PROPERTY, OWN ERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFlCA TIONS 575

POSSESSI ON
Effects ~f Possession

§ 33.2. In a_dd!tion , the law also allows as an auxiliary remedy the

""rit of pr~lnnmary mandatory injunction to prevent further acts of
dispossession.

[88.3] Writ of Prelimin ary Mandatory Injunction

A writ of prelimin ary mandatory injunction is a judicial writ, a

fonn of provisional remedy, granted at any stage of an action prior
to judgmen t or final order therein comman ding or requirin g the
performance of a particul ar act. Prior to the promulg ation of the New
civil Code, it was deemed improper to issue a writ of prelimin ary
injunction where the party to be enjoined had already taken complet e
material possessi on of the property involved. 152 Said remedy was allowed
then only for the purpose of preventing further acts of disposse ssion. 153
However, with the enactme nt ofArticl e 539 of the New Civil Code, the
plaintiff in forcible entry case has since been allowed to avail of a writ
of prelimin ary mandato ry injunctio n to restore him in his possess ion
during the pendenc y of his action to recover possessi on. The second
paragraph of Article 539 provides:

"Art. 539.xxx
A possess or deprive d of his possessi on through forcible
entry may within' ten days from the filing of the complai nt
present a motion to secure from the compete nt court, in the
action for forcible entry, a writ of prelimin ary mandato ry
injuncti on to restore him in his possession. The court shall
decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing
thereof. "

The Code Commi ssion justifies the shift in the rule in the followin g
words: "The writ of prelimin ary injuncti on is called for by the fact that
there are at present prolong ed litigatio ns between the owner and the
usurper, and the former is frequen tly deprived of his possess ion even
When he has an immedi ate right thereto. " 154

152
Torre, et al. v. Hon. J. Querubin, et al., lOl Phil. 53 (l 957 ). .
is.,D . Ph.I -, (1909)· Delgado v. Carael, 37 Phil. 161 (1917).
evesa v. Arbes, 13 1 . - 73 '
154
Report of the Code Commissi on, 98 -
 PROPERTY
576

c t d provisions, the remedy of .

Pursuant to the a1ore-quo e Writ f
. . . . .
pre lumnary 111Junct10n can e
b avai·ted of at the start of the act1·0 n
.
°
on1
· • . c h rpose of restormg · . Y
the plaintiff
m cases of forcible entry 1or t e pu . i
·
possession but not in unlawful detamer.
However
'
m cases of
unlawfuln
• .
the issuance ·
of a pre1·1mmary writ .of mandatory act·ton can
detamer,
be availed of on appeal to the higher court 111 case the _appeal of the
I

\l
lessee is frivolous or dilatory or the appeal of the lessor is prirna Jacie
meritorious. 155
According to retired Justice Florenz Regala~o, with the enactment
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, specifical~y Sectt~n .33(1 )_ t?ereof, an
inferior court has jurisdiction to issue a wnt of prehmmary tlljunction in
56
either forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases. ' Under the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, it has now been made clear that the provisional
remedy of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is available at the
start of the action in both forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases.
Under the new rules, the said remedy is also available on appeal to the
Regional Trial Court whether the action is for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. Sections 15 and 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now
provide:

Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction. -The court may grant

preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing
further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible
entry or unlawful detainer may, within five ( 5) days from the
filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his
possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty
(30) days from the filing thereof.
Sec. 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case
of appeal. - Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10)
days from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial

155Art. 1674, NCC.

156} Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th Ed., 46, 786.
 PROP ERTY, OWN ERSHTP,
AND ITS MODI FIC ATI ON 577
S
PO SSESS ION
Effects of Possession
court, the latte\' may issue a
writ of preliminary mandato
injunction to restore the plaint ry
iff in possession if the court
satisfied that the defendant's is
appeal is frivolous or dilato
or that the appeal of the plaint ry
iff is prima facie meritorious.
comparing the provisions of
the present rules above-quoted
e provisions of the second pa with
1 ragraph of Article 539 and Ar
~~ the New C~vil Cod~ , t?e following ticle 167 4
are the notable changes: ( ~)
nedy of wnt of prehmmary the
r~ . . mandatory injunctions is now
t the start of the action b available
m oth forcible entry and un .
~ases; (2) the period for the law ful detam er
filing of the motion for issua
writ at the start of the action nce of the
has been reduced to five da
days counted from the time of ys from I 0
the filing of the complaint; (3)
remedy is now available on the same
appeal to the RTC whether
for forcible entry or unlawful the action is
detainer; and (4) the remedy
limited, on appeal, to causes of is no longer
action which arise from the co
lease. Hence, the rules stated ntract of
in Articles 539 and 1674 in
with the issuance of a writ of connection
preliminary mandatory injun
appear to have been modified. ction now

Art. 540. Only the posses

sion acquired and enjoy
of owner can serve as a titl ed in the concept
e for acquiring dominion.
(447)
Art. 541. A possessor in
the concept of owner ha
legal presumption that he s in his favor the
possesses with a just titl
obliged to show or prove e an d he cannot be
it. (448a)
Art. 542. The possessio
n of real property presu
movables therein, so lon mes that of the
g as it is not shown or
be excluded. (449) pro ve d that they should

§ 89. Possession in the Conc

ept of Owner
The following are the effec
ts of possession in the conc
owner: ept of
1) It raises a disputable presump
tion of ownership. 157
2) It creates a disputable presu
mption that the possessor ha
just title, for which he cann s

----
ot be obliged to show.158 Sinc
e
15 7 A
r'-rt . 433. NC'C.
l '\R
'' Art 54\ , NCC.
 57~ PROPERTY

ti1e ac tu al possessor under claim of. ownership

k. . enJ·oys, th
presumption of ownership, a party see mg t_o recove r th:
real property must rely on the strength of h1s or her c
rather than on the weakness of the defense.1s9 ase
3) It may ripen into ownership thru acqui~i~ive prescription 161)
upon compliance with the other reqms1tes mentioned .
· ·
Article 1118 of the NCC. In order to npen mto ownershiIn
possession must be in the concept ?fan ~wner _( en concep~~
de dueno ). 161 Thus, mere possession with a Juridical title
(or possession in the concept of a holder), such as by a
usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not
being in the concept of an owner, cannot r~pe_n ~nto ownership
by acquisitive prescription, unless the Jurtdical relation is
first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been
communicated to the other party. 162

[89.1] Presumption of Just Title

Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership. 163 In addition, the possessor in the conce
pt of
owner (en concepto de dueno) has in his favor the legal presumptio
n that
be possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show it. 164
This
presumption can be availed of by the possessor in cases where
another
person claims a better right over the property. In action reivindicato
ria,
for example, the person who claims that he has a better right
to the
property has the burden of proving his title, in addition to provin
g the
identity of the land claimed. 165 In other words, the plaintiff must rely
on the strength of his own title, not on the weakness of the defend
ant's
title 166 because the latter enjoys the presumption of just title
which he
cannot be obliged to show.

159Palali
v. Awisan, 612 SCRA440 (2010).
160Art. 540, NCC.
161Arts. 540
and 1118, NCC.
162
Esguerra v. Manantan, G.R. No. 158328, Feb. 23, 2007.
163 Art.
433, NCC.
164Art.
541, NCC.
165 Art.
434, NCC.
166Huchi
son v. Buscas, G.R. No. 158554, May 26, 2005.
 PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP,
AND ITS MODIFICATIONS
POSSESS ION 579
EITects of Possession
The presumption, however,
is disputable and may be reb
proof to the con:~ry. So ~0 ng utted by
as the person claiming a be
unable to prove is own ht1e, tter right is
the presumption prevails in
ossessor en concepto de duen favor of the
o . Hence, the latter is not ev
~rove his titl~. If such ot~er pe en requjred to
rson,_however, prevails in ov
the presumption by proving erthrowing
the existence of his title upon
claim is based, the possessor is which the
now obliged to show and pro
ve his title.
The presumption of the exist
ence of a just title in favor
possessor en co~~epto de du of the
e~o may not be availed by
purpose of acqumng ownersh him for the
ip through acquisitive prescri
the latter purpose, the law req ption. For
uires that the just title of the
roust be proved: possessor

"Art. 1131. For the purposes

of prescription, just title
must be proved; it is never pre
sumed." (New Civil Code)
[89.2] Meaning of "Just Tit
le"
Although the wordings of Ar
ticle 541 seem to suggest tha
term "just title" refers to writte t the
n documents, it must not be
in such restricted sense. Th interpreted
e term "just title" should be
referring to that which is legall construed as
y sufficient to transfer ownersh
thing or the real right to wh ip of the
ich it relates. 167 Consequentl
proved orally by witnesses y, it may be
as well as through written do
evidences. cuments or

(89.3] In Relation to Acqu

isitive Prescription
Acquisitive prescription is a
mode of acquiring ownership
possessor through the requis by a
ite lapse of time. 168 In order
ownership, possession must to ripen into
be in the concept of an ow
peaceful and uninterrupted. 169 ner, public,
Only possession acquired an
the concept of an owner, the d enjoyed in
refore, can se~e. ~s a t~tle for
dominion.110 Thus, mere posse acquiring
ssion with a Jund1cal title, su
ch as by a

1674 Manresa
245 _246 ; 248 , cited in II Tolentino, Civil Code, 1992 Ed.
l68E , 283-284.
' sguerra v. Manantan , GR . . No. 1583?8 Feb. 23, 2007; see also Marce
SCR.A 800, 807-808 (1999). - ' lo v. CA, 305
169Art. 1118, NC
C.
170
Art. 540. NCC.
 580 PROPERTY

usuftu ctuary , a trnstee, a lessee , an agent or a pled~ee, not bein .

the concept of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acqu) .1h
prescriptio n, unless the juridi.cal relatio
. . fi t . I
n is rs express Y repuct·, 1t1ve
and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party.1 1i Aatect 1

of possessory character executed due to Iicense. b

or . Y mere toleran ceCb~
the owner would likewise be inadequate .112 Possesswn , to constitut of
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueno e the
use the co1mnon law equivalent of the term, that possession . , or, to
should
adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not s be
the running of the pe1iod of prescnpt10n
• •
.
173 tan

Marcelo v. Court of Appeals

305 SCRA 800 (1999)
The heirs of the deceased Jose Marcelo filed with the RTC an actio
to recover a portion of an unregistered land in Sta. Lucia, Angat , Bulacan~
They alleged that two parcels of land, owned by the late Jose Marcel
o and
his spouse, had been encroached by Femando Cruz and Servando
Flores.
After trial, a decision was rendered in favor of the heirs of Jose Marcelo
:
however, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the same was reversed.
Hence,,
this petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which ruled
that the
action initiated by Marcelo's heirs would not prosper on the theory that
Flores
already has acquired ownership of the disputed land by ordinary acquisi
tive
prescription.
According to Marcelo's heirs, the parcel of land subject of litigation was
originally owned by Jose Marcelo and they had been in continuous possess
ion
thereof since 1939. In 1967, they discovered that a portion of said propert
y had
been encroached upon by Cruz, but Cruz still sold his property, includin
g the
encroached parcel of land to Flores. Cruz, however, alleged that the
disputed
land is part of the land he acquired in 1960 from the heirs of Jorge Sannien
to,
which he (Cruz) had surveyed and declared for taxation purposes.
Then, in
1968, he sold the whole lot to Flores who then occupied and cultivat th
ed ~
same.
I,
I
I
[I

171 . . ui v. CA,
I Esguerra v. Manantan, supra; also in Marcelo v. CA, supra, citing Manateg
unav.
205 SCRA 337; Adille v. CA, 157 SCRA 455; Bargayo v. Camum
ot, 40 Phil. 85?; Lag
Levantino, 71 Phil. 566.
172 Art.
1119, NCC.
173 Esguer
ra v. Manantan, supra; also in Marcelo v. CA, supra.
 PROPERTY, OWN ERSHIP
. • AN D lTS MODIFICATIO
POSS ES SION NS 581
Effects of Pos session
Th e contract ex ecute d by Cr
u z and the heirs of Sarm
. croacbed property, as fou iento includes the
t1<l by the tri al co urt and
en
when C. z sold the land to the appella te court. An d
.1u . Flores th \ ·
, e atter 1mmed1· ately too
of the satne to th ~ e~clus,on
of al\ oth ers and promptly k po sse ssi·on
hereon. From th0t tim e on pa id the realty taxes
, Flores had been in posse
the concep~ of an ow ne r a~ 1 ssi on of the en
;
11 ~ ~olding it in that capacity for alm tire area
before tbe hetrS of M arc elo ost 14 ye ars
~h at ed their complaint
e cas e supported the ho ldm in 1982. Th e records of
tiI g of the appellate court
. . h
for ordinary pr es cn ph ?n av tha t the requirements
e b_een duly met. Flores
ontroverted property m go took possession of the
od faith and with jus t titl
: as an integra~ pa rt of !h e because the said po rti on
e big ge r tract of land wh
further, Flores possess_ion ich he bought from Cruz.
was no t only in the conc
public, peaceful a~d unmt ept of an owner bu t also
errupted. Hence, the Court
to reverse the findmgs of the found no cogent reasons
appellate court and thus ga
assailed decision. ve its affirmance to the

Art. 543. Each on e of

th e participants of a thi
mon shall be de em ed ng possessed in co m-
to have exclusively po
be allotted to him upon ss es se d the part which ma y
th e division thereof,
which the co-possess for the entire period
ion lasted. Interruptio during
whole or a part of a thing n in the possession
possessed in common of th e
of all the possessors. shall be to the prejudic
However, in case of civ e
Court shall apply. (450a il interruption, the Ru
) les of

§90. Co-possession
As discussed in supra§ 87
in relation to Article 538, the
not recognize the possibility law does
of possession de facto residi
time in two different persona ng at the same
lities unless they are co-pos
course, the concept of co-p sessors. 114 O f
ossession implies that the
matter thereof is undivided an thing subject
d there are two or more posse
co-possession is under claim ssors. If the
of ownership, each of the co
considered as the possessor -possessors is
of the whole and over the wh
exercise the right of possessio ole each may
n, subject to the si~ilar right
co-possessors. This state of
affairs will last until the pa
?~ the other
property. In the event of parti rtition of the
tion, however, each of the
shall be deemed to have ex co-po_ssessors
clusively possessed the pa
be allotted to him for the en rt which may
tire period that the state of
co-possession

--------
174A rt , 538 , NCC.
I

II
I
I
 PROPERTY
582

. tion in the possession of the WhO1

lasted. However, any tnterrup
175 n shall be to the prejudice of e 0r
part of a thing possessed in commo all the
co-possessors. 11()
. · · les may be illustrated as follows: "A ,,,,
The foregomg pnnc1p 1 f land under claim of ' 8''
and "C" are co-possessors of a parce O · ~wnership
and in good faith for a period of eleven years, th~ possession _being
. d hr "C ,, On the eleventh year, the co possessors <livid d
exercise t oug11 • . . e
the property in three equal parts, each takmg exclusiv_e_ pos~~ssion of
their part after the division. Two years after th e partition, C" died.
During his lifetime, "C" disposed of the prop~rty all~tted to him.
After his death, however, his heirs filed an action agamst "A" and
"B" claiming ownership of a portion of said property on the ground
that their predecessor-in-interest was the actual posse~sor of the same
and became the exclusive owner thereof through ordinary acquisitive
prescription. In this case, the claim of the heirs will not prosper since
"A" and "B" will be deemed as the exclusive possessors of the part
allotted to them during the eleven years that the co-possession lasted.
Under the law, "C" is deemed as never to have possessed at all the parts
allotted to "A" and "B."
In case of interruption, the law says that the same shall affect the
interest of all. This may be illustrated as follows: "A," "B" and "C"
are co-possessors of a parcel of land under claim of ownership, the
possession being exercised through "C" for a period of six years. On
the seventh year, "X" took possession of one-third of the area of the
land in the concept of an owner and adverse to the interest of the co·
possessors and continued to possess the same until the co-possessors
decided to divide the property possessed in common on the eleventh
year. In this situation, the interruption of possession in connection wi th
11
11
' I one third of the area of the land will prejudice not only "C" but also ail
,' I the co-possessors. Hence, the co-possessors can claim ownership onl_Y
th15
'
'I I
of two-thirds of th~ area through acquisitive prescription and onlY
area can be the subJect of partition among the co-possessors.
• ·ved
Art. 544. A po~se~sor m good faith is entitled to the fruits recei
before the possession 1s legally interrupted.

175
Art. 543, NCC.
176/d.
 PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, ANO JTS MOOJFICATfONS 583
POSSESS ION
Effects o f Possession

Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from the time
they are gathered or severed.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong to the possessor
in good faith in that proportion. (451)
Art. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases there should be any
natural or indust~ial !ruits, the possessor shall have' a right to a part of the
expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in propor-
tion to the time of the possession.
The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the two posses-
sors.
The owner of the thing may, should he so desire, give the posses-
sor in good faith the right to finish the cultivation and gathering of the
growing fruits, as an indemnity for his part of the expenses of cultivation
and the net proceeds; the possessor in good faith who for any reason
whatever should refuse to accept this concession, shall lose the right to
be indemnified in any other manner. (452a)

§ 91. Right of Possessors to Fruits

As discussed in supra § 40.1, the general rule with respect to the
ownership of the fruits is that the same belong to the owner pursuant to
the law on accesion discreta embodied in Article 441 of the New Civil
Code. Now, whether the possessor is in good faith or in bad faith, he
is not the true owner of the property in his possession because there
is a flaw or defect in his title or mode of acquisition which has the
effect of invalidating it - the only difference between these two kinds
of possessors is that the former is not aware of the existence of such
flaw or defect while the latter is aware of the same. Since the possessor
(whether in good faith or in bad faith) is not the true owner, a question
will arise with respect to his rights over the fruits. This question is
answered by the provisions of Articles 544, 545, and 549 of the New
Civil Code. Pursuant to these articles, the rights of possessors in relation
to the fruits shall depend on his good faith or bad faith and on whether
such fruits have already been received by him or are still pending:

I. Possessor in Good Faith

A. Fruits Already Received

(91.I] Rule
The rights of a possessor in good faith in relation to fruits already
gathered or severed by him are governed by the provision ofArticle 544

J
 584 PROPERTY

II
I
I of the New Civil Code. It is clear that this article applies to situ .
where the fruits have already been gathere d smce . h . . at1on
t e prov1s1on s 3
.
of "fruits received. " Pursuant to this . l th . Peaks
art1c e, e possessor tn good f: . ·
~p is entitled to the fiuits received by him before his possession is lega;th
I
iii intenupte d. This is one of the exception s to the rule embodied in Art~ Y 1

! . . IC
lI 441 of the New Civil Code. In other words, thts ts one of the instancee 1

. s
where the owner is not entitled to the fru its.

:! 1
[91.2) Interruption of Good Faith
From the wordings of Article 544, it may appear that the
interrupti on of good faith is required to be "legal" in nature in order
for the possessor in good faith to lose his entitleme nt over the fruits.
But this is not necessaril y so. The provision of this article must be read
in conjuncti on with the provision s of Articles 549 and 528 of the New
Civil Code. In Article 549, it is clear that a possessor in bad faith has
no right over the fruits received by him. In Article 528, on the other
hand, it is stated that the possessio n in good faith loses its character
as such, and therefore turns into bad faith, "in the case and from the
moment that facts exist which show that the possesso r is not unaware
that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongly." In other words,
every possessor in good faith becomes a possessor in bad faith from the
moment he becomes aware that what he believed to be true is not so. 177
Conseque ntly, possessio n in good faith ceases from the moment defects
in the title are made known to the possessor s, by extraneou s evidence or
by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. 178 Whatever may
be the cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor
has knowledg e of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it m~ st
be considere d sufficient to show bad faith. 179 Hence, the interruption
of good faith on the part of the possessor need not occur by reason of
initiation of legal proceedings. This is also discussed in supra § 82.3.
I I In Tacas v. Tobon, 180 the Supreme Court held that if there are 00
other facts from which the interrupti on of good faith may be determined ,

I i v. Abioo, 482 SCRA 23 (2006), citing Tacas v. Tobon, 53 Phil. 356 (1 929)·
177 Ballesteros
I
mortiz v. Kayaoao, 92 SCRA 146 ( 1979).
119wong v. Carpio, 203 SCRA 118 ( 1991 ). S)'
. 1so53 Phil. 356 (1929); see also_ Mindanao
Ac~demy, Inc. v. Yap, 13 scRA !90
Omz v. Kayanan, 92 SCRA 146 ( 1979), Wong v. Carpio, id. ; Maneclang v. Baun, 20 8 SC feb-
£:~19
I II (1992); Suobiron v. CA, 250 SCRA 184 (1995) and Ballesteros v. Abioo, G.R. No. 14336 I'
I 9, 2006.
l
 PROPERTY, OWNERSHLP, AND ITS MODIFICATfONS 585
POSSESSION
Effects of Possession

and an actio~1 is filed to recover possession, good faith ceases from the
date of receipt 0 ~ the summons to appear at the trial and if such date
does not appear 111 the record, that of the filing of the answer would
181
control. In other words, it is only in case of absence of facts from
which the interruption of good faith may be determined that Article 544
\?
shall app_ly, the sens_e th~t such interruption shaIJ be by way of "legal
interruption, and which ts reckoned from the date of receipt of the
summons or from the filing of the answer, as the case may be.

[91.3) When Fruits Considered "Received"

As to when fruits are considered "received" shall, of course,

depend on the kind of fruits involved. With respect to natural and
industrial fruits, they are considered received from the time that they
are gathered or severed. With regard to civil fruits, they are deemed to
accrue daily. Hence, the possessor in good faith shall be entitled only
to those which have accrued prior to the interruption of his good faith.
To illustrate: The property is being rented out by the possessor in good
faith and the rent is being paid on a monthly basis in the amount of
P30,000.00. Let us say, for example, that the possessor in good faith
received the summons on the 11th day of the month of October, he
will nonetheless be entitled to get his share of the. rental payment for
that month in the amount of Pl0,000.00, representing the rent which
accrued prior to the interruption of his good faith.

B. Pending Fruits
[91.4] Rule
The rights of a possessor in good faith in relation to natural and
industrial fruits which are still pending - or those that have not yet
been gathered or severed - are governed by the provisions of Article
545 of the New Civil Code. Note that the concept of pending fruits can
only apply to natural and industrial fruits but not to civil fruits since the
latter accrue on a daily basis.
According to Article 545, if at the ~ime t~e good faith ceases,
there should be pending natural or industnal fruits, the possessor and

--------
1s1M .
aneclang v. Baun, id.
 ◄
586 PROPERTY

the owner shall have o right to a part or the net harvest and each shall
divide the expenses of cultivation, both in proportion to the time of their
respective possessions. If the owner does not want to pay hi s share of
the expenses incurred in connection with the cultivation, he may, at his
option, allow the possessor to finish the cultivation and gathering of
the growing fruits (in lieu of his part of such expenses), in which case,
the owner will not have any share in the harvest. If the owner chooses
this option and the possessor refuses to accept the concession "for any
reason whatever," the latter shall lose the right to be indemnified in any
other manner. In other words, the possessor must accept the owner's
choice, otherwise he will lose the right to be indemnified and this rule
will apply even if the value of the fruits is less than the amount of the
expenses incurred.
With respect to charges, the same shall also be divided by the
possessor and the owner, in proportion to the time of their respective
possessions. According to Manresa, 182 the term "charges" in Article 545
is understood to be those expenses incurred not on the thing itself, but
because of it or on account of it. An example of charges are the taxes
incurred, whether on the capital or on the fruits.

[91.5] Rules Do Not Apply to Trees

The rules discussed above (supra§§ 91.1 up to 91.4) are applicable

only to fruits as these terms are defined in Article 442 of the New Civil
Code. Said rules do not ordinarily apply to trees because the latter are
not considered as fruits unless they are being exploited for an industry,
in which case, they are classified as industrial fn1its. 183 Hence, with
respect to trees that are not being exploited for an industry which may
have been planted by the possessor in good faith, the rules on accesion
industrial shaU apply, taking also into considerations the good faith or
bad faith of the landowner.

182
4 Manresa, 5th Ed., 243.
183
3 Manresa, 6th Ed., p. 191.
 PROPERTY, OWNERSHTP
Poss'EAS- ND ITS MOD IPrCATJONS 587
~· SJON
Effects of Possession

11. Possessor in Bad Faith

A. Fru its Alr ead y Received
[91.6) Rule
. .
The pos sess or is enti tled to th e c.inu.ts so long as he 1s m goo d
· h 1s4 E 'f tled to the
fait · rgho , i t1le ~os sess or is in bad faith he is not enti ..
. d b h.
same. w 11et ·.er the fnu ts hav e alre ady be en receive y 1m or are st1Jl
th d d . db
pendmg. Wit. h resp ect. to fruits that have be en ga ere an rece ive y
cle 549 applies:
a pos sess or m bad faith, the prov isio n of Arti
l reim burs e
"Ar t. 549 • The pos sess or in bad faith shal
timate pos sess or
the frui ts rece ive~ and those which the legi
righ t only to the
cou ld hav e rece ived , and shall have a
cle 546 and in
exp ens es men tion ed in para grap h l of Arti
rov eme nts for
Art icle 443 . The exp ens es incurred in imp
refu nde d to the
pur e lux ury or mer e plea sure shall not be
the obje cts for
pos sess or in bad faith, but he may rem ove
pro vide d that the
whi ch suc h exp ens es hav e been incurred,
law ful pos sess or
thin g su:ffers no inju ry thereby, and that the
valu e they may
doe s not pre fer to reta in them by pay ing the
(445 a)"
hav e at the tim e he ente rs into possession.
faith shal l hav e the
Und er this arti cle, the pos sess or in bad
actually rece ived by him but
obligation to reim bur se not only the fruits
also thos e "which the legitimate possessor
could have rec eive d" By
have rece ived is mea nt all
fruits whi ch the legi tim ate pos sess or cou ld
own er cou ld hav e rece ived
natural, indu stri al or civi l fruits whi ch the
e not so rece ived by the
had he bee n in pos sess ion and whi ch wer 185

or bec aus e of his frau d, aba ndo nme nt or negligence.

possess
the pos sess or in bad
In con nec tion with the fruits rece ived by
to the legitimate possessor,
faith of whi ch he is requ ired to reim bur se
less gran ts the pos sess or in
Article 549 of the New Civ il Cod e non ethe
te pos sess or the exp ense s
bad faith the righ t to reco ver from the legi tima

Alca la v. _Hernandez, 32 Phil. 628 (1915);

t84Aquino v. Taiiedo, 39 Phil. 517 (I 919); .
a v. Calma, 56 Phil. 102 (1931).
Tolentino v. Vitug, 39 Phil. 126 (191 8); Calm esa, 5th Ed., 252-2 53; Direc tor
isssee C agmo • c· -1 C o de , 1966 Ed ·• 205 , citin g4 Manr
11 a, 1v1

of Lands v. Abag at, 53 Phil. 147.

n1enti01~ed in Arti_cle 443 of the ~ ew Civil ~ ode - expenses for
product:1on. gathenng and preservation of the fnuts - upon the latt . ,
re~eipt of the reimbursement. As int!mated in sufra § 41 .2, Article : ~;
wlll_~pply reg~dless_of th~ good fa~th or bad faith of the possessor. In
add1t1on, the sa1~ a1t1cle will apply irrespective of whether the amount
of the expenses incurred far exceeds the value of the fruits. 1s6
Aside fron1 the expenses n1entioned in Article 443, the possessor
in bad faith is likewise entitled to reimbursement for the necessary
expenses incurred by hitn for the preservation of the land 187 or the
thing 188 which bore the fruit.

B. Pending Fruits
[91.7) Rule

Note that the application of Article 549 is limited only to cases

where the fruits have already been gathered or severed since the article
speaks of "fruits received." Hence, if the legitimate possessor is able to
recover the property from a possessor in bad faith at a time when the
fruits are still pending, it is not Article 549 that will apply but Article
449 of the New Civil Code. As a consequence, the possessor in bad
faith will not be entitled to any reimbursement of the expenses he
incurred in relation to the fruits, including the expenses he incurred
for its production because these expenses are ·reimbursable to the
possessor in bad faith if the fruits have already been received by the
latter. However, the possessor in bad faith is still entitled to recover the
necessary expenses incurred by him for the preservation of the land 189 or
the thing 190 which bore the fruit.

[91.8) Rule with Respect to Trees

For trees that were planted by the builder in bad faith, the nil es on
accesion industrial will apply. Hence, in connection with these trees,
the landowner may exercise the options discussed in supra§ 47.2.

186
See supra § 42.4.
187
See Art. 452, NCC.
188See Art. 546, 1st par., NCC, in relation to Art. 549, NCC.

189
See Art. 452, NCC.
190See Art. 546, 1st par., NCC, in relation to Art. 549, NCC.
 S 589
PRO PERT Y, O W NE RS HIP, AND ITS MOD IFICATrON
POSS ESS ION
Effects of Posse ssion

to every poss esso r;

Art. 546. Necessary_expenses shall be refunded
n the thing until he has
but only the poss esso r m good faith may retai
been reimbursed therefor.
poss esso r in good
Useful expe nses shall be refunded only to the
who has defeated him in
faith with the sam e right of retention, the person
amount of the expe nses
the possession having the option of refunding the
may have acquired by
or of paying the increase in value which the thing
reason thereof. (453a)
ved with out dam age
Art. 547. lfthe usef ul impr ovem ents can be remo
faith may remo ve them ,
to the princ ipal thing , the poss esso r in good
on exer cise s the optio n
unle ss the pers on who reco vers the poss essi
unde r para grap h 2 of the prec edin g artic le. (n)
sure shal l not be
Art. 548. Expe nses for pure luxu ry or mere plea
remove the orna men ts
refunded to the poss esso r in good faith; but he may
if it suffers no injur y
with which he has embellished the principal thing
does not pref er to refund
thereby, and if his successor in the possession
the amo unt expended. (454)
burse the fruits
Art. 549. The possessor in bad faith shall reim
r could have received,
received and thos e which the legitimate possesso
tioned in paragraph 1 of
and shall have a right only to the expenses men
rred in impr ovem ents for
Article 546 and in Article 443. The expenses incu
ded to the poss esso r in
pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refun
h such expe nses have
bad faith, but he may remove the objects for whic
injury thereby, and that
been incurred, provided that the thing suffers no
by paying the valu e
the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them
n. (455a)
they may have at the time he enters into possessio

enses
§ 92. Right to Necessary, Useful and Ornamental Exp
[92.1] Kinds of Expenses
esso rs of
The law recognizes three kinds of expenses that poss
ession thereof,
property may have incurred in connection with his poss
; 192 and (3)
namely: (1) necessary expenses; (2) useful expenses
19 1

expenses ). 193
expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure (or ornamental
e three
Note that the Civil Code did not define the concept of thes
upon the right
kinds of expenses but only provide for their effects
, described
of the possessors. The Spanish Commentators, however

19 1
Art. 546, 1st par., NCC.
192
Arts. 546, 2nd par. and 547, NCC.
193
Arts. 548 and 549, NCC.
 ◄

590 PROPERTY

necessary expenses as those made for the preservation of the thing194

or those without which the thing would deteri.orate or be lost. 195 Our
Supreme Court, on the other hand , defined necessary ex pen ses as those
incuned not for improvement but for the preservation of the thing
and are intended not to increase the value thereof but to prevent it
from becoming useless. 196 Following this concept, our Court held that
expenses incUITed in the repair of a house which is almost in ruins in
order to preserve it are considered necessary expenses 197while expenses
for filling a lot and building a house thereon cannot be considered
necessary expenses because they do not in any manner tend to preserve
the property. 198 Likewise, the expenses incurred by the possessor in bad
faith to develop the land and protect it from squatter syndicates are
necessary expenses, for which a possessor in bad faith is entitled to be
reimbursed. 199
The concept of necessary expenses under the Civil Code must
have reference to those which are necessary for the preservation of
the existence of the thing itself and not to those which are merely for
the preservation of the possession of the thing. 200 As such, land taxes
(real estate taxes) are not considered necessary expenses under the
provisions of Article 546 of the New Civil Code because they are not
for the preservation of the thing itself but only for the preservation of its
possession. Instead, they are regarded as "charges" which the possessor
and owner must bear in proportion to their respective possessions
pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Article 545.
Useful expenses, on the other hand, are those incurred to give
greater utility or productivity to the property. 201 These expenses increase
the value of the thing and result in improvements, called useful
improvements. 202 Thus, expenses incurred for the construction of a wall

194
4 Manresa 258.
195
Scaevola, Comentarios al Codigo Civil, 408. See also NHA v. Manila Seedlings Bank
Foundation, Inc., 794 SCRA 1 (2016).
196
Rivera v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 40 Phil. 717.
197
Angeles v. Lozada, 54 Phil. 185 (1929).
198
Alburo v. Villanueva, 7 Phil. 277 (1907).
19
9NHA v. Manila Seedlings Bank Foundation, Inc., supra.
200
4 Manresa 271-272.
201
n Tolentino, Civil Code, 1992 Ed., 294.
20
~See Art. 547, NCC.
 Pit ( )Pl ~l(1 Y, <>WN1 ms 1111', A N I) ITS MODIFI CATIO NS 59 1
P< >SSESS ION
l~ffoct~ of' l'oRflCRR ion

surroundi_ng the _e state, the construction of an irrigation system and the

introduction of 11nprovcments in an uncultivated land were classified
as useful expen ses by our C ourt. 7•n Those incurred for a chapeJ,21l an 11

electric syslem or an elevator in a building,2'15 a fi shpond /'"' dining room,

kitchen , closets or bathrooms,2' 17 are al so considered useful expenses.
Ornamental expenses or expenses for pure luxury, as
distinguished from useful expenses, are those which do not increase the
productiveness of the thing but merely embellish the same. Although
expenses for pure luxury also result in improvements ("ornament"),
such improvements, however, are for the convenience of definite
possessors only. In other words, the resulting benefit or advantage
is merely accidental or for the benefit only of particular persons. In
useful expenses, on the other hand, the resulting benefit is essential and
absolute which is available to all who may have the thing.

[92.2] Right of Possessors to Necessary Expenses

Whether in good faith or in bad faith, a possessor is entitled to
the refund of necessary expenses incurred by him. 208 In addition, a
possessor in good faith is also entitled to retain the thing until he has
been reimbursed therefor. 209 Note that this right of retention in relation
to necessary expenses is available only to a possessor in good faith. 210 A
possessor in bad faith has no right of retention.

[92.3] Right of Possessors to Useful Expenses

Only the possessor in good faith is entitled to the refund of useful

expenses. 211 Stated otherwise, a possessor in bad faith is not entitled to
the refund of useful expenses. In making the refund, the owner ( or the
person who has defeated the possessor in good faith in the possession)

203 Valenzuela v. Lopez, 51 PbjJ. 279 ( 1927).

2°"Gongon
v. Tiangco, (CA) 36 O.G. 822.
205
4 Manresa 242.
206 Rivera v. Roman Catholic Church, supra.
~07 Robles v. Lizarraga, 42 Phd. 584 ( 1921 ).
208
Art. 546, I st par. , NCC.
~()Q Art. 546. I st par.• id.

: wld.
2 11
Art. 546, 2nd par.. NCC.
I,
I
1
592 PROPER TY

has _the optio~: (I) to re~d the a1:nount of the expen~es; or (2) to pay
the mcrease m value which the thmg may have acquired by reason of
the useful expenses. 212
Until the possessor in good faith is reimbursed the useful expenses
in the manner mentioned above, he also enjoys the right to retain the
property. 21 3 This right of retention will be discussed extensively in infra
§ 92.3 (a).

The possessor in good faith may, in lieu of reimbursement for

the useful expenses, remove the useful improvement but subject to
compliance with the following requisites:
( 1) The removal can be done without damage to the principal
thing. 214 By damage, it means that which reduces the value of the thing
and not simply natural damage resulting from the separation of the
accessory and the principal. 215 Hence, if only ordinary repairs will be
needed by the separation, the separation will be permissible. 216
(2) The owner does not choose to appropriate the improvements
by refund ing to the posses sor in good faith the useful expenses in the
manne r discus sed above. 211 Stated otherwise, the owner can prevent the
posses sor in good faith from removing the useful improvements either
by paying the posses sor in good faith the actual amoun t of the expenses
or the increa se in value which the thing may have acquir ed by reason of
the useful expenses.
Does a posses sor in bad faith have the right to remove useful
impro vemen ts? The answe r is clearly in the negative. Recognized
author ities on the subjec t are agreed on this point. 218 Under Article 547
of the New Civil Code, only a posses sor in good faith may remove
useful impro vemen ts if this can be done withou t damag e to the principal

212 Supra.

213/d.
214
Art. 547, NCC.
215 11
Caguioa, Civil Code, 1966 Ed., 202.
216
/d. , citing 4 Manresa 260.
217
Art. 547, NCC.
218 MWSS v. CA,
143 SCRA 623 (1986), citing Paras (1984) Vol. II, pp. 436-437; Padilla
(1972), Vol. II, pp. 457-458; Caguioa (1966), Vol. 11, p. 201; Jurado (1981), Civil Law
Reviewer,
p. 250; Tolentino ( 1972), Vol. II, p. 54 7.
 l
PROP ERTY. OWN ERS HIP. AND ITS MOO IFIC !\TTONS 593
POSSES S fON
E fTect·s 0f Possessi0 n

thing and if the person who recove rs the posses sion does not exerci se
the option of rei1nb ursing the useful expens es.m

MWSS v. Court of Appeals

143 SCRA 623 (1986)

The City ofDag upan (hereinafter referred to as the CITY) filed a compla int
against the fom1er Nation al Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (hereinafter
referred to as the NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewera ge
System (herein after referred to as MWSS ), for recovery of the ownership and
possession of the Dagup an Waterworks System. NAWASAinterposed as one of
its special defens es Republ ic Act No. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership,
possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines
and as one of its counte rclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had
incurred for necess ary and useful improvements amounting to P255,000.00.
Judgment was rendere d by the trial court in favor of the CITY on the basis of
a stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a posses sor in bad
faith and hence, not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it. NAWASA
appealed to the then Court of Appeals and argued in its lone assignm ent of
error that the CITY should have been held liable for the amortization of the
balance of the loan secured by NAWASA for the improvement of the Dagup an
Waterworks System . The appellate court affirmed the judgme nt of the trial
court. MWSS , succes sor-in- interes t of the NAWASA, appealed to this Court
raising the sole issue of whethe r or not it has the right to remove all the useful
improvements introdu ced by NAWASA to the Dagup an Waterworks System ,
notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be a posses sor in bad
faith. In suppor t of its claim for removal of said useful improvements, MWSS
argues that the pertine nt laws on the subject, particularly Articles 546, 547 and
549 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, do not definitely settle the question of
whether a posses sor in bad faith has the right to remove useful improvements.
The Supreme Court held -
"xxx Does a posses sor in bad faith have the right to remove
useful improv ements ? The answer is clearly in the negative.
Recogn ized authorities on the subject are agreed on this point.
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that
'he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown withou t right to indemnity.' As a
builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatev er useful improvements
it had made withou t right to indemn ity (Santos v. Mojica , Jan. 31 ,
1969, 26 SCRA 703 ).
 ◄

594 PROPERTY

Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor

in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right
of retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only
a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if
this can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the
person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of
reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given to a possessor in
bad faith to remove improvements applies only to improvements
for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no
injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain
them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into
possession. (Article 549, Id.)"

(a) Right of Retention

As discussed in supra §§ 92.2 and 92.3, a possessor in good
faith is entitled to retain the thing until he has been reimbursed of the
necessary or useful expenses he incurred. This right of retention has
been considered as one of the conglomerate of measures devised by
the law for the protection of the possessor in good faith. 220 Its object
is to guarantee the reimbursement of the expenses, such as those for
the preservation of the property, or for the enhancemen t of its utility or
productivity. 221 It permits the actual possessor to remain in possession
while he has not been reimbursed by the person who defeated him in
the possession for those necessary expenses and useful improvements
made by him on the thing possessed. 222 Accordingly, a possessor (or
builder) in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the
period of retention223 nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering
him to vacate. 224 In addition, the owner of the land is prohibited from
offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful expenses with
the fruits received by the builder-possessor in good faith. Otherwise,
the security provided by law would be impaired. This is so because
the right to the expenses and the right to the fruits both pertain to the
possessor, making compensation juridically impossible; and one cannot

220
Ortiz v. Kayanan, 92 SCRA 146 (1979); Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243 (2005).
22 1/d.
222
Supra.
223
Nuguid v. CA, supra, citing San Diego v. Hon. Montesa, 6 SCRA 208, 210 ( 1962).
224/d.
 PROPERTY, OWN ERSHIP, AND ITS MODI FICATIONS 595
POSSESSION
Effects of Possession

be used to reduce the _other. 22s Pending reimbursement of the amount

due him, ~he posses~or m good faith is likewise entitled to have his right
recorded 10 th e certificate of title as an encumbrance on tbe property so
that whoever may get th e property will be forewarned of his right to
such retention and refund. 226

(b) How to Determine Value of Useful Improvements

Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful
improvements should be determined. However, this problem was
categorically resolved by the Supreme Court in the case of Pecson v.
Court of Appeals 221 where it was held that the "current market value"
of the improvements should be made the basis of reimbursement. In
arriving at this ruling, the Court took notice of the objective of the article
which is to administer justice between the parties involved. Otherwise
stated, the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of
the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer
complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the
other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. 228

[92.4] Right of Possessors to Expenses for Pure Luxury

Whether in good faith or in bad faith, a possessor is not entitled
to a refund of the expenses incurred by him for pure luxury or mere
pleasure, called "ornamental expenses. " 229 Both kinds of possessors are
entitled, however, to a right of removal of the ornaments with which
they embellished the principal thing provided that such principal will
suffer no injury.n°
If the owner, however, exercises his option to retain possession
of the ornaments by reimbursing the value thereof to th~ ~ossessor, the
latter's right of removal may not be exercised. In determmmg the extent
of the value of the reimbursement, the good faith or bad faith of the

22,
· Supra. . )
226Atkins Kroll & Co. v. Domingo, 46 Phil. 362 ( I 924 .
227
244 SCRA 407 ( J 995). . · · ·
2, 8 . . . hb · hop of Marula, 40 Phil. 717 (I 920), cued m Pecson
- Ri vera v. Roman Catholi c Arc 15
' · CA, id.
:~~Arts. 548 and 549, NCC.
~'Old
596 l-'KUPt,Kl Y

possessor shall be taken into consideration since the amount of such

reimbursement shall vary depending on the possessor 's good faith or
bad faith. If the possessor is in good faith, the extent of the refund shall
be the actual amount expended. 23 1 If the possessor is in bad faith , on
the other hand, the extent of the refund shall be limited to the value
of the ornament at the time the owner enters into the possession of the
property232 irrespective of the amount actually spent by the possessor in
bad faith.

[92.5] Rule on Improvement Caused by Nature

The foregoing discussion in connection with the rights of

possessors to "improvem ents" has reference to improvements caused
by the will of the possessor, such as trees planted by them or buildings
constructed by them. If the improvements, however, are caused by
nature or by time, the same shall inure to the owner following the law
on accession, without need of indemnifying the possessor in good faith.
This is confirmed by Article 551 of the New Civil Code, which states:

"Art. 551. Improvements caused by nature or time shall

always insure to the benefit of the person who has succeeded
in recovering possession."

[92.6] Improvements Which Ceased to Exist

In connection with the discussion in supra § 92.3, a possessor in
good faith is entitled to a refund of the useful expenses incurred by him
only if the useful improvement is still existing at the time of the recovery
of the property by the legitimate possessor. If the improvements made
by the possessor in good faith have already ceased to exist at the time
the legitimate possessor recovers possession, the latter is in no way
benefited. Hence, he cannot be obliged to refund the expenses incurred
by the possessor. This rule is embodied in Article 553 of the New Civil
Code:

" Art. 553. One who recovers possession shall not be

obliged to pay for improvements which have ceased to exist
at the time he takes possession of the thing."

:::JI Art. 548, NCC.

:!..• :::Art . 549, NCC.
 PROPERTY OWNE
' RSHlP, AND ITS MODIFICATIONS 597
POSSESSION
Effects of Possession
Art. 550. The costs of liti at"
every possessor. (n) g •on over the property shall be borne by

Art. 551. Improvements caus db

to the benefit of the person h h e Y nature or time shall always inure
( ) w O as succeeded in recovering possession.
456

5
riorati:~· ;r ~~ ~~st~:s:i.r in good faith shall not be liable for the dete-
mg possessed, except in cases in which it is
~ro~~d that he has acted with fraudulent intent or negligence after the
1ud1c1al summons. '

A possesso~ in bad faith shall be liable for deterioration or loss in

every case, even 1f caused by a fortuitous event. (457a)

. Art. 553. One w~o recovers possession shall not be obliged to pay
for improvements which have ceased to exist at the time he takes posses-
sion of the thing. (458)

§ 97. Liability of Possessors for Loss or Deterioration

Will a possessor be liable to the owner for any deterioration or
loss suffered by the thing? This question is answered by Article 552 of
the New Civil Code. Pursuant to this article, the possessor's liability for
loss or deterioration shall depend on his good faith or bad faith. If the
possessor is in good faith, he is not liable at all for the deterioration or
loss of the thing possessed. A possessor in bad faith, on the other hand,
is liable for any deterioration or loss of the thing "in every case," even
when the same is caused by fortuitous event.
As discussed in supra § 91.2, every possessor in good faith,
however, becomes a possessor in bad faith from the moment he becomes
aware that what he believed to be true is not so. If the good faith of the
possessor turns into bad faith upon his becoming aware of the existence
of defects in his title will he likewise be liable for any deterioration or
'
loss of the thing possessed by reason of fortuitous event? Article 552
answers this question in the negative. We should distinguish therefore
between a situation where the possessor is originally in bad faith (or in
bad faith from the beginning of his possession) from a. situation where
the possessor is originally in good faith but becomes in bad faith upon
learning of the defects in his title. In the first situation, the possessor is
liable even for deterioration or losses caused by fortuitous event. In the
second, the possessor is not so liable. The possessor who is originally
in good faith but becomes in bad faith upon the service of the judicial
 ◄
598 PROPERTY

summons on him shall be lia~le for any dete~iorati~n or loss of the thing
possessed only if the same 1s caused by his negligence or fraudulent
acts.

Art. 554. A present possessor who shows his possession at some

previous time, is presumed to have held possession also during the inter-
mediate period, in the absence of proof to the contrary. (459)

§ 98. Presumption of Continuity of Possession

If the present possessor can show proof that he was also in
possession of the property at some previous time, his possession will
be presumed to be continuous covering even the intermediate period. 233
This presumption, however, is merely disputable and may be rebutted
by proof to the contrary. 234
If the present possessor, however, succeeds the previous possessor
by hereditary title, his possession is also deemed continuous and without
any interruption from the moment of the death of the decedent. 235 Upon
acceptance of the inheritance, the possessor shall be deemed to have
possessed the property continuously and this rule will apply even
if he was not in actual possession of the property at the time of the
death of the decedent and prior to his acceptance. In other words, if
the possession is transmitted by hereditary title, the presumption of
continuity of possession is one which is conclusive and may not be
overthrown by proof to the contrary.

Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

(1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or
gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes
out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Ar-
ticle 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the
real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. (460a)

233
Art. 554, NCC.
234Jd.
23
5.~. 553, NCC.