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access to The Eighteenth Century
Helen Deutsch
University of California, Los Angeles
The Eighteenth Century, vol. 53, no. 3 Copyright © 2012 University of Pennsylvania Press. All rights reserved.
What do we make of her assertion that the painting, itself an act of fiction in
the sense of "fashioning or imitating,"3 is "wrapp'd up in poetry without Fic
tion"? "Fiction" here bears its negative connotation of feigning, invention, and
deceit. Most importantly and provocatively, it is defined in implicit opposition
to poetry and to the portrait. Rejecting her former "useless Beauty/' Montagu's
statement makes the poetry of desire synonymous with truth. The poet's voice
gestures toward the silent image in an act of distancing from the objectified
self—"This once was me."
thorial prowess collapsed into Pope's disgust with the visual contrast between
her diamonds and her greasy smock. Later travel to Italy in pursuit of Algar
otti offered Lady Mary an escape from marriage and English social mores to
what she imagined as the "Elysian Fields,"9 and her friend, rival for Algarotti's
affections, and companion in transgressive desire Lord John Hervey called a
"Mahomet'"s "Paradise Upon Earth" of erotic fulfillment.10
But long before her travels through space, the young Lady Mary—who
taught herself Latin, translated Epictetus in prose, and imitated Ovid, Catul
lus, Horace, Virgil, and Sappho in verse—travelled through time in her father's
library.11 Her long sojourns in ancient Greece and Rome immersed her in a
pastoral landscape that framed her perception of her travels abroad.12 Taking
romance seriously, she supplemented her reading of Sappho's poetry in Anne
Dacier's translation with a happier version of the poet's story in Madeleine de
Scudery's romances. Unlike Ovid's Sappho (imitated by Pope), who hurls her
self to her death upon being abandoned by her younger male lover, Scudery's
Sappho, "well educated by a female cousin, and a wonderful writer in verse
and prose,... dislikes marriage (which, she says, makes men into tyrants) and
gets a judgement from the courts of love to justify her living happily ever after
with Phaon—without marrying him."13
The original Sappho, of course, sang her love songs to women. The long his
tory of the appropriation and transformation of Sappho's poems and persona
by both male and female writers manifests a powerful dialectic of feminism and
misogyny that shapes the imaginary potential and subversive power of classical
literature, its perpetual generation of alternative histories. In the beginning, as
Lady Mary well knew, and as canonical literary and intellectual history often
forgets, was the female poet inspired by love.14 In this essay, I undo Pope's sa
tiric work by portraying Lady Mary as a self-made Sappho, as an innovator and
experimenter in the nonfiction poetry (both lived and written) of female desire.
In another poem addressed to Algarotti that same year, Lady Mary offers
him her own "drafted and re-drafted" version of Sappho's famous poem of
jealousy in which the poet watches her beloved with a man, the original pre
served by Longinus in his treatise on the sublime as an example of the highest
art of ecstatic self-fragmentation reassembled into poetic form:
poetry possesses its object without knowing it while philosophy knows its o
without possessing it. In the West, the word is thus divided between a word
is unaware, as if fallen from the sky, and enjoys the object of knowledge by r
senting it in beautiful form, and a word that has all seriousness and conscio
for itself but does not enjoy its object because it does not know how to repr
it. . . . What is thus overlooked is the fact that every authentic poetic pro
directed toward knowledge, just as every authentic act of philosophy is alw
directed towards joy.16
The woman who could imitate Sappho's famous poem of jealousy on one side
of the page while writing a plea for stoic indifference on the other, through the
Ovidian magic of "This once was me" articulates a desire which enjoys without
violence, which rather than staining or immobilizing its object, knows its object
by offering and transforming itself.1"
Naso insists that in this world one thing is another. That, in the final
reality is one large rhetorical figure and you are lucky if it is just a polypt
a chiasmus. With him a man evolves into an object and vice versa, wit
manent logic of grammar, like a statement sprouting a subordinate cla
him the world was the language: one thing was another, and as to which
real, it was a toss-up. In any case, if one thing was palpable, the other w
to be also.24
[Ovid's ] game was morphology, and his take was metamorphosis. When
substance attains a different form. The main thing is the sameness of s
And, unlike the rest of you, he managed to grasp the simple truth of us
composed of the stuff the world is made of. Since we are of this world.
contain water, quartz, hydrogen, fiber, et cetera, albeit in different pro
Which can be reshuffled. Which already have been shuffled into that gi
wonder she becomes a tree. Just a shift in her cellular makeup. Anyhow,
species, shifting from the animate to the inanimate is the trend. You know
mean, being where you are.26
Barbara Johnson, in her essay "They Urn It," analyzes what Brodsky takes
for granted, namely the cultural association of femininity with allegory and
thus with thingness, the construction of "woman as bearer of something more
significant than herself," that informs Montagu's life as subject of portraiture.
Noting that in aesthetic philosophy, "it is . . . not forbidden to treat women as
things and to 'possess' them as one would a thing," Johnson outlines the his
tory of "woman as mere container, as vehicle," that determines the Western
poetic canon. "As Wordsworth put it, Ά slumber did my spirit seal / duhduh
duhduh / She seemed a thing.' Women make good things; things make good
women. They don't offer the inconvenience of competition."27 Turning a blind
eye to the queer lyrics of Horace, and William Shakespeare, Johnson defines
the object of Western poetry's pursuit, epitomized by John Keats's Grecian urn,
as almost always feminine: "How feminine is the urn? The Western canon's
convention, if not reality, requires that the pursuing poet is male, the beloved
object is female. This convention colors all Western poetry written by men."28
The myth that founds this convention is the same story to which Brodsky
alludes, that of Apollo and Daphne. The god's frustrated pursuit of the nymph,
as is well known, results in her transformation into a laurel tree and the creation
of the laurel wreath as symbolic of lyric poetry's parity with epic, instituting
the equation of love with war that distinguished Roman elegy and love poetry
ever after. The laurel, Ovid claims—in a passage that Johnson notes is ignored
by critics such as Peter Sacks who equate the myth with the emergence of all
poetry out of a genderless loss—will crown not poets "but military and civic
leaders." The myth thereby "mak[es] a place within literature for love poetry"
by articulating "the seriousness and power of desire as opposed to strength."29
This endeavor, Johnson argues, "was more possible if it was troped on the story
of Apollo and Daphne, male pursuer and female prey, male lover and female
object. That is, the seriousness of lyric in comparison with epic was won by
making the sexual roles similar to those of conqueror and conquered. The la
ment of the male lover bewailing his lady's escape installed the heterosexuality
and unrequitedness of canonical love."30 Ovid's innovation, I would argue, is
not the equation of lyric with epic through the deployment of martial meta
phors (which are evident throughout the love elegy he himself wrote, as well as
in the poetry of Propertius, Tibullus, and Horace). Rather, what distinguishes
the Apollo and Daphne myth is the rendering of the gendered opposition be
tween conqueror and conquered as one between desiring human subject and
unattainable inhuman object. It is this distinction that Montagu's writing to
Algarotti challenges, articulating an embodied desire that is neither homo- nor
hetero-sexual, nor agonistic, but rather fluid and fulfilled through the writing
of the poem.
She ended there. Her point in truncating the line was to shock the audience
into an understanding of the ways in which apostrophe serves as a means for
the male poet to bring himself to life by contemplating an inanimate female
object.31
The poem, however, continues:
But you would have me say I am violently in Love. That is, finding you think bet
ter of me than you desire, you would have me give you a just cause to contemn me.
I doubt much whither there is a creature in the world humble enough to do that.
I should not think you more unreasonable if you was in love with my Face and
ask'd me to disfigure it to make you easy. I have heard of some Nuns that make
use of that Expedient to secure their own happynesse, but amongst all the popish
Saints and Martyrs I have never read of one whose charity was sublime enough to
make themselves deformd or ridiculous to restore their Lovers to peace and quiet
nesse. In short, If nothing can content you but despiseing me heartily, I am Afraid
I shall be allwaies so barbarous to wish you may esteem me as long [as] you live.33
To declare her love would be to lose the battle of courtship, and to give her
suitor "just cause to contemn me." Tellingly, Mary Pierrepont immediately
translates this emotional exchange into the register of the visual, equating the
admission of passion with self-disfigurement. The analogy begs the question:
does Edward Montagu love her for anything more than her face? Would her ad
mission of love—of a feeling heart beneath the beautiful surface—do anything
other than lower his esteem?
Philosophy for the young Lady Mary was a self-fortification against both plea
sure and disappointment, staging the battle with her suitor within. Her transla
tion of Epictetus (himself a slave), written in 1710, the same year in which she
wrote this letter to Edward Montagu, enjoins a disengagement from the object
world from which she herself can't escape. For this prime commodity on the mar
riage market to consider herself the addressee of the following lines is to effect
a gender reversal: "all things which are pursued serve either to use, or pleasure.
Remember to consider what nature they are, beginning from the very least of thy
wishes. If you love a vase, love it as a vase, and if it is broke, do not disturb your
self; if a little son or a wife, love it as a human thing, for then if it dies you will not
be troubled."34 Easier to absorb would be the following injunction:
If the image of any pleasure strikes upon your mind, moderate your desires, and
suffer them not to hurry you away, but, examine the thing, and allow yourself time
for consideration. Remember every time when you enjoyed your wishes, and how
you have afterwards found reason of grief, by those very pleasures, and you will
chide your hasty desires, and compare this wish with those that have gone before
it. If you deny yourself, by abstinence, you will one day rejoice at the conquest,
and praise yourself, within yourself. When therefore at any time pleasure shews
itself to you, have a care of being vanquished by its blandishments, sweetnesses,
and its enchantments, but oppose to it, the joy you will receive from the conscious
ness of a victory over your passions.35
To choose philosophy at this point in Montagu's life meant to resolve upon bat
tle with herself in the name of reason. Joy comes not from union with another
but from the successful resistance of desire that makes one a true philosopher:
Remember, the choice is to be now made, the combat is now beginning, neither is
it permitted you to defer it; one hour of neglect will make all your virtue perish,
or one firm resolution retain it for ever. So Socrates became what he was; in all
things he carried himself agreeable to reason, and never hearkened to any other
counselor; and though as yet you are no Socrates, yet, if you are willing to become
one, you must live in that manner.36
The martial metaphors of love poetry are deployed here in the name of a mas
culine self-possession that Montagu's later work will resist in the name of
surrender.
"LOOK ON MY HEART"
In middle age, Montagu's body was no longer the source and symbol o
value, having become instead a sign of the abjection of having lived past
and beauty.37 If women have borne the burden of mortality in literature b
while the ideal of female beauty has been a way to forestall mortality i
same literature—think again of Keats's "still unravish'd bride of quiet
the Grecian urn's cold pastoral of truth and beauty, an aestheticized ide
version of Epictetus's vase—Montagu draws upon experiences of embo
beyond such visual objectification. She expresses the estrangement of th
from its image, while articulating the possibility of different forms of
and relationship. Montagu's letters and poems to Algarotti, spoken by an
female body conscious of itself as both subject and object, tell a differen
of truth about being human by speaking physical objectification, indee
tification, as embodied desire.
It is not an exaggeration to say that Montagu, an aging woman disf
by smallpox, suffered a kind of stigmatization and social death akin t
her frenemy Pope—whom she and Lord Hervey had cruelly brand
semblance and Disgrace" of the human norm—experienced as a result
curved spine. Distinguishing between the physical fact of impairment a
social construction of disability, Lennard Davis has defined disability as
lem of perception, a "disruption in the sensory field of the observer."3
attributes an earlier version of this insight to William Hay, arguably t
person to claim disability as an identity in print in his 1754 "Deform
Essay." Hay begins his text with the statement, "Bodily Deformity is vi
every Eye; but the effects of it are known to very few," and concludes b
ing his curved spine to William Hogarth's undulating line of beauty. W
nod to Hay, Davis's "sensory field" has become the "visual field" and, as
linkage of himself to Hogarth's ideal S-curve of beauty demonstrates, s
emphasis on the visible seems to have as much to do with the construct
femininity as with disability.39 While the critical association of disabilit
visibility has rightly been contested—there are many disabilities that
visible, and the rhetoric of passing and coming out circulates in the d
community—this definition of the disabled body as aberrantly visible
How can Montagu's lyric give us insight into what it means to experience
oneself subjectively as an object, a universal human experience that the brand
ing of women as by nature defective is meant to ward off? How does the act of
narrating in time a self whose grounding in an image has been radically altered,
rebel against the tyranny of the visual? The film scholar Vivian Sobchack, work
ing within the philosophical tradition of existential phenomenology, puts this
well: "in a culture like ours, so preoccupied with images of bodies and bodies of
images, we tend to forget that both our bodies and our vision have lived dimen
sions that are not reducible to the merely visible."44 By resisting such reduction
to the merely visible, Wordsworth's "she seemed a thing that could not feel"
becomes an eloquently sentient subject rooted in time. Such speech, even after
physical death, brings the speaker to life. (Much as, it occurs to me now, my
remembering of Johnson's spoken lecture rather than her written work from
which that lecture drew, is at once an act of mourning and a revivification.)
ter to Wortley quoted earlier are significant): "Far from my Sight that killing
Picture bear, / The Face disfigure, or the Canvas tear!"49 The only way that
Flavia can acknowledge her loss of beauty is by an act of violence against the
image of her former face, a face still so identified with herself that she can only
partially acknowledge the artifice of its image. "Satturday" ends with Flavia's
embrace of social death by voluntary exile to the country, where in an ironic
echo of Adam's despair after the fall in Paradise Lost, as tragicomic, excessive,
and moving as the poem's tone throughout, she plans to "hide in shades this
lost Inglorious Face."50
It is not an exaggeration to say that in "This once was me," Montagu speaks
as if from the dead when she resurrects her lost beauty as something distinct
from herself and in the service of her own desire. For as "Satturday" and many
other texts from the period made clear, for eighteenth-century society, a woman
who lived beyond her youthful bloom, whether disfigured by smallpox or de
formed by old age, was socially dead, inhabiting an afterlife which rendered
her at best invisible, at worst monstrous. Jill Campbell has persuasively ar
gued that the popular image of the woman almost instantaneously disfigured
by smallpox denies the gradual temporal process of aging that all human be
ings must undergo; as Campbell puts it, the tableau of female disfigurement
"renders what is inherently a diachronic process [aging] as a synchronic, vi
sual image, and it does so by metaphorically equating women themselves with
their appearance."51 Pope—whose own physical disability marked him out as
a monster to his critics, and whose social disenfranchisement as a Catholic,
depriving him of the right to vote or own land, gave him a special affinity with
women—described the plight of aging beauties who will not quit the world of
social display with the cruelest of sympathy:
In "This once was me," Montagu rewrites the ghostly feminine afterlife after
the death of beauty and "Honour" (the latter encapsulating Pope's concise ob
jectification and stigmatization of female desire) as a space of potential meta
morphosis and mutual recognition. The gap between her past youthful image
and her present speaking self is thereby transformed into the possibility of
connection between the poet and her young beloved. Likening herself in the
second stanza to Ovid's Iphis, a mythical girl brought up as a boy, who was
transformed to a man by the strength of her desire for another woman, and to
Pygmalion, who falls in love with the marble statue of a perfect woman and
brings her to life by his longing, Montagu activates, to use Campbell's word,
a "dizzying" sequence of magical gendered transformations that testify to the
At the height of her passion for Algarotti, Montagu praised Hervey for
Offering him her "artless thanks," she regrets that she can give him nothing
that he doesn't already have:
[By practice love comes into the mind, by practice love is unlearnt; all love is van
quished by a succeeding love.]61
"Taste" here takes on a queer resonance as each friend urges the other to pur
sue whatever object pleases not in spite of but rather because of encroaching
age.
In her final emphasis on "Freind" in her lines to Algarotti, Montagu col
lapses the gendered oppositions of masculine friendship and feminine passion
in a queer evocation of the classical tradition of philosophical friendship be
tween men, in which each sees the other as an "alter idem" or "another him
self," which had initially conflated the two. Michel de Montaigne (with great
ambivalence) had described this Platonic "love ending in friendship" in his
essay "Of Friendship," quoting Cicero, as a unique form of desire: "love is the
attempt to form a friendship inspired by beauty."63 In her yearning to be freed
from the constraints of female form, the once-beautiful Montagu transforms
her relationship to the beautiful Algarotti, imagining their ideal relationship as
the perfect amicitia or philosophical mirroring of two male friends. When Alga
rotti looks at Montagu's heart, rather than her face, in multiple ways—both in
the desired image of her true masculine self and in her unchanging desire for
him—he will see himself.
The Iphis story takes on added resonance for Montagu if we consider its
anomalous status in the Metamorphoses—a text which usually equates de
sire with masculine violence and female loss—as a tale of answered female
prayers.64 It begins with a mother's prayer to Isis for her unborn child, after
having been told by her husband that since the family can't afford a dowry, if
"you should be delivered of a girl, / unwillingly I order this, and beg / par
don for my impiety—But let it die."65 The husband remains unmoved by his
wife's pleas, but the goddess Isis appears to her in a dream and promises her
that she will "have no reason to complain / that honors you have paid me
were in vain."66 The child is born a girl, raised as a boy, named Iphis "for its
grandfather . . . since this name / was given men and women both ... its face
was such / that whether boy or girl, it was a beauty."67 Iphis falls in love with
Ianthe, to whom her father has arranged a marriage, for affinities described as
near-identities: "the two were similar in age and looks, / and had been taught
together from the first."68 When the wedding day approaches, Iphis complains:
"my father wishes for me what I wish, / she and her father both would have
it be; / but Nature, much more powerful than they are, / wishes it not—sole
source of all my woe!"69 It is her mother's prayer, answered by Isis, that saves
the day, as Iphis walks behind her mother from Isis's altar, transformed into a
boy. This happiest of endings—parents and children equally pleased—is one of
complete union of the divine and mortal worlds:
Nothing more than what happens when things come together, when hydro
say, meets oxygen, or a story from then meets a story from now, or stone
water meets girl meets boy meets bird meets hand meets wing meets bone m
light meets dark meets eye meets word meets world meets grain of sand m
thirst meets hunger meets need meets dream meets real meets same meets
ferent meets death meets life meets end meets beginning all over again, the
of nature itself, ever-inventive, making one thing out of another, and one
into another, and nothing lasts, and nothing's lost, and nothing ever perishe
things can always change, because things will always change, and things wi
ways be different, because things can always be different.72
Gender is just one of many forms that can and must be morphed in
thing else in the endless poetry of the union of all things. The musicia
wedding of Anthea's dreams, attended by the gods, who animates in
nature with his song, is of course the poet Orpheus, whose story of th
of poetry inspired by love and loss is the subject of Ovid's next book.
not to repeat her mistake. She demands that he see through the visib
portrait of her younger self, and the diminished beauty of her pre
"view" her heart, which has changed over time but now remains co
"compassion." In her concluding lines, Montagu accomplishes thr
what she wishes to accomplish in reality: the union of herself and
That "Lov'd Form" of line 21 may refer to her heart, or it may refer
himself; through this ambiguity she asks Algarotti to acknowledge
one day, like her, lose his physical beauty but not, should he res
plea, the enlivening power of desire. Her final line "Look on my
you'll forget my Face," rewrites the social regime of the visible in
had triumphed and which smallpox had forced her to flee, as an e
sion based on mutual awareness of vulnerability, passion, and mor
line alludes once again to The Rape of the Lock and Pope's assessm
beautiful Belinda, "If to her share some Female Errors fall, / Look
and you'll forget 'em all."73 Montagu's revision, even while dwel
language of the visible, defies the predominance of beauty over tru
image over lived emotion, of bedazzled forgetting over mutual rec
Through her complex and gender-bending network of allusion
rewrites her particularly feminine experience of aging and disfigu
a human one, transforming the depradations of mortality into des
metamorphoses. I will return to Ovid momentarily, but I want to d
on this poem's debt to Horace's Ode 4.10, to Ligurinus:
This poem reminds us that Horace had begun his last book of odes with his
most powerful and personal recusatio (a genre that always conflates the per
sonal with the political), not the usual lyric love poet's refusal of epic, but a
rejection of love lyric itself as inappropriate for a man of his years. Claiming
to be too old to love, he directs Venus to the home of a young political favor
If, as Brodsky put it in his "Letter to Horace," Ovid reminds us of "the simple
truth of us all being composed of the stuff the world is made of," making it
clear "that for our species, shifting from the animate to the inanimate is the
trend,"76 Montagu's lyric, in its animation of a speaking voice beyond the static
portrait, reminds us that such shifts also work in the other direction, animat
ing the inanimate by the uniquely human power of desire to speak beyond the
flesh in which it is invested. These are truths made more acute by Montagu's
experience of objectification and subsequent disfigurement and therefore (not
nevertheless) they are central to all poetry: remember that Ovid's poet-hero Or
pheus has the power, through the beauty of his songs of mourning for his lost
wife, to animate rocks, and stones, and trees.
An Orpheus rather than a Eurydice, Montagu not only lives beyond her
younger self but proves her wrong. In 1717 she had written to Pope from
Turkey:
I dare say You expect at least something very new in this letter after I hav
gone a Journey not undertaken by any Christian of some 100 years. The most
markable Accident that happen'd to me was my being very near overturn'd in
the Hebrus; and if I had much regard for the Glorys that one's Name enjoys aft
Death I should certainly be sorry for having miss'd the romantic conclusion o
swimming down the same River in which the musical Head of Orpheus repeate
verses so many ages since.
[. . . [while] Oeagrian Hebrus swept and rolled in mid-current that head, plucke
from its [marble] neck, the bare voice and death-cold tongue, with fleeting breath
called Eurydice—ah, hapless Eurydice! "Eurydice" the banks re-echoed, all adow
the stream.]
Who knows but some of your bright Wits might have found it a subject affording
many poetical Turns, and have told the World in a Heroic Elegy that
As equal were our Souls, so equal were our fates?
I dispair of ever having so many fine things said of me as so extrodinary a Death
would have given Occasion for.77
Inspired by this letter, Pope went on to say a good many fine things in his poem
commemorating a female suicide, "Elegy to the Memory of an Unfortunate
Lady" (1717). But Montagu, herself once a fine thing, rather than drowning or
dying for love, escaped that fate forever. Keeping her head and escaping her
face, she lost herself in another and brought herself to life.
NOTES
Thanks to Kathy King for the invitation to participate in this special issue, for her pati
and generosity, and for her excellent editorial work. I owe a great debt to the students
my graduate seminars in spring of 2007 and 2008, as well as spring and fall of 2009
helping me to think about Montagu in general and this poem in particular. Emily A
son, Heather James, Paul Kelleher, Jayne Lewis, Michael Meranze, Will Pritchard,
Christian Thome provided invaluable responses and assistance, while a host of liste
to shorter oral versions of this essay inspired its development.
2. Montagu, Essays and Poems and Simplicity, A Comedy, ed. Halsband and Isobel
Grundy (Oxford, 1977; repr. 2004), 381. Grundy dates this poem to December 1736. It
was discovered in manuscript and published as Appendix I in Essays and Poems in 1993.
land: Essays Presented to Mario Praz on His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Vittorio
1966], 223-41, 233). For this point I am grateful to Shirley Tung, whose c
tagu in her dissertation in progress, "A Self-Reflexive Journey: Imagining I
Eighteenth-Century Travel Narrative," gave me insight into the final stages
relationship with Algarotti.
63. Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. Donald M. Fra
1981), 139.
64. Enterline focuses on the silenced female voice in the Metamorphoses as emblematic
of poetic impossibility. Iphis is one exception to this rule.
65. Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Charles Martin (New York, 2004), 332, 9.979-81. All
further references will be by book and line number.
66. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 9.1013-14.
67. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 9.1025-26,1029-30.
68. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 9.1036-37.
69. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 9.1089-92.
70. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 9.1144^18.
71. Ali Smith, Boy Meets Girl: The Myth of Iphis (Edinburgh, 2007), 81,159.
72. Smith, 160.
73. Pope, The Rape of the Lock, 2:17-18.
74. Horace, Ode 4.10, The Odes of Horace, trans. David Ferry (New York, 1997), 294;
translation on 295.
75. Sobchack, "The Passion of the Material: Toward a Phenomenology of Interobjec
tivity," Carnal Thoughts, 286-318,290.
76. Brodsky, 454-55.
77. Montagu to Pope, 1 April [1717], Complete Letters, 1:330-31. The Latin quotation is
from Virgil, Georgics, 4. 523-27 (Halsband's translation, l:330n).