In my paper, I will focus on Kant’s problem of the construction of a synthetic unity and its relation to

the identity of the subject. Kant aims to solve this problem of synthetic unity (i.e., discursively or
serially produced unity) as follows. According to Kant, the ‘I think’ is the paradoxical representation
that grounds the unity of all my discursively articulated representations. I clarify this structure I find
in Kant’s critique with a reference to Graham Priest’s notion of a ‘gluon.’ Priest develops this notion
in order to solve the ‘Bradley Paradox’ (closely connected to ‘the problem of the unity of the
proposition’).

The Bradley Paradox arises when we try to explain the unity of a discursively constructed series of
elements with reference to yet another additional element. This turns out to be impossible: we
cannot explain how two initially unconnected links of a chain are connected with each other by
adding yet another link in between the first two. For how could we explain how this newly added
link connects with the two others… adding yet another link between the third, added link and one of
the two initial links obviously does not help for the same reason.

Priest’s solution is to introduce a paradoxical element that stops this ‘Bradley regress:’ a gluon. On
the one hand, a gluon is just another element added to the series. Yet it is nonetheless able to unify
a series of elements because it has the following property: it is strictly identical to each and every
distinguishable element (including itself). Priest shows that this gluon, although it has paradoxical (if
not contradictory) properties, can be thought rigorously with the help of paraconsistent logic: it is
both particular (one among the elements, just another member added to the group, distinguishable
from the rest) and universal (it is identical to the whole, because of its property of being identical to
each and every element, and itself).

In my paper, I argue that Kant solves the problem of synthetic unity by introducing the ‘I think’ (in
the case of mere representations) in exactly the same way Priest solves the Bradley Regress by
introducing the gluon. How? On the one hand, Kant argues that the ‘I think’ is identical to each and
every representation (‘the I think must be able to accompany all my representations’). On the other
hand, he argues that the ‘I think’ is a distinguishable representation, which moreover, must be
thought as identical to itself. These properties allow the ‘I think’ to be at the same time universal
(identical to the whole, i.e., to all elements) and particular (distinguishable as one among the
elements). In my paper, I will argue that Kant is able to solve the problem of synthetic unity by
ascribing gluon-like properties to the ‘I think.’ If I am right, Kant’s ‘I think’ – if it is to work as a
solution for the problem of synthetic unity, is necessarily contradictory.
The upshot of my approach to Kant’s Critique is that developments in logic and analytic philosophy
(Priest’s dialethism) can thus help us to get a clearer picture of the paradoxical Kantian notions of
the ‘I think.’ Moreover, both Priest’s Logic and Kant’s Critique can in turn be connected to and
illuminate certain fundamental insights developed in Cultural Analysis and Political Theory (i.e. the
theory of contradictory or ‘false; universals).