Indian Political Science Association

GROUP DIMENSION IN POLITICS IN INDIA AND UNITED STATES: SOME COMPARISONS

Author(s): Umeshwari Charan
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2 (April - June 1994), pp. 149-
158
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41858803
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 GROUP DIMENSION IN POLITICS IN INDIA

AND UNITED STATES: SOME COMPARISONS

Umeshwari Charan*

Interest groups are natural phenomena in modern society. Gro

shape the forms and processes of government. The primary fun
of a government is to maintain order and to determine the relatio
among groups serving varied purposes ~A sáiišTač^foiy^ašTšessm
a government can be reached only by the interpretation of real
to what extent it determines the value of group activities and c
balance and order among interacting groups. 1 Arthur Bentley emphas
that governmental policies were merely outcomes of interactions of g
in society; the latter is nothing more than the mix of group
compose it. The concept of the general public interest is nothing
than the aggregation of group interests that interplay in any soc
The governmental apparatus and functioning revolve around the interac
of interest groups competing with one another in order to achieve
ends. Group theorists believe that political process should be
in terms of group activities and the laws representing the press
to arrive at an equilibrium. This paper attempts to describe the pa
of group formation, the characteristics of groups and the nature of t
participation in the political process of U.S.A. and India, two
democracies. The ethnic and cultural diversity, largely a product
an open immigration policy in the U.S.A. has been conducive to
emergence of a bewildering variety of groups in the political ar
The heterogenous character of India, its social diversity in parti
has led -to the formation of a wide variety of groups. However, in

* University Professor, Dept. of Political Science, G.L.A. College, Daftonganj.

Indian Journal of Political Science

Vol. 55, No.2, April-June, 1994.

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150 The Indian Journal of Political Science

group activity in India, unlike in the U.S.A., has to reckon with two
important features: (1) marginality of class politics with capital and
labour as counter-playing actors; and (2) centrality of the third actor,
the state.

In India, the functipn of arousal of the consciousness and struggle

for reduction of socio-economic disparities has been performed more
by status groups, cultural communities, and regional outfits than
by class-based groups. . Organisations representing language, caste and
regional interests and those speaking for minorities like scheduled castes
and tribes and Muslims, have been more instrumental than class-based
organisations in creating consciousness and influencing the political
process.3 Among the class-based associations are labour and business.
Only 10 per cent of the Indian labour force is in the organised sector;
about 67 per cent are agricultural labour and 23 per cent are engaged
in small scale, cottage industry, petty trade and services.4 Two-thirds
of those in the organised sector are in the governmental sector and
the remaining one-third in the private sector.5 In contrast to this, less
than 3 per cent are engaged in agriculture in the United States.

Only a third of the organised workforce can be considered

a fertile area for the formation of class-oriented groups. But the existence
of the Government of India as a third and powerful actor hindered
the growth of groups, based on two actors-labour and business- as the
counter-playing forces. Government' s control over private sector is heavily
conditioned by the inclusion of a plethora of regulations on labour.
Private business in India is characterized by dependent capitalism. It
relies on the protection and patronage of the third actor, the state,
for its profits and security. Since two-thirds of the labour in India
are in the public sector government's control is almost absolute. Business
interests in India are better organised and represented than those of
organised labour. The most visible and vocal are the Federation of
the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the All India Manufacturers'
Organisation. Their elected Presidents, permanent secretariats and sponsored
researchorganisations and publications comment regularly on the government's
national economic policies, programmes and objectives. Lobbyists for
organised interests or firms regularly attempt to influence the interpretation
and implementation of policy and government regulations. Given the
dependent nature of private capital in India public opinion is influenced

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 Group Dimension in Politics 151

much less by private enterprise in India than in the U.S. B

the state owns or directly controls the economy's industrial and fin
heights, private business has not been able to organise for the repres
of interests as in the U.S.A. The dependent status of private ent
in India's mixed economy has never succeeded in blocking o
in modifying a major distributive policy in India.6 Business in
can only bend the established policies to a limited extent.

In the labour area the mushrooming of a number of tr

unions is noticeable. So far the trade unions have not been able to
produce a force that can exercise effective, influence. Compared to
the American Federation of Labour, Indian trade unions are trivial and
insignificant, both in terms of organisation and funds. In fact, the
Indian trade unions are yet to acquire the status of interest groups with
the requisite strength to swing government policy. They are largely
sustained and directed by the political parties and in practice they work
as tools and agents to promote the policies of the respective parties.
The Indian National Trade Union Conference (INTUC) remained India's
largest trade union federation that endorses the policy line of the Congress(I)
Government. Similar is the case with other major unions. In contrast
to this, the U.S. trade unions are not front organisations of the organised
political parties. Instances of the largest trade union federation getting
government support and patronage is unheard of in the history of American
group activities. Indian trade unions have not been able so far to imbibe
the independence and autonomy. characteristic of their U.S. counterparts.
Evidently, organised labour has not been able to challenge India's centrist
ideology and politics. The two traditional adversaries in class politics-
labour and capital -have become marginal forces in the Indian political
arena. They do not have effective influence on political parties. The
state, which employs two-thirds of the workers in the organised economy,
constitutes an ambiguous adversary because of its claim to be a model
employer. In the United states, the labour-capital relationship is
decided at the workplace in the model of bargaining power, workplace
hierarchy and workers' control.7 As against this, the focus in India
is on the role of the state, rather than that of capital, as the most
important counterplayer. Even on occasions when, relations revolve
primarily between labour and capital, India experiences state control
on many of the interactions, but in the U.S.A. that falls in the realm
of collective bargaining.

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152 The Indian Journal of Political Science

As the proportion of the organised sector workforce increased

due to the nationalisation of banks and key industries and as the inflation
rate touched the high index, strikes, lockouts, and labour unrest also
mounted. Much of the most successful and conspicuous trade union
activity benefited middle class and lower-middle-class employees whose
standard of living was already good relative to that of the vast majority
of the nation s wage-earners. The CPI and CPI-M affiliated All India
Trade Union Congress and Centre of Indian Trade Unions took the
relatively easy path of organising and pressing demands on behalf of
those who could be easily organised and whose employer - the government
responds readily. As a critic, Rakhahari Chatterjee observes:

"Thé trade union leadership... showed political adventurism and

social irresponsibility through direct or indirect encouragement to
strikes by highly skilled and well paid employees like the doctors,
engineers, technocrats, life insurance employees or airlines staff.
When an enormous portion ofworking population... remained unorganized
and severely low paid, the leftist leadership, rather than directing
itself seriously towards them opted for encouraging those struggles
which, were for luchi and withai (sweets) on the top of bread and
buttçr. Consequently, the general public was neither interested in,
nor sýmpathetic to those struggles even though they had to bear
harassment. And the unions' loss of public sympathy helped the
government to put down even genuine struggles."*

The pervasiveness of the state in India also affects professional

associations that occupy autonomous space in the U.S.A. While the
free professions constitute a significant part of the autonomous associations
in which middle-class society organises itself in the U.S.A., this is
much less so in India. The y^st majority of doctors, scientists, engineers,
teachers and professors are employees of organisations under government
control. Because government is the principal employer of managers,
technicians, and clerks - generally speaking, the white-collar class -
the interests of India's non-capitalists/non-property-owning middle class
are closely linked to the policies of the state. In India, unlike in the
U.S.A., white-collar unions constitute a large proportion of the organised
workforce. Unions with nation-wide membership, those with the greatest
potentiality to act on an all-India basis, tend to be predominantly white-
collar: employees of the Life Insurance Corporation, of the Post and
Telegraph Department, and of nationalised banks. While they have

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 Group Dimension in Politics 153

often been militant, their working class identities are compromised

their identification with middle class interests and life styles. On th
other hand, in the U.S.A., unlike India, the pervasiveness of privat
enterprise creates the value of individuality and generates special motivatio
to groups with an autonomous character. In India, the state's prominence
does not mean that there are no areas for group activity. Religious
comüHinities, caste associations, cultural, ethnic and linguistic group
-- a large range of non-producer social forces generally, cannot be closely
manipulated and regulated by the state. Although in the econom
arena the state occupies much of the space occupied in the U.S.A. b
pluralist and corporatist forces, in the social arena its role is limit
As a consequence, it faces powerful political and policy challenges fro
cultural, ethnic and linguistic groups. With some important local a
regional exceptions, the level of consciousness and organisation amon
agricultural workers is too limited to represent themselves. Backwar
castes began to mobilize politically in South and Western India in t
1920s, but recently they have come to be a political force in the nor
as well.9 The politics of backward castes and job reservation for the
launched by the National Front-led coalition worked, especially in Bi
in the 1991 election. The results of the 1993 election to the Uttar

Pradesh Vidhan Sabha reflect the same in this Kanshi Ram and Mulayam
Singh Yadav had mobilized successfully the scheduled castes and
the backward castes respectively besides roping in the minorities.

Religious communities, castes and sects, regional and linguistic

groups play a significant role in articulating the interests of their members.
Such groups fall in the category of "demand groups". The term, ''demand
groups" signifying the units of Indian pluralism, differs from the organised
interest groups, prevalent in the U.S.A. The demand group is a form
of interest representation in open democracies which arises in response
to crises of mobilisation. 10 Demand groups are an expression of movement
and issue politics. They do not work primarily in institutionally defined
political arenas. They rely less on expertise and lobbying skill than
on symbolic and agitational politics. The tactics and style of demand
groups become a highly elaborated political art form that interacts with
India's indigenous political culture, mobilizes support, influences public
opinion and gains bargaining advantages. Its spontaneous tactics include
public dramas such as political pilgrimages (< adyatras or rathyatras ),
shutdowns ( bandhs ), road blocks (rasta rokos), and lock-ins (gheraos ).
On the other hand, the organised interest groups that we find in the

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154 The Indian Journal of Political Science

U.S.A. work in institutionally defined policy arenas. They attempt to

influence legislatures, bureaucratic agencies and sometimes part} policies.
They developorganisational infrastructure, including a headquarters bureaucracy,
means of internal communication to members and external communication
to relevant publics and research staff.11 Their means of influence include
technical and professional expertise and legal and legislative skills. Their
ideas, approach and activity imply a certain professionalisation of the
representational process. 12 Their force rests as much on technical persuasiveness
as on the pressure of members.

What distinguishes the Indian from American pluralism is

the emergence of the demand group as a representative form, especially
responsive to the unorganised sector which outnumbers the organised
economy of India with the ratio of nine to one. Interest groups work
more in camera while demand groups out of doors. Demand groups
tend to agitate first and bargain later. The force of their case rests
on its dramatic visibility and demonstration of massive public support
and sometimes on the disruption of public services. While the transactions
of the organised interest groups in the U.S.A. take place between their
knowable profession and bureaucratic counterplayers, the transactions
of Indian demand groups take place between supporters, mobilized in
favour of an issue on the one hand and governmental elites and public
opinion on the other. The difference between the American organised
interests in the U.S.A. and demand groups in India is also shaped by
different levels of consciousness and articulation. Organised interest
group of the U.S. type, assumes that there is a group with an interest
that it knows and wishes to advance.13 The problem is how to represent
a manifest interest. On the other hand, a demand group representing
the Indian pluralism has yet to recognise itself. It is still in the process
of becoming. It faces the problem to foster group consciousness about
an interest as well as to represent it. Persisting discrepancies between
formal equality and actual inequality of social, political and economic
forces in India justifies issue and movement politics. In India, demand
groups act, but also create dilemmas. They help the democratic process
by promoting bargaining and by mobilising voters, but at the same
time they create problems for administration and frequently jeopardise
public order. The Indian unorganised sector is prone to movement
politics and the traditional units of groups interacting in this area form
demand groups, not interest groups.

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 Group Dimension in Politics 155

Despite all the tall talk, especially from the neo-Left. Indian
business groups are weak and lag far behind their U.S. counterparts.
They are limited in number and restricted both in the scope of their
operations and their bargaining potential. They simply lack the vigour
and political vitality of the U.S. interest groups. This is on account
of two factors that principally shape the Indian organised sectors: (a)
the predominance of the centrist politics; and (b) the existence of the
state as an actor in the interactions of pluralism. In contrast to this,
American pluralism tells altogether a different story. It is based on
belief in the efficacy of a decentralised power structure. The political
process reflects the belief in reality. The U.S. political system is based
on the value of democracy in openness and allows the interest groups
to act at state and local levels, focus on multiple channels of access
and influence policy. In the U.S.A. the state functions on the Bentley
- Truman line in determining values of group activities and creating
balance and order among interacting groups. The equilibrium in society
breeds efficacy. That depends on the internal and external checks inherent
in the nature of groups. The U.S. Government maintains measures
of order and sets the relationship among interacting groups. In no
way it acts as a counterplaying actor competing with other actors as
interest groups, a practice widely prevalent in the Indian situation as
it is shaped by a mixed economy and policy of state intervention.

Unlike the Indian political system which is surmounted by

agitational politics and swayed by demand groups, the U.S. political
process is based on a significant and stable group dimension. In 1976,
some fifty seven per cent of all Americans were found actively participating
in voluntary associations.14 By 1987 more than nineteen thousand groups
and associations were in operation in the U.S.A.15 at national, state
and local levels. Some groups are formed on the basis of thnic and
cultural considerations, while some on the basis of members' economic
and occupational relationships. Some groups concentrate on state and
local problems, while others centre around national issues. Of fundamental
importance is the representational ethos of group politics in the U.S.
political system at all levels, influencing political life styles. Previously
unrepresented elements in the American society have today organised
themselves with great potentialities in the form of public interest groups.
Of late, the United States has been experiencing a remarkable growth
of public interest groups which represent the interests of the society

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 156 The Indian Journal of Political Science

as a whole, such as consumers groups, environmental groups and some

general organisations like Common Cause and Ralph Nader's Public
Citizens' Conglomerate. What is most remarkable about these groups
is that they do not bear the interests of selective material benefits. One
major study in this field reveals that in 1980 groups adhering to the
general public interest comprised more than one-fifth of all groups having
a base in the nation's capital.16 Of late, the single-issue politics has
been on the rise in the American political system. Issues relate to
subjects like abortion,' gun-coritrol, nuclear disarmament, clean environment,
etc.

In the U.S. context, the decline of political parties made room

for the mushrooming of interest groups. Though political parties began
losing grip since the 1960s, their decline is more pronounced in recent
years. Political parties find it increasingly difficult to deal effectively
with the emerging expectations of people and changing class structure.17
Their increasing inability to respond to social and political needs created
a vacuum which has been gradually filled by interest groups.18 The
decline of political parties has in some ways led interest groups to
assume a greater role as "a channel of communication between citizens
and government."19 Technological developments such as television and
electronic mail and computerisation have also helped the interest groups
to get down to the grass-roots and promote mass politics. While Some
big organisations such as labour unions with large membership have
been facing difficulties on account of their inability to attract and hold
media attention the relative success of public interest groups such
as the Ralph Nader organisation, with fewer members, seems to depend
largely on the skill to feed mass media and develop a wider reach
in public relations.20 Media support gathered despite the fact that it
is totally outside government control.

Group behaviour depends to a large extent upon the political

culture of a nation. The success of groups explains the opportunities
available to them and the degree of freedom permitted and tolerance
levels in any society. Besides, the availability of media of communication
and capabilities to use them to cope with the demands and interests
are also important. The culture imbibed by an industrialized society
along with the values of democracy and mass education would have
a powerful impact on the effectiveness of interest groups, as in the

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 Group Dimension in Politics 157

U.S.A. On the other hand, the Indian political culture is not con
to the intense articulation of interest groups. So. they have not dev
the requisite intensity characteristic of the U.S. interest grou
India, political and bureaucratic elites are accepted as the p
and sole repository of governmental power and they are looke
as the main actors in the critical show of the political game. G
generally do not prefer to antegonize government and bureauc
putting pressure through different means. Rather, they follow
course to please them and promote their interests. Thus pressure dw
and appeasement becomes paramount in the Indian political pr

In India, the political system sets the limits for group activ
because quite a few groups like trade unions, student groups an
a few professional organisations are fronts for political parties
the demand groups emerge with the connivance or active supp
a few political elites. In the U.S.A. the reverse is the case. I
groups have an element of spontaniety and autonomy. When
and Truman interpreted the political system as the dependent
and the groups as the independent variables, they studied the
activities in the United States where interest groups exercise the organ
strength, shape the governmental policies and influence decision
in government.

NOTES

1. Truman, David B., The Governmental Process , Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1957, p. 241.

2. Bentley, Arthur F., The Process of Government , The Principia Press, Bloomington,
1908, pp. 208-11.

3. Schernierhorn, R.A., Ethnic Plurality in India, University of Arizona Press

Tucson, 1978, p. 109.

4. The Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1983-84 ,

New Delhi, pp. 121-22.

5. The World Bank, World Development Report , 1982, Table 19, The World Bank,
New York, pp. 146-47.

6. The Hindustan Times , Editorial, February 6, 1984.

7. Michael, J. P. and C. F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for

Prosperity , Basic Books, New York, 1984, p. 29.

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158 The Indian Journal of Political Science

8 Chatterjee. Rakhahari. Unions. Politics and the State: A Study of Labour Politics ,
South Asian Publications. 1980. New Delhi.p.109.

9 Galdnter. Marc. Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India ,
Oxford t'niversin Press. New Delhi, 1984. p. 179.

10. Huntington. Samuel P.. Political Order in Changing Societies , Vale University
Press. New Haven. 1968, p. 72.

11. United States Senate, "A Report on Congress and Pressure Groups: Lobbying
in a Modern Democracy prepared for the Subcommittee on International
Relations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs by the Congressional
Research Service, the Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington DC., 1986, p. 15.

12. Ripley, R.B., Congress: Process and Policy , W.W. Norton & Co., New York,
1988, pp. 268-69.

1 3 . Berger, Suzanne (Ed. ), Organizing Interests in Western Europe : Pluralism , Corporatism

and the Transformation of Politics , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1981, p. 239.

14. Barnes, Samuel H., 4 'Some Political Consequences of Involvement in Organizations* '
paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science
.Association, 1977.

15. Pynn, Ronald E., American Politics: Changing Expectations , Cole Publishing
Co., Corona, Calf., 1987, p. 247.

16. Walkar, Jack L., 44 The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America",
American Political Science Review, Vol. 77No.2, June, 1983, pp. 390-406.

17. Cigler. A. J. and Loomis, B.A., Interest Group Politic sCongression&' Quarterly
Press, Washington D.C. 1986, p. 16.

18. Ibid., p. 17.

19. Scott, R and Hrebendr, R. J., Parties in Crisis , New York, John Wiley, 1984,
p. 355.

20. Golembiewski, R.T., and A. Wildavsky, The Costs of Federalism , N.J., Transaction
Books, New Brunswick 1984, p. 184.

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