James Manor - Government and Opposition in India

Government and Opposition in India
Author(s): James Manor

Source: Government and Opposition , OCTOBER 2011, Vol. 46, No. 4 (OCTOBER 2011), pp.
436-463
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Government and Opposition , Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 436-463, 201 1
doi:10.1111/j. 1477-7053.201 1.01347.x
James Manor
Government and Opposition in India
DESPITE THIS JOURNAL'S TITLE, NOT EVERY CONTRIBUTION TO IT

deals head-on with 'government and opposition', but sometimes the
topic cries out for analysis. That is certainly true of the interplay
between ruling and opposition parties in India, a pivotal theme which
has been largely ignored - for decades.
Classic works published in the 1950s and 1960s by the founding
fathers of political studies of India examined government and
opposition in some depth.1 Even though much has changed since
then - and ironically, even though the interactions between gov-
ernment and opposition have become more important and inter-
esting - the topic has faded from view. Academic fashions changed,
few studies of institutions have appeared, and analysts of interparty
relations have focused on dynamics within multiparty ruling coali-
tions (which have lately loomed large) rather than between ruling
and opposition forces. Recent studies of two individual states in this
federal system focused intensely on the latter topic,2 but they are
rarities. In the other 26 states and at the national level it has been
sorely neglected. It is touched upon only occasionally in one of two
1 W. H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in India, London, Longmans, 1957; M. Weiner,

Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1957; R. Kothari, 'The Congress System in India', Asian Survey, 4: 12
(December, 1964), pp. 1161-73. See also W. H. Morris-Jones, 'Parliament and the
Dominant Party: The Indian Experience', and 'Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-
relations in the Indian Party System', in W. H. Morris-Jones, Politics Mainly Indian,
Madras, Orient Longmans, 1978, pp. 196-232.
2 A. Wyatt, Party System and Change in South India: Political Entrepreneurs, Patterns and
Problems, London and New Delhi, Routledge, 2009; E. Raghavan and J. Manor, Broad-
ening and Deepening Democracy: Political Innovation in Karnataka, London and New Delhi,
Routledge, 2009. See also several of the studies in S. Shastri, KL C. Suri and Y. Yadav
(eds), Electoral Politics in Indian States: Lok Sabha Elections in 2004 and Beyond, Delhi,
Oxford University Press, 2009, esp. ch. 22.
© The Author 2011.

Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main
Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA.

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GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION IN INDIA 437
key recent books on India's political parties, and in the other it

surfaces on only two pages.3
This article is an attempt to redress that balance.4 The topic, like
Indian politics more generally, is so complex that this brief discussion
is bound to be inadequate. Researchers should treat it as an invitation
to delve more deeply.
BROAD TRENDS AND PATTERNS
We must recognize at the outset that we are dealing not with

political arena but with 29 - with India as a whole (and thus w
events at the national level), but also with 28 states in this fede
system.5 This analysis addresses patterns, first in the states a
then at the national level. The states are discussed at grea
length - necessarily, because there are greater variations there
the apex of the system is not ignored. Broadly speaking,6 p
systems have passed through three phases since Indian inde
dence in 1947.
3 The first is Z. Hasan (ed.), Parties and Party Politics in India, Delhi, Oxford
University Press, 2002. The second is P. R. de Souza and E. Sridharan (eds), India's
Political Parties , New Delhi, London and Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 2006. This
comment entails some self-criticism since one of my own papers was reprinted in the
first of these books.
4 I am grateful to Zoya Hasan, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, E. Sridharan and Yogendra

Yadav for advice on how to develop this article. They are not to blame for what appears
here.
5 Even this statement oversimplifies, since it omits several smaller 'Union Territo-
ries'. But 29 arenas are quite enough for this discussion.
6 For much more detail on the complexities that lie behind these comments, see
P. R. Brass, The New Cambridge History of India: The Politics of India since Independence,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, vol. IV. 1, pp. 64-82; J. Manor, 'Parties
and the Party System', in A. Kohli (ed.), India's Democracy: Changing State-Society Rela-
tions, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 62-98, and in P. Chatteijee
(ed.), State and Politics in India, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 92-124;
Y. Yadav, 'Electoral Politics in the Time of Change: India's Third Electoral System',
Economic and Political Weekly, 34: 34-5 (21 August-3 September 1999), pp. 2393-9;
E. Sridharan, 'The Fragmentation of the Indian Party System, 1952-1999', in Hasan,
Parties and Party Politics, pp. 489-98.
© The Author 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition Ltd

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438 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
1947 to the Late 1960s
During this period the Congress Party exercised dominance at the

national level and in nearly all states, thanks to its role in achieving
independence, its leaders' prestige, and its strong party organization
- a cluster of state-level political 'machines' that efficiently distributed
patronage in exchange for electoral support from diverse interests.
Congress occupied not just the centre ground but much of the left
and right as well. Key debates and conflicts occurred not between
Congress and the opposition but within Congress. Opposition parties
were small and disunited, widely dispersed at various points on the
margins, to the left or right of Congress.
The Late 1960s to 1989
For most of this period, Congress governed in New Delhi, but it no

longer dominated. It remained pre-eminent despite two counter-
trends: the emergence of Hindu nationalist and (especially) of
regional parties7 as serious alternatives, and Indira Gandhi's assault
on her own Congress Party organization - which she saw not as an
instrument through which to govern but as a threat. Power was
radically centralized in the prime minister's office under Mrs Gandhi
(prime minister, 1966-77 and 1980-84) and her son Rajiv (1984-89).
India's first non-Congress government, elected by a ferocious reac-
tion to her state of emergency, held power between 1977 and 1979,
but was plagued by disunity, which eventually undid it.
1989 to the Present
Since 1989, no single party has been able to win a majority in the
dominant lower house of Parliament, despite some continuing
strength for Congress, because regional parties and the Hindu nation-
alist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have won large numbers of seats. In
7 The term 'regional parties' here refers both to explicitly regional (one-state)
parties and de facto regional parties that claim to be national but have significant
strength in only a tiny number of states. The latter include the two communist parties,
various Janata parties, and the Nationalist Congress Party.

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New Delhi, minority governments or (more often of late) large, motley

coalitions have ruled.8 Power has flowed very substantially away from
the prime minister's office - horizontally to other institutions at the
national level (Parliament, its committees, the courts, the Election
Commission, political parties both in power and in opposition, etc.),
and downwards to state governments and state-level parties9 (which
are often partners in ruling coalitions10 at the national level) .
The comments above refer mainly to the national level, but (as we
shall see) party systems in the 28 states have also changed, especially
since the 1980s, and have become extremely variegated.
Interactions and relations between governing and opposition
parties changed as India passed through these three phases. During
the first phase, Jawaharlal Nehru (prime minister, 1947-64) was com-
mitted to liberal values, and knew that other parties posed little threat
to the dominant Congress. He therefore treated opposition parties
generously, unlike many of his contemporaries elsewhere in the
developing world. He and other ministers subjected themselves to
questions from the opposition, and extended privileges to them in
Parliament and state legislatures (by, for example, establishing the
convention that opposition leaders should chair public accounts
committees). Nehru also permitted the emergence of a free, often
critical press - including newspapers and periodicals published by
opposition parties - and he ensured that all parties could compete
quite freely in fair elections.
During the second phase, Indira Gandhi adopted a markedly
illiberal approach and treated opposition parties with hostility (and
8 The alliance that governed between 1999 and 2004 contained, at various times,
23 or 24 parties. The ruling coalition since 2004 has contained between 10 and 13
parties.
9 They are discussed in detail inj. Manor, 'Regional Parties in Federal Systems', in
D. V. Verney and B. Arora (eds), Multiple Identities in a Single State: Indian Federalism in
a Comparative Perspective, Delhi, Konark, 1995, pp. 107-35.
10 For more details on coalitions at the national level, see B. Arora, 'Negotiating
Differences: Federal Coalitions and National Cohesion', in F. Frankel, Z. Hasan, R.
Bhargava and B. Arora (eds), Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democ-
racy, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 176-206; B. Arora, 'The Political Parties
and the Party System: The Emergence of New Coalitions', in Hasan, Parties and Party
Politics, pp. 504-32; E. Sridharan, 'Principles, Power and Coalition Politics in India:
Lessons from Theory, Comparison and Recent History', in D. D. Khanna and G. W.
Kueck (eds), Principles, Power and Politics, New Delhi, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 270-90.

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her son Rajiv followed suit), although elections remained

fair. Leaders loyal to the Gandhis were named to suppose
posts - India's presidency and state governorships (w
intended to play roles within legislative systems sim
monarch in Britain), and the offices of speaker at both l
operated in highly partisan ways. Governments in New D
abused powers to dismiss state governments headed by o
parties, on flimsy grounds.
In the third phase, since 1989, immense changes have
and the picture has become extremely complicated. The r
article deals with that period.
One last thread that runs through India's recent histor
be noted. It has to do with the ease or difficulty of
re-election, and thus with alternations in power. During
Congress dominance, that party's governments at the n
state levels had a strong tendency to be re-elected. From
1960s, however, other parties began occasionally to defea
in state (although not in national) elections. By the late 1
norm began to take hold: as governments suffered increas
demand overload, and as voters became more politically
assertive, ruling parties tended increasingly to be thrown
levels. Between 1980 and 2007, ruling parties at the state
ousted by voters roughly 70 per cent of the time. If we s
state of West Bengal - where uniquely, a Left Front gover
consistently re-elected - the figure approaches 90 per cent.11
of the nine national (parliamentary) elections held be
and 2004, ruling parties or coalitions failed to win re-elec
mid-2008, a new trend has emerged: most state governm
been re-elected, and the ruling Congress-led coalition at t
level was returned to power at the 2009 parliamentary el
is explained in part by a surge in government revenues
which has made it possible for ruling parties at both na
state levels to spend lavishly on programmes that benef
interest groups.12 It remains to be seen whether this tre
sustained over the longer term.
11 These are approximate numbers because certain state election outc

for complicated reasons, ambiguous.
12 For more detail, see J. Manor, 'Did the Central Government's Povert
Help to Re-elect It?', in L. Saez and G. Singh (eds), New Dimensions of Poli
The UPA in Power ; London and New Delhi, Roudedge, forthcoming.
© The Author 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Oppo

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There is an easy way and a hard way to develop this analysis. Th

easy way is to focus almost entirely on the national level. The har
way is to include the 28 states in India's federal system, where w
find a diversity of inter-relationships between governing and opp
sition parties. The easy approach would provide readers with
clear, intelligible and interesting picture, but it would be super-
ficial. Most of the actual governing in India occurs at the state lev
and below. Evidence from the states demonstrates that man
patterns seen at the national level are atypical; they are seldom
found deeper down at the state level. A focus on New Delhi only
would mean that some important trends in India's recent politica
history would remain obscure. So it is better to do this the hard
way.
THE STATE LEVEL
Let us first consider the interactions between governing and opp

tion parties in the 28 states, each of which has its own Westmins
style system with legislators elected on a first-past-the-post basis. P
systems vary greatly across states. Table 1 gives a rather crude break
down of the types of party systems found (in early 2011) in India's 1
major states - those which fill seven or more seats in Parliamen
States' names and some details, which specialists may seek, are p
vided in the notes.
Table 1 understates the degree to which coherent governments

can emerge at the state level. Five states have 'fragmented' party
systems, but apart from chaotic Jharkhand, all of them have yielded
reasonably coherent governments. Those states that have 'bi-polar'
and 'bi-polar plus' party systems have provided quite stable govern-
ments, as have two of the four 'three-party' systems, most of the time.
So in the main, state governments have been easy to assemble and
have been somewhat authoritative.
Relations between ruling and opposition parties at the state level

vary greatly, ranging from acute hostility to wary accommodation,
and such variations exist within each of the four types of party
systems. This is illustrated below in two ways. We must eventually
consider the patterns that emerge when governments alternate in
power, but let us first examine Table 2, which sets out a rough guide
(written in early 2011) to changes in relations between ruling and

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Table 1
Types of Party Systems in 18 Major States
Type No. of % of seats in

states Parliament
that they fill
Bi-polar 713 24.1

Bi-polar plus (mainly bi-polar systems with 214 14.9
non-trivial additional fragments)
Three party 415 33.8
Fragmented 516 21. 017
13 The states are Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Guj

(which some may see as 'bi-polar plus') and
fragmented, but two long-standing alliances
14 The states are Tamil Nadu and West Be
15 The states are Karnataka, Orissa, Assam
'three-party plus') and Uttar Pradesh (which
elections, has been a four-party system) .
16 The states are Maharashtra (a four-party
bi-polar coalitions) , Haryana (fragmented, b
mented, but tending some of the time tow
(badly fragmented and fragmenting furth
(badly fragmented, and thus at times close
17 E. Sridharan has identified seven expla
party systems, all of which have some subst
They are as follows.
a. the growing politicization of social cle

1960s, in reaction to the centralization of
ments before 1989;
b. the de-linking of state and national elec
simultaneously) that occurred when an ea
c. the quickening political consciousness
groups from intermediate levels in social
Revolution of the 1970s;
d. reactions of regional political elites and o
in North India) against the lack of responsiv
over-centralization by Congress leaders b
explanations a and c);
e. the impact of incentives that emerge fr
between national and state governments - w
ture, irrigation, electricity policy, educatio
f. the (for a time) acute politicization of ca
created major problems for a party such as
© The Author 2011. Government and Opposition

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opposition parties in the 18 major Indian states (and at the nationa

level) since 2000.18
Readers will have noted that in Table 2 no state has 'congenial'
interparty relations; 'semi-civilized' is the best that they can do. Th
does not represent a marked degeneration since a decade ago, onl
Rajasthan had 'congenial' ties. Relations have deteriorated in severa
states in recent years, but an assessment of 'trends' suggests that, for
the most part, this should not inspire acute concern.
Those 'trends' are seldom the result of deep structural changes o
forces. The upward trends in two states (a very small number, of
course) are explained by the actions of individuals: the exit of a wildly
self-indulgent chief minister in Chhattisgarh, and magnanimous
actions by the Bihar chief minister after he won a sweepin
re-election victory in late 20 10. 19 Something similar can be said
many of the downward trends in interparty relations. Most have to do
either with individual leaders (and their enmity towards on
another) or with the approach of state elections - which naturall
to a broad range of social groups, and gave rise to regional parties that stressed cast
opportunities; and
g. 'the systemic properties of the first-past-the-post electoral system working them
selves out in a federal polity' - properties that (following Duverger) lend themselve
to the emergence of two-party or bi-polar systems in many states, but these ar
bi-polar systems in which the two main parties are different from state to state, s
that if we look across the whole of India, the result is fragmentation within th
nationwide party system.
For more detail, see Sridharan, 'The Fragmentation of the Party System', pp. 493-
The quotation is from p. 495.
18 Note one important contextual matter: a reliable poll at the 2009 parliamentary
election found that both the national government and state governments (which wer
often controlled by rival parties) had positive approval ratings in every major sta
except Jharkhand, where normlessness flourishes, partly because no party has mu
strength. The poll was conducted by the National Election Study, overseen by th
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. The full table is provided
Manor, 'Did the Central Government's Poverty Initiatives Help'. These ratings repr
sent a startling change from the anti-incumbency sentiments that had prevailed over
most of the preceding 25 years.
19 If only the last two years were considered, we might also have noted an upward
trend in Rajasthan. At a state election in December 2008, an extravagantly arrogan
autocratic BJP chief minister - who had poisoned relations with both the oppositio
and every important section of her own party - was removed from the scene, but if w
consider that state over a slightly longer time span, the trend is 'flat'.

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Table 2
Recent Trends in Government-Opposition Relations
Location Relations Trend Comments
Bihar B up CM 's understated style and recent magnanimity, plus

opposition's post-landslide confusion, improve
relations
Chhattisgarh B up Departure of normless Congress leader improves

relations; BJP CM's success befuddles Congress
opposition
Rajasthan B flat Improved relations since 2008, but slippage from old
civility caused by caste controversies and political
ineptitude20
Madhya B flat Congress befuddlement at BJP CM's success blunts
Pradesh its efforts in opposition
Delhi B flat BJP despair at Congress CM's success; its uncertainty
tempers abrasive relations
Haryana C flat Rather abrasive relations in a state with no-holds-barred
tradition
Maharashtra C flat Weak Congress-led government, but fragmentation in

the opposition mutes its attacks
Assam C flat Amid separatist violence and 'ethnic' tensions,
government/opposition interplay is abrasive
Orissa C flat/ Opposition parties despair at unassailable CM who is
down unresponsive to his own and other parties
Andhra C down Fragmentation in the party system breeds frantic
Pradesh jockeying; aggressive egotism of some leaders and
evocative issues (including sub-regional separatism)
inflame politics
Kerala C down Strong stability in a two-coalition system; conflict
quickens as state election approaches
Punjab C down Approaching election intensifies conflict in a state with a
'gloves-ofF political tradition
Gujarat C/D flat BJP CM's autocratic, brutish ways poison relations,
but Congress opposition is at a loss
Uttar D flat Thoroughly caustic, owing to leaders' personal and caste
Pradesh tensions, as it has been for 20 years
Tamil Nadu D flat Consistently caustic, increasingly personalized as election
nears amid fragmentation in the party system
West D down Opposition sees first chance to govern after 34 years;
Bengal pent-up tensions emerge as election nears
Karnataka D down Last two CMs turn to moneyed mining interests and
vendettas to debase formerly genteel politics
Jharkhand - - Weak parties; no clear party system; the ensuing
confusion and near-chaos have bred normlessness
National C/D down To sustain its motley ruling coalition, Congress suffers massive
level corruption by alliance partners; in reaction, the BJP-led
opposition, with grim prospects, shut down Parliament in
late 2010 until an uneasy truce was forged in early 2011
Notes: The abbreviation 'CM' refers to the chief minister, who heads the state government.
The word 'down' in the trend column indicates the degeneration of government-opposition
relations, while 'up' implies improvement. The letters that characterize 'relations' signify
the following: A = congenial (of which there are no current examples) ; B = semi-civilized;
C = somewhat abrasive; D = caustic.
20 See Pratap Bhanu Mehta's essay in the Indian Express, 29 December 2010.

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sharpens government-opposition conflict, but usually only over the

short term.
However, some trends are linked to deeper changes or forces. In

some states, marked antagonism between social groups that provide
major parties with distinct (barely overlapping) social bases inspires
similar antagonism between those parties (see below) . The surge in
government revenues since 2003 has enabled ruling parties in many
states and at the national level to spend heavily on programmes that
have become popular - so that they are more likely to be re-elected.
This has come as a severe shock to opposition parties, which for
three decades could expect ruling parties to lose elections - so that
the opposition only had to wait quietly for five years until power was
handed back to them. This has persuaded some opposition parties
to take extreme action. The cacophony within Parliament raised by
the BJP during the winter of 2010-11, which shut down business, is
an example. Opposition parties in several states have been further
dismayed by the success of chief ministers at obtaining massive
financial 'contributions' from industrialists, especially those in
extractive industries (see below) : funds that are used to undermine
the opposition. The money is not used to buy votes. Indian voters
are too shrewd for that; they take gifts and money from all parties
and then cast their ballots as they please. Instead, the money tends
to be used to bribe middle-level leaders of opposition parties to join
the ruling party in the months just before a state election, when the
grip of India's strong anti-defection law (also discussed below) loses
much of its force.21 This adds further to the demoralization and,
at times, the near-desperation of opposition parties. In some
states this has triggered a deterioration in government-opposition
relations.
Let us now consider a second, closely related set of issues. To

understand how the variations in state-level party systems play out in
detail, and what causes them, we must ask several key questions. All of
21 For example, in the run-up to the Karnataka state election in May 2008, the BJP
used immense sums from illicit mining interests to purchase the loyalty of key Congress
Party leaders in most of the districts of that state. That action did not prove decisive in
that election, but it gave the BJP a major advantage. For details, see J. Manor, 'Letting
a Winnable Election Slip Away: Congress in Karnataka', Economic and Political Weekly ,
43: 41 (11 October 2008), pp. 23-8.

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them focus on changes that ensue when political parties a

power at the state level - when government and oppositi
places.
If India were a polity where ruling parties usually won re-election,
this discussion would be ill advised, but for three decades the alter-
nation of parties (or in some cases, of coalitions) has been the
predominant norm at the state level. In only one state (West Bengal)
has the ruling coalition been re-elected on every occasion since
1977.22 In the other states, as was noted above, ruling parties have
been ousted by voters with spectacular frequency. This pattern has
been reversed since mid-2008, for complicated reasons,23 with incum-
bent governments usually being re-elected, but this trend is very new
and may not last. A preoccupation with alternations in power is thus
justified. So, what happens when state governments change?
Let us first consider how vindictive or congenial ruling parties
tend to be towards the main opposition party's leaders, legislators
and activists. In a limited number of cases, things run to extremes -
opposite extremes. For example, in December 2010, Mulayam Singh
Yadav, the most prominent opposition leader in Uttar Pradesh (and
a former chief minister of that state) accused the ruling party there of
Terror' tactics, of 'torturing and threatening our supporters'.24 We
must allow for some hyperbole here, but his party's activists had
clearly experienced rough treatment. Earlier, when the two parties'
roles had been reversed, a similar pattern had prevailed, so that
Mayawati, then the leading opposition figure (and in 2010, the chief
minister), accused Yadav of endangering her life.
In radical contrast, when Bhairon Singh Shekhawat became the
BJP chief minister of Rajasthan in 1993, he arranged individual inter-
views with every legislator from the main opposition party (Con-
gress) . He asked each to list ten things that were needed in his/her
constituency. He then promised to deliver soon on some of these
items (and duly followed through), and expressed the hope that he
could go further during his five-year term, although that would
22 However, at this writing in January 2011, it appears to be heading for defeat in

a few months' time.
23 The main factors are the surge in revenues that state and central governments
have enjoyed since 2003, and the tendency of ruling politicians to spend much of that
money on 'post-clientelisť development programmes that are, for the most part quite
popular. Both of those trends are discussed elsewhere in this article.
24 Indian Express, 19 December 2010 and Frontline, 17 December 2010.

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depend upon how many problems the legislators caused his govern-
ment. Shekhawat was not all sweetness and light. He was reputed to
keep meticulously documented files on the foibles of every politician
in the state (including his own party colleagues), which might be
used against them if they became troublesome. But he mainly relied
on congeniality - a strategy that he had learned during long years in
opposition from a similarly courtly Congress predecessor.25
Nearly all Indian states are much more ambiguous cases that fall
far from these extremes. In a tiny number, we find poisonous inter-
actions similar to those in Uttar Pradesh. As a state election was just
months away in West Bengal, in late 2010 the ruling Left Front
accused the main opposition leader of 'creating an atmosphere of
terror' and of colluding with Maoist insurgents.26 That leader
responded with (similarly false) claims that the chief minister was
himself 'a Maoist leader' who had unleashed 'terrorism'.27 Both the
government and the opposition claimed (accurately) that the other
had used gangs of 'muscle men' against their activists, amid what one
reliable press report described as an 'orgy of violence' attended by
'filthy language'. The mutual loathing was apparent from both sides'
use of the Bengali term ' birodhi doV to refer to their adversaries, which
means not merely 'opponents' but 'enemy party'.28
In a somewhat larger minority of states, we see actions that are
intended to promote genteel relations between parties. After winning
a landslide election victory in Bihar in late 2010, Chief Minister Nitish
Kumar agreed to designate his main opponent the official 'leader of
the opposition', even though the latter's party had fallen just short of
the 10 per cent minimum of seats required to qualify for that status
(and the privileges that it carries). Both the vituperation and the
magnanimity that are apparent from these examples, however, are
exceptions to the more ambiguous norm.
It is worth noting three things that we do not see in India's states.
We have yet to hear senior Indian politicians refer to the acts of their
25 For more details, see J. Manor, 'Political Leadership: India's Chief Ministers and
the Problem of Governability', in P. Oldenburg (ed.), India Bńefing 1995 : Staying the
Course, New York, Asia Society, 1996, pp. 47-74.
26 The Hindu , 23 December 2010.
27 Economic Times , 30 December 2010.
28 Indian Express, 28 November 2010. See also the opposition leader's claim that the
state had 'a government of guns and goons and greed, having looted the State treasury
to finance its goons . . .' in The Hindu, 6 December 2010.

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opponents as 'treason' - a word that is used every week by the

of the two main parties in Bangladesh about one another. No
we seen murderous retribution against activists from a defeated
after an election triggers a change of government - as has som
occurred in Sri Lanka.29 Nor do ruling parties ensure that th
have the temerity to stand as opposition candidates in electio
trumped-up charges before biased courts, so that they are r
financially and sometimes imprisoned - standard pract
Singapore.
We must also consider how antagonistic or relaxed new ru
parties are towards civil servants and career government employe
specialized agencies who worked under the previous governm
Here it is important to understand that these officials cann
sacked, unless they are found guilty of gross misconduct. Th
however, be transferred, perhaps to undesirable posts and loc
and frequent transfers have ^ng been common, for various r
explained below.
In most states where interparty relations fall short of being ca
newly elected governments usually make only limited change
assignments of such people. Officials are treated as relatively
professionals. Senior civil servants are often reshuffled when
ernment changes, mainly because the chief minister may w
demonstrate that s/he is in charge, and because individual m
may have great trust in the efficiency and/ or the pliability of p
lar bureaucrats. This process tends not to run to excess. Gover
employees at lower levels may experience large-scale tra
because legislators demand it - since they want loyalists ope
within their bailiwicks, and/or because they receive payment
high- and low-level government employees seeking more ag
postings.30 Senior politicians sometimes curtail mass tra
because they recognize that it can disrupt effective administ
and that it increases corruption (which causes popular dismay
the employees who have paid bribes for transfers then demand b
from citizens to recover their 'investments'.
29 This writer witnessed such violence in 1977. For an explanation of its origins,
which offers sharp contrasts with India, see J. Manor, 'The Failure of Political Integra-
tion in Sri Lanka', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 17: 1 (November
1978), pp. 21-46.
30 For details, see R. Wade, 'The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is
Not Better at Development', World Development, 4 (1985), pp. 467-97.

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In states with abrasive interparty relations, however, many mor

transfers occur. This is sometimes linked to organized efforts at illicit
'fund-raising' from employees who know that they will change posts,
but the main cause is intense suspicion among leaders in the new
elected government that state employees - especially but not only a
higher levels - have partisan attachments to the former ruling party.
Those leaders may also seek to insert officials from certain castes o
other social groups into key posts. Wholesale transfers occasional
take place. We saw this after the 2007 state election triggered
change of government in Uttar Pradesh; a state with toxic relation
between major parties. The senior police officers in each of th
hundreds of police outposts across the state were transferred.31
Then there is the question of the extent to which various impor
tant social groups gravitate towards the new ruling party when
government changes. This varies and depends heavily on the rela
tionship between the new ruling party and its social base. In som
Indian states, major parties compete for support from identical o
overlapping sets of social groups. The greater the overlap, the les
abrasive party competition is likely to be, and the greater the ten
dency of many social groups to gravitate towards a new ruling part
In other states, major parties seek support from largely distinct sets o
social groups. This produces more abrasive interparty relations an
only minimal shifts in support towards the new ruling party. Th
degree to which those relations are downright caustic depends in
large measure on the intensity of the antagonism between the soc
groups that provide different parties with support - and there ar
significant variations on that front.
A tiny number of Indian states represent extreme cases. In Karna
taka, major parties have long tended strongly to seek votes from
nearly every social group, so that the overlap between their preferred
social bases is near total. This has been possible in part because th
state has witnessed less antagonism between different castes, class
and religious groups, but peaceable social relations have in tur
partly been sustained by the tendency of major parties to seek vot
from nearly all groups because politicians have played down socia
cleavages as they build all-embracing social bases. The situation ha
changed somewhat in periods when certain leaders have appealed to
31 I am grateful to Yogendra Yadav for this point.

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their own caste fellows, but until very recently these epi
short-lived and the system reverted to the normality of rain
coalitions.32 Since 2008, the current chief minister has fa
caste and stressed divisions between Hindus and minorities; actions
that have helped to cause the degeneration of interparty relations.
His surpassing ineptitude, though, is likely to ensure that his polar-
izing efforts once again fail to produce much lasting effect.
At the other extreme, interparty relations have been embittered in
Uttar Pradesh for nearly 20 years because each major party appeals to
a different bloc of caste groups. Acute antagonism (far more acute
than in Karnataka) existed between those groups before politicians
became systematically divisive, but it has grown much worse since
then. Uttar Pradesh has thus been largely consumed by the politics of
spite for a generation.
With one exception - Gujarat33 - other states fall somewhere
between these extremes. Politicians tend to engage simultaneously
both in dividing and in uniting social groups. The chief minister of
Bihar won a resounding re-election victory in late 2010 after carefully
weaning the most disadvantaged sub-divisions within the Muslim and
Dalit (ex-untouchable) blocs away from his main opponents. He also
took steps to unite his own supporters among lower-middle castes,
and maintained an alliance with another party that appealed to
high-caste voters. Such complex machinations to unite one's own
broad social coalition while fragmenting that of one's rivals are the
subtle stuff of state politics across most of India.
It should be stressed that nearly all parties in India have weak
organizations - which limits their capacity to make their influence
penetrate beyond urban centres and below the (high-intermediate)
district level34 and thus restricts their ability to forge close ties to
32 This is examined in great detail in Raghavan and Manor, Broadening and

Deepening.
33 Gujarat stands alongside Uttar Pradesh, although it differs markedly from that
state. Its chief minister has, since a ghastly spate of communal riots in 2002, succeeded
by brutish means in polarizing society between Hindus and Muslims. His brand of
bigotry has occasionally been attempted in other states, but it has had limited popular
appeal and even less staying power.
34 The only exceptions are the two left parties, the Communist Party of India and
the Communist Party of India (Marxist). The DMK in Tamil Nadu was once an
exception, but its organization has decayed markedly as the party has degenerated into
the plaything of one family. The BJP is often said to be an exception, but outside urban

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GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION IN INDIA 45 1
members of social groups at the grassroots in this predominantly

rural country. This sometimes causes government-opposition rela-
tions to become more abrasive. Party leaders often make more stri-
dent attempts to catalyse antipathy between social groups in order to
compensate for their inability to reach them through their organiza-
tions, and intense personal feuds between the leaders of different
parties - who have kept their organizations weak in order to domi-
nate them - often poison interactions between ruling and opposition
forces.
For the most part, however, tension between social groups does
not produce serious antagonism between major parties. The main
reason for this is a persistent tendency among most Indians not to fix
ferociously and permanently on one of the many identities available
to them - caste, class, religious, linguistic, urban/rural, national,
regional, sub-regional, etc. They tend instead to shift their preoccu-
pations from one to another of these identities, and then to another
- often and with great fluidity. As a result, tension and conflict tend
not to build up along a single fault line in society, as has occurred
with grotesque results in Sri Lanka. This fickleness of Indian voters
creates great difficulties for parties on the Hindu right that seek to fix
attention on religious divisions, and for parties on the left that stress
the division between haves and have-nots. It also forces (and enables)
parties to build broad social bases by transcending these various
divisions.35 A change of government usually facilitates shifts in social
support towards new ruling parties.
How much policy continuity do we see when parties alternate in
power? In a few states - those with bitter relations between major
parties - newly elected governments tend to uproot most of their
predecessors' policies and start afresh. In most, though, we encoun-
ter considerable policy continuity, for several reasons. Many pro-
grammes originate from (and are largely funded by) the central
government in New Delhi, and even state governments that oppose
the ruling party/coalition at the national level find it convenient to
implement these (often well-funded) programmes since they can
claim some of the credit. Newly elected state governments also often
centres this is a misperception; see J. Manor, 'In Part a Myth: The BJP's Organisational
Strength', in K. Adeney and L. Saez (eds), Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism ,
London and New Delhi, Routledge, 2005, pp. 55-74.
35 For more detail, see J. Manor, ' "Ethnicity" and Politics in India', International
Affairs, 75: 3 (July 1996), pp. 459-75.

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sustain popular, developmentally productive programmes tha

predecessors had introduced, although they may 're-brand' t
changing their names. There are seldom significant ideologi
agreements between rival parties at the state level, or funda
differences about strategies for governing. Indeed, there is
dency in many states for new ruling parties and their leaders to
what Indians call their 'style of functioning' on their predec
if the latter were reasonably successful.36
It is also worth considering how immensely wealthy actors
private sector interact with ruling and opposition parties -
governments change, and between elections - and how thos
actions fit into broader patterns of corruption. Illicit 'fund-raisi
politicians used to consist partly of obtaining payments from
trialists, but other forms of corrupt profiteering also loomed
usually much larger. Since the late 1990s, however, three th
have changed that make 'contributions' from private sector f
predominant.
First, economic liberalization (which began in earnest in 19
enabled companies to flourish amid rapid economic growth, s
they now have more funds to pass to politicians (and thu
political leverage) than before. Second, industrialists can see
politicians provide further openings in what is still a semi-lib
economy, there are vastly greater profits to be made now (
period of sustained growth) than a decade or more ago. These
ings may take the form of generalized policy changes that ar
able to all firms, or of exceptional favours that are pro
(sometimes illegally) to a single company. Finally, since t
36 This is especially true of state-level units of the Congress Party, some of w

chameleon-like. For example, in the state of Kerala, Congress leads an al
parties in a bi-polar rivalry against a rather similar alliance led by the Commun
of India (Marxist) . The latter has long pursued a centre-left agenda and has
most generous state government in India to elected councils at lower l
response, the Congress there has adopted similar postures on both issue
Andhra Pradesh, the main adversary of Congress has been a regional party
consistent ideology that has radically centralized power in the hands of its lea
that it was the most hostile party to elected councils at lower levels in Ind
Congress displaced it at an election in 2004, its state-level leader also radically
ized power and treated those elected councils with such hostility that he violat
passed by a Congress-led government in New Delhi. (He got away with thi
Congress President Sonia Gandhi needed a strong leader in this important s
© The Author 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Opposition

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1990s, the international prices of many raw materials have soared as

the result of rising demand from East and South-East Asia, and from
India itself. This has enabled Indian entrepreneurs in extractive
industries to make spectacular profits. These have often been used to
provide massive bribes to senior politicians at the state level to per-
suade them either to provide permits for mining and other extractive
activities, or to look the other way when laws and regulations are
flouted.
Many entrepreneurs traditionally passed money both to ruling and

to opposition parties. This still happens in many cases, but since
politicians in power can now open the door to massive profiteering,
they tend increasingly to receive the lion's share of these 'contribu-
tions'. When parties alternate in power, the flow of funds tends
naturally to shift to those in office. In very recent times, as ruling
parties at the state level have been re-elected more often - thanks in
part to the immense funds that entrepreneurs provide - the latter
sometimes channel nearly all of their donations to politicians in
power. In several states this has demoralized opposition parties,
which despair at their financial troubles and at their chances of
gaining power anytime soon. A few have felt compelled to adopt
more confrontational tactics in their dealings with ruling parties, but
most have (so far) remained befuddled and rather quiescent.
In most of the states where entrepreneurs provide enormous
payoffs to ministers and ruling parties, the chief ministers have been
adroit enough to maintain the upper hand in the relationship, but we
have begun to see - especially in Karnataka where the chief minister
since mid-2008 has been unusually inept - moneyed interests gain as
much leverage as senior politicians, so that they are able to exercise
a significant degree of control over politics. It remains to be seen
whether this becomes a more widespread trend.
THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Since 1998-99, a 'bi-polar plus' party system has existed

national level. Lest that suggest a close resemblance to som
level party systems, it should be stressed that the 'plus' (and
'poles' which are coalitions of parties) at the national level
far more parties than in any state, and their behaviour is less pr
able. At times, especially as elections approach, some regiona
© The Author 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Government and Oppos

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either join one of the two main multiparty alliances or en

(or, briefly in 2009, a fourth) front, but some remain alo
hope of bargaining with the leading alliance after results
Since 1999, one or the other main coalition has mustered
mentary majority and provided reasonably stable govern
this has occurred amid and despite considerable fragmen
confusion, the like of which cannot be found in any state.
see in any state the internal incoherence inflicted upon b
and opposition coalitions at the national level by wilful, er
centric and corrupt leaders of regional parties.
So the party system at the national level is not a mere ag
or replication of patterns in the various states. The nu
diversity of (especially regional) interests at play in New
vastly greater than in any state. For this and several othe
interparty and government-opposition dynamics at the na
are distinctive. To understand both how they are distinctive a
makes them so, we must consider several important theme
remarkably diverse. They concern socio-cultural features, t
coalition politics that has prevailed at the national level i
years, the redistribution of power since 1989, and legal ch
result, the account that follows does not (and cannot) pr
seamless manner from topic to closely related topic.
Regional diversity breeds varied perceptions. India's regi
diverse political and socio-economic histories that cause p
different regions to have different perceptions of event
national level. As a result, national leaders find that their actions do
not produce the kind of consistent, relatively uncomplicated
responses that usually greet leaders in individual states, where the
responses are far more homogeneous than in India as a whole.
Two examples will illustrate this. In all of southern and in much of
western India, political battles over the issue of reservations for dis-
advantaged castes in educational institutions and government
employment were waged and resolved decades ago. These resulted in
accommodations that entailed substantial gains for these castes. So in
37 When one party or alliance of parties looms quite large, an important consider-
ation is the 'index of opposition unity' - a concept that David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and
Prannoy Roy usefully introduced in earlier election analyses. It is still used, especially
at the state level where single parties sometimes come close to dominating the scene.
Since the emergence of a 'bi-polar plus' system at the national level in the late 1990s,
analysts - including Roy - have found the concept somewhat less useful.

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1990, when Prime Minister V. P. Singh promised to ensure generous

reservations for such groups, he triggered ferocious controversies
between his government and opposition parties in northern and
eastern India, but not in the south and parts of the west where the
issue had been largely settled long ago. Singh was from the north,
and his apparent expectation that this promise would win him
greater nationwide support from 'have-nots' met with shrugs in the
south and much of the west.
Varied, indeed contradictory perceptions in different regions also

created problems for H. D. Deve Gowda when he became prime
minister in 1996. He was known as a leader of 'owner-cultivators' -
that is, farmers who own parcels of land that are modest enough for
the owners to do their own cultivating, so that they seldom employ
agricultural labourers. In much of northern and eastern India, where
larger landholdings are common, owner-cultivators stand on the
middle or lower-middle rungs of the economic ladder in rural parts.
Deve Gowda was thus seen there as a progressive, a champion of
people who were in many ways 'have-nots'. In southern India (from
which he came) and in much of western India, however, land is much
more equally distributed, so that owner-cultivators constitute the
rural elite, the 'haves'. As prime minister, he was thus caught between
his traditional role as elite champion and the very different expecta-
tions of voters in the north and east. He (and his party) found it
impossible to carve out a political persona that could produce con-
sistent responses - and widespread advantages in the struggle with
opposition parties - across varied regions.
Further complications afflict prime ministers and ruling parties in
New Delhi when caste issues arise. To understand this, we must
recognize that India has not one caste system but many. Each major
linguistic region (of which there are many) possesses its own distinc-
tive caste system, and the very composition of society varies from
region to region, often markedly. For example, Brahmins represent
around 20 per cent of the population in much of northern India and
often own extensive lands, but across the south they make up just
over 3 per cent of the population and own little land. So when
Brahmins from north and south meet in Parliament, they find it
impossible to operate as a political bloc that pursues coherent goals.
Their interests differ too much. The same can be said of most other
caste groups at the national level - except the Dalits (ex-

untouchables) , who experience similar disadvantages across most of

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India and make up roughly similar proportions of the po

most states. Within any single Indian state, caste is clearly un
and looms large in elections, political machinations, poli
and the interplay between ruling and opposition part
national level its meaning is so confusing that it plays a
important role.38
Let us now consider the role of ideology. It might appea
loom large in interparty relations at the national level bec
the two main national parties, the BJP, has a well-elabor
nationalist ideology. Its main rival, the Congress Party, h
enough high-profile poverty programmes since taking power
to appear more ideologically focused as a left of centre
practice there is less substance on either front than we migh
To forge alliances with other parties - all but one of
alienated by Hindu chauvinism - the BJP has played dow
logy. Heavy Congress spending on poor people has been m
similar outlays to benefit prosperous groups, so it rema
with a vague ideology that seeks support from every interest
communist parties are active at the national level, but the
serious setbacks at the national election in 2009, and they
the time of writing) likely to face defeat in West Bengal, wh
have exercised dominance since 1977. Their importan
Delhi is waning. Ideology thus generates little tension betw
and opposition parties/coalitions at the national level.
Indeed, we have actually seen considerable convergence
the two main coalitions at that level in recent years as a r
intense preoccupation with gaining and retaining pow
leaders of the two national parties that lead those coa
themselves what will get them elected or re-elected, the
with rather similar answers. Cautious, incremental steps t
the economy that do not result in destabilizing shocks to
tant interest are seen by both blocs as desirable because th
sustain or to increase rapid economic growth. Both unde
need to de-emphasize patronage distribution because
proved an inefficient means of attracting electoral su
neither bloc will entirely abandon it, since that would alienat
tant sets of clients. Both see the need to supplement
38 For much more detail, see J. Manor, 'Prologue', in R. Kothari (ed

Indian Politics , new edition, New Delhi, Orient BlackSwan, 2010, pp. xi-lv

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politics with 'post-clientelisť initiatives39 - which have increasingly

taken the form of development programmes to benefit a broad array
of interests, and which are partly or substantially insulated from
corruption. The long-standing tradition of bi-partisanship on foreign
policy and security issues may appear to have frayed in 2008. The BJP
first opposed an agreement on civil nuclear policy that the ruling
Congress-led coalition had signed with the USA, and then it criticized
the government's restrained response to the Mumbai terrorist attacks
of November 2008, but it was widely understood that the BJP would
have been as eager as the Congress Party to complete the nuclear
deal, and when its complaints in the wake of the Mumbai atrocities
yielded no advantage in state elections conducted only days there-
after, it largely abandoned that line of attack.
So we are left with two main rival parties (and their respective
coalitions) that resemble each other quite closely.40 This is not sur-
prising because each wishes to persuade regional parties to switch
sides, and that is far easier if the differences between them are
modest. We might expect the convergence of the two coalitions to
ease conflict at the national level. That has indeed happened when
we only consider conflicts that are rooted in ideology, but conver-
gence has also caused increasingly abrasive disputation between
ruling and opposition forces. Those in opposition feel impelled to
mount stinging attacks at every opportunity in order to exaggerate
the (quite limited) distance and contrast between themselves and the
government. Two other things have also inflamed relations between
ruling and opposition coalitions.
First, the most important debates between them have, in recent
years, come to take place on 24-hour television news channels. The
'moderators' of nightly panel discussions on most of these outlets
operate as agents provocateurs: hectoring, interrupting, often shout-
ing, seeking heated (and thus more watchable) exchanges. To cope
in these bear pits, the two coalitions often deploy combative spokes-
persons who slash away at their opponents defiantly, derisively, sar-
castically. Despite attempts by senior leaders in both camps - who
39 These are discussed more fully inj. Manor, 'What Do They Know of India Who
Only India Know? The Uses of Comparative Polities', Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics, 48: 4 (November 2010), pp. 505-16.
40 For more on ideological convergence, see Y. Yadav and S. Palshikar, 'From
Hegemony to Convergence: Party System and Electoral Competition in the Indian
States, 1952-2002' , Journal of the Indian School of Political Economy, 1-2 (2003), pp. 5-44.

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seldom appear on these telecasts - to behave in a dignified,

manlike manner, these clashes create a popular impression o
tics with the gloves off. It must be stressed that the debat
channels with national coverage occur in only two language
(spoken by only 41 per cent of the population) and E
(spoken by fewer than 10 per cent). Most rural voters, who
elections, have no direct access to them. While India's formidable
and free vernacular media seldom mount raucous debates of this
kind, they often report the more lurid comments made on national
telecasts. So the result is a widespread perception that strident bick-
ering is common.
Second - and more important - sharp conflicts arise from the
frustrations of those in opposition, which in recent years have
become quite excruciating. For most of the last two decades, oppo-
sition leaders could take comfort in the well-founded belief that at
the next election they would be swept back to power. Re-election was
so difficult to achieve that they could expect power to fall into their
laps at the next time of asking. The wait was often quite brief.
Between 1989 and 1999, only one of four Parliaments lived out its full
five-year term; the others lasted, respectively, 19, 22 and 19 months.
Three key things have changed since then. First, the governments
elected in 1999 and 2004 each lasted five years, and the current
government, elected in 2009, will probably do likewise. Second,
re-election has become the norm at both national and state levels
since mid-2008, so those who merely wait their turns may wait forever.
A further potent irritant is the main reason that re-election is now
more achievable: government revenues have surged since 2003, so
those in power have far more money to spend on cultivating popu-
larity. Acute pain is visible on the faces of politicians of diverse parties
who governed at the national or state levels before 2003 when the
massive new funds available to their successors are discussed. These
things make opposition leaders more inclined to raise raucous pro-

tests against those in power.
We must also consider the redistribution of power that (as noted
above) has occurred since 1989, and the resultant decline in abuses
of power by prime ministers. Since that year, no single party has been
able to win a parliamentary majority or to get anywhere close to that.
Hence power has flowed very substantially away from the once domi-
nant prime minister's office to other institutions at the national level,
and to the state level and regional parties. This infusion of power had

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revived many national-level institutions,41 so that they now restrain

the power of the executive. As a result (in my view at least), on only
one occasion since 1989 has a prime minister abused his power. That
is far fewer abuses than India witnessed between 1971 and 1989, and
fewer than Britain witnessed under either Margaret Thatcher or Tony
Blair.
The redistribution of power at the national level has made

government-opposition relations less abrasive in two main ways. First,
parliamentary committees have gained greater influence and now
often make non-trivial changes to bills before they are finally enacted
into law. Ministers find it difficult to resist changes that are initiated
by MPs from the ruling coalition, and as a spirit of accommodation
develops, alterations suggested by the opposition are also sometimes
accepted. This has eased tensions with opposition parties. Second,
the Supreme Court has become much more assertive and influential
since 1989, and one of its decisions (which are regarded as 'law
declared') removed a major irritant between ruling parties in New
Delhi and regional parties that are opposed to it. Before 1989, gov-
ernments at the national level frequently used Article 356 of the
constitution - which permits the imposition of direct rule from New
Delhi in states where severe problems have arisen - to dismiss state
governments headed by opposition parties. By requiring national
governments to provide detailed justifications for such actions, the
Supreme Court in 1994 effectively rendered that abuse nearly impos-
sible.42 This has further strengthened accommodative relations
between ruling and opposition parties.
On yet another front, one striking aspect of political discourse and
campaigning over the last generation needs to be noted. Both ruling
and opposition parties live with the memory of two long ago land-
slides in national elections. Both occurred because the elections were
fought on what the French call 'issues of regime': disputes about the
fundamental principles on which a country should be governed. The
first arose in 1971 when Indira Gandhi presented herself as a pro-
gressive who would 'abolish poverty', and characterized her oppo-
nents as reactionaries who had thwarted this noble goal. The great
41 See J. Manor, 'Political Regeneration in India', in D. L. Sheth and A. Nandy
(eds) , The Multiverse of Democracy: Essays in Honour of Rajni Kothań, New Delhi, London
and Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 1994, pp. 230-41.
42 For details, see A. Mozoomdar, 'The Supreme Court and President's Rule', in
Arora and Verney, Multiple Identities , pp. 160-8.

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issue was whether the government should attack poverty

stunning victory, although thereafter she did little to follow
on her promise. The second 'issue of regime' arose at
election in 1977, after a 19-month state of emergency in
Gandhi had governed brutishly. On that occasion, the
whether India would remain a democracy or accept her
ways. She suffered a humiliating defeat.43
Since then, occasional attempts have been made to c
such an issue. The most striking examples occurred d
when not one but two parties tried this. First, Prime Mi
Singh, who headed a government with a precarious grip
sought to mobilize numerically powerful 'have-nots' by
reservations in educational institutions and government e
for people from castes in the lower-middle reaches of
hierarchy. The BJP swiftly responded with a strident c
foment anti-Muslim sentiment, in an effort to mobilize
majority. Neither theme, then or since, has attracted
support to become an 'issue of regime'; in recent years b
been played down by nearly all parties, including the BJ
leaders retain an appetite for an issue of regime, but po
become so complex and ambiguous that it has been im
identify even a semi-plausible theme. This has made gov
opposition relations less abrasive since both successful an
attempts to raise an issue of regime poison those relation
Finally, a set of legal provisions influences government-
interactions: anti-defection legislation. In 1985, a con
amendment decreed that MPs and state legislators would
seats if they gave up membership in the party to which they
or if they voted (or abstained) in defiance of instructions
party unless at least one-third of party legislators took t
collectively. In 2003, the law was toughened. The provisio
43 A third landslide occurred in 1984, shortly after the assassinatio

Gandhi, but it was inspired not by an issue of regime, but by a wave of symp
son and successor as prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi.
44 Except in the state of Gujarat, the BJP has felt compelled to shel
entire Hindu nationalist agenda, partly because all but one of its 24 coal
when it governed at the national level were uneasy with it, and partly
performed better at the state level when that agenda is de-emphasized (as
junior partner in an alliance with a regional party in Bihar demonstrated

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one-third of a party's legislators to act en ¿Zoe was removed, so that al

defectors (no matter how numerous) would lose their seats and b
prevented from standing for re-election during the lifetime of th
legislature to which they had been elected. This made it impossib
for, say, three members of a party with nine seats to defect witho
penalty.
These changes have had an ambiguous impact on government-
opposition relations. They have largely ended attempts by ruling
parties to induce opposition legislators to cross the floor,45 and thus
eased the tensions between ruling and opposition parties that arise
from such machinations. They have also strengthened party disci-
pline, which had often been quite weak before 1985. They have,
however, been criticized for turning legislators into mere 'lobby
fodder', unable to speak their minds freely or to represent their
constituents adequately. The changes are also said have unduly
strengthened the influence of party leaders - which is already
immense, especially within regional parties, which tend to be domi-
nated by single leaders or cliques.46 This last point has important
implications for interparty dynamics both within ruling coalitions
and between such coalitions and the opposition. Leaders of regional
parties in ruling coalitions whose dominance has been strengthened
by this law feel emboldened to make extreme demands upon prime
ministers, to behave in embarrassing ways and to demand that their
lieutenants who are ministers in the national government engage
energetically in illicit 'fund-raising'. All of these things create open-
ings for the opposition to mount strident agitations against ruling
coalitions. So the anti-defection law has mitigated some tensions and
fuelled others.
CONCLUSIONS
The discussion above defies tidy summation. It is shot through

complications and ambiguities at both state and national levels.
will come as no surprise to connoisseurs of India's politics, but i
45 Note, however, that the penalties for defection become less severe as a le
ture nears the end of its term. When that occurs, defections become more feasib
common.
46 I am grateful to Pratap Bhanu Mehta for stressing these p
© The Author 2011. Government and Opposition © 2011 Governm

103.36.84.26 on Thu, 01 Oct 2020 07:39:38 UTC
frustrate non-specialists. Some trends tend to mitigate conf

between ruling and opposition parties while others have the o
effect.
Consider key examples of the former. The federal system prev

sometimes acute interparty tensions in individual states - som
the products of distinctive social (often caste) conflicts not re
elsewhere - from spilling over into other states and into na
politics.47 At the state level, social conflicts seldom inject gre
into government-opposition interactions because major
usually seek support from at least partly overlapping clusters of
(and caste) groups. Ideology has little importance at the n
level, and usually next to none at the state level. Especially
broad rival coalitions became the norm at the national level in 1999,
we have seen considerable convergence on policy issues there and in
many (but not all) states, although the shrinking distance between
ruling and opposition parties has at times led to more combative
rhetoric designed to disguise this reality. At the national level, both
sides temper the stridency of their attacks on the other because they
may need to wean regional parties away from rival alliances as they
seek to construct large multiparty coalitions that will provide majority
support in Parliament. The marked dispersal of power away from the
once dominant prime minister's office has curbed abusive actions
from the apex of the system that previously inspired bitterness in
victimized opposition parties.
Other trends foment abrasive conflict, but they seldom run very
deep. The prospect since mid-2008 that opposition parties may not
return to power soon inspires aggressive agitations against govern-
ments in some cases, but opposition confusion in most. Interparty
clashes in nightly debates on national television exaggerate the
enmity between parties, but they occur less often at the state level. At
that level, bitter personal resentments between party leaders - and
not fundamental contradictions between parties or their social bases
- are usually the main causes of antagonism. Issues of regime, which
can poison relations between ruling and opposition parties, are
nowhere to be found.
We need to bear this mixed picture in mind since this is being

written in the wake of a serious crisis within India's Parliament. Its
47 The role of the federal system in quarantining state-level conflicts was identified
long ago in Weiner, Party Building.

103.36.84.26 on Thu, 01 Oct 2020 07:39:38 UTC
entire winter session in late 2010 was paralysed by raucous protests in

the chamber by opposition parties. They were protesting both at a
apparently monumental scam in the award of telecommunication
licences, and at the government's refusal to permit a joint parliame
tary committee to investigate it. As a former solicitor-general of India
wrote, this was the 'worst' of the 82 sessions over half a century
'unseemly', a 'farce', a 'denigration of Parliament'. It set a 'danger
ous precedent' for state legislatures,48 a comment that events in on
state (where the two main parties' roles were reversed) bore o
shortly after his views were published.49
This tactic might indeed become a habit, although when the crisi
was resolved in early 2011 after the government agreed to convene
joint parliamentary committee, the opposition appeared mightily
relieved, because they no longer had to face down damaging charg
that they were paralysing and discrediting Parliament. If such protests
were to become more common, interactions between ruling an
opposition parties would surely deteriorate markedly. As many of the
arguments here indicate, though, the overall trends in relatio
between governments and opposition parties at both state an
national levels are decidedly ambiguous. So perhaps we should not
expect a dramatic and lasting degeneration - or improvement
anytime soon.
48 See T. R. Andhyarujina, 'Disgracing Parliament: A Dangerous Precedent', The

Hindu, 7 January 201 1 .
49 In Karnataka, the two main opposition parties mounted protests against BJP
corruption on the floor of the state legislature to prevent it from functioning, until the
chief minister resigned. The uproar eventually forced the session of the legislative
assembly to be abandoned after just two days. The Hindu, 10-11 and 14 January 2011.

103.36.84.26 on Thu, 01 Oct 2020 07:39:38 UTC

James Manor - Government and Opposition in India

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James Manor - Government and Opposition in India

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Government and Opposition in India

Author(s): James Manor

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Government and Opposition in India

DESPITE THIS JOURNAL'S TITLE, NOT EVERY CONTRIBUTION TO IT

1 W. H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in India, London, Longmans, 1957; M. Weiner,

© The Author 2011.

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key recent books on India's political parties, and in the other it

BROAD TRENDS AND PATTERNS

We must recognize at the outset that we are dealing not with

4 I am grateful to Zoya Hasan, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, E. Sridharan and Yogendra

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1947 to the Late 1960s

During this period the Congress Party exercised dominance at the

The Late 1960s to 1989

For most of this period, Congress governed in New Delhi, but it no

1989 to the Present

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New Delhi, minority governments or (more often of late) large, motley

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her son Rajiv followed suit), although elections remained

11 These are approximate numbers because certain state election outc

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There is an easy way and a hard way to develop this analysis. Th

THE STATE LEVEL

Let us first consider the interactions between governing and opp

Table 1 understates the degree to which coherent governments

Relations between ruling and opposition parties at the state level

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Type No. of % of seats in

Bi-polar 713 24.1

13 The states are Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Guj

a. the growing politicization of social cle

© The Author 2011. Government and Opposition

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opposition parties in the 18 major Indian states (and at the nationa

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Bihar B up CM 's understated style and recent magnanimity, plus

Chhattisgarh B up Departure of normless Congress leader improves

Maharashtra C flat Weak Congress-led government, but fragmentation in

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sharpens government-opposition conflict, but usually only over the

However, some trends are linked to deeper changes or forces. In

Let us now consider a second, closely related set of issues. To

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them focus on changes that ensue when political parties a

22 However, at this writing in January 2011, it appears to be heading for defeat in

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opponents as 'treason' - a word that is used every week by the

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In states with abrasive interparty relations, however, many mor

31 I am grateful to Yogendra Yadav for this point.

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32 This is examined in great detail in Raghavan and Manor, Broadening and

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members of social groups at the grassroots in this predominantly

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sustain popular, developmentally productive programmes tha

36 This is especially true of state-level units of the Congress Party, some of w

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