Jorg Meurkes

Contact Information 13 Carmelite Lane, AB116LZ, +31 – 6 535 959 06

Aberdeen, Scotland +44 – 7 828 626 369
j.meurkes.19@abdn.ac.uk
jorg.meurkes@gmail.com

EDUCATION PhD-Candidate in Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, 2019 – Present.

•Thesis: 'Kant and the Problem of Synthetic Unity.’ Supervision: Beth Lord
and Ritu Vij.

MA in Cultural Analysis, University of Amsterdam, 2012 – 2015.

• Thesis: “Nostalgia for the Future: On Metamodernism and Modernity.”
Supervision: Murat Aydemir and Joost de Bloois)

BA in History, University of Amsterdam, 2008-2012.

• Thesis: “Cultural Revolution Revisited: The Rise of Romantic
Consumption in the Netherlands, 1953-1959.”

PRESENTATIONS Meurkes, J. (2022 - forthcoming). ‘How Can a Regulative Principle have

Objective Validity?– Presentation at the UKKS 2022 Conference “The
Revolutionary Kant,” Kings College London.

Meurkes, J. (2022). ‘Can Trump Pardon Himself? Kant’s Antinomies,

Russell’s Paradox - Democratic Government as Unform.’ Presentation at the
Conceptualising Community Conference, University of Aberdeen.

Meurkes, J. (2021). ‘’Kant’s Antinomies, Russell’s Paradox - Presentation at

ECPR Summer School on Kantian Political Thought Today: Global
Challenges, online (Zoom).

Meurkes, J. (2020). ‘Kant’s Account of Universal Concepts: Exit Strawson,

Enter Priest (and Gluons).’ Presentation at the Postgraduate Philosophy
Seminar, University of Aberdeen.

Meurkes, J. (2020). ‘Antagonism All the Way Down: Kant, Intersectionality

and the Antinomic Absolute.’ Presentation at Conceptualising Difference
Conference, University of Aberdeen.

Meurkes, J. (2020). ‘Marked and Unmarked Categories in Kant’s First

Critique.’ Presentation at the POLITICO Colloquium, University of
Aberdeen.

Meurkes, J. (2018). ‘Badiou, Politics and Poststructuralism.’ Presentation at

“Duid het met Fruit” Philosophical Round Table, University of Amsterdam.

PUBLICATIONS Meurkes, J. and Nol, J. (2016). “Badiou: de filosofie zou zich moeten
richten op liefde en geluk.” Buiten de Orde, Feb. 2016, pp. 54–62.
TEACHING PH1027 ‘Controversial Questions’ – Tutor. Fall Semester 2021.
Philosophy Department of the University of Aberdeen.
PH1522 ‘How Should One Live?’ – Tutor. Spring Semester 2021.
Philosophy Department of the University of Aberdeen.

FACILITATION AND Tutor, 2016-2019. Assisting students in completing their BA and MA theses,
TUTORING discussing, editing and commenting on their written work, helping them with
formulating proper questions, structuring, writing style and argumentation.

Co-organized and chaired a conference on Derrida’s work, 2014. RMA

Cultural Analysis, University of Amsterdam

Organized and moderated several talks on contemporary fascism at a local

community centre, 2013-2015.

NON-ACADEMIC WORK Reviewer, Municipality of Amsterdam, department of Poor Relief, 2015-

EXPERIENCE 2017

LANGUAGES Dutch: Native Speaker.

English: Fluent/Near Native.
French: Good Reading Proficiency.
German: Good Reading Proficiency.

REFERENCES Dr. Ritu Vij Frank Ruda

University of Aberdeen University of Dundee
School of Social Science Humanities, School of Humanities,
r.vij@abdn.ac.uk Social Sciences and Law
f.ruda@dundee.ac.uk

Prof. Dr. Beth Lord Dr. Murat Aydemir

University of Aberdeen School of Universiteit van Amsterdam
Divinity, History, Philosophy Dep. Literatuurwetenschap
s.b.lord@abdn.ac.uk m.aydemir@uva.nl

Dr. Joost de Bloois

Universiteit van Amsterdam
Dep. Literatuurwetenschap
j.g.c.debloois@uva.nl

SUMMARY OF MY My research starts with the problem of persistence of so-called ‘false

RESEARCH universals’ in politics. For example, in everyday journalistic speech, Dutch-
citizens (‘the Dutch’) are often said to be a group that comprises several
ethnicities: Dutch-Turks, Dutch-Moroccans, Dutch-Moluccans, Dutch-
Surinamese, etc. No one, however, speaks of the ‘Dutch-Dutch.’ Dutch
citizens with a presumed Dutch ethnicity are simple called ‘the Dutch.’ This
paradoxical category is normally used to refer both to a particular member of
the group (ethnically Dutch), and the group as a whole (Dutch-citizens). I
approach it as a problem of self-reference, understood as the moment a
‘universal encounters itself as one of its particulars.’

In my research, I link the above problem with Kant’s problem of the

construction of a synthetic unity. i.e. a unity that is discursively (i.e. by
combination) constructed out of series of initially disparate, heterogenous
elements. In order to do so, I read the first Critique – not primarily, as is
usually done, as an attempt to undermine object-oriented traditional
metaphysics in favour of subject-oriented analysis of the conditions of
experience – but as Kant’s attempt seeks a solution to the problem of
synthetic unity (expressed in the famous question ‘how is metaphysics
possible?’ as ‘how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?)’.

I argue that Kant aims to solves this problem of synthetic unity (i.e.,
discursively or serially produced unity) with reference to two paradoxical
notions. First, the ‘I think,’ is the paradoxical representation that grounds
the unity of all my discursively articulated representation. Second, and more
interestingly, the transcendental object = x, which is the paradoxical ground
of unity of all the discursively articulated objects (i.e., contents) of
representations. This second aspect is rarely recognised in contemporary
Kant scholarship, which tends to reduce the question of synthesis to the
norm-producing productive capacity or activity of a judging subject, denying
reality of the transcendental object, and consequently the problem of
‘transcendental affection’.

I clarify this structure I find in Kant’s critique with a references to Graham

Priest’s notion of a ‘gluon.’ Priest develops this notion in order to solve a
paradox that arises when we try to explain the unity of a discursively
constructed series of elements with reference to yet another additional
element. This turns out to be impossible: We cannot explain how two
initially unconnected links of a chain are connected with each other by
adding yet another link in between the first two. For if I do, I now need to
explain how this link connects with the others… adding yet another link
between the added link and the two initial links obviously does not help for
the same reason (In Analytical Philosophy this is known as the ‘Bradley
regress’ and the problem of ‘the unity of the proposition’).

Priest’s solution is to introduce a paradoxical element that stops a Bradley

regress, and which he calls a ‘gluon.’ According to Priest, a gluon is a
particular element that has certain properties that allow it to unify a disparate
series of elements, but of which it is just another part. On the one hand, a
gluon is just another element added. Yet it is nonetheless able to unify a
series of elements because it has the following property: it is strictly
identical to each and every distinguishable element, including itself. A gluon
is an element that is both particular (one among the elements, just another
member added to the group, distinguishable from the rest) and universal. It
is universal because of its property of being identical to each and every
element. And since it is strictly identical to each and every element, it is
identical with the whole.

Priest’s shows that this gluon, although it has paradoxical (if not
contradictory) properties, can be thought rigorously with the help of a
paraconsistent logic.

I my dissertation I argue that Kant solves problem of synthetic unity by

introducing the ‘I think’ (in the case of mere representations) and ‘the
transcendental object = x’ (in the case of objects of representation) in
exactly the same way Priest solves the Bradley Regress by introducing the
gluon. In the Critique, the ‘I think’ is a paradoxical representation: on the
 one hand, it is identical to each and every representation (‘the I think must
be able to accompany all my representations’). On the other hand, it is a
distinguishable representation, and moreover, a representation that is
identical to itself. These properties allows the ‘I think’ to be at the same time
particular (distinguishable as one among the elements) and universal
(identical to the whole, i.e. to all elements). 1

The same paradoxes arise with Kant’s notion of a transcendental object = x.

According to Kant, the transcendental object = x the object that is identical
to each and every phenomenal object (insofar it is the latter’s ground or
cause). On the one hand, therefore, it is the universal object (the unifying
ground of the sum total of objects of appearances, as Kant argues in the
Dialectic). It is the ‘universal tr. object = x’ insofar it is referred to by a
transcendental idea of reason (the totality of conditions, i.e. the
unconditioned condition). Yet on the other hand, the transcendental object =
x is also something encountered as ‘that which grounds/causes’ a specific
appearance. Kant describes this in the A Deduction: when we abstract from
all the sensible aspects of this or that appearance, we are left with the
‘concept of an object in general = x’, i.e. ‘that which is distinct from and yet
corresponding to my concept’). In the A Deduction, Kant describes the
transcendental object = x insofar it must be thought as the particular ground
of this or that individual object of appearance. In this case, it is the
‘particular tr. object = x’ referred to by a concept of the understanding.2

The upshot of my approach to Kant’s Critique is that developments in logic

and analytic philosophy (Priest’s dialethism) can thus help us to get a clearer
picture of the paradoxical Kantian notions of the ‘I think’ and the
‘transcendental object = x.’ Moreover, both Priest’s Logic and Kant’s
Critique can in turn be connected to and illuminate certain fundamental
insights developed in Cultural Analysis and Political Theory (i.e. the theory
of false universals), and Psychoanalysis (I think here of Lacan’s theory of
the master signifier and the quilting point or ‘point the capiton’).

To give some examples: ‘The Dutch’: this ‘gluon’ is both particular (one
among the ethnicities) and universal (identical to the whole), and on that
account, the element that unifies the set. The same goes for the universal
category ‘Americans’ is made up of the particulars (White-)Americans,
Latino-Americans, African-Americans, Asian-Americans. 3 In critical race
studies and feminist theory, its often pointed out that he universal category
of Man (humans as whole), contains the particulars Man and Women; the
universal category of Woman (women as a whole), contains the particulars
Women and Black-Women. ‘The Fantastic Four’ is a group comprising of
Mr Fantastic, the Human Torch, The Invisible Women, and the Thing); the
X-men are a group consisting of Professor X, Wolverine, Ice Man, Beast,
etc.

1
This gets Kant into trouble of course: for how is it possible for the I think to represent itself? Kant argues that the ‘I think’ can represents itself.
This is what Kant calls self-consciousness, and is a necessary for the possibility of synthetic unity. Yet how can the thinking-activity represents
its own activity? Howe can the act of thought be the objective content of its own act of thought?
2
Just as with the I think, certain paradoxes of self-reference pop up in this case. For example: how can the transcendental object, i.e., the ground
of appearances, also be its own ground (insofar as it is identical to itself?) It would have to be its own cause, i.e. causa sui, i.e., it is a free cause –
which is precisely how Kant understands the object = x in the Dialectic (as transcendentally free).
3
Note that in each case, the paradoxical elements are understood as particular members of a group, but they are barred from being determined
as particular (just as Kant’s I think cannot determine itself).