Korsgaard - Creating The Kingdom of Ends - Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations

Ridgeview Publishing Company
Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations

Author(s): Christine M. Korsgaard
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics (1992), pp. 305-332
Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company
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PhilosophicalPerspectives,6, Ethics,1992
CREATINGTHE KINGDOMOF ENDS:

RECIPROCITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
IN PERSONAL RELATIONS
ChristineM. Korsgaard
HarvardUniversity
As thevirtuous manis to himself, also,forhisfriend

he is to hisfriend
is anotherself.
Aristotle2
Whenwe holda personresponsible,we regardheras answerableforher
actions,reactions,and attitudes.We use the conceptofresponsibility in two
contexts,the legal and the personal.We use it in the legal contextwhen
we mustdeterminewhetherto punishsomeone fora crimeor make him
liableforanother'slosses.We use itin thecontextofeverydaypersonalinter-
action,when we are pressed to decide what attitudewe will take toward
another,or towardsomeactionor reactionofanother.Itis frequently assumed
thatthesetwouses are thesame or at leastcontinuous.Because I have doubts
about this,and some worriesabout the appropriatenessof usingthe notion
in the legal context,I want to lay thatuse aside.3 In thispaper, my focus
willbe on ourpracticeofholdingpeopleresponsiblein thecontextofpersonal
relations.
I begin by offeringan account of personalrelations,derivedfromKant
and Aristotle, along withan explanationofwhytheyrequireus to holdone
anotherresponsible.I thendistinguish twoviewsaboutwhatholdingsomeone
responsibleinvolves.Specifically, I argue thatto hold someone responsible
is to adoptan attitudetowardshimratherto have a beliefabouthimor about
theconditionsunderwhichhe acts.Thisview givesriseto a problem:ifhold-
ingsomeoneresponsibleis somethingthatwe do, whyand howdo we decide
to do it?In the restof the paper, I argue thatKant'stheoryof personaland
moral relationsprovidessome answers to thisquestion.
I. Personal Relations,Reciprocity,and Responsibility
has been
In the BritishEmpiricisttradition,the conceptof responsibility
closelyassociatedwiththeideas ofpraiseand blame,and thesein turnhave

306 / Christine
M. Korsgaard
playeda centralrolein itsmoralphilosophy. In thetheories ofHutcheson,

Hume,andSmith, theapprovalanddisapproval ofothersisthefundamental
moralphenomenon, fromwhichall ourmoralideasspring.4 Thereis some-
thingobviouslyunattractive abouttakingtheassessment ofothersas the
starting pointinmoralphilosophy. Oneoftheappealingthings aboutKant's
ethics,by contrast, is thatin it moralthought is seen as arisingfromthe
perspective oftheagentwhois deciding whattodo. Responsibility is inthe
first instancesomething takenrather thansomething assigned.Andthisfact
aboutthestructure ofhisviewis complemented bya factaboutitscontent.
Kantis notveryinterested inpraiseandblameandseldommentions them.
Andwhenhe doesdiscussissuesofmoralassessment, muchofwhathesays
favorsa takinga generousattitude. Hismetaphysical viewthatwe cannot
knowevenourownmostfundamental maxims(G 407/19)combineswith
a setofmoralinjunctions-to respectothers,avoidscandal,and "neverto
denythewrongdoer allmoralworth" (MMV462-464/127-129)-to givephilo-
sophicalfoundations to theBiblicalinjunction "Judgenot."5
Butina broadersenseitisnotpossibleforustoavoidholding oneanother
responsible.6 Forholding one anotherresponsible is thedistinctive element
intherelation ofadulthuman beings. To holdsomeoneresponsible istoregard
heras a person-thatistosay,as a freeandequalperson,capableofacting
bothrationally and morally. It is thereforeto regardheras someonewith
whomyoucan enterthekindofrelationthatis possibleonlyamongfree
andequalrational people:a relation ofreciprocity. Whenyouholdsomeone
responsible, you are preparedto exchangelawlessindividual activityfor
reciprocity insomeorall ofitsforms. You arepreparedtoacceptpromises,
offerconfidences, exchangevows,cooperateon a project,entera social
contract, havea conversation, makelove,be friends, or getmarried. You
are willing todealwithheron thebasisoftheexpectation thateachofyou
willact froma certainviewoftheother:thatyoueach haveyourreasons
whicharetobe respected, andyourendswhicharetobe valued.Abandoning
thestateofnatureand so relinquishing forceand guile,youare readyto
share,to trust, andgenerally speakingto riskyourhappiness or successon
the hopethatshe willturnoutto be human.
I borrowtheideathatpersonalrelations are characterized byreciprocity
from bothKantandAristotle, twooftheveryfewphilosophers inourtradition
whohavewritten aboutthistopic.Anditwillbe important to myargument
thatI holdalongwiththemthattheterritory ofpersonal relationsiscontinuous
withmoralterritory. Thatis to say,I accepttheirviewthattheformsof
friendship, at theirbestat least,areforms ofthebasicmoralrelation among
humanbeings-particular forms ofthatrelation whichhavebeenrendered
perfect oftheirkind.Aristotle holdsthatthemostperfect humanrelation
is thefriendship ofvirtue, inwhichtwopeopleofgoodcharacter sharetheir
livesandactivities, andinparticular, sharethosevirtuous activitiesthatmake

theKingdomofEnds:Reciprocity
Creating / 307
and Responsibility
theirlivesworthliving.(NEIX.91169b28ff./1089-1090) AndKantholdsthat
theidealoffriendship is thatof"theunionoftwopersonsthrough equal
mutualloveandrespect," inwhichthetwobasicattitudes
a relation we owe
to one otheras moralbeingsare realizedinspontaneous naturalsentiment
(MMV469/135).Characteristically, Aristotleholdsthatachievingsuch a
relationshipis a virtue,and Kant,thatstriving to achieveit is a duty.For
friendship,Aristotletellsus,itis "notonlynecessary butnoble"(NEVIII.2
1155a29-31/1059); andKantechoesthethought: no ordinary
"friendship...is
dutybutratheran honorableone proposedby reason."(MMV469/135)
Bothdefinethisperfect relation,
as wellas thelessperfect variants ofit,
interms ofreciprocity,andbothcitereciprocity as thereasonwhyfriendship
is foundaboveall amongpeoplewhoare good.ForAristotle, friendshipis
characterized byacknowledged reciprocalgoodwill,inwhicheach person
lovestheotherforhisown(theother's)sake.(NEVIII.21155b28-1156a5/
1059-1060) Thisrequirestrustin theother'sgoodness,foras Aristotle says
"itis amonggoodmenthattrust andthefeeling that'hewouldneverwrong
me'andalltheotherthings thataredemandedintruefriendship arefound."
(NE VIII.31157a22-24/1062) Kantcharacterizes friendship in theLectures
on Ethicsas "themaximum oflove"(LE 202).Therehe argues
reciprocity
thatfriends exchangetheirprivate projectsofpursuing theirownhappiness,
eachundertaking tocarefortheother'shappiness insteadofhisown."I,from
generosity, lookafterhishappiness and he similarlylooksaftermine;I do
notthrowawaymyhappiness, butsurrenderittohiskeeping, andheinturn
surrenders intomyhands"(LE 203).Thisrequiresthemaximum reciprocity
oflovebecause"ifI am to love himas I lovemyself I mustbe surethathe
willlove me as he loveshimself, inwhichcase he restores to me thatwith
whichI partand I comebackto myself again"(LE 202).The lateraccount
inTheMetaphysics ofMoralsaddsanotherelement. Friendship initsperfec-
tioninvolveswhatKantcalls"themostintimate unionoflovewithrespect."
(MMV469/135)Whilelovemovesyoutopursuetheendsofanother, respect
reminds youthatshemustdetermine whatthoseendsare;whilelovemoves
youtocareforthehappiness ofanother, respectdemandsthatyoucarefor
hercharactertoo. Kantmeansherethefeelingsof love and respect,for
he is definingthefriendship ofsentiment, butthisdoes notseverthetieto
morality. Loveandrespect aretheprimary dutiesofvirtue we owetoothers.
Although onlytheoutwardpracticescan be requiredofus,Kantmakesit
clearin manypassagesthathe believesthatin thestateofrealizedvirtue
thesefeelings willbe present. Inone placehe evendefines loveandrespect
as thefeelings whichaccompany theexerciseofourdutiestowardsothers
(MMV448/112;see alsoR 23-24n/19n).Feelings ofsympathy, gratitude,and
delightin thehappiness ofothersare notdirectly incumbent uponus,but
theyare thenaturalresultofmakingtheendsofothersourown,as duty
demands.The feelingofrespect,a stillhigherachievement, is thenatural

308 / ChristineM. Korsgaard
resultof keepingthe humanityof othersand so theircapacityforgood will

always beforeour eyes. So thiskindoffriendship reallyis in Kant'seyes the
friendship of virtue,the moral relationin a perfected form.
"Whenmen are friendstheyhave no need ofjustice,"says Aristotle,and
thereare twowaysto understand whathe means.(NEVIII.11155a25-26/1059)
The wrongway is to suppose thathe is referring to an idea like Hume's of
the "circumstancesof justice":justiceis onlyusefuland so is onlyrequired
when moderate scarcityholds among people who are only moderately
benevolent.7Friends,because theyare endlesslybenevolentto each other,
are notin thecircumstances ofjusticeand have no use forit.Now thisclearly
cannotbe Aristotle'smeaning,forhe thinksthat"the truestformofjustice
is thoughtto be a friendlyquality"(NE VIII.1 1155a27-28/1059)and that
"friendship and justice...seemto be concernedwiththe same objects and
exhibitedbetweenthe same persons"(NE VIII.9 1159b25-27/1068).Justice
is, at itsbest,a kindofcivic friendship.And indeed,friendship, like justice,
is notprimarily a matterofdoingthingsforone another,butofdoingthings
together."Those in theprimeoflifeitstimulates to nobleactions-'twogoing
together'-forwithfriendsmen are moreable bothto thinkand to act." (NE
VIII.1 1155al4-16/1058)Aristotlesums up his account withthese words:
Andwhatever existencemeansforeach classofmen,whatever it is for
whosesake theyvaluelife,in thattheywishto occupythemselves with
and so somedrinktogether,
theirfriends, othersdicetogether,othersjoinin
and in thestudyofphilosophy,
athleticexercisesand hunting, each class
spending theirdaystogetherin whatevertheylove mostin life;forsince
theywishto livewiththeirfriends, theydo and sharein thosethingswhich
givethemthesenseoflivingtogether. (NE IX.11 1172a2-9/1093)
Justiceisn'tnecessarybetweenfriendsbecause thereciprocity (NE V.5-6)and
unanimity(NE VIII.1; NE IX.6) characteristicof justiceare already present.
And thisis because theywant above all to act together. Kant would again
agree. Kant thinksthatjusticeis reciprocalcoercion undera general will,
made necessaryby geographicaland economicassociation(MMJ232/36-37;
256/64-65).When we share a territory we may have a disputeabout rights.
ButI mayenforcemyrightsagainstyou onlyon theunderstanding thatyou
mayenforceyourrightsagainstme,and in thisway we makea socialcontract
and constituteourselvesa state. (MMJ315-316/80-81)Friendshipis a free
and uninstitutionalized formof justice,where the associationis createdby
love ratherthan geographicalnecessity,and regulatedby mutualrespect
ratherthan reciprocalcoercion.
But it is not merelythe narrowrelationofpoliticaljustice,butratherthe
moralrelationgenerally,thatfriendship mirrors.For to join withothersas
citizensintheKingdomofEndsis to extendto ourinnerattitudes and personal
choices the kind of reciprocitythatcharacterizesour outer actions in the
politicalstate.Thisis seen bestin theway Kantuses theFormulaofHumanity

Creating / 309
and Responsibility
to explainourdutiesto others.8 Inthepositivesense,totreatanotheras an

endinitselfis tomakeherendsyourown:"Fortheendsofanysubjectwho
isan endinhimself mustas faras possiblebe myendsalso,ifthatconception
ofan endinitself is to haveitsfulleffect inme."(G430/37)Inthenegative
sense,totreatanother as an endinitselfistorespectherautonomy-to leave
heractions,decisions, and endsto herownchoice.Butthisrespectgetsits
mostpositiveandcharacteristic expression at precisely themoments when
we mustacttogether. Thenanother's righttochoosebecomesthe"limiting
condition" ofmyown.(G431/37)Ifmyendrequires youractforitsachieve-
ment,thenI mustletyoumakeityourendtoo.BothwhatI chooseandthe
way I chooseit mustreflectthisconstraint. You mustbe freeto choose
whether youwillcontribute to thesuccessofmyprojector not.Kantsays
anyoneengagedin a transaction withme mustbe able to agreewithmy
wayofactingtowardshimandtoshareintheendofmyaction.(G430/37)
IfI forceyoutocontribute toan endyouhavehadno opportunity todecide
fororagainst, orifI trickyouintocontributing intoone endundertheguise
ofsolicitingyourhelpwithanother, thenI haveusedyouas a meremeans.
Kantillustrates thiswiththeexampleofthelyingpromise.IfI ask youto
lendme money,knowingI shallnotbe able to pay youback,I trickyou
intocontributing to an endyouhavehadno opportunity to choose.I make
youthinkthattheendproducedbyourtransaction is mytemporary use of
yourmoney,whenin factitis mypermanent possessionofit.Neither my
wayofactingnortheendproduced byitarethings thatyouareina position
toacceptorreject,andthisrenders themmorally wrong.ThusI mustmake
yourendsandreasonsmine,andI mustchoosemineinsucha waythatthey
canbe yours.Butthisjustisreciprocity. Generalized totheKingdom ofEnds,
myownendsmustbe thepossibleobjectsofuniversal subject
legislation,
to thevoteofall. Andthisis howI realizemyautonomy. Paradoxically if
youlike,myendsandactionsaremosttruly myownwhentheyarechosen
undertherestrictions ofa possiblereciprocal relation-akindoffriendship-
witheveryone.
I do notsay thisto joinforceswiththosewhobelievethattherecould
be no roomin aa Kantianlifeforpersonalas opposedto moralrelations.9
Nor,certainly, do I meantosuggest thatbeingfriends isjusta matterofbeing
good.Mypointis onlythatmoraland personalrelations are notdifferent
in kind.The difference betweenthemis thedifference betweenthedegree
ofreciprocity thatisrequiredofus as one humanbeingrelating toanother,
andthedegreeofreciprocity thatwe are capableofwhenourrelations are
at theirbest.Anyonemusttellthetruth whenthecircumstances callforit,
but betweenfriends thereis a presumption of intimacy, frankness,and
confidence. Anyonemusthelpanotherin need or emergency, butfriends
promote eachother's projects as routinelyas theydo theirown.Anyonemust
refrain fromleadingothersintotemptation; butfriends helpeach otherto

be good. The difference is thedifferencebetweentheabsolutemoralrequire-

mentswe mustmeetifhumanrelationsare to be decentat all,and thefurther
reaches of positivevirtue,where our relationswithone anotherbecome
morallyworthy.Friendshipsare humanmoralachievementsthatare lovely
in themselvesand testify to thevirtueofthosewho sustainthem.To become
friendsis to create a neighborhoodwhere the Kingdomof Ends is real.10
Kant'sfaithinthemoralforceofreciprocity showsup bestwhenhe believes
thatthe basic moral relationis at risk.In both the Lectureson Ethics and
theMetaphysicsofMoralsKantgivesinarticulate voice to theview thatthere
is somethingmorallytroublesome,even potentiallydegrading,about sexual
relations.Itis important to understandthatwhatbothershimis not theidea
thatone is usinganotherpersonas a meansto one's own pleasure.Thatwould
about
be an incorrectview ofsexual relations,and in any case any difficulty
it,would,by Kant's own theory,be alleviatedby the other'ssimpleact of
freeconsent.WhatbothersKant is ratherthatsexual desiretakes a person
foritsobject.11He says: "Theythemselves,and nottheirworkand services,
are its Objects of enjoyment."(LE 162) And he continues:
Mancan,ofcourse,use anotherhumanbeingas an instrument forhis
service,he can use hishands,hisfeet,and evenall hispowers,he can use
himforhisownpurposeswiththeother'sconsentButthereis no wayin
whicha humanbeingcan be madean Objectofindulgence foranother
exceptthrough sexualimpulseit is an appetiteforanotherhumanbeing
(LE 163)
Regardingsomeone as a sexual object is not like regardinghim as an
instrument or a tool,butmorelikeregardinghimas an aestheticobject.But
in thiscase the attitudeis not justappreciationbut desire.(MMV426/87)12
Viewedthroughtheeyes ofsexual desireanotherpersonis seen as something
wantable,desirable,and,therefore, inevitably, To yieldto that
possessable.13
desire,to the extentit is reallythatdesireyou yieldto, is to allow yourself
to be possessed.The problemis howyou can do thatina way thatis consistent
withrespectforyourown humanity. 14And thesolutionrestsin reciprocity:
If,then,one yieldsone'sperson,bodyand soul,forgoodand ill in every

respect,so thattheotherhas completerights overit,and iftheotherdoes
notsimilarlyyieldhimselfin returnand does notextendin return thesame
rights thearrangement
and privileges, is one-sidedButif I yieldmyself
completely to anotherand obtainthepersonoftheotherin return, I win
myself back,I havegivenmyself up as theproperty ofanother, butin turnI
takethatotheras myproperty, and so winmyself backagainin winning
thepersonwhoseproperty I havebecome In thiswaythetwopersons
becomea unityofwill (LE 167)
The languageofself-surrender similarto that
and retrievalhereis strikingly
Kant uses elsewhere forboth friendshipand justice. In makingthe social
contract,Kantsays,we do not sacrificepartofour freedomfora particular
purpose,but rathersacrificeall of our lawless freedomin order to regain

Creating / 311
and Responsibility
ourfreedom again,undiminished, underlaw. (MMJ316/80-81) In thecase

offriendship KantsaysI surrender myhappiness completely intothehands
ofmyfriend, butthatin lovingme as he loveshimself "he restores to me
thatwithwhichI partand I comeback to myself again"(LE 202).'5This
perfect reciprocity is theonlycondition underwhichthesexualrelationis
morally andKantthinks
legitimate; thiscondition isonlypossibleinmarriage,
wherethereciprocity ofsurrender has been pledged.Extramarital sex is
forbidden onlybecausethewoman,as Kantsupposes,does notthenhave
thesamerights overthemanthathe has overher.Ofcoursemarriage as
ithasusuallyexistedhashardly beena solution tothisproblem. Theequality
necessary forreciprocity is farmorelikelyto be distanced evenfurther by
marriage, whichhasusuallygiventhehusband rightsoverhiswifeadditional
to thosethataccruefromthesuperior socialpositionhe has heldas a man.
Kantadmitsas muchintheMetaphysical Elements ofJustice, asserting that
an unequalmarriage is nota marriage in hissenseat all.Thusmarriage as
ithasbeenpracticed inmostsocietieshasnotsanctified butrather degraded
sexualrelations. (MMJ 278-279)16 Butperhapsthemoststartling ramification
ofKant'sviewemerges inwhathesaysaboutincest.Asstrong as ournatural
aversiontoitmaybe,andhoweverriskyandtherefore conditionally wrong
itis from a reproductive pointofview,incestis onlymorally wronginitself,
unconditionally, inonecase:thecaseofparentandchild.Andthisisbecause,
according toKant,theequality ofrespect required forreciprocity cannotand
shouldnotbe achievedin thatrelation.(LE 168)
Whichbrings mebacktomytopic.Therelations ofreciprocity arerelations
thatobtainbetweenfreeand equal persons.As such,theycall formutual
responsibility fortwo important reasons.In orderto makethe endsand
reasonsof anotheryourown,you mustregardheras a sourceofvalue,
someonewhosechoicesconferworthupontheirobjects,and whohas the
rightto decideon herownactions.In orderto entrust yourownendsand
reasonsto another's care,youmustsupposethatsheregardsyouthatway,
and is preparedto act accordingly. People who enterintorelationsof
reciprocity mustbe preparedto sharetheirendsandreasons;to holdthem
jointly; and to act together. Reciprocity is thesharingofreasons,and you
willenterintoit onlywithsomeoneyouexpectto deal withreasonsin a
rationalway. In thissense,reciprocity requiresthatyou holdthe other
responsible.
Itis certainlya concomitant ofholding someoneresponsible thatyouare
preparedforblame,resentment, and theotherreactiveattitudes.17 Ifmy
friend failsme in a seriouswayand I do notblameher,shrugging itoffas
I wouldthemisdemeanors ofa childor a pet,thenI was notholdingher
responsible after
all,andprobably I washolding myself back.Butitisa mistake
tomakethesereactions central.Blameis important, notas a tooloftraining
or theenforcement ofsocialnorms, butas an expression ofthetenacity of

M. Korsgaard
312 / Christine
disappointed respect.Atitsbest,itdeclaresto itsobjecta greaterfaiththan

shehasinherself. Yetstillitis notcentral. Thewillingness to takea chance
on some form ofreciprocity is the essence of holding someone responsible.
I meanin thesewords both to acknowledge the of
affinity my position
withP.F.Strawson's in"Freedomand Resentment" and to notice one point
ofdifference. Strawson also emphasizes theemployment of the concept of
ineveryday
responsibility personalrelations. But he tendsto focus more on
theeffectofattributionsofresponsibility on oursentiments thantheireffect
on ourpractices. Histopic,as he describes it,is "thenon-detached attitudes
andreactions ofpeopledirectly involved intransactions witheachother;...the
andreactions
attitudes ofoffended partiesandbeneficiaries; ofsuchthings
as gratitude,resentment, forgiveness, love,and hurtfeelings."'8 I wantto
focusless upontheexchangeofbenefits and harms,and thefeelings that
resultfromthatexchange,andmoreuponthewillingness toactinconcert.
Butmypointis similarto his.In everyday personalinteraction, we cannot
geton without theconceptofresponsibility. Andtherefore we cannotrest
withtheviewthatagentstakeresponsibility fortheirownactionsbutcan
refrainfrom judgingothers.Fora Kantian, thismeansitis necessary to say
morethanKanthimself didaboutwhat,onhisview,isinvolved indetermining
whenand whether to holdpeopleresponsible.
II. Theoreticaland PracticalConceptionsof Responsibility
Attributions ofresponsibility maybe understood in eitheroftwoways,

whichI willcalltheoretical andpractical. Construed theoretically, responsi-
isa characteristic
bility ofpersons. Construed practically,holdingone another
responsible is something thatwe do, the more or less deliberate adoption
ofan attitude. In whatfollowsI willdistinguish thesetwowaysofunder-
standing attributions ofresponsibility,and showthataccording to Kantwe
mustunderstand attributions ofresponsibilityin a practicalway.I believe
thatthisviewofresponsibility inouractualpractices,
isimplicit andtherefore
that,on thispointat least,Kant'saccountcan makeus moretransparent to
ourselves.
Responsibilityis construed theoreticallybythosewhothink thatitisa fact
abouta personthatshe is responsible fora particular action,or thatthere
is somefactabouthercondition eitherat thetimeofactionor duringthe
eventswhichleduptoitwhichfully determines whether itiscorrect tohold
herresponsible. Itis a fact,say,thatshecouldhavedoneotherwise, orthat
she couldhaveavoidedthecondition whichmadeitimpossible forherto
do otherwise. Similaralthough somewhatmorecomplicated claimswould
be madeabouttheperson'sreactions and attitudes: factsabouttheperson
settlethequestionwhether she is accountableforthem.Decidingwhether
to holdsomeoneresponsible is a matterofassessingthefacts;itis a matter

Creating / 313
and Responsibility
ofarrivingata beliefabouther.Itseemsprobable thatwe arriveatthismodel

bya certainroute:we thinkaboutlegalresponsibility andwe suppose
first,
thatin thatcase we mustfindfactswhichcan settlethematter, and then
we imaginethatpersonalresponsibility is an extensionofthis.
Responsibility is construed practicallyby thosewho thinkthatholding
someoneresponsible is adoptingan attitude towardsher,or,muchbetter,
placingyourself in a relationship withher.Whileofcoursefactsaboutthe
agentandabouthercondition at thetimeoftheactionguideyourdecision
whether toholdherresponsible, theydo notfully determine it.Itisimportant
tosee thatthefactsstilldo provideguidance, fora practicalconception need
notbe envisioned as completely voluntaristic.On eithera theoretical or a
conception,
practical wewill,whendeciding whether toholdsomeonerespon-
sible,say suchthingsas "he is verynervousabouttheinterview he has
tomorrow" or"he'sbeenhurtso often thatnowhecannevertrust a woman."
But in a practicalconceptiontheseconsiderations appearin the role of
practicalreasonsfornot holdingthe personresponsible ratherthanas
evidencethathe couldnothave helpedwhathe did.Whenresponsibility
is viewedthisway,we need notsupposethatthereis a fixeddegreeof
nervousness or pastheartbreak beyondwhichsomeoneisinfactno longer
responsible fortheway he actsand reacts;decidingwhether to holdhim
responsibleistherefore nota matter ofdetermining whether thisfixeddegree
hasbeenreached.A resulting featureofthepractical conception whichI take
to be one of itsvirtuesis thatit distancesthequestionwhetherto hold
someoneresponsible fromthequestionwhether he actedvoluntarily. I do
notbelievethereisa stablerelationship between thevoluntariness ofan action
or attitudeand theappropriateness ofholdingsomeoneresponsible forit.
Ifa bad actionis foundto havebeen involuntary in somestraightforward
way,we willwithdraw blame,we mayalso do thisifthepersonis under
severeemotional stress.Butthereis neither neednorreasonto reducethe
secondkindofexcusing conditiontothefirst andsaythatpeopleundersevere
emotional stresscannotcontrolthemselves. We do notneedto understand
a formofdebilitation as a formofimpossibility inordertomakeallowances
forit;we needonlytoknowwhatitis like.Conversely, we maywellblame
peopleforinvoluntary attitudesor expressions, becausewe blamepeople
forlackofcontrolitself. Ifyoucannotrepressa victorious grinon learning
thatyourrivalhasmetwitha gruesome accident,yououghttobe blamed,
preciselyon thataccount.The impulseto reduceall excusingconditions to
claimsaboutthevoluntary comesfrom thetheoretical conception ofrespon-
whichdemandsan answerto thequestionwhether
sibility, one couldhave
done otherwiseor not. On the practicalconceptionexcuses need not
completelydetermine ourdecisions aboutwhether toholdpeopleresponsible.
Ifthedecisionto attribute is practical,
responsibility it maybe reasonable
to makeitpartly on thebasisofotherkindsofconsiderations: inparticular,

M. Korsgaard
314 / Christine
whichreciprocal relations youalreadystandinor planto standinor hope

in
to standin to theperson question.
Construing responsibilitypracticallyopensuppossibilities thatwouldnot
makesenseifresponsibility were a fact about the person. It is becausewe
bothacceptand avail ourselvesof these possibilities that I claim thatwe
implicitlyunderstand of
attributions responsibility practicallyin everyday life.
Forinstance, itmay be reasonable
perfectly for me to holdsomeone respon-
sibleforan attitude oran action,whileat thesametimeacknowledging that
it is just as reasonableforsomeoneelse not to hold the same person
responsible fortheverysameattitude oraction.Perhapsitis reasonablefor
you to forgive or overlookourfriend's distrustful behavioron thegrounds
thathe hassuffered so muchheartbreak, butnot me,notbecauseI fail
for
to appreciatehowhurthe has been,butbecauseI am thewomanwhose
lovingconductis alwaysmetwithdistrust.19 Again,ifdecidingwhether to
holdsomeoneresponsible is something thatwe do, itis something that we
mayin turnbe heldresponsible for.Holdingsomeoneresponsible can be
insensitive or merciless; failingto holdsomeoneresponsible can be dis-
respectful or patronizing. Moralrequirements willapplyto ourattributions
ofresponsibility, justas Kantbelievestheydo.
Consider, forinstance, theappropriate reactionto a case whereone is
disappointed in friendship. Kantthinkstheperfectfriendship I described
earlier,characterized by feelingsof equal mutuallove and respect,is
impossible toachieve.Buthedoesthink we canachievewhathecalls"moral
friendship." (MMV471-473/138-140) The formofreciprocity centralto this
relationis thefrank conversation,thesharing ofsentiments, ofwhichKant
believeswe allstandinneed.Likeotherreciprocal relationsitcallsforgood
character onthepartoftheparticipants, becauseitis hedgedwithdangers-
ranging fromthecruderiskthatyouwilltellyoursecretsto an unreliable
personwhowillpublishthem,tothemoresubtleriskthatyourconfidences
will be met withdisrespectful attitudes.20 I do not want to share my
ambitions withsomeonewhois inwardly amusedbymyvanity, norwhisper
mytemptations to someonewhowillplace a harshconstruction on them.
One whoconsents to receivemyconfidences is committed to avoidingthe
vicesofmockeryand calumny, seriousfailures of respectin theKantian
catalogue(MMV466-467/131-133). AndI willblameherifshefailsinthese
ways,without regardto theavailableevidenceof hercharacter or ofthe
circumstances in whichitwas formed. Hercircumstances musthavebeen
verybad indeed,or herfailures veryfrequent, beforeI maydecideitwas
simply myerrortotrusther.Forindeciding thisI writeheroffas a person,
and I do thisat myown moralperil.
I supposethatmostofus haveat onetimeoranotherhadtheexperience
ofbeingtempted to "writesomebodyoff."The extentto whichwe do this
isa matter ofdegree,andhopefully we do notgoso faras togiveuptreating

Lreaung mneAingaomor Lnas: Keciprociryana KesponslD1ii(y/ .1.
thepersonwiththemostbasicforms ofmoraldecency.Butwe mayavoid

as faras possible;we maychoosetoexecuteourprojects
interaction, inthe
companyofothers;whereinteraction we maycometo treat
is necessary,
thepersonas an obstacletobe workedaround.Inan extreme case we may
ceasetohavereactive attitudesaltogether,oratleastwe mayscoldourselves,
as forirrational
feelings,whenwe havethem."You knowthatshe always
endsup infuriating you.Whydon'tyoujuststayoutofherway?"Taking
such attitudestowardsothersseems disrespectful, but it can certainly
sometimes be tempting all thesame.Howdo we decidewhatto do insuch
a case?On a theoretical construal ofresponsibility,
we simplyask whether
thepersonis in factresponsible fortheoffensive behavior,and treather
accordingly.On a practical we mustdiscovermoralandpractical
construal,
reasonsthatwillguideus to therightattitude. Kant'stheoryofmoraland
personal I believe,canshowuswherethesereasonsaretobe found.
relations,
III. Kant's Two Standpoints
I willapproachtheseissuesin a roundabout way,however.I beginby

discussingthewayKantreconciles freewillanddeterminism, andbyshowing
howhisreconciliation givesriseto someapparentproblems aboutholding
peopleresponsible. Kant'stheoryofmoraland personalrelations showus
howhe might haveresolvedone oftheseissues,andhowwe might resolve
theother.
Kant'ssolutiontotheproblem offreedom anddeterminism isclearenough
in outline,howevermuchphilosophers maydisagreeaboutwhatitmeans.
We mustviewourselvesfromtwostandpoints, fromwhichwe appearas
membersoftwodifferent "worlds."(G 452/53-54) Completecausaldeter-
minismholdsin thephenomenal or sensibleworld,theworldofthingsas
theyappeartous;butwe cannotknowthatitholdsinthenoumenal world,
theworldofthings as theyareinthemselves. Indeed,sincewe mustsuppose
thatthereare some undetermined firstcauses,or freeagencies,which
generatetheappearances, we mustsupposethatthingswhichexistin the
noumenal worldare free.21Insofaras we regardourselves as "intelligences,"
thespontaneity ofreasoninducesus to attribute a noumenalexistenceto
ourselves.(G 452/53;C2 42-43/43-44) Insofar as we considerourselvesto
be intelligentagents,then,we mustregardourselvesas free:indeed,
completely andtranscendentally so. Yetat thesametimewe mustviewour
actions,likeall phenomena, as fullydetermined.22
DespiteKant'sstrictures againsttrying to envisionwhatoccurson the
boundarybetweenthe two worlds,it is naturalto wanta picturethat
reconcilesthesetwo viewsof ourselves.At one pointin the Critiqueof
PracticalReason,Kantsuppliesthebeginning ofsucha picture.He proposes
thatwe shouldthinkofourselves, and also thatwe do thinkofourselves,

as ifwe createdour own characters.Althougha personmay know thathis

actions are determinedin the phenomenalworld,Kant says:
.thesamesubject. is consciousalso ofhisexistenceas a thing-in-
onlyby lawswhichhe givesto himself
itself...determinable through reason
In thisexistencenothing is antecedentto thedeterminationofhiswill,every
action,and..eventheentirehistory ofhisexistenceas a sensuousbeing,is
seen...onlyas a consequence.. ofhiscausality as a noumenonFromthis
pointofview,a rationalbeingcan rightly say ofanyunlawfulactionwhich
he has donethathe couldhaveleftit undone,evenifas an appearance
it. was inescapablynecessaryForthisactionand everything in thepast
whichdetermined it belongto a singlephenomenon which
ofhischaracter,
he himself creates.. (C2 97-98/101)
of responsibility:
Kant then applies thispictureto our attributions
Fromthispointofview..judgments which.seemat first
maybe justified
withequity.Thereare cases in whichmen...haveshown
glanceto conflict
fromchildhood suchdepravity..thattheyare heldto be bornvillainsand
incapableofanyimprovement ofcharacter; yettheyare judgedby their
acts,theyare reproachedas guiltyoftheircrimes,and,indeed,they
themselvesfindthesereproaches as wellgrounded justas
as ifthey...were
as anyothermen Thiscouldnothappenifwe didnotsuppose
responsible
thatwhatever arisesfromman'schoice.has a freecausalityas its
groundtheviciousqualityofthewill..is theconsequenceof. freely
assumedeviland unchangeable (C2 99-100/103)
principles.
Here one's lifeis regardedas the phenomenalrepresentation or expression
of a singlechoice, the choice of one's characteror fundamentalprinciple.
Thischoicemustbe understoodas occurring outsideoftime,in thenoumenal
world.The choice is the one describedin the firstbook ofReligionWithin
theLimitsofReason Alone: the choice of how incentivesare to be ordered
in one's mostfundamental maxim,thechoicebetweenmorality and self-love.
(R 36/31) As Kant sees it,humanbeingsare subjectto certainincentives-
impulseswhichpresentthemselvesto us as candidates,so to speak, to be
reasons foraction.Amongthese are our desiresand inclinations, as well as
respectforthe morallaw. Kantbelieves thatwe are notfreeto ignoresuch
incentivesaltogether.Instead,ourfreedomconsistsin ourabilityto rankthe
incentives,to choose whetherour self-loveshall be governedby morality
or moralityshallbe subordinatedto self-love.This fundamental choice then
governsour choice of lower-ordermaxims.The fundamentalchoice is an
act-in theReligionKant calls it an intelligibleact-and it is ultimatelythis
intelligibleact thatis imputableto us, and makes our phenomenalactions
imputableto us. (R 31-32/26-27)
When firstexposed to Kant'sview, one may be temptedto tryto picture
how and where the choice of one's characterentersthe processes which
ultimatelyissue in action.Suppose,withviolentoversimplification, thatit is
a law of naturethat childrenraised in certainconditionsof povertyand

Creating / 317
and Responsibility
insecuritytendtobecomesomewhat selfish as adults,andsupposethatsuch

a childhoodhas had thiseffect on Marilyn. Are we to say to her:"Your
childhood insecurity gave youan incentive butitis stillyour
to be selfish,
ownfaultifyouelevatethatincentive intoa reason?"Thenwe arethinking
thatMarilyn's freedom inserts inbetweenthecausesinherbackground
itself
and theirultimateeffect.23 Or are we supposedto thinkthat,in her
noumenalexistence, Marilyn willsto be a selfishperson?Or,to geteven
fancier,shouldwe thinkthatin hernoumenalexistenceMarilyn willsthe
lawofnaturethatdeprived children becomeselfish adults?Obviously, ifwe
tryto picturehowMarilyn's freedom is relatedto theforcesthatdetermine
her,we mustimagineiteitherinserting itselfsomewhere intothehistorical
process,or standing behindthelaws of naturefromwhichthishistorical
processnecessarily follows.Andbothofthesepictures seemcrazy.24
Andofcoursetheyarecrazy.Kant'sresponse tothisproblem istomaintain
thatthequestion shouldnotbe asked.To askhowfreedom anddeterminism
arerelatedistoinquireintotherelation betweenthenoumenal andphenom-
enal worlds,a relationaboutwhichit is in principle impossible to know
anything.Butourunderstanding ofwhatthisresponse amounts towilldepend
onhowwe understand thedistinction between thenoumenal andphenomenal
worlds,andtherelateddistinction betweenthetwostandpoints fromwhich
Kantsayswe mayviewourselvesand ouractions.
Thisis a largeissuewhichI cannottreathereina satisfactory way,I shall
simplydeclaremyallegiance.On a familiar butas I thinkmisguided inter-
pretation,thedistinction betweenthetwoworldsis an ontological one; as
ifbehindthebeingsofthisworldwereanotherset ofbeings,whichhave
an activeandcontrolling relation tothebeingsofthisworld,butwhichare
inaccessibletous becauseofthelimits ofexperience. According tothisview,
we occupybothworlds, andviewingourselves from thetwostandpoints we
discovertwodifferent setsoflawswhichdescribeand explainourconduct
inthetwodifferent worlds.We actonthemorallawinthenoumenal world,
thelawofself-love inthephenomenal world.Thisviewgivesrisetofamiliar
paradoxesabouthowevilactionsareevenpossible, andhowwe couldever
be heldresponsible forthemiftheywere.25
On whatI take to be the correctinterpretation, the distinctionis not
betweentwokindsofbeings,butbetweenthebeingsofthisworldinsofar
as theyare authentically activeand the same beingsinsofaras we are
passivelyreceptive tothem.The"gap"inourknowledge existsnotbecause
ofthelimitsofexperience butbecauseofitsessential nature:to experience
something is(inpart)tobe passively receptive toit,andtherefore we cannot
have experiences ofactivity as such.26 As thinkers and chooserswe must
regardourselvesas activebeings,even thoughwe cannotexperience
ourselvesas activebeings,andso we placeourselvesamongthenoumena,
necessarily,whenever we think andact.According tothisinterpretation,the

M. Korsgaard
318 / Christine
laws of the phenomenalworldare laws thatdescribeand explainour

behavior.Butthelawsofthenoumenal worldarelawswhichareaddressed
to us as activebeings;theirbusinessis notto describeand explainat all,
butto governwhatwe do.27Reasonhastwoemployments, theoretical and
practical.We viewourselves as phenomena whenwe takeonthetheoretical
taskofdescribing andexplaining ourbehavior; weviewourselves as noumena
whenourpractical taskis one ofdeciding whattodo.28Thetwostandpoints
cannotbe mixedbecausethesetwoenterprises-explanation anddecision-
are mutually exclusive.29
Thesetwowaysofunderstanding thenoumenal/phenomenal distinction
yieldverydifferent interpretations ofKant'sstrictures
againsttrying topicture
therelationbetweenthenoumenaland phenomenal worlds.On theontol-
ogicalview,the questionhow thetwo worldsare relatedis one which,
frustratingly, cannotbe answered. Ontheactive/passive view,itisonewhich
cannotcoherently be asked.Thereis no questionthatis answeredby my
descriptions ofhowMarilyn's freedom withthecausalforcesthat
interacts
determine her.Forfreedom is a conceptwitha practical employment, used
inthechoiceandjustification ofaction, notinexplanation orprediction; while
causality is a conceptoftheory, usedto explainandpredict actionsbutnot
to justify them.30 Thereis no standpoint fromwhichwe are doingbothof
thesethings at once,andso thereis no placefromwhichto ask a question
thatincludesbothconceptsin itsanswer.
So, if I am myselfMarilyn, and I am trying to decidewhetherto do
something selfish,reflectionson thedisadvantages ofmybackground are
irrelevant. I mustactundertheidea offreedom, andso I mustacton what
I regard as reasons.Beingunderprivileged maysometimes be a causeofselfish
behavior,butit is nota reasonthatcan be offered in supportof it by a
personengagedinit.So although we do notnecessarilysayofMarilyn: "her
background gave hersometoughincentives to deal with,butstillit is up
to herwhether she treatsthemas reasons,"thatis whatshe mustsay to
herself. I saythatwe do notnecessarily say this,because,as I am aboutto
argue,whether we sayitdependsonwhether we havedecidedtoenterinto
reciprocal relations withherandso to holdherresponsible. Butinthatcase,
itis betterregardedas something we saynotaboutbutto her.Thesecond-
persongrammatical form,so rarelyprivileged inphilosophy, is exactlyright
here,forifanyonebesidesMarilyn has therightto makethisjudgment, it
is herfriends, thosewithwhomsheinteracts. On theotherhand,ifI am not
Marilyn's friend buta socialscientistwhoistrying tounderstand andexplain
herbehavior, thenmybusinessis notto tryto justify herconduct, and for
mypurposesthecausalexplanation whichmakesherselfish actionsseem
inevitable is therightone to pursue.
The two worlds,or the two viewsof the worldwe get fromthe two
standpoints, mayseemstrangely incongruent,butitis important tosee that

Creating
and Responsibility
/ 319
thereis no contradiction.
The incongruity
simplyfollows fromthefactthat
we standin two verydifferent relationsto our actions:we musttryto
understand them,butwe mustalso decidewhichones to do.
IV. PracticalGroundsforHoldingPeople Responsible
Butwe cannotjustleavethematter there.Fortherearecontexts inwhich

we havetomixconsiderations derivedfrom thetwostandpoints, andmake
a moralassessmentof someone'saction,on the basis of a theoretical
explanation ofwhatshe did.Thisoccurswhenwe are makingjudgments
aboutresponsibility:whenwe mustdecidewhether, forinstance, someone
is to be exonerated,excused,forgiven, blamed,or notheldresponsible for
a bad actionat all.
Therearereallytwoproblems here.First,giventhatwe can viewpeople
and theiractionseitherway,or fromeitherstandpoint, whatreasondo we
haveforsettling onthepracticalpointofview,andholding peopleresponsible,
at all?31Second,evenifwe can discoversucha reason,won'tKant'sview
be intransigent? Forifwe do regardpeopleas freeagents,fellowcitizens
intheKingdom ofEnds,thenitseemsas ifwe musttreatthemas transcen-
dentallyfreeand so as completely responsibleforeach and everyaction,
no matter whatsortsofpressures theymaybe under.Yettheobviousfact
is thatwe livein neighborhoods whichare at differentdistancesfromthe
Kingdom ofEnds,anditseemsmerciless togivethisobviousfactnoweight.
Butit also seemsas ifthe onlyoptionKantprovidesis to switchto the
theoreticalstandpoint andregardcandidates forforgivenessas iftheywere
no moreresponsible fortheiractionsthansmallchildren and animals.The
veryideaofan action'sbeingexcusableorforgivable orunderstandable seem
tobringtogether and
explanatory justificatory thoughts. doctrine the
The of
twostandpoints to
seems keepsuchthoughts resolutely
apart.
In responseto thefirstproblem, whywe holdpeopleresponsible at all,
it is important to separatetwoissues.One is theissueof holding
initially
yourself foryourownactionsinthecontext
responsible ofdeliberativechoice,
andtheotheristheissueofholding otherpeopleandyourselfatothertimes
responsible. On Kant'sview,we first encounter theidea offreedom when
we aredeciding whattodo.Weencounter itinthenecessityofactingunder
the idea of freedom, and in the commandsof the morallaw.32At the
moment ofdecision,youmustregardyourself as theauthorofyouraction,
and so youinevitably holdyourself responsibleforwhatyoudo. It is only
whenyouthink abouttheactionsofotherpeople,andwhenyouthink about
yourown actionsat othertimes,thatyou can view themfromeither
standpoint. You can takeup thepositionofthesocialscientist, and regard
actionsas psycho-socialphenomena thatneedto be explained.Oryoucan
putyourself intheotherperson'sshoesas a decision-maker,andthink about

M. Korsgaard
320 / Christine
whatit is liketo chooseor to do an actionofthatkind.

Nowitseemsclearthatyoucannotrestrict theconceptsoffreedom and
responsibility toyourselfin the context ofdeliberative choice. Ifyou did,
you
wouldthinkthattheonlyfreeagentin theworldis me-right-now. Butthe
morallaw,whichaccording to Kantpresents itselfto youin exactlythese
moments, commandsthatyou treateveryoneas an end in himself (C2
29-30/29). Unlessyouholdothersresponsible fortheendsthattheychoose
andtheactionsthattheydo,youcannotregardthemas moralandrational
agents,andso youwillnottreatthemas endsinthemselves. Indeed,unless
you regardothersand yourfuture selfas moralagents,therewillbe no
content toyourdutiesatall,forallduties(according toKant)areowedeither
tootherpersons ortotheenduring self(MMJ 241/47;MMV442-444/105-107).
The morallaw,announcing as thelaw ofyourwill,wouldbe without
itself
contentor application. Yourrelations to otherpeople,and to yourselfat
othertimes,wouldbe,at best,likeyourrelations to smallchildren andthe
otheranimals.Butthereis moreat stakeherethanjustwhether youhave
anyduties,foryou cannotenterintoany reciprocal relations withpeople
whomyoudo notholdresponsible. Norcan youdo thisifyoudo nottake
responsibility foryourownactionsat othertimes,sincerelationships after
all are enduring things.
This is whyour reactionto DerekParfit's nineteenth-century Russian
nobleman is thathe'swrong, andinparticular, thathe wrongshiswife.The
storygoeslikethis.Parfit's Russiannobleman isnow,inhisyouth, a socialist,
andplanstodistribute largeportions ofhisinheritance, whenhe comesinto
it,to thepoor.Buthe also anticipates thathisattitudes willbecomemore
conservative as hegrowsolder,andso thathemaynotthink thisistheright
thingto do, whentheinheritance is actuallyhisown.So he asks hiswife
to holdhimto thepromisehe makesnow,to distribute theland,evenifhe
tellsherthenthathe haschangedhismind.33 Parfit makesitclearthatthe
case isnotlikethatofUlyssesbinding himself tothemasttoresisttheSirens'
song.The youngnoblemandoes notanticipate thathe is goingto become
irrational,thathisjudgment willbe clouded,orthathewillbe outofcontrol.
He merelybelievesthathe is goingto thinkdifferently thanhe does now.
Thiscase illustrates mypointwell.Theyoungnobleman's attitude towards
hisownfuture attitudes
is essentially a predictive andtheoretical one,and,
becauseitis so, he abdicatesthekindofresponsibility thatis necessary for
reciprocity: thekindofresponsibility thatenablespeopleto act inconcert.
Hiswayofmakinghimself do theright thingis nottotakeresponsibility for
doingso, butto givetheresponsibility to hiswife.Thismaybe one wayto
formthe"unitedwill"thatKantsaysis necessary in marriage, butitis not
theright way.TheRussiannobleman leaveshiswifealoneinthestandpoint
ofpractical reason,wherepeoplewhoaremarried muststandtogether. Her
decisionis not,as Parfitsays,whichofthesetwomen,olderand younger,

Creating / 321
and Responsibility
is herrealhusband, themanshe loves,themanshe has married. Nor,for

thatmatter, wouldthatbe justa questionabouthowshe feelsaboutthem
or whatshethinks ofthem.She cannotbe married to theolderman,later,
unlessshe holdshimresponsible, andtakeshimat hisword.She cannotbe
married to theyounger one,now,becausehe has alreadyabandonedher.
Andfurther thanthat:totheextentthatitisimportant tothiswoman'ssense
ofherownidentity, morally and personally, thatshe is hiswife,he leaves
herwithout anything clearto be, and so without anything clearto do. You
cannotact in concertwithone whodoes notact in concertwithhimself.
Whereourrelations are constitutive ofourongoingidentities, thosewith
whomwe havethemmusthave ongoingidentities too.34
So ifyouonlyapplytheconcepts offreedom andresponsibility toyourself
at themoments ofdeliberative choice,youdo nothaveanysortofrecog-
nizablemorallifeatall.NoKingdom ofEndsonearthcanbe sought orrealized
ifresponsibility isrestricted toitsoriginal homeinthefirst persondeliberator's
perspective.
Butnoticethatall ofthereasonsI havejustgivenare moralandpractical
ones.I havebeen suggesting thatholdingpeopleresponsible is something
thatwe do formoralreasons.Thereasonwe mustviewanotheras a fellow
rationalpersonratherthanas a psycho-social phenomenon is notthathe
is in factone ofthesethingsratherthantheother.In fact,he is both.That
anotheris responsible is whatKantcallsa postulateofpracticalreason:a
beliefor attitude thatcan be formulated theoretically,butis practicaland
moralin itsbasis.(C2 132-134/137-139) We holdothersresponsible in the
samewaythat,according to Kant,we "willthattherebe a God",because
it is a condition ofourobedienceto thecommandsofthemorallaw. (C2
143/149)Or,whena morepersonalrelationis at stake,becauseit is the
condition ofoursubmission to theimperatives oflove.
No doubtthiswayofputting it makesitall soundmoredeliberate and
voluntary thanitreallyis. We do not,ofcourse,simplydecidewhether to
holdotherpeopleresponsible ingeneral; reciprocalrelationsandtheattitudes
thatcharacterize themare,as Strawson argues,toodeeplyimbedded inthe
framework of humanlifeto "comeup forreview",and reactiveattitudes,
orat leastthefeelings thataccompany them,cannotalwaysbe helped.35 But
as Strawson himself observes we do make thesedecisions inparticularcases,
andevenmorefrequently we makedecisions aboutwhether toidentifywith
ourreactive feelings or not. IfI have decidednot to holdsomeone responsible,
I mayviewmyrageat himas mereinevitable emotion, liketherageprovoked
in everyoneexcept saints by recalcitrant home appliancesand fractious
infants. Still,itmight be better to putmypoint a differentway. The idea is
notthatwe deliberately decide to hold peopleresponsible in general,but
thatourcommitment tothis view of othersand our commitment to themoral
lifeissuetogether fromthestandpoint ofpracticalreason.Holdingothers

322 / Christine
M. Korsgaard
responsible of holdingourselvesso, bothin

is an inevitableconcomitant
particular
personalrelationsand inmoregeneralmoralones.To shareour
endsandreasonsistosharethestandpointfrom whichthoseendsandreasons
are generated.ThecitizensoftheKingdom ofEndsmaketheirdecisionsin
thenoumenal
congress; worldis,aboveall,a placethatwe occupytogether.
V. MitigatingMoral Judgment
Nowwhilethisexplains whywe holdothers responsible, andwhyourdoing

so hasandmusthavea practical basis,itdoesnotsolvetheproblem ofwhat
nowappearsto be Kant'sintransigence. The moralcommandthatwe hold
othersresponsible seemsas absoluteas it wouldbe ifwe had theoretical
knowledgethattheywere indeedtranscendentally free.Kantdoes not
separatethegroundsforholdingpeopleresponsible in general,fromthe
grounds forholding themresponsible forparticular actions.Andso itseems
as ifholding someoneresponsible ingeneralamounts to holdingherrespon-
sibleforeverything shedoes.Theflexibility withwhichI credited thepractical
accountofattributions ofresponsibility doesnotseemtofollowreadilyfrom
Kant'sview.
Someofthethings Kantsays,however, suggest thatthereisroomforsuch
I willdiscuss
flexibility. twokindsofconsiderations, mentioned byKant,which
maybe usedto guideourdecisionswhether to holdpeopleresponsible for
particularactions andreactions,andinparticular, tomitigate theintransigence
thatseemsrequiredby thecommitment to treating othersas persons.
Thefirst considerationsprings from what I callKant's practical
compatibil-
ism.Although Kantendorsesbothfreewilland determinism, he is nota
theoretical Kantdoesnotbelievethatthesetwothings
compatibilist. canbe
reconciled from a singlepointofview,as hiscontempt forLeibniz'sautomaton
spirituale,whichhe says has "the freedomof a turnspit," shows.(C2
97/100-101) Andyetthisdoesnotstophimfrom adjuring that"a
politicians
goodconstitution isnottobe expectedfrom morality, butconversely, a good
moralcondition ofa peopleistobe expectedonlyundera goodconstitution."
(PP 366/112-113) Nordoes it stophimfromdetailinga theoryof moral
educationdesignedto awakenoursenseofourown autonomy.36 To the
extent, orinthesense,thatKantbelievesthatvirtuecanbe taught, ormade
to flowerbya goodconstitution, he mustbelievethatitcan be caused.37
ReadersofKantmaywanttodenythis,forintheGroundwork, Kantsays
thatinsofar as we are members oftheworldofsense,ouractions"mustbe
viewedas determined by otherappearances, namely,desiresand inclina-
tions."(G453/54)Butthisremarkis actuallysomewhat misleading.Insofar
as we view our actionsas phenomenawe mustview themas causally
determined, but not necessarilyas determined by mere desiresand
inclinations.We can stillviewthemas determined by moralthoughts and

Creating
and Responsibility
/ 323
moralaspirations; onlyfromthispointofview,thosemustthemselves be
viewedas determined inus. Forinstance, I mightexplainsomeone'sdoing
therightthingbysayingthatshe diditbecauseshevalueshumanity as an
endinitself, andI might inturnexplainthatfactbyshowing howshereceived
a moraleducation. And,forthatmatter, I mightexplainhowthatkindof
education ispossiblebyappealingtoa psychological orevenpsychoanalytic
theory,suchas Freud's,of how humanbeingsdevelopa conscienceor
superego.A deterministic accountcan be a deterministic accountofmoral
motivation itself-itdoes nothave to bypassmorality and pretendwe do
everything forthesakeofhappiness. Theelementoftruth inwhatKantsays
isthata deterministic accountnecessarily leavesoutwhatisdistinctively good
aboutmoralmotivation. Froma merelytheoretical and explanatory point
ofviewmoralinterest is on a footing withinclination. We mayimaginethe
cynicsaying:"itdoesn'treallymatterhowshe cameto treathumanity as
an end in itself.It is whatshe likesto do, so she is stillpursuing herown
happiness."When moralmotivation is viewed theoretically, it can be
distinguished frominclination onlybyitscontent. It'sspecialsource,inthe
agent'sautonomy, does notshowup.
Kant'spractical compatibilism suggests thatitmaybe reasonable, when
we are deciding whether andwhento holdpeopleresponsible, to takeinto
accountsuchthings as upbringing andeducation. Depending ontheparticular
circumstances, thefactthatsomeonehas hada goodmoraleducationmay
providea specialreasoneither forforgiveness orforblame,andourdecisions
aboutwhether to holdhimresponsible maybe governedaccordingly. Or it
maybyitself, quiteapartfrom prediction, provide a specialreasonforholding
someoneresponsible. Whenthe community has done all it can to make
someonegood,thentheremaybe nofurther outletforrespect forhumanity,
thanto blamehimifhe goes wrong.38
Another kindofconsideration comesfromKant'siterated demand,inthe
Metaphysical Principlesof Virtue,forgenerosity of interpretation. As I
mentioned at thebeginning ofmydiscussion, Kantbelievesthatwe cannot
knowpeople'smostfundamental or intelligiblecharacters. Buthe censures
contempt, calumny,and mockeryas muchfortheirdisrespectful and
ungenerous natureas fortheirlackofa theoretical basis.(MMV462-468/
127-133) He says,forinstance, "Oneshouldcasttheveilofphilanthropy over
the faultsof others,not merelyby softening but also by silencingour
judgments." (MMV466/132)Our theoretical estimateof anotherperson's
character maybe setasidein favorofourrespectforthehumanity within
him.The reproachofvice,accordingto Kant,
...mustneverburstoutin completecontempt or denythewrongdoerall
moralworth, becauseon thathypothesis he couldneverbe improved
either-andthislatteris incompatible
withtheidea ofman,whoas such(as
a moralbeing)can neverlose all predisposition
to good.(MMV463-464/129)

M. Korsgaard
324 / Christine
Kantcomparesthisto theduty,whensomeonemakesan error,notjustto

deemhimstupidbuttotryto determine howthemistaken viewcouldhave
seemedreasonableto him.We are to do thisin partin orderto "preserve
themistaken respect
individual's forhisownunderstanding." (MMV463/129)
Butregarding a personas stupidor makinghererrorsseemreasonableare
not our onlyoptionsin these cases. Sometimeswe can best preserve
someone'sself-respect, as wellas ourownrespectforher,notby making
hererrors seemreasonable, butbylaughing oftransitory
themoffas theresult
emotionorexhaustion. Thesameis surelytrueinthemoralrealm.Respect
forsomeone'shumanity is not alwaysbest expressedby holdinghim
responsible foreach and everyaction.It maybe betterto admitthateven
thebestofus can justslip.IndeedKant'sowndoctrine ofmoralprogress,
in ReligionWithin theLimitsof ReasonAlone,has thisimplication. The
phenomenal expression ofa noumenally goodwillis notperfect actionin
allcases,butprogress towards thebetter.(R47-48/43)Ifan anomalousaction
intrudesintoa courseofsteadyprogress we mightfindit in our
in virtue,
heartssimply todismiss orsometimes
ortransient,
itas atavistic without any
explanation at all. We simplysay "He isn'thimself."
VI. Conclusion
On the whole,Kant'sview is thatwe mustalways hold ourselves

responsible,andthatwe shouldas faras possiblealwaysholdotherpeople
responsible.Butthisis notbecausepeople'snoumenal freedom is knownto
us as a theoretical fact.It is becauseoftherespectwhichthemorallaw
commands ustoaccordtothehumanity ineveryperson. Weholdoneanother
responsible becausethisis essentialto ourinteractions witheach otheras
persons;becauseinthiswaywe together populatea moralworld.We may
disagreewithKantaboutsomeofthedetailsofhowrespectforhumanity
is bestexpressed, buthistheory captures theessentialideathatattributions
havea practical
ofresponsibility basis.To viewpeopletheoretically,as objects
ofknowledge, is to viewthemas partoftheworldthatis imposeduponus
through the senses,and, to thatextent,as alien. But insofaras we are
noumena,or activebeings,we join withothersin thoseintersubjective
standpoints whichwe can occupytogether, eitheras thinkersor as agents.
Whenwe enterintorelations ofreciprocity,andholdoneanother responsible,
we entertogetherintothe standpoint of practicalreason,and createa
KingdomofEndson earth.
Notes
1. I have manypeopleto thankforhelpwiththispaper.Ken Simonsprovided

comments
extensiveand helpful whichprompted me to makea numberof

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Creatingthe Kingdomof Ends: Reciprocityand Responsibility
revisions.SidneyAxinn,Charlotte Brown,Dan Brudney, and JaySchleusener

read and commented on variousversions.I presented the paperto several
philosophy departments andfoundall ofthediscussions helpful; specialthanks
are owedto audiencesat UCLA,theUniversity ofVermont, andtheUniversity
ofMichigan. A shortversion ofthepaper,entitled"Holding PeopleResponsible,"
waspresented attheVIIthInternational KantCongress andisforthcoming inthe
proceedings ofthatmeeting.
2. NicomacheanEthicsIX.9 1170b 6-7,withparentheses removed.Fromthe
translation byW.D.Rossin TheBasic WorksofAristotle, ed. RichardMcKeon
(NewYork:RandomHouse,1941),p. 1090.Henceforth citedparenthetically in
thetextas NE followed bytheBekkerpage,column,and linereferences and
thenthepage numberfromthetranslation.
3. Myreasonsforthesedoubtswillbecomeapparentin thecourseofthepaper,
although I willnotdiscuss theminthetext.Iftheargument ofthispaperiscorrect,
thedecisionwhether to holdsomeoneresponsible is governed bya variety of
considerations, ratherthandetermined whollybyfactsabouttheperson.One
might thinkthatthelegaluse oftheconceptofresponsibility requiresthatthe
issueofwhether a personis responsiblebe determinable bysuchfacts.Did he
understand whathe was doing?Does he knowright from wrong? Ifso myview
mightcausedifficulties forit,unlessthelegaluse is notas continuous withthe
moraluse as somebelieve.However,itis important to noticethatmydoubts
concerntheparticular usesto whichtheconceptofresponsibility is sometimes
putin ourlegalsystem. In a generalandphilosophical way,thejustification of
thepenalsystem mayrestonourwill,as socialcontractors, toholdoneanother
responsible. Butthislegaluseoftheconceptofresponsibility admits ofthemoral
andpractical foundation I describeinthispaper,andindeedprobably requires
it We havenogeneralreasontobelievethatourfellowcitizens areforthemost
partrationaland moralpeople,whoonlyoccasionally go haywireor fallinto
sin.IfI am right, we do havea generalreasonto holdthemresponsible: it is
becausetheyare ourpartners in thesocialcontract
4. Thisis clearfromthestructure oftheirtheories.Butforsomemorespecific
statements, see forexampletheopening paragraphofFrancis Hutcheson's Inquiry
Concerning MoralGoodand Evil(inD D. Raphael,British Moralists, (Hackett,
1991)VolumeI, p. 261);Hume'sstatement ofthecentralquestionofhismoral
philosophy on p 456 ofThe TreatiseofHumanNature(ed. L. A SelbyBigge
and P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1978).The complaint appliesless
straightforwardly to Smith,whosetheoryin generalis moresensitive to the
perspective oftheagentthanthoseofhispredecessorsButsee, forinstance,
theopening linesofI.i5 ofTheTheory ofMoralSentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty
Classics,1982),p 23.
5 Matthew 7.1.WhereI havecitedorreferred toKant'sworksinthispaperI have
insertedthereference intothetext.Asisstandard,ineachcaseexcepttheCritique
ofPureReasonandtheLectureson Ethics,thefirst page number refers to the
PrussianAcademyEditionof Kant'sworks(KantsgesammelteSchriften.
Preussische Akademieder Wissenschaften: Berlin,1900-1942), and thesecond
to thatofthetranslation used.The following abbreviations are used:
G Grounding fortheMetaphysics ofMorals.(1785)Prussian Academy
EditionVolumeIV; JamesEllington's inImmanuel
translation Kant.
EthicalPhilosophy.
Indianapolis-Hackett,1983.Although I haveused
I referto theGrundlegung
translation,
Ellington's as theGroundwork.
C1 CritiqueofPureReason.(1sted.1781,2nded.1787)Page numbers of

theA andB editions are followedbythoseofthetranslation byNorman

KempSmith.NewYork-Macmillan, Press,1965.
St.Martin's
C2 Critique ofPracticalReason.(1788)Prussian AcademyVolumeV; Lewis
WhiteBeck'stranslation. Bobbs-Merrill
Indianapolis: ofLiberal
Library Arts,
1956.
LE Lectureson Ethics.(1775-1780) editedbyPaulMenzerfromthenotesof
TheodorFriedrich Brauer,usingthenotesofGottlieb Kutzner and Chr.
Mrongovius; translated byLouisInfield.
London.Methuen & Co.,Ltd.,1930;
rpt.NewYork,HarperTorchbooks, rpt:Indianapolis,
1963;current HIackett
Press.
MMVTheMetaphysical Principles (1797)Prussian
of Virtue. AcademyVolume
VI; JamesEllington's in Immanuel
translation Kant:EthicalPhilosophy.
Indianapolis: Hackett,1983.
MMJTheMetaphysical Elements ofJustice.(1797)PrussianAcademyVolume
VI,JohnLadd'spartialtranslation. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-MerrillLibraryof
LiberalArts,1965.
PP Perpetual Peace (1795)PrussianAcademy VolumeVIII,translation
byLewis
WhiteBeckinOnHistory, editedbyLewisWhiteBeck.Indianapolis-Bobbs-
Merrill Library ofLiberalArts,1963
R ReligionWithin theLimitsof ReasonAlone (1793)PrussianAcademy
VolumeVI; translation byTheodoreM. Greeneand HoytH. Hudson.La
OpenCourt,1934.rpt.NewYork,HarperTorchbooks,
Salle,Illinois: 1960
6. We havetwosomewhat different usesoftheterm"responsible." Whenwe say
someoneisresponsible foran actionorattitude, we imply thatsheisa candidate
forpraiseorblame.Butwhenwe saysomeoneisa responsible person, we imply
thatsheisreliable, resourceful,trustworthy,andself-controlled.
Thenotion I want
is a combination ofthesebutmorelikethesecond.we thinkofthepersonas
someonewhoshouldbe regarded as reliableandtrustworthy andso forth, and
therefore as a candidateforpraiseand blame.
7. See DavidHume,An EnquiryConcerning HumanUnderstanding (inEnquiries
Concerning HumanUnderstanding and Concerning thePrinciplesofMoralsby
DavidHume.ed. L.A Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed withtextrevisedandnotesbyP.H
NidditchOxford-ClarendonPress,1975).pp. 183-192 I borrowthe term
"circumstances ofjustice"from JohnRawlsinA Theory ofJustice.(Cambridge:
HarvardUniversity Press,1971):pp. 126ff.
8. These remarksobviouslyassumea particular readingof Kant'sFormulaof
Humanity, according towhichwhatis involvedintreating someoneas an end-
isrespecting
in-itself heras a rationalbeing,whosechoicesconfer valueontheir
objects,andwhoseactionsmustbe lefttoherownautonomous decisionI defend
thisreadingin twoarticles, "Kant'sFormulaofHumanity" Kant-Studien, Band
77, Heft2 (April1986)-pp. 183-202, especiallypp. 197-200;and "TheRightto
Lie:KantonDealingwithEvil"Philosophy Volume15,Number
andPublicAffairs,
4 (Fall 1986)-pp. 325-349,especially pp 330-337.
9 See note15 forsomeremarks on thispoint.
10 Here,as severalreadershavepointedouttome,I amobviously discussing very
closeandintimate andsayingthings
friendships, thatdo notholdoflesspersonal
butstillparticular relationships.In thesecasesperhapstherightthingto sayis
thatreciprocity isheightened,butonlyina certain sphereofactivityThemembers
ofa committee ora department, forexample, musttakeactionandmakedecisions
together, andthisinvolves a commitment totreatingeachanother's contributions
to thesedecisionsas responsible onesand each other'swishesaboutthemas

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havingweightThisis a heightened formofreciprocity, although onlywithin a

delimited sphereButwithin thisspherewhatis involvedis likefriendship. The
comparison offactionalized departments to unhappy marriages is a goodone.
Whenreciprocity breaksdown,and theentity is heldtogether onlybyformal
institutional mechanisms, notonlyitspleasantness butalso itsmoralcharacter
deteriorates.
11. Sometimes Kantunfortunately changeshis groundand says the problemis
precisely thatwe don'twanttheotherpersonqua thatperson,butonlyqua
member ofa particular gender(LE 164)Thisis nonsense, andspoilswhatI take
to be ofinterest in hispoint.
12. IntheGroundwork, Kantsuggests thatintheKingdom ofEndseverything either
hasa market price,an affective price,ora dignity. Ordinary commodities have
market prices,artobjectshaveaffective prices,andhumanbeingshavedignity
(G 434-435/40) Thusmysuggestion in thetextis thatKantis notworried that
sexualdesirereducesitsobjecttosomething witha market price,buttosomething
withan affective price This suggeststwo further reflections. The firstis
interpretive Whatever hasa price,Kantclaims,can be replacedbysomething
else as itsequivalent. Thisis alreadyan oddthingto sayaboutartobjects,but
itmayexplainwhyhe was drivento makethebizarreclaimmentioned innote
11above:thatwe do notdesireanother as a personbutas a member ofa gender.
Thesecondis moregeneralManypeopleseemto be moreskeptical aboutthe
respectability ofoffering yourselfas a directobjectofenjoyment thanaboutthe
respectability ofoffering yourservices, especially, ofcourse,ifyouarea woman.
Actresses, entertainers, and modelshaveoftenbeenregardedas disreputable
characters, whilecleaning ladies,nurses, andsalesclerksarenotthought thereby
to degradethemselves. Peoplemayeven have the obscurefeelingthatthe
character actoris morerespectable thanthemoviestar,andinthiscase Kant's
analysisfits;forwhatthemoviestaroffers forourdelight is nothertalentsbut
simply herself. Theview,perhapssurprising butnotcompletely atoddswithour
intuitions, isthenthis:beinguseful isnothreat toyourdignity, butbeingdelectable
is. I do notsay thisto criticize moviestars,ofcourse,butratherto urgethat
theyareunusually dependent uponthegoodwillanddelicacy oftheiraudiences.
13. AgainKantspoilshispoint, bymaking an oddlymetaphysical-sounding argument
thattheloveronlywantsyoursexuality butthat"Itis notpossibleto havethe
disposalofa partonlyofa personwithout havingat thesametimea rightof
disposaloverthewholeperson,foreachpartofa personis integrally boundup
withthewhole" (LE 166)Butperhapstheargument thatsexuallovewantsits
objecttobe entirely atitsdisposalcanstillbe made,andmadeonmoreinteresting
grounds thantheonesKantappealsto here Pursuing thislineofthought might
haveforcedKantto admitthattheproblemhe is concerned withhereis more
ofa problemaboutsexuallove thanaboutcasualsexualencounters.
14. Itis clearfromthewayKantsetstheproblem up intheLectureson Ethicsthat
he seestheproblem as arising,
so tospeak,from thepointofviewofthesexual
object(LE 164)Thispointshouldbe detachable fromthefamiliar view,which
he also sometimes seemsto havein mind,thatthisfactmakesthemorality of
sexuality moreofa problemfora woman.
15 In publicdiscussions ofthispaper,severalpeoplepointedoutthatmoreneeds
tobe saidaboutthesenseinwhichoneisrestored tooneself intheserelationships.
Lawfulfreedom is notthesameas lawlessfreedom; thecondition towhichone
is restored is notthesame.Kantmakesthisclearina rather forceful waywhen
he saysthatmarriage producesa unityofwill.The kindofreciprocity I am
discussing hereis notmereexchange,from whichone canwalkaway Whatis

exchanged isa partofone'spractical identity, andwhatresults isa transformation

ofthatidentity Kant'saccountofmarriage isclearly basedonRousseau's account
ofthesocialcontract, inwhich"eachpersongiveshimself wholeandentire" and
"ingivinghimself to all,each persongiveshimself to no one.Andsincethere
isnoassociateoverwhomhedoesnotacquirethesameright thathewouldgrant
othersoverhimself, he gainstheequivalent ofeverything he loses..."Rousseau
certainlythinks thatthisproducesa changeofidentity, sincehe saysit is what
transforms a humanbeingfrom "a stupid,limited animalintoan intelligent being
anda man."(Rousseau, OntheSocialContract, trans.DonaldA.Cress.Indianapolis.
Hackett,1983:pp.24-27)ThisaspectofKant'sviewofpersonalrelations hasa
number ofstriking implications, amongthemsomethataddresscontemporary
criticismsofKantFroma feminist perspective, Kanthassometimes beenaccused
of denying thatpersonalrelationships can be constitutive ofidentity. See for
instanceSallySedgwick, "CanKant'sEthics Survive theFeminist Critique9" (Pacific
PhilosophicalQuarterly 71 (1990):pp.60-79,especially p 74)Andithasalsobeen
arguedthathisethics requires thatthemoralagentbe completely impartial among
personsinsomeundesirable way See forinstance, Bernard Williams, "Persons,
Character andMorality" inMoralLuck(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981):pp 1-19,especially pp.16-18.InmyviewKant'stheory ofpersonal relations
provides grounds forchallenging bothoftheseviewsI hopetopursuethesepoints
sometime.
16. Nottranslated in Ladd.Kantdoes notdrawthisconclusion, ofcourse.Buthe
comesclose.Forhegoeson)toraisetheobviousquestion whether themarriages
ofhistime,whichdeclarethehusbandtobe master, are realmarriages, andto
assertabsurdly thatso longas theinequality is reallyonlybasedon thenatural
superiorityoftheman'sfaculties it is no inequality at all. Boththefeebleness
and themoralirrelevance ofthisexcuseforinequality suggesttheconclusion
in thetext
17 In ThePossibility ofAltruism (Princeton Princeton University Press,1970 83),
ThomasNagelarguesthatresentment, forinstance, involvesthethought that
thepersonresented hada reasonto act differently thanhe did.Ifthisis right,
andpersonalrelations essentially involvethesharing ofreasons,itis clearwhy
personalrelations especiallyinvolvesuchreactiveattitudes.
18. See Strawson, FreedomandResentment and OthersEssays(London.Methuen
& Co., 1974),p 4.
19. Inhisdiscussion ofGauguin in"MoralLuck,"Bernard Williams suggests that,even
ifwe acceptGauguin's successin painting as a justificationforhisdesertion of
hisfamily, hisfamily neednotdo so. Williams thinks thatthisis becauseyou
cando something justifiedandyetleavesomepeoplewitha justified complaint.
Leavingasidethatquestion, onmyviewwe mayatleastsaythis.givenGauguin's
beliefinhisvocation, wemayfindhisdesertion ofhisfamily understandable and
forgivable-just another instance ofthestrains whichtheinstitution ofmarriage
placesonthemorallife-while hiswifecertainly neednotfindinthisa reasonfor
forgiveness at all. See Williams,"MoralLuck"in MoralLuck (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,1981):pp 20-39,and especiallypp. 36-37.
20. Thereareothers, ofcourseForinstance, onewhoknowsyouwellmayuse his
knowledge to manipulate youpsychologically. Andthereis alsothesimplerisk
thatwhileyouareopening yourheart, theotheris holding back.Fewthings are
as disconcerting as thediscovery thatsomeonein whomyouhaveconfided a
certainkindofsecretor thought or feelinghas secretsor thoughts or feelings
ofa similarkind,whichshe has notin turnsharedwithyou.Thismaymake
youfeelexposed,watched, orobjectified. Youdo notneedtothink thatshewas

/ 329
spying on orjudging youinorderforthisto hurt;thebarefailure ofreciprocity

is enough.
21. Wemustsupposethis,morespecifically, toavoidfalling intothethird antinomy.
(Cl A444& B472-A452 & B480/409-415)
22 InthissketchofKant'sviewI skateoverthedifferences betweenKant'saccounts
of howwe arriveat theidea ofourownfreedom in theThirdSectionofthe
Groundwork fortheMetaphysics ofMoralsandintheCritique ofPractical Reason.
IntheGroundwork, Kant'semphasis is on ourconsciousness ofthespontaneity
ofreasonintheproduction ofideasingeneral; intheCritique ofPractical Reason,
itis on ourawarenessofthemorallawandofourability toactfrom it(theFact
ofReason),whichhe saysrevealsourfreedom to us (See thereferences inthe
textandC2 30-31/30-31) 1 believethatKantrevisedhisargument becausethe
spontaneous production ofideasonlyplacesus amongthenoumenaas thinkers
To be amongthenoumenaas agents,we mustbe able toactfrompureideas,
and forthis,the positiveconception of freedom whichis foundonlyin the
categorical imperative, as wellas ourabilityto act fromthatconception, are
necessary
23 Thisaccount,whichof courseis not Kant's,resemblesthe moretraditional
rationalistaccount:incentives inclinebutdo notdetermine thewill Kantdoes
think thatthisis howwe mustregardourownincentives from thepractical point
ofview
24. It is important to saythattheclaimis onlythatitis crazyto regardMarilyn's
noumenalwill,takenbyitself, as standing behindthelawsofnatureWhether
Kantthinks thatall rationalwillstakentogether shouldbe regarded as standing
behindthelawsofnatureis a different questionaltogether.
25. Kant'slanguagein Groundwork III couldcertainly lead one to believethathe
holdsthisview,anditis thissamelanguagewhichgivesriseto theparadoxes
mentioned. Ifwe alwayschoosemorallyin thenoumenalworld,and ifour
noumenal choicesgovernourphenomenal ones,howdo badactionseveroccur?
Andiftheydo occur,sincetheycannotbe attributed toournoumenal will,how
can we be heldresponsible forthem?It is possiblethatat thetimeofwriting
theGroundwork Kanthadnotsufficiently distinguished (whatI taketo be) his
ownviewfromtheone underdiscussion here I discussthisfurther innote29
I discusstheparadoxesaboutthepossibility ofevilandresponsibility forevilin
"Morality as Freedom" inKant'sPractical Philosophy Reconsidered, ed.Y. Yovel
(KluwerAcademicPublishers, 1989),especially pp. 35-40.
26 The knowability of pureactivity or poweris an important themein modern
philosophy, takenupbythinkers as diverse as Descartes andHume.IntheSecond
Meditation, Descartes arguesthatalthough we cannot"imagine" ourselves as pure
thinkers, thatis theroleinwhichwe knowourselves best(i e., mostfreefrom
skeptical doubt)(Meditations onFirstPhilosophy, transElizabeth S Haldaneand
G R.T. Ross in The Philosophical WorksofDescartes,VolumeI Cambridge
Cambridge University Press,1911,p 153)Hume,whothinks we getall ofour
ideasfrom thesensesandtherefore cannothaveideasofwhatwe cannotimagine
orenvision, supposesthatwe donotknowourselves as activethinkers. He tells
us that"Theuniting principleamongourinternal perceptions is as unintelligible
as thatamongexternalobjects,andis notknownto us anyotherwaythanby
experience." (A TreatiseofHumanNature,citedin note4 above,p 169)But
theviewcomesoutmostclearlyintheDialoguesConcerning Natural Religion,
in remarkslike "Butthe ideas in a humanmind,we see, by an unknown,
inexplicable economy, arrangethemselves as to formtheplanofa watchor a
house.." (PartII,p. 146)and "We haveindeed,experience ofideas,whichfall

intoorder, ofthemselves, andwithout anyknown cause..."(PartIV,p. 162;quoted

from theedition byNorman KempSmith, Macmillan Library ofLiberal Arts,1947).
Kant'smove hereas everywhere is to finda pathbetweenempiricism and
rationalism, usingwhatis right inbothpositions. Humeis correct intying what
we canknowtowhatcanbe represented. Theworldmustshowitself tousbefore
we canapplytheconcepts thatgiveusunderstanding. Butheiswronginthinking
we can onlyhaveideasofthesortsofthings we can know.Whatwe can think
isnotexhausted bywhatwecanknow:ourconcepts donotallcomefrom sensible
intuition Descartesis right ininsisting thatwe canthinkaboutouractivity. But
heiswrong tosupposethatweknowourselves as thinkersandagents. Ouragency,
althoughnotknowable,is intelligible, and we mustthinkof it. (Cl A538 &
B566/467)
27 Theseremarks applytothemorallaw,onthepractical side,andtotheregulative
principles of reason,on the theoretical or speculative side. Something more
complexmustbe saidabouttheconstitutive principles oftheunderstanding, an
issuewhichI hereleave aside.
28. Including, inthetheoretical orspeculative realm,deciding howtoproceedwith
ourinvestigation ortheory construction. Infact,whendescribing andexplaining
ourbehaviorwe mustviewourselvesbothways,sincewe appearin therole
ofthinker as wellas thatofobjectthought about
29. The readermaywonderwhether I am suggesting thatKantwas simply wrong
intheGroundwork whenhesaidthatinsofar as we aremembers oftheintelligible
worldwe necessarily willaccording to themorallaw,andthatifwe wereonly
members ofthatworldwe wouldwillalwaysaccording to thatlaw(G453/54).
Theansweris no,buthereI thinkitis significant thatintheGroundwork Kant
usesthelanguageof"intelligible" and"sensible" rather thanthatof"noumenal"
and "phenomenal"; and also thathe changeshislanguagein theCritique of
PracticalReason.As I understand theseterms,thenoumenalworldis thein-
telligibleworldinsofar as itis thinkableIfwe thinkofnoumenaat all,we must
think ofthemas actingintheonlywaythatisintelligible tous,whichisaccording
tothelawsoffreedom. Butatthesametimewe mustalwaysadmitthepossibility
thatthenoumenal worldis unintelligible to us. The troublewiththewayKant
phrasestheargument in Groundwork III is thatit can makeitsoundas ifthe
normative forceofthemorallawfollowed from itsdescriptive application inthe
noumenalworld:"NowifI werea memberofonlythatworld[theintelligible
world], allmyactionswouldalwaysaccordwithautonomy ofthewill.Butsince
I intuitmyself at thesametimeas a member oftheworldofsense,myactions
oughtso toaccord."(G454/55)Ifwe suppose,naturally butincorrectly, thatthe
normativity ofmorality entersthescenewiththe"ought",Kantseemsto be
deriving a normative sensible"ought"from a descriptive "is" Buthe
intelligible
is not,forthelawsoftheintelligible worldare normative through andthrough.
Themorallaw characterizes noumenainsofar as theyare intelligences (insofar
as we canthink ofthem)becauseactingaccording toitistheonlything itmakes
senseforthemto do, and thisis alreadya normative point
30 Thisis slightly overstated, sinceKantdoesthinkthatinsofar as we are freewe
thinkofourselvesas thecausesofouraction,andthisideaplaysan important
roleinhisethicsatvariouscrucialmoments Butsinceheinsists thatfreecausality
is an idea without a theoretical employment, thepointstillholds.(C2 49/50,
56/57-58;133-136/137-142)
31. PerhapsI shouldmakeitclearthatthequestionI am askinghereconcerns the
waywe makethisdecisionina case whereitis alreadyclearthatwe can view
thecreature and itsactionsineitherofthesetwoways.Kantthinks we can do

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thiswhenever theactionsareperformed bya humanbeing.I amnotconcerned

herewithwhatjustifies thatview-thatis,I amnotdiscussing thequestion why
we think thathumanbeingsarecandidates forbeingheldresponsible whilethe
otherintelligent animals, whomakesomeuseofreasonandwithwhomwe may
enterintosomeforms ofrelationship, arenot.Thisis an important question,but
itrequiresa separatetreatment.
32 Thisremark againstraddles theaccountsintheGroundwork andintheCritique
ofPractical Reason,sinceI think thatbothelements are involved inKant'sbest
explanation ofhowwe cometo thinkofourownfreedom. See my"Morality
as Freedom," pp. 39-40,citedin note25 above.
33. See DerekParfit, "LaterSelvesand MoralPrinciples" in A. Montefiore, ed.
Philosophy andPersonalRelations (LondonRoutledge & KeganPaul,1973,pp
145ff.;and Reasonsand Persons(Oxford. OxfordUniversity Press,1984)pp.
327-328.
34. 1discussthepractical construction ofourownidentities in"Personal Identityand
theUnity ofAgency.A KantianReplyto Parfit" Philosophy andPublicAffairs,
Volume18,Number 2 (Spring, 1989):101-132. Theissueofwhether relationships
can be constitutive ofidentity is touchedon in note15 above.
35. "Thiscommitment ['thenaturalhumancommitment to ordinary inter-personal
attitudes']ispartofthegeneralframework ofhumanlife,notsomething thatcan
comeup forreviewas particular casescan up forreviewwithin thisparticular
framework." Strawson, "Freedomand Resentment", citedin note18 above.
36 Kant'stheory isspelledoutinthe"Methodologies" oftheMetaphysical Prnciples
of Virtue(477-484/145-153) and oftheCritique ofPracticalReason(151-163/
155-168), as wellas inhisbookEducation. (1803,trans.Annette Churton. Ann
Arbor:University ofMichigan Press,1971).
37 Kantdeniesthatwe can havea dutytopromote themoralperfection ofothers,
onthesegrounds"Fortheperfection ofanother manas a personconsists precisely
inhisbeingabletosethisendforhimself accordingtohisownconcepts ofduty.
Andit is a contradiction torequire(tomakeit a dutyforme)thatI oughtto do
something whichnooneexceptanother himselfcando."(MMV387/44)Butthis,
again,isoverstated. Granted, thatitwouldbe bothdisrespectful toyou,andunfair
to me,to holdme responsible in a generalwayforyourmoralcharacter. Yet
itisclearthatwe havea dutytoprovide forthemoraleducation ofourchildren,
and,Kanthimself insists,ourintimate friends (MMV470/136)Choosing endson
another's behalfis as impossible as itwouldbe disrespectful, butputting others
in a goodposition to chooseendsforthemselves, and to choosethemwell,is
the properworkof parents,teachers,friends, and politicians; providing for
someone'smoraleducation as wellas nurturing herself-respect is an important
partofthewaywe do this
38 Noris Kantunawareofthemoredirecteducational benefits ofholdingothers
responsible, forhe reminds us that"Examplesofrespectshownto othersmay
also inciteintheman endeavorto deserveit."(MV466/132)InEthicsand the
Limitsof Philosophy (Cambridge. HarvardUniversity Press,1985),Bernard
Williams writes, "Theinstitution ofblameisbestunderstood as involving a fiction,
bywhichwe treattheagentas oneforwhomtherelevant ethicalconsiderations
arereasons.. Thisfiction hasvariousfunctions. Oneisthatifwe treattheagent
as someonewhogivesweight toethicalreasons, thismayhelptomakehiminto
sucha person."(p. 193) It is presumably thisformof "recruitment intothe
deliberative community," touseWilliams's phrase,thathe hasinmindwhenhe
writes "Thepurity ofmorality concealsnotonlythemeansbywhichitdealswith

deviantmembers ofitscommunity, butalsothevirtues ofthosemeans."(p 195)

Williams thinks that"thefiction
ofthedeliberative community isoneofthepositive
achievements ofthemorality system" butadds"Aswithotherfictions itis a real
question whether itsworking couldsurvive a clearunderstanding ofhowitworks"
(193-194)1wanttomaketwocomments abouttheseremarks. First,theviewof
personswe adoptfromthepractical pointofviewwillseem"fictional" (ifthat
is supposedtosuggest someformofinferiority) onlyto thosewhoprivilege the
theoretical standpointanditsconcepts, or at leastbelievethatall ourconcepts
shouldbe congruent withthose.Thissuggests a certainviewofwhatconcepts
ingeneral arefor.Nodoubttheoretical concepts aremorefirmly aimedattracking
thetruth, buttracking thetruthis nottheprimary businessofethicalconcepts,
as Williams wouldcertainly agree Inanycase theterm"fiction" is one adopted
from thetheoreticalstandpoint,
andrelativized inan obviouswaytothepurposes
oftheoretical reason.Mysecondpointconcerns recruitmentintothedeliberative
community Kanthimself apparentlythought thatwecanunderstand howholding
peopleresponsible works-andeven,as thequotation abovesuggests, thatwe
can takenoticeofitsmorestrategic benefits-and yetgo on doingit.Ofcourse
itis a delicatebusinessto manipulatesomeoneintomorality whilemaintaining
theessentially non-manipulative attitude thatmorality demands.But,as Kant's
remarks abouterrorat MMV463/129(quotedin SectionV) show,he rightly
perceivesthisto be a quitegeneralproblemabouteducation.


Korsgaard - Creating The Kingdom of Ends - Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations

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Korsgaard - Creating The Kingdom of Ends - Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations

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Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations

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CREATINGTHE KINGDOMOF ENDS:

As thevirtuous manis to himself, also,forhisfriend

I. Personal Relations,Reciprocity,and Responsibility

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playeda centralrolein itsmoralphilosophy. In thetheories ofHutcheson,

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resultof keepingthe humanityof othersand so theircapacityforgood will

This content downloaded on Tue, 25 Dec 2012 22:43:42 PM

to explainourdutiesto others.8 Inthepositivesense,totreatanotheras an

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be good. The difference is thedifferencebetweentheabsolutemoralrequire-

If,then,one yieldsone'sperson,bodyand soul,forgoodand ill in every

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ourfreedom again,undiminished, underlaw. (MMJ316/80-81) In thecase

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disappointed respect.Atitsbest,itdeclaresto itsobjecta greaterfaiththan

II. Theoreticaland PracticalConceptionsof Responsibility

Attributions ofresponsibility maybe understood in eitheroftwoways,

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ofarrivingata beliefabouther.Itseemsprobable thatwe arriveatthismodel

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whichreciprocal relations youalreadystandinor planto standinor hope

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thepersonwiththemostbasicforms ofmoraldecency.Butwe mayavoid

III. Kant's Two Standpoints

I willapproachtheseissuesin a roundabout way,however.I beginby

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as ifwe createdour own characters.Althougha personmay know thathis

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insecuritytendtobecomesomewhat selfish as adults,andsupposethatsuch

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laws of the phenomenalworldare laws thatdescribeand explainour

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IV. PracticalGroundsforHoldingPeople Responsible

Butwe cannotjustleavethematter there.Fortherearecontexts inwhich

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whatit is liketo chooseor to do an actionofthatkind.

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is herrealhusband, themanshe loves,themanshe has married. Nor,for

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responsible of holdingourselvesso, bothin

Nowwhilethisexplains whywe holdothers responsible, andwhyourdoing

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Kantcomparesthisto theduty,whensomeonemakesan error,notjustto

On the whole,Kant'sview is thatwe mustalways hold ourselves

1. I have manypeopleto thankforhelpwiththispaper.Ken Simonsprovided

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revisions.SidneyAxinn,Charlotte Brown,Dan Brudney, and JaySchleusener

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theA andB editions are followedbythoseofthetranslation byNorman

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havingweightThisis a heightened formofreciprocity, although onlywithin a

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exchanged isa partofone'spractical identity, andwhatresults isa transformation

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spying on orjudging youinorderforthisto hurt;thebarefailure ofreciprocity

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intoorder, ofthemselves, andwithout anyknown cause..."(PartIV,p. 162;quoted