Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Tank Farm
Tank Farm
net/publication/306253661
CITATIONS READS
0 8,936
1 author:
Idral Amri
Universitas Riau
35 PUBLICATIONS 25 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
PENGOLAHAN AIR PAYAU UNTUK KEGUNAAN AIR BERSIH DI KAWASAN SUNGAI SIAK, MENGGUNAKAN METODE RESISTANSI ELEKTRIK KAPASITAS 1200 L/JAM View
project
All content following this page was uploaded by Idral Amri on 17 August 2016.
ABSTRACT
Oil and gas company in Indonesia have explorated the oil for a long periode. Oil
is usually storage in the tanks. To avoid the tanks accident as firing, collaps and
etc. Need to review and simulate that tanks to protect the fire accident. The aims
of that research to give recomendation and safety scenario to company for
upgrading of fire protection facility and safety processes. Research Methodology
was doing to collect that data and do simulate with NdV Phast. Based on
simulation, with oil composition, wind speed, bund capacity of inlet of oil to
tanks. Simulation Results shown that with ....oil composition, ...wind speed and
bund capacity......, need to upgrade the fire protection pump, fire detector and
cctv to watch out that process going safety.
Key words; bund capacity, Modeling, NdV Phast, oil and gas, tanks, wind speed,
Simulation
1. INTRODUCTION
Most of the oil and gas company in Indonesia using Tank Farm for storing of the oil feed
before loading to the ship. The existing tanks have aged and designed a long time ago, where
that safety is not first consideration during that construction. By the time, technology
invention should be comply to safety requirements.
Currently, tank farm facilities oil and gas companies in Indonesia should be concerns
on fire protection of existing tank farm and plans to analyze the potential consequence of fire
such that the required fire protection facilities could be implemented for the tank farm.
This research covers fire modelling consequence for Tank Farm facility. That facility
includes crude oil storage tank, electric booster pumps, and shipping pumps. Figure 1.1
shows the schematic of Tank Farm Facility.
Figure 1.1 Schematic of Tank Farm Facility
2 OBJECTIVE
3 METHODOLOGY
The study has been carried out based on the following overall methodology:
•Site visit familiarization and gather relevant data for the facilities
•Compile data and identify critical missing information
There are 2 types of incoming oil to Dumai Tank Farm. Brief properties of the incoming oil
to Dumai is summarized in Table 4. 1.
API Grafity 32 - 34
Pour Point, oF 95 - 98
Temperature, oF 90 - 100
Based on the flash point of 154oF [Ref. 14] DC is classified as Class IIIA whilst SLC is
classified as Class I with flash point of ranging from 80oF – 168 oF[Ref.14,19,20] per NFPA
30. Oil within Dumai Tank Farm is stabilized crude.
The tanks will store the incoming oil prior shipping. The facility consists of 6 tank farms,
with 2-3 tanks per farm. The tanks have been divided to store certain type of oil as per table
below.
Table 4. 2 Tank Farm
The flow of the oil from the incoming source is directed to or from the tanks with series of
motor operated valve (MOV). All tanks are fixed cone roof type. Each is equipped with the
safety valve on the tank roof and on the tank incoming/outgoing line as per P&ID [Ref. 15].
The tank dimension and capacity is summarized below.
Note: 1. Capacity is based on P&ID [Ref.15]. Currently, each tank has dedicated dike/bund
area.
Oil is boosted with the Electric Booster Pump prior pumped with Shipping Pump for
shipping to the wharf. Each EBP is dedicated for each tank farm as presented below;
The shipping pumps are sheltered in the pump house. There are 4 diesel engine shipping
pumps, with capacity of 21,000 gpm each.
5 RESULT
This section presents the results; consist of data analysis, scenario identification, fire and
explosion modeling result, review and recommendation for the preventive and mitigative
measure within the tank farm.
Isolatable section is defined to determine the process hydrocarbon inventories and the
physical properties of the inventory, as an input for the consequence modeling. In order to
determine this, the process system are split into sections, where in the event of failure i.e. leak
the process can be isolated by shutdown valves to minimize the release inventory. No credit
has been given to isolation by non-return valves (check valves) in the system since these are
not considered reliable as leak-proof barriers. P&IDs [Ref. 15] is reviewed to identify the
process inventories, which would be isolated between SDV’s. In the absence of SDV, the
following is used to define the boundary of isolatable sections:
The following figure shows the isolatable section for the tank farm scenario previously.
Figure 5.1 Tank Farm Isolatable Section
To identify the possible hazard in Tank Farm a Process Hazard Analysis is required. A PHA
analyzes potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or
flammable chemicals, and major spills of hazardous chemicals. The PHA focuses on
equipment, instrumentation, utilities, human actions (routine and nonroutine), and external
factors that might affect the process. There are several methods for hazard identification such
as What If, Checklist, HAZOP, FMEA, FTA. For this study, such hazard analysis is not
available; hence a simplified hazard identification is developed to determine the potential
hazard. To identify the potential hazard the following scheme is used.
For each isolatable section, the potential hazards have been identified based on the scheme
above. These are shown in the Table 5.2. The hazards identified would provide a basis for the
consequence modeling.
The consequence modeling is performed for the identified hazard as per Table 5.2. Fire
consequence modeling will provide estimation of fire size, duration and distance to critical
thermal radiation levels. The consequence modeling of the hazard scenario is performed with
the following methodology:
• Based on the scenario identified, the release rate for each inventory is calculated. This is
based on the probabilistic hole sizes (small, medium and large) represented by a 10mm,
50mm and 100mm diameter release respectively.
• From the release rate, the consequence of the identified scenario is determined using the
Phast DNV Software. The result will provide the extent/consequence of the identified
scenario (e.g. pool fire, explosion etc) within the location of release.
The following impact criteria are used in the modeling:
1. Impact Criteria on Human
The table below presents typical human impact criteria as applied in fire modeling.
The consequence modeling basis and assumption details is provided in the Assumption
Register as presented in Attachment B.
Isolatable Section Hole Size (mm) Leak Rate (kg/s) Resulting Scenario
Section 1 10 0,73
50 18,30 Pool Fire
100 73,19
Section 2 10 1,83
50 45,74 Pool Fire/Spray Fire
100 182,94
The unobstructed pool fire diameter has been determined for a release of hydrocarbon liquid.
The pool geometry and radiation contour resulting from pool fire event is shown below.
The heat radiation extent for the isolatable sections where pool fire is possible due to leak is
shown as follows;
Note:
1. Heat radiation distance is from the edge of the pool
The radiation coverage area is superimposed on the plant layout and provided as Attachment
C for pool fire radiation extent. The output result from PHAST is provided in Attachment D.
The heat radiation extent for pool fire due to tank rupture is shown as follows;
Table 6.7 Tank Rupture Pool Fire Radiation Extent
From the analysis, each of the contours is provided in Attachment C. In the worst case
scenario, a tank rupture will occur, causing the maximum extent of radiation. However, the
radiation/wind direction can be towards any give direction, hence a locus of radiation is
plotted for a tank rupture condition taking the origin at the edge of the bund wall for each
tank.
With the probable fire occurring for each of the tank, a composite overlapping the extent of
damage/radiation contour of each tank rupture scenario is generated in the diagram as shown
below;
Figure 6.4 Tank Rupture Radiation Coverage Composite Diagram
The composite diagram above will be used to identify the expose area and its corresponding
radiation dosage. From the above, the following is observed;
• Public area (outside the control of the tank farm) can be impacted by the radiation causing
death. This includes the fenced area under the vicinity of the main office
• Part of the main office building itself is within heat radiation intensity
• Adjacent Pertamina storage tanks are also effected a tank fire within Chevron, and may
cause escalation in Pertamina facility.
For isolatable section on Dumai tank farm, the unobstructed flame length has been
determined for a release of hydrocarbon liquid.
The radiation extent for the isolatable sections where spray fire is possible is shown as
follows;
Table 6.9 Spray Fire Radiation Extent
The preventive measures available in Dumai Tank Farm are reviewed, and any additional
requirements based on design standards, regulation and operation requirements are identified;
• Fire and Gas detection system (including tank area, pump area, and operator room).The fire
and gas detection is the main and primary preventive measure in a facility. This will allow the
shutdown/isolation of the process to limit the release, and to prevent further escalation.
Based on the site visit performed, the existing fire and gas detection is not available.
Detection of fire is by operator via CCTV.
6.5.2 Fire Detection Requirements
Tank Farms The tank farm will typically have pool fire, which can be contained within the
tank or resultant from a spillage from the tanks.
Each of the tanks will be fitted with bi metallic wire heat detectors for detection of tank fire
for operator intervention. In addition to the wire heat detectors, the tank farm will be fitted
with triple IR flame detector. This type of detector is recommended as IR responds to energy
radiated from a flame in two adjacent bands of the mid-infrared spectrum. which, permit this
detector to discriminate between flames containing hydrocarbon based material and spurious
stimuli from ultraviolet and other spectral radiation sources, such as welding areas, sunlight,
and flashing lamps. This type of detector does not require cross zoning, as opposed to UV
flame detector. Triple IR (IR3) detectors are suggested, as detector utilizes a combination of
three IR sensors of extremely narrow band response. One covers the typical CO2 emission
spectral band, and the two other sensors cover different adjacent specially selected spectral
bands. While the CO2 emission band sensor is responsible for the detection of the flame
radiation, the other sensors are sensitive to all other non fire radiation sources. Pump Station
Pump house will be fitted with triple IR flame detector to be able to detect any fire present.
No gas detectors are recommended, as the inventory of the tank farm is stabilized crude,
which will not generate significant flash gas for effective detection.
The mitigative measure for a fire event such as passive and active fire protection/suppression
is also identified as part of the study.
Spacing and layout provide a fundamental aspect of risk management. It separates sources of
potential fire, explosion, or toxic incidents from adjacent areas that might become involved in
the incident or be harmed by its potential consequences. Storage tanks of Dumai Tank Farm
(which stores liquid from Class IC and IIIA) operating at low pressure needs to meet the
minimum criteria for spacing [NFPA 30 sec 2.3 with table 2.3.2.1.1 (a)(b)]. Based in the
below table, the existing tanks meet the requirement of spacing from the important building
and public way.
Table 6.10 Spacing with Respect to Important Building and Public Way
Note:
1. Minimum distance from nearest side of any public way of from nearest important building
on the same property.
The tank to tank spacing will be based on NFPA 30 sec 2.3.2.2.1 table 2.3.2.2.1.
Table 6.11 Minimum Tank to Tank Spacing
The spacing between tanks meets the standard requirement based on the above table.
6.6.1.2 Containment
Dikes, drainage, and remote impounding should be provided in accordance with NFPA 30.
This is to prevent the spread of spills and releases of flammable/combustible liquids. Spills
that become fires need to be controlled to limit the fire spread to other storage areas and
process units.
The volumetric capacity of the diked area shall not be less than the greatest amount of liquid
that can be released from the largest tank within the diked area, assuming a full tank [NFPA
30 sec 2.3.2.3.2].
Table 6.12 shows the capacity of the diked/bund area within the Dumai tank farm.
Table 6.12 Diked Area Capacity
From the table above, the existing dike capacity is less than tank volume. As the dike
capacity cannot accommodate the full tank capacity, the following options are possible
depending on company decision;
1. Limit the inventory of the storage tank. This will however impact the storage capacity and
the plant availability. This can be achieved by resetting the HH trip point for all the tanks to
match the bund capacity. If Company standard required additional margin, the tanks HH level
trip may need to be further reduced.
2. Sharing bund. The bunds can be shared by more than one tank, with the bund capacity
sufficient for the largest tank inventory. However, it is noted that with a larger potential pool
fire, more land will need to be demarcated for safe distance. This may even require the
moving of adjacent Pertamina facility or main offices
3. Upgrading of the bund capacity by increasing the height. Detailed design should consider
the accessibility, and also excessive height can hamper firefighting efforts.
Based on the site visit performed, no structural support above ground which during a pool fire
can fail and impact escape route. Hence based on API 2218, no passive fire protection is
required.
The portable fire extinguisher (manually initiated) use will be discussed based on location
specific requirements within the area within the Dumai tank farm facility. The selection of
the fire extinguisher is based on the NFPA fire classes (which differs to European Standard
EN2:1992 or ISO7165). This is presented below.
Table 6.13 Fire Classification
Tank Farm Location The storage tank area will not require portable fire extinguisher.
However, 2 x 20lbs of dry chemical portable fire extinguisher is available on each tank
(located at bottom and top of tank staircase). The existing portable fire extinguisher location
within the tank farm is shown on Attachment G. Pump Station The pump station should be
provided with portable fire extinguisher as a support means of fighting small fire. The
minimum fire extinguisher size would be at least 40lb Class B/C fire extinguisher for high
hazard [NFPA 10 section 3-3.1]. The minimum distance/placement for high hazard area is a
40-B fire extinguisher located no more than 9.15m (30ft) from location of potential fire
[NFPA 10 section 3-3.11]. 40lbs Class B/C fire extinguisher is already available in the pump
station together with 20 lbs Class ABC fire extinguisher.The existing portable fire
extinguisher is already sufficient and the location is shown on Attachment G.
For fire extinguishment in Dumai Tank Farm, fixed foam system is recommended. A foam
system is designed to protect the equipment from hazard inside the vertical tanks (primary
protection) and small spill fire at tank adjacent area (supplementary protection). It is used
principally to form a cohesive floating blanket on the fuel surface that extinguishes the fire by
smothering and cooling the fuel as per deluge system. Foam also prevents re-ignition by
averting formation of combustible mixtures of vapor and air above the fuel surface [Ref. 3].
At Dumai tank farm, extinguishment of fire is depending on the firewater/foam monitor. For
fixed-roof tanks over 60ft diameter, monitor nozzles shall not be used as the primary means
of protection as per NFPA 11 section 5.2.4.1.1. Top side foam application for protection of
tank internal fire is recommended. This will require foam chamber to expand the foam and
deliver foam directly onto the surface of a flammable or combustible liquid. The application
rate and number of foam chamber is as per NFPA 11 section 5.2.5.2.
In the case of hydrocarbon liquid, the recommended foam concentrate is Aqueous Film-
Forming Foam Concentrate (AFFF) [Ref.9]. AFFF is a concentrate based on fluorinated
surfactants plus foam stabilizers to produce fluid aqueous film for suppressing hydrocarbon
fuel vapors and usually diluted with water to a 1%, 3%, or 6% solution. Concentrates for use
at 3% are normally preferred to those for use at 6% because their efficiency in use, storage,
and handling [Ref. 3]. Hence, AFFF 3% is to be used for fire protection A foam system
consists of a water supply, a foam concentrate supply, bladder tank, proportioning equipment,
a piping system, foam chamber with integral foam makers and discharge devices designed to
distribute foam effectively over the hazard. The foam is applied to the surface of the liquid.
The schematic of foam system is shown in the following figure.
In addition to the internal foam as primary protection system, external foam (supplementary
protection) is also required as protection for small spill fires. This supplementary protection
may be either fixed or portable hose stream with a minimum flow rate of 50 gpm (189 L/min)
per nozzle. The minimum number of fixed or portable hose streams required shall be
specified in NFPA 11 Table 5.9.2.2 and shall provide protection of the area.
Based on above recommendation, the fire water and foam requirement is summarized as
follows;
Table 6.14 Firewater and Foam Requirement for Extinguishment
The largest requirement for fire extinguishment is from T-301/302/303/304 fire event, due to its largest diameter within the tank farm. Detail
calculation is presented in Attachment H.
Essentially, exposure protection is provided for large flammable gas or liquid inventories which are liable to be exposed to a fire. The purpose of
providing such protection is to cool the metal and so prevent loss of strength. It is normal to provide the tank or vessel with pressure relief but,
even if the relief operates, it will not prevent failure if the wall temperature is allowed to rise too high. In the event of one tank under fire, the
cooling rate for adjacent tanks is summarized below.
Table 6.15 Firewater Requirement for Cooling
As part of upgrades, the required firewater demand for extinguishment (using foam monitor
and foam chamber) and exposure protect during the fire of each tank rupture scenario is
shown below.
Table 6.16 Total Firewater Requirement
Note:
1. One monitor with capacity of 500gpm is added as support for extinguishment or cooling.
Current fire water system piping is inadequate to handle such capacities. In addition, the
existing pump capacity is 17,700 gpm (consist of 3 x 5000 gpm and 2 x 1350 gpm diesel
engine pump). This is insufficient for most of cases above. However, it is awaiting Company
to decide whether the tank cooling provision is required or otherwise. If this is not required, a
much reduced firewater capacity is required (with additional sparing).
Based on above conclusion the Fire Protection within Dumai Tank Farm requires
improvement. The followings are recommended;
• To accommodate tank capacity, the tank dike/bund is need to be upgraded. Three options
are provided and awaiting company decision.
1. Limit the inventory of the storage tank. This will however impact the storage capacity and
the plant availability.
2. Sharing bund. The bunds can be shared by more than one tank, with the bund capacity
sufficient for the largest tank inventory.
3. Upgrading of the bund capacity by increasing the height.
• Install fixed foam system to increase extinguishment capacity. Foam system will consist of
a foam concentrate supply, bladder tank, proportioning equipment, a piping system, foam
chamber with integral foam makers and discharge devices. This will allow top side foam
application for protection of tank internal fire.
Upgrade the firewater system which includes the fire water line and fire water pump to the
meet the largest firewater requirement. It is awaiting Company to decide whether the tank
cooling provision is required or otherwise. If this is not required, a much reduced firewater
capacity is required (with additional sparing).
8 REFERENCE
20. 32.2 oAPI SLC Incoming Bangko Chevron Pacific Indonesia, Pusat Penelitian dan
Pengembangan Teknologi Minyak dan Gas Bumi LEMIGAS, Research Report No. LRP -
041/2010, December 2010.
21. 20.4 oAPI Duri Crude Oil Chevron Pacific Indonesia, Pusat Penelitian dan
Pengembangan Teknologi Minyak dan Gas Bumi LEMIGAS, Research Report No. LRP -
042/2010, December 2010.