ore Gg alls ars ready-to-play de ae historical els [ game The aren ‘Offensive in this March 1918 Issue PLUS: SEO aces U.S. and Soviet Naval Doctrine in the 1980's Pe Orc * See te eae Sea Ce Me eine2 ‘SE Tnr. 83, published November/December 1980 dactics ‘The Magazine of Conflict Simulation ActDivector/Co-Eaior Executive Etor Ssstewrt Manasing ors Managing Ret Director Bat ese, Raber. Rrer ‘anbod aan ‘isos Ene Sth, Eatori Stat: Dart Exot Cari olde Phils Marchal: Pad Stevens Contrbuting Cdora: HA. Garmcy, Dara © [any AvA, No Susan 8: Bowie, Sd Sachcon, Gaphis Production: Fond Huchtnon” Ta Rolbr Subecrintion aliments Pl endl mgr, fick DiNardo, Mines! Esoge, Rabson Greene Sip hudba, Retna Why Yt aan, Waa (ing ont Sammon Prosuaton: Boinee mgr, Gran Wale Moran Gone Conor Pint Rete Oat aren Cy. ‘Be Gutong’ Poaoman Die Guta, Now York, N.Y. STRATEGY & TACTICS Magar cop © 1B by Sion P.iatinm, ne hes USA” Alaa earn Al a nd fend aol olatd be sae Sinus ten, in Ee Arne Tout ht RY inh, Sree © ae eS uoaas Ionbty Ge yon i oe) ubscptone ave 6D checks ow nee Sram! Bas dri dp pge grr produce Stow BTA & GUROFE: Bran and Euupeon customers should Since ne order fr SP pect sloop oh SULATIONS PlaLeSTeNS Uke RROD Crown Eas He tinenar, hehe, HATES Unt equrs Sage nego or SPUR poral 30 pu! yews AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND vents ‘ull fite nant enh ni ifaey SMULATONG PTY. tFonccs Bradt Rice sonst ana: Simulators ablxion ne dos not us const ueston sn sell gone ris srt 3 ar Spent ees ‘design of aractice wil find pubicabons in MOVES Magarin In al cx, Senet sesmereponay ach nace moe, Tre pubcaion of ad adres n Pl publatons dra. con itn dnt aos ror ae Sn from apseeringn hs bubleavora SPI oseves ee eect ay old “Ajuarisemants of SP products are backed by 9 guaranteed credit or cash ‘cin apo pari‘ os pec fe toy Sto ‘Snes presets diane nana Inthisissue page _ THE KAISER’S BATTLE 4 |The German Offensive, March 1918 Dick Rustin Simulation: 5 Von THE KAISER’S BATTLE cg, Y The German Offensive, March 1918 ane Joseph M. Balkoski Redmond A. Simonson TASK FORCE 5 U.S. and Soviet Naval Doctrine in the 1980's David C. Isby OUTGOING MAIL The Editors 2 FOR YOUR INFORMATION Brad Hessel (ed.) a BRIEFINGS FEEDBACK Vox Populi, VoxDei 50 SET rr, BENCLOSURES: 1. Kaiser’ Battle Playing Pieces 2. Kaiser's Battle Game Map Sp spi SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS, INC. 251 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10010 Telephone (212) 673-4103 3. Business Roply Form 4, Feedback Form ‘poms fs being printed, cli-cut, flied, collate, Looking Ahead to Next Time Thesubjoct of our ame in S&78tis Gronade, the February 1945 offensive against the Rhineland ‘Joe Balkoski designed the game and has cont iyuted an article on the same subject. Tho secane rile wil sisect the Batti of Bean, the Ts st tempt te subdue 8 navon by srpower alone. Pus ‘our ogular features. When to Expect Number 84 Domestic Subscribers: If you have not recsived ‘your copy at S788 by TBMarch 191, notify ost Customer Service Deparment. Pleste include ‘yout Customer Code and isu of expiration, both ‘of high should be found on thi esue's maling Iabel, just above your name. (Veteran subscribers please note that your Customer Code now con Elss of seven letter, and the label ets ony your ‘SGT sub expiration ) Foreign Subscribers: Adc ‘ight weeks to the above date to alow for the leaden pace of international al Outgoing Mai Works in Progress ‘The following lst includes all unpublished rojcts currently bing worked on. The iting for ‘game includes the tile, subject, designer, developer, and a one-word description of tha cur rant status of the gome. These descriptions in ‘hide Design {the geme is currenty beng desig fit; Develop Ita game is boing tested either at SP or by outside Dindtosers werking undar the vwatchtuleye ofthe RED soll, Eat aevslopmont work on the game is complsted, at feast in tho Opinion af the developer, and the game is Being Checked out by sainterestad REID sare Nahe AAD {the Art Depertment. copyediting ond cxoating graphics Tor the game); Production (ho arts fort Great Palace of Ontoncle (Draganduset ‘Adventure #1, unveiled at Ongins 80) Herag/Katp, Production, Gitadel of Blood (S45 charecier ne Daainiaze adventure); Sth Smith Production. Arse game Blade of Allactus (DraganCuasr Adventure Wi: Kera/Karp. Production “Magical Research and Spell Construction (Dragonduess Supplement #1: Eker, Kar, Fitch, Woeds/Ritcnie, Deveion Dawn of the Dead {A :oo:5a10n ofthe fim by the same aame, explore the eulnary dakgnts of provnoal Pennsyivaniah; Butorfold/Butori, Production, ‘Against Four Worlds |SF intorstlir warfare Hessel & Simoneen/Atche, Develop, Voyage of the Pandora (The Biclogel Survey ‘Mission goes where ne man has gone before, Buttered Butterfield. AD oman opie)“Tho Kar apes ho situation nah Hlagenburg and Uldendar thee an av ‘alse’ presance, 10 avoid ‘tated et ar, sbout ves The German Offensive — March 1918 ; 0440 on 21 March 1918, more than 6,600 German guns and 3,500 mortars opened fire on the 43-mile frant of the British 3rd and 5th Armies in Picardy. After five solid hours of gas and high explosive bombardment, the first waves of three German armies specially trained in infiltration tactics hit the stunned British line. By 23 March, the Germans were through British defenses in open country, threatening both to separate the British from their French allies and to drive them into the English Channel.“The Germans had done in less than three days ‘what the Western Als had faled 10 do in tee ‘and a half years of bloody fighting — they had broken the trench-werlare deadlock. World War | had entered a new nd deosive phase, and wat: {fare in general was on the threshold ata new ere But despite is early, smashing tactical suc oes, the German offensive Taled to achieve iis foal. the destuaton of the ona milion-man British Exoeeitionary Ferce in France. though the 5th Army was tm to shreds by the assau British and Franch rerves stemmed she ieealter two weeks of brut fighting that cost each side sore 380,000 casualties, Further, the alforsive cared with it seeds of struction ‘of the entre German er effort, Gaivenized by near-dsaster, the msjor Western Ales — Great Brin, France and the United States — putanndto patty jelousies ana bicker ing, end accepted » supreme commander for the ‘Western Font, General eter Pets Marshal Ferd and Foch of the Franch Army. From 28 March until the Armistice on 11 November, the Allied forces in France fought 9s 3 single entity, fist repaling atdtionsl German offansives itr inthe spting, and then going onto the offensive them seives, to ultimate victory, Kaiserschlacht Tha March alfansive. the biggest single drive boy any compatant inthe war, sins the first ant largest of the series designed fo end the war and ‘ring Germany peace an favorable terms. 1 goes by various names; some cell tthe Pesce Off Sve, others cal ty is codename, Michael. After insdazzingeary success, the Grmans, anxious Grape the drive with 2 majestic poltéal mantle, Degen to call the Kaserschach, the Kaise's Bere By whatever nome, it as made possible by the collapse the previous winter of the West's ussin als. This enabled Germany to switch 3 {otal of 42 auasions from the East tothe Westem Front and achieve, by mic-March T918, 9182-162 Advantage in diiskons over tho Ale, ‘But Dot sides resized thatthe German ad- vantage was a fleeting one that had tobe exploited ‘icky. Foran the othe sd of the Aanti, the ‘manpower seals wora boing loaded with tosh healiny young men, and it wes only @ matter of tima before thse scales would tip, once and for al backn favor athe Ae “The US, whieh nae entered the warin Ap 1912, had some 182,000 combat veops and four divisions in France in miciMarch 1918. Though hotbied by shipping shortages, tho American ‘commitment, exclusive of eervies reaps and div sions which id not see combat, would total ‘imost | Tmiban man and 28 divisions by the At rites (with four nfanty and tives ald arity ‘oqiments, an American cision was the rhumetea equiaientot twa Europaan divsion). “Thus, Gormany’s March clfensive wa the first spn of the wheel ia a gigantic gamble that Uukimately fale. For her, the negative payott was the Trealy of Versaites, whose hurting terms ontanad the causes of Werks War But theo! Fensve, withitssystemotic application ofthe arin- ‘ples of infiltration fo achieve breakthroughs on 2 massive scale, alsa contained a lagacy ofits own, Far an tha trenen-seare feiss of France in 1918 ‘were forged the foundations of Germany’srritary Tenaissance two decades later. ‘As wielded in 1918, tho jnfitration princi was an impertact weapon; not until Word War I ‘were modern armies provided witn the maby to ‘explo breakthrough on a grand scala. For Ger mary 1918, it was a race by her Toot soins against tho Fronch raiway systom, ever whieh Were eared he bull of the Aled reservas who ‘eventually halted the March offensive. orgaver, a8 we shal 360, the weapen also was wielded by a war-neakened Gormany that {ould nat afford fate. Yet the offensive and its toctios come very close to succes. Is falute wat due in larg maasure tothe failure of Genoral Exch LLudondor, the guiding bran of the German war machine, 16 cleily define strategie goals For the new wariresvatem. The Precursors ‘That Germany was ina position to launch a ‘maior offensive n 1918 retlacted 9 caveleade of tactical, pots! tore, a well 35 strategie developments which eccurred tho prior year. Tho olla of Russi, major German vetoris st Figa and Caporeno, mutinieain tha French Army, and ‘he wamendously costly British offensive at Pass chendeele sl conspired to place the Altos in 18 in the unaccustomed positon of being on the strategic defensive, Confident of utimats vitor, the Alles relucrariyagroed to postponeseeking 3 Tina! daossion against Germany url 1919, when the US would be abe to ring Fer fullmitary and Industral power to bear. 'All those past events made a Geiman offen sive posobe i 1918, Tae fact thst an offensive was necessary had its roots in the presont and Tuture; the Brilsh naval blockade wes severaty sapping Germany's capsbiity end willingness to Continue the war much longer, andthe implica tions of tne American buldup were ler, Of all the events of 1917, the one with the sgreatet implications for tha Wast was, of cours, ‘he ext from the war ef evolution torn Rusa, But while Russi proved to 86 the weak Ink in the Aid chain, Germany was faced with 3 host of ‘weakening ais — Ausira-Hungary, Turkay, and Bulgaria ~ rone ef whom appeared io be capable Df survivieg moce than another yea of wer \Whleimperia Fussia wasin ner death hroos, Germany hed been perfecting, egsinst_ both Fuss and Italy, © syetem of infancy and arilery tactics that wus be loaded ona massive salen the Westin 1918 “These were the so-called Muir tactic, nam 0 after Genaral Oskar von Hutie, uno in 1917 fommanded ie German tn Amy in sel. Fa ‘ed withthe tack of aseauling the Fortress city of Figa, which hed defied capture for more ihan ‘hres years, Hutorteok tne eity by surprise in 3 matter of daysin September, Assault troops ware opt 70 mise back from tha frontline unt 10 days before the atck, and then were moved up by Stages under cover af right Instead of teltalo rogistratons by arillary days bofore the attack, Huter used only a five-hour pralminary hurricane bombardment, empioying only gas for ihe fist two hours. Tho ssseult woops avoided enemy Stongpeints, and mado for rear arose, leaving follantip forces to deal with bypassed resistance. The fal of Riga, which apensd the road fora pos- sible German advance on the Russian capital of Petiogiad {ine present-day. Leningrad, shook Russia's resolve and as a major factor in knock ing her out oF he war {less than two months ater, the tacties were used with even more davestating effect against ‘the ftalins slong the Isenze Rivar in the Julian Alps, in northeastern Itsy. The resut was the ‘alastoohic defeat of Caportto, which thresten fd to knock Italy out ofthe war as well, A mere even Garman dvsions under General Otte von Below, operetng with Austr Hungarian forces, ttrew the lalans back 70 mos in lass than ‘month ang inte 600,000 cesuties. Whan the ivited foreas litte tothe asseult hed run outa steam, thay were only about 20 mies from Venica, Tobolstr ther alan ates, Sutsh senr Bd sions an the French 80a thas sienna thar forces in France jst as the Germans were Begin ning t Sitch fotoes from th eas. 5 (On the Western Front, Germany's twa maior ‘opponents were showing signs of serious wear, France hed been bled white by almost Tour veers ‘of war on her hame sol. Widespread marinas in 1917 had shaken the morale of her army to the core. Antiwar fever among the civil population had reached epidemic proportions. Many French ‘en were wiling to 6” the war even though Ger ‘many sill occupied large shoot of nerthorn and northeastern France France's depleted armies had done relatively lite fahting sins the camage at Verdun in 1816. By January 1918, Fronce had prevailed on the teluetant British 19 take over about 25 sdlitional miles of fronton the ight ofthe Bits ine, south ‘St, Quentin, As it turned out, ths thinly man hed sector wes tobe the area where the Germans made mee most striking gainsin March. Tho brunt of the fighting sinco Vordun had ‘been horre by the BEF under Fild Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, and it was a heavy burden indeed that Haig aid on hismen, His gruetng, tule tae ‘and a half month offensive at Passchendaele, in Flanders, nad cost tne Brhist 246,000 casualtlesin the summer and fall of 1917. A year earl, there had been the Somme offensive, with i 420,000, Briish casualties In_both cases. the gains amounted ig ahandtulof mies While Pasechendeele also severely shock the Germans, had an equal effect onthe British, par Uculary upon the Sth Army. With is divisions docimatod and a risusful eovernmant at hare Lunwing to send Haig sizable reinforcements for ture slaughter, the BEF in early 1913 was forced 1 reduce the number of bataions por division to nine from 12.38 the French and Germans had ‘done eat inthe war. With fow exceptions, one battalion in each ofthe three brigades of British ison wae astoivad, 8 men sent to {a out the ranks of othe batons “The Gorman and French had found such 2 reorganization tactically sound, for i gave 8 dv Sion greater flexbilty without seriously impaiing firepower, indeed, in some cates it actualy i proved firepower by provicing beter maneuver Bolity. Doubtless the British soon would have Giseovered the advantages 38 wel, Nad they ha {he time to adjust to the new systam. However, the reorgoniztion wins completed only two weeks before the Germans struck in Piety, and British Avisional cohesiveness stilwas weak Casting the Di ‘The German decision to stra in the West was taken on 11 Nevemoer 1917 ata conferencoin Mone, Belgium. It was meds by Ludendert, who bs Fist Quartermastor-Genal ofthe Getman Ae- ny ofiially was the number thyee man inthe ir pera military hierarchy, undar Kaisa Whol I, the Supreme Wer Lord, and Field Marshal Paui ven Hindenburg, Chief of the General Stall. Ac- tually, Hindenburg and Ludendortt had been un hing tha wa in the Kalser's name since assuming thet pasiions in August 1976. And, in thespitof German multarism, they wate effectively control ling the county’ spoltical destiny as wat Moraover it was tha forceful Ludendor who ‘was casing the die for Germany. Hindenburg mas Pot even present atthe Mons Conference, hich was aitendeby he chieis of staff a the twoarmy {Groups thar wareta carry ourthe artack ‘The aim of German afensive operations in 1818 was to destroy the Alles’ wl to ght belore the US could tip the balance. Ludendorff ected a defensive sttarogy for TSIB, although such a Course mignt have achieved the same aim for Gormany had Haig been given a frse offensive hand 10 batter himself bloody in 1918, es ne nad ‘done the prior two years. Indeed, Ludendert tury ‘expected another arch offensive in 1918, but he felthehadtogot his bows in rst.Foraithough Russa was on herway out, Ger- many stil was fighting the type of centlct sho always had dreaded: a two-front war. The second batted now was the home front, whore food shortages Nad raised the mortality rate of youths "Byears and younger te daublewhatthed been in 1913, ane whore peace demonstrations. by workers were raising ominous signals among 3 populace known for iis obedience to higher auton, “The question, then, was net whethor to at- tack, Out where. Ludendorf! decided on thelaca- tion in anuary. He assessed that the Bish ware the more dangerous enemy; the Brtsh could and Drobebly would eurvive and carry on the war ‘witneut the Franch, but France would cellapse, nd the war Would ba ended the BEF were rushed, ‘htan’sevletion from the Continont was 19 be a caetuly prapared and orchestrated afta It would open with "Michael," hammer blow by ‘iver German armies inthe St. Quentin area fpanst the sh 37d and 5th Armies, which (would be civen northwa'a, away rom the French fon thar righ, Subsequent atacks by exher forces fpeirst tne Bintan at ras and n Flanders, 10 the Forth, would ai in herding the BEF toveard tne (Channel coast I was expected that tho plight of tio Bran would forea the French to. siiteh Strong reserves northward, opening the way for German assaults against the French front. Then, ‘with tha entre lied tne in dsaray, the coup de grace would be delivered agaist the Brits, ‘With the exception ofthe envisioned coup de ‘grace, all the blows in tha broad-ranged plan c= {ally wera dalverad over the next three moths yet none achieved decisive results. In retespect, ‘mani historians beleve what several officersin th Gorman high command parenved prior 10.the ‘campaign, but what Luderdort vetused to see ‘parations an sich a vast canvas were bayond the Se0pe of Germany's power in 1818. Men assert that tha Germany's only hope of ending the war lay in one gigantic, undittused push, and some frgue that & should have boen made against tha French, who wall may have folded under the pressure The Field of Battle The.rea chosen for "Michael" was a43-mile stretch o front from just south of Arras to La Fare, fn the Oise Fiver It as gently roling country ‘which required extensive ferticeions For wroops Tobe truly affective in thedafonse. Running north to-south, it was cutin several paces by eost-vest valloys which knifed into the Bish rear. Ine mediately behind the front, the tarain was a ‘maonscape of devastation, the result ef delinerate fdemaltions by the Germans during a voluntary withdrawal in 1917, Mavernent off roads was © Doullen Map 1: German Advances, Operation “Michael” J = ae Front Line, March 21 jm me Front Line, March 24. Frontline, March27 A.M FrontLine, Apel fedious and time-consuming, even in good weather The narthrn 11 mies ofthe target aes wore defended by the 3rd Army, under Gareral Sir ‘ulin Byog. It had 10 dsions inthe front ine ‘along its tata! 28 mile font. which extondad north ff Aas, beyond the area of the ints] German Dasiaught. The 3d Army had four divisions in reserve ord 98 with it Bh Army neighbor to the South, thers ware two addtional dvsions in GEO reserve behind i. Six of the frantine-dwsions ‘would oe involved in the initial Garman attack Tha Army's averoge divisional Frontage wos bout wo miles, exremely dense by World Wart Standards, put about average forthe Werld War | Western Front, which had not seen mobile war faresince 1914” Oning tothe act that much of ee ‘Amy's terrain long had ben Beh hans, the fixed defenses were in goos condition. Tactical themaior weskness wasat thesouthem endot 6 ‘Army's line, where 2 salient atound Flesqusres jutied awkwardly into the Garman front. The Salient wos the ast remrant of eritory won by the British in thar offensive against Cambrai the previous November. The rest of the ground had bean taken back by the Germans in @ surprise ‘counterattack tha flowing month, Haig, creck Iy feonng sat the Geemane might pingh off the bulge, nad pressed Byna to abandon i, shorten his ine and make betta use ofthe two dhisions manning the position, But Byog was losthe 70 leer marale ‘by ordering that such hard-won round be given ua withaut ight The remaining 32 ries ofthe “Michaal'front ‘were defended oy the 5th Army, under Ganeal Sir Hubert Gough. The Army's total frontage was 42 miles, but the southern 10 miles were in the mar shy, almost impassible orain of the Oise valey fand were held by less than one division. Thus 10, find part of an 11th, frontline divisions of th Ae my wou ue attack by the Germans. Thete was ‘nly one nfenry vision in Army serv, which ‘350 incudad thvee cavaty divisions, The eavaly Civsions fought dismounted inthe battle. Each ha the rifle Strength of one-third of an infantry division, ith Army's these average divisional ‘frontage wuld have bardarad an the uncomtort= able, even had its fortfieations Bean in good Shape. But they were m poor eoncition, owing in pat toa shortage of labor. Also, about one-i ff the aes had been taken over fram tho French, ‘wholhadiet the french and redoubt network tals ‘odistepar. [Despite the organization into nine bettaon ivisions, the manpower station of Both the th ‘and 31d Armes was bordering on the erica. OF tha 21 divisions in the line on tho entre front 1g hod been chewed up at Pasachandacle. What replacements they had received were row con scripts, Whi historians even vod debate the ab Solve slate of the two Armies’ morao, thera no ‘tion that, relatively, Hwa9 atts west point BT the war, Though the {oops were to show in foming says thet thay stl had oloniy af fight lett in them, several altaions cracked under the Drossure of tha intial atsault and surondores wholesale, Haig rasbaenmuch otlzedfr allowing Sih ‘Aum tobe stetched so thinly, considering ihe in, ‘complet state of forteatons. But Haig view ‘54 the channo! paris and the rear ares command ‘nd communications canters in Flanders as NS ‘hist prontiae while onthe defensive In is view, tha tea behing the 6th Army spparentty had no ‘major evategie significance, and so he concen trated the bule a his forces fram Arras rox hare tothe channel north of Sd Army were the Tstand dnd Armies, with 2 total of 30 divisions, reusing Tour n GHO reserve, sietened aver a combined Semi rothThe Defense The Brtish defensive system consisted of tye sectars: the Farward Zone, the Batlo Zane, and tha Rear Area. Ideal, allweuld have boon lin fa with bared wie and trenches, snl vided by ‘Switch renches to seal off penetrations, much 25 2 ship's watertight compartments protect 3 torpedo! vesso's hold against flooding. And all three zones wouls have Been dotted with mutually ‘Supporting stiongpoints. containing ora, ‘machinegunnests and fielder. Although the 3ed Army Forward and Satie Zone were n good shape, and Sth Areny's ttl. “Zona was n acceptable ordi, the latter's For ward Zone was deficient in wonches. Because of ‘hat, and because the Army was stretched so thin Iv. is Torwere defenses consisted mainly of Songpents. ny succssstalinitaton ot 2 Foe ‘ward Zone defanded in that manner would cary ‘an enemy sizaight nto the Bate Zone, where most of the Bultsh divesonal artilery wa Tera emplaced. In the British dotensive scheme, the Forward Zona was supped ta dey the enemy fort OF three days, giving the Britsh high command suti- ‘ont time te assess the strength and direction of ‘an offensive. The decie struggle was to tke piace in the Batte Zone, whore duisionsl ana corps serves were to stop the enery and than ‘counterattack. Depths ef the two zones varied, bt thoy averaged ono to 1 miles, with a mio oF to interval between the zones ‘The Rear Area was supposed to be tho nal falback postion, and was situated four to eight mes betind the Battle Zane. However, the 310 ‘andSih Army sectors, the Rear Ares existed most: iy on paper, exoopt for a Tow stands of Dsrosa wro and couple of mies of tuned wrt here and thereanthe batt “The Bish were newcomers to the fed of defensive warfara, having bovn on the offensive ‘almost continously since 1915. Thus, they nas not learned the ponciples of distributing manpower ‘epth. tn whieh Be Germans had learned et Ivin the war and the French werajust beginning to ‘rasp. Consequently, boute third ol the atenath ‘leach iront- ne division was packed inte the FOr ‘ward Zone, within easy range otenamyarilry Having eccepted a detensive stance for 1918, the Briigh Tully expected To be attacked some ‘hers, i otal along that front. Yet Haig was not ‘over concerned, He judged th German potontil for ponetration bythe miniscule gains of his own ‘olfersves. Yet ho intanded, if necessary, to craw the soutnem wing af tn Army behind the Croat Canal and tho upper reaches of tho Somme River, ‘white maintaining a bridgehead aver the Sarvs {atthe key wansporation junction of Peronne. The ‘ra Amy would swing back ts rightwing to con: orm 9 such a movarient. Apa he eied onan in formal agreoment reached ine previous winter with General” Hear Petsin, the. French Commander in-Chit, for the mutual provision of roseevos if cris afoae in Pleardy or in Charm jpagne, the Franch sector which wa on tha 11 ‘ofthe British front Assault Forces Autayed against the Bish for Michael wore ‘three armies — from north ta south, the 708, 2nd, and 16th — containing # total of 70 fubstrength ‘visions. Three more divsions, algo at full ‘svength, werBin GHO reserve bohind 17th Army. “The dlasions had bean filed aut with eintor rmants Irom the Easter Fron, al of wham ware ‘en under 35. Al Westein Front men under 35 ‘were transfered. Tha assault lores, then, Fepresented the cream of what was loft of Ger ‘many's onea-magrificent army after four years of ‘or Behind it there was vitunlly nothing: the manpower reserves ef the home front hed been rained Of the 73 dvsions avlabe, 8 hed received special trang Over the winter in the new Hutiee tactical system. Seven more were deemed ft for tensive operstions. The temning 10 were so called “position divisions," and wers to act ethar aspvots for eerain offensive divisions, or were to lwaten quiet areas, such as the nose ct the Fls- uiars salon “Two of the most suocesstul peacitioners of ‘the new system were rough? in 16 commana at rise in the offensive, Below tock over the 17th ‘and Hutier, Fimsel, the 18th. The 2nd Army wes Commanded by General von der Marwit. Luder- ‘orf, n order to give himself contral ofthe entre ‘perstion, in January detached 18in Aimy from the Army Group of Crown Prince Fuppracht of Bavaria, and placed it under tha Army Group of the Imperial Crown Pring, ine Kalse’s $00. A ‘ily preperstions forthe Ith Army ware under Colonsl Georg Bruchmullor, who had ot chestiated ihe rutricene bombardments ga, Flaws Ludendort's lan called for 7th and 2nd Ar rns, each with 1 divisions in the ist wave and fight inreserve, copush generaly westwar, on 3 front of 8% miles each, to the Ine Croiilos Bapsume-Peronne. Then they would gradually wheel northwestward to roll up the Bash lng ‘rom the south. Tho Tih Army wouldactasan oF fonsivo flank guard to the south. Attacking on 8 mila front wth 12dsions inthe frst wave and §2intesarve,itwould reach the upper Somme and ‘the Crozat Canal, then later extend the flank southwestward 10 the Oise, Huter would be Propered ro engage and deflect stacks by French reinforcements. The Flesqueres salient, four miles {cross at the base and some 8 mils around the perimeter, would be pinched off but not atacked Inentaly ‘Tho basic flaw in the plan was its lack of strategic comprehensivansss. Although Michael he the bultn potential for breking the Western Front stalamote by sol, ts geagranhieal objec twos wore vaguely dtined. Worso sil from the Geiman stencpoint, Ludendorif was to chenge those objecives about every thre days as thot tie unfolded. As we shall 99, the attack produced success where he wanted it least, and Welded falure where he wanted success most. Rathar than reinforce suocess, Ludendortt continued to back is osing horses. though by the end of the ffensive on 6 Api the Garmans had punched up to 40 mes inta the British roar and had seed 2,000 squaremies of ertary, they were no closer ‘t@astatesiewerory than they woreon21 March. Contrast Miohao vith anatheriat- 2980 Gor man efor of another war: the Ardennes atfansive In December 1944. The objactive thera was simols {nd clear — Antwerp. Although the goal was be ‘Yond the capaciy of the altecking forces, at least hey knew where they were supposed to be headed afar they broke through the enemy front. Noteovn Michael There hove been few cases in miltary history where weather played such an importantand con. ‘woversial olvas on the opening day ofthe Michael offensive, On 20 March, after several cays of fine ‘woathor, olont rainstorms, and high winds lash fad northern France. The Germans were apprenon sive Because the inital phases ofthe preliminary ‘bombardment the next meming dapendes an the lavish use of gas. The winds threatened to cary it Deokio the German ines. But meteorologists promised @ break in the woather Tor the falloming dey. Hindenburg bordered Michal to begin on Schade Then the weather took an even more mor tous tur. Thick fog set in on the night of 203 March, blanksting the enti front.Itcontinued 10 thicken ae the German bombardment opened uo ou, ‘Debate over the elfects of th fog continues ‘2 years later. Those ansaus to explain away the Germans’ smashing inital sucoess assert thatthe fog completely blindfolded whe British. and rupted their theory of detense In the Forward Zone; sengpoints could not support one ‘another, and indeed few redoubis were able wen {o.efend themseives. In many cases, German at vance elements wore upon or past thom a fow foments after the bombardment was Ifted. The Bris artilry was hamperad bscause ts orouna ‘observers could Seo litle and its aoral absarvors ‘were giounded, Most of ine artery fire was rected st So-Called “right postions” — pre ‘arranged target area in No Man's Land or in the Garman vrench system, Continuing tho argument, IRigoftan painted out thatthe ati atilery and Infentry exacted aneavy tall on the Germans wnen ‘the fog nal ied, 9 tid amas cormporly by rica (On the Garman side, the fog confused the ‘assault soaps, who often blundered into British Srangpoints. But this contusion was not oitical bbocause the German loacing waves wore tained 1a Ignore those poins and push an, toward the Briosh anilery. The German arly, however, sufferad tho samo wsual problems a¢ the British DDuring the bombsrdient, i could not adjust ts fie for accuracy, and once the assault rosps wert init could not eifectwaly answer eal for support by the infantry. The bombardment pan cae Yor the German guns to fite “by the map," without presminary ranging. Because of the fog had 10 Continue to co so, Some Brish frsthano sc: ‘ours ofthat morning tll of German shells crop ing in tho same place for hours, missing British Strongooints by only few yards. However, ine ‘nd tring wea modified by the ft thatthe Ger ‘mans wore intimataly famitar with geographical Ibestions n the nich rear area, naving S=cupied ‘them for almost tree years prior o the voluntary with oF 1817 Events Unfold In eny evant, the bomberdment exacted 2 fearful tol the Forward Zone and derupted British command and cammunieations in the rear ‘teas. When ths leading waves of assault troops hit tho line at 0640, thoy had litle twoubio Benetating the Forward Zone at dozens of points. ‘The zone, which was suaposed to have delayed attackers Tor to or Hes days, baraly desyed them two or three hourst By the end cf the day, the entire Forward Zora from the Sensoe River, near Aras, to the ‘ise was in German hancs, and the Battle Zone ‘was penetrated or complotly broken through on Doth wings. Tho attompt to pinch off the Fies- quieres salon failed, nowover, and the Briish Sighty shortened hatin thre that nigh. ‘Oh the northern wing ofthe long tron, 170h ‘Army saveraly mauled Sth Army's Vi Corps and ‘raated. huge pocket, Oriles ross atthe base. Croisiles, the nerther objective of hati phase line, was iakon. In the south, 18th Army tore Ill Corps to jiaces and foread Army's right wing 1 with ‘raw over the Crozat Canal hat eight. All four of ‘th Army's reserve divisions had boon committed, nly nthe cantor was the German stack bogged dow. Thare, 2nd Army was stuok in the Batve Zone by the Tough resistance of Sud Army's IV Corps and Sth Army's Vil Corps, on the flanks of the Fesquieres salient The German inflation tactics, aided by the fog, had worked with deadly effectiveness in several areas, particularly inthe valleys that cat in to the Britah line. The Brivsh generally were 7