1

Studies in social influence 111:

Majority versus minority influence in a group

SERGE MOSCOVlCl
ELISABETH LAGE
Ecofe des Hautes Etudes en Sciences
Sociales. Paris

Abstract

This experimental study was aimed at investigating the mechanisms of influence

involved in the two functionally opposed phenomena of innovation and cun-
formity. We have been concerned for several years with the former of these two
phenomena because of its intrinsic importance and the limited amount of research
devoted to it.
In the present article we have attempted not only to analyse the position more
thoroughly, but also to compare the effects of innovation with those of con-
formity. In particular, we have endeavoured to show that behavioural style acts
as a general source o f influence in the two phenomena under consideration, where
manifest judgments are concerned. On the other hand, the latent effects of in-
fluence may be different in the two cases o f innovation and conformity.
To investigate these questions, we developed an experimental design consist-
ing o f three parts. The first part was intended to study manifest influence on a
quasi-physical judgment based on a cultural truism. The second part was aimed
at the study of latent modifications in the perceptual-cognitive code as a result
of influence. The third, in the form of a postexperimental questionnaire, was
intended to provide information about various aspects, including the perception
o f the agent of influence by subjects. The main function of the experimental
manipulations was to vary the minority or majority relationship of the agent o f
influence within a group, and its behavioural style, consistent or inconsistent.
Our main findings indicate that behavioural consistency is the main factor
behind the influence exerted by both majority and minority. But whereas, in con-
formity, influence is limited to modifying manifest judgments, in innovation,
it changes the perceptual-cognitive code underlying such judgments.

Eur. J . soc. Psychol. 6 (2), p p , 149-I74

150 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

1. Preliminary observations

The research we have carried out over the past few years (Faucheux and Mosco-
vici, 1967; Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux, 1969) indicates that thc behavioural
style of a minority constitutes an element for its becoming a pole of influence in a
group. Specifically, we assume that a minority must provoke a cognitive and
relational conflict in the group before it can exert influence and induce the
majority to change their opinions or judgments (Moscovici and Faucheux, 1972).
In so far as it arouses such conflict, the minority’s behavioural style constitutes a
source of change.’
Our intention in the present article is to explore experimentally this assump-
tion in greater detail. First, we wish to show that a consistent minority is more
effective than an inconsistent minority. Secondly, we wish to consider why a
minority of one individual does not modify the judgments of a majority with
respect to an explicit and objective norm, while a minority consisting of two
individuals does. Briefly, in situations in which the minority consists of a sub-
group of two people, one of them sees himself as the ‘innovator’ and the other
plays the role of ‘follower’. If an individual is alone and isolated, the majority
can reduce the conflict and reject his deviant response by attributing it to a
peculiarity specific to him. On the other hand, when a second person follows
him and adheres to his judgment, the conflict cannot be reduced so easily, nor
the deviant response rejected. In this case, a change is effected in the majority
which is brought to redefine itself by reference to the minority. Finally, the cost
of maintaining a deviant point of view is greater for a minority than for a major-
ity, and a minority must therefore have stronger motives and be more convinced
in order to do so. It follows that a deviant point of view held by a minority will
carry more weight and will create a deeper cognitive and relational conflict than
the same point of view held by a majority.
Within certain limits, a minority which conforms to a majority feels itself
socially justified in doing so, and no internal psychological processes are neces-
sary to bring about a change, while, on the other hand, a majority does not feel
thus justified in conforming to a minority, and quite complex internal processes
are required before it can give up its own position. Whether for either one of
these reasons or for both, it seems to us that a minority stimulates a more acute
conflict in a group than a majority, and, in consequence, its influence should
bring about greater changes. Thus we expect the influence of the minority to

1. We shall not elaborate on these notions readers to the articles mentioned in the
which are treated elsewhere. We refer text.
 Studies in social influence III 151

operate at both the manifest and latent levels of judgment, while the influence
of the majority on the minority will be limited to superficial agreement or manifest
conformity.
We are well aware that these phenomena are more complex in real life, and
that it is difficult to provide incontestable proof of our assumption and the pro-
positions following from it. But we feel that progress may be made in this direc-
tion, given the importance of the problems involved, and, within limits, the novelty
of unexpected findings. The experiments reported here were designed to test the
following hypotheses:
1. A minority behaving consistently has influence at both manifest and latent
levels. On the other hand, an inconsistent minority has no influence at either level.
2. Where the changing of an explicit and well-structured norm is concerned
an effective minority must be composed of a group of individuals (in our case,
two), and not of a single individual.
3. A consistent minority exerts as much influence as a consistent but non-
unanimous majority.
4. A consistent minority exerts influence at both latent and manifest levels,
whereas a majority, whether unanimous or not, exerts influence only at the
manifest level?
5. The agents of minority influence are more readily accepted by the group
than the agents of majority influence.
These hypotheses suggest certain differences between the dynamics of con-
formity induced by a majority and the dynamics of innovation introduced by a
minority.
Before giving the results of this research, we shall describe briefly the experi-
mental design and the measures of the principal variables employed.

2. Experimental design

Since the research was intended to explore influence behaviour at three different
levels, the experimental design included the following sequential stages: (a) inter-
action, (b) investigation of latent response (test of colour discrimination), (c) post-
experimental questionnaire.

2. We would like to point out that influ- and private responses. While the individual
ence exerted on the manifest and latent can control his private responses, influence.
levels should not be confused with the on the latent level eludes such self-control.
distinction frequently made between public
152 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

2.1 Interaction
This stage corresponds to the classic situation used in the experimental study of
social influence. It involves opposing the opinion of the agent of influence to the
general opinion expressed by the various members of the group. We selected a
situation involving responses to structured stimuli with regard to which there are
established norms. The agent of influence contradicted the expressed judgment
of the other individuals.
Within the field of perception, we specifically selected colour vision. Colour-
naming is part of an objective and stable body of knowledge in a given culture.
It is based on cultural obviousness and is learned from childhood on; individuals
regard judgments of colour as self-evident. We chose stimuli which were called
‘blue’ by almost the whole of the control group and for which the agent of in-
fluence gave the deviant response ‘green’. The latter response, although plausible
for the material concerned, was statistically very rare.

2.1,l Experimental material

The actual presentation of the material was achieved by means of Kodak Wratten
filters 45A, permitting the passage of a beam of light of dominant wave length
483.5 mp. There were 42 trials in which the colour filter remained the same and
in which different neutral filters varied the light intensity by altering the amount
of light transmitted without changing the colour.
The experiment was presented as a study of colour vision. Subjects had to
judge the colour and variation in light intensity of each slide.3 They were asked
to respond with the names of the primary colours only, so as to avoid compromise
(intermediate shades). First of all, the experimenter made sure that no-one in the
group suffered from any defect of colour vision (Polack test). This also enabled
the experimenter to convince the subjects that the agent of influence had no
defect of colour vision either. After a series of trials, designed to reinforce the
subjects’ perception of ‘blue’, the critical stimuli were shown. There were 36
slides, presented in three series (each with twelve slides presented at one-minute
intervals). The experiment was conducted in darkness, the judgments being given
in a fixed order settled in advance. Except for responses to the stimuli, no com-
munication was allowed between subjects.
Different degrees of influence were introduced; the agents of influence, minor-

3. Responses in terms of light intensity will make the task more complex and more
not be analysed as they are not of direct realistic.
interest. We simply introduced them to
 Studies in social influence 111 153

ity or majority, consistent or inconsistent, were represented by the experimenter’s

confederates.

2.1.2 Minority, majority and behavioural style.

Consistent behavioural style is assumed to express a coherent point of view and
the conviction of those who maintain it. So far, its expression has been studied
at a simple level, in keeping with the simplified experimental set-up. Consistent
diachronistic (intraindividual) behaviour occurs when an individual maintains the
same response throughout the interaction. Consistent synchronistic (interindi-
vidual) behaviour occurs when the different individuals maintain the same re-
sponse (‘green’) in any trial. Let us now consider how behavioural style manifests
itself in minority and majority situations.

2.1.2.1 Minority
Three influence situations were created in which the source of influence was in a
minority, a consistent subgroup, a consistent individual and an inconsistent sub-
group:
1. The consistent minority of two individuals responded ‘green’ throughout
the interaction. The confederates were located at the first and fourth positions
in a group of six persons.
2. A consistent individual maintained the response ‘green’ throughout the
interaction. He was located at the first position in a group of four individuals.
3. Two inconsistent individuals sometimes gave the response ‘green’ and some-
times the response ‘Slue‘. The former response was given to 24 slides, the latter
to 12 slides in a random order independent of light intensity. The confederates
occupied positions one and four in a group of six individuals.

2.1.2.2 Majority
Two different situations were used here, unanimous and nonunanimous majority:
1. The unanimous majority, consisting of three confederates, gave the response
‘green’, with one naive subject. The subject was therefore confronted with a con-
sistent agent of influence, both synchronically and diachronically. The confeder-
ates occupied positions 1 , 2 and 3 in a group of four persons.
2. In the case of the nonunanimous majority. two naive subjects were con-
fronted with four confederates. These confederates always gave the response
‘green’, but for each naive subject the interindividual consistency of the majority
was broken by the other naive subject! The positions of the confederates were
varied in this situation, 1, 2. 3 and 4; 3, 4. 5 and 6 ; or 1. 2, 4 and 5 in a group
of six persons.
154 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

2.1.2.3 Control group

In the control group, the subjects gave their responses to the slides in writing,
without any influence used on them. Their judments served as a standard of
reference for the analysis of the behaviour of the experimental groups.
After describing the interaction stage, which allows us to study manifest in-
fluence, we must now describe the other two stages of the experiment.

2.2 Investigation of latent response (colour discrimination test)

This part of the experimental design was intended to study influence behaviour
beyond the manifest level of response. We wanted to go beyond the usual level
of analysis which does not really enable us to decide whether the modifications
that occurred represent a momentary and superficial change, or whether the
influence has more lasting effects on the subjects’ judgments, effects which may
have gone unnoticed in the course of the individuals’ conscious evaluations.
With regard to the response confIict over the colour-naming of the stimuli, we
wanted to see whether or not the code used by the subjects to distinguish blue
from green was modified by the influence and, if so, in what direction. In order
to do this, we made use of a classical method for measuring the differential thres-
hold. From a standard range of colours (Farnsworth 100 hue test), we selected 16
stimuli from the clearly blue wavelength to the clearly green wavelength, passing
through a range of ambiguous stimuli. We presented these stimuli ten times, in an
order determined from a table of random numbers. The subjects had to decidt
at each trial whether to name the stimulus ‘blue’ or ‘green’.
It was important for this test to seem independent from the previous test, so
as not to appear as a continuation of the influence situation. Accordingly, a
different experimenter conducted it. Responses were given individually, in writing,
and the experiment was presented as a study of the effects of fatigue on colour
vision.
The responses of each individual allowed us to establish the differential thres-
hold, and the upper and lower threshold^.^ Of course, we cannot distinguish be-
tween what represents a verbal change and what involves a genulnely perceptual

4. The other way of disrupting this con-
sistency is to use a single naive subject in
the group and one confederate in the
majority whose business it is to give respon-
ses that are different from those of the
other confederates (cf. Asch, 1956).
5. Differential threshold: when the stimulus
is judged ‘blue’ as frequently as it is judged
‘green’ (50 per cent/50 per cent). Lower
threshold: when the stimulus yields 75 per
cent ‘green’ responses and 25 per cent
‘blue’.
Upper threshold: when the stimulus yields
25 per cent ‘green’ responses and 75 per
cent ‘blue’.
 Studies in social influence Ill 155

change on the basis of these responses alone. At the present time, such a distinc-
tion seems to be quite a complex matter in colour vision (Goldiamond and Mal-
pass, 1958). That is why we called the object of study in this stage of our ex-
periment the ‘perceptual-cognitive code’, without specifying any further the level
involved. Since there has been very little research done on the latent effects of
influence, we regard the present experiment as a first attempt to approach this
problem. Since the problem is such an important one, we hope to be able to
develop more elaborate techniques of analysis, should the results of this experi-
ment prove to the positive?

2.3 Postexperimental questionnaire

One purpose of this experiment was to explore further such manifest responses
as could not be given during the interaction stage because of the strict limitation
imposed upon comm~nication.~ The questionnaire was intended to elicit informa-
tion about the way in which the subjects experienced the influence conflict, and
how they perceived the agent of the conflict, since the experiment did not provide
any other approach to this question. The questionnaire was mainly concerned
with (1) the perception of the stimuli, and (2) the perception of the agent of
influence. Each subject answered the questionnaire individually.
In order to better understand the responses given in the interaction stage, we
asked the subjects to state the extent to which they thought the responses ‘blue’
and ‘green’ corresponded with the stimulus material, and how much they per-
sonally agreed with each of their responses. We also tried to get some estimate
of the degree of response conflict occasioned by the various influence situations.
Before we can understand the factors underlying the influence of the minority
or of the majority, we must investigate how the subjects perceive the agent of
influence. Three dimensions seemed relevant for such an analysis: (1) the acknow-
ledged competence of the confederates, (2) the assurance which they showed in
their judgments in the eyes of the subjects, and (3) the sociometric status at-
tributed to them by the members of the group. We felt that by means of these
three indices we might be able to clarify the issue as to whether the confederates
owed their influence to some social superiority recognised by the subjects. or
whether their behavioural style might constitute an explanation.
After the questionnaire, the subjects gave their impressions and reported their

6. One of the rare studies attempting to because we were particularly interested in

approach this problem is by Flament (1958). this test, and it was important to avoid
7. The questionnaire was administered after influencing the subjects’ latent responses by
the colour discrimination test. This is their responses on the questionnaire.
156 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

reflections on the experiment in a final discussion, during which the experimenter

explained the true purpose of the research and the methods used to attain it.
Female students from the faculties of Arts, Pharmacy, and Law in Paris acted
as subjects in the experiment. All participants were paid.

3. Analysis bf the results

We shall analyse the results from each experimental stage successively, examining
the influence of the minority and that of the majority, and suggest that two types
of phenomena are involved.

3.1 Znteruction stage

The influence situation stimulated a response conflict with respect to a structured
stimulus which originally evoked ‘an almost unanimous response, as demonstrated
by the results from the control group. The fifty individuals who responded in
writing gave the response ‘blue’ in 98.78 per cent of their judgments. Thus the
response ‘green’ was not wholly unsupported but was found in only 1.22 per cent
of the judgments given by the control group. We can therefore conclude that the
stimulus induced a very strong consensus in our reference population and that the
response of the agent of influence was indeed at variance with a structured and
explicit norm.

3.1.1 Minority influence

Table 1 indicates the results obtained in the different experimental conditions
and in the control group. (a) In this kind of situation a consistent subgroup of
two individuals can modify the judgments expressed by the majority. Results

8. Three main indices were used in this
analysis: (a) the per cent of ‘green’ respon-
ses in relation to the total number of
judgments; (b) the per cent of groups in
which this judgment appears (‘influenced
groups’); and fc) the per cent of naive
subjects who respond ‘green’ (‘influenced
subjects’).
We regard as an ‘influenced group’ any
group in which at least three ‘green’ re-
sponses are given, and as an ‘influenced
subject’ any individual who gives a ‘green’
response at least once during the interaction.
The difference in the criteria adopted for
these two measures is justified by the fact
that there must be a minimum of ‘green’
responses in the group for the other naive
subjects to be aware of its existence,
whereas a single ‘green’ response retains its
salience for the subject who has given it in
the course of interaction.
Since the distribution of the results it not
normal, nonparametric methods will be used
in the analysis: the Mann-Whitney U-test
for the first measure, and the chi-square
test for the other two.
 Studies in social influence III 157

Table 1. Minority influence

Indices of influence
~

Experimental conditions and % of responses % of ‘influenced % of ‘influenced

number of groups ‘green’ groups’ subjects’
Consistent minority of two
individuals. 10 groups 10.07 50 42.50

Single consistent individual.

22 groups 1.22 14 15

Inconsistent minority of two

individuals. 11 groups 0.75 27 11
Control group. 50 individuals 1.22 - 6

show that judgments of ‘green’ represent 10.07 per cent of the responses. This
differs significantly from the responses of the control group ( z = 4.09, p < .001).
This effect is not due to a few exceptional individuals. In fact, this response
appears in 50 per cent of the groups and is given by 42.50 per cent of the indivi-
d u a l ~ (b)
. ~ Let us now consider the influence of a single consistent individual.
Responses of ‘green’ represent only 1.22 per cent, which does not differ signifi-
cantly from the control group. Thus it seems that a single individual, even if he
is consistent, does not modify the majority judgment in our experimental situa-
tion. He has significantly less influence than a consistent subgroup, which sup-
ports Hypothesis 2 (per cent ‘green’ responses, z = 3.39, p < .003; per cent
of ‘groups influenced’, X 2 = 4.83, .05 > p >
.01; per cent ‘individuals influ-
enced’, X z = 9.81, p < .Ol). (c) An inconsistent subgroup of two individuals has
no influence on the judgments of the majority. The results do not differ signifi-
cantly from those of the control group, but there is a significant difference with
respect to the results obtained from the consistent minority (per cent of ‘green’
responses, z = 3.38, p < .003; per cent of ‘individuals influenced’, X = 10.50,
p < .Ol). A minority subgroup thus has immediate influence only if it behaves
consistently. This finding confirms our first hypothesis.
On account of this quantitative analysis we feel more confident in recommend-
ing as a basic theoretical notion the idea that a minority’s style of behaviour may
be a decisive factor in the process of innovation. Moreover, at least in our ex-

9. These are the results from our previous tions referred to, in which we give complete
research (Moscivici et al., 1969). They cor- results for the three stages of the design.
respond to one of the experimental varia-
158 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

perimental situation, the minority must be represented by a subgroup of indivi-

duals in order to question the judgment of the majority; an isolated individual
cannot do so.

3.1.2 Majority influence

The results obtained in this condition are presented in Table 2. (a) When a
majority of three confederates exerts influence on an isolated individual, the
effect is tremendous (the response ‘green’ was given in 40.16 per cent of the
judgments made, and by 50 per cent of the subjects). This re-confirms the Asch
effect and demonstrates its stability. The consistent behavioural style of the
majority is sufficient to explain these results. In fact, if the synchronistic con-
sistency of the majority is broken, this influence is considerably lessened. (b)
When two naive subjects were confronted with four confederates, the ‘green’
response totalled only 12.07 per cent, as compared with 40.16 per cent obtained
in the preceding situation. This difference is significant at the .07 level ( z =
1.82).1° Influence is therefore less a matter of the numerical importance of the
majority than of its style of behaviour.

Table 2 . Majority influence

Indices of influence

Experimental conditions and % of responses % of ‘influenced % of ‘influenced

number of groups ‘green’ groups’ subjects’
Unanimous majority. 24 groups 40.16 50 50
Nonunanimous majority.
13 groups 12.07 31 35

3.1.3 Minority and majority influences

A consistent minority is less influential than a unanimous majority (10.07 per
cent of ‘green’ responses against 40.16 per cent, z = 1.98, significant at the
.05 level).
Conversely, a nonunanimous majority exerts no more influence than a con-
sistent minority. None of the three indices we considered indicates a significant

10. We also analysed the influence of the this factor does have some effect. Subjects
nonunanimous majority as a function of its are less influenced when they answer at the
position in the group. The results show that beginning than at the end.
 Studies in social influence I l l 159

difference in this respect (cf. Tables 1 and 2). The predictions of Hypothesis 3
are thus verified."
We are still left with the problem of understanding the nature of the minority
and majority influences. We must decide whether they involve similar or dif-
ferent mechanisms, whether they induce similar or different effects. The second
stage of our experimental design enables us to approach this problem.

3.2 Investigation of latent response (test of colour discrimination)

In order to study the behaviour of subjects beyond the opinions which they ex-
pressed when faced with social influence, we wanted to study their latent attitude
and such modifications thereof as might have occurred as a result of the influence
which they had experienced. We wanted to know whether at this level the in-
fluence of the minority was at all different from the influence of the majority.
According to the postexperimental interviews conducted by Asch, it would
appear that the majority influence was limited to a superficial level. In this case,
subjects adhere to the opinion of the agent of influence without modifying their
real opinion and return to their own judgment as soon as the interaction situation
is ended. On the basis of our first investigations, however, we felt that the in-
fluence of the minority might persist beyond the actual interaction and that the
manifest responses might not reflect all that was going on.
It is scarcely surprising that minority and majority pressures differ very greatly
in their effects. A unanimous majority leaves the naive subject in total isolation
if he does not join them. He is thus constrained to accept the majority response
in order to avoid conflict, but once this situation is over, the subject returns with-
out difficulty to his previous response. Minority pressure does not by any means
constitute the same kind of threat; subjects thus have less reason to adopt a
superficial form of behaviour. On the other hand, it is not impossible for a con-
sistent minority opinion to re-structure their long-term view, even though such
effects may not be immediate.
We shall now examine the latent change ensuing upon the exercise of influence.
To this end we shall examine the code which the subjects employed in distin-
guishing the two colours 'blue' and 'green'. without having experienced the in-
fluence of others (control group), and after having experienced it. A comparison
of these two groups should provide us with an answer to the questions raised.

11. In order to generalise this finding to minority and majority subgroups. This issue
larger groups, it would be necessary to could not be reduced to a mere question
first study the criteria for the perception of of numbers.
160 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

In this analysis, we shall use as indices the differential threshold and the upper
and lower thresholds established from individual responses. The displacement
of these indices with respect to the control group data will be taken to indicate a
change in the perceptual-cognitive code. A wide dispersion of scores will be
taken as an index of conflict to which the subjects react in different ways.12 It
will also be interesting to study the responses of subjects according to their
behaviour in the interaction phase. Let us first examine the effects of minority
influence and then those of majority influence.

3.2.1 Minority
Table 3 indicates the displacement of response of the experimental groups from
those of the control group. Table 4 shows the dispersion of these responses.
(a) Subjects who were confronted with a consistent minority of two individuals
modified their perceptual-cognitive code after their interaction in the influence
situation. They displaced their judgments, as compared with those of the control
group, calling those stimuli ’green’ which the control group still called ‘blue’.
This displacement was significant for all three measures, as shown in Table 3.
This reaction is not exclusively due to the subjects who were ‘influenced’ during
the interaction phase, for it is found to the same degree in those individuals who
responded ‘green’ as in those who persisted in giving the response ‘blue‘. There
is no significant difference between these two groups.

Table 3 . Displacement of responses as compared with control group responses

Thresholds

Experimental conditions Lower Differential Upper

Consistent minority of two t = 1.68 t = 1.78 t = 2.33
individuals p = .05* p = .04* p = .01*
Single consistent individual n.s. ns. n.s.
Xnconsistent minority of two
n.s. n.s. ns.
individuals

* One-tailed test

12. The displacement is measured by the
Student t-test, comparing the results of the
experimental groups with the results of the
control group.
Dispersion is measured by the variance
homogeneity test (Winer, 1962, p. 33), com-
paring the variance in the experimental
group with that of the control group: F =
VI
- the degrees of freedom being, respec.
v2’
tively, (n, - 1) and (nz - 1).
 Studies in social influence III 161

Our examination of the latent response therefore reveals more important effects of
the influence than was initially indicated in the manifest responses. In other words,
subjects were influenced by the minority whether or not they showed the effects
of this influence in the interaction stage of the experiment. This aspect of our
findings would seem to be of particular importance in that it shows clearly that
the manifest response does not reflect all aspects of influence behaviour. A certain
range of responses, however, indicates that the displacement of threshold varied
from subject to subject (differential threshold and upper thre’shold). This latent
influence effect, which we had been hoping to demonstrate, depends upon the
number of persons that make up the minority and upon its behavioural style.

Table 4. Dispersion of responses as compared with control group responses

Thresholds

Experimental conditions Lower Differential Upper

F = 1.88 F = 1.71
Consistent min ’ ”
Or no difference d f = 39/49 d f = 39/49
individuals .01 < p <.05 p = .05
F = 1.77 F = 1.68
Single consistent individual d f = 65/49 d f = 65/59 no difference
.01 < p <.05 p = .05
Inconsistent minority of two
individuals no difference no difference no difference

(b) A single consistent individual, isolated in the group, does not produce this
effect. No significant displacement of thresholds is to be found in this situation.
The only effect which occurs concerns the range of responses (differential thres-
hold and lower threshold). This finding appears to be due to the fact that some
subjects generalised the notion ‘blue’, and others the notion ‘green’, but it is
impossible to establish a systematic effect at this level in view of the disproportion
between the ‘influenced’ and the uninfluenced subjects. (c) The same is true, in
this experiment, of the influence effects of an inconsistent minority. There is no
difference between the experimental groups and the control group in either
displacement or range of responses.
The influence of a consistent minority therefore has deep-lying effects. It is not
limited to a modification of manifest responses but involves a change at the level
of the perceptual-cognitive code underlying the manifest responses. Moreover,
these effects are more pervasive than the foregoing quantitative analysis indicates,
162 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

since they affect the majority of the individuals who were confronted with this
minority. But latent influence, like manifest influence, depends upon the behav-
ioural style of the agent of influence and its numerical strength in the group. A
minority which has no manifest effect has no latent effect either. It remains to be
seen whether this phenomenon is specific to minority influence, as we hypothesised,
or if it is also to be found with majority influence.

3.2.2 Majority
It will be recalled that a naive subject exposed to the influence of a unanimous
majority was, in general, persuaded to share the majority opinion. What lies be-
hind this influence? Did the subjects modify the basis of their colour-naming
after the interaction, or did this basis remain unchanged in spite of the influence
at the manifest level? (a) The results of the second stage of the experiment show
that there is apparently no modification of latent judgments. The differential
threshold was not displaced in comparison with that of the control group; and
there was no significant difference in the dispersion of responses. The only positive
result concerns the behaviour of the subjects who were ‘influenced’ during the
interaction phase. These subjects generalised the response ‘green’ for the upper-
limit threshold to a greater extent than the control group did ( t = 2.02, .05 >
p > .01). For the other measures, no such results were found. Thus no deep-
lying modification of judgment can be inferred from the effects of majority in-
fluence.

Table 5. Displacemerit of responses as compared with control group responses

Thresholds

Experimental conditions Lower Differential Upper

Unanimous majority no difference” no difference no difference
Nonunanimous majority no difference no difference no difference
* Only those subjects who were ‘influenced’ differed from the control-group responses.

Apparently then, subjects yield to majority pressure during the interaction, but
this submission is superficial, and the subjects do not really assimilate the judg-
ment of the agent of influe2ce. This suggests that minority influence and majority
influence involve different mechanisms. Further confirmation of this is provided
by the results from the ponunanimous majority situation which indicate the same
tendency. (b) Here the perceptual-cognitive code of the subjects also remained
 Studies in social influence 111 163

Table 6 . Dispersion of responses as compared with control group responses

Thresholds

Experimental conditions Lower Differential upper

Unanimous majority no difference no difference no difference
F = 1.79 F = 1.79
Nonunanimous majority df = 51/49 df = 51/49 no difference
.01 < p <.05 .01 < p <.05

unchanged after the influence situation. However, there was a greater range of
responses than in the control group (differential threshold and lower threshold).
This finding seems to be due to the fact that some subjects persisted in judging
stimuli as ‘blue’ which were regarded as ‘green’ by the control group. Unfor-
tunately we cannot show that there is a systematic tendency here. If we could,
this would have indicated a polarisation of judgments. But the responses of the
‘influenced’ subjects do not differ from those of the ‘noninfluenced‘ subjects.
Thus, there does not appear to be any major finding concerning the modification
of latent response as a result of majority influence, unanimous or nonunanimous.
This stage of the experiment has enabled us to show that minority and majority
influences differ in nature. A minority, without obtaining substantial acceptance
of its point of view at the manifest level, can nevertheless influence subjects to
revise the very basis of their judgments, while a majority can make them almost
all accept its point of view, if it is unanimous, without affecting the underlying
perceptual-cognitive system. In other words, majority influence works on the
surface while minority influence has deep-lying effects. Our fourth hypothesis is
therefore confirmed.
This finding has important implications for the analysis of influence processes
because it suggests that different long-term effects may be attributed to innova-
tion and conformity. Since the present research is only the first of its kind, it
would seem that further research is called for. There is a need for new ex-
perimental techniques capable of analysing latent processes.” But it would appear
indisputable at the present time that the quantitative study of manifest judgments
will not suffice to increase our knowledge of the processes of influence, and, in
particular, will not suffice to enable us to comprehend the particular nature of
innovation compared with conformity.

13. I t would be particularly interesting to without recourse to intervening verbal re-

develop an experimental arrangement sponses.
enabling us to study perceptual change
164 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

The data from these two experimental phases support our hypotheses and
contribute to the analysis of innovation in relation to our previous findings. It
seems at present to be the case that a consistent minority can influence a majority
and modify structured and explicit norms. This modification occurs at a deep-
lying level, unlike the superficial effects induced by majority inf1~ence.l~
But the
behavioural style of the source of influence has a decisive role in this process,
and the numerical strength of the minority is also significant. To clarify the in-
fluence conflict, let us now consider the findings of the third stage of the ex-
periment.

3.3 Postexperimental questionnaire

The objective of this experiment was twofold: first, to get more detailed informa-
tion on the perception of the coloured slides, since the interaction phase limited
responses to ‘blue’ or ‘green’, and, secondly, to study the perception of the agent
of influence and the resulting interindividual relations. Accordingly, there were
two kinds of items in the questionnaire, which we shall now consider successively.

3.3.1 Perception of the stimuli

The questions enable us to investigate individual reactions to the coloured slides
when the subjects are no longer under direct influence. It was hoped that responses
might provide information on the general adequacy of the norm ‘blue’ and ‘green’
for this material (questions 3 and 5 ) , on individual judgment when confronted
with the slides (questions 4 and 6), and on the degree of response conflict ex-
perienced (questions 7 and 8).15 This last point requires further attention. It would
be remembered that the stimuli were of one colour only, variation being solely in

14. The same conclusion has been recently responses.

obtained with the Muller-Lyer illusion, in
an unpublished paper by Mugny (University
of Geneva). While the majority can only
change the overt answers of the subjects,
the minority influences their subjective
perceptions as well.
15. In questions 3 and 5, individuals were
asked to indicate on a scale from 0 to 100
the extent to which the responses ‘green’ and
‘blue’ appeared to them to be possible re-
sponses t o the material.
Questions 4 and 6 used a similar scale to
determine the extent to which individuals
personally agreed with each of the two
In question 7,they had to name the dif-
ferent colours o r shades which they dis-
tinguished in the material. For question 8,
they had to indicate in percentages the
importance of the different constituents
involved in the colours or shades they had
previously distinguished.
Nonparametric techniques were used in
the analysis of this data because of the non-
normal distribution. The main test used was
the Mann-Whitney U-test. The median test
was also used when that seemed more ap-
propriate to the data.
 Studies in social influence IZZ 165

light intensity. If subjects were to show a tendency to differentiate more shades

or colours than the control group, we might feel that a significant conflict was
involved and that the recognition of a variety of colours provided justification for
the occurrence of both responses, ‘blue’ and ‘green’. Similarly, a high proportion
of ‘green’ responses to these slides might be taken as validating the response of
the source of influence. Thus the responses of the control group serve as a point
of reference for the study of the effects of the influence of a minority or majority
source of influence, whether consistent or inconsistent.

3.3.1.1 Minority

Consistent minority. WKile consistency is a critical factor in influence, as the

results of this part of the questionnaire indicate, it nevertheless operates in the
same way whether the minority be represented by two individuals or by one. We
shall consider the effects of such influence in more detail.
The experimental subjects accept the response ‘green’ significantly more fre-
quently than the control group, especially at the personal level (question 4: two
confederates, z = 2.64, p .008; one confederate, z = 1.98, p .05). Similarly,
consistent judgment provokes a significant response conflict (questions 7 and 8).
The experhental subjects in fact distinguish several shades (or colours) in the
material, while the control group distinguishes only one (two confederates, z =
2.12, p .03; one confederate, z = 3.75, p < .003). The proportion of green
responses is important (two confederates, z = 2.99, p < .003;one confederate,
i = 1.69, p 0 2 ) .
The significance of these results is emphasised by the fact that subjects credited
themselves with the response ‘green’ during the interaction phase.
Just as the questionnaire indicates the effects of influence on the response
‘green’, so it indicates the lack of change in the response ‘blue’. No significant
difference was found with respect to the response ‘blue’ (questions 5 and 6). It
was as though the subjects had accepted the response ‘green’ without changing
the perceptual evidence for the blue one.

Inconsistent minority. Here the responses of the subjects differed little from those
of the control group. They were not inclined to adopt the response ‘green’ as their
own (question 4). In judging the slides, they did not use this response any more
frequently than the control group (question 8). At the very most, they more fre-
quently regarded the response ‘green’ as a possible response to the stimulus
(question 3; z = 2.86, p .004). The number .of shades distinguished indicates
that they were not entirely immune to the response conflict induced by the in-
166 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

consistent confederates (question 7; z = 2.37, p = .07).This third experiment

thus confirms the foregoing results by indicating that consistent behavioural style
really does act as a source of influence in innovation.
In the case of consistent behaviour, however, the impact of an isolated indivi-
dual and that of a subgroup seem to be equivalent at this level, something we
had not previously found. Even if these findings do not unambiguously support
our previous findings, they are not contradictory. We found that an isolated
individual did not create sufficient conflict to modify the subjects’ manifest re-
sponses or to affect latent responses. But we have never suggested that an isolated
individual can exert no influence at all. The quasi-physical standard which we
used tends to minimise this influence. The questionnaire shows that it did in fact
have some effect. At this level, a consistent individual exerts as much influence
as two consistent individuals. and more than an inconsistent minority. This is not
without interest.
The responses to the postexperimental questionnaire support the findings from
the interaction stage, since the items refer directly to the previous responses and
subjects have full control of the opinions they express. In other words, this part
of the investigation tells us more about the manifest response than about any
modifications at the latent level. And here the findings are indeed consistent.
Subjects accept the response ‘green’ without the norm ‘blue’ being at once ques-
tioned. In fact, they generalise their opinion on the basis of the judgments made
during the interaction phase. It would thus seem that a new norm cannot replace
the old norm without an intermediate stage represented by the modification of
latent judgments. The dynamics of social change suggested here require further
investigation.

3.3.1.2 Majority
Unanimous majority. The questionnaire shows that in this situation subjects tried
to resolve the response conflict in which they found themselves by regarding
the responses ‘blue’ and ‘green’ as equally plausible for the stimulus material.
Their responses did indeed differ from those of the control group in this way. The
response ‘green’ was accepted by the subjects as plausible (question 3; z = 3.61,
p < .003) and their personal judgment supported this (question 4; z = 2.13,
p .03). At the same time, however, the response ‘blue’ loses being convincing as
perceptual evidence (question 5, z = 3.52, p < .003; question 6, z = 2.01, p .04).
Both responses were regarded as equally likely for these slides. They also distin-
guished significantly more shades (question 8; z = 1.70, p .06). These findings
are further emphasised by the fact that subjects returned to the response ‘green’
during interaction.
 Studies in social influence III 167

All these findings clearly confirm our findings for manifest responses. The
naive subject, exposed to a unanimous judgment at variance with his, is induced
to accept this point of view and to doubt the generality of his own response, al-
though it rests on sound evidence.
This agreement, due to influence and persisting in the postexperimental ques-
tionnaire, nevertheless represents a superficial agreement, as we showed by means
of the colour discrimination test. The responses to the questionnaire enable us to
propound an explanation of the acute conflict which the subjects experienced.
Although they came to doubt the evidence for their judgments, they did not
modify their criteria of ‘blue’ and ‘green’. Powerful constraint seems to exert
great influence and to provoke acute conflict without apparently inducing any
profound change in the subjects’ thinking.

Nonunanimous majority. These subjects, who appeared to be less influenced at

the level of manifest responses than those in the preceding situation, seemed to
be equally less influenced on the basis of the questionnaire. Although they ac-
cepted the response ‘blue’ and the response ‘green’ as plausible for these slides
{question 3, z = 4.93, p < .003; question 5, z = 3.18 p .003),they did not alter
their own personal position with respect to the response ‘green’ (question 4).
Similarly, the absence of significant results for questions 7 and 8 indicates that
the subjects experienced the influence situation as much less conflict-producing
than in the previous situation. It would thus appear that the responses to the
questionnaire again enable us to differentiate between minority and majority
influence.

3.3.1.3 Consistent minority and nonunanimous majority

Generally speaking, the response ‘green’ was accepted by subjects confronted
with a majority, but, at the same time, the judgment conflict was less felt by them
than by the subjects confronted with a minority. Indeed, although in those two
situations subjects adopted a comparable position with regard to the response
‘green’ (question 4), those who were confronted with the majority showed a
greater tendency to regard this response as plausible (question 3; z = 4.49
p < .003),while the subjects confronted with the minority were more likely to
maintain the response ‘blue’ (question 5; z = 3.60, p < .003). On the other hand
question 7 indicates that the influence conflict was experienced more acutely by
subjects confronted with a minority; those were indeed the subjects who distin-
guished the greatest number of shades in the range of stimuli presented {X2=
3.88, p .05). But the importance which subjects assigned to green and blue in the
constitution of these shades is the same for both experimental conditions. The
168 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

effects produced by these two influence situations are thus not identical, although
the manifest responses are quantitatively similar. The colour discrimination test
indicates two distinct phenomena: Innovation leads to a deep-lying transformation
of judgments while conformity is represented mainly by superficial agreement.

3.3.2 The perception of others

This part of the questionnaire was intended to study the perception which naive
subjects have of the agent of influence when the latter occupies a minority or a
majority place in the group, and whether it adopts a consistent or inconsistent
behavioural style. We thus hoped to be able to cast further light upon the factors
upon which influence depends in each of these situations.
According to our theoretical analysis of innovation, the influence of the minority
should not be attributed to any superior competence or status but should be a
function of its behavioural style. Accordingly, the degree of conviction and assur-
ance shown by the minority in its judgment should be a sufficient explanation of
its impact. It should also be interesting to compare the factors which contribute
to majority influence.
In view of these aims, the items of this part of the questionnaire were concern-
ed with the competence, assurance and sociometric status of individuals. The
subjects were required to estimate the competence of each member of the group
on an ll-point scale from zero to ten in respect of perception of light intensity
(question 9) and of colour (question lo), and then to grade the other subjects
according to their degree of assurance when giving their responses (question 11).
Finally, they were required to choose, to reject and to indicate a leader from
among themselves, with an eye to a future experiment (question 12).**The control
group was naturally not involved in this part of the questionnaire, since it had
responded in writing during the interaction stage. We shall examine first the per-
ception of the minority agent of influence and then the majority agent.

3.3.2.1 Perception of minority

Competence assigned to the minority. Our findings indicate that the minority is
judged incompetent in evaluating colour, regardless of behavioural style (con-
sistent or inconsistent) and regardless of its numerical significance (one or two
confederates). In fact, in all three experimental conditions, the naive subjects
considered themselves to be more competent in this respect than the agent of

16. In this analysis, Student’s t-test was used was applied when more than two measures
when appropriate, namely, for independent were being compared. In question 12, the
or correlated samples. The Friedman test measure used was the chi-square.
 Studies in social influence 111 169

influence, whether they responded ‘green’ or not during the interaction stage.
Question 10:
Consistent minority of two confederates t = 7.02, p < . 0 0 1
Consistent minority of one confederate t = 10.58, p < .001
Inconsistent minority of two confederates t = 5.00, p < .001
From these resuIts it appears that behavioural style is irrelevant to this assess-
ment. The inconsistent minority, which answered ‘blue’ intermittently, was not
judged to be more competent than the minority which exclusively gave the an-
swer ‘green’.
Where the minority is represented by two individuals, the subjects seem to
judge the first of the two confederates more severely than the second (consistent
minority, t = 2.27, .05 > p > .02; inconsistent minority, t = 3.05, .01 >
p < .001). It is as if the subjects held the first individual responsible for the
response ‘green’, while in fact both confederates make the same judgment.
It is therefore not surprising to find that a single consistent individual is judged
as even less competent than two consistent individuals (question 10; t = 1.97,
p .05). Naive subjects do not regard him as fit to judge either the colour of the
slides ( t = 10.85, p < .OOl) or their light intensity ( t = 2.70, p .01).
These findings all clearly indicate that minority influence can not be explained
by the fact that subjects attribute more competence to the minority in colour-
naming. How then are we to explain this influence?

Degree of assurance attributed to the minority. We may recall that previously

we attributed the influence exterted by the minority to its consistent behaviour.
If subjects do not regard a consistent minority as more competent, we should at
least expect them to regard such a minority as being more sure of their judg-
ments than the subjects are. In fact, the naive subject does attribute a greater
degree of assurance to a consistent minority of two than to himself (question 1 1 ;
t = 2.35, .05 > p > .02). Moreover, subjects do not attribute the same degree
of assurance to the two individuals composing this minority. The first is judged
to be more sure than the second (question 11; t = 3.22, .01 > p > .OOl), while
he had just been judged less competent. The first confederate thus seems to have
the initiative with respect to the deviant response.
This assumed assurance depends upon the behavioural consistency of the minor-
ity. In fact, if the minority is inconsistent in its behaviour, subjects no longer
attribute to it any special assurance.
We must, however, distinguish between the consistent minority of two and
that of a single individual. The isolated confederate, in spite of his consistent
behaviour, is not perceived as any more assured than the naive subjects. I t would
170 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Luge

therefore appear that assurance depends upon the existence of a subgroup. We

may now ask whether, if this influence is attributed to the consistency of two
confederates, subjects show any tendency to attribute to them a special socio-
metric status.

Choices, rejections and leader designation. The individuals who form a con-
sistent minority do not differ in any way sociometrically from naive subjects.
They are not more frequently designated as leaders, nor more often chosen, nor
more often rejected. On the other hand, a consistent isolated individual is signifi-
cantly more rejected than the other members of a group (question 12; X 2 = 21.71,
p < .001). The same is true of the inconsistent minority of two confederates
(question 12; x2 = 12.15, p < ,001). In both these cases, the agent of influence
is regarded above all as a source of disturbance.
From these findings it would seem that a consistent minority appears attractive
in so far as subjects regard it as being more assured than they are. This does not,
however, imply that the minority is seen as being more powerful.

3.3.2.2 Perception of majority

Competence assigned to majority. Just as the minority, whatever its numerical

importance or its behavioural style, is regarded as more incompetent than the
majority, so the judgments made by the minority on the competence of the
majority depend on whether the majority is unanimous or not. One naive subject,
confronted with three confederates who all say that all the slides are green,
regards them as being as competent as he is. On the other hand, when two sub-
jects are confronted with four confederates, in the same conditions, they react
like a majority faced with a minority. In other words, they consider themselves
to be more competent than the confederates at judging the colour of the stimuli
(question 10; t = 5.11, p < .OOl).

Assurance attributed to the majority. All the naive subjects regarded them-
selves as less assured when confronted with a unanimous majority, whatever their
response during the interaction stage (question 1 1 ; t = 3.98, p < .001). This
finding is once more a function of their isolation; if the unanimity of the majority
is broken, this is enough for the two naive subjects to regard themselves as just
as assured as the confederates.
The conflict induced by the majority is thus essentially the consequence of its
behavioural style. The pressure exercised on the isolated subject makes him doubt
both his competence and his assurance. On the other hand, when two naive sub-
 Studies in social influence III 171

jects are confronted with a majority, they question its competence and retain
their own assurance.
Choices, rejections and leader designation. For a unanimous majority, we can
only compare the sociometric responses concerning the different confederates.
since a single naive subject cannot chose or reject himself. The only significant
result here indicates that the first confederate is less rejected than the other two
(question 12: X = 3.49, .I0 > p > .05). For a nonunanimous majority, the
naive subjects reject the confederates significantly more frequently than they
reject their partner (question 12: x2 = 5.82. p .02).

3.3.2.3 Consistent minority and nonunanimous majority

Whether the response 'green' is given by the minority or by the majority. the
source of influence is regarded as less competent than the naive subjects. But if
we consider only the judgments made by the subjects of themselves. those who
were confronted with a majority regarded themselves more favourably than those
who were confronted with a minority (question 9: t = 2.95. .01 > p > .001;
question 10: t = 2.02, p .05).
The data on assurance reinforce this finding. Naive subjects regard themselves
as less assured than a consistent minority but as assured as ;L nonunanimous
majority. Moreover, a minority is neither particularly chosen nor particularly
rejected by the subjects. whereas a majority of confederates is quite conclusively
rejected.
The role of a pole of persuasion thus seems to be recognised as belonging more
to the minority than to the majority in the influence processes which take place
in groups. The majority influences subjects by its numerical weight, while the
minority owes its influence entirelv to its behavioural style. It follows that indivi-
duals recognise in the minority a power of attraction which they do not allow to
the majority. The results of the postexperimental questionnaire thus support
Hypothesis 5 and show that the pressure exerted by a minority is more readily
accepted by the subjects than a corresponding pressure exerted by a majority.

4. Discussion and conclusion

We set out in this article to give a more detailed analysis of the phenomenon of
innovation, starting from our previous research on the subject, and to compare
it with the phenomenon of conformity. The analysis was carried out at three
levels - that of manifest influence behaviour. that of latent influence behaviour,
and that of interindividual relations.
172 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage

One result of this research suggests that a minority may influence a structured
and explicit norm. This influence is first noticeable at the manifest level and is as
great here as that of a majority in a comparable situation. But the impact of the
minority extends beyond this. Individuals assimilate the opinion of the agent of
influence at a latent level and their underlying response code is thereby modified.
This process effectively holds for all individuals, whatever their attitude during
interaction; and this indicates that the extent of minority influence is much greater
than analysis of explicit judgments would suggest.
All our results agree in attributing to consistent behavioural style the function
of a genuine source of influence in the process of innovation. If a minority can
influence majority opinion, it is due neither to the competence of the individuals
who constitute the minority. nor to their position of leadership, but solely to their
conviction and coherence. Such a behavioural style engenders an influence con-
flict, both cognitive and relational, which can explain the observed phenomena.
It would appear that the minority must be represented by a subgroup of indivi-
duals to become influential. What is involved is not, to repeat. a matter of num-
bers but of the dynamics of conflict in which each member of the minority plays,
in the eyes of the others. a differentiated role which is an essential part of the
process by which the majority opinion is brought into question. The initiative for
the deviant response falls upon the first individual to introduce it into the group,
while the second individual brings a kind of social warning to this point of view
and ensures that it is not regarded as a purely individual aberration, as may happen
in the case of a single individual giving the deviant response.
Thus we see that consistency acts not so much as an individual variable but
rather as a variable which affects the structure of interaction. A consistent minor-
ity achieves social recognition of its qualities in the eyes of others; individuals
seem to admire the courage and audacity of the agent of influence. The azent of
influence thus becomes a pole of persuasion, without however being invested
with authority and without the members of the group joining it because of a need
for affiliation. The attraction exerted by individuals who are coherent and con-
sistent. although in a minority, cannot be explained in terms of the factors to
which social influence is traditionally ascribed. The study of innovation thus
forces us to reconsider the theoretical analysis of influence processes.
We also made some attempt to compare innovation and conformity. In order
to do so. we reproduced the Asch phenomenon with our experimental material.
We confirmed the findings of Asch himself, namely, that the influence of the
majority is overwhelming at the manifest level, provided the majority is unani-
mous. The disruption of the interindividual consistency of the majority consider-
ably diminishes its impact. Behavioural style thus appears to play the role of a
 Studies in social influence ZII 173

general source of influence and is not specific to the phenomenon of innovation.

Whatever the behavioural style of the majority, our results seem to indicate
that its influence is limited to modifying manifest responses, without there being
any change in latent responses. In other words, this effsct is superficial and does
not affect individuals’ real opinion. Again, majority pressure seems to engender
different relations in the group from those engendered by minority pressure. In
the case of an isolated individual, the majority forces him to recognise its com-
petence and assurance. But, in the case of several individuals, it no longer has
such an effect: The majority is shorn of its superior qualities as compared with
the other individuals, in respect of both competence and assurance. In a group, a
majority appears to be less attractive than a consistent minority. All the differ-
ences which have appeared between the mechanisms of influence engendered
by innovation and those engendered by conformity have considerable theoretical
importance. They suggest that the two processes have different long-term effects.
These findings should be confirmed and furthered by future research.

REFERENCES

Asch, S. E. (1956), Studies of independence M. (1969). Influence of a consistent

and conformity. Psychol. Mono. 70,
416.
Faucheux, C., and Moscivici, S. (1967), Le
style de comportement d’une minorit6
et son influence sur les reponses d’une
majorit&. Bull. CERP, 16 (4), 337-360.
Flament, C. (1958), Influence sociale et per-
ception. Annte psychol. 51, 378-400.
Goldiamond, I., and Malpass, L. F. (1958),
Locus of hypnotically induced changes
in colour responses. J . opt. SOC. Amer.,
51, 1117-1121.
Moscovici, S., Lage, E., and Naffrechoux,
minority on the response of majority
in a color perception task. Sociometry,
32, 365-380.
- and Faucheux, C. (1972), Social influ-
ence, conformity bias and the study of
active minorities. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),
Advances in experimental social psy-
chology. New York, Academic Press.
V O ~6,. 149-202.
Winer, B. J. (1962), Statistical principles in ex-
perimental design. New York, McGraw-
Hill.

Rbumk Zusammenfassung

Cette Ctude expCrimentale avait pour but Diese experimentelle Studie zielte darauf ab,
d’analyser les rnkcanismes de l’influence die Beeinflussungsmechanismen zu untersu-
impIiquCs dans Ies deux phtnornknes fonc- chen, die rnit den zwei funktional entgegen-
tionnellement contraires de l’innovation et gesetzten Phanomenen der Innovation und
174 Serge Moscovici and Elisabeth Lage
d u conformisme. Nous avons pendant plu-
sieurs anntes effect& des recherches sur
I’innovation par suite de son importance in-
trinssque et du nombre limit6 d’6tudes qui
lui avaient et6 consacr6es.
Dans le prtsent article, nous nous som-
mes efforcC, non seulement d‘analyser plus
attentivement la question mais aussi d’effec-
tuer une comparaison entre les effets de
I’innovation et ceux du conformisme. Nous
avons en particulier essay6 de dimontrer
que le style de coniportement constituait
une source gCnCrale d’influence pour les
deux phinomtnes itudits dans lesquels des
jugements manifestes Ctaient exprim& Ce-
pendant, Ies effets latents de I’influence peu-
vent ne pas Stre les m h e s pour I’innovation
et le conformisme.
Pour pouvoir analyser ces probltmes,
now avons mis au point une expkrience en
trois parties. La premiere avait pour but
ti’Ctudier le mtcanisme de I’influence mani-
feste sur un jugement quasi physique fond6
sur un truisme culturel. La deuuikme partie
portait sur l’analyse des modifications la-
tentes que cette influence apportnit au code
perceptif et cognitif. La troisitme partie.
prtsentCe sous forme d’un questionnaire
post-exp&rimental,visait ?I fournir des infor-
mations sur divers aspects de la question, y
compris sur la manikre dont les sujets per-
cevaient l’agent d’influence. Lc principal
but de cette experience etait d‘etudier les
variations, au sein d’un groupe, du rapport
majorit6 ou minorit6 par rapport B I’agent
d’influence ainsi que son style de compor-
tement. cohtrent ou non coherent.
Les rCsultats que nous avons obtenus in-
diquent que la coherence de comportement
constituait le facteur determinant de l’in-
fluence exercte aussi bien par la majoritt
que la minoriti. Mais tandis que dam le
cas du conformisme I’influence se limite B
modifier les jugements manifestes. dans ce-
lui de l’innovation. elle modifie le code
perceptif-cognitif qui est Four-jacent ?I ces
jugements
Konformitat verkniipft sind. Aus Griinden
der besonderen Bedeutung und der be-
schrankten Forschung in diesem Bereich
beschaftigten wir uns bereits seit einigen
Jahren mit dem ersten dieser beiden Phano-
mene.
Im vorliegenden Artikel haben wir ver-
sucht, die Position nicht nur griindlicher zu
analysieren, sondern auch die Effekte von
Innovation mit denen von Konformitat zu
vergleichen. Insbesondere versuchten wir zu
zeigen, daI3 der Verhaltensstil als allgemei-
ne Quelle von EinfluSnahme bei beiden er-
wahnten Phanomenen wirksam ist, sofern
manifeste Urteile erforderlich sind. Auf der
anderen Seite konnen die latenten Effekte
von EinfluBnahme bei Innovation und Kon-
formitat verschieden sein.
Um diese Fragen niiher zu untersuchen,
haben wir ein experimentelles Design aus
drei Teilen entwickelt. Der erste Teil sollte
die manifeste EinfluBnahme auf ein quasi-
physikalisches Urteil erforschen, bei wel-
chem hohe kulturelle Ubereinstimmung vor-
herrscht. Der 7weite Teil diente der Erfor-
schung von latenten Veranderungen im ‘per-
ceptual-cognitive code’, die auf die EinfluB-
nahme zuriickgefiihrt werden konnen. Der
dritte Tei! sollte in Form eines postexperi-
mentellen Fragebogens Informationen iiber
verschiedene Aspekte liefern, einschlieDlich
dariiber, wie die Vpn die EinfluR ausiibende
Tnstanz (Einzelperson oder Untergruppe)
w a hrnahmen.
Der Hauptzweck der experimentellen Ma-
nipulationen diente der Variation des Mi-
noritats- oder des Majoritatsverhaltnisses
der EinfluRnahme ausubenden Instanz in-
nerhalb einer Gruppe, sowie der Variation
ihres Verhaltensstils, der entweder konse-
quent oder unbestandig sein konnte. Die
wichtipsten Ergebnisse zeigen. daf3 die Ver-
haltenskonsequenz den Hauptfaktor fur die
EinfluBnahme darstellt, egal, ob sie von der
Majoritat oder von der Minoritat ausgeiibt
wird. Aber wahrend in der Konformitatsbe-
dingung die EinffuRnahme auf die Veran-
derung manifester Urteile beschrankt bleibt,
wird in der Innovationsbedingung auch der
‘perceptual-cognitive code’ verandert. der
den Urteilen zugrunde liegt.