THE UNFINISHED WAR:

KOREA
THE UNFINISHED WAR:
KOREA

Bong Lee

Algora Publishing
New York
 © 2003 by Algora Publishing.
All Rights Reserved.
www.algora.com

No portion of this book (beyond what is permitted by

Sections 107 or 108 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976)
may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the
express written permission of the publisher.
ISBN: 0-87586-217-9 (softcover)
ISBN: 0-87586-218-7 (hardcover)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lee, Bong.
The unfinished war : Korea / by Bong Lee
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-87586-217-9 (soft : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-87586-218-7 (hard cover : alk. paper)
1. Korean War, 1950-1953. 2. Korea—History—1945- I. Title: Korea. II. Title.

DS918.L392 2003
951.904'2—dc21
2003007791

Front Cover: Courtesy National Archives, photo no. 111-SC-354789

LST takes in a load of North Korean refugees at Hungnam, North Korea on
December 12, 1950. — This is how author’s family and some 90,000 other North
Koreans, trapped in the Hanhung-Hungnam area, escaped.

Printed in the United States

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface 1
1. THUS I T BEGAN 3
Korea, the Hermit Kingdom 5
Korean Nationalists 7
2 . THE LEE FAMILY UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION 17
Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire — World War II 19
3. THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING 23
Kim Il Sung Makes an Entrance 27
4. AMERICANS IN SOUTH KOREA 29
5. NORTH KOREANS DISCOVER COMMUNISM 39
6. CHAOS IN SOUTH KOREA 49
MacArthur in Japan 57
7. PRELUDE TO A HOT WAR 61
8. ON A RAINY SUNDAY ACROSS THE 38TH PARALLEL 73
Reactions of Washington 78
9. THE ROK ARMY ON THE BRINK OF DISINTEGRATION 83
MacArthur in Suwon 86
Tactical Errors All Around 88
10. AN UGLY WAR 91
11. THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS 101
12. MAO’S THOUGHT IN BEIJING 123
13. THE INCHON LANDING AND ITS AFTERMATH 131
14. CHINESE TRAPS 143
15. A BRAND NEW BALL GAME 159

VII
16. REFUGEE STORIES 171
The Plight of Refugees and Massacres of Innocent Civilians 180
17. AN OLD SOLDIER FADES AWAY, A NEW ONE STEPS IN 185
18. THE WAY WE SURVIVED THE WAR 193
19. A TALKING WAR 199
20. THE TORTUOUS PATH TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT 215
21. SOUTH KOREA AFTER THE CEASEFIRE 233
Two Schoolgirls 239
22. NORTH KOREA NOW 247
23. OLD WAR, NEW CRISIS 257
The Nuclear Weapons Development Program 257
The Sunshine Policy 267
Military Provocations 269
What Next 273
Index 277

VIII
PREFACE

I was a teenager in 1950 when one of the most atrocious wars in history
started in Korea. Some memories are better forgotten. But in 1997, I had the urge
to revisit that bewildering war.
I was impressed to see how many new facts have come into the public
domain after the declassification of some Korean War-related documents in the
U.S., and some formerly classified documents that trickled out of Russia; and
there were several new books published in South Korea exposing the dark side
of war. When I left South Korea in 1961 to study in New York, censorship was
still in force; all the new materials and fresh perspectives piqued my interest.
However, most books in English do not provide Korean perspectives. The
background to the War usually seems cryptic, and the narrative ends abruptly
with the signing of ceasefire documents in 1953. I decided to write a book that
fills these gaps and provides a cross-cultural perspective, reflecting the latest
available documentary evidence and, at the same time, incorporating the
experiences of my own family and other Koreans who lived through the war.
Prior to starting my research for the book, I had spent over twenty years in
different Asian countries working for the Asian Development Bank, the United
Nations, and the Ford Foundation. Most of this time was spent studying
countries, and appraising and post evaluating the success and failure of
economic development projects — their causes, costs, benefits, and lessons for
the future. It did not take me long to realize that even evaluating the successes
and failures of the Korean War would not be simple because the allies (South
Korea, the U.S., and European allies) had different objectives, and these

1
 The Unfinished War

objectives shifted in the middle of the war from stopping the Communist
invasion of South Korea to a total victory by invading North Korea. Furthermore,
the Korean War was part of a larger war, the Cold War, in which the objective of
the U.S. was to stop the spread of Communism.
However, this book is not an academic research work designed to show
who won the war or who started it. I have simply tried to present the time, the
war, and the people by sharing the concrete, personal realities as I and others in
the book experienced them and as I found them in the historical record. I have
tried to show human sides of the war as well as the military, diplomatic, and
political sides. The book provides extensive accounts of the events leading up to
the war and examines the new kind of war that started immediately after the
ceasefire agreement was signed. It puts into perspective recent developments
such as President Bush’s remark on the “axis of evil,” North Korea’s nuclear
weapons development program, and the rise of anti-American sentiments in
South Korea. The book might offend some American readers — on the left as
well as the right, but it presents the truth as I see it. Although I have ventured to
offer my own views and interpretations here and there, in most cases, facts and
events speak for themselves.
I would like to acknowledge and thank my siblings, relatives, and other
Koreans for sharing their stories as soldiers, prisoners of war, and refugees. A
particular mention needs to be made to my elder brother, Dr. Simon (Jong Koo)
Lee, M.D., who wrote a significant portion of the manuscript on the accounts of
the war that he and his classmates experienced as students, soldiers and refugees
both in the North and the South. I am also indebted to many historians and
veterans who have provided rich accounts of the Korean War.

2
1. THUS IT BEGAN

On a Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, I was thirteen years old, and was at
my school in Hamhung, North Korea, cleaning the schoolyard. I had close-
cropped black hair like any other Korean schoolboy. People who knew my family
told me that I had fair skin just like my mother. Because of my fair skin and soft
facial features, a classmate teased me that I looked like the princess in a play that
the whole class had seen together several days before. I did not appreciate the
comparison, and got into a bit of a scuffle with him.
I am not sure why I was cleaning the schoolyard that day in particular, but
I was often asked to do it, especially on Sundays. My family was Catholic, and
my parents thought that the school wanted to keep me away from church. The
North Korean Constitution provided for religious freedom as well as the freedom
of speech but, as in so many other things, that seems to have been stated for the
benefit of the outside world, not for us. On that morning, the yard was spotlessly
clean. I just pretended to pick up some loose gravel.
About 10:00 a.m., I noticed several people talking to each other around the
bulletin board that stood beside the school gate, to display government
announcements. Most times, the school caretaker just pasted newspapers on the
board and the people hardly noticed them. The gathering in front of the bulletin
board that morning was unusually large, and I had never seen people actually
stand there, talking. I decided to take a look, and sidled up beside the adults; I
squeezed in and, standing on my toes, read the notice.
The news released that morning by the government was indeed something
to talk about. “In the early morning of June 25, the South Korean Puppet armies

3
 The Unfinished War

crossed the 38th parallel [separating the two Koreas], penetrating between 1 to 2
km north of the 38th parallel. The People’s Democratic Government of Korea
[North Korean Government] ordered the border guards to repulse Rhee’s
Puppet armies immediately.” The North Korean official news warned ominously,
“The Puppet Government will have to bear the sole responsibility for this
unprovoked attack.” Later on the same day, however, another bulletin was
posted, indicating, “The Border Guard and the Inmin-gun [the People’s Army]
repulsed the invading Puppet armies, and have advanced between 5 and 10 km to
the south of the 38th parallel.” This was certainly a quick turn of events.
That is how the war started for me. I was confused, and a little alarmed.
Could this be true? Only a few days before, I had overheard my father, Dr. Myung
Hoon Lee, a professor of medicine at the Hamhung Medical School, talk about a
South Korean broadcast in which a South Korean Army general by the name of
Kim Suk-won boasted, “If the South Korean Army decided to attack North
Korea, we would have breakfast in Sariwon, lunch in Pyongyang [the North
Korean capital], and dinner in Sinuiju [northwestern city on the bank of the Yalu
River bordering China].”
While I was trying to digest all this, my father and elder brother Simon [his
Christian name], a young man of seventeen years, were listening to the one and
only radio broadcast in North Korea.
My “reactionary” father received the first announcement on the war with
elation, thinking that the unification of Korea was finally near, but when he
heard the second report, he was in disbelief. These announcements heralded the
start of a war. At this time Simon was enthusiastically looking forward to
college. He was the best student and all-around athlete in his class. His entrance
to a good college was assured; the only but significant blemish on his resume was
that his father was a member of the intelligentsia, not of the proletariat. The
children of proletarian families had the first pick of schools. The bourgeois had
no chance, but the children of the intelligentsia had some.
In any case, a deadly shooting war had begun in which millions would soon
be embroiled. America decided to intervene in the war, and it would eventually
result in some 136,937 casualties including 25,801 deaths — over 30,000
according to the casualty-count of the U.S. Department of Defense. South Korea
suffered a staggering 257,000 military casualties and 860,000 civilian casualties.
Over a half million houses were incinerated or blasted by bombs, and four
million refugees abandoned their homes to cross the battle lines with nothing
but what they could carry in their hands and on their backs.

4
 1. Thus It Began

Who started such a reckless war between fellow countrymen? Most people
have decided that the Communists started the war. However, there is still
considerable debate as to who precipitated the conflict; and at least in two
countries, inquiries into such a question are hazardous. The Los Angeles Times
(February 3, 2002) reported that a Hong Kong-based historian was sentenced to
thirteen years in prison for releasing classified papers indicating that the
Communist side invaded South Korea first.
The world is accustomed to hearing such outrageous stories coming out of
the Republic of China (PRC) from time to time; it is still a Communist state and
an ally of North Korea. However, it may surprise most people that some
Americans and South Koreans believe that the Communists did not start the
war. Leftist American journalist I. F. Stone published a book (The Hidden Story of
the Korean War) in 1952, speculating that President Syngman Rhee, the first
president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), deliberately provoked North Korea to
a war so that the U.S. would come to the rescue and defeat the Communists.
Some South Korean leftists have come up with similar theories. Then there is the
familiar accusation that the U.S. government provoked the war deliberately to
benefit the “military-industrial complex” and the U.S. economy; and the
respected American historian Bruce Cumings has also said that North Korea did
not start the war.
Why did the war start and why did the U.S. get entangled in it? Obviously,
war would not have broken out if Korea had not been divided into North and
South by the superpowers. However, the role of superpowers in Korea has
deeper roots than most people realize.

KOREA, THE HERMIT KINGDOM

The first contact between the U.S. and Korea goes back to the time of
gunboat diplomacy in the 19th century when Western warships prowled the
coasts of Africa and Asia in search of trade — if not a colony. Korea was known
as the Hermit Kingdom because of its stubborn resistance to open the door to
foreign trade. China had reluctantly opened her door to the British after the
Opium War (1839–42). Commodore Matthew Perry and his “black ship”
persuaded Japan to open up in 1853–54. However, Korea managed to keep the
foreign powers out for decades longer.

5
 The Unfinished War

The British and French sent gunboats demanding that Korea open its ports,
but they withdrew after small skirmishes with Korean defenders. Western
historians called Korea’s closed-door policy xenophobic, but Korea had its
reasons. Although Korea did not have historical reasons to fear Western
warships, it feared the West’s culture as well as its military power. The
Confucian scholars who ruled the Chosun Kingdom, also known as the Yi
Dynasty, saw nothing good that could come from opening up to the “barbarians”
who dug up their sacred ancestral tombs in search of loot and tried to spread the
religion of “devil worship,” as Christianity was called at that time. To the
Confucians, desecration of ancestral graves was execrable, heinous conduct; and
commerce, trade and industry were of little value to them because they were
entirely preoccupied with moral issues and the maintenance of the social
hierarchy.
It was in 1866 that America first attempted to open Korea for trade. The
American merchant schooner General Sherman sailed up the Taedong River from
the Yellow Sea to the present North Korean capital of Pyongyang. If Korea had
opened her arms and signed a treaty with the U.S., as Japan had done twelve
years earlier, it is conceivable that Korea — like Japan — might have emerged as
a modern nation earlier. However, the Korean court and society were not ready
for that. Instead, the Koreans who gathered on the bank of the river were
shaking their fists. The crew of the General Sherman, consisting of the British,
Chinese, and Americans, opened fire against the crowd on the shore. The
Koreans destroyed the schooner and killed all the crew.
America was outraged. They took revenge in a raid that took place in 1871.
Marines landed on the beaches of the west coast island of Kanghwa, which
guarded the waterway to Seoul, and attacked several forts defended by Korean
“tiger fighters.” The defenders fought ferociously, even with their outdated
weapons, but all 650 died in the end. Commander Low was quoted to have said
that the Koreans fought back with a courage “rarely equaled or exceeded by any
people.” If the raiding party was meant to take revenge against the killing of the
crew on board the General Sherman, the objective was achieved; but if it was
meant to open up Korea, the mission failed.
The Koreans might have taken a measure of pride in fighting off the
Americans, but in hindsight, opening their country at this juncture might have
saved Korea from decades of humiliation and oppression under the Japanese. In
1876 (only five years after the U.S. Marines withdrew from the Kanghwa Island),
Korea’s ancient antagonist Japan came sailing in with her own warships. Just 22

6
 1. Thus It Began

years after Admiral Perry’s “black ships” opened Japan, she had already built tall
warships and was flexing her muscles.
Japan demanded that Korea open its ports for trade. King Kojong’s advisors
of the Chosun Dynasty (1392–1910) debated the merits and demerits, and
thought that this time it was indeed necessary to create an opening to Japan. A
Japanese gunboat anchored menacingly at what is now Inchon. Having risen to
the throne at age twelve, the king was accustomed to relying on his wife, Queen
Min, to attend to the affairs of the kingdom. She was only a year older than her
husband, but took a keen interest in the kingdom’s affairs. She opened two of
Korea’s ports to Japan in 1876.
Japan moved cautiously toward Korea; China was the Chosun Kingdom’s
suzerain. An armed invasion of Korea would bring in the Chinese armies.
Suzerainty was a convenient relationship for Korea. Once a year, emissaries of
the two countries visited one another’s capitals with wagonloads of local
products. Chinese emissaries were not allowed to stray from a designated road
while traveling between Beijing and Seoul. Yet, because of this suzerainty, Korea
could count on China to come to its defense in case Japan or any other country
invaded it.
In 1894, Queen Min invited China to send troops to counter Japan’s
growing interference in Korea’s internal affairs, but the Chinese fleet was
decimated by the Japanese Navy in what is known as the Sino-Japanese War of
1894. Queen Min then decided to play Russia against Japan. Russia coveted
Korea’s warm-water ports giving direct access to the Pacific. Russia’s port,
Vladivostok, froze over during the winter.
Japan then decided to take on Russia. Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909),
mastermind of the Japanese strategy, had conceived of a Japanese Pacific empire
long ago while he was studying in Europe. Like many of his ancestors, Ito was
convinced that the stepping-stone for Japan’s invasion of the Asian continent
had to be Korea. He knew that Russia was an obstacle to his master plan, and
Queen Min’s diplomatic maneuvering had to be stopped.

KOREAN NATIONALISTS

The growing domination of Japan and the assassination of Queen Min

gave rise to the Korean nationalists movement. Among those who resisted the
Japanese, three persons stand out because of their lasting impact on Korean

7
 The Unfinished War

history including the Korean War. In fact, their thoughts survived the Korean
War and their death; and are still in the hearts and minds of the Koreans today.
They are Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku, and Kim Il Sung.
Rhee was born in 1875, a year before Korea opened its two ports to Japan.
Rhee was born in an impoverished yangban family.1 Yangban, which literally
translates to “two elite classes,” consisted of the literary and military elites
during the Yi dynasty. Anyone could become yangban by passing competitive
state examinations that were open to all, but during the latter period of the Yi
dynasty, most yangban inherited the status from their ancestors.
Rhee was nineteen when he was exposed to Christianity, which had by
then made significant inroads in Korea. He entered the Paijai Academy (founded
by the American Methodist Mission) to learn English. The principal and
teachers were American missionaries. Once there, he was fascinated with
democracy and the Western history and within a year, he was editing a student
newspaper. Under the influence of the Western teachers, Rhee wrote about the
need for political and social changes, reformed monarchy, and even the
emancipation of women.
In 1895, he was shocked by the assassination of Queen Min. The king’s life
was spared but he was placed under virtual arrest, and the Japanese installed a
pro-Japanese cabinet. Rhee was outraged and took part in an attempted coup
d’etat against the pro-Japanese cabinet, and became a wanted man. The reform
of the monarchy became secondary goal to getting rid of the Japanese influence
from Korea.
Eventually, he was arrested and sent to prison, at the age of 22, and ended
up spending seven year in prison. In 1904, Japan mounted a surprise attack on
the Russian fleet at Port Arthur (Dalian, China), in what is known as the Russo-
Japanese War. Japan emerged victorious. A faction of the Korean government
realized that Korea could no longer maintain a semblance of independence by
playing Russia off Japan. It released Rhee from prison for a mission to the U.S.
His mission was to invoke the U.S.-Korea Friendship Treaty signed in 1885 to
ward off Japan’s growing domination over Korea. It was a long shot at best but
now that China and Russia had both failed to protect Korea, America was the
next possible protector for Korea. Rhee was considered a good candidate for the

1. Robert R. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd Mead and
Company, 1955), hereafter “Oliver.”

8
 1. Thus It Began

mission because of his command of English, and connections with U.S.

missionaries who might be able to help him in the endeavor.
Little funding was available for such a dubious mission, and Rhee was
given just enough to travel to Kobe, Japan. Once there, he solicited the Korean
community, sympathetic to Korean independence, for funds so that he could
travel to San Francisco. He raised more money there, and went on to
Washington, D.C.
Bruce Cumings provides many revealing insights into the context in which
the mission was launched.2 The U.S. had no particular interest in saving Korea
from Japanese colonialism. Roosevelt’s main objective in Asia was to maintain
U.S. control over the Philippines, which the U.S. took from Spain after the
Spanish-American War of 1898. Roosevelt admired the Japanese and accepted
his advisers’ judgment that the Koreans were “unfit” for self-government.
According to Cumings, most Americans supported Japan’s colonization of
Korea. One “progressive” wrote that Japan was a “rising star of human self-
control and enlightenment,” and that the Chinese and the Koreans were “horrid”
races. Another person called Japan the “enlightened, anointed bearer of white
civilization” in the curious guise of a “yellow people.”
After defeating Russia, there was nothing to stop Japan from a complete
takeover of Korea. On November 17, 1905, Ito forced the Protectorate Treaty on
the Korean ministers, at gunpoint. Koreans denounced it bitterly as fraud. The
means by which Japan took over Korea created a generation of anti-Japanese
Koreans. Several high-ranking officials committed suicide.
In the U.S., Rhee managed to see President Theodore Roosevelt at Oyster
Bay in the summer of 1905. Roosevelt listened politely, but at the end of the
meeting, he said, “I will be glad to do everything I can on behalf of your country,
but such a request must come through the official diplomatic channels,” that is,
from the Japanese embassy. Rhee’s mission had failed. After all, this was the age
of colonialism and the U.S. had her own flirtation with the European invention.
In fact, after the Russo-Japanese War, a diplomatic note (the Taft-Katsura
Agreement) was exchanged between the U.S. and Japan, in which the U.S.
recognized Japanese interests in Korea and southern China in exchange for
Japan not challenging the U.S. in the Philippines. Neither the Koreans nor

2. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York and London:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), pp. 141-154, hereafter Cumings.

9
 The Unfinished War

American missionaries who tried to help Rhee’s diplomatic mission had any
inkling about this.
After Rhee's failed mission, the Methodist Mission Board, which had been
helping Rhee to establish contact with government officials, offered to support
his education in the U.S. For the following five years, Rhee studied theology at
George Washington University, earned a master’s degree in history and political
science at Harvard, and received a Ph.D. in political science at Princeton. He thus
became the first Korean to receive his doctoral degree in the U.S.
In 1910, Korea was formally annexed to Japan. This was the end of the 600-
year Yi dynasty. After the annexation and the failed nationwide independence
movement on March 1, 1919, many Korean patriots left Korea and established the
Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in the French Concession of Shanghai.
Dr. Rhee was elected president of the KPG in absentia. It was at this time that
the Korean nationalists began to be split between those like Rhee, who favored
expelling the Japanese through diplomatic efforts, and others who favored the
use of force.3
Kim Ku4 was another patriot galvanized by Japanese aggression. Although
he ended up in the KPG, his path was entirely different from Rhee’s. Kim was
born a commoner. As a youth, he failed in his ambition to pass the examination
and become a yangban.5 Then he joined the Tonghakt movement (its religious
doctrine combined certain aspects of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and
Catholicism) and became one of the rebel leader. The founder wished not only to
spread his doctrine but also to establish a nation based on it in the southwestern
part of Korea. The government naturally saw this as a seditious movement and
squashed it. He then
When Japanese soldiers murdered Queen Min in 1896, Kim Ku went on a
one-man mission to avenge her death and, at an inn at Inchon, he attacked and
killed a Japanese man (whom he suspected was one of the killers), and then
drank his blood in full view of a crowd of bystanders. This Japanese spoke

3. Yi Tong Whi, who fled to Manchuria after the disbanding of the Korean Army,
became the first defense minister of the KPG and later its premier. He tried to fill the high
positions in the KPG with his fellow Communists and favored military action with Soviet
backing.
4. His biography was prepared by Do Jin Sul, based on Kim Ku’s diaries: Baikbum Ilji
(Seoul: Dolbegae, 1997).
5. His family could not afford to hire a good tutor or to buy brushes and rice paper.
Although the yangban class was technically open to all, the system favored those who had
money.

10
 1. Thus It Began

Korean with a discernible accent, and he was dressed as a Korean but hid a
Japanese long sword under his robe. The victim turned out to be Lieutenant
Suchida of the Japanese army. Whether or not he had anything to do with the
assassination of Queen Min was never established. The Japanese at that time had
extraterritorial rights, and while the Japanese police pretended to make an effort
to apprehend the killer(s), they quietly allowed the case to go cold.
After the killing, Kim Ku asked the innkeeper to bring him paper and a
brush. He wrote down his name and address for the police. He wanted to make a
political statement. They showed up about three months later and arrested him.
The police interrogated and tortured him; Kim fainted three times but refused to
open his mouth. One day, the time to make a statement had arrived. Here was a
Korean who was rumored to have killed a Japanese officer with his bare hands,
then to have drunk the Japanese blood and eaten a ton of rice after the killing.
Many people came out to watch the trial.
A police interrogator asked, “Did you kill a Japanese at Chiha-po [the old
name for Inchon]?”
Kim replied, “I killed a Japanese in retaliation for the murder of the nation’s
mother.”
This sent a shock wave throughout the entire interrogation room. Kim Ku
was being tried as a common murderer rather than as a political assassin. When
a Japanese policeman asked his translator what was going on, Kim Ku cursed
him, shouting, “You, Japanese bastard! Does the Treaty of Friendship permit the
Japanese to kill the Korean queen? I will kill your emperor and every last
Japanese. If I am not alive, my ghost will kill your emperor!”
In view of the serious political implications, the interrogators stopped the
trial and sent a messenger to the commissioner to take over.
When the trial resumed, Kim spoke directly to Commissioner Yi Jae-
chung, saying, “I killed a Japanese because I was ashamed of my shadow in broad
daylight. While they killed our mother, I have not heard any Korean talk about
killing the Japanese emperor. You are now wearing a mourning costume, but
have you not read Confucius’s Chunchu Daeui? If you have not avenged the death
of your king, you do not wear a mourning costume. How could you serve the
king if you look after your own position, power, and wealth first?”
Apparently, Commissioner Yi Jae-chung was taken aback, although he had
a job to do. The trial was adjourned. During the investigation period that
followed, Kim Ku was treated with deference. Many Inchon citizens brought
food and drink to his jail room. One rich and influential Korean went bankrupt

11
 The Unfinished War

after making several appeals to the Korean court on his behalf. However, after
full investigation, Kim Ku was sentenced to death; but on the day of his
execution, King Kojong’s adviser noted the unusual nature of the case and the
king intervened to stay the execution. Contrary to the expectations of some
people, however, Kim was not released.
After two years, not seeing any change in his legal status, he broke out of
the prison and lived under a false name.
On March 1, 1919, Kim Ku was asked to join in a nationwide movement
declaring the independence of Korea from Japan. Korean nationalists had drafted
a Declaration of Independence patterned after the American version. The
decision to declare independence was inspired by President Woodrow Wilson’s
famous assertion of the right to self-determination for national groups (at the
Peace Conference for drafting of the Treaty of Versailles). Around the same time,
Lenin also called on the world to support independence movements among the
“oppressed peoples” of the world.
Koreans believed that the claim to independence would put international
pressure on Japan. Nearly two million students, ordinary people and Christians
joined in the independence march. Japan took note, firing into a group of
Koreans singing Christian hymns. Later, Christian leaders were nailed to
wooden crosses and left to die slowly so that they could “go to heaven,” as the
Japanese scoffed. Mounted policemen beheaded young schoolchildren. The
police burned down churches. The official count of casualties was about 500
killed, 1,400 injured and 13,000 arrested. Korean estimates were much higher:
over 7,500 deaths, about 15,000 injured and 45,000 arrested.
The world was appalled and foreign nations, including the U.S., withdrew
their diplomatic missions from Seoul. However, nobody was willing to go
beyond such a diplomatic protest. Korean patriots left Korea and dispersed to
different parts of the world. Kim Ku, having few illusions by this time, did not
even participate in the march.
He went to Shanghai to join the Korean Provisional Government (KPG).
His first position in the KPG was as Chief of Police. After the KPG split into pro-
Communist and non-Communist factions, Kim Ku was approached by General
Yi to join his socialist revolutionary group, but Kim refused, not necessarily on
ideological ground but because he did not like the idea of receiving directives
from Lenin. After the departure of Yi Tong Whi and Rhee, Kim Ku emerged as
the leader of the much-diminished KPG. The armed resistance against the
Japanese was shifting to the pro-Soviet faction of nationalists in Manchuria and

12
 1. Thus It Began

Siberia. Ironically, Yi Tong Whi was assassinated by a Communist in

Vladivostok.
Kim Ku, with few men and weapons to fight the Japanese, decided to
concentrate on assassinating key Japanese figures. The first major strike was
delivered by a patriotic young man by the name of Yi Bong Chan, who was
dispatched to Tokyo with a bomb. Yi threw the bomb at a car carrying the
Japanese emperor, but the bomb was too weak to blow up the car. Attempts
were also made against Baron Tanaka, who had drawn up a blueprint to conquer
the world, and the first Japanese Governor-General of Korea.
One of the most successful operations involved Yun Bong-Gil. On April 28,
1932, he threw a bomb at a group of Japanese generals and dignitaries in a victory
ceremony staged in Hingkew Park. A Chinese munitions factory made the bomb;
this time, they made sure it was strong enough to avoid another embarrassment.
Several Japanese generals were killed and scores of others were wounded,
including the Japanese minister to China, General Shirakawa. (This is where he
lost his leg, so that on board the U.S. warship Missouri in 1945, he had to limp as
he walked to sign the surrender document. By that time, he was the Minister of
Foreign Affairs.)
Dr. Rhee disapproved of such tactics and thought they would play into the
Japanese propaganda that Koreans needed to be held in strict subjugation. From
Honolulu, he sent a confidential message ordering that such activities be
discontinued. Rhee received reluctant assurances in response. However, Koreans
needed a release from oppression and found terrorism one of the few means at
their disposal.
The bombing incident inspired the Korean community, and financial
support poured in. However, the Japanese reprisal was swift and relentless. Kim
Ku became a credible nationalist in the eyes of the Chinese, who fought the
Japanese invaders. Chiang Kai-shek welcomed Kim’s group in Nanjing. Kim Ku
formed a Korean Liberation Army of several hundred men to fight the Japanese.
In 1941, the KPG declared war on Japan. In 1942, he formally asked China, the
U.S. and Britain to recognize the KPG. In 1943, Kim Ku formed a special-forces
unit of the Liberation Army in conjunction with a detachment of the U.S. Office
of Strategic Service in China. While the mission was in the planning stages,
Japan surrendered.
For all his activities, Kim Ku was called “The Assassin” by the Japanese and
later by Americans, although he is known as a nationalist to Koreans. According

13
 The Unfinished War

to young South Koreans today, he is the most respected figure in the history of
Korea.
Compared to Rhee or Kim Ku, Kim Il Sung, who later became known as the
“Great Leader” of North Korea, was relatively unknown. As the American
historian Joseph Goulden notes in his excellent book Korea: The Untold Story of the
War, the original material had “the inherent credibility of, say, 1930s Hollywood
fan magazines.”6 There are many biographies of Kim Il Sung in Korean, of course;
the problem is how to find one’s way through the maze of blatant propaganda.
This much we know: Kim Il Sung was born in April 1912, in a rural area
outside Pyongyang. His original name was Kim Song-joo; he adopted the name of
Kim Il Sung, a legendary guerilla leader who was much older than him. The
original Kim Il Sung was about 30 years older than Kim Song-joo/Kim Il Sung.
The young Kim Il Sung was a relatively minor guerilla leader in the period
under discussion.7 According to one account, he was said to have scored his
biggest victory in 1940. His force of about 250 men at its peak virtually wiped
out a Japanese Special Police unit of 70 men commanded by Lieutenant Maeda
Takeshi. Japanese newspapers treated the incident as no more than a skirmish
between a small band of outlaws and the police. Most of the “bandits” were
captured, and the remainder of them fled north, according to the Japanese
source. The Kim Il Sung’s band of guerillas was part of a Chinese and North
Korean partisan group known as the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army.
In the mid-1930s, there were some 30,000 of them in the Army. By 1941,
however, most of the partisan fighters had been destroyed. In March 1941,
General Nozoe of the Japanese Army declared the end of the war against the
anti-Japanese guerrillas in Manchuria and disbanded his unit. Nozoe claimed to
have eliminated some 15,000 Chinese and Korean guerrillas from 1932 to 1941.
Kim Il Sung and his remnants were the survivors that fled to Siberia. On March
15, 1941, the Soviets conscripted Kim Il Sung and his men into the 88th Special
Independent Guerrilla Brigade of the Soviet Red Army, with the task of
gathering military intelligence in Manchuria. Kim Il Sung ended up commanding
the 1st Battalion, consisting of about 200 men, mostly Chinese, with about 60
Koreans.

6. Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books,
1982), p.11, hereafter Goulden.
7. Robert Scalopino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea: The Movement (Berkeley,
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1972), p. 228, hereafter Scalopino
and Lee.

14
 1. Thus It Began

According to high-ranking North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop,8 Kim

Il Sung used to talk about his battles with the Japanese as a modest effort,
“better than doing nothing.”9 Early on, when he spoke of his past in a more
humble and credible way, Kim Il Sung acknowledged that he had served under
the Soviet Army; but later on, when the cult of Kim Il Sung began to be created,
even such a fact was denied. North Korean playwrights wanted to assert a linear,
homogeneous evolution of his family from the mythical king Tangun some 5000
years ago10 to the present day. Kim Il Sung considered that his service under the
Russian army and the birth of his son Kim Jong Il in Russia were blemishes that
had to be erased.

8. Hwang was the former secretary of the North Korean Worker’s Party in charge of
international affairs and was ideological secretary to Kim Il Sung before his defection to
South Korea in 1997.
9. Hwang Jang-yop, Euduun-ui Pyon-e Dwen Hatbyol-un Euduum-ul Balkil-su
Upda (in Korean only, The Sunshine That Became Part of Darkness Cannot Bring Light to The Dark-
ness) (Seoul: Wolgan Chosun Sa, 2001), hereafter Hwang.
10. According to Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms), compiled by 13th
century Chinese historian Iryon, the Korean kingdom unfolded when a son of the
Emperor in heaven descended on the Korean peninsula and married a woman who turned
human from a she-bear and gave birth to Tangun. To Iryon, who was a Buddhist monk,
there might not have been anything unnatural in an animal becoming human. His text is
the source of most of the legends of ancient Korea.

15
2. THE LEE FAMILY UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION
Korean families can trace their lineages for many generations because most
clans maintain books of genealogy (jokbo). My grandfather, 14 generations
removed from a king, owned a medium-sized farm in a village called Seosan, in
the South Chungchong Province. Kings’ descendants are numerous in Korea,
although not all Lees are descendants of Yi dynasty kings. (Yi is another spelling
for Lee.) One of his ancestors had converted to Catholicism and moved to this
remote countryside to avoid religious persecution.11 Although not all Yi dynasty
kings persecuted Christians, one wave of persecution in 1866 killed over eight
thousand Catholics who refused to denounce Jesus. This was about half of the
Korean Catholics at that time.
After primary school, my father wanted to go to Seoul to receive his
secondary education, but few families could afford to send a second son away for
schooling; and in any case he was needed to attend to the farming. However, he
was a top student and had no intention of spending the rest of his life in the
paddy fields, so he took some pocket money and made his way to Seoul, by foot,
oxcart and train.

11. One highly controversial issue at the time was the chesa ceremony, which
involved paying annual visits to ancestral graves to offer food and drinks, and spending
time at the grave. Korean Catholics inquired of the Bishop in China whether they could
participate in the chesa rites; he considered them to be against the First Commandment:
“Thou shalt have no other gods before Me.” Confucian scholars and government officials,
often one and the same, perceived this anti-chesa ruling as a threat to the moral founda-
tion of Korean Confucian society.

17
 The Unfinished War

Once in Seoul, he showed up at the dormitory of a Catholic Church. The

priest listened to the young man, and opened the door.
Apparently, he was talented and determined. After his secondary school, he
was one of only ten Korean students to be admitted to the Medical School of the
Imperial University. This was the only university at that time. Originally, the
university was established for the Japanese living in Korea, but they began to
admit a small number of gifted Korean students each year with the advent of the
so-called Enlightened Administration.12
Mostly children of rich and privileged families entered the university, but
father was neither. He completed the six-year medical school with money he
earned by tutoring children of rich Korean families. During the Japanese
occupation, farmers were losing ground in every sense. Taxes took an average of
half their crops. Many small farmers were forced to abandon their farms; almost
half of Korean farmers had to become either tenant farmers or “fire-field people”
who burned forest, planted crops, and moved on when the soils are exhausted of
nutrients. Japanese became large landlords. Many Korean farmers lost their land
when they failed to respond quickly to a nationwide land ownership survey
(cadastre) conducted by the Japanese authority.
Mother’s maiden name was Oh; her given name was Boon Yong, which
translates to “outraged” — a strange name for a woman. Her mother had given
birth to daughter after daughter, and she was the fifth in a row. Her father
thought that by showing his indignation through his daughter’s name, his luck
would change.
Boon Yong’s father was a rich landlord in Hwang Gan in South
Chungcheong Province and had a large house with three gates in the Kahwae-
dong district of Seoul, where some of the richest Koreans lived. My father was
hired to tutor Boon Yong and her siblings, especially her brother. Boon Yong fell
in love. Luckily, her father also had an eye on the young student from the
Imperial University. He was not a yangban but had a promising future ahead of
him as a doctor. This is how they met.
He thought that perhaps the rich father-in-law might help him open a
medical practice after his graduation. That did not actually come to pass, as
Confucian traditions encourage families to support their sons and send their

12. This “Enlightened” ploy was a result of the strong international condemnation of
Japan for the way it brutally suppressed the nonviolent March One Independence Move-
ment.

18
 2. The Lee Family Under Japanese Occupation

daughters away to join other families. Boon Yong had a surprise, too — she
discovered, after the wedding, that father had married young, in the village,
before, and had children. This was a shock, although for a man to have a second
or even a third wife was common at that time. However, father had gone through
a civil divorce, which was enough for Boon Yong.

OUT OF THE FRYING PAN, INTO THE FIRE — WORLD WAR II

Upon his graduation, Dr. Lee worked as an assistant professor at the

Medical College in Daegu, and then took a job as director of the Ear, Nose and
Throat (ENT) Department of a new general hospital in Sariwon. That is where
we were living in 1941, when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. My brother Simon
was ten years old and I was five. My sister Hyon-ja was seven and our youngest
brother, Hyo-ku, was two. In 1942, everyone in town was offered a free pair of
rubber shoes; I heard that it was to celebrate the conquest of Malaya by the
Japanese Army. In hindsight, it was the high point of the Pacific War, from the
Japanese point of view. As the war dragged on, rice and sugar were rationed.
During the last years of the Pacific War, Japan was preparing for the fight to the
last man, and even Korean school children were being prepared for it.
Gradually, it became clear that the war was not going well for Japan. All
the classes, including second graders like me, were led to a mountain at the
outskirts of the city for several days. This time, it was not a class picnic; they
worked to cut down pine trees and extract roots and knots. Oil from pine roots
was used to clean airplane engines. During these months, it seems, Japan was
running out of fuel and war materials, and there were other signs that Japan
might soon lose the war.
Some Korean men went looking for work and some others were drafted in
the Japanese Army. Young women also left for Japan to work in factories and
hospitals, but it later became known that they ended up in what the Japanese
called Teishintai (comfort women brigades). It was a long time before this
shocking news came out, because the women did not talk about their shameful
experiences after they returned home. Not only Koreans but also young girls
from Taiwan, China and other parts of Asia (with the exception of Japan) were
sent to the front to service Japanese soldiers.
Korean-American journalist Connie Kang wrote, “As a colonizer, the
Japanese were ingenious, petty, determined, and greedy in pursuing their

19
 The Unfinished War

goals[.] Farmers were forced to sell the best crops — fruits, vegetables, and
especially Korean rice . . . at artificially low prices to Japan, . . . [then] were
ordered to make their rice go far by mixing it with a substance called daedubak,
the residue left over after the oil is squeezed out of soybeans, which tasted like
saw dust.”13 She goes on to say, “Venereal disease was rampant among Japanese
soldiers, so a decision was made to provide them with virgins.” Some girls in
Korea dressed like boys and wore farmers’ straw hats when they went outdoors.
Although abductions took place mostly in rural areas, everyone was afraid.
Altogether, some 100,000 Korean girls were taken away, according to Kang.

On August 12, 1945, the Japanese governor of South Pyongyan Province,

where Pyongyang is located, listened to a short-wave radio broadcast from San
Francisco, which announced that Japanese surrender was imminent.14 The
governor decided to contact Cho Man Shik, who was a prominent nationalist in
North Korea. Cho had the reputation of being the Korean Gandhi. He had
graduated from Meiji University in Japan and was a Christian elder and a
political moderate residing in Pyongyang. The Japanese provincial governor was
concerned with the safety of the Japanese after the surrender of Japan, and
requested Cho to maintain peace and order in the event that Japan
surrendered.15 Cho agreed and later created the Security Maintenance
Committee for South Pyongan Province.
On August 15, Japan surrendered. Most Koreans (including Simon), who
heard the Japanese Emperor’s squeaky voice offering his surrender to the Allies
in difficult-to-understand Japanese, could not quite understand its immediate
implications. They were rather afraid to show their joy, as Japanese police still
seemed to be in charge. It was rumored that Soviet forces were rapidly marching
south, but they did not enter Sariwon until August 26 or so. Most of the
Japanese left the Sariwon area by train. Koreans pulled down Shinto shrines and
danced in the streets. In the jubilation that followed, children saw the Korean
flag for the first time.

13. Kang, K. Connie, Home was the land of morning CALM: A Saga of a Korean-American
Family (Reading, Mass. and elsewhere: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company) 1995, p.56,
hereafter Kang.
14. This account, provided originally by Yoshio Morita in 1964, is cited in Scalopino
and Lee (1972), p. 314, hereafter Morita.
15. Morita, pp. 182-183, in Scalopino and Lee (1972), p. 314.

20
 2. The Lee Family Under Japanese Occupation

On August 26, the Soviet Military Command announced that the Soviet
occupation army would maintain law and order jointly with South Pyongan
Province Preparatory Committee under Cho Man Shick. Only two out of 20
members of the committee were Communists and this composition was a fair
reflection of the strength of Communists and non-Communists in North Korea
at that time.16
Children found out for the first time that there had been Korean alphabets
all along, called Hangul, invented several hundred years ago by King Sae-jong the
Great of the Yi dynasty. They did not know about this because its use as well as
Korean history and flag had been forbidden by the Japanese. In an attempt to
eradicate it, leading scholars in the Korean Language Society were arrested on
charges of being nationalists and some of them died in prison after torture.
Novelists, poets and other creative writers were ordered to produce their works
in Japanese, and in the end, the Japanese language was used in the schools.
Japan also began to take metal products out of Korea. Over 50 percent of
mining production was in gold. In 1936, gold production reached over 17,000
tons a year. The Japanese needed it to buy oil, metal and machinery for the war.
Other valuable mineral products taken out of Korea for the war were iron,
tungsten, graphite, magnetite and molybdenum. Moreover, as the fighting grew
more intense, the Japanese forcibly conscripted more than 700,000 Koreans to
work in coal mines and in munitions factories in Japan, as well as to serve as
soldiers in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands.

16. This was the view of one of the two Communist committee members, Han Chae-
dok, who later defected to South Korea. See Scalopino and Lee, p. 315.

21
3. THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING
Several days later, Koreans in Sariwon saw columns of Russian soldiers
coming down Main Street from the north. This was quite a spectacle. The
soldiers were covered in dust. Apparently they hadn’t had a change of clothing
for some time. Most were on foot, but there were some green trucks with the
mark of GMC (no one knew what that stood for). The trucks were part of the
war supply given to Russia by Americans under the Lend Lease Act. They were
provided to the U.S.S.R — to fight the Germans and the Japanese. Who could
have guessed that these would be used by Inmin-gun later to slaughter American
soldiers?
The Russian soldiers’ reputations preceded them. They were said to be
robbing men on the street and raping Korean women. It has been said that most
of the Russian 25th army, which came rushing down the Korean peninsula,
consisted of previous prisoners kept in Siberia. Toward the end of World War II,
the rank and file of the Russian army had been severely depleted,17 and as a
result, prisoners were conscripted. Korean women took to men’s disguises again,
to avoid being raped.
Some Russian soldiers demanded watches from pedestrians and other
things. We learned that watches were particularly rare and valuable in the
U.S.S.R. Some of the Russians were well educated. One day, a Russian officer, a
medical doctor, called on Dr. Lee because there was no one who spoke Russian
in the town. It turns out that both doctors spoke German, so they were able to
converse.

17. Musashiya, p. 36.

23
 The Unfinished War

The Russian medical officer visited Dr. Lee regularly and discussed the
condition of his hospital. The Russian provided some medical supplies that the
hospital sorely lacked.
The toughest task that the Russians faced in Korea was not fighting the
Japanese but dismantling factories, machinery and power plants built by the
Japanese, to transport to Russia as war booty. Some three thousand soldiers,
trucks and heavy equipment were used at the Supung Hydroelectric Power
Plant alone. They also dismantled a steel plant in Chongjin, mining machinery at
Gaechun, a high-frequency equipment factory at Sungjin, etc. However, the
Russians were careful not to dismantle all the power generators at Supung.
Otherwise, much of Korea would have been left in the dark.
Koreans did not understand why the Russians were there. If anybody had
the right to be in Korea, it was the Americans who had defeated the Japanese.
However, most Koreans expected that the fall of Japan would automatically
bring about liberation, and independence, to Korea without any foreign
occupation forces.
The Russian troops moving south stopped at the 38th parallel and the
Americans occupied Korea below this line. Koreans did not know the
significance of the 38th parallel until much later. An author compared the
absurdity of drawing an arbitrary line such as this to a hypothetical situation of
drawing the 36th parallel to divide America in half: “It would separate Nashville
from Memphis and Oklahoma City from Tulsa. Raleigh-Durham and
Greensboro-Winston-Salem would be turned into opposing border cities in the
middle of North Carolina.”18 Even more outrageous was the fact that this
artificial line drawn without the knowledge of Koreans (let alone their
participation) hardened over time. Millions would die because of it.
The decision on the 38th parallel was made on August 10, 1945, five days
before the Japanese surrendered. The decision flew out of the Yalta Secret
Meeting between the U.S. and USSR, in which the U.S. invited the Soviets to
fight the Japanese army in Manchuria and Korea in return for certain
concessions. President Franklin Roosevelt and others who negotiated the deal
seemed not to have had any idea that their action was about to unleash one of the
greatest human tragedies in the 20th century. The agreement was classified for a
long period, and few Koreans knew about it. Now, most Koreans consider that

18. Pierre Rigoulot in his Introduction to Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot,
Aquariums of Pyongyang (Basic Books: New York, 2001), p. viii, hereafter Kang and Rigoulot.

24
 3. The Russians Are Coming

Roosevelt’s decision showed a callous disregard for the Korean people and a
willingness to sacrifice a small nation in the interest of saving the lives of
American soldiers.
The irony is the Russian army did not even make a move until after the first
atomic bomb was dropped on August 6, 1945, and the Japanese military
retreated in panic. At that time, the nearest American soldiers were on Okinawa,
about 600 miles from the Korean peninsula. The U.S. wanted to stop the Soviet
advance before it reached the southern end of the peninsula. The Yalta
Conference did not specify how far south the Soviet army should march, only
that there should be a trusteeship government involving the U.S. and the USSR
to rule Korea for a period of time. John J. McCloy of the War and Navy
Coordinating Committee directed two young colonels, Dean Rusk and Charles
H. Bonesteel, to find a place to stop the Soviets. They did not even have a Korean
map, let alone any knowledge of Korean geography or history. They had in their
possession a Far East map. The 38th parallel appeared to be a fair division in
terms of the landmass involved. Rusk and Bonesteel reported to their boss that
the Soviets should be told to stop at the 38th parallel, and the Soviets did so.
Thus the infamous 38th parallel was drawn. (See Figure 1.)
In February, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt did what he thought
was in the best interest of the America. The Yalta Conference, where Roosevelt
and Stalin met, was held over ten days from February 4–14, 1945. Some
historians point out that when Roosevelt sailed to Yalta, he was ill and his brain
was partly damaged by a stroke he had suffered the previous summer. According
to Frazier Hunt, Roosevelt “was a dying man” and “undependable” with “his
already handicapped mind inflamed with grandiose ideas of a World State that
he would head.”19 A radical New Dealer, Harry Hopkins, and State Department
liberals surrounded him. Even Alger Hiss, a Communist spy skillfully planted in
the State Department, was in the party. While Hopkins was not a Communist,
he believed in being generous with Stalin so that Stalin would be grateful to the
U.S. — all at the expense of other nations, of course.20
In return for the USSR opening a second front against Japan, Roosevelt
offered the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands north of Japan. In
addition, it was agreed that Port Arthur (the present Dalian) would be

19. Frazier Hunt, The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur (The Devin-Adair Company:
New York, 1954), pp. 379-380.
20. See ibid, pp. 380-81.

25
 The Unfinished War

internationalized and leased to the USSR as a naval base; and the Chinese
Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provided an outlet
to Port Arthur, would be operated by a joint Soviet-Chinese company. The
twenty-odd U.S. diplomats gathered at the meeting in 1945 did not question the
right of the U.S. to give away parts of China, an ally of the U.S. during the fight
against Japan, to the USSR. Whatever American liberalism meant at that time, it
was liberal with other countries’ real estate. To give away parts of Japan, which
was about to be conquered, would have been a different matter altogether — but
why Manchuria?

America’s ally China under Chiang Kai-shek was not even represented at
the meeting. Korean nationalists had no idea that such a meeting had been held.
It did not concern Korea, on paper; but the involvement of Soviet troops in the

26
 3. The Russians Are Coming

Pacific War turned out to be a matter of life and death for millions of Koreans
later on. The meeting was so secret that even General MacArthur, who was in
charge of invading Japan, had no idea that such a meeting had taken place.

KIM IL SUNG MAKES AN ENTRANCE

Kim Il Sung and his entourage, consisting of about 40 of his former guerrilla
fighters, landed at the port of Wonsan onboard the Soviet warship Pugachev a
month after the surrender of Japan, on September 19, 1945. About a month later,
on October 14, 1945, Kim Il Sung and his Soviet advisers were given a hero’s
welcome at the Pyongyang Municipal Stadium. Everyone in the stadium and
those who saw the picture of a young Kim Il Sung with senior Russian military
officers behind him on the podium understood that he was being anointed as a
North Korean leader by the USSR.
Rumors were circulating in the town that Kim Il Sung was a major in the
Russian Army and was pretending to have been a legendary hero by the name of
Kim Il Sung. Such suspicion was natural; most Koreans were expecting a gray-
haired man of Syngman Rhee’s age. Instead, here was a young man, about 30
years old, with a Russian military haircut and an ill-fitting Western suit. The
natural reaction of the audience was that this was a fake Kim Il Sung. Some
people described Kim Il Sung as having a Chinese waiter’s haircut, and others
said that he looked like a boxer. Kim first got off a Russian ship wearing a
Russian army uniform with the insignia of major or captain. According to a
person who wrote several propaganda books for Kim Il Sung before defecting to
South Korea, he attached the title of “General” to Kim because he did not know
what to call him.21 “Major” was hardly an adequate title for the leader of a nation.
The people in the stadium felt cheated, and were angry.22 What Kim Il
Sung said on that occasion was also very disappointing to Koreans: He praised
the “heroic struggle” of the Red Army for liberating the 30 million Korean people,
when everybody knew that it was the Americans who had fought the Japanese
island by island and dropped A-bombs on Japan. Kim used extremely servile
words in thanking Marshal Stalin. This was not what the people expected to
hear from a legendary guerilla fighter against the Japanese army.

21. Han Chae-dok.

22. See O Yong-jinn, Hang-up Jung-un (An Eyewitness) (Posen, 1952), pp. 111-114.

27
 The Unfinished War

Even the Soviets were not sure that Kim could assemble enough supporters
to rally North Korea behind the USSR. Given Kim’s limited political experience,
they angled to make the veteran Cho Man-sheik the titular head of North Korea.
He was not a Communist, but he could be dispensed with in due course just as
Leon Trotsky had been. General Romanenko implored Cho to support Moscow
and offered him the presidency of North Korea in exchange for his support of
Russia. Cho declined.
It was no secret that many Korean guerilla fighters, including Kim Il Sung,
joined Chinese or Russian armies to fight the Japanese. The enemies of Japan
were the friends of Korean nationalists. This was natural gravitation. America
was too far away and the Roosevelt Administration was not sympathetic to
Korean independence.
To the vast majority of the Koreans, however, Communism was a foreign
idea. What concerned Koreans most were the Japanese. As the people began to
learn about Communism, some four and half million Koreans (about 30 percent
of the North Korean population) crossed over the 38th parallel to the south
before the Korean War broke out. Contrary to the claims of some liberal
historians, this was more than just a handful of landlords who had grudges
against the Communists.

28
4. AMERICANS IN SOUTH KOREA

In South Korea, the 7th Infantry Division of the U.S. 6th Army Corps landed
at the port of Inchon on September 8, 1945, and entered Seoul the following day
amid what Korean newspapers called a sea of people welcoming the U.S. troops.
They celebrated in cities and villages everywhere, shouting, “Mansei!” (“Ten
thousand years” or “Long live Korea!”). Maj. General John R. Hodge, the
commander of the 6th Army Corps, led the landing party. They were grateful to
the Americans for defeating the Japanese and returning Korea to the Koreans. So
they thought.
On the U.S. Army’s first day in South Korea, however, Koreans received
some discouraging news. General Hodge had granted the request of the Japanese
Governor General Abe Nobuyuki in Korea to retain his authority over Koreans in
order to protect Japanese troops and civilians who had not yet retreated
homeward. Goulden said that when dejected Koreans questioned why Hodge
was permitting this, he remarked privately that Koreans were “breeds of the
same cat as the Japanese.” Historians have said that Hodge was a brilliant
battlefield commander, but a tactless man unsuited for delicate diplomacy.
Hodge’s claim to his new job in Korea was neither his knowledge of Korea nor
his diplomatic skill but that he happened to have been near Korea when Japan
fell. From the point of view of Koreans, they were being treated worse than the
Japanese, the ones who had been defeated by America. Hodge then quickly set
up the U.S. Army Military Government (USAMG). Koreans began to wonder
whether they had been liberated or colonized again by a white race with high
noses.

29
 The Unfinished War

According to Kang, another of Hodge’s decisions that touched the raw

nerves of the Koreans was his orders to his American soldiers not to accept any
food from Koreans. Koreans were insulted that Americans refused their
hospitality, although Hodge tried to explain that this was because Korea did not
have enough food. The Koreans, whose pride was already crippled by the
ruthless and insulting Japanese occupation, suspected that the refusal to accept
their foods was a reflection of the sanitary conditions in Korea.

Dr. Syngman Rhee arrived in Seoul on October 28, 1945, amid enthusiastic
crowds of Koreans. Rhee was the symbol of the nation’s struggles against Japan
for nearly half a century. He spoke Korean with an American accent. Some
Koreans remarked that his tongue had hardened because he spoke English for so
many years; yet, his reputation was such that even the South Korean Communist
Party leader, Park Hung Yong, offered his party organization to Rhee and the
moderate left-wing leader, Yeo Un-hyong, offered his party as well. Rhee
declined both offers. Rhee was then 69 years old, but in exceptionally good
health. General Hodge welcomed Rhee in a historic ceremony in which he urged
all Koreans to accept Rhee as their leader; it seemed that the U.S. was behind
him.
This reception had more to do with MacArthur than the U.S. government.
In Washington, D.C., Rhee had been received by the State Department as
anything but a Korean leader. Immediately after Japan’s surrender, Rhee had
gone to the State Department asking for recognition as the head of the Korean
government, by virtue of his title as High Commissioner of Korea. The State
Department, however, did not recognize the KPG and therefore considered that
Rhee represented no one. Furthermore, State Department officials considered
Rhee to be too old to be taken seriously. Even after Rhee managed to return to
Seoul, President Truman made it known that the U.S. would not favor him or
any other individual.
Kim Ku, who had killed Japanese Lieutenant Suchida, also returned to
Korea, from China, but even later than Rhee, on November 23, 1945. He arrived
with a group of followers, which an American journalist called “a flotilla of paid
gunmen and concubines.” To the Japanese, he was “the Assassin,” and American
knowledge of Kim Ku as well as Korea was largely based on information and
perceptions from the Japanese. Upon Kim Ku’s arrival, the first thing that Hodge
did was to force him to sign a statement promising that he would not install the
KPG in Seoul.

30
 4. Americans in South Korea

However, Kim Ku turned out to be a huge headache for Hodge. Neither

Hodge nor the other Americans in the USAMG spoke Korean or knew Korean
history, and they depended on interpreters. Kim Ku called for the dismissal of all
the officials that had been appointed by the interpreters. He insisted that pro-
Japanese individuals and national traitors under the Japanese military
government who had gone into hiding had now come out to buy off the
interpreters so they could get positions in the U.S. military government, the
district government and the police. He said, “We must clean out all these people,
and at the same time, stop this spirit of dependence on foreign countries.” This
was tantamount to sabotage, as far as Hodge was concerned.
Hodge’s immediate mission was to install a trusteeship government over
Korea. The idea for an interim government under superpower tutelage was first
discussed in November 1943 in the Cairo Conference among President
Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. The U.S.
was the first to propose it. The idea was for Korea to go through a period of
tutelage before gaining independence. The British were the least interested in
giving independence to Korea or any other former colony.23 Of course, to the
British, giving independence to a colony, whether in Asia or Africa, would
establish an unwanted precedent for its colonies all over the world. Chiang went
along with the U.S. proposal, and Roosevelt’s view prevailed. Another issue was
when to grant Korea independence after a period of tutelage. The first U.S.
position, drafted by Harry Hopkins of the State Department, suggested “at the
earliest possible moment”; Roosevelt corrected it to “in the proper moment”; and
Churchill changed it to “in due course.”24 Churchill carried the day.
The U.S. Secretary of State Department Cordell Hull thought that the
phrase “in due course” was inappropriate, considering that the Koreans wanted
immediate freedom. Hull’s concern was well placed. When the text of the Cairo
agreement was released, the Koreans who were preparing to celebrate in
Chunking, China cancelled the celebration. The embarrassed KPG translated “in
due course” into something that suggested “immediately”; this reassured its
followers that independence was in the offing. Rhee, in Hawaii, was not sure. He

23. Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics 1940-1950: An Evolution of American Responsi-
bility (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 17-18.
24. This and other discussions at the Cairo Conference are well documented by
Korean historian Kim Gae-dong, in Hanbando-ui Bundan-gwa Cheonjaeng (Division of The
Korean Peninsula and The Korean War) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2000), pp. 36-
41, hereafter Kim.

31
 The Unfinished War

wrote to the State Department asking for clarification, but they did not bother to
reply.
Roosevelt apparently envisaged a few decades of “tutelage”;25 he said that it
had taken the Philippines 50 years to gain independence, but that between 20
and 30 years might be enough in the case of Korea. Two years later, February
1945, at Yalta, the trusteeship issue was discussed with Stalin. Roosevelt
proposed that the USSR should be a party in the administration of the
trusteeship government! Roosevelt had not even read the State Department
position paper on the trusteeship, which advocated that the U.S. should take a
dominant position in the post-war administration of Korea and that the USSR
would not be a good partner.
Hodge soon found out that Kim Ku, Rhee and most other nationalists were
dead set against trusteeship. To Hodge, the Koreans, who had nothing, were
inappropriately full of pride. Initially, the left wing was against the trusteeship
also, but suddenly switched its position, apparently seeing trusteeship as an
opportunity for the Communists to gain control over Korea.
On December 29, 1945, the Big Three foreign ministers of the U.S., USSR
and Britain met in Moscow to discuss trusteeship and the establishment of a
provisional government. The South Korean people demonstrated relentlessly
against trusteeship. To Koreans who prided themselves on their history as a
nation with a succession of Korean kingdoms dating back for over 3000 years,
the idea of tutelage sounded all too similar to the Japan’s takeover of Korea under
the pretext of reform and modernization.
Song Chin U, who was the head of the Korean Democratic Party, was the
only major non-Communist Korean political party supporting the trusteeship.
He was assassinated and Kim Ku was the suspect, although his involvement was
not proven. Then Kim Ku called a nationwide strike and ordered all Korean
employees of the USAMG to take orders from him. Kim Ku demanded
immediate recognition of the KPG. On December 30, 1945, Kim Ku was hauled
into Hodge’s office and told that the U.S. would kill him if he “double-crossed”
Hodge again. Kim Ku threatened to commit suicide in Hodge’s office.
In Seoul, stores and businesses closed and the employees of the USAMG
went on strike. Demonstrations then spread throughout the whole country.
General Hodge sent his troops into the streets to crush the “mobs.” Some 50

25. Harry S. Truman, Memoir, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday &
Company, 1956) p. 317, hereafter Truman.

32
 4. Americans in South Korea

years later, U.S. Army historians still do not seem to understand why Koreans
did not accept the trusteeship. A U.S. Army historian, James F. Schnabel, who
wrote a Korean War history in 1992, said, “The fanatic Korean dislike for
trusteeship meanwhile continued to foment resistance…”26 [emphasis added].
As chaos spread in the streets of Seoul, Communist agitation was on the
rise. Hodge needed a strong police chief. One of the persons to come to his
attention was Chang Taek-sang. Chang was born the son of a very rich and
powerful yangban. Hodge had no use for a yangban, but Chang was Western-
educated — the University of Edinburgh — and spoke fluent English. He also
had acceptable credentials as a nationalist. In 1992, Chang’s daughter Chang
Byung Hae (a former history professor in history and linguistics and the author
of several books) wrote his biography.
Chang was seventeen and studying in Japan, when Korea was annexed by
Japan (1910). He left in anger and went to England. For several years in Europe,
he represented the KPG. Upon his return to Korea some twenty years later,
Chang refused to collaborate with the Japanese and spent time in the family
business, writing poems, practicing Chinese choreography, and collecting
Korean antiques — a typical lifestyle of a yangban.
At that time, the police were the only armed group in the hands of Koreans.
Chang’s friends advised him against taking the job. “What could an English
gentleman like you and a yangban scholar do in a police force?” The perception of
a policeman at that time was one who tortured and killed suspected criminals.
Yet, Chang took the job because he was appalled by the assassination of his close
friend and political ally Song Chin U, and the appalling general lawlessness.
At that time, the South Korean Communist Party under Park Hun Yong
was actively agitating against anti-Communist groups. To make the matter
worse, the USAMG recognized the Communist Party (called the South Korean
Worker’s Party) as a legitimate political party and gave it equal time on the
radio. The Communist Party, therefore, openly propagandized its views and
organized Communist guerillas in different parts of South Korea.
Chang’s first test as the new Chief of the Capital Police came on January 18,
1946, just eight days after he took office. That evening, he arrived home after a
late dinner meeting with the press. The emergency telephone rang near
midnight. Fighting had broken out between the Communist and anti-

26. Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington D.C.: Center for Military History,
United States Army, 1992), p. 26.

33
 The Unfinished War

Communist groups, and the Communists opened fire, killing fifteen anti-
Communist youths.
Chang Taek-sang went to the scene of the shooting immediately. There
were bloodstains on the white snow and several injured female students were
still lying on the snow-covered ground. He mobilized the reluctant police, and
after a three-hour fire fight, overwhelmed the leftist youth headquarters at dawn
and captured 600 students, and confiscated weapons. This was the first time the
police had acted decisively and it sent a message to the Communists that
Chang’s police force would fight them. Previously, the Capital District Police
had avoided getting involved in the struggle between the left and the right.
A campaign to eliminate all the “people’s committees” in South Korea went
into full swing. By 1946, it succeeded in disbanding most of the People’s
Committees in South Korea. An exception was the island province of Cheju.
In May 1946, Chang Taek-sang found evidence of large-scale currency
counterfeiting at a printing press used by the Communist Party. Finally, the
USAMG put out an order for the arrest of leftist leaders. The Communist Party
then went underground. By this time, a large amount of counterfeit currency was
in circulation. Apparently, the Communist comrades in Moscow and Pyongyang
thought they could finance a revolution using several blocks of metal plates.
During the counterfeiting trial, some 10,000 Communists surrounded the
court and shouted, “Down with Chang Taek-sang! Down with the police!” The
police also discovered that nearly 100 of the rifles they confiscated from the
leftists were from a Japanese Army division that had surrendered to the Russian
Army. This incident exposed yet another lie the Communists had been telling:
that the Russians did not assist the South Korean Communist Party.
As the Communist threat intensified, Chang began to hire former Japanese
policemen for the police force. He knew that this was a controversial tactic, but
he saw little chance that his green police force would improve without the
infusion of experienced policemen. The downside of this decision was the
inheritance of the Japanese police tactics. The ensuing crackdown on the
Communists enraged the Russians.
One day, Russian Ambassador to North Korea General Terentii Shtykov
criticized Chang in a meeting held in Seoul, saying, “The South Korean Police is
rehiring Korean policemen who served under the Japanese military government.
They killed numerous Korean patriots and independence fighters. These
policemen are using the same barbaric means to suppress the masses. Aren’t you
the primary person responsible for this?”

34
 4. Americans in South Korea

Chang replied, “Don’t you know that Lenin, whom you respect so much,
used the old Imperial Russian policemen after the revolution? Policemen are
basically technicians. If you are not an ignorant man, you will know that I am
telling the truth.”
Shtykov fell speechless. American high officials who were present during
these heated debates were impressed. Apparently, the several weeks that he
spent in St. Petersburg talking to Korean nationalists on his way to Scotland and
reading through the history of the Russian Revolution had not been wasted.

Dr. Rhee actively lobbied against trusteeship by writing to influential

Americans and government agencies in the U.S. The relationship of General
Hodge and Dr. Rhee began to deteriorate over the issue. To Hodge, Rhee was
acting as if he were the Korean people’s leader, but Hodge did not think Rhee
was anybody’s leader since he had not been elected to any position. Furthermore,
Dr. Rhee could not be elected to any position as long as the USAMG was
running South Korea.
In June 1946, Hodge came up with an idea for establishing an Interim
Assembly consisting of 45 elected members — thinking that leftists and
Communists would have a fair share of representation in an election. The
Assembly was to play only an advisory role in the USAMG. Rhee won an
overwhelming majority in the election. Forty three out of 45 turned out to be
support the anti-Communist positions of Rhee and Kim Ku. This went contrary
to Hodge’s plan for building a broad coalition of left- and right-wing politicians.
Hodge then added 45 non-elected members recommended by leftist groups “in
order to give a representative character to the Interim Assembly.”
In spite of some leftist propaganda to the contrary, this was the true
representation of the will of the people. A popular daily newspaper Donga Ilbo
commissioned a public opinion poll, which took place on July 23, 1946, asking
Seoul citizens, “Who will be the first president of Korea?”27 The result indicated
that South Koreans at that time expected Dr. Rhee to be their president: he had
29 percent, while his nearest rival Kim Ku had 11 percent.28 Communist leader
Park Hun Yong hardly had any supporters, just one percent. He later went to
North Korea and became Vice Premier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Describing Rhee during this period, a biographer of MacArthur, William

27. It covered 6,671 passers-by on four street corners in different sections of Seoul.
28. See Oliver, p. 370. The result of the poll showed:

35
 The Unfinished War

Manchester, said that both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee were “despots,” and
for the U.S. “there was little to choose between them.”29 However, it is
important to understand that Syngman Rhee was not a despot at this time. In
fact, he had not even been elected to any position and had had little chance to
show his colors.
Rhee protested to Hodge for including the 45 non-elected leftists in the
Assembly. At the end of a bitter session, Rhee said he would appeal to higher
authorities. In 1947, he went to Washington and argued that the idea of
trusteeship should be dropped and Hodge should be removed. However, the
State Department had another plan.
On October 16, 1947, the U.S. proposed to hold elections in both “zones of
Korea” before March 31, 1948, under U.N. supervision, and the U.N. Temporary
Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was created to carry out the election. In April
1948, Dr. Rhee supported the U.S. proposal for a national election under the
supervision of the UNTCOK, but the USSR felt that the U.S. and its allies
dominated it. The fact of the matter was that Rhee would have easily won the
election if a free and fair election was held. North Korea immediately declared
that it would not participate in the election. Kim Ku did not support Dr. Rhee’s
willingness to accept a general election even if the North did not participate in it.
Kim Ku feared that separate elections by South and North would perpetuate the
division of Korea and might lead to war.
In hindsight, he was right; but neither Kim’s plan nor Rhee’s would have
made much difference as far as the perpetuation of the division was concerned.
As pointed out in a top secret CIA report submitted to President Truman on
February 20, 1948 (but recently declassified), the Soviet Union had been
planning to create a separate state in North Korea patterned after the USSR.
North Korea had already drafted and announced the “provisional constitution of
Korea” and had been busy staging a Communist-instigated strike in South
Korea. During the review of the Inmin-gun at Pyongyang, the CIA noted that
North Korea had announced, “this army would be the liberator of the ‘oppressed’
South Koreans.” In the CIA’s opinion, there was little doubt that the Kremlin
was preparing for a war.
In the meantime, Rhee demanded that the agreements at Yalta and
Moscow be nullified, thus doing away with both the 38th parallel and the

29. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (Boston and
Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), pp. 539, hereafter Manchester.

36
 4. Americans in South Korea

trusteeship, and that an independent transitional government be established

immediately. Kim Ku, however, sought to bring about an accord between the left
and the right to achieve unification of the peninsula.
Kim Ku went to North Korea to discuss unification with Kim Il Sung. The
Communists rejected every proposal made by Kim Ku’s delegation, which
included establishing a democratic government, recognizing private property,
holding a nationwide election and not allowing any foreign military base within
the Korean peninsula. Kim Il Sung did insist on the immediate withdrawal of all
foreign troops and called for the differences between the North and the South to
be resolved by and among Koreans.
Notwithstanding this setback, upon his return to the South, Kim Ku
continued to oppose holding a general election without North Korean
participation. However, elections took place in South Korea on May 10, 1948.
The election brought out 80 percent of South Koreans to elect the members of
the National Assembly, which, in turn, elected Rhee as the first president of the
Republic of Korea (ROK) on May 31. North Koreans did not recognize the
election. General Hodge decided to resign rather than to work with Rhee. This
was welcome news for Rhee.
In 1949, an assassin, Ahn Tu-hui, killed Kim Ku. Ahn was a lieutenant in
the ROK Army at the time. Ahn claimed to have killed Kim Ku because Kim was
surrounded by Communists and would have ruined the country. However, later
he implicated the ROK army, saying that he had been influenced by the head of
their Anti-Espionage Unit. This story had many twists and turns, even
implicating Rhee, and the whole truth may never be known.30 Today, few
Koreans believe that Kim Ku was a Communist. He was not only anti-Japanese
and anti-trusteeship, but also pro-unification at any cost. Traditionally, most
South Koreans concluded that such a position was reckless and unrealistic, but
recently his thought has gained popularity among the younger generations of
South Koreans.
The U.S. Military Government in Korea was not an exemplary good model
of military occupation, perhaps because American generals and soldiers have

30. Ahn implicated Rhee and Shin on September 23, 1992, but to confuse the matter
further, two days later, on September 25, 1992, he repudiated his confession, and said that
he alone was responsible for killing Kim Ku. He claimed that his earlier testimony had
been made under duress. There is a videotape supporting the assertion that he was under
the pressure of the Kim Ku’s followers who kidnapped Ahn. In fact, one of them, Mr.
Kwon, was arrested and convicted for kidnapping Ahn.

37
 The Unfinished War

never been trained in such an art. It went on persisting with the trusteeship
decision made at the Yalta Conference, over Korean objections. As an occupation
force in Korea, the U.S. was naïve and arrogant; however, it was not cruel,
cunning and exploitative like the Japanese. For these reasons, most Koreans did
not hate Americans (although ultra nationalists such as Kim Ku apparently did).

38
5. NORTH KOREANS DISCOVER COMMUNISM

After the Soviet occupation of North Korea, the status of the landless and
common laborers improved overnight, while the life of the landlords and
“Japanese collaborators” turned into a nightmare. What was so remarkable
about the North Korean land reform was that threshold level for confiscation
was so low. In March, 1946, Kim confiscated land without compensation and
distributed it to the landless and to tenant farmers. Any land in excess of five
hectares (11 acres) owned by a family was considered ill-gotten, secured through
exploitative means. The entire property would be confiscated and the family was
required to leave the village for some distant location. Such a low acreage
threshold was not typical either in Russia or its satellites.31
For families of the intelligentsia such as the Lee family, the change was not
dramatic at first. Initially, Dr. Myong Hoon Lee was promoted from Director of
the Ear, Nose and Throat Department to Director General of the Hwanghae
Provincial Hospital. The promotion was merit based: he was the most senior
Korean doctor with full academic credentials. His first challenge was an
attempted Russian take-over of the hospital. This was one of two general
hospitals in the province. The Russians had already taken over the other general
hospital at Haeju as a military compound for the occupying Russian troops and
now ordered the evacuation of the Sariwon general hospital as well.

31. Such a low acreage threshold and confiscation without any compensation was
unprecedented. According to Kim, the landowners were bourgeois, enemies of the people,
and did not deserve any compensation.

39
 The Unfinished War

The Russians had a reputation for brutality and Koreans believed that they
would shoot to death anyone disobeying their orders. In the provincial general
hospitals of Pyongyang and Haeju, nurses and other medical staff abandoned
their posts immediately when the Russians announced that they were moving
in. However, the medical staff of the Sariwon provincial general hospital refused
to evacuate the patients, claiming that it was the only remaining general hospital
in the province. Finally, after a few tries the Russians decided to avoid a national
incident and occupied the local school instead. The school had neither beds nor
running water. Perhaps the Russians were not as brutal as many persons had
feared.
As an occupation force, the Soviets knew what it was doing. In February,
1946, the Russians helped Kim Il Sung create the North Korean Interim People’s
Committee. Kim chaired the Committee although neither he nor the other
committee members were elected. It was clear that they derived their power
from the Soviet occupation army. No one could speak out against these
Communist leaders or openly advocate holding an election. Some intellectuals
and priests began to disappear; it was assumed that the authorities had sent
them off to labor camps or simply executed them. No one could find out their
whereabouts. Kim Il Sung then nationalized large industries, banks and
railways, most of which had been previously owned by the Japanese, and
Communist Party members took over their management. At this time, the
private ownership of retail shops, personal and business services still remained
in the hands of individuals. There were private practice doctors.
In August, two political parties were created: the Worker’s Party and the
Democratic Party. The people were given the opportunity to choose a party to
join. As the head of the government hospital, Dr. Lee was expected to join the
Worker’s Party but he joined the Democratic Party led by Cho Man Shik. His
decision proved to be costly and life threatening.
What troubled the Soviets most about Cho was that he, like most
nationalists, was against the trusteeship form of government. The Soviets tried
to change Cho’s position, and when he continued to resist, the Soviets stripped
him of all official titles, including the chairmanship of the South Pyongan
Province People’s Political Committee. Cho was then arrested and confined to
the Koryo Hotel. After a while, he just disappeared. No one has ever found out
what happened to him.
A Communist replaced Cho as the head of the Korean Democratic Party,
and Kim Il Sung allowed the Democratic Party to exist — perhaps just to show

40
 5. North Koreans Discover Communism

the world that North Koreans had the freedom to choose political parties. Yet, he
had no more intention of allowing dissent in North Korea than Stalin did in
Russia. Political enemies were removed through periodic purges. In fact, some
people suspected that the Democratic Party was created to flush out those
North Koreans who opposed the Communists. Members of the Democratic
Party were placed on a watch list.
Dr. Lee’s immediate problem was a cadre officer of the Worker’s Party,
Comrade Kim, who was assigned to supervise his hospital. Comrade Kim
claimed to be a Chinese herb medicine doctor and had been jailed one time by
the Japanese as an independence fighter. At that time, anyone who had been
jailed claimed he or she had been an independence fighter against the Japanese;
some, of course, were nothing more than common criminals.
Dr. Lee and Comrade Kim were in conflict from the outset, ostensibly
about the scientific value of herbal medicines. Comrade Kim was not pleased
with Lee’s air of superiority. An unpleasant reality for Dr. Lee was that much of
his work in hospital administration had to be approved by Kim. The role of party
cadres was to ensure that everyone followed the Communist Party’s directives.
They could easily ruin one’s life by labeling a person reactionary or anti-
Communist. Such accusations could easily send one to a labor camp,
imprisonment or even death.
In fact, one day Dr. Lee was jailed as a reactionary. Some of the prisoners he
met apparently were there for no other reason than failure to show commitment
to social issues. There was no appeals process or court that would intervene in
political cases. Common criminals had better chances. Political criminals could
be pardoned if they denounced someone else as reactionary or anti-Communist.
Sometimes, people denounced their own family members and were treated as
patriots and received promotions. Perhaps, this was how it was done during the
time of Stalin. In jail, Dr. Lee suffered days of interrogation and torture. During
this tenuous time, the Russian surgeon in charge of the field hospital heard of Dr.
Lee’s predicament and interceded on his behalf, summarily ordering Dr. Lee to be
released.
His ordeal with the Communists had not ended. Soon, the Russian surgeon
who had been his guardian angel left North Korea. He was demoted to the
position of director of a small municipal clinic without in-patient facilities. He
decided to consult his classmate Dr. Lee Byong Nam, who had become Minister
of Health. He had been one of Dr. Lee’s classmates at Imperial University
Medical School and was originally from South Korea. Most “domestic”

41
 The Unfinished War

Communists were concentrated in South rather than North Korea when Japan
fell. Kim Il Sung had invited prominent Communists to join him in the North;
several of those from the South were given cabinet posts.
Minister Lee Byong Nam checked Dr. Lee’s personal records and quickly
found that he was on a list of reactionaries — people on that list were to be
executed without question in case of a national emergency or war, because they
would be considered a security risk.
Minister Lee Byong Nam belonged to the Park Hun Young’s faction of
“domestic” Communists. Park studied theology in China but became an active
Communist during the Japanese occupation and had been jailed for his alliance.
When Kim Il Sung’s band of guerillas entered North Korea, “domestic”
Communists led by Park Hun Yong did not know Kim Il Sung well. Park had run
the Korean Communist Party for years before Kim appeared in North Korea. Kim
needed Park and his Communist comrades. Park Hun Yong rose to the position
of Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister of North Korea.
Then there was the Chinese faction, North Korean Communists who had
fought along with Mao in Yenan. There was intricate maneuvering to keep the
Yenan faction, the main Communist force outside Korea, at bay.32 Mu Chong
and Kim Du-bong were prominent leaders under Mao with thousands of troops
under their command.
In spite of land reform and other measures that pleased the landless, the
introduction of Communism into North Korea proved more difficult than Kim
had originally assumed. It seemed logical that common laborers and peasants
should welcome Communism with open arms, but a substantial proportion of
North Koreans did not. Koreans were orthodox Confucians. Over the
millennium, Koreans had been taught the virtues of respecting their elders and
the learned. Many people did not believe in the Communist version of utopia in
which everyone was supposedly “equal.” (Since there was neither an opinion
poll nor genuine election, the proportion is difficult to measure.) The
atmosphere of coercion and threat did not help. No doubt, there were a number
of genuine Communists, but this is also hard to tell because one had to pretend
to be an enthusiastic follower of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung in North Korea.
For students in North Korea, there were too many ideological meetings.
Simon, by this time sixteen years old, was increasingly worried about our

32. For this story, Scalopino and Lee drew extensively from Kim Chang-sun, Bukhan
Sip-o-nyon (First Fifteen Years of North Korea), Seoul, 1961.

42
 5. North Koreans Discover Communism

father’s safety. His outspokenness and straightforwardness endangered the

whole family. Simon decided that the best he could do for the family was to
become a prominent, indispensable scientist and follower of Communism.
Unless one was trusted by the Communists, there was no opportunity to go to
university and become a scientist. He studied Das Kapital, Leninism, and the
history of the Russian Communist Party. Eventually, Simon could discuss the
facts and theories of Communism better than most card-carrying Communist
members. He made speeches in school meetings praising Communism. He did
not discuss his plans with siblings or parents, in order to prevent any hint from
ever surfacing that his Communist activities were not sincere.
In the summer of 1948, father’s appeal to the Minister of Health for a new
job away from Sariwon resulted in an offer to become a professor at Hamhung
Medical College. This area is far above the 38th parallel, and according to the
minister, Dr. Lee had a lesser chance of getting executed than staying in Sariwon.
The 38th parallel became increasingly tightly guarded, and movement of people
across the line became more difficult by the day. A weekly train between Seoul
and Pyongyang carrying mail was terminated. The U.S. military liaison group in
Pyongyang and a Soviet military liaison group in Seoul left for good.
Listening to South Korean radio broadcasts became a serious crime, and
radios powerful enough to receive broadcasts from the South were confiscated.
Nevertheless, listening to the news from the South became Dr. Lee’s passion, and
he was convinced that the days of Communism were numbered.
Hamhung, the provincial capital of South Hamgyong Province, was the
second largest city in North Korea. It was infamous for its harsh living
conditions and cold winters. This was where the kings banished criminals and
political outcasts during the Koryo and Yi dynasties. Some were high-ranking
officials who had displeased the king; few ever came home.
During the Japanese occupation, many improvements were brought to the
area because the Hungnam port, only 10 km to the east of Hamhung, was close to
Japan and was a key strategic piece in her plan for the invasion of China. In fact,
under the Japanese occupation the whole province was turned into an industrial
complex. Cheap and abundant electricity from the Supung Hydroelectric Power
Plant made the area ideal for petrochemical, fertilizer and other heavy industries.
Factories were built to manufacture the machinery, munitions, fertilizer and
chemicals that Japan needed for the invasion of China as well as for its own
consumption. Many Japanese managers, engineers and skilled workers were
brought in, new streets were laid and new houses were built. Such

43
 The Unfinished War

modernization, however, made little difference during the harsh winters. Like
Hamhung’s weather, the disposition of the Hamhung people was harsh and
uncompromising.
The minister had done Dr. Lee a great service by giving him the university
teaching position in the city. A person with no useful skills and connections
would have been sent to hard labor in a remote mine. But medical doctors were
in short supply in North Korea.
As time went by, my school became increasingly regimented. It was
organized in military fashion: the school was a battalion, each grade was a
company and each class was a platoon. Everyone wore uniforms and rank
insignia shown in stripes and color. A more recent escapee, Kang Chol-hwan,
indicated that in the post-war North Korea a student’s rank is shown by the
number of stars. Apparently, today young people are taught to be physically
tough, too, as if the government is breeding “pit bulls.” Kang says, “I remember a
time when students in every class posted numbers representing their relative
position in terms of physical strength.”33
In my time, there were meetings practically every other day. Many students
were asked to make speeches. We praised the Great Leader Kim Il Sung, Lenin
and Stalin, and denounced American Imperialism and puppet Syngman Rhee.
These speeches were routine; we could say all the right words in our dreams.
There were other class meetings where confessions were demanded of any
antisocial acts and thoughts. After the war, praises for Lenin and Stalin were
dropped and students were taught “the history of the revolution of Kim Il-sung
and Kim Jong-il.” Students learn “useful” facts: “On what day and at what hour
was Kim Il-sung born? What heroic feats did he perform against the Japanese?”34
Returning to the pre-war days in Hamhung, Dr. Lee bought a large house
that required some work. The house once had been a dormitory for an electric
company. He had in mind to open a clinic with inpatient facilities one day.
During this time, private property was still recognized.
Dr. Lee rented one room to a middle-aged woman with a shy boy a little
younger than me. The boy’s father, who had managed a division of a factory
during the Japanese occupation, was taken away by plainclothesmen one night
and was never heard from again. The police denied any knowledge of him. The
boy’s mother sold their house and was trying to make their money last by renting

33. Kang and Rigoulot, p. 4.

34. Ibid, p.5.

44
 5. North Koreans Discover Communism

a single room. They were such quiet tenants that we never knew whether they
were in or not.
To Dr. Lee, Simon had become a real Communist, giving anti-imperialism
arguments even to him. Practically every evening, father engaged Simon in a
discussion about Communism, hoping he would grow out of it. Simon would
occasionally present the Communist viewpoint: “Land is not a commodity that
an individual should own. Most Korean landlords obtained land by exploitation
of the poor. They collaborated with the Japanese. The practice of land ownership
must cease and the land-owning class must be eradicated.”
Dr. Lee could not figure out what was going on in the mind of his son. In
the spring of 1950, when Simon was in his final year of the First Hamhung High
School, there was a province-wide examination to select students to be sent to
Moscow for further studies. Simon thought that he did well on the test. Several
days later, the leader of the Youth Cadet of the Worker’s Party summoned
Simon. The youth leader, in fact, had more power than the principal. The leader
asked some routine questions about Simon’s school activities, then asked
whether he had any relatives in Pyongyang. When Simon said no, the youth
leader asked whether he knew any high-ranking government officials. When
Simon said no, the youth leader hastily dismissed him.
After several days, a classmate whose father worked for the provincial
Department of Education whispered to Simon that he had scored the highest
among all the students who took the examination in the province, but was not
chosen because of his sungbun, his origin: Simon’s father was neither a
Communist nor Communist material. In that society, no one with an undesirable
sungbun would advance far, no matter how industrious or talented. During the
October Russian Revolution, Lenin said that members of the intelligentsia were
not to be trusted because they were all opportunists — they could still make
good living if the revolution failed.
The school announced that a classmate three years older than the other
students had been chosen to go to Moscow. Ironically, he was the worst student
in the class. He had been a factory worker before coming to school and a bona
fide Party member. Graduation from a Russian university would almost
guarantee a promising career as a leader in North Korea. Simon took the
rejection well. He understood why the Communists did not try to rehabilitate
reactionaries, landlords, capitalists and intelligentsia. In times of crisis, the
wrong class cannot be trusted.

45
 The Unfinished War

There were many families with far more serious problems than the Lees’.
One of Simon’s classmates in Sariwon (before we moved to Hamhung) was Ahn
Taeksoo. Taeksoo’s father was born into a farming family, but he had to leave his
village because Taeksoo’s grandfather did not have enough land to divide among
several brothers. This was and still is a common practice. Taeksoo’s father went
to Sariwon to find a job. Eventually, his father became a small grain merchant.
He bought grain from individual farmers and sold it to wine makers.
When the Communists took over North Korea, Taeksoo’s elder brother
joined the Democratic Party formed by Jo Man Shik. When Cho was purged and
the party was taken over by Kim II Sung’s cronies, his membership in the party
was exposed. He was a marked man since then. Under the influence of his elder
brother and father, Taeksoo became an active anti-Communist. He decided to
spread anti-Communist leaflets. He and his friend made leaflets condemning
Kim II Sung and praising Syngman Rhee. There was no copy machine at that
time. They had made a hole in their pant pockets and dropped the folded leaflets
inside the pants when the market was crowded. This went on for a few weeks,
and the security police were mobilized to find the saboteurs. One day, when
Taeksoo was approaching his home, his sister rushed out and told him to run as
fast as he could. The police had discovered the printing tools hidden in their
house and were waiting for him.
He had a distant uncle living in Haeju, a border town about 60 miles away;
he had to hope that his relative would help him to cross the 38th parallel to
South Korea. Taeksoo and his friend got on a local train and reached his uncle’s
house. His uncle found a guide who led them through the heavily-mined border
for a hefty fee. Just before sunrise, Taeksoo and his friend were told that across
the stream, only a mile away, was South Korea, and that was as far as the guide
was willing to go. From then on, he and his friend were on their own, but they
had no way of knowing whether the guide was telling the truth. Shortly after
they crossed the stream, they came to a bunker and heard a man’s voice.
Unsure whether they were Inmin-gun or ROK soldiers, Taeksoo shouted,
“Who are you?”
“South Korean soldiers,” someone replied.
Having no choice but to believe him, Taeksoo and his friend raised their
hands, holding aloft white handkerchiefs, and walked towards the bunker. This
was December 24, 1949. The boys were wearing black school uniforms and the
distinguishing hats of Sariwon First High School. The officer who was on duty at
the border happened to be a defector from Sariwon and recognized their hats.

46
 5. North Koreans Discover Communism

Taeksoo’s friend was lucky enough to have a relative in the South but Taeksoo
had neither relative nor friend. He called on a man who used to own a drugstore
in Sariwon but now lived in Seoul. He knocked on that man’s door and the man
was kind enough to provide Taeksoo food and shelter. Two days later, Taeksoo
went out to look for a job. He shined shoes on the streets of Seoul, and applied at
the military academy — but was turned down because he was too short. Next,
he got a job selling pencils and papers on the street.

47
 6. CHAOS IN SOUTH KOREA

Some leftist historians even in America and South Korea — not in China or
North Korea — still believe that Kim Il Sung did not start the Korean War. Some
of them trace it to border skirmishes along the 38th parallel prior to June 25,
1950, and the notion that South Korea was as responsible for these as North
Korea. In fact, the chief of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG),
Brigadier General William L. Roberts, suggested as much.
No one has accused him of being a leftist, but Roberts was the most
enigmatic general who only several days before the war started assured General
Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), not to worry about
South Korea because it would be able to defend itself.35 Korean War historians
Clair Blair36 and Joseph Goulden have unflattering things to say about Roberts.
From the Koreans perspective, he should have been court marshaled for
misleading Koreans and inviting a colossal military disaster of South Korean
Army. He retired a day before the Korean War started and avoided the question
why did he hide the military vulnerability of Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. A
secret report by KMAG in South Korea compared the strength of the ROK Army
just before American withdrawal to that of America’s Revolutionary War Army
in 1775. In March 1949, Roberts passed along this report to Lieutenant General
Charles Bolt, aide to the JCS. The report contained information on the number of

35. Omar N. Bradley, A General’s Life (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1983), hereafter
Bradley.
36. Clair Blair, The Forgotten War: America In Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Times Book,
1987), hereafter Clair.

49
 The Unfinished War

fighters and bombers North Korea possessed and its elaborate pilot training
programs. It must have been clear that South Korea was no match for North
Korea. Yet, in Congressional testimony a mere three months later, in June 1949,
Bolte — who must have had the report — said that South Korean forces were
better equipped than North Korean forces and that the tactical American units
could be withdrawn. Roberts went a step further by saying, “South Koreans have
the best damn army outside the United States.”37
On surface, such a deception does not make sense until one understands
the political situation at that time. The Truman Administration planned to
withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, but some Congressmen as well as
Syngman Rhee opposed the withdrawal of American troops. Some people,
including an author who claims to have been a former CIA agent in Korea,
Harimao T. Musashiya, even suspected that the U.S. deliberately induced the
war by tempting North Korea to attack the poorly equipped and trained ROK.
He could not find any reason why Washington had ignored all the intelligence
reports sent by the CIA field offices in Japan and Korea, warning how strong the
Inmin-gun was and how ready it was to attack the South. Roberts was certainly
a politician’s general rather than a simple soldier.
The CIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. and the like of Roberts were
either deceived or wanted to produce only the kind of reports their bosses
wanted to hear. Washington wanted to withdraw American troops. This fits
into the behavior pattern of the intelligence community. In a book published in
1983, a former CIA agent Ralph MacGhee said that the CIA was “producing only
that information wanted by policymakers to support their plans and
suppressing information that does not support those plans.”38 Such a culture
appeared to have existed even in 1949-50 in the CIA.
These generals must have known that they were deceiving Congress. On
June 15, 1950, the KMAG warned the Defense Department by cable that ROK
combat units possessed only enough supplies for “bare subsistence,” and that
with the equipment it had, the ROK Army could not be expected to defend itself
for more than 15 days. “Korea is threatened with the same disaster that befell
China,” the cable warned. Such reports were not shared with Koreans, and few
in the U.S. capital, least of all Congress, had access to this information.

37. The Times (June 5, 1950), quoted in Goulden, p.34.

38. A quote in Young Sik Kim’s website article “Eyewitness: A North Korean
Remembers,” from Ralph McGehee’s book, Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA (New York:
Sheridan Square Publications, 1983).

50
 6. Chaos in South Korea

After America’s withdrawal, its fiscal year 1950 military assistance to South
Korea was $11 million (equivalent to $77 million in the year 2000 after
adjustment for inflation). As national defense expenditures go, it was not much
money, but even this amount was not released on schedule. U.S. federal review
processes delayed the actual delivery of supplies and equipment so long that
only a small amount of the promised aid eventually trickled into South Korea.
Apparently, it did not matter whether Republicans or Democrats held sway.
One Republican congressman, it was reported, “fought all appropriations for
Seoul.”39 What little equipment that did find its way to South Korea consisted
entirely of small arms. Yet, many ROK soldiers (called ROKs by Americans) did
not even have rifles. To the conspiracy theorist, this constituted still more
evidence that the U.S. wanted North Korea to attack.
The United States had not provided the South Korean Army with tanks
because Korean terrain was not considered “good tank country.” This opinion
came from none other than General Roberts, who had commanded a tank
battalion in Europe during World War II before being assigned to Seoul. He
certainly had technical expertise, but one could not be sure whether this opinion
was based on his professional or political convictions. U.S. tanks were in short
supply; in fact, there were practically none in Asia.
By this time, North Korea was well supplied by its Moscow sponsor and
had enough arms to equip an artillery regiment and an armored brigade complete
with 120 Soviet T-34 medium tanks. As for the number of men in uniform, South
Korea was outgunned there, as well: it had 95,000 poorly trained soldiers against
135,000 well trained North Korean soldiers. Notwithstanding this disturbing
discrepancy, Washington hoped the ROK Army could somehow handle an
invasion from the North and thus salvage American prestige around the world.
To South Korean authorities, it was obvious that Kim Il Sung was trying to
bring down the South Korean government by promoting insurrection within
South Korea. A recently declassified CIA top-secret document supports that
position. On December 9, 1947, the Central Intelligence Group (the CIA’s
predecessor) briefed President Truman that Soviet and North Korean high
officials had met at Pyongyang on November 19, 1947 and planned to create
chaos in South Korea through a series of measures:40 South Korea had little
electricity-generating capacity at that time; before the country was divided,

39. Manchester, p. 541.

40. Ibid.

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 The Unfinished War

most electricity was generated in North Korea. At the Soviet–North Korea

meeting, it was decided to cut electricity transmission to South Korea in order to
increase unemployment and create “widespread unrest.” Another decision was
to create “a strong fifth column [subversive group] in important South Korean
cities.” Finally, the North Koreans and Soviets agreed to maintain the Inmin-gun
“in a state of readiness to occupy South Korea with the aid of the fifth column.”
Kim Il Sung had almost succeeded in achieving these objectives. The
Communist Party penetrated deep inside the South Korean military and
government organizations. A number of top military commanders and officers,
and even the former South Korean president Park Chung Hee, became members
of the Communist Party.
The South Korean economy was in shambles. According to Korean
historian Ki-baik Lee, the “contours of Korea’s economy” under the Japanese
occupation had taken an unusual shape “with emphasis on war related industry
and a high degree of reliance on Japan. Accordingly, the severance of all ties with
Japan following liberation inevitably dealt a severe blow to the economy.” 41
Even a greater blow was dealt when Korea was divided. The North was
abundant in electrical supply, mineral resources and industrial products; the
South was relatively well off in the production of consumer goods and
agricultural production. Some 90 percent of hydroelectric power, 95 percent of
steel, 85 percent of chemicals and 80 percent of coals were produced in North
Korea and about 65 percent of food was produced in the South when the country
was divided.42
To make matters worse, immediately after liberation the Japanese
authorities, still in charge of Korea until the American troops landed, flooded the
banking system with a huge supply of currency: a 72 percent increase in a matter
of weeks. The Korean people believed that this was done deliberately to create
chaos. It succeeded in creating hyperinflation. Even with American assistance in
the following few years, the South Korean economy was reeling from dislocation
and structural problems. There was serious inflation. The fiscal side of the
economy was also mismanaged. The government did not have sufficient revenues
to run the government; its tax administration was hampered by corruption; and
tax collection efforts were insufficient. The government depended on American

41. Lee Ki-baik, New History of Korea, translated by Edward W. Wagner (Cambridge,
Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 375.
42. Ibid, p. 376.

52
 6. Chaos in South Korea

aid to meeting a large proportion of the operating budget deficit. Little went for
investment in the provision of basic infrastructure such as electricity generation,
transportation and irrigation. None of these fiscal and monetary problems was
easy to solve when the economy was sinking. The Korean leaders had found their
way to the top by being anti-Communist and anti-Japanese, not for being good
economic managers.
The Soviet strategy of further disrupting the economy by cutting off the
electricity supply seems to have worked. Nowhere in South Korea was economic
dislocation more evident than on the picturesque volcanic island of Cheju. The
fishing industry was the island’s mainstay, but the local people did not have the
carbon rods necessary for night fishing. These rods used to come from North
Korea. Coal also had come from the North, but North Korea stopped selling it to
South Korea. The shortage practically shut down the island’s power plant; this,
in turn, shut down the alcohol-production plant, which used local potatoes.
Then the farmers had no place to sell their potatoes. The local economy
collapsed, and the first rebellion broke out. Leftists claimed that it was
spontaneous uprising by local residents dissatisfied with the socioeconomic
condition of the island.43
The leftist “people’s committees” blamed all of this on the mainlanders and
the USAMG, and the people’s committees armed their members and challenged
the national police. The uprising started in April 3, 1948. A national election was
scheduled for the following month. The rebel force supported Kim Il Sung’s
position, calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. Army, the elimination of
Syngman Rhee, and halting the national election.
The rebels attacked police stations and killed pro-government civilians,
following which the national police and right-wing youths embarked on a
bloody and cruel reprisal. The atrocities escalated on both sides. When the
police were no longer able to suppress the rebellion, the newly-formed ROK
Army was mobilized to put it down. At age 27, Colonel Yu Jae Hung was
appointed to the position of commander in charge of pacifying the island. Like
many other Korean senior military officers at that time, he had graduated from
the Japanese Military Academy; and at the time of Japan’s surrender, he was a
battalion commander of the Japanese Army.

43. Park Se Gil, Dasi Ssunun Hangook Hyyondae-sa (In Korean only: Modern History of
Korea Rewritten) Seoul: Dolbegae, 1988) Vol. 1, p. 135.

53
 The Unfinished War

After graduating from the military academy, my half-brother, Soon-ku, was

a brand new second lieutenant and was assigned to Yu’s regiment sent to
suppress the rebellion. He was issued a long sword and a pistol. Killing the
islanders was not what he had had in mind while studying at the Academy, but
he was prepared to do so if necessary.
When the dust settled on Cheju Island, 14,504 combatants and civilians
were dead,44 some 20,000 homes had been destroyed and one third of the island
population of about 100,000 had fled to protected villages along the coast.45
Colonel Yu pacified the island by promising not to prosecute those who
surrendered. The government also promised to support a new life and livelihood
for the rebels. But this was not the final chapter in the war of rebellion. The
Communist Party decided to show its hand, and called on its “sleepers” in the
Army to rise up. In October 1948, rebellion erupted in the port city of Yeosu and
spread to Sunchon and other cities.
One regiment of the ROK military joined the Communists — half the ROK
military at that time. The Communists formed “the people’s courts,” and tried
and executed captured policemen, government officials, landlords and rightists.
The rebels killed more than 1,000 people in each of the two cities. At this time,
Kim Il Sung and Stalin’s strategy of toppling South Korea seemed to be working.
These rebellions were suppressed, but more than 1,000 guerillas fled to the Chiri
Mountain.
Colonel Paik Sun Yup,46 who moved from the position of intelligence chief
in the ROK Army Headquarters to become the commander of the ROK 5th
Division, took on the job of eradicating the guerrillas in the area. He was born in
North Korea. When he was seven years old, his father died, leaving the family
destitute. His mother moved them to Pyongyang from their village about 28 km
to the west, and was on the brink of committing suicide.
Sun Yup later thought that his best chance for a career was to enter the
Japanese Military Academy in Manchuria. After graduation, he served in the

44. From the Investigative Report On the April 3 Casualty by the Cheju Provincial
Assembly as revised in 1997, cited in Seo Chung Seok, Cho Bong Am-gua 1950 yeondae,
Vol. 2 (available only in Korean: Cho Bong Am and the 1950s), (Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyong Sa,
2000), p.571, hereafter Seo.
45.Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), p.
221, hereafter Cumings.
46. Paik Sun Yup, the first four-star general and a veteran of many Korean War
battles, provides a detailed account of his youth and the battles that he fought in an auto-
biography in Korean (The Long, Long Summer Day) (Seoul: Ji-Gu-Chon, 1999).

54
 6. Chaos in South Korea

Japanese Army for three years. After the fall of Japan, he and his brother, In Yup,
worked for the nationalist and founder of the North Korean Democratic Party,
Cho Man Shick. After a few months, the Paik brothers realized that North Korea
was no place for anyone who had served the Japanese Military and in December,
1945, they decided to cross the 38th parallel — along with about four and half
million Koreans who would eventually come to the South.
Suppressing the rebellion in Yeosu fell on Paik’s lap. He said that he
obtained the cooperation of the residents as soon as his division convinced them
that it could defeat the guerrillas. He learned that civilians always sided with the
stronger side. Survival was the name of the game. For his part, what Kim Il Sung
learned was that it was not going to be easy to topple the Syngman Rhee
government with insurrection alone.
Park Chung Hee, who would later succeed Rhee as president of Korea and
became the architect of the post-war South Korean economic miracle, was a
Communist at that time. Born the second son of a farmer in a small village near
Daegu, he graduated from the Manchurian Military School in 1940 and later from
the regular four-year Japanese Military Academy in Japan. After his graduation,
he served the Japanese Kwangdong Army as a lieutenant, but several days before
Japan surrendered, Park and three other fellow Korean officers deserted the
Japanese army, trekked across 35 miles of rough mountain roads and surrendered
to a unit of Chiang’s Nationalist Army.
Though most Korean Kwangdong Army officers defected directly to North
or South Korea, Park chose to surrender to the Chinese Nationalist Army in
control of much of China at that time. After waiting nine months to see how
things settled, they returned to South Korea in May 1946. Park went back to
military school.47 Just before the national election in 1948, he held the rank of
major in the South Korean Defense Guard and participated in military
operations against the Yeosu uprising although by this time Park was a card-
carrying member of the South Korean Worker’s Party.
Before his involvement in this operation, Park had been an instructor in the
Korean Military Academy.48 The first batch of cadets he taught was the 5th class
of the academy, which in 1947 consisted of 420 young men. He was a respected

47. In September 1946, he entered the National Defense Guard Academy. This was
only a three-month course. He graduated third among 194 students.
48. This was before the ROK Army was created; at that time the ROK military was
called the National Defense Guard, and was an extension of the armed police.

55
 The Unfinished War

teacher, and the cadets never forgot that. They later helped Park to stage a
military coup.
Returning to 1948 on the heels of a series of Communist rebellions, the
ROK realized how deeply the Communists had infiltrated and went on an all-
out “Red hunt” intended to cleanse the ROK military of Communist infiltrators.
Park’s membership in the South Korean Worker’s Party was discovered. Some 10
percent of the ROK’s soldiers and officers were jailed and interrogated. Park was
interrogated repeatedly. He finally broke down and confessed his Communist
Party connections.
In the formal trial, Park received a death sentence; but his sentence was
commuted because of the intervention of Lieutenant Colonel Paik Sun Yop, who
was the intelligence chief in the ROK Army Headquarters in charge of purging
Communists from the army. Although Park was a card-carrying Communist, by
this time his faith in Kim Il Sung and in Communism had already waned because
he knew that anyone with a past connection to the Japanese Army was being
arrested and jailed in North Korea. Paik had been Park’s senior in the
Manchurian Military School and the Japanese Military Academy, and knew this.
However, it was Captain James Houseman of the KMAG who played the
decisive role in this decision. The KMAG controlled the U.S. military aid to the
ROK forces. Brigadier General Roberts was not exaggerating when he bragged
that the ROK Army would fall within a week if America terminated its military
aid. Because of this dependency on the U.S. military supplies, a mere captain of
the KMAG had powerful influence over the entire ROK. He advised, and shared
the room of, the chief of ROK Army, Major General Chae Byung Duk.
Houseman suggested that Paik use Park as chief of the Combat Intelligence
Section, whose job was to stop the infiltration of Communists from North
Korea. Paik reminded Houseman that Park had Communist connections, and
was awaiting sentencing. Houseman replied that Park knew the inner workings
of the Communists, which was exactly what was needed to do the job. As
predicted, Park did an excellent job of reading enemy plans and interdicting
Communist infiltration.
Although his life was saved, he was officially discharged from the ROK
Army. He, however, returned to his job as a civilian, without pay. At that time,
nobody in his right mind would have predicted that Park would one day be
reinstated in the ROK Army and become South Korean president.

56
 6. Chaos in South Korea

MACARTHUR IN JAPAN

Across the East Sea (better known as the Sea of Japan, outside Korea), the
Japanese revered General Douglas MacArthur. Every morning and afternoon,
hundreds of Japanese patiently waited to catch a glimpse of their “white
emperor.” He had disarmed Japan and brought about sweeping social and
political changes including the adoption of a new, democratic constitution. His
performance as a prosecutor of war criminals was somewhat mixed, from the
point of view of Koreans. He brought a minimal number of war criminals to trial
although he purged those suspected of war crimes and military nationalism and
aggression.49 This affected less than half of one percent of the Japanese
population, compared with 2.5 percent in Germany. “In Japan, no one went to
jail, was fined or lost his property.”50 By and large, such a mild treatment of
Japanese war criminals and ultra-nationalists did not bother Americans,
although some Americans wanted to see Emperor Hirohito dethroned.
The consequences of not uprooting ultra-nationalism in Japan was,
however, felt by her Asian neighbors, especially Korea and China, for decades to
come. They were troubled by Japan’s unwillingness to apologize for the
invasions and massacres that her soldiers committed everywhere. The Japanese
recently published a textbook that maintains that the Japanese takeover of
Korea was not an invasion at all, since it was done with the consent of Korean
representatives, and denies that the Japanese perpetrated any crimes during
World War II. The issue of 100,000 “comfort women” hardly rates a mention in
their textbooks. China also reacted angrily to the Japanese attempt to
whitewash Japan’s militaristic past. The Nanjing Massacre, in which Japanese
troops killed 150,000 civilians in China, has also been glossed over. The book
avoids using the word “invasion” when referring to Asian countries, arguing
instead that Japan actually helped those nations to achieve their independence
earlier than they would have otherwise!
The North Korean press also reacted angrily: “Japan is the gang leader of
forging history[.] Imperial Japan’s evil aggression and carnage cannot be erased
in a thousand or ten thousand years.” 51 The inflammatory North Korean
editorial went on unremittingly, at a feverish pitch. When Prime Minister

49. Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die (New York: Random House, 1996) p. 517,
hereafter Perret.
50. Ibid, 518.
51. Hankook Ilbo (Korea Times) July 13, 2001.

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 The Unfinished War

Koizumi Junichiro of Japan visited the Yasukuni Shinto shrine in Tokyo on

August 13, 2001, South Korea and China objected strongly. This shrine, where
war criminals have been memorialized, remains a symbol of Japanese militarism.
Some Japanese disapproved of Koizumi’s visit, but most remained silent.
Koreans have questioned whether the ordinary Japanese people have learned any
lessons from their military government’s past so as to prevent its possible
repetition.
In hindsight, MacArthur could have done a better job at keeping his troops
in combat condition. However, this was not his fault alone. The White House,
Congress, and the Pentagon were all busy cutting the military budget and the
number of soldiers in uniform. None of them suspected that America would have
to fight another war sometime soon. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, in
charge of the Eighth Army in Japan, did not do much to keep his men in shape.
When the JCS visited Japan in February, 1950 and inspected Walker’s four
divisions under the Eighth Army, they found that they were only 40 percent
combat-ready. However, the chiefs claimed to have been impressed. They said,
“Excellent troops…. well trained, well led, with good morale.”52
They knew it was not true, but to say otherwise would have brought up the
need to upgrade the occupation army. There was no budget for that. In fact,
there was intense inter-service rivalry to grab a greater slice of the shrinking
budget. It has been said that the young American soldiers who volunteered to
come to Japan did so to see the world, for cheap sex (“50 cents short-time, one
dollar all night”), cheap beer “fifteen cents a bottle” and enjoy the luxury of living
with the help of houseboys and shoeshine boys.53 Neither these American
soldiers nor Washington thought that they would actually face a war.
MacArthur knew that Hodge was not doing well in Korea. Independence
and unification seemed to mean a lot to the Koreans, and they were not
accepting trusteeship. Perhaps it was a bad idea. However, neither MacArthur
nor Hodge had anything to do with the decision to create the trusteeship
government. When the Republic of Korea (ROK) was created in September
1948, Korea was no longer the responsibility of MacArthur’s Far East Command
(FEC). The U.S. State Department was in charge, and the controversial General
Hodge had packed up his gear and returned home — to the delight of Syngman
Rhee, and perhaps even of Hodge himself. Although Korea was outside of his

52. Perret, p. 538.

53. See for example Perret, p. 538.

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 6. Chaos in South Korea

responsibility, MacArthur asked his intelligence chief, Major General Charles

Willoughby, to monitor the military situations both in North and South Korea.
Asia, however, inhabited by peoples of completely different heritages and
cultures and located some 8,000 miles away, was of little interest to most
Washington politicians and military strategists. However, MacArthur and many
other concerned Americans were furious about the loss of China to the
Communists. One such person was a young congressman from Massachusetts
and a veteran of the Pacific War, John F. Kennedy. He spoke out against the
Administration’s China policy. He said that continued insistence that American
aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government was formed was
delivering a crippling blow to the Nationalist Government there. He went on to
say, “So concerned were our diplomats and their advisors with the imperfections
of the diplomatic system in China after 20 years of war and the tales of
corruption in high places that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-
Communist China.”

59
7. PRELUDE TO A HOT WAR
In recent years, a lot more definitive information has come to the public
domain regarding the roles of Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang in starting the
war. As early as April 1947, Soviets started to train T-34 tank operators at
Pyongyang.54 In October 1947, Kim Il Sung requested Mao to return Korean
soldiers under him, and received the first contingent of 1,500 Koreans (called
Northeast Korean Volunteers). They were the Koreans who joined Mao’s Army
to fight against the Japanese. On February 8, 1948, Kim Il Sung established the
People’s Army (Inmin-gun). All this happened when South Korea had only a
national police force and the South Korean government had not yet been created.
On August 23, 1948, an additional 10,000 Northeast Korean Volunteers (Mao’s
164th Division) returned to North Korea.
The CIA kept the Washington policy makers informed of these
developments. On October 29, 1948, the CIA warned President Truman that an
armed invasion of South Korea was likely, although it would not happen until
after the U.S. withdrew its troops from South Korea and after the North
“attempted to ‘unify’ Korea by some sort of coup.” The reasons given for this
conclusion were the “intensified improvement of North Korean roads leading
south,” “the Peoples’ Army troop movements to areas near the 38th parallel [and]
from Manchuria to North Korea.” The report further indicated that “Communist
agents have been directed to intensify disturbances in November [1948],
ostensibly to facilitate an invasion early in 1949.” The report said that such an

54. The account of North Korean war preparation is from Harimao Musashiya, pp.
95-105.

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 The Unfinished War

invasion might not materialize, but an internal insurrection such as Yeosu

“would bolster a Soviet claim in the U.N. that the South Korean regime is
unpopular and supported only by the police and the U.S. Army.” In hindsight,
the CIA report was right on the mark.
We now know the insurrection did not work. Against such a background,
Stalin, Mao and Kim Il Sung met on December 17–18, 1948, in Moscow to discuss
the next move. The North Korean delegation consisted of Kim Il Sung, Park Hun
Yong (Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister) and nine other cabinet level
officials. The Chinese delegation included Mao and Chou En-lai. The Soviet
delegation consisted of Stalin, the first Deputy Prime Minister, Defense Minister
and other top brass numbering altogether 20 persons.
Who instigated the war has been debated for a long time. Washington’s
initial suspicion was that Stalin was behind the invasion, but after that, the
world was led to believe that it was really Kim Il Sung. There is now sufficient
evidence to answer this question: both Kim Il Sung and Stalin were involved.
Kim Il Sung was more eager, but Stalin was ultimately in charge of Kim Il Sung.
A ciphered telegram from Ambassador Shtykov to Andrei Y. Vishinsky (the
foreign minister of the USSR) on January 19, 1950, which came to the public
domain in the mid-1990s, showed the true nature of the relationship that they
had. Kim Il Sung said to Shtykov that he “cannot begin an attack, because he is a
communist, a disciplined person and for him the order of Comrade Stalin is
law.”55 In the 1948 meeting, Stalin said that North Korea was not yet ready to
take on South Korea and that the Inmin-gun needed to be strengthened.
Upon his return to Pyongyang, Kim started a massive buildup of the Inmin-
gun with Soviet assistance. This involved particularly the buildup of mechanized
units. (By May 16, 1949, the 105th Tank Brigade was created. Subsequently, three
tank regiments, one mechanized regiment and other special units, e.g., artillery,
communications and transportation battalions were created.) On July 25, 1949,
another 10,000 Northeast Korean Volunteers (Mao’s 166th Division) entered
North Korea and became the 6th Division of the Inmin-gun.
Another ciphered telegram from Shtykov to Vishinsky sent on September
3, 1949 confirms Kim Il Sung’s eagerness and Soviet involvement. It said that
Mun Il, Kim Il Sung’s personal secretary, had come to see him with Kim’s

55. The source of this and other ciphered telegrams in the following three paragraphs
are from Kathryn Weathersby, “Korea, 1949-1950: To Attack or Not to Attack: Stalin, Kim
Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 5 (Spring 1995).

62
 7. Prelude to a Hot War

message that the southerners intended to attack that part of the Ongjin
peninsula located above the 38th parallel. Shtykov reported that no such attack
had taken place on September 2, contrary to the prediction, but still Kim asked
“permission [of the USSR] to begin military operations against the south, with
the goal of seizing the Ongjin peninsula and part of territory of South Korea to
the east of the Ongjin peninsula, approximately to Kaesong, so as to shorten the
line of defense.” Then Shtykov reported to Vishinsky that he had discouraged
Kim Il Sung from undertaking such operations, but that Kim would “probably
raise this question again soon.” The telegram went on to say, “There have not
been any serious incidents since August 15[.] The southerners are carrying on
defensive work at a faster tempo. I ask your order.”
The answer came on September 11 from Andrei Gromyko of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to Grigori Tunkin, the chargé d’affaires of the Soviet embassy in
Pyongyang: “You must meet with Kim Il Sung as soon as possible and try to
elucidate the following additional questions”: the state of the South Korean
army, the condition of partisan movements in South Korea, and American troops
in South Korea, among other things. In a lengthy and amazingly accurate
assessment of the situation at that time in hindsight, Tunkin replied: Kim cannot
count on substantial help from the partisans, a rapid victory is unlikely, the
limited operation on the Ongjin peninsula might turn into a civil war, and a
drawn-out war might bring the Americans to assist South Korea — this time
more effectively than they did in China. The Politburo directed Shtykov that the
maximum efforts should be directed to “the partisan movement” and further
strengthening the Inmin-gun.
We now know that the “popular uprisings” were squashed. The attempts
to create a partisan uprising never ceased. On April 25, 1950, the Chargé in the
U.S. embassy in Seoul, Everett Drumright, reported to the Secretary of State
Dean Acheson that the ROK Army finally broke up an “organized resistance of
remaining bands of North Korean guerillas, numbering more than 600, who
penetrated into Odae Mountain area of Kangwon Province on or about March
25[.] With losses during the past three weeks of about 500 men and several
hundred weapons, North Koreans may be loath to commit men and equipment
to such adventures.”56 The Soviet hierarchy saw the world as a place full of
oppressed proletariats who would rise up against their exploiters, given some

56. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950, Vol. 7, Korea (Washington D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1976), FRUS Vol. 7 hereafter, pp. 47-48.

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 The Unfinished War

external help. An internal uprising, whether genuine or not, in South Korea

would give Stalin the legitimacy for intervention in a civil war just as it did in
China, thus assuring that the U.S. would not intervene in the war.
In spite of Moscow’s disapproval of that naked aggression, in mid-October,
1949, Kim Il Sung created a major border incident. It is not clear whether he was
trying to grab the Ongjin peninsula or provoke the South to invade the North,
providing him the pretext for invading the South. After a fierce battle, the North
captured several strategic elevation points along the 38th parallel. Ambassador
Shtykov did not report these events to Moscow. However, reports of the border
clashes reached the Kremlin via other channels and Shtykov received a curt
reprimand on October 22, 1949, from the Central Committee of the Communist
Party, noting his “failure to present timely information to the Center on combat
actions as well as his failure to implement the directive.”
On January 13, 1950, the CIA sent to President Truman a top-secret report.
On one hand, the CIA reported a “continuing southward movement of the
expanding Korean People’s Army toward the thirty-eighth parallel,” the “influx
of Chinese Communist-trained troops from Manchuria,” “the assignment of
tanks and heavy field guns to units in the thirty-eighth parallel zone,” and the
development of North Korean air capabilities. On the other hand, it concluded
that “an invasion of South Korea is unlikely unless North Korean forces can
develop a clear-cut superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean
Army.”57 The underlying assumption was that the ROK Army was sufficiently
strong to dissuade North Korea from invading the South!
For whatever reason, the CIA was singing a different tune than its earlier
report in October 1948, which concluded that North Korea would be ready to
attack the South when the U.S. left South Korea. Perhaps this report was more
in line with what Washington decision-makers wanted to hear. Without doubt,
North Korea already had a clear-cut military superiority. The “increasingly
efficient South Korean Army” was the line that Brigadier General Roberts and
Ambassador Muccio, both under the State Department, were telling everyone at
that time.
In January 1950, American troops had completed the withdrawn from
South Korea. As if this were not reassuring enough to the Communists, on
January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the now famous gaffe

57. A weekly intelligence summary on the Far East: Soviet Relations; Korea: Troop
Buildup.

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 7. Prelude to a Hot War

before the lunchtime audience of reporters at the National Press Club in

Washington, D.C.: “This defensive perimeter [in the Pacific] runs along the
Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyu Islands,… from the Ryukyus to
the Philippine Islands.” This clearly excluded South Korea and was in accord
with the Defense Department’s Offtacke Strategy. Yet, when he was accused of
having encouraged invasion, Acheson said that he was referring to “internal
subversion,” not to “communist aggression.” No matter what he may have
intended by saying it, this was the assurance the Communists needed. Perhaps
the fate of 20 million Koreans was none of his concern, but that statement may
have doomed the lives of tens of thousands of Americans as well.
After the Acheson gaffe, the grapevine between Pyongyang and Moscow
began to hum again. Another ciphered telegram of January 19, 1950 clearly
implicates the USSR. Shtykov said to Vishinsky, “Comrade Stalin…said to him
[Kim IL Sung]…in case of an attack on the north of the country by the army of
Syngmann [sic], then it is possible to go on the counteroffensive to the south of
Korea. But since Rhee Syngmann [sic] is still not instigating an attack…he (Kim
Il Sung) thinks that he needs again to visit Comrade Stalin and receive an order
and permission for offensive action…” On January 30, Stalin replied to Shtykov,
agreeing to meet Kim Il Sung and said that he was “ready to help him in this
matter.” However, he had a request for Comrade Kim Il Sung: “The Soviet Union
is experiencing a great insufficiency in lead. We would like to receive from Korea
a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons of lead[.] I hope that Kim Il Sung would not
refuse us. ”
Kim Il Sung met Stalin in April 1950. Stalin said, “due to the changing
international situation,” he would agree to the Koreans moving towards
unification, but that the final agreement would have to be decided together with
China. If China did not agree, the decision would be postponed. Kim went to see
Mao. Mao voiced his confidence that the Americans would not interfere in such
a conflict. If foreign forces intervened, then China would come to the aid of the
North. In the opinion of Mao, the Soviet Union could not directly participate in a
Korean conflict because it had an agreement with the United States over the 38th
parallel, but China had no such obligation.
Subsequently, Soviet merchant ships unloaded a large quantity of war
materiel at the port of Chongjin.58 Nikita Khrushchev said in his memoir,

58. Roy E. Appleman, South to The Nakdong, North to the Yalu (Washington D.C.: Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), p. 12.

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 The Unfinished War

“Naturally, Stalin couldn’t oppose this idea [of Kim Il Sung invading the South].
It appealed to his [Stalin’s] convictions as a Communist all the more because the
struggle would be an internal matter which Koreans would be settling among
themselves.”59 In short, it was not about the Soviet Army invading any country,
but an internal matter.
There was a series of cable exchanges between the Soviet Ambassador at
Pyongyang and Moscow immediately prior to the commencement of hostilities.
On June 21, Kim Il Sung informed Stalin via the Soviet embassy that he would
begin combat operations precisely on June 25. This is when the North launched
a massive invasion of the South. This explains who started the war, but there is
still a debate over the motive.
Returning to 1949 in Seoul, U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio called on
President Rhee in May, 1949, and informed him that the U.S. intended to pull
out its remaining 15,000 troops. Muccio asked Rhee to issue a statement
concurring with the plan so that the Communists would not think that there
was a rift between the two countries. Rhee asked Muccio, “What is the U.S.
policy toward the security of South Korea? If the U.S. considers an attack against
South Korea the same as an attack against itself, I see no need for the U.S. troops
to be in South Korea.” But no such assurance came from the U.S.
On June 24, 1949 Rhee wrote: “Most of our army men are without rifles[.]
Our defense minister reports that we have munitions which will last only three
days of actual fighting.”60 On September 30, 1949, he wrote a letter to his friends
in the U.S., saying that the Soviets were giving Communist agitators money,
weapons and propaganda literature to stir up the people. The letter concluded
that Americans were losing the Cold War. As he was writing this letter,
skirmishes along the 38th parallel were a daily occurrence.
In the meantime, Brigadier General Roberts was doing everything he could
to avoid military clashes that would hamper the withdrawal of the U.S. troops
on schedule. He asked the ROK Army to stay back at least three miles south of
the 38th parallel. In the city of Kaesong, this meant that the ROK soldiers had to
retreat to the middle of the city streets instead of on a strategic hillside above the
city. In March, 1949, a Communist force struck against the ROK position in the
city. The ROKs counter attacked and chased the Communist force toward the

59. Strobe Talbott (translated and edited), Khrushchev Remembers (Boston and
Toronto: Little Brown and Company), pp. 368.
60. This and other quotes and events confronting Rhee at this time are from Rhee’s
biography. Oliver, pp. 295-299.

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 7. Prelude to a Hot War

38th parallel, thus entering the three-mile zone. The next day, Ambassador
Muccio visited Rhee to lodge a strong protest that the ROK had crossed the
three-mile zone that he and Roberts had created. Muccio had nothing to say
about the ROK soldiers being hit in the middle of the city streets, and their
rights to retaliate. The next attack on the regiment proved fatal. On June 25, a
ROK regiment guarding Kaesong (on its streets, rather than digging in on the
hill north of Kaesong) was wiped out within hours of a North Korean invasion.
Only forty soldiers escaped the attack.
In the early fall of 1949, a strong Communist force of about 4,000 men
attacked south across the 38th parallel on the Ongjin peninsula, an area
surrounded by the Yellow Sea on three sides and the 38th parallel on the
remaining side — a virtual island. After the incident, General Roberts advised
Rhee to abandon the peninsula and let the Communists have it. Rhee refused. He
was not having much luck with American soldiers. General Hodge had treated
him as if he were his lieutenant. Now, General Roberts was doing the same.
Although Roberts and Muccio were trying to reassure Rhee that the ROK
Army was more than a match for the Inmin-gun, Rhee’s sources told him that his
army of 100,000 was no match for the North Korean Army. Muccio tried to
convince him that the ROK Army was so strong that it did not need the U.S.
Army. Then came Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s announcement that Korea
lay outside of the U.S. defense perimeter, on January 12, 1950.
On March 8, 1950, President Rhee wrote: “The enemy in the north can
sweep down on us at any moment with more arms, more planes, more of
everything than we can muster against them. We have no antiaircraft guns, no
planes…not even ammunition, spare parts and the other things which are
necessary to keep the machinery operating[.] We are not after a large army, a
large air force, or large anything. We only want to obtain forces in each branch of
the military service which will be adequate for our defense.” In this same
memorandum he also said, “The State Department must revise its interpretation
of the American perimeter so that it includes Korea[.]”
Although Rhee was not briefed about this, the CIA collected at great
expense detailed data on the Inmin-gun and forwarded this information to
Washington. MacArthur’s intelligence chief, Charles Willoughby, collected
information on North Korea and filed over 1,000 reports to Washington. All such
reports appeared to have gone unheeded. Willoughby even thought that there
was a conspiracy in Washington to ignore all such information. Musashiya was

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also convinced of a conspiracy. There was a disconnect between the CIA field
office and the CIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
By the time Ambassador Muccio testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on June 6, 1950, he was forthcoming and warned that the North
Korean Army had undeniable military superiority, particularly tanks and combat
aircraft. North Korea had, among other things, 100 Yak fighter planes, 70
bombers, 10 reconnaissance planes and 150 medium tanks; and by then, the
USSR had trained about 10,000 North Korean soldiers in Siberia, some for up to
three years. They received sophisticated training, including tank maneuvers.
What the American military turned over to the ROK when they left South
Korea was adequate to fight guerillas and lightly armed invaders but inadequate
for defense against a well-armed military like the Inmin-gun. The Americans left
no tanks, no airplanes, no heavy naval craft, and most of all, no anti-tank
weapons. The weapons and equipment left by the Americans were in poor
condition and there were no spare parts. They began to fall apart rapidly.
When Americans actually left South Korea, President Rhee vented his
frustration by publicly accusing America of abandoning his country. He insisted
that if it were not for the secret American-Russian agreement made behind the
back of Koreans, there would be no Communism in Korea, nor a separate North
and South Korea. Acheson rebuked the “old man” for such outbursts and said
that such statements only endangered the chances of obtaining American
military assistance in the future. Rhee had to swallow his pride. South Korea
desperately needed American military assistance. The last of the American
troops sailed away on schedule.
Less than 500 American advisers were left behind. These advisers were
anxious to sail away, too, from what they considered a “sorry country.” South
Korea was a hardship post. None of the Americans spoke Korean, and few
Koreans spoke English.
Months prior to the outbreak of the war, Roberts, who was nearing his
retirement, entertained entourages of VIPs and journalists who visited South
Korea under arrangements made by Ambassador Muccio. “When they [VIPs]
began arriving in increasing numbers, General Roberts artfully stage-managed
the visits and proselytized unabashedly. The visitors were wined, dined, and
briefed in Seoul, then escorted to the ‘field’ to see the ROK Army in ‘action.’ The
field maneuvers were executed by handpicked ROKs, who had been carefully
rehearsed about what to do and say.”61 All the VIPs and journalists returned
home and projected their glowing confidence in the ROK Army.

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 7. Prelude to a Hot War

Why did Roberts launch such a carefully orchestrated publicity campaign

to convince the world that the ROK Army was capable of meeting any test the
North Koreans could impose? Some suspected that he was trying to convince
everyone what a fine job he had been doing so that he could get another star
before his retirement.62 My supposition is that both Muccio and Roberts were
trying to facilitate the Truman Administration’s decision to withdraw the U.S.
troops from Korea — call it a team play. Perhaps, Roberts did not believe that
North Korea would invade South Korea. In that belief, he was not alone. At the
end of World War II, the U.S. went through dramatic military cutbacks. The
American public demanded, “Bring the boys home!” It was time for the
Americans to enjoy peacetime prosperity and pursue great American dreams.
Truman reduced 12 million men and women in arms to 2 million, but in the
spring of 1946, the Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress set a
limit of 1,070,000 men. Most Americans did not believe a war with its former
ally, the USSR, was likely. Yet, Roberts was the point man for the U.S. on one of
the Cold War fronts. It is hard to find a legitimate excuse for his behavior.
Ambassador Muccio was no better. In a post-war interview given to the
Truman Library in 1971, Muccio admitted that he was aware that North Korea
had advanced Soviet military hardware, including fighter planes, bombers and
tanks, but admitted to having undertaken the task of convincing Rhee that the
ROK Army was in such a good shape that it was safe to withdraw the U.S.
troops. Of course, in his case, the rationale is simpler to find. He was a career
diplomat and was carrying out a State Department agenda. This is what a
diplomat does.
The CIA was a young agency at that time. The Office of Strategic Service
(OSS), which was the spook agency during World War II, was dismantled just
after the War. Its successor, the CIA, was created on September 18, 1947. It
started to operate in South Korea in early 1948, although General MacArthur did
not welcome an independent intelligence unit operating outside his control. At
that time, Korea was still under his control, and MacArthur had his own
intelligence unit, G2, under Willoughby doing intelligence collection. The
Korean Labor Organization (KLO) was created in 1948. It was a front for
Willoughby’s G2 to collect information on North Korea and China. Only a

61. FRUS Vol. 7, 1950, pp. 96-98.

62. Blair, p. 55.

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 The Unfinished War

handful of American operatives worked in the organization,63 but the agency

actually employed about 10,000 Koreans and Chinese.64
The KLO was hidden under the Oceanic Survey Department of the ROK
Ministry of Fisheries. MacArthur began to intensify his intelligence gathering as
China was falling to the hands of Mao; and when the CIA passed on to him the
information that the USSR, Red China and North Korea met in December 1948
for something big, his interest was piqued. In 1949, the U.S. troops were already
withdrawing from South Korea, and MacArthur had no official responsibility for
South Korea, but G2 and its KLO continued to operate in South Korea.
Musashiya claimed that the CIA Headquarters was informed of the precise
date that North Korea would invade South Korea. However, exactly when the
CIA Headquarters in Washington received such information is not clear.
MacArthur’s biographer, William Manchester, said, “On March 10, 1950, the CIA
had predicted the PA [North Korean People’s Army] will attack South Korea in
June 1950.”65 This corroborates Musashiya’s claim. This prediction was also
backed up by Willoughby, in the third week of March, 1950. His report was only
one of 1,195 reports sent to Washington, and apparently did not impress the
recipients. Maj. John K. Singlaub, who was in charge of the CIA field office in
Mukden, Manchuria, infiltrated several spies into the upper echelon of the
North Korean military and reported that the North Korean planned to invade
the South.66 This, too, appears to have been ignored. Exactly who knew what
was investigated later by Congress.
In any event, such intelligence did not fit the U.S. plan for the withdrawal
of its troops, and therefore might have been an embarrassment to the CIA in
Washington. This was also true of the intelligence gathered by the ROK Army
sources. Washington considered Korean sources to be “too emotional” and
perhaps as having “an ulterior motive.” However, if Washington did not trust
the CIA field office, Willoughby’s G2, the KLO, or South Korean sources whom
did they trust? They trusted Roberts and Muccio, who had ulterior motives of
their own but ones that served the Administration’s agenda. They were both

63. William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: the Covert War in Korea (New York, etc.: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.), p. 20, hereafter Breuer.
64. This information is from Harimao Musashiya. His Korean name is said to be Park
Sung Uk; he was adopted by a Japanese in Korea when he was child. When he took U.S.
citizenship and became a high-ranking CIA agent is not clear.
65. Manchester, p. 543.
66. Breuer, pp. 20-21.

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State Department employees. If there was any ideological bias that doomed
Korea, one has to point the finger at the State Department.
By this time, the U.S. troops were already out of South Korea, and the State
Department had spread the word that South Korea would be able to defend itself
and that the U.S. would not defend her — at least according to Acheson. It
would have taken a very unusual CIA chief to tell Truman and the State
Department that they were all wrong. However, Washington was awash with
intelligence reports — which many dismissed as rumors — of an imminent
invasion of South Korea. It is also true that there were conflicting intelligence
reports circulating in Washington.
In early 1950, British intelligence estimated that the Inmin-gun had
between 35,000 and 36,000 trained troops. Willoughby estimated that the
Inmin-gun had 135,000 troops, which turned out to be more accurate. In view of
such widely diverging reports, President Truman asked the CIA to resolve the
dispute in early 1950. The CIA sent an agent, Lt. Colonel Jay Vanderpool, to
South Korea for fact-finding. Why Washington did so is uncertain because, by
this time, there was already a large and active CIA operation in Japan and South
Korea. Obviously, Washington distrusted these “rumors.” Vanderpool spent a
while in Japan, no doubt talking to Willoughby and others, and in South Korea
talking, presumably, with Muccio and Roberts. Although the basis of his
intelligence estimate has not been revealed, he sent a report to Washington
supporting the British estimate of 36,000 Inmin-gun67 — a conclusion that made
the CIA Headquarters and other policymakers in Washington comfortable. On
Vanderpool’s way back to the U.S., the Korean War broke out and proved that
these estimates were totally out of line.
During Congressional investigations of the intelligence failures after the
war started, CIA Director Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter testified that the CIA
had compiled an intelligence estimate based on field agent reports and sent it to
key officials. The report indicated some alarming activities, suggesting that an
invasion was imminent.68 The CIA had the signature proof that Truman,
Acheson and Louis Johnson had received such reports, although the lead
witness, Secretary Acheson, testified that he had not received such reports. The
delivery of such reports, even if true, was made only five days before the actual

67. Ben S. Malcom with Ron Martz, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Wash-
ington and London: Brassey’s, 1996), pp. 13-14, hereafter Malcom.
68. See Breuer, p. 40 for details.

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 The Unfinished War

invasion. While this was not enough time to build up the ROKs, even a few days’
advance warning could have saved thousands of ROKs caught flatfooted. In
hindsight, what failed was not intelligence gathering but analysis at the CIA
Headquarters and other agencies in Washington.
Like many North Koreans at that time, Lim Kun Shick, a classmate of
Simon’s on the west coast of North Korea, witnessed an unusual movement of
the Inmin-gun troops in mid-June 1950.During the Japanese occupation, Kun
Shick’s father had a prosperous medical practice in Sariwon. He had made
enough money to buy a big, former bank building for his clinic. Thus, when the
Communists marched into town, Kun Shick’s father was labeled as a bourgeois,
an enemy of the people, and the big building was proof of his crime. However, he
was one of few pediatricians around, and so he was not jailed. Due to his father’s
influence, Kun Shick became very critical of the Communists and became pro-
American.
Just a couple weeks before June 25, Lim Kun Shick’s distant relative,
Captain Yoo Jin Lim, the captain of a tank battalion, stopped by Kun Shick’s
boarding house in Namchun to show off his tank. It made a quite a powerful
impression on the young man. Kun Shick still remembers that it was painted
white inside and that the captain bragged that it was air-conditioned and could
travel at a speed of 45 km per hour. Captain Lim said, “I will be the first to
capture the South Korean broadcast station in Seoul and make a radio
announcement to the South Korean people.” Kun Shick heard later that, in fact, a
North Korean tank battalion did capture the South Korean broadcast station
first and did make an announcement. He was never sure whether it was Captain
Lim or someone else; Kun Shick has not seen Captain Lim since he stopped by
Namchun.
Kun Shick, now living in Piedmont, California, asked me, “How is it that
the CIA did not know about such a big military maneuver?” We now know that
the CIA in Korea and Japan knew about this, but Washington policy makers
were not convinced by their report.

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8. ON A RAINY SUNDAY ACROSS THE 38TH PARALLEL

On the Sunday morning of June 25, 1950, a monsoon rain was falling. It was
in the wee hours of that morning when the Inmin-gun launched a massive attack
all across the 38th parallel, while its navy landed troops on the east coast. The
attack bore the unmistakable mark of the Pearl Harbor surprise attack by the
Japanese nine years earlier.
At that time, the eldest of my half-brothers, Soon-ku, was a captain in the
9th Regiment of the ROK 7th Division. After the Cheju-do campaign against the
leftist insurgency, he was promoted to first lieutenant and commanded a platoon
at the front line. On that morning, however, Soon-ku was on a weekend leave
and was staying with his paternal aunt in Seoul. He had not been able to take
weekend leave for over two months. From May 1 to mid-June of 1950, his unit
had been on alert because the government expected border disturbances. On
May 1, Labor Day, Communists usually staged demonstrations, and May 30 was
Election Day for the National Assembly. During the previous election, the
Communists agitated and attempted insurgency. However, on this Labor Day
and Election Day, the 38th parallel was unusually quiet. What Soon-ku and 20
million South Koreans did not know was that North Korea was deliberately
trying to divert the attention of South Korea away from the coming invasion.
By midnight of June 23, the alert was cancelled. Soon-ku and almost half
the soldiers of the 7th Division were allowed to take the Sunday off. The ROK 1st
Division also guarding the western front above Seoul did the same. On June 25,
1950, when the news broke that a massive invasion was underway, Soon-ku was

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one of thousands of ROK officers and enlisted men who failed to return to their
units.
The ROK 1st Division’s commander, Colonel Paik Sun Yup, was in training
at what was then the outskirts of Seoul, called Shihung. Paik was tall for
Koreans of his generation. He was one of the promising colonels in the two-year-
old ROK Army. On June 25, his brother In Yup was the commander of the
independent 17th Regiment defending the barren Ongjin peninsula to the west of
the 1st Division.
About 7 a.m. on June 25, Colonel Paik Sun Yup received a telephone call
from his Chief of Operations, with the news of what appeared to be a massive
Inmin-gun invasion. He had no car at his disposal and flagged down a passing
military jeep and went to American adviser Major Lloyd Rockwell’s house in
Seoul. Rockwell was a senior advisor to the ROK 1st Division.
Practically all the U.S. military advisors at that time lived in Seoul. Their
main job had more to do with rationing ammunition and arms to the ROKs than
training them. The U.S. Advisory Group under Roberts was more concerned
with the ROK invasion of North Korea than the other way around. Therefore,
the advisers maintained a very strict control over the supply of ammunition to
the ROK army.
Major Rockwell and Colonel Paik drove north together to the division
headquarters. Paik’s two regiments, the 12th and 13th, were deployed around
Kaesong, practically on the 38th parallel. Its 11th Regiment was kept in reserve
near Seoul. They had no idea that the invading army consisted of the elite 5th, 6th,
and 7th Divisions, mostly made of the so-called repatriated Korean “volunteers”
from China. These were veterans of Mao’s army, who had fought the Japanese
and then defeated Chiang’s Nationalist Army. In contrast, the highest level of
training the ROK army received under the KMAG was “one show” of a battalion-
level maneuver. They were not prepared for the coming battles. There was not
even an overall defense plan. Each ROK army division was encouraged to come
up with its own individual plan.
At 4 a.m., June 25, some 111,000 Inmin-gun soldiers, including 242 T-34
tanks and 1,610 artillery guns of various types, drove south. The enemy artillery
could shoot almost twice the distance of the small number of artillery that the
ROK had in its possession. None of the anti-tank bullets or shells in the ROK’s
possession was capable of penetrating the armor of T-34 tanks.
Paik found out that communication was lost with the 12th Regiment. The
reserve 11th Regiment was being brought forward from Seoul. The 13th Regiment

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was apparently fighting the Inmin-gun well, although it, too, was giving ground
according to the previously established plan of retreating to the Imjin River
rather than meeting the enemy head on at the 38th parallel. The most disturbing
news, however, came from Major Rockwell. At about noon, Rockwell received
an order to return to Seoul because the KMAG was pulling out of South Korea.
Rockwell and Paik shook hands and parted, but Paik was upset. Complex
emotions erupted: Paik remembered that the U.S. had promised to help the ROK
in case of war, but now the war upon them and the U.S. seemed to have decided
to leave South Korea to its own fate.
An immediate question was who would provide ammunitions and supplies
now that the Americans were leaving. As Paik’s 13th Regiment retreated to the
southern bank of the Imjin River, the Communists were in hot pursuit. The
engineers had already wired the charges to blow up the bridge. Paik, however,
had to wait for the 12th Regiment. It had been incommunicado for the whole day,
but Paik did not believe that his entire regiment had just disappeared into thin
air. At 3 p.m., what remained of the 12th Regiment crossed the bridge: no more
than 40 men and the regimental commander, Chun, badly wounded and
bleeding heavily. Commander Chun had to be transported to Seoul immediately.
Paik could not believe it.
Meanwhile, the Inmin-gun soldiers on motorcycles were following closely
behind. Paik ordered the engineers to detonate the charges. The engineer pushed
the detonator; nothing happened. Something had gone terribly wrong. Perhaps
the cord was cut, or was defective. Hordes of Inmin-gun rushed and seized the
bridge. So much for the carefully laid plan of stopping the enemy at the Imjin
River; the bridge fell into enemy hands, intact.
The biggest problem among the soldiers was the fear of tanks. They had
never seen tanks before. Paik’s officers kept repeating, “Tank, tanks, there is no
way to stop the tanks.” Even the word “tank” seemed to terrify them. Yet, Paik’s
units fought for three days against overwhelming odds. At Munsan, some
soldiers volunteered to strap satchel charges of explosives to their backs and
hurled themselves under advancing T-34 tanks. Others charged the oncoming
tanks with pole charges. Paik denied the rumor that he had ordered such suicide
missions. Even such bravery had a limited effect, however, against mechanized
Inmin-gun divisions moving down in force with the protection of infantry.
Because of General William L. Roberts’ refusal to see Korea as a potential ground
for tank battles, the ROK Army was not supplied with anti-tank mines and

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rockets capable of destroying T-34s. This and a handful of other key decisions
doomed the ROK Army.
The ROK 1st Division reeled, recovered and then mounted a surprisingly
stout defense. Amid this turmoil, Paik received a message from his younger
brother, Colonel Paik In Yup, that his regiment was in a dire situation and that
this message might be his last. Apparently, his brother’s independent 17th
Regiment on the Ongjin peninsula was not doing as well as the 1st Division.
By noon of June 25, Russian-made YAK fighter planes appeared over the
Kimpo airport. They returned later in the afternoon and destroyed its
communications tower and damaged several South Korean light spotter planes
sitting on the tarmac. The Inmin-gun had 180 airplanes (including YAKs) when
the war broke out, while South Korea had only 30 reconnaissance planes that
were used to spot Communist guerillas in infested areas.
The North Korean air attack did more psychological than physical damage
to South Korea. The four Yak fighters, which sent bursts of fire into the Blue
House, rattled President Rhee and his staff. Rhee’s staff advised him to move
south immediately to avoid being captured by the Inmin-gun. According to
Ambassador John Muccio, Rhee and Acting Prime Minister Shin Sung Mo,
whom he met on the evening of June 25, mentioned to him that the cabinet had
met and decided that it would be “disastrous for the Korean cause to have him
[Rhee] fall into the hands of the Communists and that their defense capabilities
were such that they had better move on out of Seoul.” Muccio tried to reassure
Rhee that none of the ROK unit had given in, and said, “His [Rhee’s] military
was doing a superb job.” Muccio convinced Rhee to delay his planned evacuation
on June 26, but Rhee and his staff left Seoul at 2:00 a.m. on June 27. His Acting
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Shin left Seoul twelve hours later, and
Chief of Staff Chae did so at 2:00 a.m., June 28.
Seoul fell on June 28. Sixty-two members of the National Assembly were
caught behind the lines. Eight of them were killed and 27 were kidnapped or
missing. Rhee could certainly have delayed his departure at least by 24 hours,
but this was hindsight wisdom. They demanded his apology, which he never
gave. Historians and others said that Rhee was disingenuous if not cowardly for
abandoning Seoul while leaving behind a recorded radio message urging the
people to remain in Seoul and the soldiers to defend the lines to the end. In
hindsight, the right thing to have done was to order the ROKs to fall back to the
southern bank of the Han River, but Rhee had decided to fight for every inch of
real estate. Obviously, he had no idea how outmatched his soldiers were. Muccio

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was telling him that the ROKs were holding up well, and his Defense Secretary
was calling it a disaster. In hindsight, Rhee certainly could have delayed his
departure from Seoul by 24 hours.
Returning to Paik’s predicament, one encouraging development was that
KMAG advisor Major Robert Donovan returned to his regiment, saying that the
KMAG had cancelled the previous order to retreat from South Korea. Donovan
also brought news that the ROK Army Headquarters was mobilizing six
additional regiments to send north to defend the capital. Rhee decided to stand
and fight. Headquarters had high hopes that he and his regiment would hold the
front — a message that weighed heavily on Paik.
The ROK 7th Division, however, retreated rapidly and exposed the right
flank of Paik’s division. By this time, telephone lines had been cut and
communications had been disrupted. An ambulance sent to Seoul with wounded
men returned with them still in the vehicle. A truck sent south to bring
ammunitions also returned empty. They reported that the bridge across the Han
River had been demolished and that the enemy already occupied Seoul. Major
Ro, in charge of supply and logistics, reported that there was very little
ammunition left.
That evening, bazooka shells and machine gun bullets began to hit his
headquarters. Paik decided to retreat and ordered every unit to cross the river
with whatever means available. This meant using rowboats and makeshift rafts,
at some areas. Everyone was ordered to regroup at the Shihung Infantry School
on the other side of the river. All the artillery, vehicles and other heavy
equipment had to be abandoned.
Ambassador Muccio, recalling the situation on June 25, reflected, “I have
been unable to understand why the Communists didn’t get into Seoul the same
night, because they had such a preponderance of armor and mobility, and they
had control in the air, and the south had no defense against air or any kind.” He
answered his own question by adding, “One was the unexpected firmness of the
South Koreans. Not a single unit gave up. The second was that there was a
torrential rain on that morning[.] I think what the Communists had in mind was
to rush into Seoul, capture the government, and then they’d be able to present to
the world that Rhee and his government had no support from the people of
Korea, and the whole issue would have been settled right then and there before
the U.N. or the Free World could do anything.” Col. Paik and his men’s stubborn
though futile resistance served a purpose.

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On June 25, 1950, Park Chung Hee, still a civilian employee at the ROK
Army Headquarters, was on leave at his hometown near Gumi, just north of
Daegu. About noon that day, he received a telegram from Colonel Chang Do
Young, the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, asking him to report to work
immediately. Chang was not sure that Park would do so — considering his
background as a former Communist. However, Park managed to get on a night
train and arrived at the ROK Army Headquarters at Yongsan. A junior officer
still at the Headquarters said that practically everyone had already evacuated.
Park walked toward the Seoul Railway Station. On his way, he heard the sound
of what appeared to be a Caterpillar tractor. Soon, he observed several Russian-
made medium tanks rumbling toward the West Gate Prison, where Park had
spent about a month in 1948. Apparently, the Inmin-gun were going to free the
political prisoners who were being held there.
When Park located Colonel Chang Do Young in the Shihung Infantry
School, being used temporarily as the ROK Army Headquarters, Colonel Chang
could not believe his eyes. Most leftists had joined the Inmin-gun at this time
and he had expected Park to do the same. He restored Park’s former rank as
major.

REACTIONS OF WASHINGTON

In Washington, news of the rout of the ROK Army awoke the members of
the National Security Council. On that day, President Truman was on vacation
in his home state of Missouri. Secretary of State Acheson, who had proclaimed
earlier that South Korea was outside the Pacific defense perimeter, took charge.
With the approval of Truman, Acheson called the U.N. Security Council
meeting, which promptly declared that North Korea had committed an act of
aggression.
The Soviet Union had been boycotting the U.N. Security Council in
continuing protest that the Nationalist Chinese still represented China and
occupied her seat in the Security Council. This ultimately cost the Soviets a
chance to veto the resolution against North Korea. On June 25 (June 26 in
Korea), the U.N. called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal
of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel.
On the evening of June 25 (June 26 in Korea), President Truman rushed
back to the capital. He wrote later, “I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed

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to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to

our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the
Republic of Korea…no small nation would have courage to resist threats and
aggression by stronger Communist neighbors.” 69
The NSC meeting at Blair House in Washington D.C. started with a field
trip report by Defense Secretary Johnson and Chairman of the JCS Bradley, who
had just returned from Tokyo. The first question in everyone’s mind was
whether the invasion was part of a larger Communist offensive. They rather
suspected that it was.
The meeting approved Acheson’s proposal to order the Seventh Fleet to
proceed north from the Philippines to prevent a Communist Chinese attack on
Taiwan and also to dissuade the Nationalist Chinese from making a move
against the mainland. Truman, Acheson, Bradley and, in fact, all of the members
of the National Security Council agreed that failure to protect South Korea could
lead to a political and military disaster. Taiwan, Indochina, and the Philippines
might be next. The NSC authorized MacArthur to send arms and ammunition to
South Korea, and to use the U.S. Air Force to help evacuate American women
and children.
On the following day, June 26 (June 27 in Korea), Truman announced, “The
United States will vigorously support the effort of the [U.N. Security] Council to
terminate this serious breach of the peace.” If only the U.S. had made such a
statement several months earlier, as President Rhee had begged it to do, the war
might have been avoided. Why now?
For Stalin and Kim Il Sung, it was a mystery why the U.S. made such an
abrupt policy change. The answer was in the National Security Council’s policy
document NSC-68. Precisely two months before the war broke out on April 25,
1950, Harry Truman asked the National Security Council to approve a policy
paper that stated that the U.S. would resist any Communist threat to non-Red
nations anywhere in the world.
This policy was formulated in the aftermath of the loss of China and amid
rising public criticism leveled against the Truman Administration. Truman
understood that he and his party could not survive the fall of another Asian
country and was “running scared from Republican critics.”70 Even John F.
Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson understood and sympathized with the outrage

69. Truman, pp. 332-333.

70. Manchester, pp. 542-543.

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of the public. Ten thousand miles away in Tokyo, MacArthur was fuming and
began to battle against the Truman Administration for its inept handling of
China affairs.
The policy, however, remained top secret. Truman could not quote from it
when he wrote his memoir in 1956, and even Acheson (who wrote his memoir in
1969) could not do so. Still a mystery is why the U.S. kept NSC-68 secret rather
than announcing its intent to the world. Had it announced such a policy
immediately, the Korean War might have been averted. However, the document
also contained sensitive statements about increasing defense spending up to 20
percent of the gross national product, which would have upset not only the
pacifists and liberals, but also most Americans who were not ready for another
major war.
In a matter of a day, it became clear that the supply of ammunitions could
not stop the Communists. On June 26, Acheson called for a stronger U.N.
resolution requesting U.N. member nations to resist this aggression and
contribute forces. A second NSC meeting resolved to provide air and naval
support. Bradley said that the U.S. had to draw the line somewhere — and Korea
was as good a place as any. He commented that jets flying over South Korea
would have a great “morale effect...even if they were unable to spot the North
Korean tanks.” A few days earlier, in Tokyo, he had thought North Korea would
not dare attack South Korea; and now he grossly underestimated enemy resolve
and capability.
The speed with which the decision to intervene was made startled the
Communists. Some even saw an American conspiracy: after all, America had
lured North Korean to invade South Korea by announcing the Acheson Line and
the like.After ordering the delivery of mortars, arms and extra ammunition to the
ROK Army from the stockpile in Japan, MacArthur sent a survey team headed by
Brigadier General John Church to assess the situation in Korea. On June 27,
Ambassador John Muccio informed MacArthur that Seoul was about to fall and
all Korea might be lost. MacArthur was as dumbfounded as Washington
decision-makers. Korea was not his responsibility and he did not think much
about her. He simply conveyed the following message to Washington:
“Complete collapse is imminent.”
By that time, it became clear that the ROK Army had little hope of holding
off the Inmin-gun. In the second NSC meeting, Truman authorized the use of air
and naval support and was ready to send not only U.S. air and naval support, but
also American ground forces. However, Chairman of the JCS Omar Bradley

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successfully argued for waiting a few more days instead of taking such a “drastic
step.” To the Communists, Washington made the decision to intervene with
lightning speed, but to the ROK, which lost half of its soldiers in the first few
days of the war, it was a few days too late. General Bradley did not help matters
by dissuading President Truman from taking the right step.
On June 26 (June 27 in Tokyo), Secretary Johnson and General Bradley
made a scrambled-voice call to MacArthur, informing him of the NSC’s decision.
Washington did not ask MacArthur for his opinion and he offered none.
MacArthur was in the teleprompter room when a message arrived from
Washington through a state-of-art decoding device called “telecon.”
According to his biographer, Geoffrey Perret, MacArthur was shocked and
could not believe the message he received: “There it was, scrolling soundlessly
down the glowing telecon screen: The United States was going to commit its air
and naval forces to defend South Korea.”71 All senior staffers of the Far East
Command (FEC) were equally surprised at Truman’s decision. To quote some
more colorful phrases from Perret, MacArthur had not in the least expected “that
Missouri hayseed accidentally shot into the White House” by the death of
President Franklin Roosevelt, and now “surrounded by a bunch of mealy
mouthed liberals,” to have “the balls to fight.”
MacArthur had no knowledge of NSC-68. He had all along believed that
the U.S. would not defend South Korea. The only inkling that the U.S. might
come to the defense of South Korea was provided by the staunch anti-
Communist John Foster Dulles, who had visited the Far East as a special
representative of the Secretary of State only days before the war broke out. He
visited the 38th parallel and on the same evening, he addressed the South Korean
National Assembly. That was on June 17, 1950. He said that the American people
remained “faithful to the cause of human freedom and loyal to those everywhere
who honorably support it.” The statement was so out of line with prior
statements by U.S. officials such as Acheson, Tom Connelly (chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee) and MacArthur that most people did not
take it seriously.
Back in Washington on June 28, Truman announced to the world his
decision to go to the rescue of South Korea. In response to the call of the U.N., 29
member nations would make specific offers of assistance to South Korea.
Eventually, 16 nations sent ground, air and naval forces. This included America’s

71. Perret, pp. 541-541.

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Second World War allies, some Asian countries (Thailand and the Philippines)
and others from as far away as Colombia and Ethiopia, which furnished ground
combat troops. India, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Italy sent medical units.
Air Force support arrived from the U.S. and other countries. Naval forces were
sent from the U.S., Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
On their way from Japan to Kimpo airfield on June 27, Brigadier General
John Church’s fact-finding party received a warning that Kimpo might be in
enemy hands. His pilot diverted the plane to an airfield at Suwon, about 20 miles
south of Seoul.
Church found South Korea in utter chaos. The U.S. Military Advisory
Group in South Korea (KMAG) had also disintegrated by this time. Its
personnel was evacuating with the civilians or straggling all over South Korea.
The road south from Seoul was jammed with fleeing ROK soldiers, refugees,
reporters, and photographers. Having earlier been told of the high quality of the
ROK Army by Roberts, Church was flabbergasted to find it in total disarray. He
later wrote and attributed the collapse to the “lack of leadership.” Many ROK
soldiers were eager to stand and fight, but they didn’t know how or where; they
were leaderless. The two-year-old army did not have much in the way of
experienced military officers.
Church came to the conclusion that the only option left was to throw up a
strong defense on the southern bank of the Han River. That morning, he
conveyed the bad news to MacArthur by radio. He told GHQ that, in order to
recapture Seoul and reestablish ROK Army positions at the 38th parallel, “it
would be necessary to employ American ground forces.”

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9. THE ROK ARMY ON THE BRINK OF DISINTEGRATION
On the battlefront around Seoul, the plan was to blow up all the bridges
along the Han River to prevent enemy tanks from crossing them. Accordingly,
ROK Army engineers had packed vast quantities of explosives under the
vehicular and rail bridges. They were to blow up the bridges after the ROK army
escaped but before the enemy tanks approached. The bridges were blown up at
2:30 a.m. or thereabouts. In hindsight, the vehicular bridge was destroyed several
hours too early. Enemy troops did not reach the center of Seoul until around
noon and the Han River for another several hours.
At this time, the ROK 1st Division was desperately resisting the onslaught
of two Inmin-gun divisions around Munsan. The ROK 7th Division was
disintegrating more rapidly, but one unit was engaged in a desperate battle on
the Miari Hill to the north of Seoul; furthermore, a company-sized group of ROK
soldiers was dug in on Nam-san (South Mountain) at the heart of Seoul. About
80 of them were lightly wounded ROK soldiers who walked out of the hospital
to defend the city. These soldiers would fight the enemy to the last man.72
These ROK soldiers on the Nam-san Mountain witnessed the mid-section
of the bridge come crashing down and splashing into the river. Trucks, soldiers,
and civilians plunged into the river along with it. Many more vehicles and
persons later tried to cross the bridge in the dark, not knowing that the bridge
had been blown. Some of them also plunged into the river. The ROK Army
engineers, however, failed to destroy one span of the rail bridge.

72. This account of the ROK disaster is from Hanguk Jeonjaeng-sa (Korean War
History, in Korean only) (Seoul: Korean Military Academy, August 1996), op cit, pp. 218-
219.

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On the vehicular bridge, miles from the rail bridge, Miss Marguerite
(Maggie) Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune was on a jeep with KMAG
officers. She observed that the streets were so jammed with pedestrians and
vehicles that no one was making much progress.73 She reported that the ROK
soldiers seemed to be in good spirits, even though they had been routed.
However, the civilians on foot with children and heavy burdens were not
orderly. They stumbled along by the thousands. Women carried bundles on their
heads. Men carried their belongings in their hands.
Miss Higgins noted that the thunder of guns behind grew louder. As other
journalists tried to see what was blocking traffic, suddenly “the sky was lighted
by a huge sheet of sickly orange flame. The journalists suffered minor injuries but
the ROK soldiers in the truck ahead of the journalists had been hit and appeared
to be dead. Screaming refugees turned around and raced for the northern shore.”
Who was responsible for the premature demolition of the bridges has not
been answered satisfactorily. Some pointed their fingers at ROK Chief of Staff
Major General Chae and others at his civilian boss. In the end, Chief Engineer
Choi Chang-sik was blamed for the disaster and was executed for it. There was
confusion all around. Tanks had broken into the city, and no one knew for sure
how much longer the lines would hold. Telephone lines were cut and the
engineers at the bridges had no way of knowing how many more troops were
still north of the Han River or how close the Inmin-gun tanks were.
Some retreating soldiers of the 7th Division and civilians hobbled over the
railway ties to cross the river. The southbound train track was intact. Brigadier
General Yu, then the commander of the 7th ROK division after the successful
Cheju Island campaign, also crossed the river in this manner with some of his
soldiers. They positioned themselves on the southern end of the rail bridge. The
Inmin-gun tanks and artillery lobbed shells. Yu and his soldiers had only small
arms and could not respond in kind. The Inmin-gun did not try to cross the river.
On June 28, twelve B-26s flew out of their Japanese base and pounded lines
of supply trains and other targets. Enemy ground fire was heavy. One aircraft
crashed and two were badly damaged. The F-80 fighter-bombers, which flew out
of a separate base in Japan, found the roads jammed with tanks, trucks, and
artillery. They strafed the tanks. On the insistence of MacArthur, even the B-29s
designed as “strategic bombers” dropped bombs from high altitudes. They were

73. Miss Higgins’ story is captured in Goulden, pp. 80-83.

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not designed for close combat support and missed their targets more often than
not. It was an attempt at intimidation.
As this was happening, Maggie Higgins was crossing a mountain path to
Suwon. She heard a steady drone. She looked up to see silvery U.S. fighter planes
dive on Seoul. She said, “My heart pounded with excitement — this must be part
of the ‘momentous event’ mentioned in MacArthur’s message.” The Koreans
around her screamed with joy. Women from a nearby village rushed out to grasp
her hand and pointed to the sky with ecstasy.74
At about daybreak on June 29, Col. Paik and his stragglers also crossed the
Han River. They had walked all night. They were extremely tired and had not
eaten for some time. At the Yongdung-po train station south of the Han River, he
saw USMAG Lt. Ray May standing on the station platform. Exhausted and
hungry, Paik asked May whether he had food. May had none but managed to
find sugar from somewhere. Paik and his stragglers made sugar water and shared
it among themselves. It had a miraculous effect on them. Paik was able to
organize his thoughts and asked May about the current situation. May said, “It is
desperate, but the U.S. Army may come to the rescue of South Korea. You ROKs
must hold the Han River until the U.S. army arrives.”
Although the major thrust was toward Seoul, there were three other
simultaneous thrusts: to the central and eastern parts of the peninsula and to the
small land-locked Ongjin peninsula to the extreme west. The loss of the Ongjin
peninsula was anticipated and no attempt was made to defend it, but the
collapse of the central and eastern fronts would endanger the western front and
cut off the retreat route from Seoul.
But the ROK 6th Division in the central sector made good account of
themselves by holding onto the transportation center of Chunchon in the central
sector and pounding the enemy column with artillery until shells ran low. Its
special commando unit attacked the enemy’s artillery position with grenades
and incendiary bottles. The enemy regiment spearheading the attack incurred
heavy losses (40 percent casualties) in their repeated attacks, but failed to
capture Chunchon on the date planned. One factor favoring the ROKs in the
sector was that its commander had not issued leave passes to his soldiers
because he detected suspicious enemy maneuvers north of the 38th parallel.
Therefore, the entire division was on duty when the invasion started.

74. John Tolland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: William Morrow and
Company, Inc., 1991), p. 57, Tolland hereafter.

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The ROK 8th Division on the east coast, however, crumbled early, exposing
the 6th Division’s right flank. The ROK 6th Division retreated as instructed to the
southern bank of the Han River with minimal loss. They brought the ROK army
fighting force to 54,000 men. Nevertheless, the ROK army losses during the first
week of the fighting were 44,000 soldiers killed, captured, or missing. This was
almost half its total force, and those who remained came out of the first days of
the war physically and psychologically battered.75

MACARTHUR IN SUWON

Early in the morning on June 29, MacArthur flew from Tokyo to Suwon
aboard his private airplane Bataan. The weather was so foul that General George
Stratemeyer, the commander of the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF), almost
grounded the plane. Stratemeyer was also concerned with the threat of enemy
fighter aircraft and their amazingly effective anti-aircraft guns. In fact, hostile
ground fire had riddled twelve of his B-26s near Munsan just south of the 38th
parallel. One of them crashed during landing, killing all crew members.
On that morning, four fighters escorted the Bataan. A planeload of staff and
reporters accompanied the general. The fighter escort saw action. Earlier in the
morning, six Yaks had strafed the Suwon airfield (although they failed to disable
it). U.S. jet fighters clearing the air for the Bataan shot down two of them. When
the American jets left, Yaks returned again. As MacArthur’s party was
approaching Suwon, a Yak fighter-bomber was just pulling away after creating
craters in the airfield and leaving smoldering wreckage at the end of the runway.
Lt. Col. Anthony Story, piloting the Bataan, made an evasive move while one of
the Mustang escorts went after the Yak.
President Rhee flew into the airfield in a light spotter plane, also dodging
North Korean Yak fighter fire. MacArthur had first met Rhee when he was still
in the U.S. in exile. They shared similar values as far as Communism was
concerned. Ambassador Muccio also flew in on board a separate spotter plane.
General Church (who had been Korea only three days) and his
subordinates started to brief MacArthur, his chief of staff Major General Edward
Almond, Major General Courtney Whitney, and others present, using maps and

75. Goulden, p. 83

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pointers. General Chae, the chief of staff of the ROK Army, was also present in
the room. Harold Noble, a senior embassy staffer in charge of intelligence and the
son of Rhee’s first English teacher at Paijai, insisted that Muccio give Chae a
chance. Chae hardly spoke English, so he addressed the group through an
interpreter. MacArthur asked Chae how he planned to fight the Inmin-gun.
Chae replied that he would raise a million-man army. MacArthur was
unimpressed.
After the briefing, MacArthur, 70 years old then, insisted on going to the
front to observe the situation. His advisers were against it, but MacArthur made
the trip to the scene of battle — as he had done many times during the Pacific
War. His party, excluding by then the entourages of Rhee and Muccio, received
another air attack on the way. When his aides were hitting ditches to avoid the
air raid, MacArthur sat calmly in the back seat of the car, sucking his pipe and
telling his concerned staff, down in a ditch, “Those things aren’t going to hit
me.”76
The field visit of this legendary American general provided an immense
relief to the desperate ROKs. It was the first indication that America might be
seriously considering a dispatch of ground troops to Korea. General Yu wished
he had heard such news 24 hours earlier, when his troops had been crossing the
river and their morale was so low that some had contemplated suicide rather
than being captured alive by the Inmin-gun. The news of possible U.S. ground
troop participation would have done wonders for their morale.
MacArthur’s party got out of their cars on the southern bank of the Han
River, near Yongdung-po. On top of a hill, MacArthur saw the ancient capital of
Korea burning red as far as his eyes could see. From there, he conceived a plan.
He decided that the ROK army should retreat deep to south. This would
lengthen the enemy’s supply line. He would then cut it off at the rear, perhaps
near Seoul. Before his return, MacArthur visited his old friend General Kim
Chong-kap, commanding one of the divisions attempting to defend the river.
Upon his return to Tokyo, MacArthur reported to Washington, “The
lightly armed ROKs were designed for keeping law and order and were not
prepared to fight against the enemy force armed with tanks and airplanes.” He
concluded, as had Church, that the only way to recapture the lost territory was
to throw in American ground troops. Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins told

76. Stanley Weinstraub, MacArthur’s War, (New York, London, etc.: Simon &
Schuster, 2000) P.52, hereafter Weinstraub.

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him to send a regimental combat team (roughly 5,000 men) immediately to

Busan. MacArthur said that would not be enough. Collins asked how much more
he needed. MacArthur replied that two infantry divisions should follow the
regimental combat team by restructuring the U.S. occupation army in Japan. He
warned that, if necessary action were not taken immediately, America might pay
a costly and unnecessary price in terms of human life and prestige worldwide. If
the enemy advanced much farther, it would threaten the Republic. MacArthur
asked for the immediate approval of President Truman. Collins observed that it
was 3:00 a.m. in Washington. MacArthur’s response was, “Wake him up.”
At 4:57 a.m., Secretary of Army Frank Pace woke up President Truman
with the bad news. Truman authorized MacArthur to use all the forces available
to him. Losing the battle was not acceptable to Truman.
Ground forces available to MacArthur at the outset of the war included one
cavalry division and three infantry divisions under the Eighth U.S. Army in
Japan, and the 29th Regimental Combat Team on Okinawa. Their
maneuverability and firepower were well below wartime requirements. Some
weapons, such as the medium tanks, were not available in the Far East, and
ammunition reserves amounted to only a 45-day supply. MacArthur’s Far East
Air Force (FEAF) was much better prepared, but it was organized for air
defense, not tactical air support. Most FEAF planes were short-range jet
interceptors, not meant to fly at low altitudes in support of ground operations.
Mustangs in storage in Japan and more in the United States would later
prove instrumental in meeting close air support requirements. Naval Forces Far
East, MacArthur’s sea arm, controlled only five combat ships and a skeleton
amphibious force, although reinforcement was close by from the Seventh Fleet.

TACTICAL ERRORS ALL AROUND

The Inmin-gun halted its attack briefly, after capturing Seoul, to celebrate
and repair the bridge over the Han River. Festivals were held; and Kim Il Sung
gave the Inmin-gun 3rd and 4th Divisions and 10th Tank Regiment, which
captured Seoul, the honorary title of the “Seoul Division.” The Inmin-gun then
hesitated to make an all out, immediate attack across the Han River, partly
because there was a shortage of river-crossing equipment and partly because of
the shortage of ammunition and other supplies. In the days that followed,

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thousands of Seoul citizens were mobilized and forced to repair the bridge and
rail crossings.
Writing his memoir some 45 years later, General Yu said that in his
judgment, as a military tactician, they could have and should have sent tanks
over the undamaged track of the rail bridge immediately. The ROK did not have
anything with which to repel tanks.
General Kim Hong Il was commanding all the ROK forces who were
desperately trying to defend the southern bank of the Han River. Kim positioned
all available forces along the bank. He had been through challenging assignments
in the Chinese Nationalist Army, but this one topped them all. There was much
confusion. Soldiers were discouraged, having lost buddies and commanders, and
were deserting the army. As this was happening, a group of ROKs tried
desperately to hold off Inmin-gun who were landing on the coastal area off
Kimpo via fishing boats and rafts. An Inmin-gun reconnaissance team probed
the southern bank of the river at several locations, sometimes supported by
artillery and tank bombardments from across the river.
The ROKs had fought well for several days, engaging the Inmin-gun on a
hand-to-hand combat in one encounter. However, the contest was over on July 3,
when the Inmin-gun sent the tanks over the rail bridge that they had just
repaired. The major airfield at Kimpo and the Yellow Sea port of Inchon fell to
enemy hands.
General Yu had many years to think about the way the ROK Army fought
the Inmin-gun during the first several days of the war. He wrote apologetically
that his 7th Division did not make a better account of itself. He had been the
commander of the 7th Division only fifteen days when the war broke out. He saw
the maneuvering of T-34 tanks on the other side of the 38th parallel, and started
to dig defensive trenches in case of invasion. However, before that work could be
completed, the war started. And the 2.36-inch bazooka, their principle defense
against Russian tanks, had tested successfully against German tanks during
World War II but it was not tested against the T-34 — there was no reason to
do so against an ally’s tank.
In hindsight, the ROKs were badly outmatched in terms of weapons,
training, and manpower. The surprise attack further ensured their early defeat.
Although a series of miscalculations and intelligence failures in Washington
doomed the ROKs even before the war began, the naiveté of Brigadier General
Roberts and Ambassador Muccio (if not the game they played) guaranteed the
horrendous casualties of the ROKs. Some anti-tank mines if not tanks in the

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hands of the ROKs would have bought valuable time and saved thousands of
lives, but Roberts had declared that Korea was not tank country.

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10. AN UGLY WAR

Ambassador Muccio was probably as close to President Syngman Rhee as

any American at that time. Muccio described Rhee as having phenomenal
stamina for a man of 70, but said that “he had his better spells and less stalwart
spells.” He was certainly getting old. His Austrian-born wife, Mary, helped him
with his appointments with foreigners and kept in touch with the U.S. embassy.
Soon after President Rhee fled Seoul, Muccio left Seoul and drove south in
search of him. He found him in a house in Daejon, some 90 miles away. Muccio
wanted a promise that the ROK government would remain in existence while
tacitly turning the war over to America. As historian Joseph Goulden has
pointed out, if the government vanished, so would any U.S. pretense at being in
South Korea to defend a democratically elected government.77 The thought of
surrender certainly never crossed Rhee’s mind, although Muccio had no way of
knowing that.
Muccio had one particularly sensitive matter to discuss with Rhee. He
asked whether the Cabinet and the National Assembly could stand-down for the
time being, so the war could be left to military professionals with minimal
interference by politicians. Rhee accepted the U.S. suggestion, which amounted
to surrendering his command of the ROK military and ignoring his National
Assembly. This “agreement” was called the Daejon Agreement, but it was not
approved by the ROK National Assembly.

77. Goulden, pp. 89-90.

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The ROK was not a U.N. member country, and a means of coordinating
with U.S. forces had to be found. The agreement between Rhee and Muccio was
not put in writing, but on July 14, 1950, Syngman Rhee simply directed the ROK
Army Chief of Staff, General Chung Il Kwon, who by then had replaced Chae, to
place himself under the U.N. Command (UNC).78 The ROK Army was neither
an integral part of the UNC, nor independent of it. The ROK had little say in the
decision-making at the UNC. Subsequent statements made by Rhee indicated
that he anticipated that the war would be over soon, once the United States
intervened. However, this was not to be, and Rhee erupted into fits of anger
when the U.S. all but ignored him.
The coordination protocol that evolved included Walker or his chief of
staff calling the chief of staff of the ROK Army, upon which the ROK chief of
staff would issue orders to his commanders. Later, each U.S. company integrated
100 Korean soldiers, who were known as Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army
(better known by the acronym “KATUSA”). An American historian wrote that
they were green, true, but “brave and willing, and blended into the American
outfits in a way that increased the American units’ efficiency and power by a full
[one] third.”79 The U.S. 7th Infantry Division had 8,000 Korean recruits within it.
In September, 1950, Paik’s ROK 1st Division became part of the U.S. I Corps.
Some American writers have described Syngman Rhee as a difficult,
obstinate or mercurial person. However, the above action of turning over his
command to the U.S. Army suggests that Rhee was an American puppet. For the
Communists, he had been a puppet all along. He then tried to ignore the wishes
of his National Assembly and proceeded to run the country with an iron grip.
Koreans and Americans alike accused him of being a dictator. Ironically, these
accusers included Ambassador Muccio, who had led Rhee along this path.
It was French statesman Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929) who said, “War
is too important a matter to be left to the military.” The U.S. government saw
nothing wrong in asking Rhee to abandon democracy and hand over the ROK
military to the United Nations Command.
“Leave the war to the professionals” had a ring of practicality to it —
although America would not think of leaving a real war to military men. The U.S.
did not ask the U.K. to transfer its all decision-making to General Eisenhower in

78. Appleman, p. 112.

79. Frazer Hunt, The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur (The Devin-Adair Company:
New York, 1954), p. 457.

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return for America’s sending its ground troops to England. There was neither a
consultative body nor a combined command. Coordination between the UNC
and the ROK Army was poor. The supply of weapons and ammunition to the
ROK Army was neglected.
In July, 1950, MacArthur’s FEC ordered the Eighth U.S. Army (known for
its acronym EUSAK) to assume all logistical support of the U.S. and its allied
forces in Korea. This included the ROK military, but although the ROKs held
half the battle line, they had trouble getting anything approaching a fair share of
the ammunition and other war materiel shipped over from Japan. Despite direct
orders from General Walker, American quartermasters in the rear hijacked
supplies intended for the ROKs. The ROK supplied their troops with foods,
uniforms and other such supplies, but Korea had no capacity to supply them
with weapons and ammunition.
The Communists found it easier to attack and defeat the poorly-equipped
ROK Army than they did the American units. However, when the ROK units
broke and ran, they exposed the flank of the American units, causing the
American units to run — once again proving the old adage that any chain is as
strong as its weakest link.

After his retreat to Busan, Syngman Rhee lived in a small house and did not
have much say in the conduct of the war. Still being president of the ROK,
however, he wished to send cables thanking those U.N. member nations that
had promised their help in the war and wanted the messages routed through his
embassy in Washington, D.C. However, the U.S. Army had taken control of all
Korean telegraph and cable facilities, even the commercial cable between Busan
and Tokyo. The only way that Rhee could send messages out was through
EUSAK.
Rhee called Harold Noble of the American embassy, the son of his former
teacher at Paijai, and asked him to be so kind as to send the cable to the ROK
embassy in Washington. Noble agreed, taking the messages to the 24th Division
signal office, where a sergeant informed him that the messages would be
dispatched as soon as military traffic had lessened. The next day, Noble returned
to verify that the messages had gone out. They had not. The division’s public
information officer had refused to send them because some of Rhee’s messages to
other chiefs of state criticized the Soviet Union, contrary to command policy and
the express orders of the 24th Division.

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First, Noble argued with the communications officers — to no avail. Then

he appealed directly to General William Dean, a long-time acquaintance.
General Dean authorized the dispatch of the messages. Ambassador Muccio
sympathized with Rhee on the cable incident. He thought the disdain the
American military felt toward the ROK was wrong, but he could not change
their attitude.
Muccio said that the newly-arrived Americans made no attempt to conceal
their contempt for the ROKs. Major General Hobart R. Gay, commanding
general of the 1st Cavalry Division, told a press conference that he did not intend
to take the ROKs into consideration “at all” in deciding how to deploy his
troops. A few days afterward, when a ROK unit saved his right flank from a
severe beating, he reconsidered. Gay also forced Korean farmers out of their
homes, oblivious to the suffering that his orders caused. He even told the Korean
national police to leave his zone of operation — thus undermining his own
security. Walker forced Gay to rescind this absurd order.80

In the early days of the war, Kim Il Sung and Moscow had their own
worries. They did not anticipate American intervention. The Inmin-gun was
losing tanks to American fighter-bombers, and ROK suicide units were
destroying tanks as well. He would need more men and tanks. Kim Il Sung
drafted not only college students but even high school students to join the war.
This decision fell upon the Lee family in a very personal way. Simon was
seventeen years old. In the city of Hamhung, in mid-July, 1950, the principal of
Simon’s school received a directive from a Party cadre to “volunteer” 50 students
from the First High School to the Inmin-gun. Simon and other student leaders
were summoned to the principal’s office.
The principal, a man in his 50s from a family of landowners, had studied
English in Japan. The principal was not a member of the Party but pretended to
be a Communist. The person who really controlled the school was the leader of
the Youth Cadets of the Worker’s Party.
Simon had known the Party would test his loyalty one day, but he had not
thought that it would mean going to war before he entered college. At that time,
he was waiting eagerly to hear the results of his application to Kum Chuk
Engineering University. He wanted to study chemical engineering and become a
national hero.

80. Goulden, pp. 144-45.

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The next day, the school held a rally. Several speeches followed and a
resolution already drafted by the Party was adopted unanimously; everyone in
the room knew that the government would not tolerate dissent. Fifty students
were selected, and all the students shouted, “Long Live Great Leader Kim Il
Sung, Long Live the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The rally was an
unqualified “success.”
Simon tried hard to be seen as a good Communist. Only with a good
recommendation of the Party could one advance to a university. To the
Communists, the ideology of a student is far more important than academic
excellence. After all, why should they educate a student who may turn out to be
an enemy of the “people”?
It was hard to tell who was the real and who was the fake Communist.
Fifty years later, in the year 2000, when President Kim Dae Jung visited
Pyongyang, there were a half million citizens lined up in the streets shouting,
“Great Leader Kim Jung Il!” Many of them were in tears. How many were true to
themselves?
A few days later, Simon and other “volunteers” boarded a train heading
south. It spewed black smoke from the low-quality coal it burned. The train hid
from American planes during the day and could travel only at night. There was
heavy traffic along the railway. At each station, trains were loaded with either
soldiers or military supplies, moving south. There were several tanks and trucks
on one train. Simon and his classmates got off near Pyongyang.
He received training as a T-34 tank loader, responsible for loading the
shells. There were some truck drivers among the trainees who received training
as tank drivers. The machine was simple. Drivers and mechanics sometimes
could learn to handle it after only a few days of training. Simon was told that the
T-34 was very reliable and was still the best medium tank available then. A
Russian engineer by the name of Tsiganov had designed it. Its armor protection,
mobility, and firepower were excellent. It had a 76mm gun, with a long barrel
length with high muzzle velocity. The Christie suspension system was ideal for a
hilly country like Korea. The armor was superior to German medium tanks. Yet,
the diesel fuel lent a great operational range — between 200 km to 350 km —
and had a low risk of explosion. The speed of 51 km per hour and its
maneuverability in rough terrain were a boon. The instructor told them there
was nothing in the arsenal of South Korea to stop these tanks.
The training lasted only a few weeks. They hid the tanks under thatched
huts during the day. American fighter planes were already making sorties over

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North Korea. The supply of ammunition was low, however, and Simon was given
only one chance to shoot the gun. He wasn’t even sure he hit the target.
However, that was it. They had to save the ammunition for real battle. In the
evenings, they were given political and ideological training.
One day in early August, the tanks were loaded onto a train under the
supervision of Russian officers, and his unit began to move to the front. The train
moved only at night, and the days were spent in tunnels, hiding. After a week,
the train could no longer move because bridges had been blown up. After this,
the tanks made a slow nocturnal march on their own diesel engines, which
generated 500 horsepower. Before daybreak, they had to spend time finding
places to hide and camouflage the tanks. Along the way, a few of the tanks broke
down, and there were no repair parts. Soon, they realized that the dear comrades
in Moscow had sent old tanks to North Korea — tanks that had seen their best
days during World War II.
Simon did not know where he was going. No one gave such information to
a lowly private. He knew that they were going in the direction of Weonju and
then toward Andong. From there, Daegu was not far away. Simon was not sure
how the Inmin-gun was going to defeat the Americans if all their tanks spent the
whole day hiding. One fateful evening as they started their advance, there was a
baptism by fire from American Mustangs. A tank in front of his caught fire from
napalm, blocking the narrow road. Infantry soldiers who were riding the tank
banged the turret, asking to open the hatch — but there was no room in the tank
for them. Several soldiers caught fire and began to incinerate with agonizing
screams. Bombs exploded, and machine gun fire caught some of the tankers who
had decided to come out of the tanks rather than being incinerated within them.
Simon’s tank could neither advance nor retreat. Some of the tankers got down
and headed straight up a tree-covered hill. His gunner decided to get out and
asked Simon to follow. Another machine gun burst broke a nearby pine tree
limb. They dashed toward the tree-covered mountain. By the time the two made
it up the hill, the other tankers could not be found — they had run even faster!
Both of them decided they had had enough war. The idea of becoming a war
hero disappeared right then and there. There was no tank to return to. Simon
saw that the Inmin-gun could not possibly win this war. They had seen too
many of their “indestructible tanks” hunkering down in tunnels and hiding
under heavy camouflage. They decided to go home. Simon wasn’t able to fire a
single shell toward the ROK side. This was a long way from Hamhung.

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Among the first things Kim Il Sung introduced within the so-called
“liberated areas” of South Korea were the rapid reconstruction of the Workers
Party and the introduction of land reform. The Inmin-gun immediately began to
resuscitate the South Korea Worker’s Party and the People’s Committees, which
had by that time been all but destroyed. Many previously unheard of
organizations were created: youth groups, women’s groups, leagues of writers,
etc. Artists were urged to produce ideology-oriented publications and
performances.
At this time, Soon-ku was hiding from the Communists in his aunt’s house.
Communists were actively making rounds. They knocked the door of each house
in Seoul. On the streets, Youth Group members simply grabbed pedestrians and
“volunteered” them to the Inmin-gun. Soon-ku decided to move south, near
Suwon, to another relative’s house. He soon learned that even out in the
countryside, the Communists were looking for young people suitable for the
Inmin-gun or war labor.
The Communists were also looking for pro-Japanese, pro-Syngman Rhee,
and pro-American elements. These “reactionaries” were tried in “people’s courts”
composed of Party members with no particular legal training or expertise except
loyalty to Kim Il Sung and the spirit of proletarian revolution. Few of the
accused were released. Most either disappeared or were sent to the firing squad.
One of most celebrated such trials involved twelve or so priests, nuns and
missionaries. One person on trial was an American Catholic bishop, Patrick
Byrne. The people’s court demanded that he confess to being an agent of the CIA.
Although the fledgling CIA commanded little respect in Washington, D.C., it did
in North Korea. Many reactionaries were sentenced to death as “agents” of the
CIA.
A judge said to Bishop Byrne, “You shall denounce the United States, the
United Nations, and the Vatican on the radio, or you must die.”
His surprising reply came without hesitation: “There remains only one
course for me — that I die.”
A few days later, the bishop and others were sent to a North Korean camp;
four months later, die he did.81
Soon-ku was still a ROK officer, and the prospect of being caught and
executed by the Party grew increasingly real. He decided that the time had
arrived for him to move south and join his unit. He traveled by night and slept in

81. Father Philips Cosbie, Penciling Prisoners (Melbourne: Hawthorn, 1954), pp. 67-81.

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the hills during the day, slipping across battle lines and finally making it to the
ROK Army Headquarters located in Daegu.
By this time, some two months had passed since the war started. The
reception he got at the ROK Army Headquarters was chilling. He had already
been listed as dead or missing in action. There were numerous cases like him at
that time, i.e., “failure to report to the unit.” The interrogations dragged on for
several days. They demanded to know what had taken Soon-ku so long to
reappear: Was he a deserter? Or (even worse), was he a Communist agent now
attempting to re-infiltrate the ROK army? They eventually concluded that Soon-
ku was neither, but did note in his file his failure to report to his unit promptly.
For one month, he was not allowed to wear his captain’s insignia, and when his
classmates from the Academy moved up to the rank of major, he remained a
captain.
Meanwhile, his aunt’s family in Seoul was facing another kind of problem.
There was a shortage of rice among the Inmin-gun. The bombardment was
becoming increasingly effective, and supplies were not reaching the occupied
area. So the Inmin-gun began to “borrow” rice and other supplies from the
civilians. Though they promised to return the rice in a matter of days, several
days later the Inmin-gun came to “borrow” even more.
As the food situation worsened, all of those whose work did not require
them to stay in Seoul were assigned by the People’s Committee to work in the
mines and farms in the countryside. Those who received such assignments were
ordered to leave their belongings behind for delivery later and were told to leave
the city without delay.
At that time, my second half-brother Hong-ku was still in Seosan,
attending Hong Sung Middle School (a six-year secondary school). He had
entered the school late, and he still had one more year to go before graduation.
What concerned everyone in Seosan was the land reform system being
introduced by the Communists. South Korea had had land reform before the
arrival of the Inmin-gun.82 However, its version of land reform model was based
on compensation to the landlords to be paid over time by the landless and tenant
farmers who received the redistributed land.83 But this time, the Communists
sought to impose the North Korean model, in which landowners received no
compensation and the landless paid no money for the land. This practice sharply

82. See, for example, Park (1988), pp. 210-212.

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split farming communities. All of sudden, some of Hong-ku’s neighbors, mostly

tenant farmers, declared themselves to be Communists.
It was the endless meetings that bothered Hong-ku most. Day and night,
the Communists taught him North Korean songs praising Kim Il Sung and
provided political education. He was a practicing Catholic, and Communism did
not appeal to him. Some of his fellow middle school students joined left-wing
youth organizations and began to finger other students as “reactionaries” and
“pro-Japanese lackeys” and to beat them up. Hong-ku was threatened. What
was once a quiet rural town had turned into a battleground between the left-
and right-wing groups.
One day, the so-called “Democratic Youth Organization” ordered all the
young men of Samsung-ri Township to gather in front of the Seosan County
Office. They were trying to “volunteer” young people to join the Inmin-gun. All
of them, including Hong-ku, were lined up and marched to an unrecognized
location.
Hong-ku thought fast, and told the leader that he had already volunteered
to join the Inmin-gun through his middle school in Hong Sung, and in fact, had
been on his way to take the school’s medical examination. Hong Sung being in
another county, the youth leader had no way to check the accuracy of Hong-ku’s
story, and released him.
Hong-ku immediately went into hiding, and later went to Daegu and
sought out his elder brother, Soon-ku. Soon-ku advised him to enter a ROK
training program for artillery officers; its entrance examination was being held
soon. That is how, several months later, Hong-ku ended up becoming an ROK
officer.
Communism was not as popular in South Korea as Kim Il Sung had hoped.
When the war started, he did not get the kind of support he expected — partly
because of the orthodox Confucian orientation of Koreans and because the
South Korean government’s anti-Communism campaign worked, to some
extent. Communism did not have indigenous roots in Korea.
There were desertions from, and division within, the South Korean
Worker’s Party. Kim Il Sung’s radio appeals to South Korean laborers to stage a

83. The government fixed the value of land at 150 percent of the value of average
annual crop production. South Korean landlords received this compensation over a five-
year period. Because of rapid inflation that followed, the actual payment received by the
landlord on an inflation-adjusted basis was a fraction of the face value determined by the
150 percent of annual crop production.

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general strike went unheeded, and his appeals to farmers, small entrepreneurs,
merchants, artists, and intellectuals to join in a battle for the Fatherland fared no
better. As he complained later to his Deputy Premier Park Hun Yong, who was
in charge of organizing popular uprisings in South Korea, there were no
uprisings — except by several known guerillas in South Korea.84
Reports of purges, mass killings, hard labor, and other atrocities committed
by the Communists85 after their arrival in South Korea did nothing to endear
Communism to South Koreans. Thousands of family members of ROK soldiers
and policemen and reactionaries were executed. The number of “volunteers”
dwindled after several rounds of recruitment, forced labor became increasingly
common. The Communists entered the house, checked the amount of food
available, designated some portion of it “excessive” and confiscated it The price
of rice went up five-fold between June 25th and mid-July, 1950. Starvation was
common. The price of used clothes dropped sharply because people sold clothes
to buy food. The price of edible oils skyrocketed — because grass soaked in oil
before eating was said to lose its toxicity.

84. Seo, pp. 743-744.

85. Ibid, pp. 562-564.

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11. THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS

When President Truman authorized the use of ground troops at General

MacArthur’s disposal, the Eighth U.S. Army was in Japan (EUSAK); it had been
the principal occupation force of Japan. Lt. General Walton Harris Walker had
commanded the Army since 1948. During World War II, he had been a tank
commander under Gen. George Patton. This Texan with a stocky build and a
lined face looked like an unfriendly bulldog. To his men and to war
correspondents, he was just that. He suffered poor press coverage.
His first mission, requested by MacArthur, was to deploy a regimental
combat team quickly to Korea. The Army Chief of Staff thought that a
regimental combat team should be able to slow the advance of the Inmin-gun
until more U.S. troops could be fielded. Walker chose a regiment out of the 24th
Division, stationed on the Kyushu Island of Japan. Like most U.S. divisions
stationed in Japan, it was not combat-ready and was officially and optimistically
rated at 65 percent of combat capacity. Walker stripped another two divisions
to reinforce it. The budget-cutting in Washington had taken its toll on Walker’s
units.
The commander of the 24th Division was Maj. General William F. Dean. He
had a reputation as a “can do” general and was the only division commander in
the Eighth Army who had experience in leading troops in combat. He earned a
Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) for personally leading a platoon through a
withering German artillery barrage. His only blemish, in the eyes of some, was
that he entered the Army career via the ROTC.

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Walker’s order to Dean on the night of June 30 was to transfer one infantry
regiment and his headquarters to Busan immediately, by air. Dean chose the 21st
Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Stephans. However, even this
modest airlift was not possible because there were simply not enough airplanes
to transport the entire regiment.86 Most of them were tied up in evacuating U.S.
personnel. The airlift was therefore scaled down to a single “combat team” of
about 450 men.
This was how Major Brad Smith’s 1st Battalion, now called “Task Force
Smith,” ended up being airlifted alone to Korea. Neither Major Smith nor his
men knew that they were about to undertake one of the most perilous missions
of the Korean War. Smith’s rifle companies were under-strength and poorly
equipped.87 After five years of peace, only about 75 of the 440 men had faced an
enemy on the battlefield.
Dean tried to get to Korea by air, but twice the plane had to turn back —
once because of bad weather in Busan and another time because the Daejon
airport couldn’t be found in the darkness. Other battalions had problems finding
ships to take them to Korea. The 34th Regiment, commanded by Colonel
Loveless, managed to find a ship on the night of July 1 and arrived at Busan the
following evening.
When Smith’s unit arrived in Korea, thousands of Koreans lined the
streets, waving American flags, banners, and posters. At the railway station,
there was even a band. Obviously, the arrival of the first contingent of American
combat troops had been anticipated and well publicized.
The Smith battalion made it to Daejon on July 3 and found General Church,
the most senior American officer in Korea at that time, fuming over the rout of
the ROK Army. One day earlier, General Church had said that he would “trade
the entire ROK Army for 100 New York policemen” and that “the presence of a
few Caucasian soldiers would reverse the combat disasters” of the past several
days. When Smith reported to General Church, the general was brimming with
confidence. He put his finger on a map at Osan, a village south of Suwon, and

86. Due to budget cuts, FEAF had only about two dozen C-54s in Japan, employed
mostly in transporting emergency ammunition to South Korea and evacuating civilian
personnel.
87. A 75-mm recoilless rifle platoon with four guns (of which only two made it to
Korea) and four 4.2-inch mortars, two infantry companies with six other recoilless rifles
(bazookas) and four 60-mm mortars.

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 11. The First Hundred Days

told Smith that all that was required to stop the enemy were some American GIs
who would not run at the first sight of enemy tanks.
A tired and frustrated General Dean arrived at Daejon sometime later and
took command of all American forces in South Korea. Dean, too, assured the
Task Force that the mission would be “short and easy.” He was certain that the
Inmin-gun would run at the first of American uniforms. On this point, the two
generals appeared to agree. They were neither the first nor the last American
generals to underestimate the Inmin-gun, but this was just the kind of ignorance
or arrogance that had led to the war in the first place.
Dean then came up with a new and far more complex blocking plan than
what Church had suggested. Standing in front of a map of Korea, he put his
finger on the village of Pyongtaek, just south of Osan on the Seoul-Busan
highway. By this time, two other battalions of the 34th Regiment had arrived.
Dean decided to field a battalion commanded by Jay Loveless at Pyongtaek and
another at Ansong, a village about eleven miles directly east of Pyongtaek.
Loveless suggested that they would be “much more effective” if they fought
as a unit rather than splitting the regiment into three parts. Dean dismissed this
suggestion as a “negative attitude” and ordered Loveless to follow his plan
without offering unwanted advice. Historian Clair Blair would later call Dean’s
plan of scattering ill-equipped, under-strength battalions in this manner —
especially considering the poor communications between the units, “foolhardy.”
Concentrating all available forces at a more defensible site such as the Kum
River, about 30 miles farther south, might have been more effective.88 However,
to Dean, who suggested that the Inmin-gun would run at the sight of American
uniforms, Loveless’ suggestion apparently appeared unnecessarily cautious.

At this time, the ROK 17th Regiment (still commanded by Paik In Yup) was
near Pyongtaek. After retreating from the Ongjin Peninsula, it fought well
against the Inmin-gun 15th Division. For bravery, every soldier of the 17th
Regiment was awarded a one-rank promotion. In addition, the ROK Army
issued new uniforms and new equipment. The grateful soldiers had their hair
buzz-cut and swore to fight the enemy to the last man if necessary, even as
guerillas, if the Republic of Korea fell. Ironically, this unit would soon suffer
heavy casualties at the hands of the Royal Australian Air Force near Pyongtaek.
Distinguishing the ROKs from the Inmin-gun was particularly difficult near

88. See Blair, p. 97.

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battle lines. The Far East Air Force (FEAF) had a similar problem.89 Making
matters worse, Australian fighter-bombers mistook the Kum River for the Han
River and shot at everything north of the river. The Air Force blew up a train of
nine boxcars full of badly needed ammunition for the ROK Army. The explosion
lit up the sky of Pyongtaek for an entire night. Meanwhile, in Pyongtaek, Dean
had not made any attempt to include the 17th Regiment in the defense of Osan.
He was not the only general to consider the ROKs unworthy soldiers.
Syngman Rhee proposed to General Walker that he integrate ROK units into
U.S. troops, but Walker did not take up this suggestion. Walker decided to keep
the ROK units on the eastern front and the U.S. soldiers on the western front.

Major Smith and his men stood and fought well, but they were badly
outmatched and outnumbered.90 An effective air support at this critical juncture
could have made a difference, but the bad weather prevented the support that
Task Force Smith had been counting on. Perry’s six 105-mm howitzers,
positioned one mile south of Smith’s position, opened fire when a column of
enemy tanks was about a mile in front of Smith’s position. High-explosive shells
hit the tanks but did not damage them. The tanks did not even slow down.
Tank-busting HEAT shells were found to be effective, but Task Force
Smith had only six of them. In all, American infantry and artillerymen knocked
out four of the 33 enemy tanks. The remaining 29 tanks hardly seemed to notice
the attack and continued south along the highway to Osan. The Inmin-gun did
not turn tail at the first sight of American uniforms. One American soldier later
wrote: “Instead of a motley horde armed with old muskets, the enemy infantry
were well trained, determined soldiers and many of their weapons were at least
as modern as ours. Instead of charging wildly into battle, they employed a base of
fire, double envelopment, fire blocks on withdrawal routes, and skilled
infiltration.”
When Major Smith eventually gave an order to withdraw, the untrained
American soldiers who thus far had fought bravely did not know how to retreat
properly. They broke discipline and “bugged out” for the rear, throwing away
not only their heavy Browning automatic rifles and machine guns, but also
ammunition, M-1 rifles, carbines, helmets, boots, and even shirts as they plunged

89. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force In Korea 1950-1953 (Washington D.C.:
Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1983), p. 86, hereafter Futrell.
90. See Blair, Appleman, and Goulden for more detailed accounts of Task Force
Smith.

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 11. The First Hundred Days

wildly toward muddy rice paddies while being chased by enemy soldiers firing
sub-machine guns. Under the circumstances, Smith had no alternative but to
leave behind his dead and about 30 severely wounded men on litters, who were
tended by a brave corpsman who refused to flee. In all, Smith and Perry lost
about 185 men killed, wounded, captured, or missing.
Although better equipped than the ROKs, the U.S. troops suffered from the
same inadequacies that afflicted the ROKs: insufficient troop training, and
under-estimation of enemy strength from Washington to Tokyo. The utter
arrogance and ignorance of Church and Dean did not help. Dean later reflected
that his troops were more accustomed to “the lifestyle of houseboys” and “cheap
lays in Japan” than soldiering. The desperate mission of Major Smith was to halt
or delay the Inmin-gun advance long enough for MacArthur to move additional
soldiers. The task force failed to do that, although it fought bravely until the time
of retreat.
News of the defeat had a demoralizing effect on the rank and file of the U.S.
th
24 Division and on the ROKs. Doubt was raised about the effectiveness of their
weapons. Confidence in the quality of their military intelligence was shaken, and
the reliability and wisdom of their leaders’ tactics were questioned. However,
the Americans were learning valuable lesson.

In ensuing battles, other units of the U.S. 24th Division did no better than
Task Force Smith. On July 8, Dean climbed a hill overlooking Cheonan city and
saw one of his regiments flee without even making contact with the enemy. Dean
vented his anger and frustration on the commander of the regiment. In a calmer
moment on the same day, he wrote a letter to MacArthur, indicating that the
training and quality of equipment of the North Korean Army had been
underestimated. Its armored force, in particular, was formidable. Dean’s men
could not stop the T-34 tanks with 2.36 bazookas or ordinary high-explosive
105-mm artillery shells. He urgently needed new 3.5-inch bazookas, HEAT
shells, 90-mm antitank guns, and tanks.
The only force that could destroy the Inmin-gun tanks without too much
difficulty was U.S. warplanes. When weather conditions permitted, they scored
big. A flight of F-80 jets at Pyongtaek found enemy tanks and trucks lined
bumper-to-bumper on the highway. They called in all available B-26s and F-82s.
Together, they scored one of most decisive triumphs by the Air Force. The
combined air power that afternoon destroyed an estimated 38 tanks, 7 half-
tracks, and 117 trucks and claimed to have killed a large number of enemy

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 The Unfinished War

soldiers.91 The warplanes made enemy transportation of food and materiel

increasingly difficult.
Such successes were, however, limited because air operations during this
monsoon season were dictated by the weather, and the enemy simply started
moving at night. Most aircraft could not fly at night. The F-82s could, but the
FEAF did not have many of them and kept them mainly in Japan for the purpose
of interception, for which they were designed. As for the F-80s, the workhorse of
the air war, they flew out of Japan and with the limited size of their fuel tanks,
they could fly only fifteen minutes over target areas. Even with modified fuel
tanks, to which some F-80s switched, they could fly no more than 45 minutes
over target areas. The bigger fuel tank also made the F-80s somewhat sluggish.
Destroying the sturdy T-34 presented another challenge, as well. The only
effective weapon was the 5-inch high-velocity aircraft rocket (HVAR). Although
the Fifth Air Force was in top shape during peacetime, compared with the 8th
Army, the pilots got little practice with HVAR during peacetime. Yet, the U.S.
Air Force represented a severe test for the enemy. The F-51 Mustangs would
prove quite effective, especially with their capability with napalm. Mustangs
could burn the T-34s and terrorize the Inmin-gun soldiers — who were not
afraid of the normal arsenals of fighter-bombers. Mustangs would also use the
Daegu K-2 and Pohang K-3 airports, thus providing longer hours of operation.
The Air Force was one bright branch of the military in an otherwise humiliating
fight against the Inmin-gun.
On the ground, Walker and Dean agreed that the city of Daejon must be
defended. In 1950, Daejon was a city of 130,000 people and one of six major
population centers of South Korea. The railroad and highway branched out from
Daejon to the southwestern part of Korea, the Cholla provinces. If Daejon fell,
these two grain-rich provinces would be written off, too. Daegu is only some 100
miles south along the Seoul-Busan highway. Another 100 miles or so south is the
major port city of Busan.
Between July 14 and 18, MacArthur rushed the 25th and 1st Cavalry
Divisions to Korea. By then, the battle for Daejon had already started. The
natural barrier protecting Daejon was the Kum River, where a modest number of
American troops of the 24th Division were deployed. New 3.5-inch rocket
launchers, hurriedly airlifted from the U.S., hit two of the T-34 tanks and
penetrated their armor. MacArthur ordered maximum air support for the

91. Futrell, p. 91.

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 11. The First Hundred Days

ground troops. Yet, the U.N. forces could not stop the Inmin-gun advance on the
bank of the Kum River. It was too little, too late.

The mountainous area to the east of Dean’s 24th Division was the
responsibility of the ROK Army. The geography favored the defenders, but all
that the ROKs could do was to inflict as many casualties as possible on the
enemy as they retreated. As time passed, the ROK units were gaining experience,
and many stragglers who failed to cross the Han River on June 28 did get across
soon after, and rejoined their respective units. As a result, the ROK Army was
slowly regaining its strength. A few episodes provide a good testimony to that
fact.
In one battle in the sector, Brig. General Kim Suk-won of the Capital
Division, another former officer in the Japanese Army, stood in the middle of the
city street with the Japanese long sword Nippon-do to discourage his soldiers
from retreating. Indeed, his soldiers respected him and were loyal to him. In one
battle, his 17th Regiment mounted a counter-offensive against the Inmin-gun and
captured a strategic hill where an Inmin-gun machine gunner was chained to a
tree so that he could not run away. Such inhumane treatment of a soldier was
perhaps unprecedented in the history of human warfare. After a battle lasting
about six hours, the 17th Regiment recaptured a strategic hill while killing
hundreds of Inmin-gun and capturing others. Kim Suk-won did not change the
tide of the war, but he protected the flank of the Daejon sector where Americans
were trying to defend the city.
Other similar successes have been recorded elsewhere in the sector. An
Inmin-gun report later obtained from a POW mentioned that the increasing
effectiveness of the ROKs held up its progress. The North Korean Supreme
Command relieved and then probably shot three divisional commanders in
charge of the central and eastern sectors for failure to push the advance as
swiftly as planned.
On July 15, the ROK created the II Corps and appointed General Yu as the
Corps commander. He was 28 years old, and such a huge responsibility on a man
so young is indicative of the desperate situation. General Yu’s first responsibility
was to hold the Moongyong-Hamchang sector for at least five days. Otherwise,
the entire American sector would be at risk. During this desperate time, one
particular battle made a deep impression on him.
On July 21, the enemy broke through his defensive lines behind T-34 tanks.
Americans rushed 800 M-6 antitank mines to this front — but neither the ROK

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soldiers nor American military advisers had seen this particular model of anti-
tank mine before. There was not even time for the U.S. advisors to read the
instructions and teach the ROK soldiers how to use them. Therefore, to stop
oncoming tanks, ROK special operations units simply strapped prepared
charges around soldiers’ waists and the “anointed ones” moved to the side of a
tank, pulled the fuse lighter on a two-second fuse, and blew themselves up, thus
disabling the tank. The 6th Division stopped four enemy tanks that way; the
same special ops had destroyed eleven enemy tanks in this manner in earlier
battles. General Yu did not order such operations, but he did not stop them,
either.
With the FEAF air support and fighting men on the ground (including the
special ops), the II Corps held onto its sector until July 31, six days beyond the
orders from the ROK Army Headquarters. On that day, General Yu received
orders to retreat below the Nakdong River. By then, the ROK 6th Division had
lost one third of its soldiers in battle.
The ROKs on the east coat were less successful in holding the lines. In that
sector, North Korean units moved unopposed through some of the roughest
country in Korea. Luckily for the ROK and U.N. side, one main Inmin-gun force
moved so cautiously that it lost a golden opportunity to outflank the entire ROK
and the American lines across the peninsula. A U.S. Army war historian called
this delay “one of the enemy’s major tactical mistakes.” All across Korea, from the
Yellow Sea to the East Sea, the defensive lines retreated south.
Often, the U.S. side disbelieved the ROK reports of enemy kills, but one
American historian recorded:

On August 1 GHQ [in Tokyo] and the Pentagon estimated NKPA [North
Korean People’s Army or Inmin-gun] losses at 31,000 and 37,500, respectively.
Later the Army discovered (also to its amazement) that the true figure was
closer to 58,000. One reason for the gross underestimate was the tendency in
the Eighth Army to disbelieve or discount ROK estimates of casualties inflicted
on the NKPA. Because of these heavy losses, by early August the ten combat
divisions of the NKPA had been reduced to a total strength of but 70,000 men.
The vaunted NKPA armored force had diminished from 150 to 40-odd T-34
tanks. Owing to complete, uncontested American air and sea supremacy and
the NKPA’s ever-lengthening and complex lines of communications, it could
only barely supply its dwindling forces.92

92. Goulden, p. 136.

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 11. The First Hundred Days

The ROK side suffered as many casualties as the Inmin-gun. As Inmin-gun

casualties mounted, it simply recruited increasingly younger and older persons
both in North Korea and the occupied areas of South Korea to make up for the
losses. The ROKs did the same.

Even before the Task Force Smith saw action, MacArthur knew that he
needed more troops. He wired the JCS for one Marine regimental combat team
(RCT) and 700 aircraft. No longer was he under the illusion that a couple of
American infantry divisions could turn around the war. On July 3, the JCS
approved the dispatch of the Marine regiment and half of the warplanes
requested. Soon, MacArthur again implored the JCS for the 2nd Infantry
Division, the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, and a regiment of the 82nd Airborne
Division for operations he planned between July 20 and August 10.
Then, on July 9, he asked for additional divisions. There were only six
divisions outside Japan, and now MacArthur was requesting all but two of them.
What Washington initially believed to be a “sour little war” was now
threatening to suck up all the military assets of the U.S. At least one of the chiefs,
General Collins of the U.S. Army, wished he had spoken out more strongly
against intervention.
General Collins and General Vandenberg (Air Force Chief of Staff) flew to
Japan to assess the situation. MacArthur said that his success or failure would
depend on how fast and how much reinforcement Washington sent. For Bradley,
who was more concerned with the defense of Europe, MacArthur’s view was
troubling. However, from MacArthur’s point of view, Bradley’s reluctance and
foot-dragging endangered the lives of some American soldiers already in Korea.
MacArthur said that he was well aware of the Administration’s concern for
Western Europe and elsewhere. However, he was emphatic that success in
stopping the Communists here would slow them down elsewhere. Truman used
similar reasoning to send American troops to Korea, but the JCS, headed by
Bradley, did not share the view. The decision that emerged was to resume the
draft and build up the military. On July 20, Defense Secretary Johnson ordered
the mobilization of four National Guard divisions and two regimental combat
teams.
At the onset of the war, Truman’s decision to intervene was wildly popular.
According to a Gallup Poll conducted immediately after the invasion, 78 percent
of the public supported the intervention. On July 19, Truman sent a request to
Congress for a staggering sum of money: an emergency $10 billion defense

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appropriation. At that time, the entire fiscal 1951 budget was only $14 billion. He
wanted removal of the statutory limit of 2,005,882 on military manpower. He
also wanted authority to increase military and economic aid to allies, and to raise
taxes to finance defense spending, and to give the government tacit control over
strategic industries. Democrats and Republicans alike applauded this request
and upped the ante to $11 billion.
The Pentagon was authorized to raise a force of 3.2 million men and
women. Freshman Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas made a stirring floor
speech. Korea would go down in history “as a slaughterhouse for democracy or
as a graveyard for aggression.” Another congressman proposed permitting
MacArthur “to use the atomic bomb at his discretion.” In the end, Truman
received power to impose rationing and credit restrictions, direct allocations of
strategic materials, and control prices and wages.93 As Truman was to find out
later, obtaining the initial support was far easier than maintaining it when the
nation’s youth were being drafted and dying by the thousands.

In Korea, when the defense of the Kum River north of Daejon fell apart, the
battle around Daejon was fought in the streets. There was such confusion that
on July 19, General Dean had no idea where his battle lines were. Daejon fell and
Dean was captured. Blair provides a good summary of the military casualties of
each side at this point in the war:94 By August 1, the American ground forces had
incurred a total of 6,003 casualties. “This carnage was nearly three times that
incurred in World War II on D-day at bloody Omaha Beach (2,000)[.]” While
such numbers of casualties were terrible, “ROK casualties stood at an appalling
70,000.” In short, for every one U.S. military casualty, there were nearly 12 South
Korean military casualties. However, American reinforcements (the Army’s 5th
RCT, the Marine RCT, and the 2nd Infantry Division) were beginning to arrive at
Busan.
In spite of the doom and gloom projected by the British press, a brigade of
British soldiers was also on the move from Hong Kong. Almost as important as
the number of troops moving into South Korea was the arrival of heavy
equipment: the first tanks, self-propelled guns, heavy mortars that could actually
knock out the North Korean tanks, and radio equipment that actually worked.

93. Goulden, p. 136.

94. Blair, p. 172.

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General Walker decided to retreat to a more defensible line: on the other

side of the Nakdong River. This was a rectangular area roughly 50 miles in width
and 100 miles in depth. It was known to the outside world as the Busan
Perimeter; it contained Daegu, the third largest city of South Korea, at the
northern end and Busan at the southern end. Daegu was where Walker’s Eighth
U.S. Army Headquarters was located.
The first regiment of the 25th Infantry Division arrived at Busan on July 12
and entered the battle on July 20. Major General William Kean, a West Pointer
who was once the chief of staff of Bradley’s 1st Army in Europe, commanded the
division. He had not distinguished himself as a student and had not commanded
a unit in combat action. His 24th Regiment was an all-black unit commanded by
several white officers. Although Truman had ordered the integration of the Army
in 1948, the Army had, until then, remained segregated. The 1st Cavalry
commanded by Maj. General Robert R. Gay also arrived. Gay was once the chief
of staff under General Patton. Walker was disappointed with the initial actions
of these divisions. They seemed to retreat in panic when the circumstances did
not justify such actions.
The 5th Cavalry Regiment faced a special kind of problem. Its forward
position was defended by land mines, but the Inmin-gun rounded up several
hundred Korean refugees and forced them to go through the minefield,
exploding the mines. The wartime atrocities had reached another unprecedented
level.
On August 7, General Ridgway made an uncommon observation during his
visit to Daegu. With him were W. Averell Harriman, Lauris Norstad, and their
aides. They met with Walker and EUSAK staff and inspected some frontline
units. All three were dismayed by what they found. Later, in a damning report
Ridgway wrote, in effect, that Walker’s leadership of EUSAK was abysmal.
Walker could not even name the “key commanders” in the ROK Army.95
The Eighth Army as a whole, Ridgway went on, suffered from “a lack of
knowledge of infantry fundamentals[,] a lack of leadership in combat echelons,
[and] the absence of an aggressive fighting spirit.” The ROK forces, Ridgway
concluded, “are doing better than the U.S. forces. They are imbued with the only
offensive spirit observed in Korea.”96

95. Blair, p. 185.

96. Ibid, p. 186.

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Flying back to Tokyo that night, Matt Ridgway believed that Walker
should be relieved of command, but Ridgway refrained from discussing the
matter with MacArthur. There was a danger that the general might misinterpret
his motives and denounce him as a Truman lackey interfering with his
operations or as a throat-cutter trying to create a job for himself.
The whole world watched a war in an obscure country that they hardly
knew existed. The only true super power was reeling from the punches thrown
by North Korea. Newspapers all over the world showed maps of the battlefront,
moving south, deeper day by day. As narrated by Goulden, an English
newspaper, The Statesman, said, “The United States should recognize a lost cause
and stop pouring men into this Asian sinkhole.” It urged the British government
to cancel the plan to send a brigade of 1,800 men to Korea. The Soviets were
utterly delighted that its surrogate was beating the mighty U.S. army that they
might have to face one day.

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 11. The First Hundred Days

Walker recognized the vital necessity of holding the Busan Perimeter, but
he was overly fearful of his units being outflanked. The North Koreans knew this
weakness. They also knew that the Americans would not fight if their supply
line was cut off even for a moment. The threat of encirclement would create
panic within the U.N. units. The Inmin-gun could fight by living off the land, but
U.S. soldiers required not only their stateside foods, but also water purified in
Japan!
Walker apparently wanted authority to move his EUSAK Headquarters
from Daegu to Busan. He feared the loss of his communications equipment,
which was practically irreplaceable if destroyed or captured. He felt that the
enemy was so close to Daegu that the equipment was endangered. This brought
MacArthur and Almond flying out of Tokyo. MacArthur simply said to Walker
that EUSAK must cease its withdrawals and stand its ground. There would be
“no Korean Dunkirk.”
Walker got the message. Regardless of how many men perished and under
what circumstances, EUSAK must “stand or die.” Two days later, he spoke to
General Kean and the 25th Division staff and said, “There will be no more
retreating, withdrawal, or readjustment of the lines or any other term you
choose. There is no line behind us to which we can retreat. There will be no
Dunkirk, there will be no Bataan; a retreat to Pusan would be one of the greatest
butcheries in history[.] We must fight until the end.”97 One field officer who
heard this directive said his men understood the order as meaning, “Stay and die
where you are.” However, another regimental commander said he and his men
received the order with a “great sense of relief.”98
Later, Walker told his division commanders: “If the enemy gets into Taegu,
you will find me resisting him in the streets, and I’ll have some of my trusted
people with me and you had better be prepared to do the same. Now get back to
your division and fight it!” Walker told another laggard general that he did not
want to see him back from the front again unless it was in a coffin.
Amid what was a discouraging performance of the U.S. troops, the 1st
Marine Brigade was the first American combat unit to score victory. As the
Inmin-gun was soon to find out, even inexperienced Marines were different from
the U.S. infantry. They were a formidable combat unit of 6,534 men, not only

97. Appleman, p. 206.

98. Goulden, p. 174.

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with superior training and physical fitness but also with organization and
equipment, complete with new 3.5-inch bazookas, medium 105-mm howitzers,
the M-26 Pershing (with a 90-mm gun), and supporting fighter planes consisted
of three squadrons of F-4U Corsair prop planes and one squadron of four two-
man Sikorsky helicopters, the first American helicopters to be sent to a war
zone.99 Most of all, the Marines had kept in training and had the spirit of the
Marines, “esprit de Corps.” They could out walk any soldier and out last any
fanatical soldier in hand-to-hand combat.
The Marines’ first mission was to defend the western portion of the Busan
Perimeter around Chinju and Masan, cities just west of Busan. Facing this
brigade was the Inmin-gun 6th Infantry Division, which earlier played an
important role in the capture of Seoul and then rushed down the west coast,
suffering relatively minor casualties. They remained 8,000 men strong after
suffering only 400 killed or wounded. On July 28, the commander, Maj. General
Wae Pang, confidently told his troops that the enemy was demoralized and that
they should simply annihilate the remnants of the enemy. The “liberation of
Chinju and Masan,” he said, would cut the enemy’s windpipe.
However, the Marines brought the North Koreans to an abrupt halt while
inflicting heavy losses to the Inmin-gun 6th Infantry Division. The victory was
known as the Kosong Turkey Shoot. Before the Marines were able to celebrate
their victory, however, they were ordered to move south to a new position.
Enemy troops had broken through the Nakdong River and the Marines were
needed to counterattack.
The responsibility for the counterattack fell on the 2nd Battalion of the 5th
Marine Regiment. The fight for the No Name Ridge was reported in The New York
Times, warming the hearts of the Americans back home who had heard few
stories of success.100 It was a fierce battle. One of the platoons leading a charge
up the No Name Ridge was led by Second Lieutenant Michael J. Shinka. He had
only fifteen soldiers left at the end, but refused to withdraw. When the smoke
cleared, it was the Inmin-gun who had lost.
When Paik’s tattered division (now down to less than 3,000 men after
successive battles) arrived at Sangju on July 26, several surprises awaited him.
The 20th Regiment and some young men were waiting to join the remnants of
the 1st Division. This brought the total force to more than 7,000 men. In addition,

99. Blair, p. 193.

100. James Bell, in The New York Times (August 28, 1950).

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an artillery battalion, with new model M2 105-mm artillery, joined his division.
Many of Paik’s soldiers, who had no rifles (this was the situation before as well
as during the war), were issued M1s or carbines. Apparently, U.S. war
equipment and supplies were now being rushed to the ROKs. FEAF air support
also became more effective. Their morale soared. Paik received the first of four
stars that he would eventually receive, but this was a bitter promotion for Paik.
By this time, the 1st Division had retreated some 300 km since leaving the
Han River. During this month-long retreat, he lost many soldiers, but those who
survived had become battle-hardened, with iron legs. Some stragglers who had
been lost above the Han River returned to their units. The 1st Division engaged
enemies in three major battles and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.
However, it lost several regimental and battalion commanders, as well as over
half of its troops.
By August 1, the ROK 1st Division had taken up a defensive position along
the Nakdong River north of Daegu. Paik’s 7,000 men were spread thinly over a
41-km defense perimeter. The Inmin-gun, which was following close on their
heels, decided to attack and break into the Perimeter. They had three times more
men and ten times the firepower of the 1st Division. Paik’s men did not know the
number of enemy soldiers confronting them. The enemy tried to ford the river at
its shallower spots. Machine guns shot down most of them. The river and the
sandy beaches were stained red with their blood. Yet, they kept on coming, and
some even broke through the lines and appeared behind the 1st Division. At the
front of these suicide squads were South Korean conscripts. The Inmin-gun
called this human shield “volunteers.”
Luckily, the morale of the 1st Division was high. They had just received a
supply of new anti-tank weapons, 3.5-inch bazookas, and 57-mm recoilless guns.
After brief training, each regiment was issued two to three bazookas. They
organized special ops to counterattack. Their mission was to cross the river and
destroy enemy tanks. With their help, the 12th Regiment destroyed the first four
enemy tanks and captured another. All together, ten tanks were destroyed.
Finally, the 1st Division recovered from tank-phobia and the soldiers began
volunteering to join the special force to hunt down enemy tanks.
The hardest battles, however, were still ahead of them. Paik got Walker’s
message: “Stand or die.” There was no place to retreat to. Paik decided to make
the final stand at Dabudong, which was only 25 km north of Daegu. The
topography favored the defenders. If the ROK 1st Division failed to hold the line,
Daegu (with Walker’s EUSAK Headquarters) would fall. The enemy was

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making an all-out attack to push the U.N. forces and the ROK out of the
peninsula by August 15. This was the anniversary date of the liberation of Korea
from Japan. Kim Il Sung set this date as the victory day for the Communists.
Battles intensified as August 15 approached. The 1st Division lost ground
during the night but usually reclaimed it during the day. U.S. air support became
more frequent and better coordinated with the ground operations. Usually,
within 30 minutes of request, fighter planes appeared over the battlefield and
provided two hours of support. Even with such support, however, the 1st
Division was losing some ground each day. The attack from the elite Inmin-gun
3rd Division was sharp and brutal. August 14 turned out to be the peak of the
battle. All the fronts entered hand-to-hand combat. It was too close to use rifles.
Instead, they hurled grenades. Dead soldiers from both sides piled up so high
that they were used as human shields. On August 15, Paik decided that the 1st
Division could not hold the line much longer and requested troop
reinforcements from EUSAK and the ROK II Corps under General Yu. Paik
received replies quickly, indicating that the EUSAK and ROK II Corps were
each sending a regiment. He was ordered to hold the lines until the
reinforcements arrived.
On August 16, Paik received word that the U.S. FEAF would carpet bomb
his fronts and that soldiers were requested to dig trenches deeper and not to
raise their heads above ground level. Apparently, the bombers intended to drop
close over his troops. This gave his soldiers a ray of hope. Paik ordered all his
regiments to prepare to launch counterattacks. His reasoning was: “If we are
experiencing pressure, the enemy may be facing greater pressure.” Before noon,
all regiments counterattacked.
At about noon, B-29s pounded the western quarter of the 1st Division’s
fronts. The earth shook. The bombing continued for 26 minutes. Ninety-eight B-
29s dropped 3,234 bombs weighing about 900 tons. An area of 5.6-km width and
12 km depth was pockmarked with bomb craters. Most of the enemy soldiers,
however, had already crossed the Nakdong River and were eyeball to eyeball
with Paik’s units. Although enemy casualties were not heavy, the carpet-
bombing devastated enemy morale.
On August 17, Col. John H. “Mike” Michaelis’ 27th Regiment came to
support the ROK 1st Division with its formidable firepower. The 27th Regiment
was General Walker’s mobile support regiment, shuffling from one critical
battlefront to another. Colonel Mike later became a four-star general and
commanded the U.S. forces in Korea. Paik detailed the firepower of this regiment

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 11. The First Hundred Days

in his autobiography as if he were envious of all the equipment under Mike’s

command: three battalions of infantry, a battalion of 105-mm artillery (18 guns),
a company of tanks, a company of 155-mm artillery (six guns) and a limitless
supply of ammunition.
On the following day (August 18), the enemy made another all-out assault.
It was a desperate battle, to be sure, but this time, Mike’s Regiment —
unbeknownst to the enemy — blocked the Inmin-gun tanks. Elsewhere, Paik’s
men were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with grenades and bayonets.
Wounded and captured Inmin-gun soldiers smelled of liquor. Apparently,
“young volunteers” were given soju (Korean vodka) before being sent off to hand-
to-hand combat.
On August 19, the U.S. 23rd Regiment also came to the aid of the ROK 1st
Division. Its commander, Colonel Paul Freeman,101 spoke to Paik in Chinese.
Colonel Freeman had studied in Beijing, and apparently had heard that Paik
spoke Chinese. The ROK II Corps sent the 10th Regiment to support Paik. In
spite of all these support regiments, the enemy attack by three divisions was
relentless. This was their own attack-or-die mission.
On August 20, the enemy broke through a hill defended by the ROK 11th
Regiment and the ROKs were beginning to retreat. Michaelis was afraid that the
enemy would encircle his regiment, and he also planned to retreat. If the 27th
Regiment withdrew, Paik’s entire division would be isolated. Paik rushed in
front of his battalion, which was retreating.
He asked the battalion commander, Kim Jaemyong, “Where are you going?”
Kim replied, “We have been cut off without any supplies. We’ve had
nothing to eat or drink for some time.”
Paik halted the column of soldiers and told them that there was no room
for retreat. “The Americans trust us to protect their flank,” he said. “If you
retreat, this may be the end of the 1st Division and the Republic of Korea. I will
lead the counterattack. Shoot me in the back if I retreat.” The rest of the
battalion followed Paik and they recaptured the lost hill.
The front was stabilized again, and Mike apologized to Paik, saying, “I have
not seen a Division Commander personally lead an attack like this. This must be
God’s Army.” A bond of trust was reestablished. Trust is essential in a multi-
national combat mission.

101. He, too, was later promoted to a four-star general.

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 The Unfinished War

August 21 was the peak of the Dabudong battle. Paik wrote that this was
the day of “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.” Every hill was piled with
dead bodies. All the American artillery opened fire and blazed away for five
hours. Some units of the ROK 1st Division, which had already suffered 100
percent casualties and 100 percent turnover of its soldiers, suffered further
losses. However, by August 22, the tide had turned. The ROK 12th Regiment,
which had suffered several night attacks by the enemy, launched its own night
attack and captured a key hill.
The next day, Michaelis’ regiment pulled out, heading toward Masan to
put out another fire. When the dust settled, the Dabudong battle cost the 1st
Division 2,300 deaths, but the enemy suffered 5,690 deaths. The ROK
Headquarters sent a special team of investigators to find out why the casualties
were so high.

The battle around the Busan Perimeter was far from over. On September 4,
1950, General Yu received a report that the 19th Regiment of the 6th Division had
destroyed eight enemy tanks near Gapryong. Early the following morning, Yu
went to the battle site to congratulate the special ops. They had planted newly
supplied American mines along the path of tank invasion. The lead tank of a
column of fourteen tanks hit a mine. While the column was stalled, the special
ops went after the tanks with grenades, disabling 8 of the 14. While General Yu
was luxuriating in these moments of glory, an urgent call arrived from his staff
asking him to return to headquarters immediately.
The bad news was that the enemy had broken through the 8th Division
lines along the east coast and was threatening the city of Yongchun. From
Yongchun it was only 20 miles to Daegu, still the seat of the ROK Army and
EUSAK headquarters. The ROK Army was transferring the 8th Division to
General Yu at this desperate moment. He knew that this was not going to be
easy. The 8th Division had been the weakest link in the whole chain of defense.
However, if Yongchun fell, the enemy could split the ROK defense right down
the middle. The ROK Army considered this to be a battle of life or death for the
ROK.
Yu pulled a regiment each from the 1st and 6th Divisions — against their
commanders’ dire warnings. These Divisions were also under heavy pressure
from the enemy and pulling out regiments was not without risk. Yu then went to
General Gay for tank assistance, but Gay refused. Next, he rushed to General
Walker. They had never met before. Walker asked Yu, “Why have you come?” Yu

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 11. The First Hundred Days

asked for tank support. Walker said that he was willing to release one Korean
battalion under the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, but he did not promise tanks.
Walker asked Yu to discuss the tank problem with General Gay again.
Yu went back to Gay and told him what Walker had said.
The Korean battalion was at important to Gay, and he was worried. Gay
asked, “So, are you going to take the Korean battalion from me?”
Yu said, “No.”
Gay asked, “Do you plan to retreat from Yongchon?”
Yu answered, “We cannot do that. I will see what I can do. If everything
fails, I will personally resist the enemy on the street.”
Yu rushed to the ROK 8th Division Headquarters and asked about the
situation. The 8th Division commander, Col. Lee Sung Gae, believed that
Yongchun had already fallen and painted a none too optimistic picture. Yu said
abruptly, “You may not withdraw from the line. Reinforcements from the 1st and
6th are coming.” The next day, on September 5, Yu received word that one
platoon of tanks from the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division would be sent the following
day. Apparently, General Gay had had second thoughts; either this, or EUSAK
was alarmed about encirclement.
Early in the morning of September 6, General Yu and his aide left for
Yongchun in his jeep, although his staff discouraged him from taking such risk.
When he arrived, the entire town appeared dead. He soon discovered that the
enemy had already broken through and gone further south toward Kyongju, the
old capital of the ancient kingdom of Silla. Even more desperate news was that
communication with two regiments (the 5th and 21st) of the ROK 8th Division
had been cut off.
As promised, however, five U.S. tanks arrived soon after at Ohsu-dong, the
outskirts of Yongchun. Villagers came out shouting Mansei, Mansei. ROK Army
Captain Park Chung Inn was onboard the lead tank, pointing out which were
ROKs and which were Inmin-gun. Inmin-gun soldiers stood there, stunned.
They had believed that only their side had tanks. The ROK soldiers were also in
disbelief, but their faces lit up when they realized that these tanks were on their
side.
Two reinforcement regiments, one each from the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions,
were also on the way. Two enemy battalions had encircled one of the two “lost”
regiments, the 21st, but it did not retreat even an inch and fought back fiercely.
This regiment and the 19th Regiment killed 2,300 Inmin-gun soldiers and
destroyed 30 vehicles. Another lost regiment, the 5th, also reappeared.

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In the six days of battle from September 5 to September 11, the ROK II
Corps killed 4,000 Inmin-gun soldiers, destroyed 5 enemy tanks and 14 pieces of
122mm artillery, and captured 300 prisoners and numerous small arms. The
support provided by the five U.S. 1st Cavalry tanks, along with the air support
provided by the U.S. Air Force, was critical to this success. Even the civilians
pitched in. Many of the residents decided to stay put instead of fleeing to the
south. They cooked food for the ROKs and carried ammunition to the front lines.
A captured Inmin-gun document indicated that Kim Il Sung thought that he had
the best chance of winning the war if he captured Yongchun; his troops lost that
chance. The once hapless ROKs were quickly becoming veteran fighters. Yu was
promoted to Major General. Three years later, the residents of Yongchun built a
monument in honor of General Yu Jae Hung and invited him to open the
dedication ceremony.

After crossing the 38th Parallel to escape the North Korean Security Force
in December, 1949, Taeksoo was determined to find a way to go to college, even if
it meant he had only one meal a day. He was accepted at a university as a night-
school student. With this letter of acceptance, he tried to raise the registration
fee from those who had come to South Korea earlier from Sariwon. While he was
struggling to find donors, the Korean War broke out. Taeksoo had to run. With
his record, he would have faced a firing squad if captured.
When Taeksoo reached the Han River, he found that the Inmin-gun had
already reached the northern suburbs of Seoul. When he arrived at the river, the
only bridge had already been blown. The chaos on the riverbank was beyond his
imagination. The retreating ROK soldiers took over practically all available
boats. Taeksoo did not know how to swim but he jumped into the river,
shouting for help. He hoped that some soldiers would save him from drowning.
It was a gamble. Luckily, a soldier stuck out his hand, and Taeksoo safely crossed
the river just ahead of the Inmin-gun. He walked for two days and was able to get
on a train headed to Daegu. When he reached Daegu, he was offered two choices:
either join the police constabulary or the regular army of South Korea. He felt
that it might be safer with the police force, but perhaps more honorable in the
army. After only two weeks of training, he was sent to the Army Engineering
Corps, which was responsible for laying and removing land mines.

Around this time, on top of a hill in the North Korean city of Hamhung, I
was seeing sorties of American bombers attempting to destroy a railroad bridge

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 11. The First Hundred Days

over the Sungchon River. They went after it almost every day. The best strategy
would have been to approach it in parallel formation at low altitude, but a
battery of anti-aircraft guns protected the bridge from a nearby hill. The
bombers, therefore, would approach the bridge along the river. Attacking it at a
90o angle made the probability of a hit low; and in fact, most of the bombs
missed the bridges. I used to sit and watch from the hilltop as dozens of bombs
fell and detonated harmlessly in the river. Once in awhile, a bomb would damage
a section or two of the bridge. However, what was amazing was that the bridge
would almost always be repaired within a day or so because thousands of
civilians and Inmin-gun engineers worked all night to repair it.
Toward the end of July, 1950, the bombing provided more spectacular
shows than ever. Huge bombers in formation executed large-scale
bombardments over Hungnam, dropping their bombs in turn. We could see the
bombs fall and hear the distant kung! kung! kukung! Occasionally, there were
huge secondary explosions, and smoke shot sky-high. Hungnam was five miles
away, but the impacts of the 500-pound bombs seemed to shake the earth where
we were in Hamhung. We were witnessing the destruction of gigantic military-
industrial installations in North Korea.
In the U.S., the Pentagon was convinced that factories in Hungnam were
producing war materials not only for North Korea, but also for the USSR.
General MacArthur authorized special missions to wipe them out. A plant in
Hungnam was reportedly processing monazite, a primary source of thorium and
other radioactive elements used in Soviet Russia’s atomic energy program.
Targets in Hungnam also included the Chosen Nitrogen Fertilizer Company, the
Chosen Nitrogen Explosives Company, and the Bogun Chemical Plant.
The air operation began in July with 47 B-29s. The following day, 46 B-29s
were engaged. Another massive air operation was conducted on August 3 — and
that was the end of the largest explosives and chemical complex in Asia.102

102. Futrell, pp. 186-190.

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12. MAO’S THOUGHT IN BEIJING
Meanwhile, Chairman Mao (now virtual emperor of China) had been
monitoring the Korean War through his chief of staff, General Zuh De. General
Zuh was receiving intelligence on the Korean War front regularly from its
military attaché Colonel Wong Lichan, who was then in Korea. By this time,
Mao was comfortably settled in the Forbidden City, like all of China’s ancient
emperors. Zuh occupied one of the palace buildings.
Why the People’s Republic of China (PRC) decided to intervene in the
Korean War is one of those decisions that has been shrouded in mystery for a
long time. The PRC insisted that it was to defend itself, and the rest of the world
accepted this statement uncritically. Some cable traffic and other information
that has leaked out of the USSR and the PRC has since indicated that the real
motives lay elsewhere. Until the PRC and Russia open up their archives more
fully, however, these motives will continue to be debated. Several authoritative
books and articles have thrown light on this matter, as well.
According to a popular war history book by Russell Spurr,103 it was on
August 6, 1950, that all military leaders of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
gathered at the Hall of Longevity, hidden behind the high walls of the Forbidden
City. When General Peng Duhai stepped in, Mao was having a heated argument
with General Ye Jianying on how long it would take to move a sizeable army to
Korea. Mao said that three weeks would be enough. Ye replied that it would
require four months.

103. Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-
51 (New York: New Market Press, 1988), pp. 53-69, hereafter Spurr.

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Mao asked Peng, “Old Peng, tell him he is wrong.”

“Old” meant wise, venerable, and experienced, not necessarily weak and
feeble. Strangely, this took place around the time the Inmin-gun had the U.S. and
the ROK troops cornered in the southeast part of the Busan Perimeter.
Peng was a burly man from Hunan, the cradle of the Communist
revolution. This is where Mao and about 40 percent of Mao’s generals came
from, as well. Peng was a peasant, talented at suggestive cursing and even better
at warfare. Known for his bluntness, Peng said, “It will take more than three
weeks.”
Mao threw a tantrum and shouted, “Are we recruiting tortoises?” Time was
of the essence, for what he had in mind.
Peng knew that American ground troops had landed on Busan, but at the
time, the Inmin-gun seemed to be doing well. He was surprised that Mao was
even thinking about how many days it would take to send a large army to Korea.
“Well,” he thought, “it never hurts to be prepared.”
He respected Mao and his military judgment. As far as Mao was concerned,
the decision to support North Korea had been made months ago, even before
Kim Il Sung started the war. He had already promised support to Kim; and now
found stronger reasons than ever to do so.
As soon as the Korean War broke out, Truman’s first action was to
dispatch the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits. Mao suspected that he might
have to fight the Americans someday. To him, International Communism was
real; and capitalism was a threat to it. He also knew that he could not fight
America alone. He had to get the Soviets involved. To him, the liberation of
Taiwan and the conquest of Tibet were urgent tasks. Sooner or later, Mao would
have to defeat or humble the U.S. to achieve his goals. He could not fight them on
the sea. Korea would be a better place to do so than on Chinese soil or Vietnam.
He knew that the PLA was not yet ready to take on Taiwan. Its navy did
not amount to anything. In keeping with his plan to enter the Korean War, Mao
had already made moves to strengthen his forces near Korea.
According to Michael Sheng, a university professor who wrote a highly
revealing article,104 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Military Committee
informed Xiao Jinguang, commander-in-chief of the CCP Navy, on June 30, that

104. Michael M. Sheng, Korea and World Affairs, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 1995, Univer-
sity of Missouri, Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea; p. 4 of the Internet
version. “The creation of the NDA and its purpose,” hereafter Sheng.

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 12. Mao’s Thought in Beijing

the timing for liberating Taiwan must be reconsidered and that the preparation
for encountering the U.S. in Korea must take first priority. This was only five
days after the Korean War broke out. At that time, the Inmin-gun was winning,
but American intervention had started. On July 7, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting
of the CCP Military Committee, which decided to immediately form the
Northeast Defense Army (NDA). Su Yu, the CCP general previously assigned to
“liberate” Taiwan, was appointed commander of the NDA, which would initially
include four infantry armies and three artillery divisions.
The task of the NDA was not to defend its border (as its name suggested),
but to take part in the Korean War. From the very beginning, its military
training program was geared toward fighting the Americans in Korea. As early as
August 4, when the U.N. forces were still hard-pressed by the Inmin-gun, Mao
stated in a Politburo meeting that if U.S. imperialists gained the upper hand in
Korea, they would become cockier and would further threaten China. Therefore,
Mao insisted that Beijing should assist its North Korean comrades by sending in
the PLA. In the same Politburo meeting, Zhou Enlai firmly supported Mao’s
proposal.
The timing of the intervention was not fixed at this point. According to
Chen Jiang, Mao thought that he could make a better case for China’s
intervention in Korea if he could prove that “China’s territorial safety was
directly threatened by the Americans.”105 When the ROKs crossed the 38th
parallel, the opportune time had arrived. By this time, Mao had received official
requests from Kim Il Sung and Stalin to intervene. Stalin’s official request was
important because the USSR would have to provide war materiel and fighter
plane protection.
As documented by Kathryn Weathersby,106 there had been a stream of
papers and telegrams indicating what Mao and Stalin were planning. On
October 2, a telegram was drafted outlining China’s intent to intervene and
presenting its rationale. An American victory would mean a major setback to

105. Chen Jiang, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confron-
tation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 153-56, hereafter Chen.
106. Kathryn Weatherby’s two papers entitled “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins
of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” November
1933; Cold War International History Project [CWIHP], Working Paper No. 8,
November 1993; and “Korea, 1949-50: To Attack or Not To Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung,
and the Prelude to War,” Bulletin of the CPIHP, Spring 1995, 2, The Woodrow Wilson
Center, Washington D.C.

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 The Unfinished War

Communism worldwide. Just as the Americans perceived the Korean War as a

fight against Communists, Mao saw the PLA’s participation in the war as a fight
against the imperialists led by America. Mao did not believe that the Americans
would invade China at that time, but he perceived America and its ideology as a
threat. This telegram, however, appears not to have been dispatched and another
telegram was sent instead.107
On October 4 and 5, the Politburo met. Zhao and Peng Duhai supported
Mao’s proposal to send troops to Korea. As Zhou Enlai stated later, the
confrontation between U.S. imperialists and China was inevitable; the question
was location.

“The American imperialists decided to have this showdown in the Korean

battlefield,” he said. “This was advantageous to us, and we decided to confront
the Americans and assist the Koreans, too. Looking back, it is understood that,
everything considered, it would have been much more difficult for us if we had
chosen Vietnam to fight, let alone the off-shore islands of Taiwan Straits.108

With the decision to invade Korea, Beijing was prepared not only to take
on the Americans in the peninsula, but also to face an American invasion of the
Chinese mainland. Although none of the paper trails deny that it was Kim Il
Sung who started the war, the PRC and the USSR were deeply involved in the
planning and subsequent support for it. At the very least, U.S. air and naval
attacks on China’s major cities and strategic locations were expected. Later, the
Communists were much surprised that none of this occurred.109
Returning to August 7 in the Forbidden City, the Chief of Staff General
Zhu De called his generals to the Hall of Consummation of the Martial Arts. The
subject of discussion was the situation in Korea. General Nie Rongzhen, the
commander of the North China Field Army, briefed the meeting, stating that war
had broken out in Korea because South Korea had made an unprovoked attack
against North Korea six weeks earlier. Everyone nodded. To the generals, the
fact that the Inmin-gun was trying to wipe the South Korean Army off the
peninsula was beside the point.

107. For this somewhat involved story, see Shen Zhihua, “The Discrepancy between
the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese
Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar’s Reply” translated by Chen Jin, Bulletin of
the CWIHP, 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 237-42.
108. Sheng, p. 5 of the Internet version.
109. Ibid p. 6.

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 12. Mao’s Thought in Beijing

General Nie continued, saying that the Inmin-gun was encountering

unexpectedly heavy resistance around the Busan Perimeter, according to
messages received from Colonel Wong, the military attaché to the Chinese
People’s embassy in Pyongyang. As soon as Colonel Wong had arrived at
Pyongyang, he rushed to the front at Kimchon, where the Inmin-gun front
headquarters was located. Wong noted that the U.S. air attacks were creating
havoc all along the lengthening supply lines of the Inmin-gun. In fact, while
Colonel Wong was in the Inmin-gun Headquarters, the building sustained a
direct hit by an American bomb. A heavier bomb could have killed nearly
everyone inside, but only a few signalmen died.110
General Nie moved on to the next point, studying a file in his hand: the
Inmin-gun casualties were heavy111 — 40 percent. Some generals in the room
gasped and others groaned. In the PLA, a 30 percent casualty rate was
considered to be a prelude to the disintegration of an army. While the news was
clearly not good, it was less clear what it had to do with the assembled parties.
Finally, Zhu De announced that “The Revolutionary Committee [chaired
by Mao] has given a great deal of thought to this matter and it has asked us to
prepare a contingency plan to back up the Inmin-gun.”112
Concerns were raised. Would the Americans use atomic bombs again?
General Nie noted that since the Soviet Union now had the bomb, too, the U.S.
would think twice before using it.
But was this China’s problem? Wasn’t North Korea supposed to be the
Soviets’ responsibility? Why should they get involved? Zhu De broke in again.
“Because when the lips are destroyed, the teeth feel cold.” Everybody laughed at
this ancient expression.
Nie urged action; General Su Yu was reluctant, saying that the Inmin-gun
was only behind schedule. Nie insisted: “That is the problem,” he said. “A
prolonged war is disadvantageous to the Inmin-gun.”
At that time, Peng did not know how close he was to predicting the events
about to occur. Nor did he have any idea that the burden of saving North Korea
would fall on his shoulders.
The generals had marathon meetings over a three-week period. The
situation in Korea did not improve. That was a bad news. At the conclusion of

110. See Spurr, pp. 10-12.

111. Ibid, pp. 61-63 for the briefing by Nie to the group.
112. Spurr, p. 62.

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the meetings, Peng was given the responsibility of mobilizing and setting up
headquarters in Shenyang, called Mukden in the old days, near Korea. None of
the generals knew that it was part of an old Korean kingdom called Koguryo.
Neither did they know that their intervention would cost the lives of almost one
million soldiers. Peng left the meetings with instructions that plans should be
prepared for all contingent situations. One thing that neither he nor other
generals knew was that Mao’s mind had been made up for a long time to fight
the Americans eventually, no matter what.
By the end of August, the situation in Korea turned gloomy. On August 27,
Mao telegraphed Peng Duhai with instructions that twelve armies be mobilized
to reinforce the four armies already near the Sino-Korean border. A Chinese
army consisted of between 45,000 and 50,000 soldiers. In accordance with Mao’s
instruction, Zhou Enlai called another military meeting on August 31. The NDA
would be strengthened to include eleven armies with 700,000 troops.
As narrated by Spurr, by early September, they were on the move to
Shenyang from all over China. Major Han and other members of Peng’s staff
spent hectic days and sleepless nights setting up headquarters and making room
for the converging armies. Mao wanted prompt action. The new headquarters,
having been thrown together in haste, still had no name. Armies were ordered to
report to “National Defense Headquarters.”
When he heard the news, a soldier of the 38th Field Army on the move
asked his pal, “Defense against what?”
His friend said, “Perhaps, to defend Korea. Haven’t you read about the
Korean War in the newspapers? The high-nosed, yellow-headed foreign devils
are going to take over Korea first and then China.”
The three field armies113 already in Manchuria were elite PLA troops that
had fought the Japanese and Nationalist armies all the way from Manchuria
across China to the Vietnam border, but then returned to Manchuria. More
armies were gathering around Shenyang.
Where they were going ultimately, and when they would make a move,
was not known. The PLA took secrecy seriously. Surprise was half the battle.
Major Han, General Peng’s aide, did not know what orders General Peng
brought with him from the Forbidden City in that bulky briefcase, except that
they involved Korea.

113. The 38th, 40th and 42nd.

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General Peng called a day-long staff meeting on September 10. They met
around a scale model of Korea at 8:00 a.m. sharp. The model, made of stucco,
contained topography, roads, railways, airports, cities and rivers. Peng called to
the attention of his staff the narrowness of the valleys and the steepness of the
mountains. Roads were few and far between. Peng said, “Logistics will be
extremely difficult. Supply lines will be susceptible to enemy air attacks and can
be cut easily as we move deeper south.”
What he did not realize — or at least did not mention at that time — was
that the terrain would affect their enemies even more than the PLA. The PLA
infantry was trained and experienced in crossing mountains and valleys on foot,
but the Americans were dependant on jeeps and trucks and would be helpless
without them.
Peng urged that every effort be made to avoid being seen by enemy aircraft
— moving and attacking by night, hiding by day, and using camouflage.
He wanted to recommended waiting for the U.N. forces to cross the 38th
parallel and engaging them at the narrow neck of the peninsula, from north of
the Chongchon River (situated about 30 miles north of Pyongyang) to
Hamhung. (In an ancient war between the Chinese empire of Sui and the mighty
Korean kingdom of Koguryo, General Ulchi Munduck of Koguryo decimated
Sui’s army of one million soldiers at the Chongchon. Such a natural barrier
always favored the defender.)
On October 6, the Chinese high command agreed on the details of the
invasion with the proviso that the Northeast Defense Army be renamed the
Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) and moved into Korea immediately. On the
same day, Peng Duhai, now the Commander of the Chinese troops, ordered that
all preparations be completed within ten days. On October 8, Zhou Enlai flew to
the Soviet Union to discuss Soviet military aid and finalize the details for the
participation of Soviet Air Force.
Stalin agreed to send arms for 20 divisions to Manchuria immediately, but
he was reluctant to send the Soviet Air Force to participate directly. He told
Zhou that the Air Force was not ready. Zhou telegraphed Mao on October 10 to
inform him of Stalin’s decision, which took Mao by surprise. Mao’s telegram to
Stalin on that day conveyed the “unanimous opinion” of the Politburo: They
would go ahead even without Soviet air cover. Stalin was said to have been
moved by Mao’s willingness to send his troops to Korea under the
circumstances.

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Peng decided to go to Korea to meet Kim Il Sung on October 11 to make

final arrangements for the Chinese invasion. According to Hong Xuezhi, the
vice-commander of the Chinese invasion force who wrote a book on his
experience in Korea,114 both Beijing and Moscow realized that Kim could not
hold off the U.N. forces by himself. Peng’s two vice commanders, Deng Hua and
Hong Xuezhi, doubted whether the PLA could fight U.N. forces without air
cover and without adequate anti-aircraft guns. They thought that they should
wait until next spring to invade Korea. Peng reported this to Mao. However,
Mao sent the final order to cross the Yalu.

114. Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei Yuancao Zhangzhen Huiyi (Recollections on the War of
‘Resisting the U.S. and Assisting Korea’) (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1991). Also
available in English and Korean.

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13. THE INCHON LANDING AND ITS AFTERMATH
MacArthur’s FEC had been planning to land U.S. troops behind enemy
lines as soon as he returned to Tokyo from Suwon on June 29, 1950. That was
just four days after the North Korean invasion started. For most people, the
pressing question at that time was how to slow the advance of the enemy tanks
and soldiers until reinforcements could arrive. Envisioning such a strategy while
watching Seoul smolder and burn was quite a feat for the imagination. However,
to MacArthur, the idea of an amphibious landing behind enemy lines came as a
matter of course. He owed much of his success during the Pacific War to his
island-hopping strategy. He did not fight for every Japanese-held island, but cut
off supply lines to island fortresses by seizing islands in the rear. This strategy
saved many lives. Hand-to-hand combat was what the Japanese wanted, but
that was not MacArthur’s idea of war.
The only thing that MacArthur wasn’t sure about was the exact location at
which to land his amphibious forces. By July 10, his staff completed a plan code
named Operation Bluehearts, which would land troops on the port of Inchon,
about 25 miles to the west of Seoul on July 22. The timetable, as well as the
finding sufficient number and mix of troops for this operation, turned out to be
far more difficult than he first imagined. General Walker was facing one crisis
after another in defense of the Busan Perimeter. Every unit at his disposal, even
the 2nd Infantry Division (on its way from the U.S. to Korea) and the 1st Marine
Brigade, trained in amphibious tactics and already in South Korea, had to be
thrown into the defense of the Perimeter.
One of the problems of landing troops at Inchon was its high tide — one of
the highest in the world — up to 35 feet, with high stone walls at the water’s

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edge. Another problem was a narrow channel (known as Flying Fish Channel)
between Inchon and the island of Wolmi-do. This was a dangerous spot for
ships to navigate. Wolmi-do, which flanked Inchon, could be heavily fortified,
and the Flying Fish Channel could easily be mined. If ships were to run aground
in the mud flats, they would be sitting ducks until the next high tide.
An alternative plan suggested by members of his staff involved a landing at
Inchon in combination with a simultaneous landing at Kunsan on the west coast
about 100 miles south of Inchon; or a landing near Chumunjin on the east coast.
However, MacArthur had limited manpower and naval assets. He needed to use
those assets effectively and decisively, rather than scattering them all over the
peninsula. His idea was to trap the Inmin-gun and decimate them rather than
making marginal gains by flanking movements at Kunsan.
General Collins, U.S. Army Chief of Staff and General Vandenberg of the
Air Force flew over to Tokyo to hear MacArthur’s plan. General Collins shook
his head when MacArthur said that he needed two additional divisions.
“General,” Collins said, “you are going to have to win the war out here with
the troops available to you in Japan and Korea.”
MacArthur held his ground, saying “Joe, you are going to have to change
your mind.”
Admiral James Doyle, the naval commander who was approached later by
Collins for his opinion, said that landing at Inchon would be extremely difficult,
although it could be done. Before his departure from Tokyo, Collins reluctantly
agreed to send the rest of Marine 1st Division, but he remained skeptical about
landing at Inchon.
The rest of the JCS had various reasons for disliking MacArthur’s plan.
General Bradley did not believe in the Marines and had said at a Congressional
budget hearing several months earlier that the days of the Marines had passed
and that large-scale amphibious operations would never occur again. General
Vandenberg of the Air Force did not think much of the Marines either. Admiral
Forrest P. Sherman, the Navy representative, had misgivings about MacArthur’s
request for Marines because he would have to strip the entire Marine Corps and
call up reserves to bring the 1st Marines to battle strength. That would also mean
that the Marines wouldn’t be able to meet other responsibilities.
The JCS told MacArthur on July 20 that he could not have the 1st Marines
before November. MacArthur was furious at the delay and angrily cabled on July
21: “There can be no demand for its [the Marines’] potential use elsewhere that
can equal the urgency of the immediate battle mission contemplated for it.”

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Eventually, the JCS caved in to MacArthur.

While MacArthur was deep in planning the Inchon landing in mid-August,

he received a request from the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), asking for a
speech to the convention scheduled in Chicago on August 27. (He had already
been criticized for calling Chiang “my old comrade in arms” during his recent
visit to Taiwan. Chiang offered to send his troops to South Korea. This exchange
between Chiang and MacArthur stirred up a storm of anger from Secretary of
State Dean Acheson and his other State Department critics.) In the draft speech
to the VFW, MacArthur discussed the importance of Taiwan to the U.S., using
the often-quoted phrase: “Formosa in the hands of…hostile power could be
compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender[.]” He then
went on to criticize those, including Acheson and even Truman, who would
advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific. Appeasement was a word
with an ugly connotation because of England and France’s experience with
Hitler. MacArthur’s view of Asia clashed fundamentally with that of an
Administration that was increasingly dominated by the State Department. On
August 25, Truman discovered that MacArthur’s speech had been sent to the
Veterans of Foreign Wars without obtaining clearance from the Pentagon, as
required since MacArthur had begun to make statements that went against the
Administration’s policy. Truman was so angry that he was about to fire
MacArthur, but Secretary Johnson, who was sympathetic to MacArthur’s view,
intervened. MacArthur was ordered to stop the delivery of the speech, but it was
too late. It went out to the press.
The intensity of the State Department’s hostility toward the Chinese
Nationalists at that time is hard to understand. The State Department was
trying to distance itself from Chiang — although MacArthur was not
exaggerating when he called Chiang a “comrade in arms.” During their fight
against the Japanese, over three million Nationalists died. Fighting the
Nationalists, a large number of Japanese troops had been tied down in China.
Although Mao’s army also fought the Japanese, he was fighting the Nationalists
more than the Japanese, and conserved his army for the eventual fight against the
Nationalists.
According to the State Department, the Nationalists were corrupt beyond
salvation (although this had much to do with their exhaustion from a long fight
against the Japanese Army and the ensuing collapse of the Chinese economy and
hyperinflation). Instead of helping to rebuild the tattered Chinese economy and

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reform the administration, the State Department advocated withdrawing aid to

the Nationalists. This was the same State Department that convinced Franklin
Roosevelt to offer part of China to the USSR as a price for its participation in the
final push against the Japanese. State Department officials and the liberal media
called Chiang a “warlord” and Mao an “agrarian reformer.” They lived to see
Taiwan blossom under Chiang and a billion Chinese in the mainland go through
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which killed millions of
them.
It was because of the Taiwan controversy that Truman’s advisor, W.
Averell Harriman, visited MacArthur on August 10, conveying the
Administration’s displeasure. The occasion also provided Harriman the
opportunity to learn MacArthur’s plan for the Inchon landing. Harriman liked
what he heard and he said so to Truman. Lauris Norstad and Gen. Matt
Ridgway, who were with Harriman, were also favorably inclined toward the
Inchon plan. Ridgway reported to the JCS that MacArthur’s presentation was
“brilliant, supported by every military argument of his rich experience.”
Harriman said to Truman, “The three of us were enthralled by General
MacArthur.”
However, the JCS were uncomfortable. They asked specific details, but
MacArthur was close-mouthed, fearing a security leak in Washington. It was
understandable — sensitive military secrets regularly leaked out of the Pentagon
and it was discovered that the Soviets had a nest of highly-placed espionage
agents in the British embassy in Washington. MacArthur advised Washington
in one cable that it would be “unwise” to describe fully in a message his plans for
the use of the 1st Marine Division, which he had requested and the JCS had
withheld thus far.
The JCS decided to send General Collins to Tokyo together with Admiral
Sherman. They left on August 19. MacArthur sensed that the actual purpose of
their trip was not to discuss but to dissuade him from going ahead with the plan.
The Navy disliked the landing site for all the reasons already cited and some
other reasons as well, such as the fact that the island of Wolmi-do would first
have to be bombed for at least a day to destroy the artillery, and that would alert
the enemy — even if they had been caught off guard up to that point. The Navy
also did not like the idea of landing the Marines in the heart of a city where every
building could be a potential pillbox. The plan for the Inchon landing went
against everything in the textbook.

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General Collins had his own reasons to dislike Inchon: he questioned

whether General Walker in the Busan Perimeter would be able to break out of
the Busan Perimeter immediately after the Inchon landing. Walker was too busy
plugging holes in his leaky front to give much thought to a breakout. The failure
of EUSAK to break out of the Perimeter “might result in disaster” for the Inchon
amphibious landing force.
Both Collins and Sherman counseled MacArthur to forget Inchon and
strike for Kunsan. MacArthur wrote later in his memoir that he could almost
hear his father’s voice telling him, “Doug, councils of war breed timidity and
defeatism.” MacArthur believed that he was not taking chances with the lives of
American men but that such an invasion would actually save American lives. His
Pacific campaign had incurred relatively few casualties compared to the Navy’s
operations on Iwo Jima and elsewhere in the Pacific.
MacArthur argued that the bulk of the enemy was concentrated at the
Busan Perimeter and had failed to prepare Inchon properly for defense. The very
arguments raised by his opponents, he insisted, would ensure him the element of
surprise. No enemy commander would think that the Americans would be so
brash as to risk such an attack. As a parallel, he cited the British raid on Quebec
in 1759, when a small force scaled supposedly impossible heights and caught the
French by surprise. He added: “The Navy overcame similar difficulties in Second
World War amphibious operations. It could do the same at Inchon.” Kunsan, for
sure, would be less risky, but it was also less valuable. A strike there would not
disturb enemy logistics lines. “Better no flank movement than one such as this,”
he added.
The only other alternative MacArthur saw was to continue attritional
warfare at Busan. Then he asked, “Are you content to let our troops stay in that
bloody perimeter like beef cattle in the slaughterhouse? Who will take the
responsibility for such a tragedy? Certainly, I will not.” He added for a good
measure: “If my estimate is inaccurate and should I run into a defense with
which I cannot cope, I will be there personally and withdraw our forces before
they are committed to a bloody setback. The only loss then will be my
professional reputation. However, Inchon will not fail. Inchon will succeed. And
it will save 100,000 lives.” He was certainly passionate.
The Joint Chiefs fell silent. MacArthur wrote later, “I can almost hear the
ticking of the second hand of destiny. We must act now or we will die.”
MacArthur won the argument at Tokyo but the JCS were still not fully
convinced of the landing site and sent a message to MacArthur on September 5,

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inquiring about modification, obviously referring to the Kunsan alternative. On

September 7, the chiefs questioned the landing schedule, considering that
virtually all of MacArthur’s reserves were committed in defense of the Busan
Perimeter. MacArthur was convinced that the JCS was trying to delay if not
abandon his plan. Much valuable time had already been lost. MacArthur had to
fight off not only objections of the JCS but General Walker, who protested
bitterly against the idea of pulling out the Marines under him.
These delays and doubts went on in spite of the fact that Truman told
Defense Secretary Johnson that MacArthur should be allowed to proceed with
the plan. He was impressed with Harriman’s report. After their return from
Tokyo, Harriman, Ridgway, and General Lauris Norstad of the Air Force also
urged the JCS to replace General Walker as the commander of EUSAK. The
consensus was that Walker was worn out and lacked the finesse to control the
army in the field. The JCS also dragged their feet on this recommendation. If the
JCS had been more supportive of MacArthur’s pans, the Chinese would not have
found the time to mobilize their troops and the course of the Korean War might
have been changed. Unfortunately, the timidity of MacArthur’s superiors in
Washington D.C. delayed the execution of MacArthur plan.
Within days of Harriman’s return, MacArthur asked the JCS for
permission to bomb Rajin, a town 35 miles from the border with Siberia. “It was
the key supply center for this entire northern area, and the destruction of its
transportation facilities by air would have been a perfectly safe and reasonable
proposition.”115 The Far East Air Force was vigorously pressing for the
bombardment. While the U.N. forces were desperately trying to hold onto a
small corner of the peninsula, Washington denied the request. It became clear
that MacArthur was to fight the Communists with one hand tied behind him.
MacArthur finally received approval from Washington for the Inchon
landing. However, on September 17, a day before he boarded the USS McKinley for
Inchon, he received the news that General George C. Marshall had been
appointed to succeed Louis Johnson as Secretary of National Defense. This was
hardly good news for MacArthur, who held Marshall in low esteem and
considered him partly responsible for the fall of the Nationalists in China.
Other bad news was the appointment of Acheson’s close ally, Lt. General
Bedell Smith, as the head of CIA. In 1953, he would move to the State

115. Hunt, p. 466.

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Department as Assistant Secretary and Allen Dulles would take charge of the
CIA.
In Tokyo, MacArthur decided that the invasion forces, consisting of the X
Corps under the command of General Almond, would report directly to him
rather than to Walker. It is not clear whether MacArthur did so because he
harbored doubts about Walker’s capacity to direct both operations or whether
he was trying to provide a promotional opportunity to his loyal chief of staff,
Major General Almond. Whatever the real motive, it was not one of his better
decisions. The X Corps under Almond consisted of 75,000 soldiers of the 1st
Marine Division, the U.S. 7th Division (with 8,000 ROK recruits), a newly
formed ROK Marine Division, and the ROK 17th Regiment still led by Paik In
Yup, who had just recovered from a major injury sustained in an earlier battle.
MacArthur was so confident of the success of the Inchon plan that he
retained Almond as the chief of staff of the Far East Command. MacArthur told
Almond that the invasion would be over in no time, and then he could then
return to Tokyo and resume his full-time job as his Chief of Staff. This unusual
decision of splitting the command stung Walker. He knew that his days under
MacArthur were numbered.
Notwithstanding all the actual and imagined perils of the Inchon invasion,
the actual landing operations were almost anti-climactic. Deception tactics such
as making bombing runs at Kunsan and other Korean ports to divert the
attention of the Inmin-gun from Inchon apparently worked. Inchon and the
island fortress of Wolmi-do guarding the Flying Fish Channel were lightly
defended. The secret intelligence mission of Lt. Commander Eugene F. Clark and
ROK Lt. Yeon Jeong, working with Korean fishermen in the area, were able to
collect critical information on the tide and the depth of the Flying Fish Channel
at various points, and send the information to Tokyo. Just prior to the landing
operation, the Air Force and the U.S. and British naval vessels lobbed so many
shells and dropped so many bombs on Inmin-gun positions on Wolmi-do that
the island was pockmarked with craters. Its forest turned into an inferno before
the actual landing started. The amount of firepower thrown at Wolmi-do and
Inchon was several times the amount used in the invasion of Omaha Beach on D-
Day. It was planned in meticulous detail and executed perfectly. The Marines
suffered only 21 dead, 1 missing in action, and 174 wounded. The enemy suffered
1,350 men dead, wounded, or captured. The success of the landing operations
exceeded even MacArthur’s wildest anticipation.

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After landing, the Marines moved out of Inchon as swiftly as possible and
left control of Inchon to the Korean Marine Corps, which began to land by boat
on the morning of September 15. Then the U.S. Marines struck out across a 25-
mile stretch of road to Seoul, destroying enemy tanks and killing hundreds of
enemy infantrymen along the way. The stunning success was particularly sweet
to MacArthur because the Joint Chiefs in Washington, and even the Marine
generals, would not have forgiven him if anything had gone wrong.
General Walker was supposed to break out of the Busan Perimeter when
the Inchon landing succeeded. MacArthur had anticipated that once the Inmin-
gun learned of the landing, they would panic. So he set his own breakout date for
September 16, the day after the Inchon landing. However, the Inmin-gun at the
Busan Perimeter had no idea that the Inchon landing had even taken place. Kim
Il Sung kept the news secret from his troops around the Perimeter, and gambled
on a new offensive. To him, it was now or never.
Once again, EUSAK found itself defending its positions rather than making
a breakout. The monsoon weather was so foul that FEAF planes could not
provide the expected air support. Before long, however, the skies cleared and the
Air Force was able to fly again. Bombs and napalm fell over the Inmin-gun, and
the news of the Inchon landing that had trickled in by then broke the enemy’s
will to fight. The Inmin-gun panic started. Thousands simply took off their
uniforms and tried to merge into the general population or slipped into the
mountains to engage in guerrilla activities. They were retreating in such haste
that they fled both day and night. The Air Force strafed them and threw deadly
napalm over them. ROK soldiers were also making many kills. By the last week
of September, it seemed that the war was practically over.
The only place where the Inmin-gun put up stiff resistance was in and
around Seoul. On September 26, the Marines encountered ferocious Inmin-gun
charges comparable to the suicidal Japanese banzai attacks during the Pacific
War. At dawn on September 27, however, they broke off the attack, leaving
hundreds of men dead in the streets. By September 28, fighting in Seoul was over.
General MacArthur made a triumphant return to the city in a limousine with
President Syngman Rhee at his side. The citizens of Seoul who had survived the
ordeal showed up en masse to greet them. There were even a few young men in
the crowd who had somehow avoided being “volunteered” by the Inmin-gun. A
ceremony was held and moving speeches were delivered.
MacArthur then received what he called an “astonishing message” from
Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the restoration of Rhee’s

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government “must have the approval of higher authority.” MacArthur replied:

“Your message is not understood.” He reminded the chiefs that the existing
government of the Republic had never ceased to function and the U.S. had
recognized the Government of the Republic of Korea as the responsible
government and the only lawful government of Korea. This was yet another
example of Washington belittling Rhee and the sovereignty of the Republic of
Korea, for whose existence the U.N. was supposed to be fighting. This happened
to Chang Kai-shek, as well, and would happen again to Vietnamese leaders.

After the surprise Inchon landing, only about 30,000 North Korean troops
escaped above the 38th parallel, mostly through the rugged eastern mountains.
However, several thousands were ordered to hide in the mountains of South
Korea and fight as guerrillas.
After abandoning their tank, Simon and his gunner became deserters and
had been moving north on foot for many days now. They lost track of time. They
could not use the main roads. They did not want to be captured either by the
ROKs or the Inmin-gun. The Inmin-gun had a way of dealing with deserters. As
they moved — sometimes by day and sometimes by night — they stopped at
farmhouses in remote villages for food and occasionally for shelter. They were
never refused food, but Simon did not know whether their hosts were simply
good Samaritans or were afraid of their sub-machine guns and pistols. They
hoped that it was the former.
Simon did not expect the tanks to be so helpless against American fighter
planes. It was obvious to him that the Inmin-gun would not be able to fight the
mighty Americans without the direct intervention of the Russians, but there was
no sign that the USSR would enter the fray. It never occurred to Simon that the
Chinese would be on their way to help North Korea.
He wasn’t sure what would happen to him, but he was determined to reach
Hamhung safely. He thought father would know what to do. His uniform was
soiled, and stank. The sub-machine gun on his shoulder weighed more every day.
He was disappointed in himself, but he convinced himself that he had had no
alternative to joining the Inmin-gun. He had seen a lot for a 17-year-old, but he
was still a boy and needed his father’s guidance and protection.
In late September in Hamhung, my parents were awakened by a knock at
the gate. Father asked me to go out and see who it was. It was a moonless night.
I found two uniformed Inmin-gun soldiers standing there, with their arms in
slings. I did not recognize them. The darkness and sleepiness did not help. Simon

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and his gunner washed their faces and ate like hungry jackals under the watchful
eyes of mother. Mother noticed how gaunt Simon looked and how much weight
he had lost. The next morning, Simon’s gunner thanked Dr. Lee for his
hospitality and said goodbye to everyone. His home was further north at the
border town of Rajin. Dr. Lee found a place for Simon to hide “until U.N. soldiers
arrived,” which he was sure would be soon. A farmer, a former patient of his,
offered to shelter Simon His farm was so remote that hardly a soul ever came to
that place.

In Washington, Truman was pondering whether to carry the war further

north, or to halt MacArthur at the 38th parallel. Acheson had once said that the
U.N. was intervening in the Korean War “solely for the purpose of restoring the
Republic of Korea to its status prior to the invasion from the north.” A halt at the
38th parallel would have achieved that objective. However, it seemed to Truman,
as well as to MacArthur and the American public at large, that a complete
military victory was within reach. To stop at the 38th parallel might have put
Truman in a very unpopular political position. The routed Inmin-gun was
offering little resistance. Washington abruptly changed its avowed policy and
decided to seek total victory.
Although it had no bearing on Truman’s decision, Rhee had all along said
that he would not stop at the 38th parallel. On September 19, he announced that
the ROK troops would continue to march northward. Rhee called ROK Army
Chief of Staff Chung Il Kwon and ordered him to drive north as fast as possible,
no matter what the Americans did. General Chung said that General Walker
must approve any large-scale movement of ROK troops, but he was willing to
oblige his president. MacArthur was concerned that a failure to destroy the
North Korean armies, which managed to escape above the parallel, might
rekindle the war. In fact, MacArthur was on record as saying to his visiting
chiefs of the Army and the Air Force, prior to Inchon, that he intended to go all
the way.
The Indian Ambassador to the U.N., through whom the Communists often
conveyed their messages, warned that China would intervene if the U.S. troops
crossed the 38th parallel. However, Washington and Tokyo figured that China
was just bluffing. As far as Washington was concerned, India — which sided
with the Soviet block under the guise of neutrality — had been the mouthpiece
of the USSR rather than an honest broker. On September 27, President Truman
authorized MacArthur to send his troops north across the 38th parallel.

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The directive that MacArthur received from the JCS stated, “Your military
objective is the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces.” Then it went on
to circumscribe certain conditions, i.e., provided that by the scheduled time
there had been no major Chinese or Soviet entry into North Korea and provided
that MacArthur used only Korean forces in the extreme northern territory near
the Yalu River bordering Manchuria and along the Tuman River bordering the
USSR. Ten days later, the U.N. General Assembly voted for the restoration of
peace and security throughout Korea, thereby giving implicit approval to the
UNC’s invasion of North Korea. When the going got tougher, there would be
disagreement regarding the meaning of these directives.
On the east coast, ROK I Corps crossed the 38th parallel on October 1 and
rushed north to capture Wonsan, North Korea’s major seaport on the east coast
ahead of the landing of the second X Corps. On the west coast, the ROK 1st
Division rushed to capture Pyongyang ahead of the U.S. Cavalry Division. It was
a heady day for Paik, who returned to his hometown in triumph. All across the
peninsula, the U.N. and ROK forces moved north. (See figure 3.)

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14. CHINESE TRAPS
As the ROK Army and EUSAK were celebrating the fall of Pyongyang,
several field armies of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (which were now
called the Chinese People’s Volunteers, “CVA”) were poised to cross the Yalu
into Korea. If the UNC had bombed the hell out of Andong (the Chinese city
across the Yalu from Sinuiju) in mid-October, it would have caught Peng Duhai
and his troops flatfooted. On October 14, General Peng Duhai watched
thousands of Chinese soldiers marching south toward the 3,000-foot rail and
road bridges across the Yalu River.116 That there were a large number of Chinese
troops across the Yalu was no secret to the UNC. A CIA agent had returned from
Manchuria with detailed intelligence indicating that some 300,000 Chinese
soldiers had converged on Manchuria.117
This corroborated the intelligence collected by Navy Lt. Commander
Eugene F. Clark from some 150 Korean irregulars under him. They came by this
information while on a mission to steal parts from a suspected radar site. They
never found the radar site but brought back disturbing news that a large number
of Chinese soldiers were crossing the River.
General Willoughby knew that the Chinese had the capability to intervene
in Korea. However, he did not know whether they would. Neither he nor

116. They belonged to units of 38th Field Army made up of tough men of the Shan-
dong Province. The 38th, 39th and 40th Field Armies made up the Thirteenth Army Group
commanded by General Li Tianyu.
117. See Breuer, pp. 105-106 and 91-92, for the accounts of the CIA and Clark. A
former officer of Chiang’s Nationalist Army was sent to Manchuria to collect the exact
number of Chinese troops.

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MacArthur was sure whether the concentration of the troops was for the
purpose of bluffing, attacking, or defending the Chinese border. In any event,
neither Tokyo nor Washington was willing to stop the U.N. forces from
marching north just because some Chinese “laundry men” were on their side of
the Yalu River.
At this time, the U.N. side had about 250,000 troops consisting of 7 U.S.
divisions, 6 ROK divisions, 2 British Commonwealth brigades (British and
Australian), a British commando company, and battalions from Canada, the
Netherlands, and the Philippines. Soon to join them in Korea were a Turkish
brigade and battalion-size Thai, New Zealand, French, Greek, and Belgian
troops. The U.N. side had vastly superior firepower, a modern navy, and
powerful air forces.
On the day the PLA crossed the Yalu, MacArthur was on his way to Wake
Island to meet President Truman. MacArthur was not sure what this meeting
was all about. He had just achieved one of the most successful military
operations in the history of warfare. When the Inchon landing wound down and
the ROK and U.N. troops crossed the 38th parallel, the total number of Inmin-
gun captives rose to 130,000. The Inmin-gun appeared to have been all but
beaten and the war appeared almost over. However, the British and other
European countries had opposed sending the U.N. forces into North Korea, and
there was a vigorous criticism leveled against him for crossing the 38th parallel
although it was not his decision per se. His detractors did not see it that way.
The British were particularly agitated. Perret’s supposition was that “The British
in particular had opposed crossing the parallel for fear that the Chinese should
respond by seizing Hong Kong.”
Some regarded the Wake Island meeting to be largely a political gimmick.
The Congressional elections were only two weeks away, and President Truman
may have wanted to capitalize on the success at Inchon.
Truman was accompanied by a group of high-powered advisors. For an
hour, the president talked privately with MacArthur before the others joined
them. MacArthur thought that it was private meeting, but a stenographer,
behind a door left ajar, was transcribing every word spoken.118 MacArthur was
later ridiculed for some of the things that he said: that the possibility of Chinese
intervention was small, “victory was won in Korea,” the Inmin-gun resistance

118. Hunt, p. 474.

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would “end by Thanksgiving,” and American boys would be back home for
Christmas.
On the surface, the two men ended the meeting on a cordial note, but
privately they had a poor opinion of each other. MacArthur thought that Harry
Truman’s original drive to defeat Communism was gone. MacArthur remarked
later that a “curious and sinister change” was taking place in Washington, and
that the president was surrounded by a council of caution, and was willing to
settle for less than victory. In his memoir, MacArthur said, “This put me as field
commander in an especially difficult situation. I had been engaged in warfare as
it had been conducted through the ages — to fight to win. But I could see now
that the Korean War was developing into something quite different.” To him,
there seemed to be a deliberate undermining of the importance of the conflict
and the lives of U.S. fighting men. Truman was also unimpressed with
MacArthur, and said privately that MacArthur was “full of shit.”
In October, 1950, the CIA prepared several intelligence reports regarding
the likelihood of Chinese intervention.119 The first such report, on October 3,
provided a vague warning of Chinese intervention. The October 12 report
concluded that such intervention was not probable at that time. The October 16
CIA Daily Summary to the President said that there had been numerous reports
that “four Chinese Communist units (variously identified as Armies and
Divisions)” had allegedly “crossed into Korea from Manchuria.” Yet, for a reason
that it did not elaborate, the report said that the “CIA continues to believe that
the Chinese Communists…probably will not intervene openly in the present
fighting in Korea.” On October 20, 1950, the CIA had credible information that
some “400,000 Chinese Communist troops had been moved to the Korean
border and alerted to cross on the night of 18 October or two days later.” Yet the
CIA’s comment was that it believed that “the optimum time for such action has
passed.” Thus on the eve of a new phase of the Korean War, the CIA misled
Washington.
The PVA started to cross the Yalu in mid-October, and by the first week of
November there were about 380,000 Chinese soldiers in Korea. Some units
crossed a rail-only bridge at Manpojin, 160 km farther east of Andong.
Still more troops were converging on Korea from other parts of China. The
Chinese armies that came to the aid of North Korea were not modern; they had
no more than three regiments of Soviet 122-mm howitzers and a handful of

119. October 3, 6, 12, 13, 16, 20, 28, 30, and 31, 1950.

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truck-mounted M-13 rocket launchers. The Chinese logistics were equally

inadequate. The main logistical burdens in the opening months of the Chinese
campaign fell on a small number of trucks and a large army of Manchurian
coolies, some 100,000 of them. However, morale was high among the soldiers,
who believed that they were defending China. They carried everything they
needed for three to four days on their backs, including blankets and food.
General Peng Duhai entered Korea two days earlier than Vice Commander
Hong Xuezhi to confer with Kim Il Sung. Since then he had been
incommunicado with his vice commanders for several days because he was
separated from his jeep, which had the only wireless communication equipment
available to him. Finally, on October 21, an anxious Hong received a telegram
from General Peng Duhai: “I have met with Comrade Kim Il Sung and the
situation is extremely confusing here. Comrade Kim Il Sung has been out of
touch with his armies defending Pyongyang for three days.” Peng asked his two
vice commanders, Tung Hwa and Hong Xuezhi, to rush to him to discuss the
deployment of the armies. In the meantime, the two vice commanders had been
receiving telegrams from Chairman Mao, urging them to get together with
General Peng to discuss redeployment.
The original plan was to position the PLA on the northern bank of the
Chongchon River and fight the U.N. forces head on. But, ROK soldiers
spearheading the invasion force were moving so fast that the Chinese could no
longer meet the U.N. forces at the Chongchon River. Mao was monitoring the
situation from the Forbidden City and sent three successive telegrams ordering
his troops to utilize guerilla tactics (hit the enemy and run) instead of trying to
hold onto a fixed location. He wanted to kill the maximum number of enemy
rather than hold onto any particular area. This is how he had defeated Chiang,
and this is what he was going to do in Korea.
At this point in time, the Chinese enjoyed a tremendous advantage in that
the U.N. side did not know that the Chinese had entered Korea, and the ROKs
were rushing north in a haphazard manner. There were about 80 miles of no
man’s land between EUSAK and the X Corps. This provided an opportunity to
infiltrate a large number of the PLA without being discovered. Mao kept sending
telegrams in the following days, sometimes with specific instructions, such as to
attack certain ROK units at certain locations. Mao’s mind was apparently racing
along the Korean battlefronts.
When Tung Hwa and Hong Xuezhi arrived at a small village called
Daedong to meet Peng, he was conferring with Kim Il Sung on a heated ondol

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floor in what appeared to be a typical farmer’s house. They were smiling and
talking as if they were old buddies. Kim Il Sung spoke Chinese with a
Manchurian accent. In fact, he spoke Chinese better than Korean when he first
returned to Korea in September 1945.
Peng said to his aides that he had explained to Kim how difficult it was to
mobilize the PLA, and told Kim that a price China would pay would be
American bombardment of Manchurian industrial centers and coastal cities.
Kim had expressed his gratitude to China for coming to the aid of North Korea in
this time of crisis.
Peng also learned that Kim did not have many troops left: 2 infantry
divisions, 1 tank division, an engineering battalion, and an independent tank
regiment, altogether 30,000 men in uniform from its original strength of 200,000
men. However, Kim said that his troops trapped behind the enemy lines would
gradually return to join the Inmin-gun. When Peng was alone with his deputies,
he said, “It will be our war, rather than us assisting the Inmin-gun.”

It was at about this time that Dr. Lee and his family was thrown into
further turmoil. The whole town was aware that the war was not going well for
the Inmin-gun. Dr. Lee could hardly hide his delight. However, in late October,
the entire senior staff of his medical college — doctors, especially — received a
directive from the university administration to report to the campus by 6 p.m.
They would be evacuating the city for a short while. They were asked to take
with them only essential items such as blankets, toiletries, and spoons that they
could easily carry. They were to come alone, without family members. The rumor
was that they would be going to Manchuria. Boon Yong was extremely upset.
She was afraid that her husband might not return alive. At this time, Simon was
still hiding in the farmer’s house.
Several Party cadres and armed soldiers were escorting Dr. Lee, other
doctors, and university medical staff along the main road leading out of the city.
It was already dark. Parts of the city were on fire. The retreating soldiers were
burning documents, supplies, and buildings. On that night, whole cadres of
Communist Party members were ordered to evacuate the city. One of the
buildings on fire was the prison. Hundreds of political prisoners had been held in
the jail, and it was rumored that they were still inside. Hamhung residents had
witnessed political prisoners being simply thrown into deep wells to die.
Perhaps those responsible did not have ammunition, or wanted to save it for
better use. Other facilities burning were grain storage bins and armories. The

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North Korean Army was making sure not to leave anything behind that could be
useful to the enemy.
By now, the whole city appeared to be on fire. Columns of smoke shot up.
The sky glowed red. Explosions pounded the eardrums — some sounded like
exploding gun shells.
By then everyone, including Dr. Lee, realized that this was a general retreat.
He had plans of his own. Approaching the Party officer in charge of the escort, he
said: “I am very sorry, but I left my People’s ID card at home. I would like to go
home and get it. It won’t take long, perhaps 30 minutes.” The Party cadre
hesitated, but he knew that a person without an ID was a problem. Without it,
he could not ride a train or get food rations. He told him to go, but make it fast.
A couple of mornings later, Hamhung residents saw a lead unit of ROK
soldiers move into the town. They were elements of the famed 18th Regiment of
the ROK Capital Division. They had the marking of “white bones” on their
helmets, the sign of veteran soldiers in the war. They looked sharp. The ROKs
met no resistance in Hamhung. By then, the North Korean soldiers had moved
out of the city.
When the U.S. X Corps landed at Inchon and the Communists started to
run, the Inmin-gun headquarters issued orders to their units to either bring
political prisoners north with them or dispose of them locally. Naturally, in
many cases they took care of the prisoners locally, using whatever resources
were at hand. At the Daejon Penitentiary, they killed 1,557 out of some 5,500
prisoners. Several hundred prisoners were killed at Mogpo and Okgu. There
were numerous places where smaller numbers of prisoners were killed. Some
were shot by a firing squad; others were hit by blunt instruments (rifle butts,
shovels, and hoes), thrown into wells, or speared by sharp bamboo sticks.
Burning prisoners alive was yet another method.120 Such killings in South Korea
have been well documented; but the equivalent killings in North Korea, whether
in Hamhung or elsewhere, have not.
In his book, John Tolland presents one group of U.N. POWs who endured
the death march.121 Even before the general retreat of the Inmin-gun, the POWs
— including General Dean, thousands of combatants, and many civilians such as
missionaries and diplomats captured during the war — were moved to
prisoners’ camps near the Manchurian border. Some of these prisoners would

120. Seo provides a complete list of such atrocities.

121. Tolland, pp. 255-264.

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give the Communists bad publicity if retaken by the U.N. side. There were 87
diplomats and other noncombatants of various nationalities: Englishman
Herbert A. Lord, the lieutenant commissioner of the Salvation Army, many
Roman Catholic priests and nuns (led by Bishop Byrne, who refused to
denounce God), men and women from the Methodist Mission, and Father Philip
Crosbie of Australia, who had been keeping notes ever since he was captured. He
survived the detention and wrote a book about the experience.
In early September, this group of noncombatants was moved from
Pyongyang to the Manchurian border town of Manpo, by train. The weather was
good enough in early October for them to swim occasionally and wash their
clothes on the banks of the great river. However, as leading elements of the
ROKs spearheaded the move north in mid-October, the real ordeal began. The
Communists decided to shift these and other prisoners to a broken down mining
town about 12 miles from Manpo. They were forced to march behind a large
group of U.N. POWs. In late October, they were ordered to move again, through
rain, in the bitter cold. By this time, they could hear artillery fire and saw bands
of Inmin-gun retreating north in disarray, some even without guns.
On the last day of October, the prisoners were on their way to Chunggan-
jin, more than 100 miles away. As Crosbie noted, among them were “mothers
with babes in their arms, a blind nun, the tottering Father Villemot, and frail
Mother Beatrix, as well as consumptive Mother Therese.” Yet an Inmin-gun
major wanted the group to march like a column of soldiers. The Lord
Commissioner, who spoke Korean, came forward and said to the Inmin-gun
major that they would die if they had to march at that rate. The answer was
short. “Then let them march until they die.”
They were marched back and forth along a stretch of about 100 miles
bordering the Yalu River to prevent recapture by the U.N. side, which would
hardly help the Communists’ propaganda campaign. There were about 700
POWs with them. Even for them, the march was too much. Some of them had
bleeding feet. The wind from Siberia began to blow hard and the weather turned
cold. Some who did not move fast enough were shot to death. The POWs,
soldiers and civilians alike, struggled to help each other, stronger ones carrying
sicker and feebler ones, on a stretcher or on their shoulders, although they
themselves were utterly exhausted, some even without shoes. During a span of
eight days, 21 POWs were murdered, including Mother Beatrix. There were
countless other POW incidents which Father Crosbie did not witness. There are
1,615 de-classified files on Korean War crimes perpetrated against troops serving

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with the UNC in Korea; such war crimes claimed 10,233 American victims. If all
crimes against ROK soldiers and civilians were included, the number would
multiply exponentially.

Returning to the PVA after they crossed the Yalu, the Chinese marched
south during the night and slept during the day to avoid detection. They began
their daily activity after sunset at 7 p.m. and walked until 3 a.m. the following
morning, covering about 18 miles in that time. Before daylight they found shelter,
ate, camouflaged their equipment, and went to sleep. They succeeded in
remaining undetected by the U.N. forces. Peng and his staff agreed that they had
to win big in their first battle. The psychological impact of surprise and clear
victory would carry them far. Their targets were three ROK divisions moving
north, totally unaware of the PLA’s approach. They were the northernmost U.N.
units, and a reconnaissance unit of the ROK 6th Division boasted that their
horses drank water on the Yalu River.
At about 2 a.m. on October 24, a telephone rang at Peng’s headquarters.
The call was from the 118th Division, the only army that could be contacted by
telephone at that time. There was a self-imposed blackout on wireless
communication. The division commander said that they had encountered enemy
units.
Chief of Staff General Hae was on duty that night. He was surprised, and
asked a few questions, then instructed the caller to watch the enemy movement
but stay concealed. “Report back as soon as you find out whether they are
Americans or South Koreans,” he added.
The chief of staff woke up Vice Commander Hong, and they waited
anxiously for another call. When the telephone rang, it was the commander of
the 118th Division. He was sure that they had encountered a South Korean army.
Hong ordered, “If they are South Koreans, let them walk deeper into our trap and
then encircle and decimate them.”
He immediately sent a cable to the 120th Division. “Proceed and occupy the
northeastern sector of Unsan.” The Chinese were making their usual move,
encirclement and surprise attack. Chinese infantry would use footpaths and
mountain roads to avoid detection and pop up behind the enemy lines. They
would emerge from mountainsides too steep for a motorized army. Such
surprises would spook the entire U.N. and ROK forces.

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The Korean soldiers that the Chinese encountered at Unsung were the
ROK 1st Division, which resumed its northward advance after conquering
Pyongyang. General Paik and his men noted that the Inmin-gun had killed all
political prisoners and any suspected reactionaries before leaving the city. Dead
bodies filled wells, and lay on the roadside and hillsides. The air of the city was
thick with the smell of decaying bodies. On October 24, Paik was promoted as
the commander of the ROK II Corps and left his 1st Division to replace General
Yu, who was promoted to ROK Deputy Chief of Staff.
The day before his transfer order, the 1st Division was ordered to move
north and cross the Chongchon River. After crossing the river, the 1st Division
felt that something was not right. Up to this time, refugees moving south had
clogged the roads, but now there were no refugees in sight. The eerie silence was
troubling. In the dark of the night, a regiment of the 1st Division was attacked by
Chinese troops.
By 9:00 a.m. on the morning of October 24, Vice Commander Hong
received the first news of victory from the 120th. They struck a lead regiment of
the ROK 1st Division that was advancing with ten tanks at the front. The
Chinese attacked at night, with bugles blaring and gongs clanging. The ROK
unit, taken completely off guard, ran in panic. They had no idea how many
soldiers were attacking them. All the noise generated by the Chinese made it
appear that large armies were involved. At about 10:30 a.m., Hong received news
of another victory. This was from the 118th Division. They had also sprung a
surprise attack and captured several hundred soldiers from a regiment of the
ROK 1st Division and the U.S. 6th Tank Battalion that supported it. Among the
captured were three Americans.
This is how the war began, on the first encounter between the Chinese and
the U.N. side. The Chinese were, in fact, as surprised to find ROKs so far north
as the ROK 1st Division had been at the sudden appearance of its enemy (which
was presumed defeated) at night. However, the Chinese detected the ROK first,
because the ROK 1st Division moved along the main road, with armor, while the
Chinese had kept out of sight.
Peng had all along planned to encircle three ROK divisions and decimate
them. The ROK 6th Division was way out in front, with no other units protecting
its flank. On October 26, all ROK units that were covering the central sector ran
into unexpected opposition in the mountainous central wilderness near Yalu.
The Chinese were prevented from completely encircling and destroying the
ROK 6th and 8th divisions by the late arrival of their 38th Field Army, which was

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supposed to cut off the retreat route. The 38th was a highly decorated elite
Chinese field army. Peng was furious: “We have almost netted the big fish, but
because of these turtles, we are going to lose it!” The delay was due to refugees
clogging the road, but that was not a good enough excuse for Peng. Meantime,
the ROK II Corps was receiving urgent messages indicating that the 6th Division
was out of ammunition.
The desperate news from the ROK 6th Division did not impress American
commanders; they thought that it was just an ROK panic. On October 25, the
first Chinese soldier was captured. General Paik, who was fluent in Chinese,
interrogated him. According to the prisoner, large Chinese regular armies were
already in Korea. Paik asked General Milburn to interrogate the prisoner
personally. Milburn reported the prisoner’s statement to MacArthur’s
intelligence chief Willoughby. MacArthur’s FEC was, however, unwilling to
believe the report of a single prisoner that a large number of Red Chinese
soldiers had entered Korea.
Within two days of his transfer to the ROK Headquarters, Major General
Yu Jae Hung noted that his old Corps was under attack and dangerously
exposed. He asked Chief of Staff Chung Il Kwon to send him back to the Corp,
rather than leave this to General Paik. Chung and Defense Minister Shin Sung
Mo sent Yu back to the II Corp on October 27, 1950.
By this time, the Chinese had encircled the 2nd Regiment. Yu sent the 19th
Regiment to the rescue. The Chinese then encircled the 19th, as well. He ordered
the 7th Regiment to retreat to the Chongchon. Every unit seemed to fall apart.
His old comrades in arms were in trouble, but he could do little. Yu later said, “I
never felt more distressed in my life than during these several days. I bit my lip
and thought, ‘An easier way out for me might be to die in battle.’ However, I was
responsible for a large army.”
Yu explains why the ROK 6th and 8th divisions persisted in marching so far
north all by themselves. It was because on October 28, General Walker told Yu
that General MacArthur had ordered an all out attack, and Yu’s troops were
expected to march all the way to the Yalu.
By this time, Yu said that he had information indicating that the Chinese
have stepped in and that four enemy divisions had appeared in Hichun. He
advised consolidating their forces at the Chongchon River rather than advancing
north.
Walker said, “Personally, I agree with you, but Tokyo is asking to attack
without delay.”

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Yu noted that there was no way to supply the units when they moved
north; Walker promised air drops.
Only on November 1 did an order arrive from EUSAK to stop the attack. By
this time, his three divisions suffered heavy losses.
Yu thought about this disastrous week for 40 years. By that time, the
Chinese had released information on the tactical moves that they had made.
Only then did Yu know for sure that his poorly supplied and equipped divisions
were the deliberate targets of the Chinese.
On October 27, General Paik, having been relieved by Yu, tried to return to
his old division, but his jeep met a Chinese roadblock. He and his driver turned
the jeep around in time to escape capture; they found a smaller back road leading
to Unsan that was not guarded by the Chinese. Upon his arrival, he found his old
ROK 1st Division extremely tired and dispirited from nightly attacks by the
Chinese. Supplies had run low, and replenishments were not coming through.
Around this time, the U.S. newspapers mistakenly reported that the ROK
st
1 Division was trapped and decimated. Colonel Hennig’s wife knew that her
husband was part of the ROK 1st Division and wept all night, thinking that her
husband must have died. However, at that time, Hennig’s 105-mm howitzers
were pounding enemy columns near Unsan. Hennig received a radio message
from an artillery spotter plane, whose highly excited pilot made a somewhat
garbled report, the essence of which was, “You better believe this! Our shells are
landing right in their columns and they are still coming!”
Meanwhile, winter seemed to have arrived ahead of its time, and neither
U.S. nor ROK units were issued full winter clothing. Only several days earlier,
such clothing had seemed unnecessary since the war seemed to be winding
down. Nobody expected that the war would turn bad so rapidly.
Hennig’s battery of artillery shot 13,000 rounds of shells. During this
attack, the 1st Division infantry slipped out of the trap in an orderly retreat. Only
four to five 4.2-inch bazookas were left behind. During the entire Unsan battle,
the 1st Division casualties amounted to 530, a considerable loss but not a
crippling one.
For weeks now, the U.S. 1st Cavalry had been recuperating in Pyongyang.
However, the situation deteriorated so rapidly at Unsan that by October 28, the
1st Cavalry rushed out from Pyongyang to rescue the ROK 1st Division. An enemy
flanking movement appeared to be developing at this late stage of the war. They
couldn’t believe it. The 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry rushed to secure Unsan.
Light defensive positions were dug into the foothills north and west of the town.

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General Walker did not understand why the so-called “large units” of the
Chinese were appearing only in front of the ROK units. He even suspected some
internal problems within the ROK Army. He was at the same time under a
different kind of pressure from Tokyo. Messages from MacArthur showed no
sympathy for the embattled ROKs. The FEC was not going to waver because a
ROK division was panicking. The intelligence community was also confused. A
top-secret daily report of the CIA on October 28, 1950 cited a Hong Kong source
indicating, “The Chinese Communists and the USSR regard the Korean War as
virtually ended and are not planning a counter offensive.” The report added that
“the bulk of the Chinese Communist units had been withdrawn from Korea,
leaving only skeleton forces in order to create the impression that a large number
of Chinese Communist forces were still present…” It was a deception that the
CIA bought.
On October 29, Willoughby in Tokyo received an urgent telephone call
from General Ned Almond on the east coast, insisting that he had sixteen
captured Chinese soldiers. They were captured by the ROKs and turned over to
Almond after interrogation. The ROKs were sure that they were part of a large
Chinese army. Willoughby doubted it, but flew to Korea at Almond’s insistence.
He concluded that they were Chinese, but were “stragglers.”122 Any other
conclusion would overturn his previous conclusion that China would not enter
Korea on a large scale at this late stage. MacArthur was also predisposed to
discount a large scale Chinese intervention.
Walker’s G2, which was pinpoint accurate about movements of the Inmin-
gun around the Busan Perimeter, came to the same conclusion as Tokyo. The
CIA reports of October 30 and 31 and November 2, 3, and even 10 were all
variations on the same theme. There were POW reports transmitted by General
Walker indicating that large armies had entered Korea. The CIA dismissed them
as unreliable. The CIA’s October 31 report also dismissed a similar report from
the U.S. embassy Seoul about Chinese troops; it dismissed similar reports from
Hong Kong, London, and Rangoon. There was no lack of intelligence, only of
open minds and credence. Ridgway wrote in his memoir, “MacArthur simply
closed his ears to their [Chinese] threats and apparently ignored or belittled the
strong evidence that they had crossed the Yalu in force.” 123

122. Appleman, p. 761.

123. Matt Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday, 1967) p. 47, hereafter
Ridgway.

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On the battlefield, on late afternoon of November 1, the U.S. 1st Cavalry

commander Major General Gay realized that his 8th Regiment was dangerously
exposed. The ROK 1st Division on his flank was rapidly disintegrating. He
requested permission from Walker to evacuate Unsan. The request was refused.
It was too late, anyway. Rescue troops groping toward their beleaguered units in
Unsan found the approach roads blocked by the Chinese. No amount of artillery
or aerial bombardment could shift them. By nightfall, the 8th Regiment was
enveloped on three sides by what appeared to be huge numbers of enemy forces.
At 19:30 on November 1, the Chinese struck. The 1st Battalion was instantly
overwhelmed. Squads of Chinese riflemen overran the forward platoons. The
attackers broke through the American lines at 21:00 when the battalion’s
ammunition was virtually exhausted. The 1st Cavalry was shaken by the ferocity
of the attack. They had never experienced anything quite like it. The enemy
attacked in the darkness. They pressed on regardless of losses. All this came with
the blowing of bugles, whistles, and the beating of gongs. Sun Tzu’s ancient art
of war still worked on the modern American troops.
The 2nd Battalion broke next. Survivors streamed toward Unsan, mingling
with the hundreds of terrified South Koreans fleeing westward across the
Samtan River. The Chinese did not want to fight the Americans, first because
they were told that the 1st Cavalry was peerless. However, they could not avoid
it once they entered Unsan. To Hong’s surprise, when they hit the 1st Cavalry, it
seemed to collapse almost as easily as the ROKs.
To most in Korea, there was no longer any doubt that they had encountered
a major Chinese force. However, MacArthur, in Tokyo, wasn’t sure whether this
was a reconnaissance-in-force across the Yalu to probe the U.S. resolve, a Red
bluff, or a full-scale Chinese entry into the war. His intelligence chief, Major
General Charles Willoughby, was holding to his earlier estimate of about 30,000
or 40,000 Chinese assisting the Inmin-gun.
After Unsan, Peng and his deputies could not believe that MacArthur still
seemed to have no clue that a huge Chinese army was already in Korea. After the
initial setback, the U.N. side began to regroup to move north again. Peng told his
staff that the situation offered another golden chance to spring a trap. No one in
EUSAK knew for sure how big the PVA was. They were still well disguised,
surviving for days on what they carried on their backs. Food supplies during
combat consisted of misugaru, a mixture made of roasted and powdered rice,
beans, millet, dried peas, and corn. It was usually soaked in water before eating;

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however, Chinese soldiers on the move would simply chew the dry powder and
chase it down with a swallow of water. While this was nutritious food, it lacked
important vegetable and protein components. After months of this diet, some
soldiers would develop night blindness from vitamin deficiency.
On November 3, MacArthur sent Washington an intelligence report based
on a captured Communist battle order. It showed that 498,000 Chinese soldiers
were in Manchuria, ready to cross the Yalu. In addition, there were district
service forces of 370,000, bringing the total number of Chinese troops to
868,000. Other forces were still converging north from central China.
MacArthur was convinced that the entire resources of the Chinese Red Army
were being mobilized but was not sure how many of them had actually crossed
the Yalu River to Korea.
By November 5, MacArthur was sufficiently alarmed that he ordered
General Stratemeyer of the Fifth Air Force to launch a maximum air assault of at
least two weeks’ duration. He said, “Isolate the battlefield” and destroy “every
means of communications and every installation, factory, and city within it.” He
ordered both napalm and conventional bombs to be used. In order to isolate the
battlefield, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) needed to destroy the 12 bridges along
the Yalu River. MacArthur thought that he already had the authorization from
Washington to do so when Secretary of Defense Marshall sent him a message
saying that he “should not feel hampered strategically and tactically when he
crossed the parallel.” General Stratemeyer was not sure. To make sure, he relayed
this order to the Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Landenberg.
When this order reached Washington, Dean Acheson reacted strongly.
Truman intervened and said that such missions should be carried out “only if
there was an immediate and serious threat to the security of the troops.”
Washington still did not order MacArthur to withdraw. Policies were being
made on a day-to-day basis. The U.S. was still trying to show that America did
not have hostile intentions against China — although no amount of conciliatory
gestures on the part of the U.S. at this stage would have made an iota of
difference to the Chinese resolve to confront the Americans.
On November 6, the JCS ordered MacArthur not to conduct the bombing
and gave other directives curtailing his use of air power. First he was forbidden
to make a “hot” pursuit of enemy planes that attacked his. Manchuria and
Siberia were off limits for the American airplanes, whatever the purpose. He was
denied the right to bomb the Soopung and all other hydroelectric power plants
in North Korea, which supplied electricity to Manchuria and Siberia as well as

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North Korea. He was even forbidden to bomb important supply centers and
supply depots such as Rajin, through which the Soviet Union supplied war
materials. In fact, Secretary Marshall directed MacArthur to postpone the
bombing of all targets within five miles of the Manchurian border. But by
holding back the air strikes, Americans would only punish the U.N. side rather
than make the Chinese back off.
MacArthur could not believe that protection was extended to the enemy,
not only in Manchuria but also within North Korea. The bridges were the only
means through which the Chinese could move their men and supplies across the
wide river into North Korea, but they were to remain intact. MacArthur
protested strongly and Washington gave him permission to bomb the Korean
end of the Yalu bridges.
The head of the Far East Bomber Command, Major General Emmett
O’Donnell, protested the unfairness of the situation. “We were not allowed to
violate Manchurian territory, [even an] inch of it. For instance, like most rivers,
the Yalu has several pronounced bends before reaching the town of Antung, and
the main bridges [are] at Antung[.] These people on the other side of the river
knew that and put up anti-aircraft batteries right along the line.”
One of the bomber pilots was wounded badly and returned to Japan with
an arm dangling at his side. He gasped at MacArthur, through bubbles of blood,
“General, which side are Washington and the United Nations on?” MacArthur
reflected in his memoir, “For the first time in military history, a commander has
been denied the use of his military power to safeguard the lives of his soldiers
and safety of his army. The order not to bomb the Yalu bridges was the most
indefensible and ill-conceived decision ever forced on a field commander in our
nation’s history.”
This was the beginning of a no-win war. Hundreds of thousands would die.
Some blamed Secretary Marshall for the loss of China, although that is another
story. Now, his lackadaisical approach to the war was threatening to destroy
another American ally: South Korea. To MacArthur, this only confirmed that
Truman was no longer the man that he once was.

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MacArthur decided that the best means of determining the enemy’s true
strength was to mount reconnaissance in force. He prodded Walker to move
north, cautiously. MacArthur flew in from Tokyo to see the attack being
launched.
After his ceremonial appearance, MacArthur asked his personal pilot, Lt.
Colonel Tony Story, to fly to the Yalu River and follow it east to the East Sea. He
wanted to see for himself whether there were Chinese troop concentrations. His
staffers, who had flown in with MacArthur from Tokyo, were not sure that he
should take such a chance because the FEAF had sighted 75 modern MIG fighter
planes near Sinuiju, the northwestern border town on the Korean side.
MacArthur insisted on seeing the Chinese and Korean border areas personally.
What MacArthur saw was rugged mountains covered with snow, nothing else.
If MacArthur was looking for armies riding trucks, and traditional military
camps, there were none of them.
While the U.N. side commenced its “reconnaissance in force,” the Chinese
were prepared to spring the second trap. Their target was the ROK 6th, 7th and
8th divisions. This would expose the right flank of American troops. The Chinese
troops attacked in overwhelming number while some units slipped through the
ROK lines blocking their retreat routes. The ROKs were no match for the battle-
hardened Chinese soldiers who had been fighting a continuous war for more
than a decade, first against the Japanese and then against Chiang’s Nationalist
armies. The three ROK divisions crumbled.

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This stripped the U.S. 2nd Division of its right flank protection. Scanning
his maps, General Walker read the intent of the Chinese. It was clearly to
encircle the EUSAK. For foot soldiers to encircle motorized armies was no small
task, but the Chinese marched day and night, without stopping for food. They
just ate their misugaru. Requests for rest were denied. In a desperate attempt to
protect his flank, Walker ordered the 5,000-men Turkish Brigade to that front.
The Brigade had been in the country only for a few days. Within hours, Walker
received news of a stunning victory. The Turkish Brigade had killed and
captured a large number of enemies at bayonet point. Walker thought that the
U.N. side had finally won a major battle against the Chinese troops.
The U.S. 2nd Division interpreter was rushed to interrogate the prisoners.
The dead and captured “Chinese soldiers” turned out to be ROKs fleeing from
the Chinese! The next day, however, there were no mistaken identities. The
Turks bravely stood their ground and fought waves of Chinese troops. Most of
them fought to the bitter end. It was a massacre. Only a few Turkish companies
survived the battle more or less intact.
Next, the Chinese went on to smash two battalions of the U.S. 1st Cavalry
Division. Then they marched fourteen hours nonstop and cut off a major retreat
route of the U.N. and ROK forces. By this time, they had covered 43 miles. They
had not slept for two nights. They marched even during daytime, pretending to
be ROKs, knowing that the airplanes would not be able to tell the difference. To
further deceive the U.N. and ROK soldiers, they cut off all wireless
communication.
Their unorthodox fighting methods — crossing mountains and fields and
appearing behind the enemy in the dark of night — unnerved EUSAK as well as
the ROKs. Walker was not willing to fight when his rear was threatened. But
retreat is always a delicate maneuver that can turn into a rout. EUSAK ran,
abandoning a large quantity of materiel. A huge number of American soldiers
surrendered. In his book, Vice Commander Hong did not even bother to list the
number of prisoners they captured, but listed 1,500 new model trucks, a large
number of artillery pieces, and piles of ammunition and food, as if those were the
real fruits of their blood, sweat, and tears. That night, the Chinese had the
challenge of hiding these vehicles from American fighter-bombers; they did not
have enough men who knew how to drive them. Finally, they came up with the
ingenious idea of using American POWs to drive the vehicles to safe hideouts.
By December 2, when the EUSAK retreat was over, three ROK divisions
had disintegrated.124 The U.S. 2nd Division was wrecked. The Turkish Regiment

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had lost 1,000 men and was utterly disorganized. The U.S. 25th and the 1st
Cavalry Divisions had suffered considerable losses. Among all the units under
EUSAK, only the U.S. 24th Division and the Commonwealth British 27th Brigade
had escaped with relatively minor losses. EUSAK abandoned Pyongyang on
December 5, leaving behind about 10,000 tons of supplies and materiel.
The second Chinese offensive in so many months had a devastating impact
on the U.N. side, psychologically as well as physically. By December 15, EUSAK
was completely out of contact with the Chinese and had fallen back to the 38th
parallel. Walker and his armies were demoralized. Their confidence was shaken.
Most EUSAK units retreated without making any contact with the Chinese
troops. Some unkind historians called it shadow boxing.

On the east coast, the plan was to pull the X Corps — consisting of the 1st
Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division and the untested 3rd Division, fresh
from Japan — out of Inchon and send them by ship to the major port of Wonsan
on the east coat. The idea was to trap the Inmin-gun along the east coast and
then link up with the EUSAK on the west coast through the rugged interior
region. This was meant to be the second landing operation following the Inchon
landing. However, the operational plan quickly became irrelevant.
On the east coast the ROK 3rd Division and the Capital Division simply
chased the retreating Inmin-gun. The Inmin-gun put up some resistance with
mortars and antitank weapons in fortified caves and pillboxes, but the ROKs
simply pushed forward “by day and night, on foot and by vehicle, more often
than not out of communication with any headquarters.” Some ROKs without
shoes walked “on bloody feet.” 125
In this unsophisticated manner, the troops of the ROK 3rd Division and
Capital Division reached Wonsan on October 10. At Inchon, the Marine 1st
Division was still boarding ships for the “invasion” of Wonsan. When the
landing ships finally made it to Wonsan and tried to enter the harbor, they found
out that it was protected by thousands of mines. The Marines were stranded.
The ROKs pushed forward and captured Hamhung and Iwon by October
24. After time-consuming operations to remove the mines, the Marines landed
on Wonsan on the last day of October. Thus, during the critical one-month
period following the collapse of the Inmin-gun, the most effective fighting men

124. The ROK 6th, 7th and 8th divisions.

125. Goulden, p. 249.

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of the U.S. military spent their time getting on board ships and waiting to get off
them. While the ships were moving back and forth along the coast in a holding
pattern, the Marines were depleting the supply of food to a dangerously low
level.
The U.S. 7th Infantry Division which was supposed to have followed the
Marines to Wonsan also spent the critical period on the East Sea — getting
seasick. For reasons uncertain, this infantry division was eventually sent to
Iwon, a coastal town further north of Hamhung, for landing. By this time the
ROK Capital Division had already taken Iwon, and the 7th Division easily
walked ashore. However, it too spent this critical period of the war on ships
rather than destroying the Inmin-gun.
By the time the X Corps arrived at Yudam-ri and the Changjin Reservoir
(about 70 miles further north of Hamhung into the rugged mountains), it was
already late November. They were strung out along 40 miles of nearly impassable
mountain roads on both sides of the reservoir. The Marines climbed up
cautiously, through snow and ice, around the western shores of the Changjin
Reservoir (also known as Chosin) while the U.S. 7th Division moved along the
eastern shore. Little did they know that some 100,000 Chinese soldiers had
beaten them to the area and were waiting for them.
Mao had rushed in 100,000 relatively inexperienced soldiers, from
Shantung Province. According Commander Hong Xuezhi, the deployment of the
IX Field Army was almost an afterthought. When Peng learned of the strength of
the X Corps moving to the east coast, he pleaded with Mao to mobilize the IX
Field Army to counter it. As soon as the Chinese troops got off the trains at the
Yalu in November, they were marched straight to the Changjin Reservoir.
By this time, the Chinese offensive on the west coast was well on its way.
Obviously, the plan to link up with EUSAK needed rethinking. Historian
Hammel wrote, “Far from having a merely impossible mission, the X Corps had
no firm mission at all.” The original purpose of destroying the Inmin-gun along
the coastal area had been achieved before the X Corps landed on Wonsan and
the plan to link up with EUSAK was no longer an option.
Almond could have changed the original plan then and there, but he did
not. He was concurrently the chief of staff of MacArthur’s FEC; this did not help
the FEC review the ongoing battlefield situation objectively. Also not helping
the matter was the rough mountain ranges that run south to north in the interior
of Korea, making communication difficult, but the fact of the matter was that

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Almond and Walker had poor opinions of each other and did not consult each
other regularly.
In the final analysis, MacArthur was ultimately responsible for creating the
problem because he had made the unconventional and ill-advised move of
splitting the command in Korea between EUSAK and the X Corps.
The ancient Chinese sage Sun Tzu said: The army which first occupies the
battlefield and waits for the enemy is well rested, but the army that arrives late
and rushes into battle is tired. When the Marines were negotiating the rough
terrain, the Chinese remained undetected. They were intent on making a
surprise attack on the famed Marines and inflicting heavy damage on their first
encounter. The battle of the Changjin Reservoir inspired some full-length books
as well as chapters of books on the Korean War.126 Some light contacts were
made on November 25 and 26 with elements of Chinese reconnaissance units.
The Marines were not alarmed; but all hell broke loose on the night of November
27, just after the troops had polished off their Thanksgiving dinner and gone to
bed. “Unexpected developments” were taking place. Elements of three Chinese
divisions of the IX Field Army Group sprang into action.
Then the temperature dropped to -17° F. At these temperatures, skin sticks
to metal and has to be torn off. Both sides would also learn the hard way that
many weapons fail to fire under such severe weather conditions.
The predicament of Marine Fox Company on top of the isolated hills best
illustrates the situation. “Fox Company was settled in by 2100, by which time
half the men were asleep in their heavy down bags[.] No one on Fox Hill [so
named after the battle] knew or had any reason to think that the company was
completely surrounded, cut off by the Chinese regiments that had stolen down
from the heights to sever the MSR [Main Supply route].…The Chinese hit Fox
Hill just before 0230. Bob McCarty was awakened from deep sleep by a shout
from his reserve squad leader: ‘Here they come!’”127 The Chinese attacked with
all their disorienting cacophony, and mortar shells blasted. Chinese soldiers
appeared from nowhere and hurled grenades at point blank range while others
fired burp guns [Russian sub-machine guns]. The hellish din shattering the still
night gave the impression of a million soldiers charging toward the lonely

126. See Eric Hammel, Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War (Novato, CA.: Presideo,
1981), Goulden, pp. 344-381, and Tolland, pp.287-353, to name only a few.
127. Hammel, pp. 96-98.

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Marines, who were outnumbered in real terms, anyway. The enemy knew where
the Marines were, but the Marines did not know where the enemy was.
Before dawn broke, the Chinese went into hiding. Not knowing how many
there were, the Marines were hesitant to go after them. They left about 400
bodies on the ground, some of them only fifteen feet in front of the Fox Company
positions. The Fox Company suffered 20 dead, 54 wounded, and 3 missing. In
terms of the kill ratio, it was a victory for Fox Company, but the Americans and
the Chinese had different ways of looking at casualties. In any event, the battle
was far from over. The fight continued in this manner for two more days before
the Marines were ordered to withdraw. However, the order to Fox Company
was to defend the hill to the last man because it was guarding the only possible
route of retreat for the rest of the Marines. Reinforcement was not coming in
because the Chinese had a chokehold around Fox Hill. Fox Company suffered
76% casualties before reinforcements finally arrived three days later.
Dog Company and Easy Company of the 7th Marines suffered even heavier
casualties. Easy Company had only a handful of men left after confronting wave
upon wave of Chinese attacks. At the height of battle, they resorted to hand-to-
hand combat. Dog Company had only 16 men left after the first night. With the
dawn came an eerie silence, and they could see some 450 Chinese bodies piled up
in front of them. By then, the Chinese had gone into hiding to avoid air strikes.
Corsairs appeared and pounded the hillsides, although they had no specific
targets to shoot at. The vast majority of the Chinese found magic Chinese
“boxes” to hide themselves in. Most military units might have withdrawn after
the first savage contact, but the Marines stood their ground, even for hand-to-
hand combat, though only a few had seen action during World War II. Some had
not even gone through boot camp, but the more experienced Marines had
instilled in them the esprit de corps.
The American casualties were intolerable, but the Chinese casualties were
far higher. However, it was the news of the Marine casualties that hit all of the
major newspapers around the globe. Most Americans were shocked that their
boys were trapped in a remote valley, dying from Chinese human-wave attacks,
and suffering from frostbite on top of nameless hills in a country thousands of
miles away. The 7th Infantry Division on the other side of the Changjin Reservoir
was under attack also.
MacArthur realized that he had miscalculated the intentions of China. He
had a lot of thinking to do. He ordered withdrawal to the port of Hungnam, but
even such a move was anything but uneventful. There were more enemy soldiers
who blocked the Marines’ retreat than had opposed their advance only days
before.

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When the Marines regrouped at Hungnam, General Smith was still of the
opinion that he could hold onto the beachhead indefinitely. MacArthur agreed.
The X Corps at Hungnam could be a “geographic threat” that could deter
Chinese from deepening their advance. MacArthur made several mistakes after
the Inchon landing. However, in hindsight, MacArthur was right about
maintaining the beachhead, because the Chinese were too badly beaten at this
point to mount further attacks. But the Joint Chiefs disagreed with MacArthur
and gave a direct order to withdraw the X Corps by sea and proceed to Busan,
where they would become part of EUSAK. Almond started the evacuation on
December 11. The frontline troops began to retreat as rapidly to the south as they
had moved north less than three months ago.

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A Chinese commander wrote later that they had neither the will nor the
intention to pursue the Marines to Hamhung and Hungnam. The casualties were
at an unsustainable level, and the Naval and Marine firepower on a flat plain
would have been suicidal for the Chinese. When all the Marines were loaded
onto ships headed to Busan, the 1st Marine Division had incurred 4,418 battle
casualties (604 killed, 114 dead from wounds, 192 missing, and 3,508 wounded).
Captured Chinese documents indicate that they suffered 37,500 casualties
(15,000 killed and 7,500 wounded by the Marine ground forces, plus 10,000
killed and 7,500 wounded by air operation).128 The Marines made a good
account of themselves even as they stepped into the trap.
Chinese documents further indicated,

The troops did not have enough food, they did not have enough houses to
live in, they could not stand the bitter cold, which was the reason for the
excessive non-combat reduction in personnel, and the weapons could not be
used effectively.…their feet, socks, and hands were frozen together in one ice
ball. They could not unscrew the caps on the hand grenades, fuses would not
ignite, the hands were not supple, the mortar tubes shrank on account of the
cold, and seventy percent of the shells failed to detonate. Skin from the hands
was stuck on the shells and the mortar tubes.129

Even for the Chinese, who did not place as high a premium on individual
human life as the Americans, their losses were unacceptable. The Chinese IX
Army was no longer able to fight. General Peng Duhai was outraged. He flew to
Beijing, in a state of rage, and went straight to Mao’s bedroom in the Forbidden
Palace. He said bitterly,

This cannot go on. Thousands of my men have turned into frozen snowmen.
Those who survived the cold have been blown to pieces by American bombs
and artillery. American airplanes have cut off our supply lines. There is not
enough food coming through. Unless our comrades in Moscow provide us with
artillery and air support, we cannot achieve our objective.

What Peng Duhai wanted was a modern army with fighter planes and
artillery. Mao was not convinced, because he still believed in guerilla tactics
rather than fighting as a regular army, but he appealed to Stalin. The Russians

128. Goulden, p. 380.

129. Goulden, p. 381.

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rushed in MIG fighters — it is suspected that they were flown by Russians in

Chinese uniforms — artillery, and anti-aircraft guns.

After the Inchon landing, MacArthur had grown over-confident. In less

than three months after the Inchon landing, his confidence was severely shaken.
Following the bitter Thanksgiving debacle, MacArthur cabled Washington on
November 28, saying, “We face an entirely new war.”
His main concern at this time was how to fight the hordes of Chinese, who
were freely entering Korea from “the safety of a privileged sanctuary.” Truman
used those very words just a couple weeks earlier in his November 16 speech.
Truman was trying to make the point that the U.S. had no intention “to carry
hostilities across the frontier into Chinese territory.” Perhaps he thought that
such an assurance would make the Chinese less hostile, but it did not. In fact,
Truman’s statement only seemed to embolden them.
During a press conference on November 30, Truman was at pains to explain
that the U.S. had tried to assure the Chinese that it had no “aggressive intentions
toward China” but that the Chinese attacked the U.N. forces “in great force.”
Washington had no clue that the Chinese wanted to flatten the protuberant
Yankee nose no matter what. He said, “Recent developments in Korea confront
the world with a serious crisis.” In response to a question by a reporter regarding
the kind of weapons to be used in the battlefield, Truman indicated that atomic
bombs were not excluded. That brought British Prime Minister Clement Attlee,
a Socialist, flying over on the next available flight to Washington. Attlee
returned home after being assured by Truman and Acheson that no such
weapons would, in fact, be used in Korea. This promise took the threat of the
atomic bomb out of the Korean War and China. The one thing that worried the
Communists deeply was now out of play.
Now that the “police action” had gone bad, finger pointing began.
MacArthur was no longer invincible. “Already a surge of violent personal attacks
and bitter criticism against MacArthur began to appear.”130 His critics
questioned: Why did MacArthur advance without sufficient preparation or
without gathering sufficient information about the mobilization of the Chinese
Communist troops? Why did he send American soldiers across the narrow neck
of North Korea between the Chongchon River and Hamhung?

130. Hun, p. 488.

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Of course, neither MacArthur nor Washington knew that Mao had decided
months earlier to send in large forces. The CIA and the State Department had no
information regarding Mao’s decision. MacArthur’s G2 had nothing solid on the
Chinese intention. A clash was inevitable as soon as the U.N. forces and the
ROKs crossed the 38th parallel. However, forming a defensive line along the
narrow neck of the peninsula would have given the U.N. side a tactical
advantage, but MacArthur was overconfident. The Chinese remained invisible,
and the air reconnaissance had not located any enemy masses.
Washington had given MacArthur tacit approval to all of his actions. But
in the wake of the Thanksgiving debacle, the JCS became increasingly critical of
MacArthur and placed a number of restraints on his methods. On December 1,
MacArthur answered a series of questions posed by the president of the United
Press. In his reply, MacArthur went on to protest the fact that the Communist
Chinese were being accorded “the privileged sanctuary” and he was not
authorized to take “defensive retaliation.” The reaction from the European press
was violently against MacArthur, although this was not the case in America.
What the Europeans and to some extent the Americans feared most was the
possibility of a general war and the siphoning off of resources that might be
needed to defend Europe. On September 25, 1949, the USSR had announced that
it had developed an atomic bomb.
According to Musashiya, the CIA discovered that the Soviet A-bomb was
in an experimental stage and would take four to five years before it could be used
on the battlefield. If this story is to be believed, there was a window of three to
four years in 1950 before the USSR would have become a real threat.
The USSR had good reason to fake or exaggerate its success in the
development of atomic weapons. That way, it could demand the respect of the
West. Washington wanted to do everything possible to avoid confrontation
with the Soviets. Policy-makers saw MacArthur’s aggressive statements as an
increasing liability. The Pentagon issued a statement on December 6: “Officials
overseas, including military commanders, [should] clear all but routine
statements with their departments[.]” It was a gag order directed against
MacArthur.
In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were already thinking that
withdrawal from the Korean peninsula might be inevitable, although it should
be done while inflicting as many casualties on the enemy as possible, “thus
extracting a measure of self-respect even in defeat,” as Bradley wrote in his
memoir. MacArthur did not see the situation in those terms. By then, MacArthur

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thought that the entire military resources of China, including Soviet logistics
support, already had been committed to Korea. This would have left mainland
China vulnerable to attack. The Chinese showed that they were poorly supplied
and equipped. The logistical difficulties prevented continuous fighting, resulting
in alternating periods of fighting, re-supply, and rest.
MacArthur then formulated retaliatory measures which, in his opinion,
would secure victory: a naval blockade of the Chinese coast and air
bombardment of China’s industrial complex, communication network, supply
depots, and troops massed around the Korean borders. He wanted to deny the
Chinese the sanctuary in Manchuria which Truman had promised them. Unless
the U.N. forces’ superior air power could be used to destroy them, he predicted,
the best U.N. forces could expect was a stalemate and an unconscionable level of
human loss. MacArthur saw little risk in reinforcing his troops with the
Nationalist Chinese soldiers and in using them for diversionary action, possibly
by counter-invasion of mainland China, if not Korea itself.
In hindsight, it is not clear how effective the blockade of the ports would
have been. Much war materiel was slipping through the Hong Kong-Kowloon
ports under British control. However, the use of the Nationalist Army and
bombing the massed troop and military and transportation infrastructure in
Manchuria might have been effective. The Nationalists already had about half a
million soldiers on the mainland. Had Chiang sent in an invasion force, Mao
would have been forced to divert more armies to defend the mainland from
Taiwan. Soldiers from all over the world, including the Middle East, Latin
America, and Africa were in Korea. What was the reason for rejecting Chiang’s
offer of as many as 500,000 soldiers? This might have tipped the balance of
power in favor of the U.N. forces.
But, the Secretary of State vetoed the idea. Muccio rationalized his boss’s
decision years later by saying that, historically, Koreans feared having Chinese
troops on their soil! Yet, surely he felt that South Koreans had far more reasons
to fear the PLA in North Korea than Nationalist troops in South Korea. And
during the Yi dynasty, Korean kings had more than once invited Chinese troops
to repel Japanese invaders.
MacArthur insisted that the measures he proposed would severely cripple
and largely neutralize China’s capability to wage an aggressive war against
Korea and other Asian countries. By then, China had not only taken over helpless
Tibet, but was also assisting North Vietnam in its fight against South Vietnam
and supported insurgencies in Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula. Later,

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MacArthur articulated his view at the Republican National Convention of July 7,

1952: “It is fatal to enter any war without the will to win it.” The American
public in general, and the Republican congressmen in particular, supported
MacArthur’s view; but the president did not.
General Bradley later testified before the Senate Committee on the Korean
War: “Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world.
Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy [of widening the
Korean War] would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the
wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” This position contrasted very sharply
with MacArthur’s view that, if unopposed, the Communists would not only
overrun South Korea but would go on to Japan, India, and the Middle East, and
eventually to Europe and America. We now know that MacArthurs’s fear of
Communist takeover was exaggerated, but the Communists would have assisted
wherever there was an effective Communist insurgency. The conditions were
ripe in parts of Latin America also, and certain parts of the Middle East.
Western Europe, like Washington, thought MacArthur’s idea of involving
the Chinese Nationalist Army was ridiculous. The British would rather see the
U.S. dump Taiwan than endanger her delicate relationship with China vis-à-vis
Hong Kong.

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16. REFUGEE STORIES

In November, the people in Hamhung were blissfully unaware of what was

happening on the battlefield. Hard core Communists had already left town and
most people were willing to speak out about how they really felt about them.
They had no idea that the Communists would soon return. In late November,
sorties of American warplanes were becoming more frequent. By early
December, the distant thunder of bombardment was heard. In the following
several days, the people heard the terrifying sound of shells from naval guns
screaming over the city, growing louder.
Amid such bombardment, Dr. Lee received a telephone call from Dr. Choi,
his fellow medical college alumnus and the head of the ROK 15th Army Field
Hospital, who said that the twin cities of Hamhung-Hungnam were completely
surrounded by the Chinese and that a decision had been made to evacuate his
hospital to the rear. He offered Dr. Lee’s family free passage on board a Landing
Ship Tank (LST). He made an identical offer to other medical professors. Every
doctor accepted the offer.
The Lee family had only one day to pack, and they could take only what
they could carry. This was in the middle of the coldest winter in ten years. Warm
clothes and blankets were essential. After debating awhile, Boon Yong decided
to take the head of her treasured Singer sewing machine — she thought that it
would fetch good money wherever the family went. Money would be worthless;
North Korea and South Korea used different currencies. She also had two gold
rings with her.

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The next afternoon, a truck arrived and the Lee family, two adults and five
children, each with a package in hand, managed to climb on, although it was
nearly full with other hospital staff. After sunset, the temperatures seemed to
drop below zero. Up in the mountains, the temperature was supposed to have
dropped to -60°; at least it was less severe in the coastal cities of Hamhung and
Hungnam. Still, even with layers of warm clothes and earmuffs, riding on top of
an open truck in sub-zero temperatures with whistling winds was an
experience.
As we moved out, I heard loud thunder and saw flashes of red, far in the
distance but all around us. Soon, the entire horizon lit up and stayed red for the
entire night. It appeared that the whole Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter was on
fire. I assumed at the time that the attack was from Chinese guns; but I learned
later that it was the U.N. side’s artillery and naval bombardment, directed at the
Chinese.
As we crossed the final bridge to the harbor, I saw that it was wired for
explosion. Soldiers were standing by to guard the charges. At the time, I thought
they were waiting for the order to blow up the bridges. However, it would be
several days before that happened. It turns out that we were among the earliest
wave of refugees to cross the bridge.
By the time we arrived at the port, the Marines had already left. They were
ordered to board the ship first, because of the casualties they had suffered. By
this time, the ROK Capital Division had retreated all the way from Cheongjin
along the east coast to the Hamhung perimeter. Now that the U.S. Marine 1st
Division had pulled out of Hungnam, the ROK Capital Division and the U.S. 3rd
and 7th divisions took over its defense. The Chinese intended to destroy the X
Corps and ROK Capital Division, but instead they were being decimated by
fierce naval, air, and artillery bombardments. The Chinese knew that they could
not fight the U.S. on the flat plains near the Navy fleet. Sun Tzu’s techniques for
surprise attack had been used to good effect, but now the U.N. forces were wise
to them. Sun Tzu had not taught them how to fight against a modern army with
naval guns.
What inflicted particularly heavy damage on the Chinese and allowed an
orderly retreat of the X Corps was the Navy Task Force 90 commanded by Rear
Admiral J. H. Doyle. Task Force 90 consisted of an armada of the 7th Fleet war
ships with formidable firepower. The U.N. forces, including the ROKs, would
evacuate practically everything with military value: 17,500 vehicles and 350,000
measurement tons of cargo.131

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Our boat left amid such fireworks. The most vivid memory that I retained
was how cold it was on board the LST, how bad the food was, and how seasick I
was. Dinner and breakfast consisted of a rice ball with salt sprinkled over it. The
LST sailed for what appeared to be an eternity for a seasick person before it
docked at a wharf at Busan. A mass of refugees rushed out. For some reason,
South Korean MPs tried to stop us from landing. They said that this was the
wrong harbor, and they tried to redirect the LST to another location. Half of the
Lee family got off the LST and the other half remained on the ship that sailed
away. It took several days to find each other.
The estimated number of refugees which fled the Hamhung-Hungnam area
through sea is estimated at 91,000. Each of them has a story to tell on why they
fled North Korea and what life they found in South Korea. One common factor
was that they hated the Communists and feared retribution. Even to this day,
the North Korean refugees have by and large remained more anti-Communist
than the average South Korean.
Many of Simon’s classmates also fled Hamhung. One of them, Mr. Hahn
Kyong-nam, got out of Hungnam later than us. According to him, the situation in
late December was considerably more chaotic than when we left. Hahn had his
reason to fear Communist retribution. After Simon and some of his classmates
volunteered for the Inmin-gun, Hahn decided to hide in order to avoid being
conscripted. One day, the school asked all the students to come to collect their
graduation certificates. Everyone who showed up was taken to an Inmin-gun
training camp, but Hahn had smelled a rat and stayed away. He only came out of
hiding, shouting Mansei!, when the ROKs showed up at Hamhung. When
Chinese soldiers advanced to Hamhung, he had no choice but to escape the city.
Like many young people at that time, Hahn left home alone. His father was too
old to be drafted and he was sure that he would be back within a month, if not
sooner. Hahn got out by walking all the way to the port of Hungnam on
December 21 in freezing temperatures. On his way, he had to cross a small river
on foot because the Americans had already blown up all the bridges to protect
their retreat. Luckily, the river was frozen solid. In late December, refugees came
out by the thousands. The crowd grew bigger by the day. A journalist who was
on the scene reported seeing “elderly men and women carrying their possessions
on their backs, mothers with their babies strapped into white cotton-cloth

131. See an on-line article posted on August 10, 2000, by the Naval Historical Center,
the Department of Navy, “The Hungnam Evacuation, 10-24 December, 1950.”

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slings, curious youngsters, some without parents, were eager for the ‘big boat
ride’ to the south.”132
Hahn had to wait a full 24 hours before he could get on board a ship. While
he was anxiously waiting his turn, he saw the awesome display of U.S. naval
firepower. Many battleships in the open sea were too far away to see, but their
barrage of large caliber shells illuminated the entire harbor just as if it was a
broad daylight. He also saw the skies over the direction of Hamhung turn red.
The battleships were firing at the ammunition depots and other war materiel. All
the ammunition, food, and brand-new railroad rolling stocks which the X Corps
could not take with them were blown up.
The bombardment went on all day and all night. Hahn was part of one of
the last groups that made it to the ship during the last days of this exodus. He
landed on the Koje-do Island at the southern end of South Korea and volunteered
for the ROK Army, in which he served for three years in an artillery battalion. He
saw a lot of action. On the Inje front, his batteries of artillery fired so many shells
day and night against the human waves of the Chinese Army that their gun
barrels turned red from overheating. This was at the time of so-called the “Van
Fleet shelling,” or carpet shelling of enemy-held areas.
Another of Simon’s classmates, Park In-yong, shared a similar experience.
He and his elder brother took an LST, out of Hungnam during the final day of
evacuation. When they arrived at an east coast port of Okjin, now called
Donghae, on the east coast of South Korea, they were asked to volunteer for the
ROK Army, which they did gladly. When they arrived at the training camp, it
was about to retreat to the south because the Chinese were coming south.
During their march, they were soaked in icy rain and thought they would
die from exposure. Park and two other fresh recruits knocked at the gate of a
farmhouse for help. The owner fed them and the wife washed and dried their
clothes while they warmed their backs on the heated ondol floor. The owners
allowed them to stay overnight while their clothes dried.
Park never forgot the farmer, during the 25 years he served in the ROK
military. As soon as he retired, the first thing that he did was to search for the
house. When he found it — now with a new tile roof instead of the straw of
bygone days — a man answered the door. When Park asked him if he
remembered the four stragglers in 1951, the man said, “You must be referring to
my father. He’s passed away.” He also said that there were hundreds of soldiers

132. Goulden, p 379.

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and civilians who had stopped by the house during the war. Park unloaded a
sack of rice on the doorstep, but he was too late to thank the kind man who had
saved him from freezing.
Another North Korean refugee out of Hamhung, Dr. Donald Chung,
became a cardiologist in the Los Angeles area. He wrote a book on his experience
as a refugee. Anyone who was not fit to walk from Hamhung to the port city of
Hungnam in sub-zero weather was left behind. Most people in that condition
were not in the age bracket for military service. Dr. Chung left home, leaving
behind his mother. Like many others, he believed that he would be back home in
weeks, if not days. It took him 25 years. Returning from a trip to North Korea to
pay homage to his parents’ graves, he wrote a book entitled The Three Day Promise:
A Korean Soldier’s Memoir. It became a bestseller in South Korea and he donated
the entire income from the book to the U.S. Korean War veterans’ organization.
Minja Yoon also evacuated the port of Hamhung in December 1950 as the
Chinese soldiers were closing in around the city. Her father was too old for the
Inmin-gun, but they had another reason to be concerned. When the ROK
soldiers advanced to Hamhung, one of Minja’s second cousins appeared at her
doorstep. He had escaped to the South shortly after the division of Korea at the
38th parallel and became an officer of the ROK Army. He was assigned to a
communications unit and came to Hamhung. This cousin not only visited her
home, but also sometimes stayed in her house. The neighbors saw him. The
family became enemies in the eyes of the Communists. Now, they were desperate
to leave before the Inmin-gun arrived. Just as they were scrambling to leave the
house, her parents decided to fetch her grandmother and told Minja to wait at
the bus depot. By the time she arrived there, the depot was in complete chaos.
She waited for her parents but they did not show up.
Finally, her uncle arrived and decided to send her ahead to Hungnam for
her own safety. He told her that he would bring her parents there soon. Minja
waited and waited, but her parents did not show up. Finally, she was placed on
an LST designated for POWs. Under the decks were hundreds of Inmin-gun and
Chinese prisoners. She stayed on the open deck for three days until the ship was
fully loaded with POWs and set sail. She doesn’t understand to this day how she
avoided being frozen to death, riding on deck during the middle of that terrible
winter.
Minja never saw nor heard from her family again. The LST unloaded the
refugees as well as the POWs on Koje-do Island. She was sent to an orphanage,
while the POWs went to the Koje-do prison camp. After a year, she was moved

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to the boarding house of a high school in Koje-do established by a church

mission. Minja, not surprisingly, suffered from recurring nightmares; she could
see her mother standing just across a small stream, but she would not cross it to
come to her. Minja would shout, “Mom, why don’t you come to me?” And then
she would wake up.
These refugees abandoned their life savings and left behind everything they
had. Thousands could not find passage out of Hungnam and some were no doubt
killed as anti-Communists.
In one last-minute rush to get on a ship, some 4,000 people managed to
board a single LST, sinking it into the mud. ROK soldiers fired submachine guns
into the air, and everyone got off while the skipper managed to maneuver his
craft into deeper water.133 Then some Koreans re-boarded. Another ship, a large
commercial vessel, carried about 12,000 civilians. Newspapers all over the world
carried pictures of thousands of Koreans trying to flee Hungnam. A “big boat
ride,” it was called. Others called it the Christmas Retreat. Some observers blame
Washington for sending the U.N. forces across the 38th parallel to the north,
only to fall back more or less at the 38th parallel. The invasion did not achieve its
original intent, but hundreds of thousands of Koreans did escape to the south.
On the west coast of Korea, refugees left by train, if they could find one.
Otherwise, they traveled on foot. Lim Kun-shick, another classmate of Simon’s in
Sariwon, was one of those who rode a train for part of the journey and walked
the rest of the way. In early December 1950, Kun-shick noticed an increasing
number of refugees moving south through the heart of Sariwon. According to
him, “All kinds of people were on the move. Some appeared to be relatively well-
to-do, and others appeared to be simple farmers with deep tans and wrinkles.”
Kun-shick said everyone in Sariwon was confused about the exact
battlefield situation at that time. The rumors were changing by the minute.
Either a wave of Chinese soldiers was sweeping southward and the ROK troops
were on the run, or EUSAK had steadied the battlefront and it was safe to stay
put. Kun-shick’s father had his ear glued to the radio, but there was no useful
information to be found. On December 5, the situation deteriorated rapidly. The
highway was packed with people moving south: “The Chinese are coming!” they
said. Dr. Lim decided it was time to go. His older son and daughters had already
gone; the grandparents would have to be left behind — they were too fragile to
join the column of refugees fleeing on foot in the middle of winter. And so Kun-

133. Goulden. p. 379.

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shick’s mother, father, and four siblings packed up, taking with them the staff of
Dr. Lim’s clinic including the medical assistant, pharmacist, nurse, and a servant.
As was the custom, the servant woman was regarded as a member of the
household rather than an employee. The family dog had to be left behind. He
sensed something was wrong and barked furiously.
The Lim family had completed preparations for the coming winter, and
were comforted to know that the grandparents would have plenty to eat. The
house was stocked with a large quantity of rice and kimchee in several 20-gallon
jars. (They were buried underground except for the lids; this was to prevent the
jars from freezing and cracking open.) Kimchee would last for the entire winter,
fermenting ever so slowly because of the cold temperature. They also left 20 or so
chickens and several ducks that would provide eggs. Dr. Lim was sure that he
would return in a week or so, anyway. His wife packed enough rice, rice cakes,
and toffee to last the travelers for several days, and she brought along several
gold rings in case they needed money along the way. By now, everyone had heard
that the ROK and U.N. soldiers were making a tactical retreat, and that they
would return very soon; the Lim family felt they were pretty well prepared for a
week or two away. They were just trying to run away from the Inmin-gun who
might kill anti-Communists elements.
An otherwise good book written by an Englishman remarked, “To a
Westerner, the decision to abandon the very old and the very young seems
almost fanatic. However, as the U.N. armies so often observed, the people of
Korea seem to draw their character from the harsh environment in which they
live. This was the kind of parting, the kind of decision that was commonplace in
hundreds of thousands of Korean families that created the legions of starving
orphans and infant beggars that hung like flies around every U.N. camp, supply
dump, refuse heap.”134
Apparently, this military historian had no clue as to what the refugees were
thinking: that this was just a one- or two-week evasion of the Inmin-gun. Filial
duty is taken as seriously in Korea as anywhere on earth. He also had no
appreciation of the risks inherent in a reputation as a “reactionary” or the
appearance of being fit for military conscription. This was no World War II in
Europe.

134. Max Hasting, The Korean War (London: Michael Joseph, 1987) p. 196, hereafter
Hasting.

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Even as Dr. Lim’s family rushed to the Sariwon train station, the situation
was unraveling by the minute. The crowd was growing bigger and the people
pushed and shoved. Kun-shick got separated from his family. At the station was
a train with about half a dozen boxcars. He heard someone say that it was on its
way to Seoul. The doors were shut. Apparently, a horde of refugees had already
rushed into the boxcars and they were completely full. Kun-shick climbed up on
top of one boxcar by the little stairs at the back. He could not find his parents,
but he wanted to secure a seat somewhere on the train to the land of freedom.
The train top was covered with coal residue, but most of the space was already
crowded with people. Kun-shick noted that a mother had tied a rope around the
waist of her daughter to prevent her from falling off.
Kun-shick did not know where his parents were, but at this point the
desire to live was the most compelling drive.
However, the train did not budge for a whole day. This was December,
amid the coldest winter in his memory. On the second day, Kun-shick managed
to find his family, inside a boxcar. The people were packed like sardines and it
was hard for anyone to go in or out. Eating rice was out of the question; people
ate whatever other snacks they had brought with them. They peed into cans. At
least, since the cars were packed, it did not feel so cold anymore. The train did
not move for another two days. It was bad enough to be inside a jam-packed
boxcar for three days, but an even bigger worry was that the Inmin-gun might
appear any moment and shoot everybody inside. People were weighing whether
it might not be better to get off the car and walk rather than wait like this
indefinitely.
That night, however, the train moved without warning. Kun-shick heard a
scream and a thud. Someone obviously had fallen from the roof. Each time the
train stopped at a station and each time it started, and each time the train made
an erratic move, Kun-shick heard more screams and thuds. Kun-shick looked up
at his father, wide-eyed. If he had not found his parents inside the boxcar, he
might well have been one of those to fall off the roof.
In Seoul, they stayed with a relative for a week. Then the news became
truly ugly. People began to say that the Chinese were marching to Seoul. Hopes
of an early return to Sariwon evaporated in a hurry. Even Seoul citizens were
now packing to move south. Lim’s family decided to go to Kunsan, although
most refugees were heading toward Daegu and Busan. Dr. Lim’s brother-in-law
was a liquor manufacturer in Kunsan and had a big house.

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The whole family of six moved on foot. By this time, they had hardly
anything to eat. They stopped by roadside farmhouses to ask for food, as
travelers had done throughout Korean history. Yeogwan, the traditional Korean
inns, were available in towns and cities, but not out in the countryside. But
thousands of refugees were on the road. Farmers could not afford to be generous
to everyone. Furthermore, the southerners looked down on the northerners,
calling them “38th [parallel] tramps.” Kun-shick said, “As soon as the farmers
heard our northern accents, they would slam their doors. This went on for
several days and we were dead tired and hungry.”
However, as they were passing through a town, a train pulled in. Someone
pointed and said that it was going to Kunsan. A horde of people pushed and
shoved again to get on the train; Kun-shick’s parents and two of the children
made it on board; Kun-shick and his younger sisters were left behind. There
were so many people milling around that it was sheer madness.
Soon the train began to pull away and Kun-shick saw his father feverishly
waving at them to get on. Kun-shick and his sister ran as fast as they could, but
the train was pulling away farther and farther. Kun-shick collapsed on the
ground, desperate and out of breath. At that moment, he saw his father jump off
the speeding train, and away it sped, taking the rest of the family south.
Kun-shick could not remember how many days it took for them to reach
Kunsan. Now and then, they would come across rivers where the bridges had
been destroyed. They had to pay fishermen to ferry them across. One of these
rivers flowed toward Kunsan; they found a fisherman who was willing to take
them down stream, and slept the night away as his small boat took them south.
And that was the last of his father’s savings — but they still had a distance to go.
They asked strangers for food as they moved south. Kun-shick said, “My father
led a privileged life, and was treated like a king at home, but I heard no word of
complaint during this whole trip.”
Finally, they made it to Kunsan. They expected that his mother and two
siblings would have arrived safely ahead of them, but they were not there. Kun-
shick’s uncle had not heard from his mother yet. His uncle made an ondol room
available for the Lims. For the first time in more than two weeks, they slept on a
warm floor and ate as much hot food as they could.
However, the ordeal was not over. Now, the news was that Kunsan might
also fall. His uncle decided to charter a 100-ton boat and throw everything on it
and move to Cheju-do Island — as far south as one could go and still be within
Korea. Most of his uncle’s employees and their families decided to join them.

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They were altogether a party of 300-some refugees-to-become. His uncle loaded

barrels of liquor, some 1,000 sacks of rice (the raw material for making liquor),
and even furniture.
The journey to Cheju-do was supposed to take three days. However,
within a day of leaving port, a typhoon tossed the 100-ton boat about like a toy.
The boat was too big to beach on the rocky shore, and there was no proper
harbor within reach. The captain navigated as close as he could to the shore,
then threw out the anchor. All except Dr. Lim’s family and the crew went ashore
on a small boat. Dr. Lim had no more money to spend on lodging and meals, so
they decided to stay put. Other people were from the Kunsan area. Finally, the
typhoon passed, but not before everyone onboard was sick, several 50-gallon
liquor barrels were toppled over, and somehow a fire broke out. Incredibly, the
men managed to put it out.
When the sky cleared and their party came back aboard, the boat
continued to sail south and landed at a small town called Hanlim on the Cheju-
do Island. The Lims stayed on the island for several months before they located
Kun-shick’s mother. Her train had gone to Daegu and then to Busan, rather than
to Kunsan. In 1953, Dr. Lim and his two children sailed to Busan to join the rest
of the family. Kun-shick’s father found a job as a company doctor and Kun-shick
resumed his college education in 1953. He said that although his father did not
make much money as a company doctor, they did well and were happy in South
Korea.

THE PLIGHT OF REFUGEES AND MASSACRES OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS

The sufferings that the Lims and our family experienced cannot be
belittled, but they were fundamentally different from the anguish experienced
by the refugees at No Gun Ri during the first several weeks of the war — July
1950. According to an Associated Press (AP) of September 1999, some of them
were intercepted and machine-gunned by American soldiers. This was big news
in America and the Korean version of the story, written by one of Hanley’s co-
authors, Sang-Hun Cho, was serialized in a Korean newspaper. Yet, this was not
a new story. A committee in South Korea that investigated it summarized the
extent and the nature of the killing in July 1994. What made No Gun Ri a big
story were the interviews with the GIs who admitted that they committed such
atrocities, and the documentary evidence in the archives.

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Most Koreans never heard such stories during the war, which is
understandable. There was strict censorship by the ROK, and voluntary
restraints by the American press as requested by Washington. Yet, some fifty
years later, the AP story broke and went on to win the 2000 Pulitzer Prize for
investigative reporting. A full-length book was written, complete with
photocopies of once top-secret documents and references to a large number of
now declassified documents.135 Hundreds of refugees (as many as 200 to 400
civilians, by some) were slaughtered at No Gun Ri. The decision to kill was
apparently not made by individual soldiers out of fear or malice, but by the top
echelons of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and the U.S. 25th Division. The U.S.
Fifth Air Force was asked to shoot the refugees. The headquarters of EUSAK
also gave orders not to allow refugees to cross the battle lines. The civilians
killed at No Gun Ri were mostly the elderly, women, and children. The soldiers
of the 1st Cavalry Division acted according to the order of General Gay not to
allow any civilian refugee to cross the lines. Still, officers and enlisted men down
the line of command were not entirely blameless because the orders gave some
leeway on children and women.
No Gun Ri was not an isolated incident. General Kean, the commander of
the 25th Infantry Division, operating next to No Gun Ri (a small rural village in
South Korea famed for nothing but the massacre), issued an order: “All civilians
seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly.”
Three days later, Colonel Raymond D. Palmer of the 8th Cavalry ordered, “Shoot
all refugees coming across river.” This order killed several hundred refugees. No
doubt, there were many Inmin-gun soldiers infiltrating the lines disguised as
refugees. A Korean witness, Kim Won Kee, said that he saw American planes
drop napalm over refugees, incinerating children and everything alive. In one
cave near Danyang, Chungchong Province, an American plane dropped napalm
and some 300 Koreans suffocated to death. One survivor of the incident, Cho
Bong Won (who later became principal of a high school), said that the villagers
were only hiding there to avoid the frequent air raids.
Colonel Turner C. Rogers, 5th Air Force Operations Chief, corroborates
such stories. He wrote to his superior, General Timberlake, indicating that the
U.S. 5th Air Force had been strafing “large groups of civilians,” and it was “sure to

135. Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mandoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri:
A Hidden Nightmare From the Korean War (New York: Henry Holt and Company LLC, 2001),
hereafter Hanley, et al.

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receive wide publicity and may cause embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force and
to the U.S. government in its relationship with the United Nations.”
Major General Robert R. Gay, 1st Cavalry Division commander, said that he
was sure “most white-clad people on South Korean roads were North Korean
guerilla.” Apparently, there were white-clad infiltrators. However, that does not
mean that everyone wearing white was a Communist infiltrator: perhaps half the
farmers in the countryside wore white clothes at that time. They were mourning
clothes. Confucian custom required lengthy mourning periods, sometimes for
years — not only for the death of one’s direct family members but also for
relatives, the king, and so on. Carried to the extreme, killing everyone in white
clothes would have meant killing at least half the farmers.
CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow observed atrocities, too. He sent a radio
report to New York, saying “The U.S. military was creating ‘death valleys’ in
South Korea, and wondering whether the South Korean people would ever
forgive America.” CBS refused to broadcast Murrow’s report, because of the
“self-censorship system that forbade criticism of the U.S. military.” There are
many more such stories of hapless Koreans in Hanley’s books, Korean
newspapers, and Seo and others who wrote extensively about atrocities during
the war. Charles Hanley and the company tried to provide an explanation for the
prevalence of such massacres by citing Howard Levie, the Army lawyer who
oversaw war crimes investigations from MacArthur’s headquarters in 1950. He
said that American brutalities were relatively rare in Europe during World War
II, but became more common in Korea because “American soldiers considered
Orientals to be ‘gooks,’ that’s why. They considered them [Koreans] to be lesser
beings.” Were American racists? Levy’s explanation rings true. The U.S. Army
was still segregated and racial prejudice was part of the American culture then.
And it was not confined to those from the Deep South.

Obviously, the killing was not motivated by racism, but by tactical

considerations. However, it is hard to imagine such decisions being made so
casually by American commanders in Europe during the World War II. This was
an ugly chapter in the otherwise noble endeavors of the U.S.: Americans
provided food and other aid and adopted orphans, and risked their lives for
them. But this is not to say that all GIs were good guys. Books by Max Hastings
and others including one by an ex-Marine136 show there were, indeed, bad sorts.
Initially, the U.S. government denied any knowledge of this incident. After
the AP story broke, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen conducted an

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investigation. The report says that American soldiers involved in the incident
were “young, under-trained, under-equipped, and new to combat” and under the
command of leaders with limited combat experience. Clinton later expressed his
“regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri.” The U.S. Defense
Department interviewed 200 Korean War veterans and 75 Korean victims’
family members, but no compensation has been paid to them.
No Gun Ri did not go away. In February, 2002, the BBC documentary
(Kill’em all) alleged that there was an order to kill civilians and the U.S.
government tried to cover it up to avoid legal responsibility. It also reported that
there were similar American massacres of Korean civilians in Pohang and Masan.
Such news once again aroused the surviving family members of the massacre.
The affected families and a Catholic Church group were preparing to take the
matter to the U.N. Human Rights Committee.
America does not accord legal protection to foreign casualties of war or to
massacres in a uniform manner. Her cold-blooded reaction after accidentally
bombing a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan and a wedding party in Afghanistan
prove the point. By contrast, when two Canadian soldiers were killed by an
accidental bombing in Afghanistan, a court martial was convened. Obviously,
such differences contribute to anti-American sentiments.
During the Korean War, simple collateral damages from bombing were
rather common. Most of them were accepted as a military necessity. Lim Kun-
shick witnessed the destruction of Sariwon when the U.N. and ROK forces
crossed the 38th parallel. He said, “By the time Seoul was recaptured, my family,
including me, had taken refuge in a small village outside Sariwon. The city had a
population of more than 50,000, but it was bombed heavily, perhaps because it
was a commercial and transportation center. Soon, there was practically no
building left in the town center except my father’s clinic and a police station.”
Lim said, “Pretty much the whole city burned to ashes because the
American bombers dropped napalm.” His family returned to the city once the
bombing ceased, but the city had been burned down. Yet, Sariwon citizens
received the ROK and American soldiers as liberators, and the people did not
hold the burning of the town against them. Such a reaction was not always
common. I came across a book written by a South Korean, with a fiery hatred
against his own government and America. His short biography showed that his

136. Roger “Rog” G. Baker, USMC, Tanker’s Korea: The War in Photos, Sketches and Letters
Home (Oakland, Oregon: Elderberry Press), p. 136.

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whole village was bombed even though there was no Inmin-gun soldiers in it and
his parents died in the raid. Such memories live long in a person.
As the timeline moves further away from 1950, South Koreans who have
not experienced the war tend to be more impressed by No Gun Ri and other
such incidents as well as Roosevelt’s sell-out of Korea than by the blood that
Americans shed on the peninsula to buy their freedom. The division of the
country and the constant threat of another war are daily reminders to Koreans
that they are still the victims of Roosevelt’s decision — which seems to have
been taken with arrogant disregard for the interests of the Koreans themselves.

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17. AN OLD SOLDIER FADES AWAY, A NEW ONE STEPS IN
In December 1950, General MacArthur told officials in Washington that
unless he received major reinforcements, the Chinese could drive the U.N. forces
out of Korea. At the time, there was only a small reserve of combat units in the
United States, and the JCS notified MacArthur that a major build-up of U.N.
forces was out of the question. They said that if it was possible, MacArthur
could stay in Korea; but should the Chinese drive U.N. forces back on Busan, the
JCS would order a withdrawal to Japan.
Secretary Acheson seemed to have all but written off Korea. The question
was how to pull out rather than whether or not to pull out. Even Truman seemed
to gravitate toward such an inglorious end to the war.
General Ridgway arrived in Korea amid all these political and military
debates. He quickly restored EUSAK’s morale and performance. He wanted
“maximum punishment, maximum delay” of any Communist advances. In the
process, he fired several division commanders. Among those sacked was the 2nd
Division Commander, Maj. General Robert B. McClure, who had retreated
without the corps commander’s permission. Admittedly, McClure had been
unable to reach Corps commander Almond during a snowstorm. Another reason
for firing General McClure was that he had not flattened a Korean village in the
battlefield with artillery, something that Ridgway had ordered to be done as a
routine practice. In this case, there was no sign that the village was occupied by
the enemy. The war had now entered a more exaggerated phase of ruthlessness.
Washington would not allow the UNC to bomb Manchuria, but Korean
villages appear to have been fair game. For this reason, to many Koreans General
Ridgway’s legacy will always raise the question: Did he not use excessive force?

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South Koreans consider that such ruthless tactics ought to have been applied to
the Chinese, if anyone — not to Koreans.
Returning to General Ridgway’s battlefield exploits in Korea, his first
challenge came on the New Year’s Eve. Enemy forces launched another all-out
attack, directing their major thrust toward Seoul. This was the third general
offensive. He was not interested in defending Seoul or any other piece of land. He
evacuated Seoul. The U.N. forces withdrew to a line about 40 miles south of
Seoul. The residents of Seoul once again saw Communist soldiers entering the
city in what was turning out to be a seesaw battle. It set off another wave of
refugees, more destruction of the city, and more atrocity for those who were
trapped behind the lines
Only light Chinese forces pushed south of the city, and enemy attacks in
the west petered out. On the central and eastern fronts, North Korean attacks
did not abate until mid-January. However, beyond that time, the enemy could
not sustain its offensive. As Ridgway suspected, the enemy’s primitive logistical
system did not permit undertaking long offensives. The FEAF was causing havoc
to the enemy’s transportation infrastructure. The Chinese were facing severe
food shortages and they were already relying on local supplies to meet their food
requirements. There was a limit.
Ten days later, Ridgway went on a cautious counter offensive. EUSAK
advanced slowly and methodically, ridge by ridge, line by line, wiping out each
pocket of resistance before moving farther north. Enemy forces fought back
vigorously, and in February struck back in the central region. During that
counterattack, the U.S. 2nd Division successfully defended the town of
Chipyong-ri against a much larger Chinese force. EUSAK then recaptured Seoul
by mid-March, and by the first day of spring stood just below the 38th parallel.
This was a new EUSAK.
During the U.N. counter-offensive, the Chinese noted some interesting
tactical changes brought about by Ridgway. He anticipated the Chinese
predilection for penetrating behind the line and he blocked it by spreading out
his troops seamlessly across broad fronts. The U.N. troops were no longer
moving in large units. Small units were attacking from different directions. They
learned to use the topography and natural settings as the Chinese did, rather
than sticking to the major roads.
Thus, the Chinese counter offensive flopped. Ridgway’s army was getting
tougher and more skillful. Colonel Paul Freeman of the 23rd Regiment and Lt.
Colonel Ralph Montclair137 of the French battalion emerged as heroes. The

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Greek and Turkish units also fought well. Like several other veterans of the
Korean War, Colonel Freeman later became a four-star general. During this
offensive, however, ROK divisions suffered heavy casualties because General
Almond, who commanded the central and eastern fronts at that time, sent the
lightly armed ROK divisions against the Chinese without any back-up. The
heavily armed U.S. divisions were well behind the ROK divisions. The ROKs
took unacceptably heavy casualties in the so-called Massacre Valley. To prevent
possible adverse repercussions from the U.N. member countries supporting
South Korea, the press release on the number of casualties was censored. Paik
wrote that Almond, who lost many Marines at the Changjin Reservoir, might
have been trying to spare the American units at the expense of the ROKs.
In any event, Ridgway steadied the entire front. The debate on whether or
not to withdraw from Korea became an academic issue.
Ridgway’s battlefield exploits notwithstanding, he would never be an
endearing figure to Koreans. He apparently had little regard for Asiatic races.
According to Goulden, Ridgway visited POW camps at Busan and remarked
that the North Korean and Chinese prisoners were just a “shade above the
human beast.” He also said, “It is by the use of such human canaille that the
Soviets are destroying our men while conserving their own.”
Korean-American scientist Young Sik Kim, who posted his book-length
account of the war entitled Eyewitness: A North Korean Remembers on the Web, lists
several quotes on racial prejudice among American military leaders. One,
originally from Goulden’s Korea, says that General Ridgway issued an order on
January 8, 1951, to “shoot any civilian suspected of being a Communist before
they become prisoners.” Ridgway also asked MacArthur’s permission to use
poison gas. Ridgway, who so ably fought off the Communists, appears to have
come close to committing war crimes — if he did not actually commit them —
via orders, requests and statements such as these.
Young Sik Kim was no leftist. He would perhaps consider himself a Korean
nationalist. He was making a point that many top American generals were
racists at that time, although he thought that America is today “the most racially
tolerant country in the world.” Perhaps Kim’s history might explain his
bitterness to Americans during the war. He was a North Korean refugee who

137. Lt. Colonel Ralph Montclair was a veteran of the First and Second World War,
with a rank of Lt. General, but to participate in the Korean War with a mere battalion of
French soldiers, he took the rank of Lt. Colonel.

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received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Purdue University and taught the
subject at Ohio State University. In North Korea, he was a student volunteer
fighting the Communists as a member of a guerilla unit. After escaping to South
Korea, he worked as an interpreter for the CIA. One day, he happened to be
interpreting for a CIA officer when his former North Korean guerilla commander
came to see his CIA boss. His former boss had risked his life to cross the
demilitarized zone, better known for its acronym DMZ, on foot to ask for
airdrops or the evacuation of his unit. The CIA officer denied both and coldly
abandoned Kim’s old guerilla unit that was still operating in North Korea after
the cease-fire. The Americans were still supporting some pro-American and pro-
South Korean partisans behind the DMZ, but they too were later abandoned
without being offered any way out of North Korea.

As the war dragged on and casualties mounted, support for the war waned
and the way Truman fought the war became increasingly controversial.
Republicans in Congress were talking about sending a Congressional delegation
to Tokyo to ask MacArthur how the war should be fought. On February 12, 1951,
Representative Joseph Martin, Minority Leader of the House, deplored the
“sheer folly” of not using Chiang’s troops in Korea, and weeks later sent the text
of his remarks to MacArthur, inviting comment. MacArthur offered his views on
March 20:

Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Taiwan is
in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition. It seems strangely difficult for
some to realize…that if we lose this war to Communism in Asia, the fall of
Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet
preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for
victory.

To Truman, such a letter to his political opponent was direct

insubordination and violated his order to clear all statements other than routine
matters through Washington. To Truman, this was a case of a soldier meddling
in national policy. The Times of London called the letter the “most dangerous” of
“an apparently unending series of indiscretions.” The British government called
it “irresponsible.” More attacks on MacArthur would follow, suggesting that he
“personally” wanted war against China. Republicans such as presidential
contender Senator Robert Taft rallied around MacArthur, who was now at the
center of a political storm.

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 17. An Old Soldier Fades Away, A New One Steps In

While this was going on, Ridgway opened a general offensive on April 5
toward the more easily defended lines roughly ten miles above the 38th parallel,
known as the “Kansas Line.” Truman recalled MacArthur on April 11 and named
General Ridgway as his successor.
In a speech given to the nation, Truman said, “We do not want to see the
conflict extended. We are trying to prevent a world war — not to start one.” In a
direct rebuttal of MacArthur’s well known positions, Truman asked rhetorical
questions: “But you may ask why can’t we take other steps to punish the
aggressor? Why don’t we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don’t we
assist Chinese Nationalists troops to land on the mainland of China?” He
answered these questions by saying, “If we were to do these things we would be
running a very grave risk of starting a general war.” This seemed to provide a
potent justification for firing MacArthur, although what we know today
indicates that this was an unfounded fear.
MacArthur returned to America amid the thunderous ovation of a nation
deeply grateful to him. Americans were shocked by the dismissal of one of its
greatest military heroes. MacArthur had his opportunity to reply to Truman’s
speech on April 19, 1951 to a joint session of Congress. He said, “Once war is
forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means
to bring it to a swift end. War’s very objective is victory — not prolonged
indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory. For history
teaches us with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and
bloodier war.”
A Gallup poll indicated that two out of three Americans disapproved of
Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur. The controversy lasted many months, but in
the end the nation decided that the president as commander in chief had the
right to fire a military commander. Many people did not necessarily believe that
the military strategy of the Truman Administration was correct. The history of
the Korean War has been rewritten many times by writers with the Vietnam
War frame of mind. Some of them branded MacArthur as a warmonger who
almost started the third world war, but others disagree. The events that
followed have showed that the Truman Administration’s strategy did not end
the war quickly, as expected, but killed a large number of soldiers and civilians,
only to achieve at the end a stalemate. Did that outcome give encouragement to
Communists elsewhere, as predicted by MacArthur? The answer to that
question is uncertain.

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To Koreans, MacArthur was the symbol of struggle against the

Communists. He, more than any other American, symbolized what was great
about America. He seemed to be the only American general who genuinely cared
for Asians. The Filipinos admired him when he was in the Philippines, and the
Japanese admired him for the reforms that he introduced in the post-war era. To
Koreans, he was the only American general who attempted to unify Korea —
albeit for entirely different reasons than Koreans did. For sure, he made the
mistake of dismissing the possibility of large-scale Chinese intervention and not
believing it even when the evidence was there, but Koreans were shocked: Is this
a way to fight the Communists? Koreans respected the way Ridgway fought the
war, but he was just a professional soldier, not an inspiring figure like
MacArthur, who gave a purpose for the fighting and sufferings and a vision at
the end of a long dark tunnel.
Before going to Tokyo, General Ridgway turned over EUSAK to Lt. General
James A. Van Fleet. He, too, fought well. He successfully stopped the Chinese
Spring Offensive, which commenced on April 22, 1951, with 337,000 soldiers of
21 Chinese and 9 North Korean divisions. Van Fleet’s saturation shelling on the
dense formation of enemy troops slaughtered the enemy in droves. This was a
costly offensive for the Communists, although Van Fleet almost ran dangerously
low on ammunition. The U.N. side suffered 900 casualties, but the Chinese
suffered 35,000 casualties.138 The consumption rate of artillery shells was five
times the normal rate during battle.
Van Fleet wanted a counter-offensive, but he was not allowed to advance
beyond the so-called Kansas-Wyoming lines. The Wyoming Line included a
bulge projecting from the Kansas Line. The bulge was known as the Iron
Triangle with Pynggang (not Pyongyang) to the north and two southern towns
of Chorwon to southwest and Kumhwa at southeast. Ridgway ordered to inflict
maximum damage on the Communists. This was a war to kill the enemy rather
than to win the war. Van Fleet resented the no-win policy of the Truman
Administration. He was a passionate anti-Communist like MacArthur and
Syngman Rhee, and sought a clear-cut victory. He too did not last long with the
Truman Administration. A more politically correct Lt. General Maxwell Taylor
replaced him somewhat prematurely in early 1953 and went on to become the
Army chief of staff and Ambassador to Vietnam. In an interview given to the Life
magazine, Van Fleet said, “We could have beaten the [Communists] in the

138. Hanguk Junjaeng-sa, by the Korean Military Academy, op. cit. p. 480.

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 17. An Old Soldier Fades Away, A New One Steps In

spring of 1951[.] Our offensive caught the Chinese by complete surprise. We

could have followed up our success, but that was not the intention of
Washington. Our State Department had already let the Reds know that we were
willing to settle on the 38th parallel.” Van Fleet was referring to Acheson’s
statement indicating that the U.S. would settle for the 38th parallel, thus
surrendering some hard-earned real estate to the Communists.
Enemy forces renewed their attack after dark on May 15, but it was
unsuccessful. Battles raged on, just so that the Chinese would come to the
negotiating table.

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18. THE WAY WE SURVIVED THE WAR

Returning to the day the Lee family disembarked from the LST docked at
Busan harbor in December 1950, those who got off first were led to a cavernous
theater from which all the seats had been removed. It was half full of refugees.
There were some empty straw mats thrown over the cement on which we slept.
Even in this southernmost city of Busan, it was freezing.
The hardest thing for most North Korean refugees was to eke out a living
without home, job or money. Dr. Lee and his colleagues from Hamhung joined
the ROK Army as military surgeons — they were all beyond the mandatory age
for military service, but there was no better option. Each of the seven doctors
and their families was given a room in a yeogwan — an economy-class, Korean-
style lodging — called Dong Sung in the central part of the city. Even a yeogwan
was a luxury for a refugee family. Many lived in shacks made of makeshift
materials, with roofs made of flattened cans, on the steep hillsides surrounding
Busan.
The Lee family of seven was given an upstairs room, perhaps 150 square feet
at most. There was no heat; a bare electric light bulb hung from the ceiling and
several families shared one bathroom. There was a stove for cooking and heating
the room, and each family bought some utensils and coal for the stove. Although
this was a huge improvement over the cement floor in the theater, it was
extremely cramped and difficult. However, Hamhung was already a different
world in a different era. Had they stayed there, they would not have lived to
enjoy their house. Most likely, Dr. Lee and Simon would have faced a labor camp,
if not a firing squad.

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Hyon-ja, the elder sister, was almost 16 years old. She took job as a nurse’s
aide. Notwithstanding the fact that two of my family members were working for
the ROK Army, we did not have enough money to feed ourselves adequately. Dr.
Lee received the equivalent of about twenty dollars a month, and Hyon-ja
received far less. The government had hardly any revenue and survived on
American handouts.
ROK military casualties mounted daily, and the militia was grabbing young
men on the street for the ROK Army. One day, Simon was taken by the militia;
he was a healthy-looking eighteen-year-old. This is how he ended up in the ROK
army — not out of love of country or hatred of the Communists. Simon’s military
career ended abruptly when he contracted TB and was coughing blood.
Simon was lucky compared with Kun-shick’s older brother, In-shick.
When the Korean War started, In-shick was 22 years old, newly married, and
teaching in an elementary school in Pyongyang. He and his wife left Pyongyang
several days after his parents left Sariwon. As they moved south, an ROK MP
captured In-shick. He was kept behind barbed wire for a couple of months. The
ROK Army treated him like a prisoner because he came from the North and his
background could not be ascertained. During the detention and interrogation,
the food was so poor that he fell ill. One day, the ROK Army contacted In-shick’s
father, Dr. Lim, then on Cheju Island.
When Kun-shick finally met his older brother again, In-shick looked like a
scarecrow. The ROK Army decided that he was not a spy, but decided to release
him rather than drafting him into the army because he was physically too weak
to serve. They did not want one more corpse in the camp. Within a month of
discharge, In-shick died from illness caused by malnutrition. During this time,
the food budget was quite insufficient already, but some ROK officers higher up
were stealing food so that what reached some of the conscripted men or
prisoners was wholly inadequate. The military and government pay was such
that commanders who did not take advantage here and there would starve their
own family members. An honest commander skimmed off just enough for
himself and his family to survive, but the corrupt one ripped off enough to live in
style.
When the ROK Army discharged In-shick, he could not even speak
coherently. Being the eldest son, his father, Dr. Lim, had sent In-shick to Japan
for his secondary education. Dr. Lim had not spared money in raising him. In-
shick thought that he was escaping the brutality of the Inmin-gun. However,
that or an immediate execution like those at No Gun Ri would have been far

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kinder than dying the way he did at the hands of a “friendly” government. He
was only one of an unknown number of war casualties who was not even
recorded as such.
No one was exempt from the drudgery of life as refugee. Boon Yong decided
that she, Hyo-ku, and I should peddle cigarettes, candies, and that curious
American invention chewing gum, on the streets outside the yeogwan. Koreans in
those days were very class-conscious. This was a humiliating experience for
Boon Yong, who was from a rich yangban landlord family. Even for me, the most
difficult aspect of the work was overcoming humiliation. The only consolation in
being a peddler in those days was that there were many like of them throughout
the city. In some streets, there would be more than one such peddler on each
block. Legless and armless veterans would sell their wares on the sidewalk, too;
there were beggars everywhere.
Later, I ended up as a “house boy” on a train that transported American
troops to the front. I cleaned up the train after each trip. I basically worked for
food. On payday, the sergeant in charge of the train would give me a dollar. Still
later, I worked at a Marine airbase in Kimhae. I have nothing but praise for the
Marines I met — they constantly cursed, but I never heard them call Koreans
“gooks.” I ended up working at a mess hall cleaning ovens, carrying boxes of
powdered milk, eggs, sacks of flowers, sugar, and loads of meat and potatoes
from the warehouse to the kitchen. For about a month, I stayed in a Marine
barracks with twenty or so Marines. One of them asked me to write a letter to
his wife’s younger sister. She wanted a Korean pen pal.
A few days later, I drafted a letter in Korean and asked Mr. Min, a Korean
interpreter, to translate it into English. What could I say to a stranger,
thousands of miles away? I talked about my family: my father being a medical
doctor but serving the ROK Army, and practically everyone else in my family
serving in the ROK Army to fight the Communists. I also said how happy we
were to escape North Korea and find freedom in South Korea, although our life
as refugees was miserable. When I showed the letter to Roger, he seemed
impressed. He circulated the letter to all the Marines in the barracks and
beyond. Several days later, we had a meeting. My translator was also present.
Roger asked me whether I had written the letter, and if it was a true story. I
said that Mr. Min had written it; but he insisted he had only translated it. A
certain Master Sergeant Thompson, whom I had never met before, with a bushy
mustache, said, “Lee-san, this is a very good letter. We’d like to get it published.”

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They were perhaps surprised that this young boy, seemingly like any other
street urchin, had something to say about Communism and the value of freedom.
I still do not know why such Korean family travails, which were common at that
time, impressed the Marines. Perhaps it was the novelty of being able to present
an articulate individual to represent the anonymous crowd; war correspondents
followed around generals and other notables for big stories, rather than covering
stories of Korean families who were uprooted and whose properties were
burned to ashes. It must have had some propaganda appeal, as well.
Nothing came of publishing the letter, but several weeks later I received a
note from a Mr. E. L. Hogan of Pittsburgh, who owned a mining company. We
exchanged several letters.
Soon thereafter, I was living outside the military base, like all the other
Korean laborers who worked at the base. However, all of them were grown-ups;
I seemed to be the only kid doing a man’s work. I paid for room and board at a
farmer’s house outside the base. Like most boys of my age, I did not know how to
cook. Now that I was not with the Marines, I had nothing to do in the evening —
no radio, and for that matter not even electricity, just a kerosene lamp. It was too
dim even for reading. There was no telephone in this remote village, and my
parents did not have a telephone, either.
After about six months of such life, I searched for my parents and found out
that they moved away from the yeogwan. I finally located them in Daegu. By that
time, Dr. Lee had gotten out of the military service, and opened his medical
practice with the help of his medical school classmate.
During the war, practically all Korean people had a hard life. There were
thieves, pickpockets, and con artists everywhere. The press was awash with
stories of corruption in the government and the military. Most government
employees had no way to feed their families unless they took bribes or their
families were independently wealthy. The economy of South Korea would have
been a challenge for any president, but Rhee hadn’t the foggiest notion on how to
manage it. Rhee and the National Assembly had been at loggerhead over
atrocities committed by the ROK soldiers at Geochang.
This was a remote county surrounded by mountains that remained in the
Inmin-gun’s hands until early October 1950. Even after the Inmin-gun withdrew,
the ROK was suspicious of the loyalty of the residents. Then on December 5,
1950, several hundred Communist guerillas struck and occupied parts of the
county until early February 1951. The police could not handle the situation and
they requested the ROK Army to intervene. The ROK 11th Division, which

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specialized in securing guerilla-held areas, moved in on February 5, 1951. Two

days later, the guerillas attacked a police station and killed eleven policemen.
The ROK soldiers responsible for protecting the police station went on a
rampage.
In one village, the soldiers killed 76 civilians. Most of them were old people,
women, and children. To the ROKs, they were either Communists or
Communist sympathizers. Young men were rare perhaps because they joined,
voluntarily or not, the guerillas. In another village, soldiers ordered all the
civilians to gather in the school grounds, and then burned the village. In two
other villages, 106 and, respectively, 517 villagers were massacred. During the
trial of those responsible for the massacre, the soldiers testified that they were
merely following orders. The National Assembly demanded that the division
commander and others responsible for issuing orders be punished. Throughout
the summer of 1951, the trial of several involved officers continued. However,
Brig. General Choi Duksin, who gave the orders, escaped all responsibility. In a
way, it was ROK’s No Gun Ri.

After the Inchon landing, Simon’s classmate Taeksoo’s 101 Engineering

Battalion moved north, first to Seoul and finally to Dongduchon. The Inmin-gun
had retreated from the town only hours earlier. The rightist group rounded up
ten families who had executed rightists during the previous three months, and
demanded that Taeksoo’s unit execute all ten families, including the children —
for, if they were not executed, some day they might return to avenge the deaths
of their parents. Such harsh punishments were used in old Korean kingdoms for
crimes of treason.
Taeksoo’s platoon leader obliged, rounded up the families, and marched
them to a mountainside. Taeksoo noticed a girl of about sixteen following the
firing squad.
Asked why she was following, she said, “The chairman of the People’s
Committee, there, crushed my father’s head with a heavy stone.”
After Dongduchon, Taeksoo’s unit rushed to the Chinese border. He felt
that finally the reunification of Korea was near and that he would be able to
return home soon to see his parents and sisters. However, he had no way of
knowing whether they were dead or alive. The thought didn’t linger long
because, by the time Taeksoo’s unit reached Duckchon, after passing Pyongyang,
the Chinese intervened. His unit retreated in a big hurry.

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When Taeksoo’s unit reached Danyang — a village in Chungchong

Province — at night, the platoon was attacked by Communist guerillas, which
had been trapped and could not retreat to the North. By the time the battle was
over, the platoon was nearly wiped out, but Taeksoo was among those who
survived. The next day, at the train station, Taeksoo ran into his brother, Yusoo,
who was three years his junior. They had not seen each other since Taeksoo
escaped Sariwon in a big hurry before the war. Taeksoo found out that their
parents and sisters were still in North Korea. Yusoo’s train left for Busan and
Taeksoo’s unit began its retreat south as well.
Little did they know at that time that they would one day create a major
furniture manufacturing company in South Korea, and donate a huge sum of
money to North Korea in the late 1990s to repave the roads in Sariwon and
furnish North Korean hotels with new beds. This was done under the
encouragement of Kim Dae Jung Administration’s “sunshine policy.” The two
brothers were motivated by their desire to help their sister, still in Sariwon, and
obtain a permission from North Korea government to visit Sariwon so that they
could pay a visit to their parents’ graves in North Korea.

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19. A TALKING WAR

By June 1951, the U.S. saw no point in continuing with the war. With
neither the will nor the passion to win it, all the casualties appeared pointless. In
an effort to determine the Communist side’s interest in a cease-fire, the State
Department sent a feeler to the Russian Ambassador to the U.N., Yakov Malik. A
reply came within days, indicating that the Russians were eager to participate.
On June 25, newspapers in China indicated that China had accepted Malik’s
proposal.
On June 29, General Ridgway broadcast a statement indicating that he
would be willing to have a talk with the Communists. On June 30, Syngman
Rhee issued his own terms for a cease-fire, practically demanding North Korea
to surrender. The UNC ignored Syngman Rhee. If U.N. forces had pulled out,
Rhee’s government would not be able to fight the Communists. On July 1, a big
demonstration was staged in Busan against the negotiations. Even the National
Assembly, dominated by Rhee’s political opponents, also opposed cease-fire.
They wanted to fight on until the country was unified in spite of the suffering
and casualties that Koreans were enduring. (The number of Korean War
casualties per capita was about 300 times greater than those of the U.S.) Since
there were no opinion polls in those days, it was impossible to determine how
many ordinary Koreans really wanted to go on fighting. However, leaving the
country divided once again was unacceptable to most Koreans, and they were
not ready to quit yet.
On July 2, 1950, the Beijing radio broadcast, “If Americans want peace,
Americans should accept Chinese terms,” which included cease-fire along the

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38th parallel. This would mean the U.N. side had to give up a large chunk of real
estate gained at tremendous cost. Weakening the U.S. position somewhat was
the fact that earlier on Dean Acheson had committed yet another untimely gaffe:
stating that the cease-fire could take place along the 38th parallel. Talk-talk and
fight-fight is an ancient Chinese war tactic. Some persons including MacArthur
attributed the loss of China to the Communists to the way Secretary of State
George C. Marshall tried to mediate that armistice between the Nationalists and
the Communists.
MacArthur wrote in his memoir, “In China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek was gradually pushing the Communists back, being largely aided and
supplied by the United States[.] Instead of pushing on to the victory, an
armistice was arranged...and General Marshall was sent to amalgamate the two
components.”139 MacArthur noted that age and perhaps the war had worn
Marshall “down into a shadow of his former self.” After months of fruitless
negotiations, an indecisive Marshall withdrew. However, in this interval of
seven months, the Nationalists had received no munitions or supplies from the
U.S., while the Soviets had reinforced the Chinese Communist armies. Mao
wanted to win the talking war, and he gained an upper hand over Chiang while
talking. While most historians think that more than the lengthy talks
contributed to the fall of Chiang, the U.N. side had a justified concern whether
China would not try to strengthen her position again while the talks went on.
On the U.N. side there were those who thought that they could beat the
Communists on the battlefield. General Van Fleet was one of them; he remarked
that the enemy was so weakened by June 1952 that EUSAK could have easily
marched north and defeated the Communists. In early July, Van Fleet had
prepared and submitted to Ridgway “Operation Overwhelming,” aimed at
pushing the front all the way to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line by early September.
Ridgway did not approve the plan and decided to pursue a cease-fire agreement.
He ordered Van Fleet to hold onto the present position along the “Kansas-
Wyoming” lines.
Heading the U.N. negotiating team was Admiral C. Turner Joy, a World
War II veteran now in charge of naval forces in the Far East; Major General
Lawrence Craig of the Air Force, Major General Henry Hodes of the Eight Army,
Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, and one South Korean, Major General Paik Sun

139. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, Toronto and London: McGraw-
Hill Book Company), p. 320, hereafter MacArthur.

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Yup. Paik was handpicked by the UNC, and did not represent or receive any
instructions from the ROK in any way. Ridgway had done some homework on
the art of negotiating with the Chinese. He decided that one of the qualifications
for being on the negotiation team was the ability to keep from urinating for six
or more hours without a break and to maintain one’s cool under insult and
provocation from the Communists. “Asian experts” told the team members that
they were to be mindful of the Oriental sensitivity to embarrassment — that is,
losing face.
The Communist side announced that its negotiation team would be headed
by North Korean General Nam Il, commander of the Inmin-gun Second Army.
General Nam Il was born in Korea, but when he was young, his family had fled to
Siberia to escape the Japanese oppression. He later took up Soviet citizenship
and spent most of his adulthood in the USSR. As a Soviet captain, he fought the
Germans at Stalingrad. Later, as the chief of staff of a division, he helped take
Warsaw. After returning to North Korea, he held one important position after
another. Another member of the Communist delegation was General Lee Sang
Jo, who had fought in China against the Nationalists and returned to Pyongyang
in 1945. The third member of the North Korean team was also a military man.
On the Chinese side were General Hsieh Fang and the first vice commander
of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, General Tung Hwa. Hsieh Fang played a
major role in the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek by the Chinese Communists in
1936. Immediately after the peace agreement with Chiang, he became the chief of
propaganda for the northeastern Chinese provinces. After the talks started,
Admiral Joy believed that General Hsieh Fang had direct access to Beijing and
was controlling the negotiating position of the Communist side.
On July 10, the actual meeting commenced. The venue was at Kaesong,
about 50 miles northwest of Seoul. This was formerly a South Korean city, and
during the ancient kingdom of Koryo it was the capital city. As the talks began,
it lay about 10 miles north of the front. As Goulden, among others, has
documented in detail, the opening session of the negotiations immediately
turned into propaganda circus. Communist escort vehicles met Admiral Joy’s
convoy at Panmunjom. Three vehicles filled with Communist officers in their
uniforms led the convoy of vehicles to Kaesong. The roadside was packed with
Communist photographers, and the Communist officers made victory signs at
them. The U.N. team looked like POWs being escorted to prison. At the
meeting, when Admiral Joy sat on his seat, he sank almost below the tabletop.
The Communists had sawed the legs off his chair. Across from him, General Nam

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gloated and puffed on his cigarette in satisfaction. Communist photographers

took reels of films before Admiral Joy could obtain a proper chair. During a
recess, a Communist guard pointed a sub-machine gun at Admiral Joy and one
guard proudly explained to Col. Oliver G. Kinney in charge of liaison that a
medal on his chest was for “killing 40 Americans.”
General Nam Il proposed an immediate cease-fire and the establishment of
a 20 km demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel. After this, POWs would be
exchanged. The Communist side also demanded the complete withdrawal of
foreign troops from Korea — while there was no provision to confirm the
withdrawal of the Chinese troops. Even before getting into these agenda items,
an immediate problem was the objection raised by the Western press — gun-
toting Communist guards controlled the conference area and denied them
access. The jockeying for a propaganda advantage continued for a couple weeks
before talk started in earnest.
The first real issue discussed was about the withdrawal of foreign troops
while the press was already talking about getting “the boys back home,”
exasperating Ridgway, who wanted to so in honorable terms.
As the patience-taxing talks were inching forward, the Chinese brought in
more troops and supplies to North Korea. The situation was alarming. It was
understood from the beginning that fighting would not stop until a cease-fire
agreement was reached. On July 21, Ridgway told the JCS that he intended to
unleash an “all-out air strike on Pyongyang” aimed at disrupting the alarming
build-up of supplies and equipment. The JCS declined. It did not want to
antagonize the Communists and put the cease-fire at risk.
On the issue of foreign troop withdrawal, Ridgway stood firm and told the
JCS that he would recess the talks until something constructive was heard from
the Communists. It would be difficult to re-deploy U.S. troops, due to the
distance factor, while only a bridge separates Korea from China. Ridgway had
the backing of President Truman. Notwithstanding all the State Department’s
concern that this would sidetrack negotiations, the Communist side backed
down and agreed not to raise the issue of American troop withdrawal. It was
becoming apparent that the Communist side wanted cease-fire as much as
Washington.
The next round of negotiations concerned a demarcation line for the cease-
fire. The Communist insisted on using the 38th parallel. The UNC did not want
to give up their hard-won real estate. By August 11, negotiations reached an
impasse.

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A horrendous number of soldiers died in battles to occupy better vantage

points, mostly in the Iron Triangle. New and evocative names were showing up
on the press: “Blood Ridge,” “Ridge 983,” “J Ridge,” “Punch Bowl.” Van Fleet
prepared ambitious operational plans to capture more real estate but Ridgway
did not approve them.
The good news on the U.N. side was that the capabilities of the ROK Army
were increasing sharply. Washington wanted to upgrade ROK capabilities in
preparation for the U.S. troop pull out. The firepower of the U.N. side had
increased to the point that Chinese mass assaults became costly to them. Now
seasoned in battle, American and ROK troops burrowed deeper into reinforced
bunkers and called in hails of artillery shells when the hordes of Chinese
attacked. And as the winter approached again, improved logistical support
meant the UNC would be better outfitted than the Chinese to endure the cold.
The Communists realized this.
One disturbing sign for the U.N. side was the vastly increased number of
the Chinese troops. By early September, the number of Communist soldiers
increased by 61,000 men to a total of 700,000. Furthermore, intelligence reports
indicated an increasing presence of Caucasians in North Korea, suggesting
possible Soviet involvement. Another disturbing development was an indication
of increasing Communist air strength.
Yet, the Chinese did not look forward to spending another winter on the
Korean battlefield. Negotiations resumed in earnest on October 19. Ridgway
insisted that the U.N. should refuse to return to Kaesong and insisted on
meeting in the neutral zone of Panmunjom. Washington was nervous about
further delays, but reluctantly gave permission to seek a new venue. On
November 12, the Communist side agreed. By this time, some four months had
passed since opening the negotiations. The Communists gave up their demand
to stick to the 38th parallel. The New York Times asked why the delegates were
haggling over “seeming trifles” when the “big issues” had been settled already.
Ridgway tried to make the point that the agreed line must be one that could be
defended.
Washington was under pressure from its European allies to get out of
Korea. The Europeans had contributed no more than 5 percent of the men and
resources but seemed to have a 50 percent say about the war. On the other hand,
the ROK military, which suffered over 80 percent of the total military casualties
of the war, had no say. Some narrators of the war talked as if South Korea was
the 100 percent beneficiary of the war efforts by its allies and thus should not

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complain. They forgot that this small, poor country was taking the brunt of
fighting the “Cold” War. It had become a global war fought on Korean soil,
where South Korea “loaned” the whole country and its people to the U.S. and
other U.N. member countries in the fight against the Communists. Of course,
South Korea wanted to remain free from Communism and become a unified
country again.
Even more difficult to resolve than the lines of cease-fire were the prisoner
of war (POW) issues. On December 18, both sides released the number of
prisoners that they held. The peculiarity of the situation was that the UNC held
132,474 POWs consisting of 95,531 North Koreans, 16,243 former ROKs who had
been captured and conscripted into the Inmin-gun — in violation of the Geneva
Convention on POWs — and 20,720 Chinese. The Communist side said it had
only 11,551 POWs consisting of 7,142 ROKs, 3,193 Americans, and 1,216 U.N.
soldiers other than Americans. The Communist side’s claim that it held only
11,551 POWs fell much short of an earlier number and list. Ridgway accused the
Communists of not providing the entire list. Some 50,000 U.N. and ROK POWs
were missing. The Communists claimed that many of them had died from
sickness and bombing. Perhaps many of them died from starvation and
executions too; but the U.N. side believed that some names were intentionally
being withheld. In recent years, defectors from North Korea have confirmed that
there were and still are a large number of ROK and U.N. (Caucasian) POWs in
North Korea. Some ROK POWs were among those who have defected recently.
While not responding to the UNC’s charges, the Communists demanded to
release the names of some 37,000 additional “reclassified” ROK POWs who
should be on the U.N. list. In fact, there were about 170,000 detainees in the
POW camps, but not all of them were POWs as such. Held in the Koje-do camps
were not only soldiers but also conscripted civilians, civilian war laborers, and
even ROK youths who were mistakenly taken as enemy by American soldiers
who did not speak the local language and suspected most civilians as enemy.
Rear Admiral R.E. Libby delivered to the Communist negotiators a statement at
Panmunjom on January 2, 1952, which shows the complexity of the situation at
that time. The statement explained that the so-called POWs held by the UNC
included approximately 38,000 South Koreans “who were incorrectly classified
initially as POWs and who have been since reclassified as interned persons,”
approximately “16,000 nationals of the ROK who were identified with” the
Inmin-gun and the PVA and were now being held as POWs by the UNC, and
about 11,000 soldiers of the UN and the ROK Army who were held as POWs.

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The UNC demanded a one-for-one exchange of the POWs. The remainder

would be repatriated to North Korea and China, except for those refusing to be
repatriated. In order to make sure that the choice was not made under duress,
delegates from the International Committee of the Red Cross would screen the
POWs. The Communists did not agree: they wanted all the so-called POWs
back, regardless of their national origins. By this time, attrition due to the war
and the mass exodus of North Koreans to South Korea had depleted the North
Korean population — especially in the military age group. North Korea wanted
to replenish the rank and file of its army with these POWs. Even more important
to the Communists was the unacceptable notion that many of their soldiers
wanted to remain in South Korea or go to Taiwan.
Their demand that all the POWs be returned created a moral dilemma for
the UNC. At least on paper, the international law was on the side of the
Communists. The Geneva Convention states that prisoners of war shall be
repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities. This clause was
created to prevent the Communists from keeping thousands of prisoners in slave
labor camps after World War II. The POWs of the Korean War were peculiar in
that a large proportion of the prisoners did not want to return to their families
and home, and included South Koreans who should return to South Korea even if
the strict letter of the Geneva Convention were applied. Complying with the
1949 Geneva Convention meant going against the intent of that Convention —
returning POWs to where they wanted to go — but also going against basic
human rights.
On January 15, the JCS made a concession to the Communists. The U.S.
abandoned a one-for-one exchange of prisoners although they stood firm on “no
forcible return of the POWs.” Ridgway saw the tendency for the Truman
Administration to make concession after concession in eagerness to get out of
the war. Now, accustomed to getting concessions from Washington, the
Communists were waiting for more concessions rather than holding earnest
negotiations at Panmunjom. Truman perceived that the USSR was behind the
intransigence of Communist positions. “Writing in his diary on January 27, 1952,
the President mused about giving the USSR an ‘ultimatum with a ten day
expiration limit.’ Unless the Soviet nudged the Chinese toward settlement, the
United States would bomb Manchurian military bases, blockade China, and
enter into ‘all out war.’ Truman also discussed with his aides the possible use of
nuclear weapons should the Chinese violate any armistice agreement.”140 This
amounted to going beyond MacArthur’s proposal.

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The Europeans allies sided with the Communists and supported sticking
to the letter of the Geneva Convention. This would have meant a large-scale
repatriation. In spite of political indoctrination and so-called “high morale”
among the Chinese soldiers, only 5,000 of the 20,720 Chinese POWs wished to
return to China. While leftists were talking about Mao’s “egalitarianism” and
the popular support of Communism by the masses, three out of four Chinese
POWs wanted to go to Taiwan rather than to the People’s Republic of China.
Accepting such choices as the true reflection of the views of the Chinese POWs
would have been a humiliating moral defeat for Mao. Therefore, they dug in their
heels. The U.N. side was afraid that if those anti-Communists were repatriated
to North Korea and China, they might be executed.
In February 1952 the negotiators discussed using an alternative to the
International Red Cross to screen the prisoners, since the Communists had
rejected the Red Cross. The UNC suggested Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The Communists proposed the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Admiral Joy
was instructed to object to the inclusion of the USSR as a neutral commission
member, not because it was supplying war materiel to China and North Korea
but because “the countries share a common border [with Korea.] To Joy’s chagrin,
again and again the Communists taunted his delegation: ‘Why do you give no
logical reason for opposing the great, peace loving USSR as a member of the Neutral
Nations?’… Even after years of reflection, Joy was unable to perceive any sound
reason for such timidity”141 [emphasis added]. Truman was no longer the man
who decided to drop two atomic bombs to bring the Pacific War to an early
conclusion.
The Truman Administration, however, insisted on the principle of not
repatriating the POWs against their wills. In late February, the JCS instructed
Ridgway to screen the POWs and remove from POW status those who violently
resisted repatriation and feared for their lives if returned to Communist
countries. This was not acceptable to the Communists and they decided to
obstruct the survey. The survey team could not even interview some 44,000
POWs because the compounds controlled by the Communists refused to let
them in. The UNC informed the Communists that only 70,000 would be
repatriated. This included the 44,000 prisoners who were not allowed to be
interviewed. This fell far short of the Communists’ expectations.

140. Goulden, p. 591.

141. Ibid, p. 591.

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The pro-Communist POWs had been intimidating those POWs refusing to

repatriate for some time by then. An ingenious scheme that North Korea started
was to infiltrate its agents into the POW camps, disguised as POWs, with the
instructions to take over the camps and “convince” the prisoners to repatriate to
North Korea. The Inmin-gun created a special unit in Pyongyang to conduct this
operation. Its special agents came to the POW camps by pretending to surrender
to the U.N. side. Since Koje-do was the only POW facility, there was no
uncertainty regarding where they would end up. This island of about 130-
square-mile off the southwest coast of Korea is today home of a huge shipyard,
but at that time it was a sparsely populated fishing village that had been turned
into a massive POW prison.
The agents brought with them small weapons and the flag of North Korea.
They were not strip-searched because the Geneva Convention prohibited such
search. As soon as the North Korean special agents arrived at the camps, they
organized pro-Communist groups and began to terrorize everyone opposing
repatriation. Some anti-Communist prisoners were killed and chopped into
pieces and thrown into the dugout pits used as toilets. Communists raised
North Korean flags in the camps they controlled.
The POWs who refused to return to the Communist countries came under
intense pressure from the Communist agents. Lee Uk and Cho Byon-am, who
were Simon’s classmates from Sariwon, ended up in the Koje-do POW camps as
prisoners. They now live in Seoul and told Simon the woes that they faced at the
time. Lee Uk was pressed into the Inmin-gun in mid-August, 1950. After a brief
period of training in Jaeryong, Hwanghae Province, he was assigned to an
“independence brigade” as a liaison aide to the brigade commander in charge of
“cultural affairs.” The so-called “cultural affairs” carried out political
indoctrination.
In early September, Lee Uk’s brigade moved south. By the time it reached Il
San, now a suburb of Seoul, the U.N. force broke out of the Busan Perimeter and
hit his brigade hard. They retreated to the small town of Gumchon in the
Hwanghae Province just north of the 38th parallel. There, his unit dug in, waiting
for a possible attack from U.N. forces.
While Lee Uk’s commander was inspecting the unit’s defensive position,
he stepped on a land mine and was severely wounded. Lee Uk took him to the
nearest hospital. After depositing his commander, Lee decided to desert. He was
not a Communist and did not see any point in fighting the U.N. or ROK forces.
However, on his way to Sariwon, he was grabbed by a North Korean MP and

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taken to a jail in Pyongyang. He was again able to escape, and surrendered to a

unit of ROKs. That appeared to be a better option than being captured again by
another Inmin-gun unit. After his surrender, he was moved around from
Pyongyang to Inchon, then to Busan, and finally to Koje-do.
Another POW, Cho, was drafted into the Inmin-gun as soon as he
graduated from the Sariwon high school in July 1950. He bitterly resented the
Inmin-gun because, in 1949, he had been arrested and tortured by the feared
Security Department just because he was a close friend of Ahn Taeksoo, his
classmate who fled to South Korea after being discovered distributing anti-
government leaflets in the marketplace. Cho had nothing to do with that
incident or Ahn’s private war against the Communists, but he was severely
tortured for several days by the Security Department, which wanted to identify
Taeksoo’s network. After conscription, he was taken to a training camp near
Pyongyang, but he decided to risk escape rather than taking his chances with the
Inmin-gun. He hid in a small village outside the city of Sariwon for three months,
until Sariwon was liberated by the ROKs.
Cho did not expect that the Chinese would intervene or that the U.N. and
ROK forces would retreat back to South Korea soon thereafter. He came out of
hiding to welcome the ROKs. But when the Chinese troops marched to Sariwon,
he decided to join other refugees moving south; but he could not get on the train
headed for Seoul. It was full. So he walked in the direction of the west coast city
of Haeju. By the time he and other refugees reached there, the Chinese and
Inmin-gun had already encircled the area. He went into hiding again and
managed somehow until June 1951, when the Inmin-gun found him. This time, he
was unable to escape and was sent to a training camp in Yongbyon, a town north
of Pyongyang. After a brief training, he was thrown into battle.
While his unit was at the eastern sector of the frontlines, he and three of
his platoon members decided to surrender to the ROK Marine Regiment. This is
how Cho ended up in the Koje-do POW camp in March, 1952. He noted that in
the POW camp, a fierce struggle had already started between pro-Communist
and anti-Communist POWs. Each camp had already been divided into prisoners
from North Korea, China, and South Korea. Cho ended up in the 83rd Brigade
compound, which was dominated by anti-Communist prisoners.
According to him, anti-Communist camps terrorized the Communists, just
as the Communists terrorized the anti-Communists, but among anti-
Communists there was no killing. Cho said that in many camps, there were
contests between the Communist and anti-Communist factions. Some camps

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siding with South Korea during the day were siding with the North after the
sunset.
Each compound, also called a brigade, contained about 4,000 prisoners,
and there were between six and seven such brigades in each barbed-wire
enclosures. The number of brigades increased over time. Because the number of
prisoners increased each month, the number of compounds and the size of each
compound swelled over time, much beyond the original capacity of the
compounds.
The UNC’s control over the POWs was lax. Gradually, the Communist
POWs became bolder and engaged in open indoctrination and persuasion
through speeches, meetings and intimidation. One day, Communist POWs
killed dozens of anti-Communist POWs and piled their bodies near the barbed-
wire fence. The American MPs were afraid to enter the fenced-in area, so they
picked up the bodies by crane from outside the fence and loaded them on a
truck, leaving the area drenched in blood. The leftists no longer had to chop up
the bodies with small knives and discard them secretly.
The prison guards, both American and Korean, picked up some ringleaders
for interrogation, but there was no physical torture involved. At least, there was
no outward sign of injury or bruises. Such measures did not slow down the
Communist militants. In fact, they were gaining ground. By the spring of 1952,
the militants took over Lee Uk’s 78th Brigade. He was certain that his life was in
danger and he escaped to join a newly created 96th Brigade.
The U.N screening committee had problems entering the Communist-
dominated compounds. The Inmin-gun headquarters ordered the Communist
POWs not to cooperate with their surveys. All of the POWs in Communist-
dominated compounds had to be classified as wanting to be repatriated.
Obviously, there were a number of prisoners who kept their mouths shut for fear
of execution.
In April 1952, seven of eleven compounds remained unscreened because the
militants refused to let the surveys proceed. At Panmunjom, an important
concession of sorts, offered by the Communist side, came on May 2: Nam Il
offered to delete the USSR from the list of the neutral nations and to forgo
44,000 former ROK soldiers pressed into the Inmin-gun. However, he insisted
that not a single Chinese be left behind. The UNC refused.
Finding no favorable response from the UNC, on April 28 the Communists
suspended negotiations. On May 7, 1952, the Communist militants carefully
executed a plan to kidnap Koje-do’s commandant, Brigadier Gen. Francis T.

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Dodd, to throw off the negotiations at Panmunjom. In spite of an intelligence

report warning that this plan was afoot, General Dodd went to Compound 76,
which was known to be in the control of militant pro-Communist POWs.
Dodd stood outside an open gate, listening to the usual complaints about
food, clothes, and medical attention. Suddenly, a group of prisoners rushed up
and grabbed him and carried him inside the compound. The Communist POWs
now held a prize prisoner to use as a bargaining chip. This happened on the very
day that Lt. General Mark W. Clark arrived in Japan to replace General
Ridgway. General Ridgway was going to NATO to replace General Eisenhower,
who was now preparing to run for the presidency of the United States. General
Clark had made his name as a hero of the Italian campaign during World War II.
General James Van Fleet was the commander of EUSAK. Each general had his
own views on how to handle the crisis. Clark’s instinct was to “Let them keep
that dumb son of a bitch Dodd, then go in and level the place.” The outgoing
Ridgway felt the same way.
Clark ordered a battalion of tanks to Koje-do and ordered the men to shoot
the POWs if the militants resisted. While waiting for the tanks to arrive, Dodd
“confessed” to the POWs that he was guilty of a litany of charges drawn up by
the prisoners, including killing and injuring prisoners. Dodd’s successor,
Brigadier General Colson, did even worse — perhaps to save Dodd. Instead of
sending in tanks as he was ordered to do, he signed a document admitting many
false charges, including mass murder and using poison gas. The prisoners made
more demands before releasing Dodd. For this stupidity, these two generals
would be demoted.
Another commandant, Brig. General Haydon L. Boatner, took over the
command from Charles F. Colson and sent in tanks and paratroopers and broke
up the militant gangs and dispersed them to smaller units. During this two-and-
a-half hour battle, the militants hurled Molotov cocktails, spears, and rocks. At
the end, the troops confiscated 3,000 spears, 1,000 Molotov cocktails, 4,500
knives, and other weapons. Until this time, Americans apparently did not know
or did not care what was going on in the prisoners’ barracks behind the barbed
wire.
By the autumn of 1952, Communists infiltrated Lee Uk’s compound for a
second time and fighting between pro-Communist and anti-Communist factions
began again. To Lee Uk’s huge relief, the anti-Communist faction prevailed in his
camp. After this incident, anti-Communist POWs were relocated to newly
constructed mainland camps. Lee went to the Youngchun POW camp, located

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north of Daegu. In the spring of 1953, when POWs were being dispersed to
different locations, he was shifted to the Nonsan prison camp. By this time, each
brigade comprised only 500 POWs.
While keeping one eye on the cease-fire, Rhee was locked in a fierce
political battle with the National Assembly dominated by the opposition. The
opposition wanted to have a constitutional amendment to create a cabinet
system of government. Its real agenda was to remove Rhee. Rhee wanted a
different kind of constitutional amendment: a direct presidential election and
bicameral National Assembly. Most Koreans believed that he would be easily
elected under direct election — even without any foul play. The National
Assembly was simply unhappy with Rhee’s dictatorial style and favored his
prime minister Chang Myon to run the country. Rhee fired Chang Myon and
appointed Chang Taek Sang, the former police chief, as his new prime minister.
Chang Taek Sang was at that time an influential, independent member of the
National Assembly. He had the best chance of being confirmed by the legislators.
The National Assembly had soundly rejected Rhee’s constitutional
amendments. In response, on May 24, Rhee declared martial law around Busan,
then went on to stop a commuter bus of National Assembly members, and took
them directly to prison. Chang Taek Sang rushed to see President Rhee at the
Blue House and implored him to release the Assembly members. Rhee was
furious at Chang for not supporting his decision to silence the “rabble rousers.”
The U.S. government was concerned that its European allies, which were
increasingly critical of Rhee’s dictatorial tendency, might withdraw their troops
from Korea. Truman hurriedly dispatched a letter advising Rhee to refrain from
such actions and follow democratic procedure. Rhee did not lift the martial law
but refrained from dissolving the National Assembly. At this point, America
devised a plan to depose Rhee. As compiled by Gye-Dong Kim, Foreign Relations of
the United States (FURS) 1952-1954 and other documents on Korea have presented
a detailed record of such a scheme.142 Even before the June 2 incident, in some
circles of the State Department there was debate on whether or not to oust Rhee.
However, such an idea did not receive wide support at that time. When Rhee
refused to release the National Assembly members and lift martial law, the State
Department began to be more assertive on the idea of intervening in the internal
politics of South Korea.

142. Kim, pp. 520-526.

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On June 25, 1952, Clark received formal orders from the JCS to intervene in
case the ROK refused to accept Truman’s proposals. General Clark, however, did
not savor such a role and favored a diplomatic approach. He was not sure that
military intervention in the internal politics would be helpful in fighting the war.
A plan that he prepared in the event an intervention could not be avoided
included drawing Rhee to visit remote areas outside of Seoul and Busan,
detaining him and arresting five to ten key government leaders in Rhee’s
dictatorship, and taking control of the administration under martial law through
an ROK Army chief of staff. If Rhee did not abolish martial law and guarantee
the freedom of speech to the National Assembly and the press, the UNC would
demand that Prime Minister Chang Taek Sang do it. Chang was expected to
collaborate. If he did not, the UNC would establish an interim government, a de
facto military government.
Although key Administration and military leaders of the U.S. agreed that
Clark should intervene in some manner, there was no agreement on establishing
a military government. The general sense was that some of Rhee’s close
supporters had to go, but that much of the government apparatus should remain.
While such schemes were being drafted, one day Chang Taek Sang was
meeting with the chairman of the National Assembly, Shin Ik Hee, and leftist
vice chairman Cho Bong Am to resolve the constitutional crisis. According to
Chang’s biographer, a high-ranking official, not identified by name, representing
the U.N. Commission on Korea (UNCOK) stepped in and said, “Your country is
at war but you are just fighting among yourselves. We, representing the sixteen
U.N. member countries, cannot sit idle. Unless you stop the infighting, we will
propose a trusteeship form of government.” To make sure that all three of them
understood the seriousness of the situation, he emphasized that this was an
official position of the U.N. After the man left, the three politicians sat silently,
looking at each other. Apparently, they took this threat seriously. Finally, Cho
Bong Am said, “Syngman Rhee is better than a U.N. trusteeship. Prime Minister
Chang, you must come up with an idea quickly. Otherwise our shinju [ancestral
tablet] will be taken away by a dog.”
Gye-Dong Kim suggests that Clark did not leak word about a possible
American intervention, although some wished that he would. If such a plan were
leaked, it would have strengthened the opposition’s hands. The above scene
suggests that UNCOK was trying to hint that something unusual was in store.
The way the plan was described, i.e., trusteeship, silenced the opposition,
whether deliberately or not.

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This is how Syngman Rhee avoided being deposed by the U.S. and the U.S.
avoided having that particular “blood” on their hands. Apart from moral issues,
eliminating a national leader is always a risky business, even in the name of
democracy and justice. When the State Department staged a coup against Ngo
Din Diem later in Vietnam, the U.S. could not find anyone who was half as good
as Diem to replace him. From then on the Vietnam War went downhill.
Rhee’s day of reckoning would come, but he was destined to accomplish
further feats before fading away into the sunset. Rhee’s popularity was
beginning to slip away, although the average people and especially North Korean
refugees still admired him. They worried that the naïve National Assembly
members would play into Communist hands. Although most American presses
appeared to be incapable of distinguishing the dictatorship of Rhee and Kim Il
Sung, to North Korean refugees, the problem with Rhee’s regime was not that
there was too much oppression but that it allowed too much chaos and seditious
acts. Some forty years later, Kang Chol-hwan who escaped North Korea,
expressed a similar sentiment: “Everyone [in South Korea] seemed to do as they
wished. I have to admit that it rather worried me at first. This sort of society
couldn’t last; it could never face crisis.”143 Later Kang found out how
democracies and capitalism worked in spite of seeming selfishness of the people,
but the above reactions of the North Korean refugees prove the point that
dictatorship comes in many shades and colors.

143. Kang and Rigoulot, p. 232.

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Rhee remained adamantly against armistice. Rhee was not alone in this;
even the opposition joined him. To the U.S., unification at this stage was a
foregone conclusion, but to Koreans it was not. Korea had been a unified country
for more than a thousand years before its division in 1945. This was longer than
the period most European countries had fixed international boundaries. Most
non-Korean historians who wrote about the Korean War were puzzled with
what appeared to be the unusual obsession of Koreans for unification, but they
might thought twice if it concerned their countries.
What concerned Rhee as well as other South Koreans about armistice were
not only unification but also national defense after armistice. Rhee feared the
Communists would re-arm during cease-fire and then start another war. Rhee
remembered the promise of the U.S. to provide military aid to South Korea
before the U.S. troops withdrew in 1949; the promise had come to practically
naught after the U.S. withdrew from Korea. He doubted that the U.S. would
come back if the Chinese invaded Korea again. Another matter that irritated
Rhee immensely was the fact that the U.S. did not allow the ROK any
representation in the armistice talks. The only Korean in the negotiating team
represented the UNC, not the ROK.
In early 1952, Rhee threatened to pull the ROK Army out of the UNC in
protest. Ridgway took the threat seriously enough to send a telegram to
Washington suggesting that a formal agreement might be necessary to make
sure that Rhee did not carry out the threat and obstruct the armistice agreement.
Washington rejected this proposal, thinking that such negotiations with the

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ROK would give Rhee the opportunity to demand conditions that the U.S. could
not meet.144 The U.S. strategy was to stonewall Rhee and present a final
agreement that he could take or leave. Rhee knew it, and others knew it too.
What Rhee wanted as the minimum conditions were a mutual security pact and
military assistance to strengthen the ROK Army to a level where it could defend
South Korea, if not implement unification itself. Washington, however, did not
like the idea of such a mutual defense pact in 1949 and did not like it now.
The Truman Administration’s problem was that the war was no longer
popular in the U.S. It was going nowhere, and was killing a huge number of U.N.
troops each month for no apparent gain (although most casualties were on the
part of the ROKs, because the Chinese were trying to convince the ROK to
accept the terms of armistice). The Truman Administration found out that the
path to half a victory was also not an easy one.
Fighting went on. On September 5, 1952, the Chinese hit the ROK Capital
Division. The battle took a terrible toll on the ROK, but they hung onto their
original positions. On October 6, the Chinese hit the 9th Division at the White
Horse Hill north of Chirwon. The hills and streams turned red with human
blood. Some 10,000 ROKs died but their group, too, remained in control of the
sector, according to General Paik who was by then the ROK Army Chief of
Staff.145 Next were the ROK 2nd Division at Sniper Ridge and the ROK 5th
Division on the east coast.
Rhee had no illusions about the strategy of the just-elected Eisenhower.
There seems to be hardly any difference between Truman and Eisenhower. He
was elected to the presidency by promising that he would visit Korea. This
implied to the voters that he would end the war one way or another, perhaps
honorably. Eisenhower visited Korea on December 2-4, 1952 between election
and inauguration, to fulfill his promise. He had no substantive discussions about
the future of the war with anyone. General Clark thought that he might want to
win the war and prepared elaborate plans on how to achieve a military victory
should the president-elect want to consider such an option. Clark did not even
have a chance to present the plans. It was apparent that Eisenhower did not have
such a spectacular change in mind.146

144. Ibid, 532.

145. General Paik Sun Yup provides detailed accounts of these battles in his From
Pusan to Panmunjom, (Washington, et al: Brassey’s (US), 1992) p. 207, hereafter Paik.
146. Harry J. Middleton, The Compact History of the Korean War (New York: Hawthorn
Books, Inc., 1965), pp. 222-223. Middleton hereafter.

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 20. The Tortuous Path to Armistice Agreement

While Seoul and Washington were exchanging discordant letters on the

terms of armistice, the talks at Panmunjom were stuck. A sudden breakthrough
appeared when Josef Stalin died on March 5, 1953. His successor Georgi
Malenkov thought that it was a waste of national resources to engage in external
conflicts such as the Korean War, and Nikita Khrushchev, who emerged as the
leader of the new troika, also had no passion for the Korean War.
Eisenhower saw a new opportunity. Even before Stalin’s death, scientists
at Los Alamos, New Mexico reported in January 1953 a successful test of a
nuclear weapon in battlefield conditions: a tactical or strategic warhead that
could be delivered by artillery. On March 27, 1953, the State Department and the
JCS met on the possible use of such nuclear weapons.147 The new
Administration decided that the taboo against using atomic bombs should be
lifted. Eisenhower thought that the use of nuclear weapons was worth
considering, if it could ensure victory on the Korean peninsula. He was keenly
aware that his European allies would react strongly against the idea, but new
Administration did not feel bound by Truman’s promise. In any event,
Eisenhower thought that quick action would deprive the Soviets the chance to
intervene and that the U.S. could convince the allies if they were approached
quietly and unofficially.148
Another idea being advocated by the Department of Defense was the
advantage of convincing the Communists that a major offensive would be
launched if armistice talks did not resume and conclude quickly. On May 19, the
JCS recommended air and naval operations against China and Manchuria,
including use of nuclear weapons. In essence, it was a revival of MacArthur’s
idea and then some. The NSC approved it on May 20. The JCS dispatched
nuclear warheads to Okinawa to be used in tandem with air attacks on China
and Manchuria and a naval blockade of selected ports. Secretary Dulles was in
Asia as the NSC met. He went to India on May 21 and asked Prime Minister
Nehru to warn China that the U.S. would bomb Manchuria unless the armistice
talks were concluded quickly.149 Dulles also mentioned the successful testing of
nuclear artillery shells. Yet, in another move, Eisenhower withdrew the Seventh
Fleet from the straits of Taiwan and said, “We certainly have no obligation to

147. Kim, pp. 528-529. FRUS 1952-54, Vol. 15, Korea (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1984), hereafter FRUS Vol. 15, pp. 817-818.
148. The record of the 144th and 145th meetings of the NSC on 13th and 20th May,
1953; FRUS Vol. 15, pp. 1059-1064.
149. Dulles Memorandum, May 21, 1953; FRUS, Vol. 15, pp. 1068-1069.

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protect a nation fighting us in Korea.” The message was clear: Taiwan could
unleash an attack on the mainland. The CIA, in fact, organized an infiltration of
the Nationalists.
Even before such threats, the Communists decided to resume the talks at
Panmunjom apparently because of the new USSR position. On March 28, the
Communists responded to a month-old proposal made by Clark to exchange
sick and the wounded POWs. As the talks restarted, Rhee renewed his agitation.
As far as he was concerned, the U.S had addressed neither his security concern
nor many other issues. In a letter addressed to Eisenhower on April 9, Rhee said
that if the Chinese troops remained on Korean soil after armistice, any foreign
troops who did not join the ROK Army’s march to the Yalu must leave South
Korea. Even before this letter, the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Seoul,
Ellis Briggs, warned his government that Rhee might release anti-Communist
POWs150 and Clark warned that Rhee might withdraw the ROK Army from the
UNC.151
The new policy direction from Moscow and the tough stance that the
Eisenhower Administration took began to bear fruits. The actual exchange of
sick and wounded POWs, known as a Small Switch, started on April 20. The
Communists transferred 600 prisoners — no more than skin and bone, and
many of them with untreated wounds — to the UNC and the UNC transferred
5,800 prisoners to the Communists. The Communists indicated that the
remaining POWs might be exchanged along the lines that India had proposed
the previous December. Key elements of the plan were to repatriate all those
POWs who wished to repatriate immediately after an armistice agreement
document was signed, and the other POWs would be sent to a neutral state “so
as to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.” No one knew
what that meant for sure. Rhee was neither impressed with India’s plan nor
convinced that India was a neutral nation. On April 22, Rhee confirmed Clark’s
worry by declaring openly that he would pull the ROK Army from the UNC and
march north alone. Ambassador Ellis Briggs urged his government to consider
favorably Rhee’s demand for a mutual defense pact.
America began to take Rhee’s “obstruction” and the threat of withdrawing
the ROKs from the UNC seriously. Although the ROK Army would have no

150. March 2, 1953 letter from Briggs to the State Department, FRUS Vol. 15, pp. 803-
804.
151. April 4, 1953 from Clark to the Department of Army, cited in Kim, p. 535.

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chance to unify Korea from south to north, it manned three-quarters of the front
lines and could sabotage the armistice negotiations by making independent
moves. To assuage Rhee’s concern about the Chinese troops remaining in North
Korea after armistice, Clark decided to insert a clause in the proposed agreement
that all foreign troops should leave Korea after a specified period. He then
reformulated and submitted to the JCS on April 26 a plan to arrest Rhee and
install a temporary government if Rhee continued to obstruct armistice.152 To
the U.S., Rhee appeared as much an obstacle to armistice as the Communists.
In early May, Clark prepared Operation Everready. This was basically an
elaboration of Clark’s previous plan of staging a military coup and installing a
military government under the UNC. Detailed plans were prepared to isolate the
ROK Army units unwilling to cooperate with the coup. The U.S. still held a tight
control over ammunition and supplies to the ROK Army.
After the Little Switch, the talk at Panmunjom moved on to the selection of
neutral countries, a country to move the POWs, and the procedure to follow for
persuading not-repatriates. The first direct meeting of the two sides in many
months took place on April 26. But the meeting bogged down immediately. The
Communists would not accept Switzerland as a neutral nation, insisted on
moving the POWs out of Korea during the screening process, and wanted a
period of six months to persuade non-repatriates. Pressed to name a neutral
nation, they suggested India, Burma, Indonesia, or Pakistan. Pakistan was
acceptable to the UNC, but the Communists agreed to abandon their demand
that the POWs be taken out of Korea and agreed to cut the persuasion period
from six months to four months. They also settled on a Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland,
Sweden, and India.
On May 7, Nam Il came up with a new plan on the exchange of the POWs:
to keep the POWs in Korea during screening, and detain those who did not wish
to repatriate — indefinitely, until they changed their minds. The UNC could not
go along with the proposal. The POWs were not supposed to be coerced into
repatriating. At this juncture, Washington came up with a compromise plan
which thus far had not been acceptable to the U.S.
Clark wrote:

152. FRUS Vol. 15, pp. 940-943.

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 The Unfinished War

I was instructed to agree to turn over to the neutral repatriation

commission all Korean as well as Chinese non-repatriates — a point that made
many in the ROK government feel that we had betrayed them. In addition I was
instructed to agree to the Communist demand that all disputes within the
Repatriation Commission be decided by a majority vote rather than by
unanimous vote. This gave the Communists an edge since India, although
avowedly neutral, recognized and was sympathetic to Red China.153

On May 25, Clark and Briggs visited Rhee to present the final agreement
which the U.N. side intended to hand over to the Communist side. They offered
economic and military aid, as inducements. The South Korean Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Yong Tae Byon, was present. Clark recalled that Mr. Byon spoke
almost impeccable Oxford English and was sharper and more difficult to deal
with than Rhee. Byon said he could not understand how such a completely new
proposal, without any prior consultation, could be presented to the Korean
government just before it was to be sent to the Communist side. Even up to this
time, the ROK had not been consulted on the terms of armistice. Byon said that
it was tantamount to an ultimatum. Clark could not help but agree with Byon —
silently. He would fail in his mission if he opened his mouth.
Rhee’s concerns about national defense and POWs were still not
addressed. Rhee noted that this was the critical moment and that the U.S.
should not let democracy retreat. Byon accused India of selling appeasement to
Washington. Rhee was adamant:

You can withdraw all UN forces, all economic aid. We will decide our own
fate. We do not ask anyone to fight for us[.] Sorry, but I cannot assure
President Eisenhower of my cooperation under the present circumstance.154

Some Americans in Korea believed that it would be best if the U.S. offered
Rhee a mutual defense pact, but on May 27 the Eisenhower Administration
listed several reasons why it could not agree to that. However, it offered military
assistance to the ROK to build up its military forces to 20 divisions and gave
somewhat more vaguely worded assurances on the defense of South Korea. But
two days later, on May 29, a joint telegram of Defense and State asked Clark to
let Rhee know that they were advising President Eisenhower to accept a mutual

153. Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper &Brothers, 1954),
p. 267, Clark hereafter.
154. CINCUNC to DA for JCS, May 26, 1953.

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defense pact. On May 30, Defense and State agreed to cancel Everready and to
offer a pact similar to those signed with the Philippines and Australia and New
Zealand. Such an offer to South Korea would come with conditions: the
cooperation of the ROK in the armistice agreement and the ROKs remaining
under the UNC until it considered such arrangements unnecessary. Eisenhower
endorsed the recommendation.
Without any knowledge of this agreement in Washington, on June 2, Rhee
wrote a letter to President Eisenhower outlining his demand for cooperation: a
mutual defense pact, military and economic assistance, stationing American Air
Force and Navy near Korea (without specifying a country), and the
simultaneous withdrawal of the Chinese and American forces from Korea. The
withdrawal of American troops from Korea presented problems for the U.S.
because it was not clear that the ROK could defend itself and because the
Chinese were in a geographically more advantageous position to intervene than
the Americans.
In the meantime, at Panmunjom the parties agreed on June 8 on the Terms
of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The
Communists came to learn that atomic bombs had been deployed on Okinawa
and began to sense that there was a limit to American patience.155 The
Communists also had a taste of escalated bombing. On May 13, American planes
smashed an earthen dam, washing away five rail bridges, two miles of a major
highway, and six miles of rails as well as flooding a large area. While the
Communists became more pliable, the South Koreans did not. When they
learned of the terms of agreement on the exchange of the prisoners, nearly
100,000 South Koreans went on demonstration against it. By a vote of by 129 to
0, the National Assembly adopted a resolution against an armistice agreement.
Rhee declared a national emergency and called back high-ranking officers in
training in the U.S. to South Korea. Clark and Briggs met Rhee again and asked if
he would cooperate with an armistice agreement if he was offered a mutual
defense pact. Rhee did not give a decisive answer. They did not offer the mutual
defense pact that Washington had agreed already, deciding to wait for a more
opportune time to do so.
In the minds of most South Koreans, especially of the younger generations,
Rhee’s legacy is not only that of a despot but also as a pawn of America; to North
Koreans he was an American puppet. However, it is not clear what more Rhee

155. Kim, p.549.

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could have done to assure the safety of the future generations of South Koreans.
To the Americans, he was an obstinate old man; but his insistence on a mutual
defense pact had served the interests of both nations well. However, Rhee was
not done yet.

There are several accounts of how Rhee staged a small coup against the
UNC by releasing anti-Communist POWs. General Paik, who by then was the
ROK Army chief of staff, wrote that at 2 a.m. on June 18, 1953, tens of thousands
of North Korean anti-Communist POWs poured out of POW camps in Busan,
Masan, Kwangju, and Nonsan. Perimeter wire fences were down. The U.S. Army
was in control of the camps, but most of the guards were ROKs. On that night,
Won’s ROK Military Police Command seized the camp guards, cut barbed wire,
and turned off the lights. A handful of American MPs at the POW camp in Busan
stood helplessly by as thousands of anti-Communist POWs ran out. Within a
few hours, some 27,000 anti-Communist North Koreans POWs who did not
want to go to North Korea vanished into the night air. Prisoners were scattered
in different locations. The release was well-coordinated and went off
simultaneously at all locations. A few minutes after 2:00 a.m., Paik was
awakened by a telephone call from Major General Gordon Rogers, the KMAG
chief. Soon thereafter, General Taylor, the commander of EUSAK, called him;
and then General Clark, from Tokyo, angrily demanding to know who had
ordered it. Paik called President Rhee, in bed, to convey Clark’s displeasure.
Rhee said, “Okay. I see. Just tell them that I did it. I’ll put out press release in the
morning.”156
On the same day, General Clark flew in from Tokyo to protest directly to
Rhee. When questioned about his secret operation, the old man just shrugged it
off. “Had I told my generals about this beforehand[,] their positions would have
been even more difficult. Right?”157
Although the whole world condemned Rhee for this “sabotage,” it was
overdue. Most post-Vietnam historians loathed Rhee for his obstinate behaviors
and dictatorship, but at that time Rhee had his share of admirers in the U.S. as
well as in South Korea. It is conceivable that if such a daring move were made
earlier, the armistice agreement might have been reached a year earlier and tens
of thousand soldiers would have avoided being killed. Even his belated “surprise”

156. Paik, P.256.

157. ibid, p. 231.

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might have saved thousands of American and Korean lives. For sure, he saved
27,000 POWs from possible forced-repatriation. Over 100,000 South Koreans
poured out into the streets, this time spontaneously, to celebrate the release of
the anti-Communist prisoners.
On June 18, POWs Lee Uk and Cho were among those who escaped. By
then, they were in the Nonsan POW camp. Although Lee Uk became a free man,
this was not the case with Cho. General Won Yong-duk, the head of the secret
Military Police Command, prepared the actual plan under Rhee’s direction. Few
in the ROK Army and none in the UNC knew of its existence. Won’s plan did
not include a scheme to hide these POWs once they were released. Soon after
they ran out to the open, the South Korean radio appealed to the public and the
police to shelter them.
An American historian wrote that the American soldiers attempted to
recover the prisoners but had not been able to capture a single one, but this was
not true. According to Cho, two days after his escape, he was hired by a local
farmer near Nonsan to help transplant paddy plants. He had to eat and needed a
job, although he had never done such backbreaking work before. And there he
was, knee-deep in the water, when he was captured by an American soldier and
taken back to the Nonsan POW camp.
In Washington, Eisenhower and Dulles were flabbergasted and feared that
Rhee’s outrageous act might kill the delicate negotiations. Eisenhower
threatened to pull out the U.N. forces if this happened again. Contrary to
Washington’s fear, however, Rhee’s daring move pulled the rug out from under
the Communists. The Communists were willing to let the matter pass, and the
talk turned more to whether or not the U.N. could control the ROK in future. By
this time, the ROKs were further modernized and had become an effective
fighting force. With the release of anti-Communist POWs, Rhee’s fury was
spent and he promised to cooperate. He had his say on the matter, although he
refused to be a party to the signing of the Armistice Agreement. With the POW
matters already behind them, the negotiations moved quickly.

However, one more savage battle remained. It was named the Kumhwa
battle, after the southeastern-most of the three towns forming the Iron Triangle.
On July 13, 1953, some 236,100 Chinese soldiers — five armies, including the
crack 54th Army — attacked ROK II Corps at their stronghold where it bulged
into North Korea. The Chinese took a terrible beating but gained a chunk of
land. General Paik, who was ROK Army chief of staff, estimated 66,000 men

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dead and wounded. That figure might have been exaggerated. Chinese General
Hong Xuezhi mentions how much land area was taken from the ROKs in that
battle but says nothing specific about either side’s losses except for the
admission that they suffered heavy casualties. Korean War History, prepared by
military historians of the Korean Military Academy and revised in August 1996,
cites casualty figures of 36,381 Chinese and 12,154 ROKs. These figures may be
closer to the truth. However, even this is enormous: the Chinese suffered roughly
the same number of casualties that they did at the hands of the U.S. Marines and
X Corps at the Changjin Reservoir battle. This was the most deadly offensive
launched since the 1951 Chinese Spring Offensive. Due to the monsoon rains,
cloud cover, and fog over narrow mountain passes, the usually potent FEAF air
support was ineffective. The Chinese armies as usual attacked at night, encircled
the ROKs, and infiltrated deep inside the ROK units, in some areas by finding
out passwords from captured ROK soldiers. One of the Chinese units entered a
ROK regimental headquarters and captured communications equipment,
unopposed, by this means. The PVA at this time was no longer a primitive army
fighting with small arms. The attackers had two artillery divisions with some
1,000 artillery pieces.
Middleton said the attack was intended to make a final demonstration to
Syngman Rhee of “what he could expect if he should decide to press for the
unilateral military unification of Korea.”158 General Hong indicated that the
attack was intended to quickly conclude the armistice negotiations — a similar
point — but he mentioned that Mao remarked that a few more such victories
could destroy the U.N. defense. How many Chinese died in the first such
offensive alone, it seems, was unimportant to him. Mao thought that a total
victory was still possible.
Hong also wrote in his memoir that Rhee complained to Generals Clark
and Taylor that the EUSAK did not come quickly to the rescue of the embattled
ROKs. The U.S. 3rd Division, from nearby the ROKs, the 187th Airborne
Regimental Combat Team from Japan, and the ROK 7th Division under the U.S.
X Corps did come to back up the ROK II Corps, but by then the battle was
practically over. Taylor threatened to counterattack but did not do so.
Middleton thought that the Chinese did not want to fight the Americans, and
that was the reason why the Chinese stopped the attack. Paik thought the
Chinese attack was slowed by effective ROK defense along the Kumhwa River,

158. Middleton, p. 229.

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but Hong said that it was because the river swelled under heavy rain and the
muddy road conditions complicated the transport of supplies and materiel. In
Paik’s opinion, the Chinese wanted to achieve two objectives: to reduce the
bulge projecting northward and to “crush the morale and spirit of a reborn,
confident, and strengthened” ROK Army. According to Paik, the Chinese
achieved the first but not the second objective.
After both sides had played their last gambit, the Armistice Agreement was
signed on July 27, 1953. The Mutual Defense Treaty, which Rhee pursued so
relentlessly but which was resisted by two U.S. Administrations with equal
determination, was finally ratified on October 1, 1953, after many negotiations.
Once again, the Old Patriot who turned a dictator delivered an important
insurance policy for the future of South Koreans. In hindsight, this might have
deterred another large-scale invasion of South Korea from the north.
During the final year of negotiations, some 100,000 U.N. and ROK soldiers
died or were wounded. Most casualties were ROK rather than American
soldiers. At the end of the final battle, a new boundary emerged, roughly along
the 38th parallel, but it bulged to the north in the east coast area and dipped to
the south in the west coast area near Seoul. The bulge to the north was larger
than the dip to the south, but that dip brought the DMZ uncomfortably close to
Seoul. (See figure 5.)

The exchange of prisoners, known as the Big Switch, took place

immediately after the signing of the armistice documents. The U.N. side
repatriated 75,823 Communist POWs (70,183 North Koreans and 5,640
Chinese) to the Communists. However, there were still 22,604 North Korean
and Chinese POWs who did not wish to repatriate. Three out of four Chinese
POWs decided to go to Taiwan rather than to China. The Communists had only
12,773 POWs (7,862 Koreans, 3,597 Americans, and the remainder from 13
different countries). Some of them refused to repatriate (35 South Koreans, 23
Americans and 1 British).
Some 22,600 POWs in South Korea unwilling to repatriate were loaded on
a flotilla of LSTs and were taken to the DMZ on September 12. Most of them
were anti-Communists. After spending about a month and half in the Nonsan
POW camp, Cho was among those POWs taken to the neutral zone. On the
southern side of the DMZ were compounds containing these POWs and on the
northern side of the camp were smaller compounds containing 35 South Korean
and 24 UN prisoners.

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Under the armed supervision of Indian troops, each side tried to give
“explanations” to lure them over. Initially, the anti-Communist prisoners, both
North Korean and Chinese, were afraid to go to the special tents where such
persuasions were to take place, for fear of being abducted; but they found out
that no one was carrying arms other than the Indian troops. Some of them
became bold enough to spit at the Communists when they tried to persuade
them to come to their side. The Chinese “examiners” said, “if you come back to
China, all previous sins will be forgiven. Soon China will rule all Asia, so you
should come over to the winning side rather than going to Taiwan.”159 Cho, like
so many others, stuck to his position and was released to the ROK on January 21,

159. Tolland, p. 591.

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1954. By this time, he had spent four months in the neutral zone. Out of 22,604
POWs who were transferred from South Korea to the DMZ, 21,805 men chose to
move south. “Examination” did not do the Communists much good. Some of
those few who were persuaded by the Communist examiners to go to their side
were sorry that they did. One was Zhang Ze-shin, a former high school principal
in China. “He was demoted to teacher. Almost every day he had to stand on a
table and confess his sins. After a year of this, he was demoted to janitor. He
complained, and was sentenced to ten years in prison.”160 Another Chinese man,
Ding Shang-wing, returned home and found out that his wife had been forced to
divorce him. His daughter also left him and he was imprisoned several times, for
a total of twenty years.
Those Chinese who chose Taiwan had a grand reception. The sole British
POW who chose to go to China returned to England nine years later. Some of his
comrades never forgave him but others regarded him just a dissident. The
Americans who chose the Communist side were considered turncoats who
caved in to brainwashing. They were forever scorned, and movies were made
about them.
On the last day of the prisoner exchange, when non-repatriate POWs came
out of the neutral zone, Paik was one of many dignitaries waiting on the South
Korean side. He said, “When at last they came, they dismounted the vehicle in
dead silence, their faces masks of pain and suffering. Once they were convinced
they were really on our side of the lines[,] their sense of relief was immense.” He
found out that there were “no officers among the repatriated POWs. The
communists singled out the officers for persecution, and the only ones to survive
captivity were those skillful enough to pretend to be enlisted men, and maintain
that fiction throughout long months of captivity.” A number of American
dignitaries were on hand to welcome the POWs including Secretary of State
Dulles and General Clark. Paik noted that the South Korean band was playing
only American songs, so he requested some Korean folk songs such as Arirang
and Toraji. He said, “Hardly any Korean eye was free from tears.”161
No one knows exactly how many South Korean and U.N. prisoners were
still in the hands of the Communists. A natural question was what happened to
some 51,000 POWs that were unaccounted for. Ridgway claimed that the Inmin-
gun deliberately killed many U.N. prisoners during their captivity, but North

160. Tolland, p. 593.

161. Several quotes in this paragraph are from Paik, p. 246.

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Korea denied it. Even 50 years after the war, defectors from North Korea are
bringing out the news that many South Koreans and some Caucasians are still
held in North Korea. They were all said to have bent backs from old age and hard
labor. They worked in mines and quarries. Could they be American and British
POWs? Some defectors said that they were.
After his release, Cho joined the ROK Infantry Officer’s Academy on April
5, 1954. After six months of training, he was commissioned as a second
lieutenant in the ROK Army. In May 1978, he retired from the Army with a rank
of Lt. Colonel and now lives in Seoul. Recently, asked for his thoughts and last
wishes, he said that what he wanted most was “to know what happened to my
parents in North Korea and visit their graves.” This is a common wish shared by
refugees from North Korea.
Thanks to Lewis H. Carlson, many first-hand accounts of American POWs
were published in 2002.162 Of the 7,140 American soldiers captured during the
war, only 3,597 returned. Twenty one American POWs decided to go to the PRC
rather than to return to the U.S. The remainder, according to the Communists,
died in captivity. The 21 American POWs who chose the Communist side were
called collaborators, perhaps correctly, and some of them were suspected to have
ratted on fellow American prisoners.
A prevailing view was that as many as 30 percent of the POWs were
collaborators, although a more reliable estimate according to Carlson was 5
percent. The American public and the media looked at the POW population as a
whole as suspects. The movie The Manchurian Candidate featured a brainwashed
POW as the main character, played by Frank Sinatra, and popularized the
notion of brainwashing; in the process, the image of American POWs as a whole
was tarnished.
The notion that these men could have been brainwashed is highly dubious.
What is already in one’s brain is hard to erase, although it may be relatively easy
to mold young people before they are “corrupted.” Perhaps due to my father’s
influence, in my case, no amount of propaganda or indoctrination at school really
altered my view of Communism. Robert A. McLean, a POW interviewed by
Carlson, said, “They [the Communists] never made any sense. After a few hours,
you got so numb that it went in one ear and out the other.” It is believable that

162. Lewis H. Carlson, Remembered Prisoners of a Forgotten War: An Oral History of Korean
War POWs (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002).

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some POWs collaborated with the Communists just to survive or avoid

starvation. Most North Koreans under Kim Il Sung did the same. That does not
mean that they gave up their convictions. The POWs’ conditions were
exceptionally harsh. Air Force pilot Robert “Bob” Coury, another POW
interviewed by Carlson, said, “My personal belief is that you can break anybody
down if you really want to, given the time and the right environment.” Yes, a
person can be broken; but that is not same as being brainwashed.
McLean said that it took his group of POWs from November, 1950, to the
Easter Sunday of 1951 to march to the POW camp near the Manchurian border.
They were exposed to extreme cold, starvation, and exhaustion. “You can’t
imagine how tough these marches were. You really can’t. It’s hard to explain to
anybody [that] we were all starving and in terrible physical shape, [and] every
time I got up to march at night, I’d have to bend over and open the cuts on the
back of my feet so the blood would flow and I could move my feet.”
Under such conditions, it is not hard to imagine that a bowl of rice might
have persuaded a POW to sign a paper denouncing America. Sometimes, a man
would do it to let his wife and children know that he was still alive — as was the
case with one POW interviewed by Carlson. Better training in how to cope with
captivity and the Communists might have helped. The GIs were poorly trained
and did not know that the Communists were using any confession for
propaganda purpose and in an effort to turn world opinion against the war. It
has been said that the Turks and the British held up much better under captivity
than the Americans did. Only one British man refused to repatriate. Few of the
British and the Turks died or broke down during the captivity. Of course, this
assertion is based on the North Korean statement on the number of dead
American POWs.
For those GIs who survived the ordeal, not to be remembered (like the
POWs of World War II or even the Vietnam War — for whom many inspiring
movies have been made) must have hurt. Many, including McLean, suffered
recurring nightmares, and were in and out of therapy even forty years after the
war. In one session held with former POWs of World War II, McLean got so
mad at their complaints about the hardship they suffered that he shouted, “You
sons of bitches. You lived in a goddamn Hilton for a stalag!” That started a riot,
and he just walked out and did not return. He said hardly a day passed by
without experiencing flashes of his experiences as a POW.

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Reflection

With the signing of the cease-fire agreement on July 27, 1953, the
Communists had a big celebration over their “victory.” Even today, North
Koreans are taught that their side won and in fact believe that Americans are
afraid of them. There was no party on the U.N. side. The mood of the Americans
was somber. Most American military leaders and soldiers were not proud of
their accomplishment; some felt absolutely crushed.
General Clark lamented that he was the first American military general to
sign an armistice agreement in a war that the U.S. had not won. U.S. veterans
came home from Korea to discover that “their experience was of no interest
whatsoever to their fellow countrymen.”163 As quoted by Max Hastings, one
young returning GI said to his wife, “I couldn’t accept the fact that we hadn’t
won, that we couldn’t beat the Communists.” When the GI talked about Mao
and the number of Communists he killed, his friends just said, “You’re a
McCarthyite.”164 (Senator McCarthy tried to expose Communists in key
positions in the U.S., but his witch-hunt style brought more discredit to anti-
Communism than the Communists ever hoped for. The people became weary of
the very notion of anti-Communism.)
General Arthur Trudeau, who commanded the U.S. 7th Division, said:
“When we let the Russians and the Chinese off the hook in Korea, we opened
the door for their victory over the French in Vietnam. We should have let
MacArthur go to the Yalu and bomb the piss out of them on the other side.”
Likewise, Colonel Paul Freeman said, “I thought there had been a lot of
unnecessary bloodletting for a stalemate[.] We should have knocked the
Chinese out of there, whatever it took. But some of the European nations were
scared that we were going to start something … the absurdity of trying to destroy
those Yalu bridges without bombing the other side, that isn’t the way to fight a
war.”165 The Pentagon would come to the same conclusion, but not for another
generation.
Yet, a total victory was not possible because Washington was preoccupied
with the fear of Russian armies marching into Western Europe, in spite of the
fact that the Communists’ modus operandi was to instigate internal

163. Max Hastings, p. 169.

164. Ibid, p.169.
165. Hastings, p. 337 for several quotes below.

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insurrections. In any event, in 1950-51, the U.S. had overwhelming nuclear

weapon superiority if not a nuclear monopoly, notwithstanding Soviet
experiments with nuclear bombs. Unfortunately for the free world, the State
Department and the Pentagon during the Truman Administration were filled
with overly cautious generals and diplomats with a European focus. The U.S.
had no chance of winning the Korean War outright with such men in leadership.
On the positive side, Communist expansionism was thwarted, although not
defeated.
Of course, America came to Korea to fight the Communists rather than to
save Koreans. American policy makers in Washington and military commanders
such as Dean, Kean, and Gay showed little regard for the value of Korean lives —
remember the No Gun Ri. Such an attitude did not serve the war effort. In
today’s parlance, the Americans that showed up in Korea were a strange mixture
of racists and humanitarians. In the 1950s, the two were not mutually exclusive.
Americans were condescending and arrogant sometimes, although never evil.
Their policy makers were ignorant about Communism, Korea, and Asia, yet
Americans were kind and gentle people.
America served the world well, on balance, because she was willing to fight
to stop the spread of the Communism. Without such American resolve, around
the world, South Korea as well as many other countries would have fallen to
Communist hands, particularly in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Latin
America.
After the cease-fire, America did come through with the economic and
military assistance that she promised to South Korea, and stationed her troops
on South Korean territory. By doing all this, the U.S. made up for many naïve and
thoughtless actions taken prior to the war, such as dividing Korea, abandoning
South Korea by withdrawing U.S. troops prematurely, and announcing the
Acheson Line.
For Koreans, the worst part of not defeating the Communists completely
was that Korea has remained divided and the Korean War has never come to
closure. Even some 60 years after the division of Korea and some 50 years after
the bloody war ended, Koreans have not accepted the notion of two Koreas. In
day-to-day conversations, Koreans do not refer themselves as either South
Korean or North Korean. They have a long history as a unified country with a
common language, culture, and relatively homogenous ethnicity, and the idea of
a permanent division of Korea is unimaginable. The fact that Korea still remains
divided and there are 22 million Koreans in the North, starving and oppressed, is

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a daily reminder that Koreans are still suffering from the machinations of the
Roosevelt Administration.

The Korean War had a significant impact on the neighboring countries.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) emerged as a new power. However,
China paid a terrible price, with an estimated 900,000 casualties. For the war-
devastated Japanese economy, the Korean War was a bonanza.166 Korean War-
related demand revitalized Japanese heavy industry, especially shipbuilding,
automobile manufacturing, pharmaceutical manufacturing, beer production, and
oil refining. With large military contracts pouring in from the U.S., talk of
dismantling the Japanese industrial-military complexes (known as Zaibatsu) was
silenced.
Unfortunately for America, the lessons of the Korean War were wasted
when it came to the Vietnam War. Whether the U.S. should have entered
Vietnam in what appeared to be support for the failing French colonialism is
another story; but once she did, Washington fell into the same trap that she did
in Korea. America permitted the existence of sanctuaries and belittled
nationalism, as she had done in Korea. The U.S. even eliminated Vietnam’s
president, Ngo Dinh Diem, a nationalist in his own right, by staging a coup
against him. While Americans had good reasons to dislike Diem for not
respecting civil liberties, there was no one else who could lead the country as
well. America again fought a “limited” war rather than aiming for a total and
swift victory with overwhelming force. It would take another generation for the
Pentagon to appreciate MacArthur’s words: In war there is no substitute for
victory.

166. Brian Catchpole, The Korean War (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc.,
2000), pp. 332-334.

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21. SOUTH KOREA AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE
After the cease-fire, the contest between Communism and capitalism
shifted to the arena of economic development. Communism was an economic
ideology which promised to make everyone live better and share the fruits of the
earth equally. The state would ensure the equitable distribution of wealth
created by everyone. Capitalism also promises to make everyone live better by
letting individuals produce wealth with minimal state intervention and by
letting the “invisible hand” do the redistribution. The division of Korea into two
economic systems provided a perfect ground to test the validity of the two
opposing systems.
South Korea had little in the way of natural resources, capital, or
technology. One positive impact of the war on the Korean psyche was in
shedding the lingering vestiges of the old class system: everyone wanted to
become a rich commoner rather than a poor yangban. South Korea also had a
relatively well-educated labor force due to Koreans’ traditional emphasis on
education. The emphasis on education is one of the more enduring traditions in
Korea.
An article dated November 26, 2002 indicated that the United Nations
Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF) placed South Korea at the top of a list of
countries with effective education systems among developed countries. Japan
came in second. This test was based on “what pupils actually know [reading,
math and science of 14 and 15 year olds] and what they are able to do.” The
UNICEF study was unable to conclude the causes of the test results or even
their correlation with variables such as the amount of money spent on education.
Both in South Korea and Japan, students receive support and encouragement at

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home. This does not always mean that youngsters in South Korea are pressured
by their parents — although it is true in many families. Perhaps, it is the culture
of respect for knowledge and accomplishment that is central to South Korea’s
education accomplishment.
Although not enough to rebuild the devastated physical and social
infrastructure, the U.S. provided generous military and other aid to the South
Korean government. Yet, when the student uprising ousted President Rhee from
office seven years after the cease-fire on April 19, 1960, South Korea still had a per
capita income of below $100 per annum, which was on a par with the poorer
African countries. Most economists labeled South Korea a “basket case.” And
one year of democracy under U.S.-educated Dr. John M. Chang did nothing to
the economy except by creating more chaos.
What South Korea lacked more than natural resources and capital was
someone to initiate the country’s process of development.

General Park Chung Hee overthrew the civilian government on May 16,
1961 with a promise to eradicate corruption and bring in more prosperity, but he
failed to impress most Koreans, who had no confidence in a military strongman
to deliver. In 1961, he was virtually unknown. His background as an ex-
Communist did little to reassure the people. Donald Gregg, a former CIA
operative stationed in Korea and later a U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, said
that the U.S. never found it easy to deal with Park, because of his “deeply
ingrained skepticism toward foreigners” and lack of attention to such issues as
“human rights” or “free trade,” which interested the U.S.
Park swept away old, corrupt politicians and judges and arrested
professional gangsters, executing several of them and sending the rest to hard
labor for road building projects. His model for nation building would be
“politically incorrect” as a model for other less developed countries, but it began
to work. Park also tried to eradicate corruption, although it would take much
longer than his rule to change this behavior pattern. Civil servants needed to eat,
too. Still, there were constant reminders that a revolution had taken place.
Capitalism requires the rule of law and a judicial system that upholds such laws.
Park quickly went on to prepare a five-year economic development plan.
The plan, prepared with the assistance of an American consulting company,
emphasized agricultural development. It would take decades for Korea to
become self-sufficient in food. In a country without enough foreign exchange to
buy food from overseas, that was an important goal. But South Korea had more

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immediate success with the export of light industrial products, namely textiles,
wigs, footwear, and garments.
Park had a bigger plan in mind. Although he was a soldier, he had studied
the history of Japan’s economic development, especially the Meiji Restoration,
which started in 1867 and ultimately transformed Japan from an agrarian into an
industrial economy. Park met frequently with all of the major exporters to learn
about the problems they faced, including high interest rates, difficulty in
importing technology and raw materials, and bureaucratic red tape. He enacted
the Foreign Capital Inducement Act in 1962, reversing Rhee’s policy of trying to
keep foreign capital, especially Japanese capital, out of South Korea. Rhee had
equated such investment to colonialism.
In 1962, Japan was dangling $300 million in grants and $200 million in
loans to South Korea, provided that the two countries could normalize relations
without agreeing to the South Korean demand that Japan admit and apologize
for the wrongs committed during her 37-year occupation of Korea. Park was
willing to forget the past and move forward. However, most Koreans wanted
Japan to apologize, and went on the street to denounce the proposed treaty.
They would rather forego Japanese aid than implicitly allow Japan’s crimes to go
unrecognized. Park backed down several times under the mounting opposition,
but he persisted. John Kennedy, who was the U.S. president at the time, was
keenly interested in the economic growth of less developed countries in general
and South Korea in particular to prove that capitalism was superior to
Communism. He encouraged the normalization of the relationship between
South Korea and Japan.
In 1965, Park finally succeeded in ramming through the National Assembly
a treaty normalizing relations with Japan, even though South Korea had been
unable to extract any apology. It is doubtful that any democratically-elected
leader would have been able to pursue such a politically unpopular policy; but
the Japanese grant and loan provided the capital needed to start
industrialization.
Another development that fueled the South Korean economy was the
Vietnam War. During its peak, South Korea had as many as 50,000 soldiers in
South Vietnam. Each of them was paid $5,000 a year by the United States. This
provided South Korea the hard currency to buy much needed machinery and
equipment from overseas. During the First Five-Year Economic Development
Plan (1962-1966), South Korea achieved an economic growth rate of 19 percent
per annum compared with the planning target of 8.5 percent. Exports grew by

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50 percent per annum, although South Korea was still running a huge trade
deficit every year.
All this primed the pump. Park helped to build a strong and varied
industrial base: steel, shipbuilding, construction and electronics. When the
Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) broke ground for the construction of
a one-million-ton steel plant, observers were not convinced that there was
enough demand for that much South Korean steel. Existing world supply was
adequate at that time. However, POSCO eventually became the world’s second
largest steel producer, with a production capacity of 21 million tons, and
arguably is the most efficient steel producer.
The construction industry also played an important role. Some of the
companies worked in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. Korean
contractors and their engineers were willing to work in conditions that most
other countries’ engineers refused to tolerate. They became known for building
around the clock and finishing the job ahead of schedule. Chung Ju Yong’s
biography167 provides an interesting account of how his Hyundai Construction
Company ended up dredging the Vietcong-infested Mekong Delta area. Then, in
1976, Hyundai secured a $930 million contract for the Al Jubayl deep-sea port
construction project in Saudi Arabia. It would be worth more than $5 billion
today, after adjustment for inflation. This was the largest single project in the
20th century.
In 1973, as the POSCO’s first steel plant was starting production, Park
formally launched an ambitious development program of “heavy and chemical
industries.” Steel provided the most important raw material for shipbuilding and
automobile manufacturing. Hyundai Heavy Industry is the largest shipbuilder in
the world. Other large conglomerates such as Samsung and Daewoo groups also
entered the market.
Most people associate Park Chung Hee with Korea’s industrialization and
the expansion of its export industry, but he accomplished more than that. One of
his greatest achievements was the Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement),
although not many have heard of it outside of Asia. Despite its name, it was a
nationwide rural development program. The success of the “movement” and
news that the per capita income of South Korea’s rural households had caught
up with that of urban areas made waves all around Southeast Asia. Asian

167. Chung Ju Yong, Shiryong-un Itso-do Silpae-nun Upda (in Korean only, There Is
Trial But No Failure) (Seoul: Jesam Gihaek, 1991), pp. 101-102.

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countries were curious to see how South Korea did it. The disparity between
rural and urban household income was one of the stickiest problems that many
Asian countries faced. Saemaul Undong was later phased out as a result of financial
scandals and politicization of its leadership groups. This all happened after Park
Chung Hee was assassinated by his Korean CIA chief. However, the program
served its purpose at a time when it was much needed, and a great deal of
progress was achieved in improving the living standards of rural areas.
By the time Park passed away, the economic contest between the North
and the South was over. Today, illiteracy hardly exists in South Korea. Life
expectancy at birth is 73, compared with 60 in North Korea. It may come as a
surprise to most Koreans, as well as to others, that the distribution of income in
South Korea is one of the most level in Asia. For example, the ratio of the 20
percent highest income group to the lowest 20 percent income group was 5.3 in
South Korea in 1999, compared with 5.7 percent in India, which championed
socialism; 8.5 in Singapore; and 9.0 in Hong Kong, which followed more
unadulterated capitalism.
Yet, Park was a dictator although far more beneficial to South Korea than
Syngman Rhee as far as the management of the economy was concerned. He held
on to the power until October, 1979 when his trusted intelligence chief
assassinated him. Even after his demise, his two successors, also military
strongmen, followed Park’s strategy of export-driven growth. They gradually
opened the market to the world and permitted organized labor movement. The
South Korean economy continued to grow, fending off the “oil shock,” minor
recessions, and the like. It took the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to shake Korea’s
confidence by exposing structural problems in its model of economic
development. The collusion of the government and large conglomerates, which
were supported by generous government loans and protection, created an
unhealthy corporate culture.
In 1997, the central bank ran out of dollars, and South Korea was
dangerously close to defaulting on major debts owed to international banks.
Although currency speculators may have triggered the crisis, the macro
economic policy was at issue as well. South Korea (as well as many Asian
countries) had artificially high currency values. The crisis forced it to make
serious financial reforms. The rescue package and reforms prescribed by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) were almost as painful as the financial crisis
itself — so that the financial crisis came to be called the “IMF crisis.” At times, it
looked as if the IMF prescription was going to kill the patient (Korea, Inc.)

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rather than save it. A high unemployment rate and corporate bankruptcies hit
the Korean economy hard. Elsewhere as well, in Indonesia, Thailand, and the
Philippines, the IMF rescue packages and prescriptions seemed to inflict much
pain without resuscitating the economy.
In South Korea the gigantic Daewoo Group and a number of banks and
industries went under, leaving behind huge debts to the public, banks, and the
government. As the crisis deepened, South Korean middle-class families pulled
their children out of U.S. universities, stopped taking overseas trips, sold gold
pieces to the government so that it could convert gold to dollars, and avoided
buying imported consumer goods. The government let most ailing companies go
bankrupt and saved several others with the taxpayers’ money. The people
reluctantly accepted such measures.
Although the IMF prescriptions may or may not have done any good for
other Asian countries, the South Korean economy needed some of the medicines
that the IMF prescribed. The government was too deeply involved in the private
sector. It was the majority stockholder in a number of commercial banks.
Government support for the conglomerates in the early stages of Korea’s
economic development was expeditious because South Korea did not have a
viable private sector. However, this support dragged on too long for the good of
the country. In the aftermath of the crisis, the South Korean government began
taking itself out of the commercial banking business, exchange rate
manipulation, and its close support for large conglomerates.
By 1999, when Japan was still trapped in recession and other Southeast
Asian countries were reeling from the crisis, South Korea slowly climbed back to
the 13th largest economy in the world, albeit with a damaged credit rating. Its
GDP per capita of $16,100 (after adjustment for purchasing power parity) in
2000 was sixteen times that of North Korea’s and was comparable to the lesser
economies of the European Union. Against all odds, including external threats
and high defense expenditures, through hard work the children of the war
succeeded in producing what some economists called an “economic miracle.”
Well before South Korea co-hosted the 2002 World Cup with Japan, its
economy seemed to be humming again. South Korea is still not a wealthy
country in terms of per capita income, but it has shown remarkable
resourcefulness and dynamism as it emerged from the financial crisis. However,
new challenges always seem to be around the corner.

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 21. South Korea after the Cease-fire

In the past decade or two, many U.S. veterans have made sentimental
journeys back to South Korea. One of the first things they’ve noticed is how
much the country has changed since the war. On the whole, Koreans have
remained enormously grateful to the U.S. and other nations that came to their
rescue. In his book on the Korean War, Max Hasting, an Englishman, compared
South Korean sentiments to those of the Europeans, noting that where
Europeans were resentful of the U.S., rather than grateful for its troops’
sacrifices, in South Korea (where he noted that the GIs were “terribly” arrogant
and condescending), the people remained grateful.
An American journalist wrote that tears flowed from the eyes of an
American veteran of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division when Koreans of all ages,
“even schoolchildren too young to have personally experienced the war” stopped
a group of touring veterans on the streets to thank them.168 Many South Koreans
believe the relationship between the U.S. and South Korea is special because two
countries are “allies bonded in blood.” South Koreans also remember that
America provided economic and military assistance for years even after the war
ended. Without such assistance, even a larger proportion of South Korea’s GNP
would have gone into national defense and importation of grain, wheat flour and
other commodities.
For all these reasons and more, South Korea has remained a faithful ally of
the U.S. With increasing prosperity, South Korea has been paying not only for
its national defense, but also for some costs of stationing U.S. troops in South
Korea. It contributed generously to the Gulf War and other multilateral
endeavors. When all the Western European steel producers and Japan took the
U.S. to the World Trade Organization to litigate for unilaterally imposing tariffs
on steel imports, South Korea refrained. This and other incidents indicated that
South Korea was treating the U.S. more like a big brother than a competitor.

TWO SCHOOLGIRLS

Yet, the American-South Korean relationship began to turn sour in the new
millennium. Attention turned to American servicemen’s crimes against Koreans,
as well as old incidents such as the No Gun Ri massacre. Crimes committed by

168. Rudy Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drum: An Oral History of The Korean War (New York,
Chester, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), p. 242.

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the GIs in South Korea have been particularly troubling to South Korea, where
the crime rate is only a fraction of that in the U.S. The Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA), which defines the legal status of American troops in South
Korea, was first signed in 1965 and was revised in 1991 and again in 2000. As a
result of these revisions, some criminal cases were brought to the jurisdiction of
the South Korean courts. Still, they represented only 5.5 percent of all crimes
committed by American servicemen between 1999 and 2001. To make matters
worse, most Koreans feel that the SOFA does not grant the human rights of
South Koreas as much weight as those of Americans (the Japanese and Germans,
who also have American soldiers stationed on their soil, have similar concerns).
Crimes against Koreans are far more widespread than most people realize.
Two South Korean civic groups called to the attention of President Clinton a
general pattern of crime against Koreans and the environment committed by
U.S. troops. Between 1993 and April 2000, the number of crimes committed by
U.S. soldiers against Korean civilians averaged 820 incidents per year, including
some serious crimes such as a U.S. soldier strangling 31-year-old bar waitress to
death in Itaewon after she refused to have sex with him. Many older generation
Koreans remember a kinder and gentler side of Americans during the war.
Without question, America today has far higher crime rates than it had during
the Korean War, and the trend carries over to the U.S. Army.
On August 9, 2000, Ahn Mi Young (Online Asia Times) reported the case of a
Korean construction engineer run over by a car driven by an American
serviceman. A Korean police officer involved in the investigation said, ‘‘There is
neither a procedure nor clear [rules on how] legal authorities should
handle...suits against American soldiers stationed in South Korea[.] The U.S.
authorities came to the spot, they walked away with the American suspect, and
later sent us their notice saying the car accident was the result of driver fatigue.
[The case was] closed, [and there is] nothing we can do about it.’’
Some crimes have been against the environment. In 2000, the Commander
of the Eighth U.S. Army admitted that the U.S. military had been illegally
dumping concentrated formaldehyde, a toxic chemical known to cause cancer,
into the Han River. The Eighth Army only admitted this after a South Korean
environmental group publicly exposed the dumping. Apparently, it had been
going on for years. Ilene R. Prusher (The Christian Science Monitor, November 10,
2000) reported Korean activists’ view that “U.S. troops are not held accountable
for their crimes because the SOFA…puts prosecution of most U.S. troops’ crimes
in the hands of U.S. officials, not local authorities[.] There is a fundamental

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problem here: The US soldiers don’t view Koreans as having the same rights as
they do.” She also goes on to quote U.S. military officials: “Military personnel are
given stiffer treatment [in the U.S. military courts] than they would under
Korean law[.]” There is obviously a perception gap. South Koreans do not sit in
the U.S. military courts as juries, and Koreans do not trust the fairness of
American juries. All Koreans hear about is American soldiers getting away with
“murder.”
In June, 2002, the news of two young school girls run over by American
minesweepers on training made the front pages of Korean newspapers. A mixed
group of Koreans, consisting of those who really grieved for the dead school girls,
students in search of a new cause to demonstrate against, nationalists, leftists,
anti-war groups, and anti-Americans for whatever the reason began to agitate
for the two GIs to be turned over for trial in South Korean courts for negligent
homicide.
The persistency of the demonstrations surprised most people. Some
demanded the ouster of the American troops, others demanded a review of the
SOFA, and yet other groups demanded an apology from President George W.
Bush. The Internet generation of South Koreans admires the nationalism of Kim
Ku’s tradition. They are not only against the Japanese, who have tried to
rationalize their colonial past, but also remember atrocities committed against
Koreans by Stalin, Mao and Americans (whether military commanders at No
Gun Ri, individual American advisers before the war, or American politicians
who divided Korea).
Demonstrations went on almost non-stop, but when the two GIs were
acquitted of negligent homicide charges in late November, 2002 the situation
turned decidedly more ugly. About 700 activists chanted, “Let’s drive out the
American troops!” (AP, November 24). The crowd shouted and shook their fists
in front of the Korean War museum in central Seoul and proceeded to a nearby
military base; the South Korean police tried to block the march. Instead of
subsiding, demonstrations spread to other towns and cities, involving thousands
of demonstrators. On November 26, 2002, a local newspaper (Hangyure) reported
that the ROK Minister of Law, Sim Sang Myong, said that he saw no need to
revise SOFA again only one year after it was revised. He explained that in no
country had the jurisdiction of an accident involving American servicemen on
official duty been handed over to the host country. He went on to explain that in
the U.S., traffic accidents do not usually result in criminal convictions.

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On November 27, President Bush apologized for the death of the two
schoolgirls, through American Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. To Koreans, this
tardy and indirect apology appeared insincere. The commander of the U.S.
troops, General Leon J. LaPorte, made another apology and pleaded to Koreans
to understand the difference between American and Korean laws on traffic
accidents: the U.S. law does not incriminate drivers except in the case of
intentional accidents. (This is not necessarily the case in South Korea.) The
demonstrators were unimpressed. On December 7, there were 15,000
demonstrators surrounding the U.S. embassy. On December 14, there were
between 30,000 and 50,000 demonstrators carrying candles. Bush personally
apologized for the incident to Kim Dae Jung by telephone, but it made little
difference to the intensity of demonstration. Even the conservative Grand
National Party (GNP), usually in tune with the U.S. policy on North Korea,
challenged a spokesman of the Kim Dae Jung Administration who had called the
demonstrators a radical group. All political parties demanded a revision of the
SOFA and distanced themselves from the U.S. Americans were upset when
demonstrators burned the U.S. flag, but all along there has been a sense, among
Koreans, that America had no respect for Korea or Koreans.
A large number of ordinary South Koreans do not trust the U.S. military
courts. It has become an emotional issue in spite of the fact that Korean
prosecutors — who had made some preliminary investigations — hinted that
the accident might have been caused by a faulty communications system in the
minesweeper that crushed the two schoolgirls. Most Koreans apparently believe
that American servicemen once again have gotten away with criminal
misconduct and the SOFA needs to be revised. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld said that no such review was justified; he remarked that a revised
SOFA would not have prevented the accident. True, but the demonstrations
were not only about this specific case but also American arrogance and hurt
national pride that derive from incidents going well beyond the Bush
Administration. The new generation has read about No Gun Ri and other
massacres during the war, the unwillingness of President Clinton to apologize
for these, and stories about more recent crimes committed against persons and
the environment. To them, the U.S. Army continues to belittle such crimes and
has not punished guilty parties. Justice has not been served.
Under Rhee and three military strongmen that followed, any criticism of
America and anything that smacked Communism were severely suppressed. The
situation has changed, and today it is more like America under President Carter.

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The Seoul National University invited Bruce Cumings (University of Chicago

history professor) to speak at a seminar amid continuing demonstrations and
burning of American flags. Cumings said that such a demonstration was useful.
He ended a chapter on his 1997 book with what appeared to be a rationalization
of Kim Il Sung’s “corporatism,” as well as the statement that North Korea did not
start the Korean War. The younger generation of South Koreans are skeptical of
their own government and of American motives. They also have problem
accepting horror stories brought by recent North Korean refugees. Kang Chol-
hwan said, “It was terrible shock. I have been through so many awful things, and
these people [the press corps which appeared in his press briefing] … were
looking skeptically down their noses at me! … I found the journalist from
Hangyore [a liberal South Korean newspaper] particularly irritating.… Millions of
people were dying [,] and his only concern was our credibility.”169
In the run-up to the 2002 elections, the spokesman of the ruling
Millennium Democratic Party said, “Friendly ties between the U.S. and South
Korea can be preserved only when both sides are on an equal footing and
national pride remains intact.” Partly due to the schoolgirl incident and partly
due to the fear that the U.S. will touch off a war, its presidential candidate Roh
Moo Hyon began to overtake the conservative candidate, Lee Hoi Chang of the
GNP, in the opinion poll two weeks before the election. Roh said that “if elected,
[he] would ‘guarantee the security of North Korea’” (The New York Times,
December 5, 2002). He went on to win the election. Is Roh going to turn the
ROK Army into a shield between North Korea and American troops?
The emotional outpouring over what may be a simple traffic death may
seem irrational to Americans. But even in this age of globalization, the ways of
the East and the West are fundamentally different. In the West, particularly in
America, the slightest grievance is aired immediately and often ends up in the
courts, but in South Korea people tend to be reserved and deferential to each
other, at least on the surface. Bowing to each other and prostrating to parents
during holidays are some of the manifestations of such customs. Such courtesy is
expected to be reciprocated. Koreans treat foreigners as honored guests and
generously attribute their lack of courtesy (if any) to cultural differences. But
there comes a limit, in any personal relationship. This tendency is also found
among Thais, Malays, and Filipinos. The Philippines chose to close down
America’s Subic Naval Base and the Clark Air Base, although that does not

169. Kang and Rigoulot, p. 223.

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appear to serve the national interest of the Philippines. Nothing positive came
out of the closure except restored national pride; but that was the choice that
they made.

After the presidential election, South Koreans seem to have sobered up.
Some counter-demonstrators demanded that American troops stay in South
Korea. On March 1, 2003, the national holiday celebrating independence from
Japan, some 100,000 anti-Communist demonstrators showed up with South
Korean, American and U.N. flags, and with placards denouncing nuclear
weapons and Kim Jong Il. They called for a stronger alliance with the U.S.
Meanwhile, anti-American demonstrators, who appeared with lighted candles
and burned an American flag, numbered about 2,000 (The Korean Times, March 3,
2003). President-elect Roh also said that he does not wish American troops to
withdraw. He apparently dislikes being under America’s thumb, especially on
the question of another war on the Korean peninsula, but he is realistic enough
to realize that a U.S. withdrawal would create a dangerous tilt in the balance of
power in Korea. North Korea is also a threat to the stability of Northeast Asia.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington research
organization, said, “Growing anti-American sentiment within Korea’s body
politic serves as one of the greatest dangers to U.S. interests on the peninsula
following unification (emphasis added).”170 The Center is concerned that a new
SOFA or any reduction in the numbers of U.S. troops in Korea might encourage
similar moves in Japan. The Center advocates that the U.S. “lean heavily” on
South Korean leaders to counter anti-Americanism. South Korea is no longer
dependent on America for its survival, although it still would like to enjoy
American nuclear protection. Therefore, South Korea is less likely to succumb to
American pressure than before. A way to defuse the intransigence is to turn the
issue into an intellectual dialogue based on facts and reasoning rather than
pressure from a big country on a small country. This is what Koreans resent in
the first place.
One thing that the U.S. could do in the interest of justice as well as
improving the rift in U.S.-South Korea relations is to review and amend the
SOFA. The fact that it was revised a few years ago is no reason to refuse to
review it now, considering the current political atmosphere in South Korea.
There is no reason to treat South Korea differently than Japan or Germany — or,

170.Jim Wolf, Reuters, September 19, 2002.

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if there is, the reason needs to be acceptable to South Koreans. The U.S. must
extend the sense of fairness and justice beyond her borders; she may also want to
share the operational command of the UNC with the ROK. Roh had a point
when he voiced concern that he would have no control over a war once it started.
Koreans are justifiably afraid of American moves that might turn Seoul into that
sea of fire. The operational command of the UNC is still 100 percent in American
hands, even though 95 percent of its soldiers are South Koreans.
South Koreans today are well educated and mannerly people, although
their suppressed feelings tend to explode now and then. Since the Student
Revolution which ousted Syngman Rhee on April 19, 1960, Koreans are
accustomed to taking their grievances to the street. Yet, Koreans can be trusted
to make rational decisions if they are offered the facts, explanations of the
differences in the two countries’ legal systems, and a comparative analysis of
SOFAs in different countries where American troops are stationed.

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22. NORTH KOREA NOW
As late as 1970, the North Korean economy was stronger than that of South
Korea. It began to suffer soon thereafter, and has registered negative growth ever
since. The fundamental reason for its failure is the one that brought down the
USSR and its satellites: no production incentive, and undue emphasis on heavy
and defense industries at the expense of the consumer sector (light industry and
agriculture). A side effect of its reliance on heavy industry was an endemic
dependence on Moscow for capital goods. Therefore, the economic and political
collapse of the USSR has had a disastrous effect. Much of North Korea’s
resources went to support a one-million-man military.
To most people, the fact that North Korea has not yet fallen like other Russian
satellite countries and has been able to maintain such a large military force raises
a number of questions. Even more surprising has been the news that North
Korea has engaged in expensive weapons development programs. Supposedly,
about two million people have died from starvation in the past seven years. The
Soviet empire fell when its government stores ran low on bread. Why has North
Korea not fallen and how can they go on pouring resources into the military?
What can we expect in coming years?
North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop provides a credible answer. He
was one of the secretaries of the Communist Party and the highest-ranking
officer to defect to South Korea from the North. Since his defection Hwang has
complained that he has been under a virtual house arrest and a gag order by the
South Korean government, which did not want to upset the North-South
relationship. However, he was allowed to publish a book in August, 2001. He
was a close personal advisor to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s teacher. He was

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credited as the principal author of the Juche (self-reliance) philosophy, the

governing ideology of North Korea. According to Hwang, Juche has been used to
elevate Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il to what can be best translated as Absolute
Leader.171 North Korea today is not so much a Communist state as it is a feudal
state. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il saw how the people discarded Stalin’s
legacy after his death and they saw other Communist leaders in Eastern Europe
being deposed. Kim wanted something more permanent — a dynasty. (Juche was
originally intended to be an adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the Korean
situation. However, over time, it has been used to legitimatize Kim’s dynasty,
like an old feudal kingdom of Korea. All foreign ideas were cut off. North Korea
pulled down the ubiquitous portraits of Stalin — Kim did not want to be
encumbered by Marxism, Leninism, or Maoism.)
According to Hwang, the North Korean economy consists of three separate
sectors: the enterprises belonging to the Party, the military, and the consumer
sector. The Party-owned enterprises are synonymous with Kim Jong Il’s
personal properties. Many foreign-exchange earning enterprises such as gold
mines belong to this sector. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have enjoyed all
the luxuries of the world. Their share of Party-owned enterprises is estimated to
represent about 20 percent of the country’s total economy. The military sector
comprises a whopping 50 percent of the total, and the consumer sector makes up
the remaining 30 percent. However, the first two sectors’ shares have been
expanding at the expense of the consumer sector as the economy has contracted
and the shortage of electricity and raw materials increased.
The actual supply of electricity was about 20 percent of the total demand.
Every sector, particularly the military, went to Kim Jong Il to seek priority
access. However, even the demand for those who received such sanctions
exceeded the available supply. Since the consumer sector had the least priority
in North Korea, it received hardly any electricity. In no small measure, this
explains why the average citizens in North Korea have been starving while the
military has been well cared for. At least, it had enough resources to engage in
the development of weapons of mass destruction.
Hwang also gave the example of steel production. In one particular month,
the steel industry produced 18,000 tons of steel. It needed to sell 5,000 tons to
generate enough income to operate the following month, but the military

171. This is the translation of Chuldae Suryong that Hwang said was being used in
North Korea today.

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demanded all 18,000 tons for itself. The military does not pay for steel. Yet the
steel industry could not refuse the demand.
Another problem is infrastructure bottlenecks. Railways fail to deliver
input or collect output on time. Fuel must be imported, but North Korea has
hardly anything to export to earn foreign exchange. It exports minerals and
metals, but mines and factories produce far below their potential because they
are short of electricity. The machinery is inefficient or worn out. North Korea is
suspected of trading in illegal drugs to earn foreign exchange. A North Korean
ship suspected of carrying illegal drugs blew up recently when a Japanese Coast
Guard ship tried to intercept it.
One of the consumer sectors that has suffered the most is agriculture.
Regardless of the exact number of persons who have died from starvation, an
unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe has been taking place in the “workers’
paradise.” North Korea and some aid groups claim that drought, floods, and
other natural disasters caused the catastrophe; but the bad news comes with
such regularity year after year that there has to be more than the climate
involved. Its neighbor, South Korea — with a population more than twice that of
North Korea — faces serious problems with the falling price of rice due to over-
production. South Korea has had its share of floods and drought in recent years,
too, but it has built dams and irrigation systems to mitigate adverse weather
conditions. These are the kinds of projects that North Korea has neglected for
decades in order to build up its military.
Another fundamental problem in North Korean agriculture stems from the
collectivization of farms and the resulting lack of incentives to produce. The
inherent problem in collective farms is that workers do not have to work hard;
regardless of their effort, they get the same share of food from the Great Leader.
He is the Santa who takes care of everyone who believes in him.
Electricity is necessary to produce fertilizer, and fuel is necessary to run
farm machinery. Even when food supplies are donated, there is not even enough
fuel to deliver grain to the worst-hit areas. It is obvious that North Korea would
be hard pressed to feed its people even with a good climate and external aid, as
long as the infrastructure is full of bottlenecks and fuel shortages are not
relieved.
Aid agencies say many rural people are getting just 100 grams — one bowl
of rice — a day. Mike Chino of CNN posted a report on a Web site (April 28,
1997), stating that some North Koreans were surviving on bark, roots, and grass.
In 1996, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il called for a crackdown on cannibalism

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after three cases were reported. If the people have been eating the fibers inside
tree bark, many trees must have died. They have also cut down trees for fuel,
which exacerbates floods. When the mountains are stripped bare, even a small
rainfall becomes a torrent, washing away the soil and clogging the irrigation
systems.
Tuberculosis is rampant in North Korea, and hospitals constantly run out
of antibiotics. According to international doctors who are helping North Korea,
there is such a shortage of anesthetics that most operations are carried out
without any. However, there is a special hospital in Pyongyang reserved for high-
ranking party officials that has all kinds of advanced medical equipment.
Since North Korea has no hard currency, it cannot make expensive
investments in economic and social infrastructure and rehabilitate or build new
power plants and communications infrastructure. Its factories do not have
proper machinery. North Korea might have been able to borrow money from
sources such as the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Funds if it had not
defaulted on loans in the 1970s. International financial institutions such as the
World Bank have money to lend, but they, too, require North Korea to clear its
bad debt before borrowing again.
A natural question is why North Korea has not made the kind of economic
policy changes that the PRC has. In fact it has tried, although its attempts did
not go far enough to have any material impact. Its first experiment was with the
Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone (FETZ) at the border with China
and Russia in 1991. North Korea modeled the FETZ after the PRC’s Shenzhen
Free Economic Trade Zone to attract overseas investment, but it fell far short of
adopting the market-opening measures of the PRC.172 The North Korean
government maintained too much control over investors, such as the right to
nationalize or seize foreign enterprises, and maintained a rigid control over the
hiring of local workers.
Not surprisingly, the Rajin-Sonbong FETZ attracted only a small number
of foreign investors.
North Korean officials simply do not seem to understand how business
ventures are conducted in a capitalistic economy. Several South Korean
companies found this out the hard way. Many other South Korean companies
that initially showed interest in doing business with North Korea were

172. See Patricia Geode, The Legal Framework for Investment in North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong
Free Economic and Trade Zone, September 2001.

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dissuaded by the many obstacles, such as high distribution costs (caused in part
by the high cost of transportation and high fees for handling goods); the lack of
an official mechanism for discussing and resolving issues between the two
Koreas; the absence of business information and a general lack of transparency;
inadequate telecommunications, port facilities, and power; and the lack of
insurance for possible economic losses. North Korean authorities act as
employment agencies and set wage levels. They even require managerial staffers
to be recruited locally. Under “contractual joint ventures,” a local North Korean
entity takes responsibility for the company management while the foreign entity
provides the machinery, technical know-how, and, more importantly, buyers for
the products. South Korean investors met North Korean counterparts in Beijing
and other third-country locations. Apparently, the North Korean government is
afraid of the presence of South Koreans in the North.
However, the experiment with capitalism vis-à-vis the Rajin-Sonbong
seems to have taught North Korea that its version of capitalism does not work.
Kim Jong Il visited Russia and Shanghai (including the Shanghai Stock
Exchange) in 2001. In the summer of 2002, signs of change in North Korea’s
economic policy began to appear. North Korea experimented with the
abolishment of the system of food rationing and free housing, increased the fees
for its public utilities, devalued the local currency in line with its international
market value, and raised workers’ wages many times over. A special
administrative region of Sinuiju, on the bank of the Yalu River across from the
PRC, was launched with much fanfare. It is to be a laboratory for a market
economy.
It remains to be seen whether North Korea will be able to provide the
necessary physical and social infrastructure, as well as to make the legal and
economic policy reforms necessary to induce international investors. The
challenge to North Korean leaders will be to introduce fundamental policy
reforms while maintaining their grip over the people.

Another North Korean defector brings revealing episodes about equality in

North Korea. After her defection Shin Yong Hee, who in her younger years was a
Mansoodae (Hall of Longevity) ballerina at Pyongyang, wrote about the lifestyle
of Kim Jong Il and top Communist leaders.173 The Mansoodae ballet company was

173. Shin Yong Hee Jindalle Kkod Pilttae Kkaji (available only in Korean: Until the
Azalea Blooms), Seoul, 1996.

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the top North Korean national ballet team, which performed in Moscow, Beijing,
and Seoul, as well as in North Korea. Later, Kim Jong Il turned it into a Joy Team,
which performed regularly at secret parties for Kim Jong Il and other North
Korean leaders. In addition to the Joy Team, some bold dancers (more like strip
teasers) performed regularly and entertained Kim and his parties. One such
dance team visited Europe for a month to study at the Lido and Moulin Rouge,
learning the arts of seductive dancing while millions in their country were
starving. Shin wrote that Kim Jong Il and other high ranking leaders who
attended such parties loved to fondle young virgins. They made sexual demands
on these girls, which, of course, no one dared to refuse.
The book also shows why a coup d’état is practically impossible in North
Korea. All the office and home telephones of military and other leaders go
through official operators. In spite of such supervision, military officers in
Hamhung almost pulled off a military coup in the 1980s. In the end, however,
several hundred officers were arrested and executed. North Korean diplomats
have not been allowed to travel with their family members. I had heard of this
practice but it did not strike home until I personally met the North Korean
ambassador to Malaysia at a party held at the house of the Resident
Representative of the United Nation Development Programme in 1975. When I
asked her where her husband and children were, she said that the Great Leader
is looking after them. Even an ambassador had to leave family behind. It was
because of such practice that Hwang (equivalent to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs) had to defect alone, with his aide, rather than with his family.
With the collapse of the North Korean economy, increasing numbers of
escapees have been arriving in South Korea. The number has been just about
doubling every year (71 in 1998, 148 in 1999, 312 in 2000, 583 in 2001, and 1,141 in
2002) in spite of the perils and difficulty of escaping from North Korea. Hunger
seems to be the main reason for escape. In the case of Kang Chol-hwan, he was
able to cross the border by bribing the guards. The escapees brought some fresh
news about North Korea.
There have been disturbing reports that some South Korean and Caucasian
POWs are still in North Korea. According to the Chosun Ilbo (August 16, 1999), an
ROK Army POW, Park Dong II (now 72 years old), defected to South Korea via
China with four members of his family. This was the fourth time that a ROK
POW escaped with his family members.
Another defector who claims to have been a Communist cadre member at
the Gumduck Coal Mine said that there were as many as 400 ROK POWs at his

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mine in the mid-1990s, but that the number had dwindled to about 100 by the
time he defected in late 1999.174 He had detailed data on 24 of them and said that
he remembered 40 names altogether. In 1996, another defector, Dong Yong Sup,
said that at that same mine there were several thousand ROK POWs in the
1970s. Other escapees from different mines had similar stories: some 600 ROK
POWs at the Aoji Coal Mine just after the armistice in September, 1953, and
about 500 ROK POWs at Hamyon Coal Mine in early 1954, etc. According
Yonhap New Agency and The Korean Herald Tribune (March 15, 1999), based on
accounts of North Korean escapees, North Korea detained 454 South Koreans
kidnapped by North Korea from all over the world. It had long been suspected
that North Korea had abducted some Japanese citizens for the purpose of
training North Korean agents. North Korea had denied this all along, but
admitted to it in 2002.
According to the recent escapees’ stories, the POWs who are forced to
work in mines and quarries are only allowed to marry women of “poor origins,”
and their children are forced to work in the mines after a minimal education. One
female defector in 1995 wrote an essay called Animals Without Tails, describing
how several ROK POWs worked like animals in coal mines with only shovels
and pick axes.
Apparently some Caucasian POWs remain in North Korea also. One
defector, Kim Yong, said that he saw Caucasians with blue eyes working only
ten feet away from him in a mine. He believed that the men were U.N. POWs; a
guard told him that these foreign POWs were captured in the battle of the
Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.175 The U.S. government has no evidence that any
of them is American. If the North Korean defector’s word is to be believed,
however, these Caucasians could be soldiers of either the U.S. 1st Marine
Division or the U.S. 7th Infantry Division. Some other escapees also mentioned
seeing Caucasians, and one such story specifically related to British officers.
Many North Korean would-be escapees may have been intercepted at the
border or captured in China and returned to North Korea. Still, between 100,000
and 300,000 North Korean refugees are believed to be hiding in China (The
Guardian, July 19, 2002). What they want is, first, to survive, and then to make it
to South Korea. However, the passage is perilous, if not almost impossible. China
does not accept refugee status for North Koreans. Any North Korean caught in

174. December 28, 1999, Chosun.com.

175. April 22, 2000, Chosun.com.

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China is handed back over to North Korea. Once they are repatriated, they
invariably face hard labor or prison terms.
The New York Times (June 10, 2002) reported that in 2000 and 2001, China
deported thousands of North Korean escapees to North Korea, and several of
them asserted that for women who are caught pregnant by Chinese men, “forced
abortion and infanticide are the norm in North Korea prisons.” An Associate
Press report (June 30, 2002) provides a story on the plight of a family which
escaped North Korea. Once in China, escaping from it presents another
challenge. Yoo Sang-joon lost his wife and two children from starvation and
disease in China. He said: “I lost both my sons and I alone am alive in this affluent
South Korea. I ask myself, ‘What kind of father are you?’’’ Yoo, 39, says he has
tried to settle into his new home since his arrival in South Korea in December
2000, but his mind keeps returning to the wind-swept plains of Mongolia.
There, under a white wooden cross, lies one of his sons, Chul Min. Yoo says that
he will have no peace until he saves enough money to go back and bring his son’s
remains to rest in South Korea, the place to which his son wanted so much to
come. Such an effort, however, involves more than money because the South
Korean government does not permit such trips for escapees.

In 2002, “crashing” embassies in Beijing in search of asylum became a

favorite method of escaping China. This is happening in spite of the fact that
Chinese soldiers have created “Berlin walls” around diplomatic missions. But it
was getting harder by the summer of 2002. On June 14, 2002, Chinese security
guards even invaded a South Korean consulate office in pursuit of a North
Korean asylum-seeker. In the scuffle, the Chinese injured a South Korean
counselor and several other diplomats who tried to block their illegal entry to
the embassy. South Korea claimed that China had violated the Vienna
Convention, but China disagreed. To the credit of the PRC, however, it has not
continued the practice.
However, after the incident, the Chinese have been cracking down on
missionary groups such as the ones who had arranged for Yoo to escape.
According to Timothy Peters, an American national who has been in China
helping refugees and who testified to the U.S Senate, the Chinese authorities are
offering a large bounty, the equivalent of $700, to encourage its citizens to give
information on foreign or domestic individuals helping North Korean refugees
and for spotting refugees themselves (Reuters, July 12, 2002). North Korean
refugees are now interrogated, and in some cases tortured, in order to find out

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who helped them in China. Some 200 foreign missionaries are said to have been
detained in China, accused of aiding North Korean refugees.
One of those detained and tried is South Korean missionary Chun Ki-won.
Peters, who worked with Chun in China, accuses the Chinese government of
abusing Chun while he was in detention awaiting trial. “He has been given the
equivalent of one piece of coarse wheat bread per day, he’s been deprived of sleep
[and] forced to clean all prison toilets,” Peters said. After paying a fine and
enduring eight months’ detention, Chun was freed in August, 2002, and is
awaiting deportation. According to the Associated Press (August 6, 2002), Chun
helped 170 North Koreans escape to South Korea since 1999, taking them
through the jungles of Southeast Asia and the grasslands of China’s Inner
Mongolia, before Chinese border guards arrested him. The soft-spoken
missionary said that eight months in a grimy Chinese prison has hardly shaken
his faith in his work. He found his mission when he first saw some of the North
Korean women in China forcibly separated from their husbands and children
and sold for money by human traffickers. He insisted that he would continue to
help these people wherever he happens to be.
China has oscillated between trying to do what is humane and what her
treaty obligation with North Korea requires her to do. While this is going on, the
plight of North Korean refugees and missionaries hardly receives mention in
American newspapers and television.
By far the worst story out of North Korea has been its gulags. In 1999, South
Korean source (Yonhap News Agency, April 23, 1999) indicated that there were
about 150,000 to 200,000 political prisoners in North Korea in ten different
camps. According to the report of the U.S. Congress North Korean Advisory
Group (November 1999), some seven million North Koreans (or about one-third
of the population) are considered to be members of a “hostile” class. The
prisoners are denied medical care and regular food rations, and a large
proportion of them die every year. This story has been confirmed by many more
recent stories from North Koreans who escaped to South Korea.
North Korea denies the existence of such camps, but satellites have
captured images of them in remote locations and witness accounts have
corroborated their existence. Kang Chol-hwan, whose experience has been
described earlier, was a former inmate of Political Prison Camp No. 15 at Yuduk.
Kang grew up in the family of a Communist official, but one day his grandfather
fell from grace for reasons which have not been specified. Instead of imprisoning
the grandfather alone, three generations of the family were sent to the gulag.

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Kang was a mere nine years old then, but spent ten years of his childhood in the
camp. The conditions were such that inmates prayed for death. He survived on
corn all that time but occasionally caught frogs, lizards, rats and anything alive
to supplement the diet. Some committed suicide; but those who tried it and
failed paid by being sent to gulags from which nobody returned. He is now an
author and reporter for the South Korean daily newspaper Chosun Ilbo. When he
first arrived in South Korea and told of the inhumane conditions in the camp, not
everyone believed him. He was excited when a clear picture of Camp No. 22 was
released to the public recently, although it was not his camp (Chosun Ilbo,
December 4, 2002) — perhaps people will take him more seriously now. His
camp was by no means the worst. Unlike other gulags, half the inmates served
less than a life term.
Several other harrowing stories have been told by escapees from different
gulags. According to Soon Ok Lee, prisoners were being used for martial arts
practice and for experiments with chemical and biological weapons (The
Guardian, July 19, 2002). Ms. Lee said that she survived detention because she
was an accountant and kept the camp’s records. She was released in an amnesty
in 1992 and escaped to South Korea in 1995. She said that nearly all the 6,000
intimates who were in her camp when she arrived had died by the time she was
released five years later. As they died, each year, a fresh supply of prisoners was
obtained.
Such stories did not seem to inspire the Western press. They were also not
welcome news to the Kim Dae Jung Administration which was trying to find a
diplomatic solution to the North-South confrontation.

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THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

It was in April 1982 when a U.S. spy satellite captured for the first time an
image of what appeared to be a nuclear reactor vessel under construction at a
bend of a river at Yongbyon, North Korea. Yongbyon is about 60 miles north of
Pyongyang. Four years later, in March 1986, the satellite captured images of two
cylindrical craters in sand which appeared to be the result of high-explosive
detonations. More suspicious signs appeared.176
In May 1992, a team of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts
headed by Director General Hans Blix visited North Korea and met with its
leaders. North Korea was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Before their visit, the team was given an intelligence briefing by the CIA and a
virtual-reality tour of Yongbyon using advanced computer modeling based on
aerial photographs. After the preliminary discussion, the delegates were led to
Yongbyon to see the nuclear power plant, built with Russian technical
assistance. There was a sprawling research complex by then. Particularly
interesting to Hans Blix and his team was a reprocessing building: “six-story-
high and two football-fields long.” The building was far more imposing than
what the IAEA delegates were led to expect from the “virtual tour.” But it was
only 80 percent completed; and the equipment inside was primitive and only 40

176. For the beginning of the nuclear crisis, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Basic
Books, 1997), pp. 249–260, Oberdorfer hereafter.

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percent ready for full-scale operation. At least the situation was not as bad as the
CIA had suspected.177
In a follow-up visit, regular inspectors were able to obtain radioactive
waste from a steel tank and a waste storage pipe. The analysis of the waste
material, conducted at the IAEA’s supporting laboratories at the U.S. Air Force
Technology Center in Florida, revealed that plutonium separation took place in
1989, 1990, and 1991 rather than in a single separation conducted in 1990, as
claimed by North Korea. Furthermore, new satellite imagery showed evidence of
new facilities being built, carefully camouflaged by huge mounds of earth and
landscaping. A trench was being dug (and covered up) between the reprocessing
facility and what appeared to be a nuclear waste storage facility.
The IAEA pressed North Korea to accept full-scale inspection, but North
Korea accused the IAEA being an agent of the CIA, and on March 12, 1993, North
Korea announced that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Thus began the first nuclear crisis.
The simmering situation landed on newly-elected President Bill Clinton.
Robert Galucci was handpicked by Clinton to convince North Korea not to
withdraw from the New Non-Proliferation Treaty in return for certain
unpublicized incentives. Galucci demanded that North Korea allow IAEA
inspectors to enter the Yongbyon site to replace films and batteries in
monitoring equipment and make “other nonintrusive tests” to make sure that
nuclear materials were not diverted for the production of bombs. Not much
progress was made. The IAEA threatened to take the matter to the U.N. Security
Council with a demand to impose sanctions against North Korea.
North Korea threatened to consider such a move an act of war. The Clinton
Administration decided to talk. In early October 1993, Representative Gary
Ackerman, the chairman of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the House of
Representatives, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and State Department
desk officer for North Korea C. Kenneth Quinones traveled to Pyongyang to
deliver the Administration’s message in person: the U.S. wanted dialogue and
negotiations. North Korea had a message ready for them, in writing. It would be
willing to remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and accept
IAEA inspectors, provided that (i) the U.S.-ROK Team Spirit exercise, which
had been held on a regular basis for years but was considered a hostile act by

177. ibid, pp. 268–271, Oberdorfer hereafter.

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North Korea, ended; and (ii) the U.S. lifted its economic sanctions and opened a
round of U.S.-North Korea negotiations on broader issues.
Galucci and others tried to work out a detailed accord with the North
Korean Mission to the U.N., but had little success. While this was going on, the
U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution, by a vote of 140-1, urging North
Korea to cooperate with the IAEA. The only dissenting vote was North Korea; its
ally in the U.N., China, abstained. In South Korea, the newly elected Kim Yong
Sam (1993-1998) reacted negatively to the direct contacts between North Korea
and the U.S., on South Korea’s future security — without involving South Korea
itself in the negotiations. A military action to stop the North Korean nuclear
program was one of the options being considered by the U.S., but Kim Yong Sam
said that he never favored “U.S. plans…to attack the North Korean nuclear
facility at Yongbyon” (Reuters, January 17, 2003).
Several influential groups in the U.S. were calling for sanctions rather than
talks. A poll showed that 31 percent of Americans considered North Korea’s
development of nuclear weapons program to be America’s most serious foreign
policy issue.
In the meantime, the IAEA called its inspectors back to Vienna on March
15, 1994, since they were barred from taking measurements at key sites and at the
plutonium reprocessing plant. (A reprocessing plant is a chemical factory for
separating plutonium from spent fuel discharged from a nuclear reactor. It is
during such a process that plutonium could be diverted from accepted uses to
the illicit manufacture of bombs.) The board of the IAEA voted to take the
matter to the U.N. Security Council.
During the escalating crisis, a working-level meeting of North Korea and
South Korea was held at Panmunjom. The delegates from the North and the
South exchanged harsh words. North Korean negotiator Yong Su Park shocked
the South Korean delegate by threatening: “Seoul is not far from here. If a war
breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song [South Korean delegate], it will
probably be difficult for you to survive.” President Kim Yong Sam was not
pleased and summoned an emergency meeting of his cabinet, which approved
deployment of the Patriot missiles.
At this juncture, the CIA estimated that North Korea had separated enough
plutonium to produce one or two 10-kiloton bombs, similar to the one dropped
on Hiroshima in 1945. A bigger issue emerged in 1994: North Korea was
unloading the fuel rods at the 5-megawatt reactor; the rods could be chemically
treated to separate plutonium from other waste materials. The IAEA insisted

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that the unloading must take place under its supervision. It wanted to conduct
tests to ascertain the history of the reactor and estimate the amount of
plutonium that might have been produced previously. North Korea was,
however, not in the least interested in revealing such history.
Robert Gallucci impressed upon his counterpart in North Korea, Kang Sok
Ju, that if the unloading took place without the supervision of the IAEA,
negotiations with the U.S. would terminate. On April 29, North Korea backed
off a bit and invited the IAEA to witness the unloading operations that would
take place in the near future. However, the two parties were unable to agree on
the procedures for inspection and testing the spent rods. The talks broke down
and North Korea went ahead with the defueling on May 8, 1994, without
international observers. North Korea was concurrently constructing a much
larger 50-megawatt reactor and an even large 200-megawatt reactor at
Yongbyon. They had the potential to supply North Korea with a large number of
bombs.
It is still not clear whether North Korea refused oversight to hide the
amount of plutonium it had separated or to keep the West guessing what it
might have. Defueling progressed much faster than the IAEA expected. The
opportunity to learn the history of the reactor was gone. Therefore, now, no one
knows for sure how much plutonium was separated.
The U.N. began to consider international sanctions and Washington began
to prepare military options. The isolated and impoverished North Korean regime
had few trading partners other than Japan and China. Koreans residing in Japan
and sympathetic to the North had been the major source of hard currency for
North Korea for decades. Cutting off this flow would have hurt North Korea, but
Japan was reluctant to cooperate with such sanctions, because Koreans in Japan
might agitate. Japan found a convenient pretext, in her constitution, for not
participating in anything resembling military action — including sanctions.
China, the major source of oil and food for North Korea, was said to have been
privately irritated by North Korean intransigence and was reluctant to support
sanctions. But, who can tell? China might rather have a nuclear North Korea as
neighbor rather than a unified Korea friendly to the U.S. and with U.S. troops on
the peninsula. However, when Clinton offered her “most favored nation” status,
China eventually softened its opposition to the sanctions.
On the military front, one day after the North Korean delegate at
Panmunjom threatened South Korea with the possibility of “a sea of fire,” the
ROK defense minister unveiled the essence of the war plan in testimony to the

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agitated National Assembly. In 1994, North Korea had moved roughly 65 percent
of its forces, 8,400 artillery pieces, and 2,400 multiple rocket launchers to within
six miles of the DMZ, the most heavily armed 150 miles on earth today. The
threat of turning Seoul into an inferno was credible. In Washington, the
Pentagon had completed a war plan with the help of four-star generals called in
from all over the world. The National Security Council and the Pentagon
presented Clinton with a stark calculation that if a war broke out in Korea, the
military casualties could reach 52,000 Americans and 490,000 South Koreans,
not counting innumerable civilians. The price tag for the war was estimated at
$61 billion. Clinton chose a crisis management approach rather than military
confrontation.
In June, the sense of crisis loomed large. By now, polls showed that 46
percent of Americans viewed North Korea the most serious foreign policy issue.
As South Korea moved to a heightened level of national defense, its stock market
plummeted 25 percent in two days and foods were disappearing from the
supermarkets. It was during this time that former president Jimmy Carter
entered the scene. He had already received a few invitations to visit North Korea
from Kim Il Sung, but each time the State Department had discouraged him from
going. This time, the State Department agreed to Carter’s visit to North Korea —
but as a private citizen. The ROK did not look favorably on Carter’s visit because
as President he had almost succeeded in pulling the U.S. troops out of South
Korea. Carter’s reception in South Korea was cool. Kim Yong Sam called the visit
“ill timed.” However, his reception at Pyongyang was warm.
In a face-to-face meeting, Kim Il Sung said that if the U.S. supplied light
water reactors, North Korea would dismantle its gas-graphite reactors (which
can more readily lend to the production of bombs). This idea had been floating
around for months, but it was the first time that Kim Il Sung personally
proposed it. Carter’s mission as a private citizen now acquired an official stature,
with communication lines humming between the State Department and Carter.
A package deal that was finally struck on October 21, 1994 at Geneva is
known as the Agreed Framework (AF). The centerpiece of this agreement is the
provision of two light water reactors of 1,000 megawatts each, which the
international consortium would endeavor to construct by 2003. The combined
capacity of 2,000 megawatts was several times larger than what North Korea
had planned at Yongbyon and was far beyond the electricity demand in the
foreseeable future; but that was the deal. The agreement stipulates that the U.S.
“will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and

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supply” the light water reactors. Until the first reactor has been completed,
500,000 tons of heavy oil is to be supplied to North Korea annually for heating
and electricity production. In return, North Korea will “freeze its graphite-
moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle” them.
The IAEA “will be allowed to monitor the freeze” at the Yongbyon and Taechon
facilities. But the actual dismantling “will take place when the LWR [light water
reactor] project is completed.” The AF stipulates, “The two sides will move
toward normalization of political and economic relations.” Such steps include
reducing “barriers to trade and investment” and opening diplomatic liaison
offices in each other’s capitals. The U.S. agreed to provide “formal assurances” to
North Korea, “against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.” North
Korea agreed to “take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on
the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The last, but far from the least,
provision was that North Korea would remain in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. The IAEA would make “ad hoc and routine” inspections of the facilities.
North Korea hailed the AF as a diplomatic victory. Why not? It would get
the two state-of-the-art 1,000-megawatt reactors to replace the 5-megawatt
reactor in operation and 300 megawatts under construction. The mood in South
Korea, on the other hand, was not so jubilant. The U.S.-led deal was seen to be
too loose. There was no specific inspection regime in the AF outside of
Yongbyon and Taechon. As usual, the small country of North Korea negotiated
from the position of power — habits learned from the time of the armistice
negotiations at Panmunjom. In the U.S., the media praised the Clinton
Administration for its “brilliant” move, which it claimed would stop the
proliferation of nuclear arms. Clinton managed to push off the immediate crisis
and come out of the negotiations smelling sweet. However, the celebration was
premature.
The AF ran into trouble as soon as it was signed. The cost of constructing
the reactors was estimated at $4-$5 billion. South Korea committed to pay 70
percent and Japan agreed to cover much of the remainder. The reactors would be
manufactured in South Korea. The proposed contract specified the reactors
would be the “South Korean type.” Seoul wanted to have its central role in
providing the reactors, especially in financial terms, acknowledged. No doubt,
there might have been a propaganda motive as well. But North Korea was
unwilling to accept such labels on the reactors. North Koreans were, and still
are, largely insulated from the news that South Korea is well ahead of North
Korea.

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A face-saving device created to resolve this standoff was the creation of

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), with an
American executive director. Its members, in March 1995, were the U.S., South
Korea, and Japan. Since then, its membership has expanded to include the E.U.
and some Asian countries. Negotiations were concluded on June 12 at Kuala
Lumpur. The words “South Korean type” were deleted and technical
specifications describing the reactors were used instead. But as soon as the
negotiations were concluded, the Korea Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO), with the understanding of North Korea, announced that
“Korean standard model reactors” would be provided and the primary contractor
would be Korean Electric Power Corporation of South Korea. Both sides saved
face.
In March 1995, KEDO started operations with funds provided by the U.S.,
South Korea, and others (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia). The
supply of heavy fuel oil, funded mostly by the U.S., started immediately but there
was little progress on the construction of the reactors until August 2001, when
excavation started. North Korea complained bitterly about the delay and
threatened to pull out of the AF and demanded financial compensation for the
economic losses it suffered as a result of the delay.
The reasons for the delay since 1995 have been many and each side can
point a finger at the other. There were difficulties in getting North Korean work
permits and resolving contract-related issues such as hiring of local personnel,
and transportation of workers and technicians from South Korea. From the
point of North Korea, the U.S. side did not follow through on the normalization
of political and economic relations. In Congress, the Clinton Administration
faced criticism over North Korea’s unwillingness to allow broader inspections
and possibly not complying with the intent of denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula. IAEA monitoring was confined to the Yongbyon area. From the point
of view of North Korea, it had not specifically committed to broad inspections.
In 1998, Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastings asked the North Korean
Advisory Group to investigate the question: “Does North Korea pose a greater
threat to U.S. national security than it did five years ago?” This question was
prompted when North Korea surprised the whole world by successfully
launching a multi-stage missile (Taepo Dong 1) over Japan into the Pacific
Ocean. North Korea then threatened to test the three-stage Taepo Dong 2
missile, with a range of 10,000 miles: it could reach the west coast of the U.S.

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A report of the Advisory Group completed in November 1999 concluded

that it was. It said, “While North Korea’s nuclear program at its Yongbyon and
Taechon facilities appears to be frozen[,] there is significant evidence that other
nuclear weapons development activity is continuing.” The report suggests that
North Korea sought to obtain external assistance for its nuclear program even
before the ink dried on the AF. Specific mention is made that North Korea “sold
missiles and missile production equipment to Pakistan,” among other countries.
On November 24, 2002, The New York Times confirmed this finding by
providing some intriguing details on North Korea-Pakistan contacts. The first
inklings of a nuclear deal between the two countries came in 1993 when Benazir
Bhutto was the prime minister of Pakistan. North Korea had more sophisticated
missile technology than Pakistan, and Pakistan needed it to target all parts of
India. Pakistan had advanced technology for producing bombs from enriched
uranium. North Korea had an abundant supply of good grade uranium ore.
Nuclear weapons from highly enriched uranium 235, the type that was
detonated over Hiroshima in 1945, could be built outside the Yongbyon area
where IAEA inspectors were not allowed to wander about; and such bombs did
not require test firing because the trigger mechanism was simple.
The Congressional report also found that U.S. policy had not addressed the
threat posed by North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
international terrorism, while U.S. assistance had sustained a repressive and
authoritarian regime. It was also suspected that North Korea might be financing
its weapons development program through drug trafficking (the report cited 34
documented incidents). Counterfeiting was another state-sponsored activity.
Even more alarming to the Advisory Group was the intelligence that North
Korea was selling missile systems, components, and technology to Iran, Syria
and Egypt as well as Pakistan. If the Taepo Dong 2 were installed in the Middle
East, all of Europe would fall within its range.
While all these were going on under the AF, the U.S.-led coalition became
the biggest supplier of food and heavy fuel oil, freeing the resources of North
Korea to be used for other purposes including the build up of its military and its
weaponry. One U.S. aid worker in North Korea recently called the monitoring
system a “scam.” Food aid monitors have only been able to visit some 10 percent
of food aid distribution sites in North Korea. The North Koreans have never
divulged a complete list of where aid is distributed.

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In Tokyo, at an international conference on human rights conditions in

North Korea, three North Korean defectors testified that international food aid
was not reaching the starving people and that the government was resorting to
elaborate schemes to deceive U.N. monitors (Associated Press, February 8, 2002).
The defectors said that millions of dollars worth of food aid was being stockpiled
in military complexes in the mountains and was being used to feed soldiers and
the ruling elite. A defector who had been a bodyguard of Kim Jong Il added, “I
know about this because I worked in the security network….It’s all a farce.”
Another defector revealed other incidents of carefully staged deception.
The Advisory Group made some observations on North Korea’s extensive
chemical and biological weapons, including the capability to deploy a full range
of chemical or biological weapons (such as plague, typhoid, cholera, anthrax,
smallpox, yellow fever, botulism toxin, and hemorrhagic fevers) on missiles.
All along, North Korea has refused to admit that it was developing nuclear
weapons. However, on October 17, 2002, the White House released the news
that North Korea had admitted to having a secret nuclear weapons program. The
North announced this to U.S. special envoy James Kelly during his visit to
Pyongyang on October 3-5, 2002. The U.S. and South Korea had suspected all
along that North Korea was developing nuclear bombs and might even have
several bombs already, but North Korea’s admission has placed the U.S. and
South Korea in a difficult position.
The Bush Administration downplayed the predicament, since it was
preoccupied with Iraq. There were and continue to be other problems. America’s
staunchest ally, South Korea, has been unwilling to adhere to what it considered
was a “hard line” policy of America. Newly elected president Roh indicated that
he would continue with the policy of the previous administration, including
economic assistance (such as the development of the Kaesong industrial estate
in North Korea). For the moment, economic sanctions against North Korea as a
method of containing North Korea appears to be a non-starter. Neither China
nor South Korea seems to support such a move. This time, Japan seems to align
more closely with the U.S., although it is not certain that she would participate
in sanctions. China and Russia have been pressuring the U.S. to engage in direct
negotiations with North Korea while the U.S. wants a multilateral approach.
These two Korean War allies of North Korea apparently do not wish to face the
issue of sanctions against North Korea in the U.N. Security Council.
In the meantime, North Korea has been ratcheting up the crisis by
restarting the 5-megawatt reactor, firing a cruise missile in the sea between

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Korea and Japan (perhaps to warn against any naval operations including a
blockade of its coast), sending a fighter plane into the South Korean air space
(perhaps to test the UNC response), and issuing a warning that nuclear war
could break out on the Korean Peninsula at “any moment'' in an escalation of
hostile rhetoric. Even without such escalation, by their mere presence the long-
range missiles coupled with nuclear weapons represent a grave threat to South
Korea and Japan if not also to the U.S. Sales of such advanced weapons to
sensitive regions of the world present yet another serious danger to the U.S. and
her allies.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY

Returning to the 1990s, the Kim Dae Jung Administration, with the full
blessing of the Clinton Administration, extended its gesture of friendship and
reconciliation, called the “sunshine policy”. Under the policy, the government
has been sending a generous amount of rice, fertilizer, and economic assistance
including money to North Korea. It has been renamed Peace and Prosperity
Policy by newly elected South Korean president Roh Moo Hyon. The South
Korean government has also encouraged the private sector to follow the suit.
The initial intention was to open dialogue with the isolated North Korean
regime and relax the tension between the two Koreas. Private individuals and
businessmen responded to the call to support the government policy and to help
improve the living conditions of their countrymen in the north. The first
celebrated case of private sector participation involved Chairman Chung of the
Hyundai Group, who drove a herd of cattle across the 38th parallel in a symbolic
gesture for peace.
An opposition assemblyman insists that some $300 million in cash were
delivered to North Korea during the two cattle runs which took place in 1998.
This was reportedly tied to obtaining the exclusive right for the Diamond
Mountain tourism project. This project has managed to send more than 300,000
South Koreans on tours of Diamond Mountain in North Korea. It is a mountain
that most Koreans wish to see before they pass away, but this project has
resulted in huge financial losses to the Hyundai Asan Group while North Korea
has earned valuable hard currency. Was this a pure commercial deal or was it
urged by the government with assurance of counter payment? There is no
definitive answer yet; but the government has subsidized the company to the

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tune of $400 million. Even smaller businessmen such as the Ahn brothers
(discussed previously in the book) made multi-million dollar donations to North
Korea.
Supporters of the sunshine policy claim that it has contributed to the
lessening of tensions between the North and the South. Its critics, including
Hwang Jang-yop, believe that the policy has only managed to resuscitate the
failing North Korean regime. Certainly, it can be argued that cash assistance to
North Korea has strengthened the military build up and the weapons
development program rather than improving the living conditions of the average
North Korean. Money is fungible. Prima facie, the policy has not materially
lowered the danger of military conflict on the peninsula. On June 29, 2002, two
North Korean Navy patrol boats crossed the Northern Limit Line established by
the UNC in 1953 and opened fire on South Korean patrol boats. Four South
Korean sailors died, 19 of the 27-member crew were injured, and one sailor was
missing after the patrol boat sank. The North Korean boats also sustained
damage but North Korea did not release any information on its casualties. A
similar incident took place in 1999.
Seoul and Washington charged that the North violated the armistice
agreement. North Korean’s official news agency, Korean Central News Agency
(KCNA), however, said that the Northern Limit Line was illegal. It became clear
later that the North wanted to redefine the 50-year old sea border. The only
mystery was why it was doing so at this time, when South Korea was pursuing a
conciliatory policy? Was North Korea testing the resolve of South Korea and the
UNC?
During the naval battle, the North Korea coastal defense force activated the
radar system of its Soviet-made STYX and Silkworm guided missiles. The
incident had a definite potential to escalate. After the battle, South Korea’s rules
of engagement prohibiting its navy from shooting first were revised, and there
was a major cabinet reshuffle, including the dismissal of the defense minister. At
least, South Korean has shown its resolve to defend the borders.
Then came the North Korean admission that it had a nuclear weapons
development program. The South Korean government has all along been playing
down information on the suspected developments. On October 21, 2002, the
South Korean Defense Ministry admitted that it had learned of North Korea’s
attempt to import uranium-enriching equipment from abroad in 1999, and
insisted that it passed on the information to the U.S. government (The Korean
Herald). In April, 1999, Hwang Jang-yop told a Japanese weekly magazine that

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Pyongyang had already developed nuclear weapons using uranium rather than
plutonium. Hwang was not permitted to leave South Korea to testify to the U.S.
Congress. The South Korean media had been reporting on the improving
relationship between the two Koreas under the sunshine policy, including
market-opening measures and a rail connection between the two Koreas, rather
than the increasing threats from the North.
In the aftermath of the North’s admission, the South Korean Opposition
asked the government to hold back on “inter-Korean exchange projects” such as
the rail connection to Sinuiju and the Diamond Mountain tourism until North
Korea allowed IAEA inspections. However, the Kim and Roh Administrations
have continued with such projects. They have, however, supported KEDO’s
decision to discontinue the shipment of heavy oil and other assistance tied to the
AF, such as the provision of reactors.

During the close South Korean presidential election in 2002, the opposition
Grand National Party (GNP), which has the majority in the National Assembly,
accused the government of secretly sending the North a bundle of money, about
$400 million. People suspected that this might be just a smear campaign. But
after the election, it came to light that such an amount was indeed covertly sent
to North Korea through various companies of the Hyundai Asan Group.
According to the opposition, the total amount sent to North Korea between 1998
and 2000, both openly in business transactions and secretly, was as high as $2
billion. Almost all of this involved Hyundai companies (The Korea Times, February
8 and 12, 2002). It was alleged that some of the money was intended to entice
Kim Jong Il to come to a summit meeting. Whether it is $200 million or $2
billion, it is an enormous sum for North Korea, which has hardly any way to earn
hard currency, and is certainly enough to allow her to import equipment and
material for a nuclear weapons’ program.

MILITARY PROVOCATIONS

Since the cease-fire, South Korea has been in a tenuous peace with North
Korea, punctuated by periodic crises. In January 1968, the USS Pueblo, a U.S. Navy
vessel sent on an intelligence mission in international waters off the coast of
North Korea, was attacked by North Korean naval vessels and MiG jets. One

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man was killed and several were wounded. The 82 surviving members of the
crew were captured and put through an ordeal for eleven months.
In 1974, a North Korean agent tried to assassinate President Park. Although
the attempt failed, he succeeded in killing the first lady. One of the more bizarre
and barbaric acts took place on August 18, 1976, when Inmin-gun guards
attacked a team of U.S. and ROK soldiers who entered the U.N. side of
Panmunjom in the DMZ to trim an old tree that obstructed the view from a U.N.
checkpoint. Inmin-gun soldiers axed two American officers and wounded
several ROK and U.S. soldiers. The incident brought the UNC and North Korea
to the brink of war until Kim Il-sung expressed “regrets,” the first event of its
kind, by Kim. In 1983, North Korean commandos attacked South Korea’s high
level delegation visiting Rangoon, Burma (now Myanmar), killing eighteen
officials, including four cabinet ministers. In 1987, North Korean agents
exploded a bomb in a Korean Airlines jet killing all 115 aboard.
In 1994, the first nuclear crisis erupted. Even after the AF was signed and
while the assistance under the sunshine policy was being delivered, hostility
never ceased. In 1996, a North Korean submarine ran aground on the east coast of
South Korea with 26 commandos and crew members on board. Bloody naval
clashes flared up on the Yellow Sea in 1999, and then in 2002.
The latest is the second nuclear crisis, which started in 2002 when North
Korea admitted having a nuclear weapons development program. What perhaps
concerns the U.S. most today is not only North Korea’s development but also
sales of “weapons of mass destruction” to the Middle East and other sensitive
regions of the world. On August 29, 2002, the United States’ top arms
negotiator, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, said that North Korea was
the world’s foremost peddler of ballistic missile technology and related
equipment, components, and materials. Bolton was quoted by the Associated Press
as saying that North Korea has “one of the most robust offensive bioweapons
programs on earth.” He went on to say that President Bush’s use of the term “axis
of evil” to describe Iran, Iraq, and North Korea was more than a rhetorical
flourish — it was factually correct; and “There is a hard connection between
these regimes — an axis along which flow dangerous weapons and dangerous
technology.”
News events since then have supported the suspicion that North Korea has
been selling missiles to countries willing to pay for them. On November 24,
2002, David E. Sanger (The New York Times) said that in July 2002, “American
intelligence agencies tracked a Pakistani cargo aircraft as it landed at a North

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Korean airfield and took on a secret payload: ballistic missile parts … in full view
of American spy satellite.” In an apparent admission of the fact, the article said
that Secretary Colin Powell was assured that “such trade will not occur in the
future.”
On December 10, news broke that a ship carrying 15 SCUD missiles of
unknown types, rocket fuel, and chemicals which originated in Nampo, North
Korea was intercepted on the Arabian Sea. Apparently, a spy satellite had been
tracking the ship for a few weeks before two Spanish navy frigates participating
in Operation Enduring Freedom intercepted it. This is the first time that a North
Korean ship was stopped on international water with missiles on it.
The high-tech spy work and the capture of a North Korean ship on the high
seas had an un-dramatic ending. The ship and its cargo were apparently on their
way to Yemen, an ally in the War Against Terror. The drama ended in a rather
embarrassing manner from the viewpoint of the U.S. and her allies when the
Spanish and American navies had to release the ship and cargo one day later,
when the Yemeni government protested. There was no law prohibiting the sale
of missiles to Yemen.
This incident took place eight days before the South Korean presidential
election. Two major candidates (conservative Lee Hoi-chang, a former supreme
court judge, and liberal former human rights lawyer Roh Moo Hyon) both
condemned North Korea. Lee said, “Even in the vortex of a nuclear crisis, North
Korea does not cease its rash provocations, exporting missiles.” The unexpected
release of the ship and the cargo the next day pulled the rug out from under such
statements.
North Korean rhetoric has become more outrageous, threatening to make
an all out attack against South Korea and American troops there if the U.S.
increased her military strength in South Korea. If the U.S. and South Korea
decide to take on North Korea militarily, the final outcome is not in doubt —
although defeating North Korea would be much more difficult than defeating
Saddam Hussein. It boasts over a million well trained soldiers equipped with
aging but sophisticated weapons, even if one is to discount biochemical and
possibly nuclear weapons. Yet, to South Koreans, a victory after destroying
much of their country and perhaps suffering hundreds of thousand if not
millions of casualties would be hollow. South Koreans are understandably
nervous today.
When Bush first spoke of the “axis if evil,” he received a standing ovation in
the joint session of Congress; but the majority of South Koreans were concerned

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that the name-calling might doom the weakened sunshine policy — regardless of
whether or not the statement was true. As many South Koreans suspected,
North Korea reacted angrily (although it routinely calls the U.S. by all kinds of
names), instead of being intimidated. It was a matter of saving face. North Korea
has all along been telling the world and its people that American imperialism
was evil, not its own regime. The U.S. did not anticipate a belligerent Kim Jong Il
hurling insults, and had no immediate answer. In hindsight, perhaps Bush
should have “walked softly and carried a big stick.”
If the problem lay between the U.S. and North Korea alone, the U.S. could
demolish the North Korean nuclear facilities; but the reprisals would be taken
against the U.S. troops in South Korea and South Korea itself. The small and
bankrupt North Korea is practically the only country in the world today that
tries to bully America.
Kim Jong Il has been variously described a paranoid, sociopath, or a
madman. Under his father, Kim Jong Il used to produce propaganda movies. In a
way, he lives the life of the character that he helped create. In official
propaganda, his family lineage is traced to the legendary founding king of Korea,
Tangun, some four thousand years ago, and the fearless Korean kingdom of
Koguryo which occupied parts of what is now North Korea and much of
Manchuria. Its kings did not bow to anyone, including Chinese emperors. To
give more credence to his family lineage, his birth place was changed from a
border town in Siberia to a slope on Mt. Paikdu, the spiritual center of the
ancient Korean kingdom, now between North Korea and Manchuria. He acts
like one of the ancient kings of the Koguryo kingdom. Kim Jong Il has also
convinced North Koreans that North Korea won the Korean War and that
America is afraid of North Korea.
Whether or not he believes in these myths is not certain, but it is certain
that he props up his regime by threatening to use his considerable military
might. In exchange for his not unleashing terror, he wants the U.S. and South
Korea to guarantee the security of his regime and provide food, energy and
money to maintain that regime. South Koreans today are sharply divided on how
to deal with him.
The opposition party with a majority in the National Assembly has accused
the ruling party of appeasement. Many South Koreans agree that the sunshine
policy or any other form of conciliation is unlikely to solve the problem, but they
elected a president who seems to believe in it — although he denies that he is
engaged in appeasement.

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The West avoided one opportunity to start a Third World War by

threatening to annihilate the USSR if attacked. But the South Korean ruling
party is unsure that such a strategy would work, and prefers to believe that
friendly gestures and economic aid to North Korea can relax the tension. In any
event, the Cold War model of nuclear brinkmanship cannot work when one
party does not have nuclear weapons and the other party can hit its capital in a
matter of minutes, not hours. Imagine America in the 1960s, if the USSR had
succeeded in putting nuclear-tipped missiles not only on Cuba but also on Long
Island and in the Chesapeake Bay. That is South Korea today. The barrels of
10,000 artillery pieces are trained on the Inchon-Seoul region of 20 million
people; they are under the control of a seemingly unpredictable leader. The
threat is credible.

WHAT NEXT

What should the U.S. and South Korea do about North Korea and its
nuclear weapons program? Clearly, broad economic sanctions, even if the U.S.
chose that option, would not go down easily. China and South Korea would not
go along, for the reasons discussed above. As reported by The New York Times (Feb.
23, 2003), “Mr. Roh has given strong indications that he intends to accelerate
South Korea's embrace of North Korea, even as the United States looks for ways
to ratchet up pressure on North Korea.” Roh spoke “in recent weeks of
establishing an economic community with North Korea, stepping up trade, aid
and investment there, ruling out economic sanctions and military strikes against
the country and even of personally ‘guaranteeing’ North Korea's security.” Such
talk has distressed many South Koreans as well as Americans.
Initial diplomatic efforts by the U.S. to convince China and Russia to put
pressure on North Korea have not produced anything concrete. High-level South
Korean delegates went to Pyongyang, but that too did not produce any
appreciable result. Both China and Russia suggested that the U.S. hold direct
talks with North Korea — precisely what the U.S. said that she did not want to
do. The Bush Administration insists that such talks should be held within a
multilateral framework.
North Korea’s immediate demands were a non-aggression treaty with the
U.S., respect for North Korea’s sovereignty, and its right to economic
development in exchange for dismantling its nuclear weapons development

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program. Prima facie, these conditions are benign and reasonable. However, it is
clear that what the North wants from Seoul and Washington is major economic
concessions even as North Korea is breaking off from the AF. The U.S. has not
rushed to talk with North Korea, let alone to offer a deal. The post-September 11
America, especially on the heels of the failed AF, is less tolerant.
Yet, the Bush Administration is likely to explore the possibility of a deal,
hopefully with the participation of North Korea’s neighbors (South Korea,
China and Japan), if not the U.N., because the alternatives are even less
attractive. There is little doubt as to what Kim Jong Il wants; and South Korea
and other KEDO allies have it: food, money, economic infrastructure, know-how,
and the market. They are particularly important, because North Korea has been
flirting with coming out of isolation and following the PRC model of economic
development. The success of its market opening plan depends on the
inducement of foreign capital and technology and its products’ access to foreign
markets.
Theoretically, the consortium may be able to buy off North Korea’s entire
nuclear and other WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs at the right
price. Kim Jong Il sees nuclear weapons as a means of obtaining security and
prosperity. A good argument can be made that it would be far cheaper to pay him
off and try to turn North Korea into a mini-China rather than confront him at
this time. An unintended but beneficial impact of such a strategy, from the U.S.-
South Korean perspective, could be either a transformation of Kim Jong Il into
someone like Deng Xiaoping — or the collapse of North Korea (especially if such
a reform goes hand in hand with opening the country to the world).
A big question is whether the U.S. or a consortium can trust Kim Jong Il
enough to make any deal with him at all. He has not lived up to the terms of the
AF and the sunshine policy has not transformed him. Would he allow inspectors
to verify any future agreement, such as the dismantling of the nuclear weapons
program? Considering Kim Jong Il’s past behavior, it would require an intrusive
type of inspection to verify compliance. It is worth a try, although it is doubtful
how far Kim Jong Il would go to open up the country.
If an acceptable deal cannot be struck, America could still try to impose
more limited sanctions against North Korea’s weapons trade. Then, China and
Japan as well as South Korea would collaborate. From the U.S. point of view, the
objective is primarily to blockade the shipment of missiles and WMD to
terrorists or hostile nations in volatile regions, rather than starve North Korean

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 23. Old War, New Crisis

military or civilians. In fact, food aid is continuing even as North Korea is

threatening to start a total war.
The actual events that might unfold in the near future are impossible to
predict. North Korea has as much say on the future course of the peninsula as the
U.S. or South Korea. It is possible that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from
South Korea if the views of the U.S. and South Korea diverge further and anti-
American sentiments intensify. Without large numbers of troops on the ground
in South Korea, in a sense the U.S. would be in a better position to take military
action against North Korea, as it would not be a sitting duck for the
counterattack. Then again, that might leave South Korea alone to face the threat
of a North Korea invasion, in spite of the mutual defense pact. It would also not
be a happy occasion for the U.S., because it would signal failed diplomacy and
withdrawal in the face of gathering danger.
America has been growing stronger militarily, but not necessarily in her
ability to convince allies around the world to share her strategy and values. It is
not a question of lack of tact in one U.S. president or another. In the final
analysis, all American presidents engage in diplomacy and foreign conflicts to
promote the strategic interests of the U.S.
That is how it has been for any country throughout human history.
However, what is good for the U.S. is not necessarily good for other countries.
The history of American engagement in Korea has shown, as discussed at length
in this book, the national interest of the U.S. has not always served the national
interest of Korea — starting with the series of actions leading to the division of
Korea and to the start of the war, in the first place. Even in their common fight
against the Communists and the defense of Korea, the U.S. and South Korea did
not always share the same strategy.
A new and more pressing issue today is how to deal with the nuclear
North. A preemptive strike against a North Korean nuclear facility may make
sense from the standpoint of the strategic interest of the U.S., but not from South
Korea’s. Retaliation most likely would be against South Korea, not the U.S., even
if the U.S. troops had already withdrawn from South Korea. North Korea is
desperately poor. One cannot discount the possibility of its invading South
Korea just to grab food, fuel, and other necessaries. Kim Jong Il might have to
take such a desperate gamble for his regime to survive, as many South Koreans
privately believe.
The real challenge for the U.S. and South Korea is how to contain, if not
defeat, the Kim Jong Il regime without starting a full-scale war. In Afghanistan

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and Iraq, the U.S. has tested a new, technology-savvy and intelligent military
that aims to work with local groups and accommodate complex realities. Unlike
the days of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the U.S. troops seek to avoid and are
more able to avoid collateral damage. In Korea, the U.S. will need all of that and
more. A new level of psychological warfare will be called for to frustrate the
North Korean regime and formulate a common front that serves the interests of
both South Korea and the U.S.
The option of doing nothing, or at least nothing drastic, should be also
considered seriously. One must assume that North Korea already has several
bombs; and at this stage, a few more would not make a huge difference. Time is
not necessarily in Kim Jong Il’s favor. The regime could crumble from within —
note the increasing number of defectors. Kim Jong Il should be made aware, if he
is not already, that a naked invasion or the use of nuclear weapons would bring a
swift and massive retaliation.

276
 INDEX

38th parallel, 4, 24, 25, 28, 36, 43, 46, 49,
55, 61-67, 73-75, 78, 81-86, 89, 125, 129,
139-141, 144, 161, 168, 175, 176, 183, 186,
189, 191, 200-203, 207, 225, 267
Acheson Pacific Defense Line, 80, 231
Acheson, Dean, 63-65, 68, 71, 78-81, 133,
140, 156, 167, 185, 200, 231
Agreed Framework (AF), 261-264, 269,
270, 274
British role, 5, 6, 31, 71, 110, 112, 134, 135,
137, 144, 161, 167, 169, 170, 188, 225,
227, 228, 229, 253
British 27th Brigade (Commonwealth),
161
Busan, 88, 93, 102, 103, 106, 110, 111, 113, 114,
118, 124, 127, 131, 135, 136, 138, 154, 165,
166, 173, 178, 180, 185, 187, 193, 198,
199, 207, 208, 211, 212, 222

Al Jubayl Deep-Sea Port, 236 Busan Perimeter, 111, 113, 114, 118, 124, 127,
131, 135, 136, 138, 154, 207
Almond, Edward M., 87, 113, 137, 154, 162,
165, 185, 187 Bush, George W., 241, 242, 265, 271, 273,
274
Attlee, Clement, 167
Byon, Yong Tae, 207, 220
Beijing, 7, 61, 117, 123, 125, 126, 130, 166, 199,
201, 251, 252, 254 Byrne, Patrick, 97, 149

Biological weapons (BW), 270 Cairo Conference, 31

Blix, Hans, 257 Canada, 82, 144, 183

Blue House, 76, 211 Carlson, Lewis H., 228, 229

Boatner, Haydon L., 210 Carter, Jimmy, 242, 261

Bolt, Charles, 49 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 36, 50,

51, 61, 64, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 97, 136,
Bolton, John, 270 143, 145, 154, 168, 188, 218, 234, 237,
Bonesteel, Charles, 25 257, 258, 259
Bradley, Omar, 49, 79, 80, 81, 109, 132, 168, Chae Byung Duk, 56
170 Chang (John) Myon, 211
Briggs, Ellis, 218, 220, 221 Chang Taek-sang, 33, 34
Changjin Reservoir, 162, 163, 164, 187, 224,
253

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 The Unfinished War
Cheju-do, 73, 179, 180
Chiang Kai-shek, 26, 31, 200, 201
China, People's Republic of (PRC), 5, 123,
126, 206, 228, 232, 250, 251, 254, 274
Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), 124
Nationalist, 78, 79, 169
Nationalist Army, 55, 74, 89, 143, 169,
170
Northeast Defense Army (NDA), 124,
125, 128, 129
People's Volunteers (CPV), 129, 143,
201
Red Army
38th Field Army, 128, 143, 151
118th Division, 150, 151
Spring Offensive, 190, 224
120th Division, 150
Spring Offensive, 190, 224
Chongchon River, 129, 146, 152, 167
Chosun Kingdom or Dynasty, 6, 7
Chunchon, 85
Churchill, Winston, 31
Clark, Eugene F., 137, 143
Clark, Mark W., 143, 210, 212, 216, 218-
224, 227, 230, 243
Clinton, William, 183, 240, 242, 258, 260-
263, 267
Cohen, William S., 182
Cold War, 2, 62, 66, 69, 125, 273
Collins, J. Lawton, 88, 109, 132, 134, 135
Colson, Charles F., 210
Commander Low, 6
Communist Party, 30, 33, 34, 40-43, 52,
54, 56, 64, 147, 247
Confucian, 6, 17, 18, 99, 182
278
Coury, Robert, 229
Craig, Lawrence, 200
Cumings, Bruce, 5, 9, 54, 243
Dabudong battle, 115, 118
Daedong River, 146
Daegu, 19, 55, 78, 96, 98, 99, 106, 111, 113,
115, 118, 120, 178, 180, 196, 211
Daejon, 91, 102, 103, 106, 107, 110, 148
Daejon Agreement, 91
Daejon Penitentiary, 148
Daewoo Group, 238
Dean, William F., 94, 101, 103, 105, 110, 148,
231
Declaration of Independence, 12
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 188, 225, 227,
261, 270
Deng Hua, 130
Diamond (Kumgang) Mountain, 267, 269
Dodd, Francis T., 8, 210
Dongduchon, 197
Donovan, Robert, 77
Doyle, James H., 132, 172
Dulles, Allen, 137
Dulles, John Foster, 81, 217, 223, 227
Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), (see
also U.S. Military) 93, 101, 111, 113-119,
135, 136, 138, 143, 146, 153, 155, 160-
165, 176, 181, 186, 190, 200, 210, 222,
224
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 92, 210, 216-223
European Union, 238
Flying Fish Channel, 132, 137
Forbidden City, 123, 126, 128, 146
Freeman, Paul, 117, 186, 230
Gay, Hobart R., 94
General Sherman, The, 6
 Index

Grand National Party, 242, 269
Gregg, Donald, 234
Hamhung, 3, 4, 43-46, 94, 96, 120, 121, 129,
139, 147, 148, 161, 162, 166, 167, 171-175,
193, 252
Han River, 76, 77, 82-89, 104, 107, 115, 120,
240
Hangul, 21
Harriman, W. Averell, 111, 134, 136
Hastings, Max, 182, 230, 263
Khrushchev, Nikita, 65, 66, 217
Kim, Dae Jung, 95, 198, 242, 256, 267
Kim, Du-bong, 42
Kim, Hong Il, 89
Kim, Il Sung, 8, 14, 15, 27, 28, 36, 37, 40, 42,
44, 49-66, 79, 88, 94-99, 116, 120, 124-
126, 130, 138, 146, 213, 229, 243, 247,
248, 261
Kim, Jong Il, 15, 244, 247-251, 265, 269,
272-276

Hermit Kingdom, 5 Kim, Ku, 8-14, 30-38, 241

Hillenkoetter, Roscoe, 71 Kim, Suk-won, 4, 107

Hingkew Park, 13 Kimpo, 76, 82, 89

Hiroshima, 259, 264 King Kojong, 7, 12

Hodge, John R., 29, 30-37, 58, 67 Kinney, Oliver G., 202

Hong Xuezhi, 130, 146, 162, 224 Koguryo, 128, 129, 272

Hopkins, Harry, 25, 31 Koizumi, Junichiro, 58

Hsieh Fang, 201 Koje-do, 174, 175, 204, 207-210

Hungnam, 43, 121, 164-166, 171-176 Korea

Hyundai, 236, 267, 269 Christianity in, 6, 8

IAEA, 257-264, 269 Division of, 25, 36, 175, 199, 215, 231,
233, 241, 275
Inchon Landing, 7, 10, 11, 29, 89, 131-140,
144, 148, 161, 165, 167, 197, 208, 273 Korean

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Central News Agency (KCNA), 268
257 Declaration of Independence, 12
Iron Triangle, 190, 203, 223 Democratic Party, 32, 40, 46, 55
Ito Hirobumi, 7 Labor Organization (KLO), 69, 70
Japanese Language Society, 21
Annexation, 8 Liberation Army, 13
Military Academy, 53, 54, 55, 56 Provisional Government (KPG), 10,
Occupation, 17 12, 13, 30-33

Johnson, Louis, 71, 136 Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Organization (KEDO), 263, 274
Joy, C. Turner, 200
Kosong, 114
Juche, 248
Kremlin, 36, 64
Kean, William B., 111, 113, 181
Kum River, 103, 104, 106, 110
Kennedy, John F., 59, 79, 235

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Kunsan, 132-137, 178, 179, 180 Masan, 114, 118, 183, 222
Landenberg, Hoyt, 156 Massacre Valley, 187
LaPorte, Leon J., 242 McCarthy, Joseph, 230
Lee, Byong Nam, 41, 42 McCloy, John J., 25
Lee, Hoi-chang, 271 McClure, Robert B., 185
Lee, Simon, 2, 4, 19, 20, 42, 45, 49, 87, 94- McLean, Robert A., 228, 229
96, 139, 147, 173, 193, 194, 207 Meiji Restoration, 235
Lee, Soon Ok, 256 Methodist Mission Board, 10
Lee, Soon-ku, 54, 73, 97-99 Miari Hill, 83
Lee, Sung Gae, 119 Michaelis, John H., 117
Lee, Uk, 207, 209, 210, 223 Milburn, Frank, 152
Lend Lease Act, 23 Millennium Democratic Party, 243
Leninism, 43, 248 Mongolia, 254, 255
Levie, Howard, 182 Montclair, Ralph, 186
Lim, Kun Shick, 72 Muccio, John J., 64, 66-71, 76, 77, 80, 86,
Loveless, Jay, 102, 103 87, 90-92, 94, 169
MacArthur, Douglas, 25, 27, 30, 35, 36, 57- Munsan, 75, 83, 86
59, 69, 70, 79-88, 92, 101, 105, 106, 109- Murrow, Edward R., 182
113, 121, 131, 132-140, 141, 144, 145, 152,
154-159, 163-169, 185, 188-200, 230 Musashiya, Harimao T., 23, 50, 61, 67, 70,
168
MacGhee, Ralph, 50
Nakdong River, 108, 111, 114-116
Maeda Takeshi, 14
Nam Il, 201, 202, 209, 219
Malcom, Ben S., 71
Nam-san Mountain, 83
Malik, Yakov, 199
No Gun Ri, 180-184, 194, 197, 231, 239, 241,
Manchuria, 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 54, 61, 64, 70, 242
128, 129, 141, 143-147, 156, 157, 169,
185, 189, 217, 272 Noble, Harold, 87, 93
Manchurian Military School, 55, 56 Norstad, Lauris, 111, 134, 136
Mansei, 29, 119, 173 Northern Limit Line, 268
Mansoodae, 251 NSC-68, 79, 80, 81
Mao Zedong, 42, 61, 62, 65, 70, 123, 124, Ongjin Peninsula, 103
125, 127-130, 134, 146, 162, 166-169, Operation Bluehearts, 131
200, 206, 224, 230, 241
Pace, Frank, 88
Maoism, 248
Pacific War, 19, 27, 59, 87, 131, 138, 206
March One Movement, 10
Paijai Academy, 8
Marshall, George C., 136, 156, 157, 200
Paik In Yup, 76, 103, 137
Marxism, 248

280
 Index

Paik Sun Yup, 54, 74, 216 Pyongyang, 4, 6, 14, 20, 24, 27, 34, 36, 40,
Panmunjom, 201, 203-205, 209, 210, 216- 43, 45, 51, 54, 61-66, 95, 127, 129, 141,
219, 221, 259, 260, 262, 270 143, 146, 149, 151, 153, 161, 190, 194,
197, 200-202, 207, 208, 250, 251, 257,
Park, Chung Hee, 52, 55, 78, 234, 236 258, 261, 265, 269, 273
Park, Hun Yong, 33, 35, 42, 62, 100 Queen Min, 7, 8, 10
Pearl Harbor, 19, 73 Rajin, 136, 140, 157, 250, 251
Peng Duhai, 123, 124, 126, 127- 130, 143, Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade
146, 147, 150-152, 155, 162, 166 Zone (FETZ), 250
Pentagon, 58, 108, 110, 121, 133, 134, 168, Republic of Korea (South Korea)
230, 231, 232, 261
First Five-Year Economic Development
People's Committee, 34, 97, 98, 197 Plan, 235
People's Liberation Army (PLA), 123, 143 Military units
Peoples' Democratic Republic of Korea 1st Division, 73, 74, 76, 83, 92, 115-
(PDRK) or North Korea 118, 141, 151, 153, 155
North Korean Interim People's 2nd Division, 216
Committee, 40
3rd Division, 161
North KoreanNavy, 73
5th Division, 54, 216
North KoreanPeople's Army (NKPA),
4, 23, 36, 46, 50, 52, 61-63, 67, 68, 6th Division, 85, 86, 108, 150-152
70-89, 94, 96-127, 132, 137-140, 7th Division, 73, 74, 77, 83, 84, 89,
144, 147-151, 154, 155, 161, 162, 173- 137, 162, 224, 230
178, 181, 184, 194, 196, 197, 201, 8th Division, 86, 118, 119
204, 207-209, 227, 270
11th Division, 196
3rd Division, 116, 161, 224
11th Regiment, 74, 117
4th Division, 88
12th Regiment, 74, 75, 115, 118
6th Division, 62, 86, 108, 118, 119,
152 13th Regiment, 74, 75
Philippines, 9, 32, 79, 82, 86, 144, 190, 221, 17th Regiment, 74, 76, 103, 107,
238, 243 137
Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO), 18th Regiment, 148
236 19th Regiment, 118, 119, 152
Port Arthur (present Dalian), 8, 25 Capital Division, 107, 148, 161,
Port of Chongjin, 24, 65 162, 172, 216
Powell, Colin, 271 I Corps, 92, 141
POWs, 107, 149, 154, 187, 204, 206-210, II Corps, 107, 108, 116, 117, 120, 151,
222, 223, 225, 227- 229, 252 152, 223, 224
Release of, 205, 218, 219, 222, 227 National Assembly, 37, 73, 76, 81, 91,
92, 196, 197, 199, 211-213, 221, 235,
Protectorate Treaty, 9 261, 269, 272

281
 The Unfinished War

Rhee, Syngman, 5, 8-14, 27, 30-32, 35-37, Sinuiju, 4, 143, 159, 251, 269
44, 46, 50, 53, 55, 58, 65-69, 76, 77, 79, Smith, Bedell, 136
86, 87, 91-94, 97, 104, 138-140, 190,
196, 199, 211, 212-225, 234, 235, 237, Smith, Brad, 102
242, 245 Stalin, Joseph, 25, 27, 32, 41, 44, 62-66, 79,
Ridgway, Matthew B., 111, 112, 134, 136, 125, 126, 129, 166, 217, 241, 248
154, 185-190, 199-206, 210, 215, 227 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 240,
Rockwell, Lloyd, 74, 75 241, 242, 244
Roh Moo Hyon, 243, 267, 271 Story, Tony, 159
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 9, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32, Stratemeyer, George, 86, 156
81, 134, 232 STYX, 268
Roosevelt, Theodore, 9 Su Yu, 125, 127
Rusk, Dean, 25 Sunchon, 54
Russian role, 28, 32, 34, 36, 45, 51, 61, 62, Sungchon River, 121
64, 65, 66, 94, 96, 130, 166, 218, 247,
Sunshine Policy, 267
252
Supung Hydroelectric Power Plant, 24, 43
Russo-Japanese War, 8, 9
Suwon, 82, 85, 86, 97, 102, 131
Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement),
236 Suzerainty, 7
Samsung Group, 99, 236 Sweden, 82, 206, 219
Sariwon, 4, 19, 20, 23, 39, 40, 43, 46, 72, T-34 tanks, 51, 61, 74, 75, 89, 95, 105-108
120, 176, 178, 183, 194, 198, 207, 208 Taedong River, 6
Schnabel, James F., 33 Taft, Robert, 188
SCUD missile, 271 Taft-Katsura Agreement, 9
Seoul, 6, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, Taiwan, 19, 79, 124, 125, 126, 133, 134, 169,
34, 35, 42, 43, 47, 51, 53, 54, 63, 66, 68, 170, 188, 205, 206, 217, 225- 227
72-91, 97, 98, 103, 106, 114, 120, 131,
Task Force Smith, 102, 104, 105, 109
138, 154, 178, 183, 186, 197, 201, 207,
208, 212, 217, 218, 225, 228, 236, 241, Taylor, Maxwell, 190
243, 245, 251, 252, 259, 261, 262, 268, Thailand, 82, 238
273, 274
Third World, 273
Sherman, Forrest P., 6, 132-135
Treaty of Friendship, 11
Shihung Infantry School, 77, 78
Trudeau, Arthur, 230
Shin Ik Hee, 212
Truman, Harry S., 30, 32, 36, 50, 51, 61, 64,
Shin Sung Mo, 76, 152 69, 71, 78-81, 88, 101, 109-112, 133, 134,
Silkworm, 268 136, 140, 144, 145, 156, 157, 167, 169,
185, 188, 189, 190, 202, 205, 206, 211,
Sim Sang Myong, 241
216, 231
Singlaub, John K., 70
Tuman River, 141
Sino-Japanese War, 7

282
 Index
Turkish Brigade, 160
U.N.
Command (UNC), 92
Forces, 88, 141
Security Council, 78, 79, 258, 259, 266
U.S.
Congress, 50, 58, 69, 70, 109, 188, 189,
255, 263, 269, 271
Defense Department, 50, 65, 183
House of Representatives, 258
Military Organizations
Air Force, 79, 82, 88, 103-106, 109,
120, 129, 132, 136-140, 156, 181,
200, 221, 229, 258
Fifth Air Force, 106, 156, 181
Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF),
86, 88, 102, 104, 106, 108, 115,
116, 138, 156, 159, 186, 224
Far East Command (FEC), 58, 81,
137
Korean Military Advisory Group
(KMAG), 49, 50, 56, 74, 75, 77,
82, 84, 222
Marine Corps (see also specific
Units, below), 132, 138
Marine RCT, 110
Navy, 25, 79, 88, 90, 124, 172, 217
Military Units
1st Cavalry Division, 94, 106
1st Marine Brigade, 113, 131
1st Marine Division, 134, 137, 161,
166, 253
2nd Engineer Special Brigade, 109
2nd Infantry Division, 109, 110, 131,
239
5th Marine Regiment 114
7th Fleet, 79, 88, 124, 217
283
7th Infantry Division, 29, 92, 161,
162, 164, 253
7th Marines Dog Company, 164
8th Cavalry Regiment, 153, 155
23rd Regiment, 117, 186
24th Division, 93, 101, 105, 106, 107,
161
25th Infantry Division, 111, 181
82nd Airborne Division, 109
I Corps, 92, 141
X Corps, 137, 141, 146, 148, 161-165,
172, 174, 224
National Security Council, 78, 79, 261
Office of Strategic Service in China, 13
Secretary of State, 31, 63, 64, 67, 78, 81,
133, 169, 200, 227
Senate, 68, 81, 170, 254
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 81
State Department, 25, 30-32, 36, 58,
64, 67, 69, 71, 133, 168, 191, 199,
202, 211, 213, 217, 218, 231, 258,
261
War and Navy Coordinating Committee,
25
U.S.-Korea Friendship Treaty, 8
Unsan, 150, 153, 155
USS McKinley, 136
Van Fleet, James A., 174, 190, 200, 203, 210
Vandenberg, Hoyt, 109, 132
Vanderpool, Jay, 71
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), 133
Vienna Convention, 254
Vladivostok, 7, 13
Wake Island, 144
Walker, Walton H., 58, 92, 93, 94, 101,
104, 106, 111-113, 118, 119, 131, 135-140,
152, 153, 154, 155, 159, 160, 161, 163
 The Unfinished War

Weathersby, Kathryn, 62, 125 Yalu River, 4, 141, 143, 144, 149, 150, 156,
Weinstraub, Stanley, 87 159, 251

Western European, 239 Yangban, 8

Whitney, Courtney, 87 Yasukuni Shinto, 58

Willoughby, Charles, 59, 67-71, 143, 152, Ye Jianying, 123

154, 155 Yeon Jeong, 137
Wilson, Woodrow, 12, 62, 125 Yeosu, 54, 55, 62
Wolmi-do, 132, 134, 137 Yi Bong Chan, 13
Wong Lichan, 123 Yi Jae-chung, 11
Wonsan, 27, 141, 161, 162, 200 Yi Tong Whi, 10, 12
Workers Party, 97 Yongbyon, 208, 257-264
World War II, 19, 23, 51, 57, 69, 89, 96, 101, Yu Jae Hung, 53, 120, 152
110, 164, 177, 182, 200, 205, 210, 229 Yun Bong-Gil, 13
Xiao Jinguang, 124 Zaibatsu, 232
YAK fighter, 76 Zhou Enlai, 125-129
Yalta (Secret) Meeting, 24, 25, 32, 36, 38 Zhu De, 126, 127

284