BAR Q AND Q 2018

1. Congress enacted a law to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to a full range of modern family planning methods, including contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectibles, non- abortifacient hormonal contraceptives, and family planning products
and supplies, but expressly prohibited abortion. To ensure its objectives, the law made it mandatory
for health providers to provide information on the full range of modern family planning methods,
supplies and services, for schools to provide reproductive health education, for non-governmental
medical practitioners to render mandatory 48 on hours pro bono reproductive health services as a
condition to Philhealth accreditation, and for couples desiring to marry attend a family planning
seminar prior to issuance to a marriage license. It also punishes certain acts of refusal to carry out its
mandates. The spouses Aguiluz, both Roman Catholics, filed a petition to declare the law as
unconstitutional based on, among others, the following grounds:

• It violates the right to life, since it practically sanctions abortion. Despite express terms
prohibiting abortion, petitioners claim that the family planning products and supplies oppose
the initiation of life which is fundamental human right, and the sanction of contraceptive use
contravenes natural law and as an affront to the dignity of man.
• It violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude because it requires
medical practitioners to render 48 hours of pro bono reproductive health services which may be
against their will.
• It violates the Freedom of Religion, since petitioners’ religious beliefs prevent them from using
contraceptives, and that any State- sponsored procurement of contraceptives, funded by taxes,
violates the guarantee of religious freedom.

Rule on each of the above objections. (2.5% each)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

• The law in question does not sanction abortion even in practical terms. In the case of Imbong v.
Ochoa (GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014), the law on its face expressly mentioned that abortion
is not permissible, and this was the determinative factor in making the ruling. In the same case,
the Court also found that the RH law was replete with provisions that embody the policy of
protecting the unborn from the moment of fertilization.

In addition, the majority of the court believes that the question of when life starts is a scientific and medical
issue; hence, the Court refused to make a ruling on this issue.

• Involuntary servitude denotes compulsion or coercion to do something either through force,

threats, intimidation or other means. The accreditation with the PhilHealth, as ruled by the
Supreme Court in the case of Imbong v. Ochoa, should be viewed as an incentive and not a
punishment. These health service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of
health service they wish to provide. Clearly, there is no compulsion, force or threat upon them
to render the pro bono services against their will.
• What is prohibited in the Constitution is the establishment of a state religion. While the
establishment clause in the Constitution restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause
the government to adopt their particular doctrine as policy for everyone, nor can they cause
the government to restrict other groups. To do so would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus establish a state religion (Imbong v. Ochoa, GR No. 204819, April 8,
2014).

2. Agnes was allegedly picked up by a group of military men headed by Gen. Altamirano, and was brought to
several military camps where she was interrogated, beaten, mauled, tortured, and threatened with death if
she would not confess her membership in the New People’s Army (NPA) and point to the location of the NPA
camps. She suffered for several days until she was released after she signed a document saying that she was a
surenderee, and was not abducted or harmed by the military. After she was released, alleging that her rights
to life, liberty and security had been violated and continued to be threatened by violation of such rights, she
filed with the Supreme Court (the Court) a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Corpus with prayers
for Temporary Protection Orders, Inspection of Place and Production of Documents and Personal Properties.
The case was filed against President Amoyo (who was the President of the Philippines when the abduction,
beating, mauling and life threats were committed), General Altamirano, and several military men whom Agnes
was able to recognize during her ordeal. The Court, after finding the petition to be in order, issued the writ of
amparo and the writ of habeas data and directed the respondents to file a verified return on the writs, and
directed the Court of Appeals (CA) to hear the petition. The respondents duly filed their return on the writs
and produced the documents in their possession. After hearing, the CA ruled that there was no more need to
issue the temporary protection orders since the writ of amparo had already been issued, and dismissed the
petition against President Amoyo on the ground the he was immune from suit during his incumbency as
president. Agnes appealed the CA ruling to the Court. The appeal was lodged after President Amoyo’s terms
had ended.
(a) Was the CA correct in saying that the writ of amparo rendered unnecessary the issuance of the temporary
protection order? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

• Yes. The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding and requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs to the petitioner. It serves both preventive
and curative reliefs in addressing extrajudicial abduction and torture. Temporary protection
orders are merely intended to assist the Court before it can arrive at a judicious determination
of the amparo petition. A temporary protection order, being an interim relief, can only be
granted before final adjudication on the amparo case is made. The privilege of the writ of
amparo, once granted, already entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since the
writ of amparo was already granted and issued, there is no more need to issue a temporary
protection order (Yano v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640, Feb. 11, 2010; Rodriguez v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 191805 & 193160, Nov. 15, 2011).

• Will the president’s immunity from suit continue even after his term has ended, considering
that the events covered by the petition took place during his terms? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) No. The presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the President’s incumbency. A
non-sitting President cannot claim immunity even if the acts complained of were committed while he was still
a sitting President. The reason for this is that if the immunity is not granted while he is in office, he might be
spending all his time in attending to litigations. After his term, he can already attend to them (Estrada v.
Desierto, G..R Nos. 146710-15, 146738, April 3, 2001;Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 191805 &
193160, Nov. 15, 2011).

3. PO1 Adrian Andal is known to have taken bribes from apprehended motorists who have violated traffic
rules. The National Bureau of Investigation conducted an entrapment operation where PO1 Adrian was caught
red-handed demanding and taking PhP500.00 from a motorist who supposedly beat a red light.
After he was apprehended, PO1 Adrian was required to submit a sample of his urine. The drug test showed
that he was positive for dangerous drugs. Hence, PO1 Adrian was charged with violation of Section 15, Article
II of RA No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
PO1 Adrian argues against the admissibility of the urine test results and seeks its exclusion. He claims that the
mandatory drug test under RA No. 9165 is a violation of the accused’s right to privacy and against self-
incrimination.
Are PO1 Adrian’s contentions correct? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
PO1 Adrian is correct that his rights to privacy and against self- incrimination have been violated. The results
of the “confirmatory” urine test should therefore be rejected as evidence against him.
It should be noted that RA 9165 allows the conduct of urine tests only for persons arrested for acts prohibited
under said law, such as, among others, the manufacturing, sale, use or possession of illegal drugs, and not for
any unlawful act, like extortion, for which PO1 Adrian was arrested (De la Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July
23, 2014).
XIV
4. Amoroso was charged with treason before a military court martial. He was acquitted.
He was later charged with the same offense before a Regional Trial Court.
He asks that the information be quashed on the ground of double jeopardy.
The prosecution objects, contending that for purpose of double jeopardy,
the military court martial cannot be considered as a “competent court”.
Should the Regional Trial Court grant Amoroso’s motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
A defendant, having been acquitted of a crime by a court martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under
lawful authority, cannot be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court.
It appearing that the offense charged in the Court Martial and in the Regional Trial Court is the same, that the
military court had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts derive their powers from one sovereignty,
the acquittal by the military court should be a bar to Amoroso’s further prosecution for the same offense in
the Regional Trial Court (Crisologo v. People, (G.R. No. L-6277, February 26, 1954); Marcos v. Chief of Staff
(G.R. No. L-4663, May 30, 1951); Garcia v. Executive Secretary (G.R. 198554, July 30, 2012).

5. Five foreign nationals arrived at the NAIA from Hong Kong. After retrieving their checked-in luggage, they
placed all their bags in one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5. They were instructed to place their
luggage on the examiner’s table for inspection.
The examiner found brown-colored boxes, similar in size to powdered milk boxes, underneath the clothes
inside the foreigners’ bags. The examiner discovered white crystalline substances inside the boxes that were
the inspected and proceeded to bundle all of the boxes by putting masking tape around them. He thereafter
handed the boxes over to Bureau of Customs agents. The agents called out the names of the foreigners one by
one and ordered them to sign their names on the masking tape placed on the boxes recovered from their
respective bags. The contents of the boxes were thereafter subjected to tests which confirmed that the
substance was shabu.
Can the shabu found inside the boxes admitted in evidence against the five foreigners for the charge of illegal
possession of drugs in violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, shabu obtained in ordinary customs searches such as those done in airport, which is a valid warrantless
search, are admissible in evidence (Dela Cruz v. People G.R. 209387, January 11, 2016).

6. The police served a warrant of arrest on Ariston who was suspected of raping and killing a female high
school student. While on the way to the police station, one of the police officers who served the warrant
asked Ariston in the local dialect if he really raped and killed the students, and Ariston nodded and said,
“Opo.” Upon arriving at the police station, Ariston saw the City Mayor, whom he approached and asked if they
could talk privately. The mayor led Ariston to his office and, while there in conversation with the Mayor,
Ariston broke down and admitted that he raped and killed the student. The mayor thereafter opened the door
of the room to let the public and media representatives witness Ariston’s confession. In the presence of the
Mayor, the police and the media, and in response to questions asked by some members of the media, Ariston
sorrowfully confessed his guilt and sought forgiveness for his actions.
Which of these extrajudicial confessions, if any, would you consider as admissible in evidence against Ariston?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ariston was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the
police failed to inform him of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His
confession to the police is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
His confession before the mayor, however, is admissible. While it may be true that a mayor has “operational
supervision and control” over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, Ariston’s confession to the mayor,
as described in the problem, was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor
did not appear as having questioned Ariston at all. No police authority ordered Ariston to talk to the mayor. It
was he himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor
did not know that he was going to confess his guilt to him. When he talked with the mayor as a confidant and
not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to the Mayor did not violate his constitutional
rights.
His confession to the media can likewise be properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements spontaneously
made by suspects to news reporters during televised interviews are deemed voluntary and are admissible in
evidence (People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997).
7. Two police teams monitored the payment of ransom in a kidnapping case.
The bag containing the ransom money was placed inside an unlocked trunk of a car which was parked at the
Angola Commercial Center in Mandaluyong City.
The first police team, stationed in an area near where the car was parked, witnessed the retrieval by the
kidnappers on the bag from the unlocked trunk. The kidnappers thereafter boarded their car and proceeded
towards the direction of Amorsolo St. in Makati City where the second police team was waiting.
Upon confirmation by radio report from the first police team that the kidnappers were heading towards their
direction, the second police team proceeded to conduct surveillance on the car of the kidnappers, eventually
saw it enter Ayala Commercial Center in Makati City, and the police team finally blocked it when it slowed
down. The members of the second police team approached the vehicle and proceeded to arrest the
kidnappers.
Is the warrantless arrest of the kidnappers by the second police team lawful? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The warrantless arrest is lawful.
There are two requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected under Section 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of
Court: (1) an offense has just been committed, and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Both requirements are present in the instant case. The first police team present in the Angola Commercial
Center was able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummated the crime of kidnapping. Its team
members all saw the kidnappers take the money from the car trunk. Such knowledge was then relayed to the
other police officers comprising the second police team stationed in Amorsolo St. where the kidnappers were
expected to pass.
It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough
for them to be informed as to who the kidnappers were. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on
probable cause (People v. Uyboco, G.R. No. 178039, January 19, 2011).

BAR Q AND Q 2019

1 Mrs. W supplies the Philippine National Police (PNP) with uniforms every year. Last month, he and two (2)
other officers
of the PNP conspired to execute a "ghost purchase', covered by five (5) checks amounting to P200,000.00 each,
or a total of P1,000,000.00. An investigating committee within the PNP, which was constituted to look into it,
invited Mrs. W, among others, for an inquiry regarding the anomalous transaction. Mrs. W accepted the
invitation but during the committee hearing, she stated that she will not answer any question unless she be
provided with the assistance of a counsel. The PNP
officials denied her request; hence, she no longer participated in the investigation.

(a) What is a custodial investigation? Under the 1987 Constitution, what are the rights of a person during
custodial investigation? (3%)

ANSWER: Custodial investigation is the stage where an investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, and
direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police
would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements (People v. Dela Cruz,
G.R. No. 118866-68, September, 17, 1997). Custodial investigation also includes the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law (RA
7438). A person under custodial investigation has the following rights, to wit: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if he cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one; (3) to be informed of such rights; (4) waiver of these rights not allowed
except in writing and in the presence of counsel; (5) no torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will can be used against him; (6) secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited; and (7) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of these rights are inadmissible in evidence against him.
2. Mrs. W supplies the Philippine National Police (PNP) with uniforms every year. Last month, he and two (2)
other officers of the PNP conspired to execute a "ghost purchase', covered by five (5) checks amounting to
P200,000.00 each, or a total of P1,000,000.00. An investigating committee within the PNP, which was
constituted to look into it, invited Mrs. W, among others, for an inquiry regarding the anomalous transaction.
Mrs. W accepted the invitation but during the committee
hearing, she stated that she will not answer any question unless she be provided with the assistance of a
counsel. The PNP officials denied her request; hence, she no longer participated in the investigation.
(b) Was the PNP's denial of Mrs. W s request violative of her right to counsel in the proceedings conducted
before the PNP? Explain. (2% )

ANSWER: No. because Mrs. W was not under custodial investigation. The fact that she was “invited” by the
investigating
committee does not by itself determine the nature of the investigation as custodial. The nature of the
proceeding must be
adjudged on a case to case basis. It was simply a general inquiry to clear the air of reported anomalies and
irregularities
within the PNP. What was conducted was an ordinary administrative, and not custodial, investigation (Luspo v.
People, G.R.
No. 188487, October 22, 2014). Hence, she was not entitled to right to counsel during the proceedings.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Yes, because Mrs. W was under custodial investigation. Hence, she should have been
afforded right to counsel. Under Sec. 2, last paragraph of RA 7438, custodial investigation includes the
“invitation” to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he or she is suspected to have
committed. The investigation was not a simple general inquiry of a reported anomaly but directs the
investigation to Mrs. W and several others as a prime suspects. Assuming otherwise, even in administrative
investigations, procedural due process has been recognized to include a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, if requested.

3. At about 5:30 A.M. of September 15, 2019 Police Senior Inspector Officer A of the Manila Police District
Station received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer that one Mr. Z would be meeting up
later that morning with two (2) potential sellers of drugs at a nearby restaurant. As such, Officer A decided to
hang around the said place immediately. At about 9:15 A.M., two (2) male passengers. Named A and Y, who
were each carrying a traveling bag, alighted from a bus in front of the restaurant. A transport barker, serving as
a lookout for Officer A, signaled to the latter that X and Y were "suspicious-looking.” As the two were about to
enter the restaurant, Officer A stopped them and asked about the contents of their bags. Dissatisfied with their
response that the bags contained only clothes, Officer A proceeded to search the bags and found packs of
shabu therein. Thus, X and Y were arrested, and the drugs were seized from them. According to Officer A, a
warrantless search was validly made pursuant to the stop and frisk rule; hence, the consequent seizure of the
drugs was likewise valid.
(a) What is the stop and frisk rule? (2.5%)

ANSWER: Stop and frisk rule is a vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapons (Manalili v. CA, G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997)

4. At about 5:30 A.M. of September 15, 2019 Police Senior Inspector Officer A of the Manila Police District
Station received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer that one Mr. Z would be meeting up
later that morning with two (2) potential sellers of drugs at a nearby restaurant. As such, Officer A decided to
hang around the said place
immediately. At about 9:15 A.M., two (2) male passengers. Named A and Y, who were each carrying a traveling
bag, alighted from a bus in front of the restaurant. A transport barker, serving as a lookout for Officer A,
signaled to the latter that X and Y were "suspicious-looking.” As the two were about to enter the restaurant,
Officer A stopped them and asked about the contents of their bags. Dissatisfied with their response that the
bags contained only clothes, Officer A proceeded to search the bags and found packs of shabu therein. Thus, X
and Y were arrested, and the drugs were seized from them. According to Officer A, a warrantless search was
validly made pursuant to the stop and frisk rule; hence, the consequent seizure of the drugs was likewise valid.
(b) Was the stop and frisk rule validly invoked by Officer A? If not, what is the effect on the drugs seized as
evidence? Explain. (2.5%)

ANSWER: It was not valid. Stop and frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) crime prevention and detection; and (2)
safety and
self-preservation of the police officer. While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person has weapons concealed about him. (Malacat v. CA, 283 SCRA 159 [1997]). Since the drug seized was a
product of unlawful search and seizure, the same is inadmissible in evidence against X and Y (Art. III, Sec. 3(2),
Const.).

5. An Information for Estafa was filed against the accused, Mr. D. During the course of the trial, Mr. D
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute the case for a reasonable length of time. Opposing the
motion, the prosecution argued that its failure to present its witnesses was due to circumstances beyond its
control. Eventually, the trial court dismissed the case with finality on the ground that Mr. D's right to speedy
trial was violated. A month after, the same criminal case for Estafa was refiled against Mr. D, prompting him to
file a motion to dismiss invoking his right against double jeopardy. The prosecution opposed the motion,
arguing that the first criminal case for Estafa was dismissed with the express consent of the accused as it was,
in fact, upon his own motion. Moreover, it was already able to secure the commitments of its witnesses to
appear; hence, it would be prejudicial for the State if the case were to be dismissed without trial.
(

a) For double jeopardy to attach, what requisites must exist? (2%)

ANSWER: To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. In relation to this, the first jeopardy attaches only (a)
upon a valid complaint or information, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment and a valid plea has
been entered; and (d) the accused was previously acquitted, convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

(b) Rule on Mr. D's present motion. (3%)

ANSWER: The motion to dismiss of Mr. D should be granted. While it is true that the right against double
jeopardy cannot be invoked if the dismissal of the original case was with the express consent of the accused,
This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to
speedy trial (Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, 26 September 2005).Hence, Mr. D may
invoke right against double jeopardy.