IMPROVING FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN ACA

BARRY M BERNACSEK
Programme Officer
International Development Research Centre
POBox 62084
Nairobi, KENYA

Abstract

Reluctance of some donor agencies to invest in African fisheries stems Trom perceptions
that it is a 'difficult' economic sector in which project performance and impact are often
unsatisfactory. Project execution problems identified by several donors (World Bank,
African Development Bank, CIDA, Netherlands, Norway, IFAD, UNIDO, UNDP, FAO) are
reviewed and various proposals for improving projects are presented. Range extension
coupled with cost-effective management is seen as crucial to further African fisheries
development. Technology choices should be aimed at extending the range of part of the
inshore fleet out into the EEZ so as to relieve fishing pressure on inshore stocks.
Upgrading of existing technology must be done in close consultation with fishermen and
be economical and socially rational. South-south transfer of appropriate offshore
fishing technology could play a much greater role. Aquaculture projects need to focus
increasingly on stocking of small water bodies, careful species introductions to fill
vacant ecological niches and R&D of indigenous African and other production
enhancement fishing systems (acadja brush parks, artificial reefs, FADs). Greater
emphasis must be put on increasing the economic productivity of the individual
fisherman. Strengthening fishing community organizations, as well as beneficiary
participation and control of all aspects of the project cycle, are considered key factors
for securing project success. Both vertical integration of projects within the fisheries
sector (boat and net making, processing, marketing), and horizontal integration across
several economic sectors (transport, water supply, health, education) are identified as
necessary for overcoming the entrenched problem of poverty in fishing villages.
Institutional strengthening should be addressed by projects routinely including
appropriate training components. More nationals should be employed at middle and upper
project managerial levels. Some improvements are needed in statistics and stock
assessment, which will require more research into devising less costly and more
effective methods. Community and resource user group capabilities in effective fishery
management are not nearly fully utilized. Reinstatement of traditional African
community-based resource management and ownership structures (with central fisheries
administration backstopping) is strongly recommended. There is a need to develop low
cost, composite surveillance and control capability. Fisherman credit schemes must be
flexible and tailored to the special characteristics of the fisheries sector. Integration
with local informal credit and savings markets should be sought. More comprehensive
micro- and macroeconomic studies are required to improve the policy stance of fisheries
projects. The important role of National Conferences for Fisheries Policy and Planning
for strengthening the policy formulation process through direct participation by all of
the diverse interest groups of the national fisheries sector is highlighted. Lack of
strong political will and short-sighted self-defeating economic policies on the part of
both donors and recipients may be the most serious of all constraints to full
development of the African fisheries sector.

lt,') 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION

Within the rural milieu of Africa fisheries is an important economic sector,

employing 5 to M of the agricultural labour force and contributing 7% to
Africa's agricultural exports (Bernacsek, 1987). However, African fisheries are
less well developed than those of most other regions of the world. Given that the
African domestic marine catch is only about 42% of the potential, and the inland
catch 44% (based on FAO data), there are good grounds for many African countries
expressing interest in more fully developing their fisheries sectors. The
potentials for economic growth, employment creation and food production clearly
exist. Africa's high population growth, sluggish economic growth and declining
per capita food production give considerable urgency to the problem of
accelerating development of all sectors of the economy, including fisheries.
While many externally-funded fisheries development projects have been
successful in generating economic growth and increasing incomes, a significant
number have not attained their goals. As a consequence, some important donor
agencies view fisheries as a difficult or 'delicate' sector for investment and
maintain that fisheries projects are especially difficult to administer. This has
resulted in limiting of fisheries portfolios, a policy stance which is of great
concern to African countries possessing significant surplus stocks. The World
Bank (1986a), for example, considers that its own project portfolio 'does not
reflect the potential in the developing world for expansion of their fishing
industries', and furthermore that it has taken a 'passive stance .... (and that)
essential pre-investment work is not in prospect.' On the other hand, IFAD
(1986:5) notes that once problem areas were identified, projects proceeded fairly
well and have achieved their set targets. Thus difficulties in fisheries project
execution may be overstated in some cases, or simply reflect a poor capacity of
donor agencies to carry out fisheries development. The fault therefore lies not
necessarily with recipient nations or is inherent in fisheries development. This
implies that some donors may being pursuing very ineffective or inadequate
approaches to fisheries development, and this can cost developing countries
dearly in lost opportunities and 'misdevelopment'.
It is clear that aside from simple managerial incompetence (whether on the part
of donors or recipients) project focus, design, organization and control must all
be scrutinized for inadequacies which might be responsible for defeating real and
sustained development conclusions of fisheries projects in Africa. Serious
attempts have been made by several agencies (African Development Bank, World
Bank, CIDA, The Netherlands, Norway, IFAD, UNIDO, UNDF, FAO) both in reports
presented at the important Paris Donor Conference held in October 1986, and
elsewhere, to determine the major causes of poor project performance. This paper
compiles the findings of these studies and presents what is judged to be a
rational and coherent strategic pathway directed at improving the focus and
execution of fisheries development projects in Africa.
1.2 TECHNICAL FOCUS OF PROJECTS

Project problem areas identified by donor agencies are as follows:

- CIDA (1986:5-6) calls attention to persistent 'myths' and 'misconceptions and
confusion' concerning the respective roles of small scale and large scale
fisheries. These include: D that 'industrial fishing ...(is)... more efficient and
profitable', and 2) that small scale fishing is 'an outdated mode of production, a
transitory feature in the evolution of a modern fisheries sector.' Not all donors
may recognize that small scale fishing can 'reconcile high returns on capital, low
investments, labor-intensiveness and high added value.'
- UNIDO (1986:1) notes that 'governments are faced with the problem of accepting
technological options without a proper prior evaluation of the impact of different
technological options upon the social-economic variables of an economy such as
employment.'
- The World Bank 0986a:10,13,31) cites 'design faults in boats, discovered after
entering service' (such as insufficient power, wrong type of engine) as a common
problem experienced with fisheries projects. Some designs may be too radically
different from existing designs and do not gain acceptance from fishermen. Also
'normally insufficient analysis was made of the local or national boat and net
making industry. While in many instances projects caused great pressures on such
local industries, these seldom benefited from technical assistance or other
activities supported by these projects.'
- CIDA (1986:15) draws attention to spoilage of fish resulting from inadequate
preservation and stresses that 'greater efforts must be directed to improving
fish handling, processing and marketing activities, so as to reduce lossess
between harvest and consumption.'
- Infrastructure. The Netherlands (1986:4) note that 'insufficient attention (has
been) paid to ... necessary infrastructure.'
- UNDP/NMDC/FAO (1986) have carried out an in-depth thematic evaluation of
UNDP-sponsored aquaculture projects in Africa and elsewhere. A comprehensive
list of problems is cited. Fish culture stations frequently prove 'costly to
operate, adding to expenditures which in some countries are out of proportion,
given the contribution of aquaculture to total fisheries production.' The lack of a
well-articulated aquaculture policy can result 'in hasty and uncritical attempts to
transfer technology often not suitable to the needs of the recipient country.'
There is often a 'preoccupation with what is technically possible rather than with
what is economically feasible and socially acceptable.' High production costs,
poor selection of appropriate combinations of species and culture systems and a
preference by fish farmers to culture high-priced species has lead to projects not
producing 'the expected effects in terms of nutrition, employment, foreign
exchange or higher income for the producer.' This effectively defeats 'the
governments' goal of producing cheap fish, to be sold to the urban and rural poor.'
In general, production costs are too high, resulting in products that are too highly
priced to compete with capture fisheries products.
Technological issues will continue to be in the forefront of fisheries
development issues in Africa for several decades in the future. CIDA makes the
important point that smaller-scale fisheries are to be viewed as very
economically viable and rational, and not an antiquated or inefficient mode of
production on the way out. Several studies show that smaller scale technologies
are more socially and economically rational and efficient. Thomson (1980) and
UNIDO (190:i9, Table 2.6) note that smaller-scale fisheries yield a much greater
tonnage of fish caught per unit of capital investment, and incur much lower
capital cost per job created and much lower fuel consumption per ton of fish
caught. CIDA (1986:5-6) cites return on capital of 50-70% for smaller-scale
fishing in Senegal, while industrial fishing only manages 3-7%. These findings
are similar to those reported by Jarrold and Everett (1981). Smaller-scale
fisheries are here to stay in Africa because they meet more national economic,
social and sustainable development goals (end-state visions) than large-scale
fisheries. Projects which do not have a fundamental smaller-scale orientation
(i.e. labour intensive and capital frugal/efficient) will likely have difficulty
achieving a satisfactory development impact in African fisheries. CIDA's whole
development strategy now concentrates on smaller-scale fisheries.
One conclusion of the Paris Donor's Conference was to focus on fishery
resource management rather than on increasing fishing capacity (World Bank,
1986b:2). This is ostensibly to ease fishing pressure on shallow water stocks,
both marine and inland. However this approach may by itself not achieve the
desired objective. The solution to the problem of easing excessive fishing
pressure may be as much a technical challenge as it is a management challenge.
Reducing the numbers of fishermen is extremely difficult, and the frequently
cited option of creating alternative employment in other economic sectors to
absorb displaced fishermen is simply not feasible in most African countries. A
more economically rational option would seem to be to focus on enhancing the
national smaller-scale fishing fleet's capability to harvest offshore resources
since only about half the potential is now taken by existing African capacity. This
applies to the EEZ of coastal countries, as well as to the pelagic zones of large
lakes and reservoirs. It is here where the only remaining resources surplus to
national fishing capacity are to be found. The obvious technical need is to
upgrade part of the existing fishing fleet and redeploy it out into the EEZ. This
will ease fishing intensity on inshore stocks and make sound management of these
stocks easier to bring about. Expanding the national fleet size and extending its
range out into the EEZ would have to coincide with a phasing out of foreign fleet
fishing effort. This is not only to avoid overexploitation (virtually all African
marine resources are now at or close to full exploitation 1FA0 1987, Bernacsek,
1987]). Partial fallowing of offshore stocks would result in higher catch rates for
new African EEZ vessels and improve their economic performance. A significant
number of artisanal fishermen are ready and eager to graduate to offshore
fishing and they need assistance to do so (Netherlands, 1986:5). Indeed this is a
rational pursuit of resource rents and normal entrepreneurial behaviour.
Mabawonku (1986b:98) emphasizes the important role that the African private
sector can play in fisheries development. Governments must encourage and
support private sector initiatives through appropriate incentive programmes.
Donor agencies, especially development banks, can clearly play an important role
in assisting African governments to carry out such programmes.
The development of appropriate economically-rational, low capital-intensive
EEZ fishing technology for use by African countries is a paramount task, and one
which could be effectively addressed in part by fishing technology development
institutes such as the Marine Institute in Newfoundland. Much suitable
technology already exists in other regions (i.e. South-East Asia) but needs to be
adapted to local African conditions. UNIDO (19,37) has identified areas of
expertise in Asia and Latin America which are potentially transferable to Africa.
 5

The pump boat used for tuna fishing in the Philippines is one example. Many
opportunities exist even for technology transfers from one African country to
another. One success story was the transfer of small pelagics fishing methods
between West African countries in the 1970s. Popularization of sails, outriggers
and floatation is an urgent need in several African countries. Projects should
also routinely help develop local import substitution industries for boat and net
making.
Technologies being considered for transfer must 'fit' into the local receiving
economies. Problems and failures have usually arisen when donor and fisheries
administration enthusiasm for transfering sophisticated industrial technologies
proved incompatible with local economic and manpower capacity to utilize these
technologies on a sustainable basis. The 'litter' of scuttled trawlers and
abandoned ice plants/cold stores across Africa is a sad testament to poor
technology choices. The most common inappropriate technology problem is
creation of longterm demand for imported spare parts and fuel. The technology
required to harvest offshore resources must meet the principal design criteria of
adequate safety at sea, balanced labour intensiveness, low fixed and variable
costs and low foreign exchange demand. These are difficult criteria to meet
successfully and some governments may be tempted to opt for the more
convenient, though often socially and economically irrational, route of importing
existing high technology from developed countries. The Key to meeting these
criteria will lie in most cases in effective R&D at the local level to improve
fishing technology using available materials and through tranfer of already
developed appropriate technology from other developing countries. Technical
solutions should not automatically be thought of as residing in OECD/CMEA
technologies. An example of good local R&D project work is the FAO-executed
Programme for the Integrated Development of Artisanal Fisheries in West Africa
(IDAF), based in Cotonou, Benin, which is attempting to upgrade smallscale West
African fishing vessels (Akester, 1986; FAO/DANIDA/Norway, 1985).
Improvement of processing technology is urgently needed. Better handling
proceedures for fish sold fresh that do not require ice (shading and damp packing,
for example) can potentially improve product quality significantly and cut post
harvest losses. Technologies for producing dry fish (solar, wood-smoKed and
salted) need to be upgraded further and widely introduced. Adaptation of design
to local materials is crucial. The rapid depletion of forest resources all over
Africa is exacerbated by the demand for wood for smoking fish. Given the
importance of smoke processing in Africa (about 25% of the African domestic
catch is smoked), fuel wood plantations should become a normal component of
many fisheries development projects.
As regards infrastructure, there are still not enough harbour facilities in
Africa. But there is a danger that donors will want to fund large prestigious
harbour projects when the greater need is perhaps chains of miniharbours along
the coastline so as to avoid congestion at large coastal cities and redress
distrubtion imbalances of fish between urban and rural consumers..
Pond aquaculture has not been widely successful in Africa, and has neither
created many new employment opportunities nor significantly increased national
food supplies. Many serious constraints beset aquaculture development in Africa,
making the often quoted large theoretical potential not easily realizable.
Economic analysis, such as that of Abiodun (1986), indicates that high costs of
seed and feed render many small pond operations uneconomical. In contrast
smallscale capture fisheries are unsurpassed in creating employment, and in
 6

several African countries (i.e. Kenya, Zambia) more amd more people are becoming
fishermen. African governments will have to very carefully judge if they should
continue to give pond aquaculture development as high a priority as some donors
advise. Abiodun suggests that 'a radical departure from the present approach' is
required if the goal of accelerated increase in fish production through fish
farming is to be attained. More realistic possibilities for aquaculture-like
development perhaps rest with indigenous African 'production enhancement'
practices (acadja brush park, garse, barachois, whedo, ahlo, hosha), FADS,
artificial reefs, carefully selected introduction and stocking of species, and
microfisheries in small water bodies. Most of these are already proven successful
in Africa (BernacseK, 1987). Aquaculture projects in Africa would do well to base
themselves on the real-world economic potential, rather than the theoretical
potential. Donors and host governments alike need to become much more careful
and selective when undertaking aquaculture projects in the future.
At the fundamental economic level, there is need to increase the productivity of
the individual fisherman. This is a general prerequisite for efficient economic
growth and increasing income. Entrepreneurial behaviour needs support and
opportunities to be exercised (African Development Bank, 1987:7). Many factors
(some contentious) impinge on increasing productivity (resource ownership and
management, incentives, opportunity costs). However, improved technology that is
more productive and less costly can play a central role in achieving the twin goals
of producing more fish (the social welfare goal) and earning larger income (the
personal welfare goal). Rather than focus discussion negatively on decreasing the
number of fishermen, focus should be out on increasing the output of existing
fishermen. This is a more difficult problem, but not one that can be shied away
from if African fisheries are to develop to their full economic potential. The
'production enhancement technologies' approach is one possible key to increasing
production because it would allow overcoming the inherent constraint of maximum
sustainable yield (MSY) in fish stocks.

1.3 PROJECT ORGANIZATION/MANAGEMENT AND BENEFICIARY

PARTICIPATION

Project problem areas identified by donor agencies are as follows-

- The Netherlands (1986:4) finds that there is a 'lack of attention paid to the
social and cultural structures within the fishing community.'
- IFAD (1984:19) notes that 'people in the (small-scale) subsector have problems
in articulating their needs and in getting their voice heard.'
- IFAD (1984:15,19) stresses that 'one of the reasons for the problems which
have been experienced in designing and implementing projects in (the smallscale)
subsector has been due to the tendency to concentrate efforts on increasing
production without paying sufficient attention to the integration of this
subsector into the national economy.' It is noted that constraints to lateral
integration of small-scale fishing communities within the economy and society
are 'lack of transport and communications, the lack of education, health and
hygienic services.'
- IFAD (1986:4) stresses that project implementation is held up by high 'turnover
of staff or delays in appointing consultants - due to poor response to
advertisement, unsuitability of applicants or unstable exchange rates.' CIDA
 z

(1986:12) notes that a 'serious problem ... is the shortage of technical personnel.'
The Netherlands (1986:4) note that 'insufficient attention (is) paid to the
necessary ... training.' The World Bank (1986a:20) cites incorrect identification of
manpower training needs. In one project 'actual needs were very different from
those around which the project had been designed and that major changes in
curriculum, entry qualifications and specializations were required.'
- The African Development Bank (1986:5) notes that in 'many countries, there
seems to be an inherent weakness in institutions in the fishery subsector. These
institutions especially those in the public domain tend to be under-financed and
under-staffed. In some countries this affects the performance of projects during
implementation.' '...efficient and dynamic management though crucial to a
successful implementation is very often lacking.' IFAD (!986:4) traces some
problems of project implementation to 'weakness of institutions responsible for
project management', which can take place during ministerial reorganization or
establishment of a new Ministry of Fisheries. The World Bank (l986a:10) notes
that poor project management is 'caused by local insitutional inadequacy ... or
lack of trained local personnel.' Another difficulty is 'faulty record keeping and
failure to comply with Bank procedures.'
- The World Bank (1986:8) notes that 'no impact evaluations of (its) fisheries
projects have been made ... and in the absence of other data the audit results will
remain the only performance indicators.' Just over half of projects were judged
worthwhile at completion (i.e. satisfactory rates of return), but audit results are
the only performance indicator used. UNDP/ MNDC/ FAO (1986:ir,) note 'uneven
monitoring of (aquaculture) field projects by the (donor) agency (in scope and
intensity)' influences project implementation. There are also 'difficulties in
finding qualified counterpart staff and other forms of support from counterpart
institutions'. 'Travel funds for technical staff at headquarters' are scarce.
'Project management capabilities were found to be a weak aspect of several
aquaculture projects. Sometimes this has been reflected in: G) the project
becoming involved in activities not evidently related to the achievement of
project objectives, and (ii) a tendency to concentrate on achieving physical results
as opposed to transferring know-how to the counterpart staff.' There were no
instances of 'any systematic evaluation of impacts subsequent to the termination
of project activities.'
Most of the problems related to project organization and management identified
by donors are resolvable if one fundamental principle is built into all stages of
the project cycle: beneficiary participation. This implies mobilization of
fishermen and fishing communities to act individually or in unison (depending on
the nature of the task) in their own best interests as they define and perceive
them to be. Approaches to achieve beneficiary control of the five project cycle
stages (identification, preparation, appraisal, implementation, completion) have
been developed over the last few years (see Black-Michaud and Johnson, 1986;
FAO, 1986a; Johnson and Wilkie, 1986; Midgley et al, 1986). The FAO-executed
IDAF project in West Africa has been especially instrumental in developing the
beneficiary participation approach to fisheries development. All IFAD (1984:15)
projects now encourage beneficiary participation.
Beneficiary control of project formulation automatically leads to certain very
desirable project structures and outputs. For one, full attention is paid to social,
cultural and political structures within the community, and projects become
harmonized and integral new components of existing structures. A stronger
 P

collective political lobbying power emerges out of strengthened community

organizations. In view of the complexities and subtleties of African social
organization (see, for example, Gaudet et al E19861 and van der Meeren EM61,
and especially the excellent investigative study of Jorion C1MI), community
control of project formulation and execution represents possibly the best hope
for effective incorporation of the project into the local economy. One can only
marvel at the myopia of many past 'development' projects which were formulated
and executed without even a semblance of socio-cultural preparation, and failure
of such projects becomes more easily explicable. The important point in the
benefiary participation approach is that all relevant social and cultural factors
will automatically be addressed even without donor agencies being aware of them
and whether or not specialist investigators are sent into the field.
A second outcome is the formulation of projects which are both vertically
integrated (within the fisheries sector) and horizontally integrated (across
several economic sector). Unlike donors, fishing communities are constantly faced
with the totality of their development needs. These include the various forward
and backward linked industries and activities within the fisheries sector (net and
boat making, engine repair, landing facilities, catch processing, marketing,
transport, retailing). All African Development Bank projects now use the
vertically integrated approach (African Development Bank, 19::6:1). This involves
the construction of boats, provision of fishing gear, construction of landing
places and in many cases on-shore facilities. Ben-Yami and Anderson (1985) have
provided a very usefull framework for establishing vertically integrated
community fishery centres.
Important though it is, vertical integration is however normally insufficient to
effectively deal with the greater totality of fishing community development
problems which include the numerous other industries and services which
constitute the community's economic life (agriculture, livestock, small-scale
industries, water supply, electricity, transportation, health, education). A
completely integrated approach has been the cornerstone of the IDAF project.
Complete integration is vitally important for development of African fishing
communities because they are perhaps the poorest of all rural African
communities, and extraordinary assistance on all fronts will be required to raise
them out of the poverty trap they are mired in. It seems abundantly clear that the
traditional narrowly-focused sectoral-type fisheries project will not be
successful in eradicating poverty from African fishing communities (Bernacsek,
1987). Donors can undoubtedly appreciate the virtual impossibility of achieving a
correct 'sectoral mix' in projects which have not had beneficiary participation at
the planning stage.
Where necessary, complete integration can extend well beyond the immediate
waterfront geographical territory occupied by fishing communities. The IDAF
project, for example, has identified numerous critical social, cultural and
economic linkages between coastal fishing villages and inland villages which, if
ignored in project structure, would severely weaken or even nullify a project's
development impacts. In archipelagic nations, geographic coverage becomes even
more important since almost all communities are affected by the maritime-based
economic sectors. Fisheries projects could ideally become important components
of larger integrated rural development programmes. An excellent example of a
completely integrated rural development programme outside the African region is
the World Bank-sponsored Central Visayas Regional Project of the Philippines.
The CVRP project (based on beneficiary participation, is perhaps the most highly
 9

integrated anywhere and, not surprisngly, is quite successful (Bojos et al, 1987).
CVRP includes agro-forestry, improved terrace rice culture, mangrove
reforestation, artificial reef fish production, bivalve culture, coral reef
conservation and composite surveillance and control of fishing grounds.
A third gain from beneficiary participation is that the role of women in
development is automatically given a much greater weight in projects. While there
exists an awareness of the important role of women in fisheries, especially in
post-harvest operations where their role is central (IFAD, 1984:21; CIDA,
1986:15-16; Netherlands, 1986:4; Trottier 1987), women do not usually receive
sufficient attention when projects are formulated remotely. It may not be widely
recognized that this has most probably seriously constrained development of the
post-harvest sector as well as many informal credit facilities, both of which are
persistent major weak-links in African fisheries. Gender prejudices and biases
will continue to exist, and be reinforced, among males in both fishing villages and
donor agencies if women are excluded from full access to finance windows of
projects. Beneficiary participation makes such gender exclusion extremely
difficult to sustain and can rapidly ameliorate project stance vis-a-vis women.
Many donor agencies are sensitive to problems of institution building and
manpower training in African fisheries. Weakness in local and national
institutions can be more effectively addressed through the beneficiary
participation process. It is rare to find individuals in beneficiary institutions
who are not interested in further training and skills improvement. Selection of
candidates for training is done more efficiently by the community, which can take
into account their position and work tasks within community structures so as to
ensure that correctly focused training programmes are formulated. Foreign
interests in African fisheries do not only include production and technology
transfer, but perhaps most importantly also expertise transfer, and many
expatriates (consultants, field staff, agency staff) depend on the African
fisheries sector for their livelyhood. This conflicts with greater
employment-based training of Africans in middle and senior management
positions. Donor agencies should be fully conscious of the fact that any project
task performed under a sustained timetable by an expatriate specialist denies a
local beneficiary on-the-job-training in that task. Furthermore, the large
salaries paid to expatriates could be used to employ a much greater national
manpower and pay for local or overseas training expenses. Beneficiary control
can restructure such project training and employment expenditures to increase
the impacts and benefits to local and national institutions.
Project monitoring and evaluation in African fisheries is weak or non-existent.
Procedures used in agriculture are not fully appropriate for fisheries (for World
Bank, see Casley and Lury, 1982). Special procedures specifically tailored to the
characteristics of the fisheries sector are needed and should be routinely
applied. These cannot be restricted to audit results alone, but must take into
account social impacts, both during the project's formal lifespan as well as
afterwards. Monitoring and evaluation should rely heavily on the beneficiaries'
perceptions and assessments of project successes and failures. Rapid feedback of
specialists' analytic findings to beneficiaries will allow adjustments to be made
to project activities during formal project lifespan, and allow better orientation
of project follow-ups or extension phases after project completion. This raises
the more fundamental question of for whose information is the evaluation being
done - the donor or the recipient? While donors can clearly make good use of such
information in improving their own approaches to fisheries development projects,
 i0

it should be obvious that the primary client is the beneficiary assembly. It is

essential therefore that findings be made available to beneficiaries in timely and
appropriate formats so that the maximum possible utility can be derived from
them.

14 COMMUNITY- AND USER GROUP- BASED MANAGEMENT OF

FISHERY RESOURCES

Project problem areas identified by donor agencies are as follows:

- The World Bank (1986a:9) notes that in some projects 'fish catches (are) lower
than appraisal estimates, resulting from inadequate resource information,
insufficient attention to level of exploitation, or over-optimistic appraisal
estimates about catches and fishermen's capabilities.' The Netherlands (19£6:4)
also identifies 'over-optimistic assessments of fish stocks' as an important
problem. The World Bank (1986a: 16) states that 'too often statistical coverage is
inadequate and its reliability suspect.'
- CIDA (19::6:6) calls attention to the fact that major technical constraints
prevent countries from fully developing their fleets. These include 'the lack of
adequate information on the amount and of fish resouces, the lack of appropriate
technology for exploiting these newly-acquired (EEZ) resources, and and the lack
of trained personnel required for the development and management of fisheries
programmes'. This often results in 'overfishing with a resulting decline in
exploitable stocks. This is particularily true when foreign fleets fish in the
territorial waters of developing countries.' The World Bank (1936a:30) emphasizes
the need for emphasis on improving the ability of countries to carry 'out
surveillance over their EEZ and enforcing the management and regulatory systems
which they must develop in order to protect their fisheries resources from being
pirated and depleted by both their own and foreign fishing fleets.'
Inaccuracy of fish stock assessment appears to be a recurring problem which can
seriously distort fisheries investment planning. Underestimation of stock
potential is the lesser evil. It results in moderation of fishing effort and
investment, and can promote conservation. The chief shortcoming is that the full
economic potential of the stock may not be realized. However, as soon as a project
starts generating catch and effort data it will become clear that the fishery can
handle even a higher rate of investment and steps can be taken to attract more
funding. To some extent this will occur spontaneously due to the above average
economic rent that the stock will be percieved as yielding. Overestimation
however is very serious because it can lead to excessive fishing effort and
'mining' of the stock (read: general economic inefficiency and waste). Excessive
economic vested interests are created whose fishing activities may be extremely
difficult to limit or control once installed.
Accurate information on the state and potential of fish stocks is necessay for
both sound investment planning and rational resource management. Acquiring this
information is however costly and requires skilled personnel for data collection
and interpretation. Most African countries have great difficulty in meeting this
demand for human and material resources on a continuing basis. Options therefore
need to be explored to render African statistics /stock assessment services much
more cost effective. Clearly training is a major need, and in general donors have
shown a strong willingness to support human resource development programmes.
Weak points still exist in meeting reoccurring expenses for statistics collection
and stock assessment surveys. It will be necessary to achieve an optimal
cost-effective financial allocation between these two activities. Since accurate
catch and effort time series data can give very good insight into the state of the
stock for management purposes, as well as provide economic intelligence data
required by central government, it seems appropriate that greater emphasis
should be put on statistics. There is room for developing more effective and less
costly methods for collecting catch and effort statistics. Analytical (and
predictive) stock assessment methodologies also still need some improvement.
But it should be recognized that incorrect stock appraisals can be the result of
insufficient sampling coverage due to financial constraints, rather than
weaknesses in the scientific models and methods employed.
Overfishing and depletion of African stocks by both foreign and domestic
fishermen has raised the issue of resource management to the forefront.
Basically, two separate issues are involved: how best to achieve rational
management of domestic marine and inland fishing effort, and how to best control
foreign fishing in African EEZs when this is permitted by African countries.
Prior to colonialism, African fisheries were managed by traditional community
political instruments. A body of historical evidence as well as more recent
studies of surviving examples of traditional management suggest that under
traditional management resource allocation was efficient, access was controlled,
resource rents were not dissipated (as tends to occur in open access fisheries)
but were captured and equitably distributed, stocks were carefully conserved and
conflicts could be contained and resolved without undue social stress and
disruption (Lawson and Robinson, 1983; Scudder and Conelly, 1985; Weigel, 1985;
Kone, 1986; Ruddle 1936; Jeay, 1987). Colonial governments installed centralized
fisheries agencies which attempted to replace traditional management. Vital to
this maneuver was legislating exclusive state ownership of water and fishery
resources, and consequently cancelling out customary ownership and usufructuary
rights. Western resource tenure systems were routinely carried over by newly
independent administrations into the post-colonial period. In theory, reducing
fishing effort to below the MSY yielding level (i.e. the central tenent of the
Western fisheries management approach) would maximize the resource rent, and
thus increase the potential taxation base available to central government.
Administration attempts to appropriate a portion of resource rent (whether or not
it was actually available) as revenue through taxation or licencing (sometimes
through repressive measures) has encountered widespread resistance by
fishermen and is often unworkable.
The evident ineffectiveness and cost-inefficiency of most central fisheries
management in Africa has resulted in considerable interest in transfering
management functions back to fishing communities and user groups. The expected
benefits of doing this are much more effective management and reduced cost.
While the optimism that surrounds reinstatement of community-based fishery
resource management is certainly neither unfounded nor naive, some caution is
however advisable. Traditional management may have difficulty reaching the same
level of effectiveness in the present era as it did prior to colonization. This is
due to Africa's current population boom which puts heavy pressure on natural
resource sectors for employment and food production. It seems reasonable to
assume that traditional management structures would have evolved (if left
undisturbed by central government) into novel forms to cope with the new
stresses and needs imposed by the population boom, but at this late date that
question is largely academic. More pragmatically, reinstatement of
community-based management would likely require various forms of central
administration backstopping to increase its efficiency. Outside of Africa, an
excellent example of the form this could take is Japan, where traditional fishery
tenure has been incorporated into national legislation (Asada et al, 1983; Ruddle,
1987). The successful CVRP project in the Philippines noted above is based on the
principle of community-based fisheries management - that the fisherman is the
de facto manager of the resource (Vusse, 085).
Some donor agencies are inclined to equate management with reducing effort.
'Excess fishermen', it is argued, should transfer into other more profitable
economic sectors. In Africa, this is unrealistic as there are usually few other
more profitable jobs available. In many instances people turn to fishing as a last
resort when nothing else is available. The only way to get 'excess' fishermen into
other sectors is to create many new jobs in these sectors and allow market forces
(such as opportunity cost) to move them out. A more realistic solution to the
'excess fishermen dilemma' may be to aim for greater economic growth and
development in the fisheries sector. Thriving fishing communities with more
disposable income will automatically create strong demand for diverse goods and
services, part of which can be met locally. This will lead to job creation in other
sectors, and thus stabilization or a reduction in the number of fishermen, as some
move into other professions. Many fishermen are in any case multi-vocational,
engaging in fishing and one or more other economic pursuits. Simultaneously,
there is a need to create strong fishermen organizations to limit access to the
fishery resources once a socially, economically and biologically harmonized level
of fishing effort is achieved.
Management of larger-scale domestic fisheries in Africa is not widely seen as a
prime issue at present because of the small size of the African industrial fleet
(although some exceptions do exist). African countries might be well advised in
future to develop their own institutions to do this. Management structures could
be based on the principle of user group management with central government
backstopping, and could perhaps grow out of traditional smallscale institutions.
Transfer to Africa of approaches to management used in OECD/CMEA countries
might be difficult and inappropriate because these countries all have individually
tailored management structures and institutions, and there is no general
agreement among them.
Control of foreign fleet fishing is the second major concern of fisheries
management in Africa. Some 60% of all fish caught in African marine waters is
taken by foreign fleets (Table 1), and all important commercial marine fish stocks
are now fully exploited (Table 2). The most disasterous cases of stock collapse
(i.e. Namibian pilchard) are due to overfishing by the large foreign industrial
fleets, and not small African domestic fleets. The current low fuel prices have
resulted in a resurgence of foreign fleet fishing which is again endangering
stocks. The prospects for control of foreign fleet fishing in African EE Zs are not
bright. Enhancing African surveillance and control capabilities has been the
objective of some external assistance, but the need is far greater than what the
limited project activities can address. Domestic fleet expansion offshore (which
would displace a portion or all of foreign fleets by reducing the surplus stock
available from the total allowable catch) is not proceeding at a fast enough pace.
Perhaps the most realistic option available to governments in the short term is
the development of an efficient composite surveillance and control system.
 13

Ideally this should be based on the fishermen themselves, perhaps including

domestic shipping, and only when economically justifiable, spotter aircraft.
Enforcement capability should be in the form of high speed pursuit boats
belonging to the national Navy or Coast Guard, already in service for control of
smuggling and territorial defence. Most African countries cannot afford the
luxury of expensive surveillance and control vessels and aircraft dedicated only
to fisheries use, as this might result in complete dissipation of whatever
licencing fees and other royalties are being derived from allowing foreign fleets
into the national E E Z in the first place.
Donors should be aware that developing MCS is not enough. It doesn't by itself
put fish on the table, and there is a real danger that it can lead to perpetuation
of foreign fleet fishing by creating an elaborate and expensive long term
accomodating management infrastructure. Under such conditions the African host
country will never fully develop its domestic fleet. Those donor agencies
representing countries which operate distant water fleets in African EEZs will
have to address the problem of 'divided loyalties' that they face.
Consideration of the above discussion allows the formulation of a three point
strategy for effective management of Africa's fisheries:
- fishing community or user group resource ownership and
self-management;
central administration back-stopping with resource surveys, statistics,
and extension;

composite low-cost surveillance and control;

1.5 FINANCE, CREDIT AND ECONOMICS

Project problem areas identified by donor agencies are as follows:

- IFAD (1984:18) notes that one implementation problem is 'lack of local
counterpart funds.' The World Bank (1986a: 6,7,9,10) notes that 'cost escalation ...
(affected) most projects including in particular boat building and port
construction.' Time overruns varied for different types of projects. 'The "simple"
projects took, on average, 1.4 years above appraisal estimates to complete,
compared with an average 2.6-year overrun for the "complex" projects, and an
overall two-year average.' 'The most common cause of time overruns was
difficulty and delay in procurement and in recruitment of project personnel,
reflecting in some cases administrative constraints in the executing agencies
concerned and in other cases a degree of over-optimism at appraisal by setting
unrealistic time targets.' The African Development Bank (1986:5) notes that
delays and cost overruns which cause projects to suffer come about 'because the
borrowing countries take some time, either through unfamiliarity with ADB
disbursement rules or because of slow administrative processes, to fulfill loan
conditions precedent to first disbursement.' IFAD (!986:4) noted the occurence of
'delays in the procurement of equipment and delays in civil works.' It also notes
'a slow start in project activities due to procedural difficulties/bureaucracy.'
UNDP/NMDC/FAO 0986:ix) note that 'investment support has been the focus of
few of the past UNDP/FAO aquaculture projects. Most of the investment
 14

providing the infrastructure base for ... production ... has been financed without
recourse to international development banks.'
- The World Bank (1986a:10) observes that in the area of sub-loan repayment
'providing loans in cash or in kind to fishermen, particularily to artisanal
fishermen, has given rise to more difficulties than has any other area of
fisheries development.' 'Most countries with fishing industries have established
fisherman credit schemes of one sort or another and almost without exception
have experienced difficulties with repayments and high rates of arrears or
default.' IFAD (1984:10) notes that 'obtaining credit from institutional sources is
difficult. There tends to be a reliance on the informal credit market.' The
Netherlands (!986:4,5,9) draws attention to 'insufficient credit facilities for
investment.'
- UNIDO (!986:1) notes that 'frequently, due to the lack of an appropriate analytic
framework, there is an absence in development strategies of a proper focus on
interactive relations between demand and supply both in the factor and goods
markets as well as in the financial markets. This can cause such problems as the
resulting planned capacity to be erroneously forecasted or the resulting product
prices not to be commensurate with the consumer's ability to pay.' The World Bank
0986a:6) calls attention 'to the fact that normally insufficient analysis (is) made
of the local or national boat and net making industry.' (i.e. intrrsectoral
linkages).
- UNIDO (1986:1) notes 'that the preponderance of a sector specific point of view
- especially in the treatment of projects - deprives development programmes and
projects of the necessary focus to permit them to take into consideration
intersectoral linkages so that economy-wide impacts of such activities may be
fairly evaluated. Projects are funded without sufficiently assessing their
upstream and downstream effects. Moreover, there is a lack of attention paid to
the interdependence between the macro-economic (national economic policy) and
the micro-economic aspects in project formulation and evaluation.' IFAD
(1984:16) notes that 'government policies in pricing, exchange rates, trade,
subsidization and taxation, even when not directly related to the fisheries sector
can affect markets and prices for fish.' The Netherlands (1986:4) finds
problematical 'government pricing policies, aimed at low prices for locally
produced basic food.'
Insufficient investment /finance is a problem which plagues many if not all
fisheries development projects in Africa. There is generally a need for much
greater flexibility in donor allocation to meet inevitable price increases during a
project's lifespan. The problem of time over-runs, which result in extra expense
for salaries to pay staff for longer contracts, is perhaps more a problem of
inappropriate timetabling based on the donor country's business pace rather than
that of the recipient country. It is becoming clear to donors that considerably
longer timetables are required in fisheries development for the simple reason
that the sector is generally more complex than other economic sectors. If
completely integrated multisectoral development programmes are being
formulated (as is recommended by the present paper), project lifespan and budget
must be extended further still.
This raises the general problem of attracting more foreign direct investment
(FDI) and official development aid (ODA) into the African fisheries sector. ODA
capital assistance over the five year period 1981-5 totalled some US$ 0.5 billion.
Bernacsek (1957) calculated that a further US$ L8 billion would be required to
 15

fully develop African fishing capacity, and that another US$ i billion or more
would be required for infrastructure and processing. Failure to raise more capital
could sound the death knell for Africanization and expansionary growth of the
region's fisheries. Some 'division of labour' is perhaps called for. ODA might best
serve fleet expansion and community development, while FDI could be very
effective in outward-oriented processing and marketing of value-added export
products. A favourable interplay of political and economic factors could result in
an accelerated increase of foreign investment flow into African fisheries, and it
is the task of African governments to identify the actions and incentives which
will be most effective and appropriate to bring this about. Beneficiary pressure
(through such vehicles as national conferences - see below) could be instrumental
in developing and sustaining the 'political will' needed.
Credit is a special issue in smaller-scale fisheries development. Most crediting
is done through informal credit (money lenders) and revolving community savings
facilities (tontine in West Africa), which finances both capital investment (for
purchasing boats, nets) and operating costs (fuel, ice) (Jorion, 1985; Gaudet et al,
1986). Official credit institutions have difficulty competing with local community
creditors who may be linked through kinship with the clients. Typically, high or
even exhorbitant interest rates are charged, but this in part reflects the
substantial risks involved and the lack of an underlying risk-sharing formal
support facility. The actual pay-back interest earned by the community creditors
may be considerably less than the nominal rate initially agreed to. An awareness
is growing among donors such as the World Bank that cooperation rather than
competition with informal credit and savings facilities may be a much more
effective approach to sub-loan disbursement and recovery (African Development
Bank, 1987:8). A new willingness to work with and through informal financial
facilities could result in much greater economic viabiity of credit component of
projects. Credit allocation in particular, when controlled by local financial market
structures, would likely be carried out in a much more efficient manner, with
better attention given to balancing the multisectoral development needs of the
community (i.e. fisheries project money not being rigidly tied to fishery sector
inputs but also being partitioned out for garden crops and livestock, water
supply, primary health care, etc).
Inadequate microeconomic studies of the fisheries sector can lead to such
problems as overcapitalization or failure of retail markets to clear due to
excessively high product prices. There is pressing need for high quality analytic
studies of fisheries microeconomics in Africa. Problems of economic inefficiency
and wasteful use of resources (financial and biological) should be high on the list.
One such problem for example is by-catch dumping. CIDA (!936:6,!6) notes that
large-scale fisheries dump about 45% of their catch, while smaller-scale
fisheries average only 5% (in this respect, the latter are much more
conservation-intensive). Replacing industrial boats with smaller-scale vessels
would thus automatically reduce biological resource wastage by perhaps 40%+ for
Africa as a whole (not to mention a much greater reduction in capital resource
dissipation). The prospects for more economical utilization of foreign fleet
by-catch in Africa are poor. The great difference in value between target species
and discarded species makes low profitability of a by-catch utilization operation
the major obstacle (FAO/IDRC, 1982:13-4). Efficiency of fuel use in African
fisheries has also not been well studied, and is a prerequisite for rational choice
of production scale. In the area of economic models used for management, Wilson
(19361 notes that the widely used bionomic model (revenue and cost versus fishing
 16

effort), with its narrow focus on rent dissipation, has led to naive fisheries
management policies (effort reduction) which do not take into account existing
property rights distribution and entrepreneurial processes (which lead to rent
redistribution), and equity considerations arising from trade offs between
employment of capital versus labour.
Fisheries projects should also not been seen or structured as welfare handouts
(transfer payments) as this weakens, rather than strengthens, them economically.
More comparative studies analyzing costs, earnings and internal rates of return
for different operating scales (such as the work of Jarrold and Everett, 1981) are
needed to help the private sector and government make optimal technology
choices. It is extremely important that smaller-scale fisheries projects achieve a
high level of economic viablity and efficiency so as to remove the stigma of being
transfer payment operations. A special programme of research needs to be
directed at the microeconomics of traditional community-based management and
resource ownership, since it appears, at least in theory at present, that a
resolution of the so-called 'tragedy of the commons' is possible within the
framework of public ownership of fishery resources (Roemer, ms).
At the macroeconomic level, considerable research has gone into analyzing the
effects of macroeconomic policies on agriculture. In general, policies which are
intended to promote import substitution industrialization (overvalued exchange
rates, low controlled producer prices, importation of cheap food, export taxes,
urban fiscal bias) depress rural production by negatively affecting the structure
of incentives (Chhibber and Wilton, 1986). Although the fisheries sector is less
well studied, the effect there appears to be the same. Fishermen will of course
be acutely aware of the effects of inappropriate and self-defeating
macroeconomic policies on their livelyhood, and it is in their best interests to
inform government and donor agencies of their views through the most effective
channels available to them. Projects should promote such dialogue through
support to fishermen organization and by holding national conferences (see
below).

1.6 POLICY

Project problem areas identified by donor agencies are as follows:

- The World Bank (1986a:10) considers that 'government actions (are sometimes)
detrimental to project aims, such as changes in Government fisheries policy.'
IFAD (!986:4) found that 'difficulties have been experienced by governments in
complying with the policy assurances and consequently the effectiveness and/or
the start of the projects were delayed.'
- The World Bank (1986a:9,i i) notes that complexity in fisheries projects
'imposes particularily heavy demands on expertise during project preparation and
implementation, necessitating unusually large, multi-disciplinary missions that
could include, in addition to economic, legal and financial expertise, a marine
biologist, port engineer, naval engineer, gear technologist or master fisherman, a
training /extension specialist, a fisheries statistician, a business management
expert, an international fish marketing expert and a sociologist. In reality, it has
never been possible to field such teams, and it is possible, therefore, that
project quality may have suffered on occasion in consequence.' Furthermore, 'it is
clear that unless all the relevant technical, institutional, financial and economic
 17

issues pertaining to a particular project proposal are fully covered during

preparation and appraisal, the project is unlikely to perform satisfactorily or to
attain its targets.' UNDP/NMDC/FAQ (1967:vD argues that 'there is a lack of
well-founded projections of future aquaculture production. As aquaculture,
particularily freshwater, competes with agriculture and other activities for
resources and markets, such projections should preferably be made by teams
which in addition to aquaculturists include technicians and social scientists in
capture fisheries, livestock and poultry, coastal zone development and marine
technologies. It is rare that such multidisciplinary groups are engaged for
projecting the future of aquaculture, even in industrialized countries.'
Lack of stability in government policy could signify inter alia a recurrent
difficulty in formulating sound policy. This calls into question the greater
problem of how best to formulate fisheries development policies in the first
place. Mabawonku 09E:6a:36) draws attention to the fact that the exercising of
political lobbying power by fishermen organizations can strongly influence and
direct government policies and initiatives. He stresses that policy/planning
involves a 'complex chain of political and social interactions.' He recommends
that various interest groups be identified, and organized into articulate units
which can then 'use the mechanism of "voice" to make their felt needs known to
the authorities.' In effect this carries the principle of beneficiary participation
from the individual project and community level up to the national economic policy
and planning level. UNDP and FAO have been active in assisting countries to
develop this approach through the format of the National Conference for
Fisheries Policy and Planning. In recent years such national conferences have
been held in Tanzania, Zaire, Madagascar, Angola, Cape Verde, and outside the
region, in Pakistan and Philippines. The Pakistan (M FD, 1986) and Philippines
(BFAR, 1987) national conferences were particularily well attended and
documented. Attendence was 200-300 persons, with over 60% of delegates from
the private sector in the case of the Philippines. Fifty to 60 issue-focused
position papers were presented at each conference. Thematic participatory
conferences held at local level can also be very effective as was the
IUCN-sponsored multisectoral-use and sustainable development conference for
Kafue and Bangweulu in Zambia. In a recent review of the FAO EEZ programme it
was noted that countries have expressed a preference for national
policy/planning conferences and workshops rather than subregional ones in the
future, and that such conferences should include participants from all sectors of
the fishing industry and government (Doucet et al, 1987).
National conferences are very effective in formulating policies strongly
oriented toward national fisheries sector growth (Bernacsek, 1987:66-67). The
purpose of such conferences is to allow representatives from the entire fisheries
sector (fishermen organizations, traders, processors, exporters, gear
manufacturers, boatbuilders, cooperatives, unions, banks, credit institutes,
research institutes, various government agencies) to review the performance of
the fisheries sector and formulate new policy recommendations through
presentation of position papers and open forum discussion. Such an approach
effectively brings all important development issues into the open and allows the
entire sector to participate in finding solutions. The process of policy
formulation and planning is thus put on a more democratic footing and there is a
greater possibility that correct and effective policies and plans will be adopted
because all interests can be taken into account. The exercise tends to strengthen
 1S

the fisheries sector as a whole, and can lead to private sector agitation for
restructuring and strengthening of national fisheries institutions if these are
seen as being too weak and underfinanced to carry out the support services the
private sector requires. Private sector participation exerts a political control and
discipline which can help ensure that sound policies in the best national interest
are formulated. Limiting conference participants to nationals prevents foreign
interests from exerting pressure on the sensitive policy formulation and planning
process. National conferences become the most important event in the national
fisheries timetable, and, by virtue of the authority invested in them, the
dominant force shaping government fisheries policy.
National conferences on fisheries policy and planning should not be confused
with sectoral studies as the purposes and impacts of the two are completely
different. A sectoral study is an economic analysis carried out sometimes by
nationals, but more often by foreign specialists, and usually contains some
recommendations for action based on the study's findings. Governments can either
accept or reject each recommendation. In sharp contrast, a natal conference's
purpose is to formulate fishery development policies -through consensus
discussion by the entire fisheries sector of a country. It would be difficult for a
government to ignore the policy recommendations of a national conference. The
latter thus carries much greater political weight and functional capability than a
sectoral study (especially if the sectoral study is carried out by foreign
consultants who will almost always represent to some degree outside vested
interests). At best, a sectoral review can act as a useful input to a national
conference, but can never replace one.
CIDA (1986:8) notes that some setbacks and failure experienced by donors arise
from inadequate knowledge of conditions in recipient countries. This underlines
the need for sensitization of donor countries partnering a particular host country.
National Conferences for Fisheries Policy and Planning are an unparalleled
opportunity for donor agencies (who might be invited to participate as observers)
to gain a thorough understanding of the issues affecting the fisheries sector of a
host country and to begin to identify areas where they feel they can be of
assistance. Typically, donors who are invited to participate as observers can
avail themselves of a 4 or 5 day immersion experience of intense cross-sectoral
debates on fisheries issues and policies which typically take place at National
Conferences. This can lead to an understanding of national fishery development
priorities which no amount of sectoral review missions can possibly duplicate.
This was implicitly recognized by the final report of the 1986 Paris Donor
Conference: national conferences 'gave good opportunities for donors to
participate in a coherent programme which would be in accord with government
policy and priority' (World Bank, 1986b:5).
In this respect the large sectoral review study teams being fielded by some
donor agencies may not represent an economical use of development resources. It
is impossible that such teams can be superior to national conferences in correctly
identifying all of the important development issues currently faced by the
fisheries sector of a country. Furthermore the important mobilization process of
involving the fisheries sector directly in policy formulation (in effect, 'an
exercising of political lobbying power) is undermined if sectoral studies are
exclusively relied upon for policy formulation. Perhaps the most pressing
criticism of many sectoral reviews is that their purpose is primarily to facilitate
penetration of foreign direct investment, which almost exclusively gravitates
toward capital-intensive industrial fishery development, and not the more
 19

important small-scale fisheries since these do not readily generate repatriatable

profits. During the 1937 Abidjan consultation 'concern was expressed that social
issues were not adequately considered by the private sector and that private
industrial vessels would infringe on artisanal fisheries and possibly endanger
the overall resource levels' (African Development Bank et al, 1937:6). National
conference debates also leave little room for 'confusion' over what consitutes
real national capacity development and what consitutes foreign capacity
development.
The 1984 FAO World Conference on Fisheries Management and Development
represents a landmark attempt by the nations of the world to jointly come to
grips with the new sustainable development problems of global fisheries in the
EEZ era. The outputs of the World Conference consitute a comprehensive set of
guidelines and strategies to achieve wise use and maximal economic benefit from
the world's fisheries resources (FAO, 1934, 1936b). However, a serious criticism
of these outputs has been raised by WRI/IIED (!936:153, 157): 'It is, however,
difficult to see how nations will be able to use the strategy as a practical
guideline to manage or develop their fisheries - most of the 116 points are
unexceptional, if not platitudinous. Without some guidance on which points are
important, this list risks encouraging governments to select the points that match
what they are already doing, and does not challenge governments to critically
examine present policies and make the drastic changes that are often needed.' In
many cases, national conferences could constitute a most effective solution to
this telling shortcoming.
Governments should be careful to correctly sequence the component events and
activities of the policy formulation, planning and project execution processes.
National conferences need to be interfaced with the national economic
development planning cycle, and ideally should be held every 5 or 6 years
(depending on the planning cycle) as the basis for preparation of the fisheries
sector component of the national economic plan. Once sound development policies
are formulated through national consultation, and strategic and operational plans
are drawn up and ratified, fisheries institutions need to be restructured and
strengthened to execute the plans (otherwise the entire process may flounder and
end up an exercise in futility). Policy/planning and institutional
restructuring /strengthening are closely linked and interdependent$ and
practically meaningless if carried out in isolation from each other. This requires
adequate funding and manpower training in the needed skills. Increased
interaction with the private sector is of crucial importance. Mechanisms to
increase the back-stopping and support role of fisheries institutions to the
private sector need to be established. The services provided by fisheries
institutions need to be continuously reviewed and modified as necessary to
insure that outputs are kept relevant to current development needs in the
fisheries sector. National fisheries legislation requires review and appropriate
modification. This is obviously a necessity if community- and user group- based
management and resource ownership are being reinstated.
A particularily urgent need is the production of a policy and planning
guidelines /training manual for use by African fisheries planners, and as a base
text for training courses (similar to the one being prepared by FAO for ASEAN
countries - CFAO, ms]).
 20

1.7 CONCLUDING ITEM

The most serious constraint to the implementation of the measures proposed in

this paper is not technical, economic or social, but quite simply lack of strong
pro-development political will on the part of donor agencies as well as some
African governments. It is becoming increasingly clear to all concerned that the
continued existence of weak or crippled African economies benefits no one, least
of all the African population, and certainly not developed countries in search of
viable trading partners. All groups suffer to a varying degree as a result.
Depression of economic growth in the African fisheries sector, either through
mining of the fisheries resources by foreign fleets, trade barriers to value-added
fishery products, or low foreign assistance inflow rates, will in the long run be
self-defeating. African countries perhaps need to be more forceful in signalling
donors as to what is acceptable and what is not, and in marketing the mutual
advantages of increased donor support for the accelerated development of
domestic African fishing capacity. Donors need to make balanced political
decisions concerning their country's own short and long term economic
self-interests.

1.8 REFERENCES

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1986 experiences from some coastal states of
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African Development Bank. ADB Group
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1986, Paris, 5p.

African Development Bank et al. Consultation

1987 on fisheries in Africa, 13-15 October 1987,
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Akester, S J. Design and trial of sailing

1986 rigs for artisanal fisheries of Sierra Leone.
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GCP/RAF/198/DEN - GCP/RAF/197/NOR,
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 21

Ben-Yami, M and Anderson, A M. Community

19E:5 fishery centres: guidelines for
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Bojos,R M, Ansula,A, Juanich,G, Arambulo,R,

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Casle y, D J. and Lury, D A. Monitoring and

1932 evaluation of agricultural and rural
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and agricultural performances in developing
countries. Finance & Development,
September 1986:6-9.

CIDA. Canada and Third World fisheries. CIDA,

1986 Hull, 18p.

Doucet, F J., Fernando,C., Hauge,M. and

1987 Ulfstein,G. FAO/Norway evaluation of the
EEZ programme financed under the
FAO/Norway government cooperative
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TABLE 1. Time series for domestic marine and foreign fleet catches from major
African fishing areas. Based on FAO data.

Unit of measurement = tons

EASTCENTRAL SOUTHEAST SOUTHWEST T 0 T A L

MEDTRN. ATLANTIC ATLANTIC INDIAN OCEAN M A R I N E

FA 37 FA 34 FA 47 FA 51 (part)

YEAR Domstc Domstc ForgnFl Domstc ForgnFl Domstc ForgnFl Domstc ForgnFl Overall

1970 82400 905800 1598800 10794('.)0 854400 88500 69500 2156100 2522700 4678800
1971 91000 109010C) 1845700 907100 912500 98700 76700 2186900 2834900 5021800
1972 97200 1220800 1961044 1128000 1205700 103500 79500 2549500 3246244 5795744
1973 93600 1377900 2091497 1181800 1263900 94600 79300 2747900 3434697 6182597
1974 108849 1307063 2286796 1233635 962461 109351 86755 2758898 3336012 6094910
1975 118570 1263983 2326065 914406 1002018 124463 67882 2441422 3395965 5837387
1976 118669 1206472 2355527 648966 1474614 111686 62929 2085793 3893070 5978863
1977 128803 1237451 2506008 517502 1655661 118781 98877 2002537 4260546 6263083
1978 114008 1292547 1896560 531268 2129574 116666 97831 21154489 4123965 6178454
1979 137937 1240588 1529847 437415 1432646 105499 71677 1921439 3034170 4955609
1980 145596 1296919 2158159 315127 1242890 119398 67325 1877040 3468374 5345414
1981 153442 1442357 1863347 377587 1406846 125246 70658 2098632 3341051 5439683
1982 159356 1434550 1805139 307879 1436630 110929 89700 2012714 3331469 5344183
1983 166075 1546032 1583014 442368 1297224 126940 110515 2281415 2990753 5272168
1984 174682 1419420 1298696 227237 1333877 136921 170858 1958260 2803431 4761691
1985 189139 1406078 1392588 198540 1229235 137168 215684 1930925 2837507 4768432
TABLE 2. Comparison of current (1985) and potential catches for African countries
and associated islands. Based on FAO data.
Unit of measurement = tons
Countries arranged in order of magnitude of theoretical unexploited potential.

MARINE FISHERIES INLAND FISHERIES TOTAL

---------------------- ---------------------- ----------------------
OOONTRY 1985 POTENTL UNXPLOIT 1985 POTENTL UNXPLOIT 1985 POTENTL UNXPLOIT

Angola 66497 700000 633503 8000 113000 105000 74497 813000 738503
Namibia 132043 800000 667957 50 5900 5850 132093 80590 673807
Chad 0 1.) 115000 560000 445000 115000 560000 445 Oi)
Mauritani 45000 300000 255000 12000 36600 24600 57000 336600 27960)0)
Gu i nB i ssa 28000 273000 245000 2000 10500 8500 30000 283500 253500
Zaire 1000 5000 4000 101000 324000 223000 102000 329000 227000
Moz amb i qu 32700 175000 142300 5000 55000 50000 37700 230000 192300
Congo 20000 25000 5000 13539 175000 161461 33539 200000 166461
Sudan 409 10000 9591 25881 157000 131119 26290 167000 140710
Zambia 0 0 67731 207500 139769 67731 207500 139769
Nigeria 154252 150000 -4252 87382 214000 126618 241634 364000 122366
Guinea 3600 119000 115400 0 800 800 3600 119800 116200
Gabon 45854 130000 84146 1900 270)00) 25100 47754 157000) 109246
Senegal 229002 310000 80998 15000 37000 22000 244002 347000 102998
Ethiopia 1000 15000 14000 40100 87000 83000 5000 102000 97000
Tanzania 40850 69000 28150 230000 297000 67000 270850 366000 95150
Seychel e 4445 940)x:)0) 89555 0 0 4445 940)00 89555
i
1

Ma aw i
1 ) 0 62067 150000 87933 6067 150000 87933
Coted I vo i 75098 140000 64902 18000 39000 2100C) 9,3098 179000 85902
Mali 0 0 60000 144000 84000 60000 144000 84000
S i erraLeo 36500 130000 93500 16500 2400 -14100 53oOO 13240)0 79400
Liberia 7478 690o(') 615'22' 4000 2400 -1600 11478 71400 59922
Cameroon 30000 45000 15000 20000 56000 36000 50000 1010)0)0 51000
Niger 0 0 6840 5600)0) 49160 6840 5600)0) 49160
Botswana 0 0 1700 24000 22300 1700 24000 22300
"ambia 8012 30000 21988 3500 2300 -1200 11512 32300 20788
1geria 66000 80000 14000 0 3000 3000 66000 83000 17000
Somalia 16467 20000 3533 0 11400 11400 16467 31400 14933
CapeVerde 10180 25000 14820 0 0 10180 25000 14820
Rwanda 0 0 786 13010 12214 786 13000 12214
Benin 3806 9500 5694 16500 17000 500 20306 26500 6194
Comoros 5200 10000 4800 0 0 5200 10000 4800
Zimbabwe 0) 1.) 17362 2200 )0) 4638 17362 220)00) 4638
Djibouti 380 1000 620 0 4000 40)00) 380 5000 4620
Libya 7800 12000 4200 60) 60 7800 12060 4260
Burundi 0 0 14900 19000 4100 14900 19000 4100
Mauritius 12483 15000 2517 29 335 306 12512 15335 2823
EquatorGu 3200 5000 180)0) 400 340 -60 3600 5340 1740
SaoTomPri 4355 6000 1645 0 0 4355 6000 1645
Togo 14844 15000 156 700 2000 130)0) 15544 17000 1456
Tunisia 88893 80000 -8893 0 10300 10300 88893 90300 1407
Lesotho 0 0 15 290 275 15 290 275
CanaryIsl 0 270 270 0 270 270
MadeiraIs 0 0 0 0 0
WestSahar 0 0 0 0 0 0
Swaziland 0 0 44 -44 44 0 -44
Reunion 3025 -3025 0 0 3025 0 -3025
BurkinaFa 0 0 7000 2800 -4200 7000 2800 -4200
CentAfrRe 0 0 13000 8000 -5000 13000 8000 -5000
Uganda 0 0 212200 200000 -12200 212200 200000 -12200
Kenya 6209 15000 8791 99764 71600 -28164 105973 86600 -19373
Morocco 471726 445000 -26726 1330 6400 5070 473056 451400 -21656
Ghana 214171 175000 -39171 40000 56000 16000 254171 231000 -23171
Egypt 26446 45000 18554 112336 69000 -43336 138782 114000 -24782
Madagasca 14000 17000 3000 42000 12000 -30000 56000 29000 -27000
DOMESTIC
TOTAL 1930925 4564500 2633575 1459456 3312195 1852739 3390381 7876695 4486314
'OREIGN
L-EET TTL 2837507 2837507
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND
TOTAL 4768432 45645110 -203932 1459456 3312195 1852739 6227888 7876695 1648807
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------