MAGTAJAS v.

PRYCE PROPERTIES

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

FACTS:

Mayor Pablo Magtajas and the city legislators denounced the establishment of PAGCOR
within their city through an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling
existing business permit to any establishment for using and allowing to be used in its premises
or portion thereof for the operation of casinos. Also, an ordinance was passed prohibiting the
operation of casinos and providing penalty for its violation. PAGCOR is a corporation created
directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on
land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and is the third highest revenue-
earner in the government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinances are valid as enacted by theSangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City.

HELD:

NO. Petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

TEST OF A VALID ORDINANCE:

•Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute

•Must not be unfair or oppressive

•Must not be partial or discriminatory

•Must not prohibit but may regulate trade

•Must not be unreasonable

•Must be general and consistent with public policy.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D.1869 and
the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power
conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Although LGC is permissible to
modify P.D. 1869, there is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal by the former. LGUs may
prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like P.D. 1869. This decree has the statutes of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance.

1
TATEL v. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992

FACTS:

Based from the complaints received from the residents of Barrio Sta. Elena against the
disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca boiling machine inside the warehouse of the
petitioner, the Municipal Council of Virac passed Resolution No.29 declaring the warehouse a
public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. The said machine
affects the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and
dust emitted by the machine. Respondent municipal officials contended that the petitioner’s
warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13 which prohibits the construction of
warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the
necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties
by accidental fire.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 13 is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the
municipal council

HELD:

YES.

Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police
power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the
promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police
powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its
authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code. Also, the
ordinance passed according to the procedure prescribed by law and in consonance with certain
well-established and basic principles of a substantive nature.

2
TAN v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

FACTS:

This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act
Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del
Norte. Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite in
January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P.
Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code
because:

1.The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within
the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.

2.The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be
about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing
statute. The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered.
Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4,1986, after the plebiscite
sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plebiscite was legal and complied with theconstitutional requisites under
Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.

HELD:

NO

In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whether a province is
created, divided, or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, ―the approval
of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected‖ must first be obtained. The
creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division
and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.―Plain and simple logic will
demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of
Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected
entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute
the proposed province of Negros del Norte.‖ The Supreme Court further held that the case of
Governor Zosimo Paredes v.Hon. Executive Secretary to the President, et. al. (128 SCRA 6),
which respondents used to support their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos in the aforementioned
case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that: ―…when the Constitution speaks of
―the unit or units affected‖, it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to
be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a

3
merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.‖It appeared that when Parliamentary
Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte was passed
for approval, it recited therein that ―the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within
a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act.‖ However, when the bill
was enacted into B.P. 885, there was an unexplained change from ―areas affected‖ to ―the
proposed new province, which are the areas affected.‖ The Supreme Court held that it was a
self-serving phrase to state that the new province constitutes the area affected.

―Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading,
erroneous, and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area
affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the
petitioners.‖Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebiscite held on January 3,
1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

―Wherefore, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The

proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials
thereof are also declared null and void. SO ORDERED.‖

4
QUEZON CITY v. ERICTA

GR L-34915 JUNE 24, 1983

FACTS:

Quezon City Council passed Ordinance No. 6118 where under Section 9 of which
provides for regulation of private memorial type cemetery and providing penalties for non-
compliance thereof. The said section ordered private cemeteries to allot at least six (6) percent
of the total area for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and who have been
resident of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. But respondent Himlayang
Pilipino reacted and alleged the ordinance to be contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City
Charter, the Local Autonomy Act and the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners argue that
the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police lower and
that land taken for a public use as itis intended for the burial ground of paupers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

NO.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is not a mere police regulation but an outright
confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process by law and even
without just compensation. Police power usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not
involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the
peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally-possessed article such as opium and firearms.

5
CRUZ v. PARAS

GR L-42571-72 JULY 25, 1983

FACTS:

The petitioners are operators of nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. They filed prohibition suits to
stop the municipality of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of
nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or renewal of licenses to operate them.
The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipal corporation can prohibit the operation of nightclubs.

HELD:

NO.

A municipal corporation cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be

regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. R.A. 938, as originally enacted,
granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of
nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on May, 21,1954, the law was amended by R.A. 979
which purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the
operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power
granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory
act as granting municipal corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be
to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that ―every bill shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.‖ Moreover, the recently-enacted
LGC (B.P. 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment and operation of
billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment.

6
VILLACORTA v. BERNARDO

GR L-31249 AUGUST 19, 1986

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari was raised against a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan annulling an ordinance adopted by the municipal board of Dagupan City. Ordinance
22, that sought to regulate subdivision plans in Dagupan City, ordained that every proposed
subdivision plan over any lot in the City of Dagupan, shall before the same is submitted for
approval and/or verification by the Bureau of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission,
be previously submitted to the City Engineer of the City who shall see to it that no encroachment
is made on any portion of the public domain, that the zoning ordinance and all other pertinent
rules and regulations are observed, and that subsequent fees be imposed thereafter.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance 22 is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD :

NO.

In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo, and affirmed by the
Supreme Court, declared: From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would
justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts
with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be
submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by
the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of
said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of
Act496, the latter being silent on a service fee of PO.03 per square meter of every lot subject of
such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section
44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City
Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last
section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does
not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision
owner additional conditions. The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in
bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as
already intimidated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance
cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or
make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. To sustain the ordinance would be to
open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of

7
implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the
issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize
carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter
imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless,
but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.

We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it
deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-
called "general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness.
Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the
individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public. This advice
is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue
of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instant
case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this authority for legislation
in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

8
LIM v. PACQUING

G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995

FACTS:

The issuance of the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated

Development Corporation (ADC) within the territorial boundaries of the City of Manila was the
focus of this full blown litigation that question, among others, P.D. 771 which revoked all existing
Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20 August1975.

ISSUE:

WON P.D. 771 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

NO. Presidential Decree No. 771 is valid and constitutional.

The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid
and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII
Section 3 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of

instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still
exercised legislative powers).

9
LIMBONA v. MANGELIN

GR 80391 FEBRUARY 28, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of
Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the
invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall
be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the
Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the
Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly
on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which
the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its
resolution.

ISSUE:

WON the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions.

HELD:

YES.

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There

is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power,
on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

10
 An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the
Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say,
of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the
former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very
Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they
were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power).

PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction.
And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can
we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5,
1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
"[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang
Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the
twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled
matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for
the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not
appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead,
they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the
ground of good faith.

11
Binay vs Domingo
G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991

Facts:

On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved

Resolution No. 60 (A resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program
extending P500 to a bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds
existing in the municipal treasury.) Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60.
Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of P400,000 for the
implementation of the program. However, COA disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in
audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners’ reconsideration as Resolution 60
has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public
safety, general welfare, etc of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a
few individuals. Public funds should only be used for public purposes.

Issue:
WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a
valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

Held:
Yes.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which
was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et
ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the
general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power
by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation
of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the
creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may
exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably
proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the
enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this
power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to
"enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and
discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,

12
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP
337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as
to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and
order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants
therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the
government.
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by
the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards
state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare social
justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the
poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an
accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of
legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare
of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is
a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial
Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a
family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision however must not be taken
as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

13
Basco vs. PAGCOR

G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

Facts:

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue
of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also
dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals,
public policy and order.

Petitioners claim that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxesand legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is in violation of the
principle of localautonomy.

Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying
any"tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever
nature, whether National or Local."

Issue:

WON the local Government of Manila have the power to impose taxes on PAGCOR.

Held:

No, the court rules that The City government of Manila has no power to impose taxes on
PAGCOR.

The principle of Local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the
state; the principle of local autonomy within the constitution simply means decentralization. It
cannot be an―Imperium in imperio‖ it can only act intra sovereign, or as an arm of the National
Government.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is
exempt from local taxes.

14
 The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to
"limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law
until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption
clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose
taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local
autonomy.

15
League of Cities of the Philippines vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 176951. December 21, 2009

Facts:

During the 11th Congress, fifty-seven cityhood bills were filed before the House of
Representatives. Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The twenty-
four (24) other bills were not acted upon. Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate
of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 215723 to amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed amendment sought to
increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million
average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income.

In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June
30, 2001. As thus amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now provides that ―[a]
municipality x x x may be converted into a component city if it has a [certified] locally generated
average annual income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million] for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 2000 constant prices.‖

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July
2001 House (H.) Joint Resolution No. 2924 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from
the income requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into
cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29.

Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of
Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarding it to the Senate for approval.

The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate
session held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H.
Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from the income requirement
imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this reason, he suggested the filing by the
House of Representatives of individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to become
cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action.

Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures was a provision exempting the municipality
covered from the PhP 100 million income requirement.

Issue:

Whether or not the cityhood laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:

16
 A law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with
Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.—To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special
treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the standard PhP 100
million minimum income requirement, violate Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution, which in part
provides that no person shall ―be denied the equal protection of the laws.‖ Petitioners’ challenge
is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal protection clause proscribes undue favor as well
as hostile discrimination. Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or
things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting
upon factual differences between individuals and classes; Criteria for Classification to be
Reasonable.—As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection
does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or
obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing
and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent
in the right to legislate is the right to classify, necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable,
must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

17
BALACUIT v. CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE & BUTUAN CITY

G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988

FACTS:

The municipal board of the City of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 640 which penalized
any person, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling tickets to any movie or
other public exhibitions, who shall require to pay full payment of tickets intended for adults but
should charge only one-half of said ticket. The ordinance also provides for a penalty by fine and
imprisonment. Petitioners are the aggrieved party by the effect of the ordinance as they were
the managers of the different theaters in the city.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the police power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of
prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement

HELD:

NO.

While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation
must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable and
its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation,
be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the
regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. Hence, the proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission
they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay
away.

18
CRUZ v. CA

GR L-44178 AUGUST 21, 1987

FACTS:

The private respondents instituted a class suit before the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch VIII in behalf of the vendors and regular stall holders in Padre Rada Market for
annulment with preliminary injunction against the then Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas,
petitioner Cruz, and other persons whose names were unknown to them after the decision of
the City Mayor to withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public market.

ISSUE:

WON the Mayor of Manila can withdraw Padre Rada Market from government supervision.

HELD:

NO.

By the very nature of a market, its location, opening, operations, and closure must be
regulated by government. It is not a question of the petitioner's right to run his market as he
pleases but what agency or office should supervise its operations. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that the Mayor had no legal authority to, by himself, allow the petitioner to withdraw the
major portion of Padre Rada Market from its use as a public market, thereby also withdrawing it
from the city's constant supervision. The establishment and maintenance of public markets is by
law among the legislative powers of the City of Manila. Since the operation of Padre Rada
Market was authorized by a municipal board resolution and approved by the City Mayor, as
provided by law, it follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion from use as a public
market must be subject to the same joint action of the Board and the Mayor. The Mayor of
Manila, by himself, cannot provide for the opening, operations, and closure of a public market.
There is no question that the Padre Rada Market is a public market as it was authorized to
operate and it operates as such. The Padre Rada Market is, therefore, a public market which
happens to be privately-owned and privately operated. The Padre Rada Market is a public
market and as such should be subject to the local government's supervision and control. It’s
conversion into a private market or its closure must follow the procedures laid down by law.

19
ARDONA v. REYES

GR L-60549 OCTOBER 26, 1983

FACTS:

The Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for
the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in Barangays Malubog and
Babag, Cebu City, under PTA’s express authority, as mandated in its Charter, ―to acquire by
purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without
the tourist zones― for the development into integrated resort and sport complexes of selected
and well- defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The defendants, numbering 40,
filed motions to dismiss on the ground that the taking was not for public use, specifically that the
there is no constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism
purposes. Moreover, the defendants claimed that the land they own subject of the expropriation
is actually covered by certificate of land transfer (CLT) and emancipation patents thereby
making the lands expropriated within the coverage of the land reform area under P.D No.2. The

Defendants argue that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in the order
of priorities than other state policies like those relating to the health and physical well-being of
the people.

ISSUE :

WON the position of the so-called Ardona Forty is tenable

HELD :

NO.

The petition should be dismissed. Reasons:

1. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes like the
construction of roads, bridges, parks and the like. Public use is not use by the
public.‖ It also mean, public well-fare and such a concept are broad, and
inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual, as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious, as well as
clean, well balanced as well as carefully patrolled.

20
2. Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of Eminent Domain is clear. As a general rule then, as
long as the taking is public, the power of eminent domain comes into pay.
3. The records show that the only 2 of the 40 defendants have CLT’s or
emancipation patents. And those CLT’s in their possession covers only less
than1 hectare of the 282 hectares intended for expropriation. Moreover, the
less-than 10-hectare portion of land is not even part of the resort and sports
complex proper but is part of the 32 hectare resettlement are for all persons
affected by the expropriation. Certainly, the human settlement needs of the
many beneficiaries of the 32 hectare resettlement area should prevail over the
property rights of two of their compatriots.

21
MACASIANO v. DIOKNO

GR 97764 AUGUST 10, 1992

FACTS:

Respondent municipality Parañaque passed Ordinance No. 86, series of 1990 which
authorized the closure of some streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal
council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and
/or municipal streets, roads, and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea
markets and/or vending areas under certain terms and conditions. On June 20, 19990, the
municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N.
Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation,
maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On July 20, 1990, the
Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86 of the municipal council of
respondent municipality subject to conditions. On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and
respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets. Consequently,
market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets. On September 13, 1990,
petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command,
ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls. On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued
an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 of the Municipality of Parañaque and
enjoining petitioner Macasiano from enforcing his letter order against respondent Palanyag.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque

authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.

HELD:

NO.

Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no
authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public property unless specific authority is
vested upon them by Congress (e.g. Section 10,Chapter II, Local Government Code – Closure
of Roads) However, the afore-stated legal provision should be read and interpreted in
accordance with basic principles already established by law.

22
 Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that property of public dominion devoted to public
use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot
be disposed of or used by the local government unit to private persons.

The closure of a road, street or park should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the
road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no
longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from
public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit
concerned. It is only then that the respondent municipality can ―use or convey them for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully
used or conveyed‖ in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of B.P. Blg.
337, known as the Local Government Code.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used
for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the
local government has no power tom use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to
private persons.

Even assuming, in gratia argument, that respondent municipality has the authority to
pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be
considered approved by the MMA due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the
conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. Respondent municipality
has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing conditions precedent to
the approval of the ordinance.

23
ORTIGAS & CO. LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. FEATI BANK & TRUST CO.

GR L-24670 DECEMBER 14, 1979

FACTS:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas & Co., a partnership involved in real estate particularly the
Highway Hills subdivision along EDSA in Mandaluyong entered into a contract of sale on
installment over two parcels of land with Augusto and Natividad Angeles who later transferred
their rights and interests to a certain Emma Chavez. Under the agreement, it was stipulated
among others that: ―xxx this shall be used exclusively for residential purposes xxx‖. Eventually,
defendant FEATI Bank and Trust Company acquired the lots and started the construction of a
building on the said lot devoted to banking purposes. Ortigas then filed for a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain and enjoin the defendant from continuing with the construction of the
commercial bank in violation of the restrictions set in the contract of sale that was imposed by
the plaintiff as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and
development of the Highway Hills Subdivision.

Defendant maintains that the area in question has been declared as a commercial and
industrial zone by the Zoning Regulation of Resolution No. 27 on February 4, 1980 of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. The trial court ruled in favor of defendant bank FEATI
holding that there strictions set by plaintiff Ortigas were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No.
27 because of the Municipal’s valid exercise of police power. It stressed that the private interest
should ―bow down to the general interest and welfare.‖ Plaintiff appealed until it reached the
Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power.

2.Whether or not the said resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations
assumed by defendants

HELD:

1. YES

Although the validity of the resolution was never questioned in the past proceedings, its
validity was at least impliedly admitted from the facts. Section 3 of R.A.2264 (Local Autonomy
Act) empowers a municipal council ―to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
for the municipality. It gives more power to local governments in promoting the economic

24
conditions, social welfare and material progress of the community. The only exceptions are a
contract between ―a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other
hand,‖ in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The
exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case.

2. YES

The resolution as an exercise of police power can supersede contractual obligations

assumed by defendants. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the
rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.

Police power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable power, the greatest and most
illimitable of powers. It is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. Its exercise may be
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee.

Resolution No. 27, in declaring that the western part of EDSA is an industrial and
commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the
exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and
general welfare of the people in the locality.

Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area. Industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs
through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream
of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety
or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances and regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its
Municipal Council, was reasonably justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject
resolution.

25
VILLANUEVA v. CASTAÑEDA

G.R. No. L-61311 September 21, 1987

FACTS:

On November 7, 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No.
218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the said place. A protest was filed and the
CFI decided that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the
commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. This decision
was not enforced for the petitioners were not evicted. In fact, the petitioners paid daily fees to
the municipal government. On January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and
Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No.
29, to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza. Vicente
Macalino (officer in charge in the office of the mayor) required the municipal treasurer and
engineer to demolish the stalls. Petitioners filed a prohibition with the CFI claiming that the
disputed area was leased to them by the municipal government. The CFI denied the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have a right to the said land.

HELD:

NO.

There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are
sought to be evicted is a public plaza pursuant to the previous case. It does not appear that the
decision in this case was appealed or has been reversed.

A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or
any other contractual undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this point was settled as early as
in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, where the Court declared as null and void the lease of a
public plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private person. In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, it
was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta.
Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of man. We rule that the petitioners had no right in
the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the
strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should have realized and accepted this earlier,
considering that even before case was decided, the municipal council already adopted
Resolution No.29, declaring the area as the parking place and public plaza of the municipality.

26
 It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution of the municipal council
of San Fernando that respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he ordered the
demolition of the stags constructed in the disputed area. As officer-in-charge of the office of the
mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place
and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando, conformably to the orders from the court
and the council. It is, therefore, not correct to say that he had acted without authority or taken
the law into his hands in issuing his order.

Since the occupation of the place in question, it has deteriorated increasingly to the
great prejudice of the community in general. The proliferation of stags therein, most of them
makeshift and of flammable materials, has converted it into a veritable fire trap, which, added to
the fact that it obstructs access to and from the public market itself, has seriously endangered
public safety. The filthy condition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet items are sold, has
aggravated health and sanitation problems, besides pervading the place with a foul odor that
has spread into the surrounding areas. The entire place is unsightly, to the dismay and
embarrassment of the inhabitants, who want it converted into a showcase of the town of which
they can all be proud. The vendors in the talipapa have also spilled into the street and obstruct
the flow of traffic, thereby impairing the convenience of motorists and pedestrians alike. The
regular stallholders in the public market, who pay substantial rentals to the municipality, are
deprived of a sizable volume of business from prospective customers who are intercepted by
the talipapa vendors before they can reach the market proper. On top of all these, the people
are denied the proper use of the place as a public plaza, where they may spend their leisure in
a relaxed and even beautiful environment and civic and other communal activities of the town
can be held.

The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by
the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. This
authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein." This authority was validly exercised in this case through the adoption of Resolution No.
29, by the municipal council of San Fernando.

Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have
effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered
or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public
interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power
as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the
general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to
and limited by the paramount police power.

27
FRIVALDO v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

FACTS:

Juan G. Frivaldo filed for candidacy for governorship. This was contested by Raul Lee
who filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified because he was not
a Filipino citizen. COMELEC granted the petition. Frivaldo filed for Motion for Reconsideration
but was not acted upon until after the elections. His candidacy continued and he was voted.
Three days after election, the COMELEC affirmed the previous resolution. The Board of
Canvassers completed the canvass of the election and determined that Frivaldo garnered the
largest number of votes, followed by Lee. But Lee filed another petition praying for his
proclamation as Governor. Petition was granted. Lee was declared Governor. Frivaldo filed a
new petition alleging that he already took his oath of allegiance or in the alternative; he averred
that pursuant to the case of Labo v. COMELEC, the Vice-Governor should occupy said position
of governor. On December 19, 1995, the COMELEC First Division annulled the proclamation of
Lee and proclaimed Frivaldo as rightful governor. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not citizenship requirement must exist on the date of election or filing of candidacy.

HELD:

NO.

Section 39 of the Local Government Code does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship. Purpose of the citizenship qualification is so that
no person owing allegiance to another nation shall govern our people. Impediment no longer
existed. It should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
qualifications of officials, not of candidates. Citizenship is necessary at the time he is proclaimed
and at the start of his term.

28
GUILATCO v. CITY OF DAGUPAN

G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989

FACTS:

Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk

located at Perez Boulevard when she accidentally fell into a manhole located in said side walk,
causing her right leg to be fractured. She was hospitalized and also as a result, suffered loss of
income and moral damages. Guilatco sued the City of Dagupan. The City replied that Perez
Boulevard, where the deadly manhole was located, is a national road not under the control and
supervision of Dagupan. It is submitted that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that
has control and supervision thru the Highway Engineer, who by mere coincidence, is also the
City Engineer of Dagupan.

ISSUE:

WON Control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists which makes
City liable under Art 2189.

HELD:

Yes.

Art 2189 states : Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries, suffered by, any person by reason of the defective conditions of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works, under their control and supervision.

Thus, it is not even necessary that such defective road or street belongs to the City. In
the case at bar, the control and supervision of the national road exists and is provided for in the
charter of Dagupan. It provided that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets,
avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the
Municipal Board. Such control and supervision is exercised through the City Engineer Tangco,
who aside from his official capacity as City Engineer, was also Ex Officio Highway Engineer, Ex
Officio City Engineer of Bureau of Public Works, and Building Official and received
compensation for these functions. The function of supervision over streets, public buildings and
public works, pertaining through the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman
and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these two officials are employees of the Nat’l Gov’t, they
are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the
city through the City Engineer. Hence the City is liable.

29
FLORES v. DRILON

G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which Mayor Richard J.Gordon of Olongapo
City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA). Under said provision, ―for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of
this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority.‖Petitioners, as taxpayers, contend that said provision is
unconstitutional asunder the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first
par.,Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure,"
because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public
offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress
through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject
posts; and, (c) Sec. 261,par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

HELD:

YES.

The rule expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in
one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be
efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job.
Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive department described in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip
Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform should be allowed to attend to his duties and
responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should

30
be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.

In this case, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e.,
the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA).

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of
the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph
authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not
providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to
the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the
President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be
appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of
Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance. However, the court held that the Congress
did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to
the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be
appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely
adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the
subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and,
instead, "ex officio" would have been used. Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were
fully aware that subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they
nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts.

31
JIMENEZ v. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987

FACTS:

Bernardino Jimenez fell in an uncovered opening on the ground located within the
premises of the Sta. Ana public market. At that time, the market was flooded with ankle-deep
rainwater which prevented the opening form being seen. Jimenez, for his part, went to that
market to buy bagoong despite the rains. He sustained an injury due to a rusty 4-inch nail which
pierced his left leg. Jimenez sued the Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) and the City of Manila
for his misfortune. The Sta. Ana Market at that time was under the administration of the AIC by
virtue of a management and Operating Contract it had with the City of Manila. The trial court
held the AIC responsible but absolved the City of Manila.

ISSUE:

WON the City of Manila is indeed not liable.

HELD:

The City of Manila is liable.

Art. 2189 comes into play, since the injury took place in a public building. Also, Art. 2189
requires that the LGU must retain supervision and control over the public work in question for it
to be held liable. The evidence showed that the Management and Operating Contract explicitly
stated that the City of Manila retained supervision and control over the Sta. Ana Market. Also, in
a letter to Finance Secretary Cesar Virata, Mayor Raymond Bagatsing admitted this fact of
supervision and control. Moreover, Sec. 30(g) of the Local Tax Code says that public markets
shall be under the immediate supervision, administration and control of the City Treasurer.3)
Jimenez could not be held for negligence. A customer in a store has every right to presume that
the owner will comply with his duty to keep his premises safe for customers. The owner of the
market, on the other hand, was proven to have been negligent in not providing a cover for the
said opening. The negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
It is not necessary for the LGU to have ownership over the public work in question; mere control
and supervision is sufficient.

32
G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989

CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO and for and in behalf
of her minor children, VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VERGEL and IMELDA, all surnamed STO.
DOMINGO, respondents.

Facts:

Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo and father
of the litigating minors, died on June 4,1971 and buried on June 6,1971 in Lot No. 159, Block
No. 194 of the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo from
June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the
said receipt which appears to be regular on its face. Apart from the aforementioned receipt, no
other document was executed to embody such lease over the burial lot in question.

In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, the City Mayor of Manila prescribing
uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use
and disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, subject lot was certified on
January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation. On the basis of such certification, the authorities of
the North Cemetery then headed by defendant Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and
removal from subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the
bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the
cemetery. Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that
when the plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls Day in their shock, consternation and
dismay, that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker
which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Indignant and disgusted over such a sorrowful finding.

Issue:

W/N the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or
proprietary function of the City of Manila.

Held:

Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city
government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued,
and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or
political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental
powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the
one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include
those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In connection with the powers of a municipal
corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or
proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use
and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or

33
municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws.

Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North
Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the
Municipal Board. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the
use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through Administrative
Order No. 5. With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is
within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private
respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law
between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages
even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.

34
G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner

vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR.,
SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R.
BANIÑA, respondents.

Facts:

A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and

owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg
and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney
including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four others
suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of
Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger
jeepney, However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner
and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred
to Branch IV, presided over by respondent judge. The private respondents amended the
complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the
first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack
of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence
of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.

Issue:

Whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee.

Held:

Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its
employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in
behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized
in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606),
the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the
driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that
the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was
then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger ––
tragic and deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary
compensation.

35
G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978

LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN, ALFONSO R.

MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN, FIDEL MONTEMAYOR,
MELCHOR VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui
in 1959, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners,
vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA,
ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA,
and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

G.R. No. L-30183 October 23, 1978

MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner,

vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA,
ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA,
and the Honorable COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

Facts:

the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 whereby "it
resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23,
1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta
Executive Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage,
with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. the council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the
construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan. The "zarzuela"
entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the
Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in the evening of January 22
for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program
started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the
stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the
stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned
underneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the
afternoon of the following day.

The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila
on September 11, 1959 to recover damages. Answering the complaint defendant municipality
invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its
governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of
its agents.

Issue:

W/N the celebration of a town fiesta is an exercise of a municipality's governmental or public

function or a private or proprietary character.

36
Held:

We hold that the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an
exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. — fiesta may be held in each municipality not
oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not
be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for
weighty reasons, such as typhoons, foundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or
other public ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case it may
be held at a later date in the same year, by resolution of the council.

This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does
not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to
commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special
benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of
a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or
gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For
instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private
undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which
are for public service.

Tthere can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are
to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the
undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise. the function becomes
private or proprietary in character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is
involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

37
G.R. No. 107916 February 20, 1997

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution
No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1)
Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday
for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." In due time,
Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11, 1989, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that
"expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
establishment of the government center."

The public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of
Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer
the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and
that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take
possession of the property.

Issue:

Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal

resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Held:

The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government
Code 18 in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law
states:

Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent
domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right
since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.

Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:

Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. — (1) Within thirty days after
receiving copies of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders
promulgated by the municipal mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall

38
 examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be
none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall examine them promptly and inform the
sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect or impropriety which he may
discover therein and make such comments or recommendations as shall appear
to him proper.

(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance,
resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the
sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or
executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes
and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an
action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in
whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an

infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a
municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Mayor to issue.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal

Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right
of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution,
pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No.
43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation
of petitioners' property.

39
G.R. No. 72841 January 29, 1987

PROVINCE OF CEBU, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ATTY. PABLO P.
GARCIA, respondents.

Facts:

While then incumbent Governor Rene Espina was on official business in Manila, the
Vice-Governor, Priscillano Almendras and three (3) members of the Provincial Board enacted
Resolution No. 188, donating to the City of Cebu 210 province owned lots all located in the City
of Cebu, with an aggregate area of over 380 hectares, and authorizing the Vice-Governor to
sign the deed of donation on behalf of the province. According to the questioned deed of
donation the lots donated were to be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be used
to finance its public improvement projects. Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina
denounced as Legal and immoral the action of his colleagues in donating practically all the
patrimonial property of the province of Cebu, considering that the latter's income was less than
one-fourth (1/4) of that of the City of Cebu.

To prevent the sale or disposition of the lots, the officers and members of the Cebu
Mayor's League along with some taxpayers, including Atty. Garcia, filed a case seeking to have
the donation declared illegal, null and void. It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiffs
were filing it for and in behalf of the Province of Cebu in the nature of a derivative suit.

Meanwhile, Cebu City Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. announced that he would borrow funds
from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and would use the donated lots as collaterals. In July,
1965, the City of Cebu advertised the sale of an the lots remaining unsold. Thereupon,
Governor Espina, apprehensive that the lots would be irretrievably lost by the Province of Cebu,
decided to go to court. He engaged the services of respondent Garcia in filing and prosecuting
the case in his behalf and in behalf of the Province of Cebu.

Issue:

W/N the matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney is valid.

Held:

The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled

in Ramos v. Court of Appeals(108 SCRA 728). Collaboration of a private law firm with the fiscal
and the municipal attorney is not allowed. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:

.Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in

litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any
municipality, or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof
original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
municipality, or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial

40
 government or to some other municipality, or municipal district in the same
province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political
division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the
province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other

political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its
council

The above provision, complemented by Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in
providing that only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality in its lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a
private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent it, as when he represents the province against a municipality.

The lawmaker, in requiring that the local government should be represented in its court
cases by a government lawyer, like its municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal intended that
the local government should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private lawyer. The
lawmaker also assumed that the interests of the municipal corporation would be best protected
if a government lawyer handles its litigations. It is to be expected that the municipal attorney and
the fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the corporation's interests, and that, as civil service
employees, they could be held accountable for any misconduct or dereliction of duty.

41
G.R. No. 97882 August 28, 1996

THE CITY OF ANGELES, Hon. ANTONIO ABAD SANTOS, in his capacity as MAYOR of
Angeles City, and the SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF
ANGELES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

Private respondent donated to the City of Angeles, 51 parcels of land situated in Barrio
Pampang, City of Angeles. The properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the
site of the Angeles City Sports Center. However, petitioners started the construction of a drug
rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land. Upon learning thereof, private respondent
protested such action for being violative of the terms and conditions of the amended deed and
prejudicial to its interest and to those of its clients and residents. Private respondent also offered
another site for the rehabilitation center. However, petitioners ignored the protest, maintaining
that the construction was not violative of the terms of the donation. The alternative site was
rejected because, according to petitioners, the site was too isolated and had no electric and
water facilities.

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court in Angeles City against
the petitioners, alleging breach of the conditions imposed in the amended deed of donation and
seeking the revocation of the donation and damages, with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order to halt the construction of the said center.

Issues:

W/N donation made can be revoked.

Held:

The private respondent contends that the building of said drug rehabilitation center is
violative of the Amended Deed of Donation. Therefore, under Article 764 of the New Civil Code
and stipulation no. 8 of the amended deed, private respondent is empowered to revoke the
donation when the donee has failed to comply with any of the conditions imposed in the deed.

We disagree. Article 1412 of the Civil Code which provides that:

If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:

(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover
what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the
other's undertaking;

42
 comes into play here. Both petitioners and private respondents are in violation of P.D.
957 as amended, for donating and accepting a donation of open space less than that
required by law, and for agreeing to build and operate a sports complex on the non-
buildable open space so donated; and petitioners, for constructing a drug rehabilitation
center on the same non-buildable area.

Moreover, since the condition to construct a sport complex on the donated land has
previously been shown to be contrary to law, therefore, stipulation no. 8 of the amended deed
cannot be implemented because (1) no validstipulation of the amended deed had been
breached, and (2) it is highly improbable that the decree would have allowed the return of the
donated land for open space under any circumstance, considering the non-alienable character
of such open space, in the light of the second Whereas clause of P.D. 1216 which declares that
. . . such open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in residential subdivisions are for public use
and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men.

Further, as a matter of public policy, private respondent cannot be allowed to evade its
statutory obligation to donate the required open space through the expediency of invoking
petitioners breach of the aforesaid condition. It is a familiar principle that the courts will not aid
either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where they find them. Neither
party can recover damages from the other arising from the act contrary to law, or plead the
same as a cause of action or as a defense. Each must bear the consequences of his own
acts. 19

There is therefore no legal basis whatsoever to revoke the donation of the subject open
space and to return the donated land to private respondent. The donated land should remain
with the donee as the law clearly intended such open spaces to be perpetually part of the public
domain, non-alienable and permanently devoted to public use as such parks, playgrounds or
recreation areas.

43
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987

FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA,

RICARDO PUNO, FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch III, VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor,
San Fernando, Pampanga,respondents.

Facts:

In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip
of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to
remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no.
28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the
demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council
Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public
plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.

Held:

Petition Dismissed.

It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of
market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to
law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot
insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a
valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the
agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away
through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case
at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum
absque injuria.

44
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Republic Act No. 4850 created the ―Laguna Lake Development Authority‖ – a
Government Agency that works toward environmental protection and ecology, navigational
safety, and sustainable development. This agency is responsible for the development of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns in view of the national and
regional plans.

Sec. 1 of P.D. 813 established a policy of development with environmental management

and control, among others for the Laguna Lake Development Authority. Special powers,
pertinent to this case, were also granted under Sec.3 which include the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Authority to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said lake including navigation, construction, and operation of fish pens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like. The Authority also has the power to collect fees for these
activities and projects which may be shared with other governmental agencies and political sub-
divisions.

Then, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enforced.
Municipalities around the Laguna Lake Region interpreted this law as delegating the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. Municipal governments
started issuing fishing privileges and fishing permits to big fish pen operators. These
unregulated issuances of Mayor’s permits to construct fish pens were clear violations of the
policies implemented by the Authority.

Issue:

WON the Laguna Lake Development Authority should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna
Lake insofar as the issuance of permits for fisheries privileges is concerned.

Held:

Yes.

Provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA No. 7160) do not repeal the laws
creating the LLDA. Therefore, LLDA maintains its exclusive authority over issuances of permits.

The charter of the LLDA is a SPECIAL LAW while the Local Government Code of 1991
is a GENERAL LAW. A basic rule of statutory construction is that the enactment of a later
legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law.

When there is conflict between a general law and a special law, the special law will
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.

45
 A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent law by mere
implications.

46
TANO v. SOCRATES

G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997

Facts:

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality
of:

(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled: " AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL
LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES THEREOF"

(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business,
trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which
a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayor’s and authorizing and directing to check or
conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out
from Puerto Princesa and,

(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING
THECATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE
MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS‖

The petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had
the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit.

They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as
the Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their
vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out
their business endeavors to a successful conclusion.

Public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the
Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that
there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional

Held:

NO

47
Ratio:

In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC
and the powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General
Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi),
which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
Ordinances cannot be doubted.***Sec. 16.

General Welfare

. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology , encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.

It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes:
(1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a
period of five years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.

It imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the
sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing
and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance."

The petition is dismissed.

48
G.R. No. 141616 March 15, 2001

CITY OF QUEZON, petitioner,

vs.
LEXBER INCORPORATED, respondent.

Facts:

Tri-Partite Memorandum of Agreement was drawn between petitioner City of Quezon,

represented by its then Mayor Brigido R. Simon, Jr., respondent Lexber, Inc. and the then
Municipality of Antipolo, whereby a parcel of land located in Antipolo was to be used as a
garbage dumping site by petitioner and other Metro Manila cities or municipalities authorized by
the latter, for a 5-year period.

Meanwhile, a second negotiated contract was entered into by respondent Lexber with
petitioner, again represented by Mayor Simon, whereby it was agreed that respondent Lexber
shall provide maintenance services in the form of manpower, equipment and engineering
operations for the dumpsite for the contract price of P1,536,796.00 monthly. It was further
agreed that petitioner shall pay respondent Lexber a reduced fee of fifty percent (50%) of the
monthly contract price, or P768,493.00, in the event petitioner fails to dump the agreed volume
of garbage for any given month.

The petitioner immediately commenced dumping garbage on the landfill site

continuously from December 1991 until May 1992. Thereafter, petitioner ceased to dump
garbage on the said site for reasons not made known to respondent Lexber. Consequently,
even while the dumpsite remained unused, respondent Lexber claimed it was entitled to
payment for its services as stipulated in the second negotiated contract.

On December 12, 1992, respondent's counsel sent a demand letter to petitioner

demanding the payment of at least 50% of its service fee under the said contract, in the total
amount of P9,989,174.00. In view of the idle state of the dumpsite for more than a year,
respondent also sought a clarification from petitioner regarding its intention on the dumpsite
project, considering the waste of equipment and manpower in the meantime, as well as its loss
of opportunity for the property.

Petitioner, this time acting through Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. who succeeded Mayor
Simon in the interim, denied any liability under the contract on the ground that the same was
invalid and unenforceable. According to Mayor Mathay, the subject contract was signed only by
Mayor Simon and had neither the approval nor ratification of the City Council, and it lacked the
required budget appropriation.

Thus, a complaint for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance or Rescission of

Contract and Damages was filed by respondent Lexber against petitioner before the RTC of
Quezon City. Respondent Lexber averred that because petitioner stopped dumping garbage on
the dumpsite after May 1992, Lexber's equipment and personnel were idle to its damage and
prejudice..

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the said Judgment was affirmed in toto.

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Issue:

W/N a contract entered into by the city mayor involving the expenditure of public funds by the
local government without prior appropriation by the city council valid and binding.

Held:

There is no denying that Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. 1445 (Auditing Code of the
Philippines) provide that contracts involving expenditure of public funds:

1) can be entered into only when there is an appropriation therefor; and

2) must be certified by the proper accounting official/agency that funds have been duly
appropriated for the purpose, which certification shall be attached to and become an
integral part of the proposed contact.

However, the very same Presidential Decree No. 1445, which is the cornerstone of
petitioner's arguments, does not provide that the absence of an appropriation law ipso
facto makes a contract entered into by a local government unit null and void. Section 84 of the
statute specifically provides:

Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in
pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority.

Consequently, public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to an appropriation law,
but also in pursuance of other specific statutory authority, i.e., Section 84 of PD 1445. Thus,
when a contract is entered into by a city mayor pursuant to specific statutory authority, the
law, i.e., PD 1445 allows the disbursement of funds from any public treasury or depository
therefor. It can thus be plainly seen that the law invoked by petitioner Quezon City itself
provides that an appropriation law is not the only authority upon which public funds shall be
disbursed.

Furthermore, then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. did not enter into the subject contract
without legal authority. The Local Government Code of 1983, or B.P. Blg. 337, which was then
in force, specifically and exclusively empowered the city mayor to "represent the city in its
business transactions, and sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury and all bonds, contracts
and obligations of the city." Such power granted to the city mayor by B.P. Blg. 337 was not
qualified nor restricted by any prior action or authority of the city council. We note that while the
subsequent Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect after the execution of the
subject contracts, provides that the mayor's representation must be "upon authority of the
sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance," there was no such qualification
under the old code.

We must differentiate the provisions of the old Local Government Code of 1983, B.P.
Blg. 337, which was then in force, from that of the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A.
No.7160, which now requires that the mayor's representation of the city in its business
transactions must be "upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or
ordinance" (Section 455 [vi]). No such prior authority was required under B.P. Blg. 337. This
restriction, therefore, cannot be imposed on the city mayor then since the two contracts were
entered into before R.A. No.7160 was even enacted.

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 Under B.P. Blg. 337, while the city mayor has no power to appropriate funds to support
the contracts, neither does said law prohibit him from entering into contracts unless and until
funds are appropriated therefor. In fact, it is his bounden duty to so represent the city in all its
business transactions. On the other hand, the city council must provide for the "depositing,
leaving or throwing of garbage" and to appropriate funds for such expenses.{Section 177 [b]). It
cannot refuse to so provide and appropriate public funds for such services which are very vital
to the maintenance of cleanliness of the city and the good health of its inhabitants.

By entering into the two contracts, Mayor Simon did not usurp the city council's power to
provide for the proper disposal of garbage and to appropriate funds therefor. The execution of
contracts to address such a need is his statutory duty, just as it is the city council's duty to
provide for said services. There is no provision in B.P. Blg. 337, however, that prohibits the city
mayor from entering into contracts for the public welfare, unless and until there is prior authority
from the city council. This requirement was imposed much later by R.A. No. 7160, long after the
contracts had already been executed and implemented.

Even the very Charter of Quezon City, more particularly Section 9(f), Section 12(a) and
Section 12(m) thereof, simply provide that the mayor shall exercise general powers and duties,
such as signing "all warrants drawn on the city treasurer and all bonds, contracts, and
obligations of the city," even as it grants the City Council the power, by ordinance or resolution,
"to make all appropriations for the expenses of the government of the city," as well as "to
prohibit the throwing or depositing of offal, garbage, refuse, or other offensive matter in the
same, and to provide for its collection and disposition x x x."

While the powers and duties of the Mayor and the City Council are clearly delineated,
there is nothing in the cited provisions, nor even in the statute itself, that requires "prior
authorization by the city council by proper enactment of an ordinance" before the City Mayor
can enter into contracts.

Petition is denied for lack of merit and decision of RTC and CA are affirmed.

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G.R. No. 141307 March 28, 2001

PURTO J. NAVARRO and DANNY B. TAMAYO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ADOLFO AQUINO, ROLANDO LALAS, ABRAHAM MORALES,
BLANDO QUINTO, ROMEO VISPERAS, ANTONIO PENULIAR, EDUARDO ABULENCIA,
EMILIO PENULIAR, JR., ERNESTO SERAPION, VICTORIO LALANGAN, ANTONIO
BURGUILLOS, MIGUEL JIMENEZ, and ELPIDIO VILLANUEVA,respondents.

Facts:

On March 25, 1999, Mayor Cesar Calimlim of Municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan

died. A vacancy was thus created in the Office of the Mayor so by operation of law, Section 44
of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, then Vice-
Mayor Baltazar Aquino succeeded him. Accordingly, the highest-ranking member of the
Sangguniang Bayan,i.e. the one who garnered the highest number of votes, was elevated to the
position of the Vice-Mayor, pursuant to the same law. This was petitioner Danny B. Tamayo
who belonged to the REFORMA-LM political party.

Since a vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the elevation of petitioner

Tamayo to the office of the Vice-Mayor, Governor Victor Agbayani of Pangasinan appointed
herein petitioner Purto J. Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Navarro belonged to
the same political party as that of petitioner Tamayo.

Private respondents filed Civil Case to nullify the appointment of petitioner Navarro
before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City but the Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals due to the hierarchy of courts. Private respondents argued before the Court of Appeals
that it was the former vice-mayor, succeeding to the position of the mayor, who created the
permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a member of
the Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from said former vice-mayor’s political party, in
this case, the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi.

Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that it was the elevation of petitioner Tamayo,
who was the highest-ranking member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the office of the Vice-Mayor
which resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan. Pursuant to Section 45 (b) of
RA 7160, the person to be appointed to the position vacated by him should come from the same
political party affiliation as that of petitioner Tamayo. Hence, the appointment extended by
Governor Agbayani to petitioner Navarro, who was a member of and recommended by the
REFORMA-LM, is valid.

The Court of Appeals resolved the petition in favor of private respondents but for the
reason different from that posited by private respondents. According to the appellate court, the
vacancy which resulted from the death of the mayor created a series of vacancies and
successions by operation of law. By this interpretation, petitioner Tamayo’s former position as
the highest-ranking member of the Sanggunian Bayan was filled up by second highest-ranking
member and that vacated by the second highest-ranking member was succeeded by the third
highest-ranking member, and so forth. And the last vacancy created was the position of the
lowest ranking-member of the Sanggunian, that is, the eighth position occupied by Rolando
Lalas. The Court of Appeals then concluded that it was the appointment of the eighth councilor,
who was Rolando Lalas to the number seven position which created the "last vacancy;"

52
therefore, the person to be appointed to the vacant position should come from the same political
party to which Rolando Lalas belonged, which was the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners brought the instant
petition.

Held:

We give due course to the petition.

Under Section 44, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

What is crucial is the interpretation of Section 45(b) providing that "xxx only the nominee
of the political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and
whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian
shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the
political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy xxx."

The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a
permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed
by the people in the election.

With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position
of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone
who should belong to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s
representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. To argue that the vacancy created was
that formerly held by Rolando Lalas, a LAKAS-NUCD-Kampi member, would result in the
increase of that party’s representation in the Sanggunian at the expense of the REFORMA-LM.
This interpretation is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law and thus violative of a
fundamental rule in statutory construction which is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and
purpose of the law.3 As earlier pointed out, the reason behind par. (b), section 44 of the Local
Government Code is the maintenance party representation in the Sanggunian in accordance
with the will of the electorate.

The "last vacancy" in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the
member formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by
any of the causes already enumerated. The term "last vacancy" is thus used in Sec. 45 (b) to
differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. The term by no means refers to the
vacancy in the No. 8 position which occurred with the election of Rolando Lalas to the seventh
position in the Sanggunian. Such construction will result in absurdity.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 54675 dated October 7, 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
appointment of petitioner Purto J. Navarro to the Sanggunian Bayan of Mapandan, Pangasinan
is hereby AFFIRMED as valid and legal.

53