the courts and the authorities tasked with interpreting the same. Consequently, it
is also the intent of Article 366 to grant the retroactivity of penal law to any
individual who may be discovered in the circumstances specified in Article 22.
In addition, the authors of the RPC intended the code to be retroactive
insofar as it would benefit a person convicted of a felony, even if, at the time of its
enactment, a final sentence had already been pronounced and the convict was
already serving it, provided he was not a habitual offender. Thus, even though
Article 366 states that felonies and misdemeanors committed before the RPC's
enactment are to be punished according to the laws in effect at the time of their
commission, as in the petitioner's case, since the clause "without prejudice to the
provisions contained in Article 22 of this Code" was included, it is concluded that
the general principle on the retroactivity of favorable penal laws, as recognized in
Article 22, should be applied.
As a result, the petition for habeas corpus was granted, and the petitioner was
released from custody.