Alexander of Aphrodisias On Simultaneous

Forthcoming in D. Bennett J. Toivanan (eds.
), Philosophical Problems in Sense

Perception: Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism (Springer Verlag)
penultimate draft
Alexander of Aphrodisias on Simultaneous Perception
Attila Hangai
Abstract Alexander of Aphrodisias picks up Aristotle’s insufficient treatment of

simultaneous perception and develops an adequate solution for the problem—thereby
offering an account of the unity of perceptual consciousness: the single mental activity of
a single subject with complex content. I show the adequacy of the solution by using as
criteria the requirements that have been identified by Aristotle and approved (and
explained) by Alexander. I analyze Alexander’s solution in two turns. First, with respect
to heterogeneous perceptibles, Alexander adopts and reformulates Aristotle’s
metaphorical account invoking the analogy with a point. Second, with respect to
homogeneous opposites, accordingly, perception is judgement, but it involves physical
changes in diverse parts of the primary sense-organ. By this account Alexander resolves
the issue of the unity of the subject on the level of the capacity of the soul, and coordinates
the complexity of content with the complexity on the physical level. In addition to being
adequate, the solution is faithful to Aristotle. I suggest that the interpretative decisions
Alexander makes (the clarification of the analogy; the reference he finds to the analogy;
the two components of the solution, judgement and parts of the organ) form an ingenious
extension of Aristotle’s treatment. Interestingly, even though many elements in
Alexander’s interpretation are taken up by modern commentators, no one has followed it
in its entirety, nor even treated it in its own right.
1 Introduction
There is a growing interest in the notion of simultaneous perception in Aristotle.1 The

problem is how it is possible to perceive two (or more) perceptible objects at one time.
The problem applies to perceiving white and sweet together as well as white and black—
thus perceiving multiple objects from one sense-modality as well as from several. The
importance of the issue is clear in Plato’s depiction of it in his Theaetetus (at 184–186)2:
without a solution to it one might believe that one’s perceptual awareness is a disjointed
array, as if it were of multiple subjects in the Trojan horse. Plato endorses the argument
1
The most important contributions to interpreting Aristotle’s notion are Marmodoro 2014, esp. Chap. 4–7;
Gregoric 2007, esp. 129–162; Osborne 1998; Charlton 1981; Modrak 1981a; and Hicks 1907.
2
On this problem in Plato’s Theaetetus see e.g. Cooper 1970; Modrak 1981b; Burnyeat 1990.
2 Attila Hangai
with its conclusion that on the level of perception there is no unitary conscious experience.
Apparently this is what made Aristotle discuss the issue.
Even though Aristotle did have many things to say about the problem and has
something to offer as a solution, what we find in his works is not satisfactory. He returns
to the problem at least three times: in De Anima 3.2 and 3.7, and most extensively in De
Sensu 7. He explicates the problem quite clearly, and determines the features a
satisfactory solution would require. But his explicit explanations are rather metaphorical;
he does not seem to aim at a straightforward, thorough account of the issue, despite its
central importance in the explanation of perceptual awareness.
Due to the nature of Aristotle’s discussion there is controversy as to which analogy
he prefers (if those he describes are not equivalent); what his account consists in; and
even what sort of phenomenon of simultaneous perception is under consideration.
Aristotle does not explicitly answer these questions, but only offers remarks and
philosophical considerations which might help in settling the issue: hence there is room
for disagreement. Since my aim here is not to provide an understanding of Aristotle, I
shall not judge between the competing interpretations. Instead, my goal is to show that
the solution Alexander of Aphrodisias offers for the problem on the basis of Aristotle’s
treatises is both an adequate solution (judged by the requirements set out by Alexander
and for the most part already by Aristotle) and a reasonable extension of Aristotle’s
account. I shall demonstrate this through examining how Alexander reads Aristotle and
how the solution he offers is an interpretation of Aristotle’s analogy with the point.
This leads to the clarification of a few issues with regard to Alexander’s theory of
perception (though these are to be investigated further in a separate study). What does it
mean that perception (as activity) is judgement? How is material change involved in
perception, what kind of change is it, and how is it related to the judgemental activity of
perceiving? How may complex mental (esp. perceptual) content be explained? And most
straightforwardly: how is the unity of (perceptual) awareness to be accounted for?
Again, Alexander’s account may be taken as an interpretation of Aristotle. In this
regard it is instructive to see how Alexander answers the interpretative questions above.
It is clear that he prefers the Point Analogy to the Apple Analogy; and it is explicit how
he understands these. The phenomenon to be explained remains implicit, however, as
Alexander simply uses the same terms as Aristotle. I suggest that what Alexander and
Aristotle have in mind (as simultaneous perception) is basically the unity of (perceptual)
awareness—that is, having a single cognition of the (immediate) environment without the
need to join them, in contrast to having several distinct cognitions that require further
cognitive acts to relate them to each other. This account in turn enters into the explanation
of several higher functions of perception: having complex perceptual content in general;
having the ability to distinguish perceptible objects from one another; and perceiving
physical objects as single unitary things.3 It could be shown that even though many of
3
Modrak (1981a: 421) argues that perceiving common perceptibles also depends on simultaneous
perception. But common objects simply accompany special ones (Alexander, de An., 65.11–22), so that in
their case the problem of simultaneous perception does not arise: see Gregoric 2007: 129–130. Again,
Marmodoro (2014) argues that it is simultaneous perception, together with other functions, that depend
upon the more general becoming aware of complex perceptual content. However, she often seems to equate
3 Alexander of Aphrodisias on Simultaneous Perception
Alexander’s ideas are often reiterated by commentators, his interpretation in its entirety
is quite unique.
In what follows, I first (Sect. 2) set out the problem as it is presented by Alexander
(and Aristotle), identifying the requirements for any adequate solution. I shall introduce
(Sect. 3) one particular issue, the Problem of the Opposites: the problem of being moved
in opposite ways while being affected by opposite perceptible objects when perceiving
them together. Before this issue may be resolved, however, the solution for simultaneous
perception of objects in multiple sense-modalities (heterogeneous objects) has to be
discussed (Sect. 4). For the two problems are better resolved in the same way. I explicate
(Sect. 4.1) a General Account; (Sect 4.2) the Apple Analogy; and most importantly (Sect.
4.3) the Point Analogy. Then, I turn (Sect. 5) to Alexander’s solution for the Problem of
Opposites. This problem is particularly important, for Aristotle apparently did not provide
a satisfactory answer to it. Instead, what he has to offer is at best a metaphorical account
of the possibility of a solution, or even the impossibility of it.4 Alexander’s account
involves two elements: (Sect. 5.1) explicating that perception is indeed judgement; and
(Sect. 5.2) showing how the material change involved in perception is related to
perceptual judgement. Once this is discussed, I shall briefly show how the account applies
to the Point Analogy (Sect. 5.3), and to the Apple Analogy (Sect. 5.4). I conclude by
assessing the adequacy of the solution against the requirements set out by Alexander
himself, and indicating how Alexander’s account is an ingenious extension of Aristotle's
brief remarks (Sect. 6).
Alexander discusses the topic of simultaneous perception directly and most
elaborately in his commentary On De Sensu, following the topic and reasoning of
Aristotle’s corresponding work De Sensu 7. In the other passages, in his De Anima and
Questiones 3.9, Alexander follows Aristotle’s discussion in De Anima 3.2, where
Aristotle focuses rather on judging that two perceptible objects are different—viz.
perceptual discrimination—and consider simultaneous perception because discrimination
is dependent upon simultaneously perceiving the items that are discriminated5. Thus, I set
out the problem and Alexander’s solution mainly as it appears in the commentary. But,
since the preferred solution Alexander offers is the same in all three places, I will use all
of them to fully reconstruct the solution. Since much of what Alexander says depends on
Aristotle’s text, I note the parallel passages in Aristotle, especially to provide some notes
on Alexander’s relation to Aristotle.
these functions. Johansen (2012: 180–185) argues that complex perceptual content (including simultaneous
perception) is gained by accidental perception. But this cannot account for simultaneous perception of
opposites—for they are by no means accidentally perceived.
4
Hicks (1907: 452) claimed that it turns out that a solution is not possible after all. Gregoric (2007: 141–
144, 153–55) argues that the Point Analogy shows only the possibility of a solution, without providing one
clearly; cf. Kahn 1966: 57; Hamlyn 1968a: 128; Shields 2016: 274.
5
Cf. Alexander, in Sens., 163.6-17.
4 Attila Hangai
2 The Problem of Simultaneous Perception
In the first half of his treatment in the commentary, Alexander investigates the reasons to
deny the possibility of simultaneous perception (Alexander, in. Sens., 136.7–156.23). He
takes these considerations to be stating and assessing the endoxa: posing difficulties to be
resolved.6 He presents three arguments—by setting out the main principles on which they
rest—as he identifies them in Aristotle’s chapter.7 The first and the second arguments
introduce requirements for any solution for the problem, so we shall run through them in
turn (Sect. 2.1 and 2.2). The third argument poses a difficulty for a certain case of
simultaneous perception: for opposites in one sense-modality. Since Alexander’s
innovations lie especially in providing a coherent solution for this problem—which
Aristotle did not explain satisfactorily—this will be introduced separately (Sect. 3). But
before that we shall see one attempt for an account that provides further requirements for
the solution (Sect. 2.3).
The requirements for any solution for the problem of simultaneous perception that
may emerge from these arguments are as follows. If two things are perceptible
simultaneously they must be perceptible (i) distinctly, in the same way, and (ii) as two,
not as one. Again, (iii) the activity of simultaneous perception has to be one, and (iv) this
activity has to be in one time. One activity will require (v) one capacity, indeed one that
is able to perceive all kinds of perceptibles. For (vi) the account should be the same for
heterogeneous and for homogeneous perceptibles.
2.1 Argument from Mixed Perceptibles
The first argument (Alexander, in Sens., 136.7–139.8; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 447a14–b6)
is briefly as follows:
(1) The greater movement always displaces the lesser.8
(2) What is unmixed and on its own can be perceived to a greater degree than what
is mixed.9
Now, there are four possible combinations. The two perceptible objects might be:
(a) from one genus (belonging to the domain of a single sense modality) and of the
same intensity;10
6
Alexander, in. Sens., 136.5–6, 156.23–157.2.
7
The latter arguments are introduced by ‘moreover’ (ἔτι). A different identification of the arguments is
given by Gregoric 2007: 133–35.
8
Alexander, in Sens., 136.7–8. Alexander takes up Aristotle’s description in Aristotle, Sens. 7, 447a14–
15: ἀεὶ ἡ μείζων κίνησις τὴν ἐλάττω ἐκκρύει. The term ‘displace’ (ἐκκρύει) occurs also at Aristotle, De
Insomniis 3, 460b32–461a3, where it is claimed that small perceptual motions are displaced by larger ones
from perceiving when the person is awake, so that these motions are ‘effaced’ (ἀφανίζονται) and remain
unperceived or unnoticed, i.e. do not come to awareness.
9
Alexander, in Sens., 136.13–14; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 447a17–18.
10
In most cases Alexander refers merely to greater (μείζων) and lesser (ἐλάττων) movements, but
occasionally (Alexander, in Sens., 137.16) he identifies them as stronger—σφοδροτέρας.
(b) from one genus and of different intensity;

(c) from different genera (in different sense modalities) and of the same intensity;
(d) from different genera and of different intensity.
It is possible in none of these cases that two objects are perceived simultaneously. If the
two objects are from one genus—(a) or (b)—then they are mixed, so that they efface
(ἀφανίζει) each other, hence do not come to awareness. Out of the two objects one thing—
their mixture—comes to be intermediate between them.11 And in general, the objects
mixed are perceptible to a lesser degree than if they were unmixed,12 as (2) states. In case
(d), the lesser movement is displaced by the more intense one so that it is effaced,13 as (1)
states. Moreover, there is an impure awareness14 even of the greater movement: thus it is
perceived to a lesser degree than in unmixed state,15 because of (2). Finally, in case (c)
there will be perception of neither object: they efface each other, and being equal this
amounts to annulling each other.16
What the argument shows, is that (i) if two things are perceptible simultaneously
they must be perceptible distinctly, both of them must be revealed in the same way. In the
cases above, the two objects may appear together (in mixture) at best as revealed in a
quite low degree, due to their interference.
2.2 Argument from the Numerical Correspondence of Activity and

Object
Let us turn to the second argument (Alexander, in Sens., 139.9–143.8; cf. Aristotle, Sens.
7, 447b6–448a1).
(3) It is more plausible that two things are perceptible simultaneously if the two
objects are from one genus—homogeneous (e.g. two sounds)—than if from
different genera—heterogeneous (e.g. colour and sound).17
11
Alexander, in Sens., 136.22–137.2. Alexander returns to the mixture of perceptibles at in Sens., 138.8–
24. The idea is that out of two perceptible objects in the domain of one sense (e.g. two colours) one single
object comes to be when they are put together—in perceiving them (e.g. red and white are mixed and pink
comes about). Alexander’s view of intermediate, mixed, colours dependent on mixture of the coloured
bodies is expressed at Alexander, in Sens., 63.13–66.6.
12
Alexander, in Sens., 137.12–14.
13
14
I shall use ‘awareness’ as a translation of ἀντίληψις and related terms, as Caston (2012) advocates (see
139, n. 346 on the term). In general, I use Caston’s terminology set out in his Index (Caston 2012: 189–
214) when not stated otherwise.
15
16
Alexander, in Sens., 137.26–138.5.
17
Alexander, in Sens., 139.9–18; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 447b6–9. Alexander takes Aristotle to be arguing
that ‘the activity of one sense is able to be one and the same to a greater extent than the activity of several
senses; […] because of similarity[.]’ (Alexander, in Sens., 139.21–23, translations from On De Sensu are
Towey’s, often modified.) This similarity is explicated below at Alexander, in Sens., 145.2–145.18, in
connection to the same principle (cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448a14–18). Accordingly, the closest similarity is
between homogeneous objects—as white and black; then between those heterogeneous objects that are
6 Attila Hangai
(4) It is impossible to perceive simultaneously two homogeneous objects.

Hence,
(5) It is impossible to perceive simultaneously two heterogeneous objects.
Since two objects are either homogeneous or heterogeneous: no two objects are
perceptible simultaneously.
According to Alexander (4) is shown by the following argument.
(6) One activity of perception is of numerically one perceptible object.18
(7) If two homogeneous perceptibles are not mixed, they are separate and
numerically two.19
Hence, unmixed homogeneous perceptibles may be perceived only in two distinct
perceptual activities.20
And since
(8) At one time there can be only one activity of perceiving by a single capacity.21
Either there must be two activities of one capacity for the two distinct objects, and hence
two activities at different times—not simultaneously (from (8)). Or there must be two
capacities for the two simultaneous activities: but this is a non-starter, as we are in the
hypothesis that the two objects are homogenous, hence perceived by one single capacity.
Again, the converse of (6) is also adopted.
(6*) Of numerically one thing there is numerically one perceptual activity.22
But, since a mixture is one thing:
(9) Homogeneous perceptibles can be perceived together and simultaneously if they
are mixed.23
correspondent (both lie on the same place in the spectrum of the quality, so that perceptible in the same
way)—as white and sweet; and the greatest distance is between heterogeneous not correspondent objects—
as white and bitter. On the view that perceptual qualities are defined as proportions of extremes of the
spectra see Alexander, in Sens., 63.13–66.6 for colours (cf. Aristotle, Sens. 3, 440a31–b25); and Alexander,
in Sens., 80.22–82.20 for flavours (cf. Aristotle, Sens. 4, 442a12–28).
18
Alexander, in Sens., 140.21–24; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 447b14–16. Aristotle, interestingly, states the
consequent as ‘perception will claim its objects to be one’ (ἓν ἐκεῖνα ἐρεῖ). Alexander finds support for this
claim in that numerical oneness is judged by the (oneness and identity of) time of perceiving: Alexander,
in Sens., 141.10–17; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 447b24–25. This claim is used by commentators for arguing that
simultaneous perception amounts to perceiving physical objects as one, see Gregoric 2007: 138–41.
19
This is implied by Alexander, in Sens., 140.5–6.
20
Alexander, in Sens., 140.24–141.1; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 447b16–17.
21
Alexander, in Sens., 141.1–4; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 447b17–20.
22
Alexander, in Sens., 140.8–10. Indeed, this is introduced earlier than (6); cf. Ross 1906: 219–20.
23
This follows from the first argument, cf. Alexander, in Sens., 140.5–6, 10–12; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7,
447b9–12.
However, in this case the two homogeneous perceptibles are perceived as one, not
as two separate things.24 Exactly the unity of mixture is what renders it
simultaneously perceptible.25
This argument exposes further requirements for a solution. First, simultaneous perception
of two things requires that (ii) the two things are perceived as two, not as one.26 Second,
(iii) the activity of simultaneous perception has to be one. And the difficulty lies exactly
in this: one activity is required with multiple objects to which it is directed (iv) at one
time. But it seems that (8) ’at one time there might be only one activity’; and (6) ’one
activity is directed at one single object’; hence at one time only one object might be
perceived.27 So, to establish the possibility of simultaneous perception, this view must be
dropped, or at least qualified. As we shall see, this consideration reappears in modified
terms: the subject of judging will have to be simultaneously indivisible, and divisible into
many (Sect. 4.1).
2.3 First Attempt: Different Parts of the Soul
Once the plausible arguments against the possibility of simultaneous perception have
been enumerated, and a prominent anti-realist solution has been ruled out28, Alexander
turns to solve the problem. As a first attempt, he suggests that it is by different parts of
the soul—i.e. with different perceptual capacities29—that we can perceive two objects
24
Alexander, in Sens., 140.5–6. This connects it to perceptual discrimination: judging that two perceptible
objects are different. Hence they must be perceived as different (cf. Alexander, in Sens., 163.17).
25
Further elaboration of the notion of one thing coming about from the mixture can be found at Alexander,
in Sens., 143.27–144.19.
26
Pace Gregoric 2007: 133, 138–39. Cf. Marmodoro 2014: 177–78, 220–21.
27
Gregoric (2007: 132–33) claims that the problem of simultaneous perception consists esp. in the three
principles: (6), (6*) and (8), all of which he takes to be corollaries of the principle according to which the
activity of the sense is identical to the activity of the object. For Alexander, cf. Gregoric 2017: 50-52.
28
Alexander, in Sens., 146.1–156.22; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448a19–b17.
29
It is noteworthy that in introducing the issue, ‘part’ is not mentioned by Aristotle. What he claims is only:
‘perceiving together but with a different item belonging to the soul (ἑτέρῳ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς).’ (Aristotle, Sens.
7, 448b20–21.) He mentions the existence of ‘parts’ as a consequence of this account: ‘there will be several
parts specifically the same’—πλείω γε μέρη ἕξει εἴδει ταὐτά (Aristotle, Sens. 7. 448b24–25) (translations
from Aristotle are mine). So it seems that these parts are parts of sight (if anything) rather than of soul (and
by no means of the eyes as Ross (1906: 234) takes it despite the explicit reference to the soul). Alexander
himself interprets Aristotle’s argument this way (Alexander, in Sens., 158.1–16). The idea is that by positing
several means of perceiving, the perceptual means is, so to say, divided into parts. Alexander takes up the
term and tries to clarify its meaning. He says that ‘it is not by one indivisible part of the soul with which
we perceive everything’, but the perceptive soul consists of different parts that are one by being continuous.
The idea seems to be that the perceptual capacity is not a simple thing, but it has internal complexity that
might be cashed out in terms of different parts of it that nonetheless constitute one single bodily magnitude.
It is important in this suggestion that the parts are different—they have to be different numerically, but, as
it will turn out in the present argument, also specifically. Understood in this way, it is clear why this first
attempt will be rejected for homogeneous objects: the parts in case of homogeneous objects will turn out to
be specifically the same and not different. It is also clear that this suggestion may be maintained for
heterogeneous perceptibles: the different parts of the perceptive part would be the five special senses.
However, this is not exactly Alexander’s view, for he denies that the unity of the perceptual capacity lies
in the continuity of its parts (cf. Alexander, in Sens., 164.6–7)—which seems to be the view of the Stoics:
Alexander , de An., 30.26–31.2; cf. Long and Sedley 1987, Chap. 53; Inwood 1985: 27–41.
8 Attila Hangai
together (Alexander, in Sens., 157.11–162.11; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448b20–449a5).

Heterogeneous perceptibles are indeed perceived by different senses that Alexander
considers to be parts of the perceptual capacity,30 so the idea suggests itself. But this
account is inadequate for homogeneous perceptibles. In their case one individual would
have more than one capacities (or perceptive parts: merē aisthētika) that are specifically
the same (homoeidē allēlois)—i.e. that are for perceiving objects in one and the same
genus. For a perceptual capacity (as any capacity of the soul) is defined in terms of the
object with which it is concerned). That is, one genus of perceptibles requires one species
of perceptual capacity. So if two objects are the same in genus, they require capacities
that are specifically the same.31
This consequence, however, is unacceptable. Let us consider an example:
perceiving simultaneously two visible things: white and black. Now, the two capacities
that this solution postulates are either one visual capacity for perceiving white (Vw) and
one for perceiving black (Vb) or two full-blown visual capacities (V1 and V2) one
perceiving the white and the other the black in simultaneously perceiving them. Neither
option is acceptable in an Aristotelian account. Now, in the first case Vw and Vb are
specifically the same insofar as both are visual capacities, having certain colours as
objects. It is quite clear what it means that they are parts of the visual capacity: each of
them is capable of perceiving part of the domain of vision: white and black respectively.
But this account is in contradiction with the Aristotelian notion of a perceptual capacity:
it is an ability to perceive all the perceptibles in its domain (genus) on the scale defined
by the two opposites. In the second case V1 and V2 are specifically the same in the robust
sense of being capable of perceiving the same range of perceptibles. However, it is unclear
what it would mean for these capacities to be parts of the visual capacity. Rather, vision
seems to be reduplicated. Moreover, it does not make sense in the Aristotelian framework
that one subject has two (numerically distinct) visual capacities, or in general two
capacities for perceiving the same objects.32 For a perceptual capacity is defined in terms
of its object—thus the same object defines the same capacity. And having the capacity
for perceiving all objects in the given domain, there is no place for a further capacity with
the same domain.33
Next, Alexander considers an analogy that was suggested by Aristotle himself. The
two capacities with which we perceive simultaneously are like our two eyes: they are
specifically the same and different in number—and yet they form such a unity that their
activity is the same, resulting in one act of seeing.34 But this is not a good analogy. For
30
Alexander, de An., 40.4–5, 11–15.
31
Alexander, in Sens., 158.8–9, 11–12, 15–16; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448b22–25. See also Alexander, de
An., 32.23–33.11; and Aristotle, de An. 3.2, 426b8–12.
32
One object might be the special object for exactly one capacity. Cf. Osborne 1983: 401.
33
It is not clear how Alexander understands the argument, it is genuinely ambiguous. Two facts suggest
that he takes it in the former way: involving Vw and Vb. First, he claims that the capacities will be
specifically the same ‘because the perceptibles also are the same in genus with each other, for they are all
visible.’ (Alexander, in Sens., 158.14–15). Second, he takes the analogy with the eye to be a possible reply
to the issue, and it certainly involves the very same capacities specifically, and different only in number:
V1 and V2, cf. Alexander, in Sens., 158.17–159.19. Gregoric (2007: 141) takes it in the former way too, as
Marmodoro (2014: 222–27), though she mistakes a part of the sense to be a sense-organ.
34
Alexander, in Sens., 158.23–25; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448b26–27.
even though the two eyes together constitute the organ of seeing, thus they together form
a unity, being a joint-organ for one single capacity, so that their activity—i.e. the activity
of the capacity sight—is one; this does not apply for the capacities. Two distinct capacities
cannot have a single activity insofar as they form a unity by being capacities of one
capacity.35 Indeed, being two capacities, they will have two activities, that cannot be
simultaneous in light of the previous arguments (esp. that in Sect. 2.2).36
This reasoning shows two things. First, it is not by several distinct capacities of the
soul that we can perceive several things together, but (v) by one and the same perceptual
capacity. It follows then that—since homogeneous as well as heterogeneous objects
should be perceptible simultaneously—this one capacity has to be able to perceive all
things.37 Again, since the reason for dismissing this preliminary account was that it is not
applicable for all cases, in particular for homogeneous perceptibles, (vi) an account that
can handle all cases in the same way is preferable to one that can handle different cases
in different ways. The latter requirement—the homology of the accounts—is explicit in
Aristotle, de An. 3.7, 431a24–25,38 and is also taken up by Alexander at de An., 63.23–
64.4. Both of these remarks occur in the context of the Point Analogy, hence it is safe to
assume that this is one fact that makes this analogy superior.
Let me recapitulate the requirements for a solution that have been identified. If two
things are perceptible simultaneously they must be perceptible (i) distinctly, in the same
way, and (ii) as two, not as one. Again, (iii) the activity of simultaneous perception has to
be one, and (iv) this activity has to be in one time. One activity will require (v) one
capacity, indeed one that is able to perceive all kinds of perceptibles. For (vi) the account
should be the same for heterogeneous and for homogeneous perceptibles.
35
The disanalogy in other terms. The two eyes on the one hand, and the one capacity of which the eyes are
the organs on the other are ontologically distinct: body and capacity. This allows that the two eyes are
unified on another level in the one capacity of vision, hence having one activity. But in the case of two
visual capacities as constituting one visual capacity there is no such difference in the ontological status that
would allow the unification into one activity.
36
Alexander, in Sens., 158.25–159.17; cf. 159.20–161.20. It is noteworthy that Alexander here adumbrates
his solution by admitting the adequacy of the analogy with certain provisos (Alexander, in Sens., 159.9–
13). As Ross (1955: 233) puts it ‘it will be that unity (and not the two parts) that is the percipient’.
37
This requirement is explicit in the immediately following passage: Alexander, in Sens., 162.12–163.17,
cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 449a5–7. I discuss this in Sect. 4.1.
38
The interpretation of the whole reasoning at Aristotle de An. 3.7, 431a20–b1 is difficult, for many
pronouns have unclear denotation—probably referring to a lost figure, cf. Osborne 1998. Hence it is best
to restrict the use of this passage only as a source of the claim about the homology of the accounts, agreeing
with e.g. Beare 1906: 281; Hicks 1907: 531; Modrak 1981a: 419; Gregoric 2007: 157; Shields 2016: 339–
40; even though effort is made to extract a coherent picture out of the text, cf. Marmodoro 2014: 228–33;
and Osborne 1998, who basically extends the account of Ross 1906: 231. For a view according to which
the two problems (of homogeneous and heterogeneous objects) need different approaches see Charlton
1981: 107. Again, even though Accattino and Donini (1996: 227–28) note that Alexander explicitly asserts
that the problem is the same for the two cases, they doubt that indeed this is true.
10 Attila Hangai
3 Problem of Opposites
The third argument (Alexander, in Sens., 143.9–26; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448a1–19)
concerns simultaneous perception of homogeneous objects, and it is based on the
connection between perception and physical movement.
(10) Perception is a sort of movement (or it is by means of movement).
(11) Movements of opposites are opposed.
(12) Opposites cannot coexist in the same thing at the same time. Nor can
opposite movements.
Hence, opposites cannot be perceived together.39
The argument can be extended to every pair of homogeneous objects.40 Since
perceptible objects that are intermediate between the opposites—and come to be as a
mixture of them in a certain ratio or by means of excess—might be allocated to one of the
opposites in virtue of which one is in them in greater amount.41 Hence it is impossible to
perceive two homogeneous objects simultaneously. And this, together with (3), leads to
the conclusion that simultaneous perception is impossible for any two objects.
This argument is the most important difficulty for the discussion in Alexander and
already in Aristotle; its examination occupies most of chapter 7 in Aristotle, De Sensu
and most of Alexander’s commentary on it. Since it would be difficult to deny (11) or
(12), the question is how (10) should be understood so as not to lead to the unacceptable
consequence of the impossibility of simultaneous perception of opposites. Moreover,
since (vi) a unitary account is preferable—one which explains all cases of simultaneous
perception in the same way—the solution for the Problem of Opposites must be
coordinated with the solution for heterogeneous perceptibles. So first this latter account
has to be seen.
4 Simultaneous Perception of Heterogeneous Perceptibles
Alexander proceeds from a general characterization of the solution (in Sens., 162.12–
164.4), through a discussion of Aristotle’s metaphorical accounts (in Sens., 164.5–167.9),
finally to the clarification of the metaphor that enables him to answer even the Problem
39
Alexander uses the same argument also in de An. and Questiones 3.9 (hereafter Q.).
For (10), see Alexander, in Sens., 143.11–12; cf. Alexander, de An., 61.21–24.
For (11), see Alexander, in Sens., 141.12; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448a1–2; de An. 3.2,. 427a1–2. Alexander
provides reasons for clam (11) in parallel passages. The movement in question is assimilation: and
assimilations to opposites are opposed (Alexander, de An., 61.23, 28–30). Or, the movement is the reception
of the perceptible form: and forms of opposites are clearly opposed (Alexander, Q.uestiones 3.9, 95.23–
25).
For (12), see Alexander, in Sens., 141.13; cf. de An., 61.20–21; Q.uestiones 3.9, 95.25–26, 97.19–22;
Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448a2–3; de An. 3.2,. 426b29–30.
For the conclusion, see Alexander, in Sens., 141.13–14; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448a3–5.
40
Alexander, in Sens., 143.19–22; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448a5–8.
41
Alexander, in Sens., 142. 25–27, 143.17–19.
of Opposites (in Sens., 167.10–168.5). In this section we shall see in detail the General
Account and the metaphor that Alexander prefers—the Point Analogy—and only in
passing the other metaphor with physical bodies—the Apple Analogy. In the following
section I shall turn to the solution for the Problem of Opposites.
4.1 General Account
Alexander provides a general account, at Alexander, in Sens. 162.12–164.4, in

commenting on Aristotle, Sens., 449a5–7. He picks up the claim that ‘the soul perceives
things different in genus with different capacities’,42 and then explicates that despite the
multitude of perceptual capacities there is one single unity constituted of them which is
perceptive of all perceptible objects. For this claim, Alexander invokes Aristotle’s
discussion of perceptual discrimination at Aristotle, de An. 3.2, 426b8–427a16: how can
one judge the difference between objects of different senses—like white and sweet. We
learn there that one single capacity is required for judging the difference, and since the
thing which judges must also be perceiving the objects, there must be one single thing
perceiving the objects at the same time. In other words: discrimination of two
heterogeneous perceptibles presupposes the simultaneous perception43 of them by one
single perceptual capacity.44
42
Alexander, in Sens., 162.14–15, 20–22; cf. Aristotle de An. 3.2, 426b8–12. The text is uncertain, being
quite lacunose. But even though the way I interpret this sentence makes a good sense, nothing hinges on
the exact meaning. The reference ‘having postulated’ might be to Alexander, in Sens., 159.14–19, where it
is stated that each sense (capacity) perceives its peculiar object, hence if there are multiple objects different
in genus, there will be several distinct capacities.
43
Alexander at in Sens., 163.12 calls this ‘joint perception’ (συναίσθησις). What he means we can see from
Alexander, de An., 60.27–61.2: ’if there were two perceptible objects, of which you perceived one and I the
other, both of us would grasp the difference of the one that one of us perceives in relation to the difference
that he does not himself perceive but the other perceives.’ (Translations from Alexander, de An. are mine.)
εἰ δύο ὄντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν τοῦ μὲν σὺ αἴσθοιο, τοῦ δὲ ἐγώ, γνωρίζειν ἑκάτερον ἡμῶν τὴν διαφορὰν οὗ
αὐτὸς ᾔσθετο πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὗ οὐκ αὐτός, ἀλλ' ἕτερος ᾔσθετο. That is, A perceives a, B perceives b, and it
would be the case that A perceives the difference of a from b in virtue of perceiving a, but not perceiving b
herself, but b being perceived by B. There would not be a single subject that perceives both a and b ‘jointly’;
cf. Aristotle, de An. 3.2, 426b17–20. This point goes back to Plato Theaetetus 184–186.
44
Alexander, in Sens., 162.12–163.17; cf. 164.9-11. The argument is a summary of Aristotle’s argument at
his de An. 3.2, 426b8–29. Three requirements are settled there for perceptual discrimination. (i) That it is
by perception, since the objects are perceptible objects; (ii) that it is by one single subject (or capacity),
otherwise it was like the Trojan horse; and (iii) that it is in one indivisible time—i.e. simultaneously. On
alternative interpretations of the argument see Polansky 2007: 395–398. This is summarized by Alexander,
de An., 60.14–61.19 and Quaestiones 3.9, 94.25–95.18. The De Anima passage foreshadows Alexander’s
preferred solution by specifying the sense of simultaneity (de An., 61.15–18). In the Questiones Alexander
speaks in his own terms—explicitly equating perceiving with judging (e.g. Q. 3.9, 94.31–95.1, 95.11–12),
so that he opens the way to his own theory that indeed defines the activity of perceiving as judging, and
leads to his own resolution of the Problem of Opposites (discussed below in Sect. 5). Polansky (2007: 396–
397) also emphasizes the terminology used by Aristotle: judging (krinein), thinking (noein) and esp. saying
(legein); cf. Accattino and Donini 1996: 233. Polansky claims that this is to give generality to the argument
for all kinds of cognitive discrimination, as well as to emphasize the type of content involved in perceptual
judgement. This latter point I shall explicate in Sect. 5.1.
12 Attila Hangai
Even though it is granted that there is one single underlying perceptual capacity—
the common sense—there is a difficulty for this position.45 What is the characteristic
object of this one capacity? Since it is supposed that this capacity is able to perceive all
kinds of perceptibles, namely all the objects of the special senses (colours, sounds, tastes,
etc.); and there is no unitary genus of object formed from the five special objects, for
objects from different genera cannot be mixed; it seems that the common sense does not
have one genus of object. But lacking such a characteristic object seems to demolish the
unity of the capacity.
This problem is not solved here,46 it is only the Point Analogy (at in Sens. 164.5–
165.20) that explains the unity of the perceptual part. Rather, Alexander first shifts here
from the question of a single object (the perceptibles, aisthēta, about which the perception
is) to that of a single underlying body (sōma).47 But since one capacity does not require a
single bodily organ (as it should require a single object), but may unify different organs
(as its parts in a sense)—as it was the case with the two eyes and sight, the one capacity—
the fact that the several sense-organs do not constitute a unitary organ (though they
constitute a unitary sensory structure48) is not troubling for Alexander. Thus, by making
the shift, nothing hinders talking about one capacity. Several objects define several
capacities; but several organs do not. As a consequence of this move, Alexander also
shifts from claiming that we perceive heterogeneous objects by different perceptual
capacities to saying that the perceptual capacity ‘perceives different objects through
different parts of the body, i.e. through different organs’.49
To clarify the issue: what is required for the solution is one unitary capacity of the
soul that may have sufficient diversity or complexity, so that it can perceive several things
45
Alexander, in Sens., 163.18–164.4; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 449a8.
46
Alexander admits this at in Sens., 164.8–9. Indeed, it cannot be solved in the way it was posed: by
identifying a single genus as the object of the perceptual capacity. This is because the five special senses
are parts of the perceptive soul, forming a hierarchical series. In cases of such hierarchies, however, it is
not possible to give an account consisting in the identification of the object, cf. Alexander, de An., 28.14–
29.1, 30.17–20. Hence, it is not the case that the unified object of the common sense is the range of common
perceptibles, as e.g. Hamlyn (1968b: 205) and Modrak (1981a: 413–14) suggest for Aristotle. Nevertheless,
in Alexander it is indeed the common sense which is responsible for perceiving the common objects
(Alexander, de An., 65.11–22). Were this the case—i.e. if common sense were defined as the faculty for
perceiving common perceptibles—common sense would be a special sense distinct from the five special
senses. But Aristotle explicitly rules this out in his de An. 3.1. The same reasoning applies to the suggestion
that the object of common sense is physical objects as such, see Charlton 1981: 108. This problem is
observed by Marmodoro 2014: 189–212. But her proposal—that the common sense has another type of
individuating condition: the type of content—is not convincing.
47
Alexander, in Sens. 164.5–6. ’Next he explains in another way of what one underlying thing this
perceptive <thing> is, i.e. of what body there is a perceptive capacity.’ Ἑξῆς δὲ λέγει πως ἄλλως, τίνος τὸ
αἰσθητικὸν τοῦτο ἑνός ἐστιν ὑποκειμένου καὶ τίνος σώματος αἰσθητικὴ δύναμίς ἐστι. It seems to be
important in the shift that underlying thing (ὑποκειμένου) might mean both the object and the underlying
body or subject.
48
Cf. Kahn 1966: 68–69; Everson 1997: 139–48.
49
Alexander, in Sens. 164.20–21, cf. 164.4.
simultaneously. In short: it must be one and many (complex50) at the same time.51 This is
apparently granted in what follows, so this can be taken as a General Account.52
To explain how this is the case, Alexander appeals to the Point Analogy. It is
important to see that Alexander invokes the analogy quite forcedly.53 For Aristotle in De
Sensu does not even seem to explicate the Point Analogy. What he offers is a dense
expression of a possible option of a solution:
Is that [capacity], then, which perceives white and sweet, some unity qua indivisible in
actuality, but different, when it has become divisible in actuality?54
Moreover, immediately after this, closing his investigation on simultaneous perception,

Aristotle turns to the Apple Analogy.55
Yet, as it will become clear shortly, Alexander prefers the Point Analogy to the
Apple Analogy. He does so, for the Apple Analogy does not fit the General Account, and
because he manages to interpret the Point Analogy in such a way as it is highly
illuminating for the case of heterogeneous perceptibles, and may be applied—with some
additional nuances—to homogeneous objects too.
So Alexander identifies two serious solutions (attributing them to Aristotle) in his
commentary in Sens.: the Point Analogy and the Apple Analogy. He introduces the
analogies with the General Account, which he formulates in a way that helps him to argue
for his preference for the Point Analogy. Since we do not possess Alexander’s
commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima—though Questiones 3.9 clearly functions as a
commentary on the last part of de An. 3.256—we might only judge Alexander’s
interpretation of it indirectly. It seems that he found only one solution there: he apparently
took—quite reasonably—the accounts at Aristotle, de An. 3.2, 427a9–11 and 427a11–14
together to be the expression of the Point Analogy. Since he does not explicate the Apple
50
Additional requirement is that the complexity of the capacity has to be mirrored in the complexity of the
physical structure, see Marmodoro 2014: 191–94.
51
It is instructive to understand the diversity of the judging subject ‘in being’ as ‘divided in its relations’
and grasping them together as ‘bringing them into one relation with one another’ as Beare (1906: 279–81)
takes it, cf. Modrak 1981a: 419; Marmodoro 2014: 246; Shields 2016: 274. However, this in itself is not
yet a solution, for the coming to bear of several relations has a basis in real occurrent changes, cf. Alexander,
in Sens., 126.25–127.12. See Sect. 5.2.
52
Hence, I disagree with Ross (1906: 230) that this is taken by Alexander as a full-blown solution for the
problem, and that it is connected to the Apple Analogy rather than to the Point Analogy.
53
However, Ross (1906: 230–31) believes that the passage ’without doubt’ refers to the Point Analogy. Cf.
Marmodoro 2014: 242–48.
54
ἆρ' οὖν ᾗ μὲν ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἕν τί ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν γλυκέος καὶ λευκοῦ, ὅταν δὲ
διαιρετὸν γένηται κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἕτερον. (Aristotle, Sens. 7, 449a10–13.) According to Charlton (1981:
107) this picks up Aristotle de An., 427a2–9, an unsatisfactory solution. Gregoric (2007: 136) takes this to
mean as follows: when it perceives two things simultaneously the perceptual part of the soul is undivided,
when consecutively, it is divided. Then he finds this unattractive, for what is required is that it is both
undivided and divided. The problem with this suggestion is that this is a non-starter as an explanation of
simultaneous perception, for this simply takes that as one unproblematic case.
55
Gregoric (2007: 136) believes that closing the investigation with the Apple Analogy implies that it is the
preferred view here.
56
See Sharples 1994: 135.
14 Attila Hangai
Analogy but in his commentary in Sens., it is safe to judge that he did not find it in
Aristotle’s De Anima.57
Let us see, in short, what the Apple Analogy consists in and how it may explain
simultaneous perception. Then, we can see why Alexander prefers another solution to
this.
4.2 Apple Analogy
The analogy (Alexander, in Sens., 165.20–167.9; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 449a13–20) is this.
‘As it can be with the things themselves, so too it is with the soul’.58 That is, ‘as it can be
with bodies and things underlying the senses that something, being numerically the same,
possesses several affections within itself’, ‘so too can it be like this with the soul’.59
Getting to his conclusion about the soul, Alexander offers an example for the analogy: an
apple.
The apple, being numerically one, is at the same time sweet, yellow or white, and
fragrant, and the affections differ from one another and are perceptible by different
senses.60
The difference of the several affections (the qualities or properties) of the apple lies in
their being perceptible by different senses; in general: they are different in being (to einai)
or in account (logos); in essence (to ti ēn einai).61 Since perceptible qualities differ in
genus or species (i.e. in their form—essence) by virtue of defining different senses, such
that the qualities are perceptible by the different senses they define; their difference in
being is rightly identified as being perceptible by different senses. Alexander appeals to
the same example of the apple in arguing for the unity of the soul in his On the Soul,
where it serves to illustrate the way of dividing ‘the soul by enumerating the capacities it
has and by ascertaining the differences between them’62.
So, just as the qualities of the apple are different insofar as they are perceptible by
different capacities, there are several different perceptual capacities by means of which
the one unitary perceptive soul perceives the different qualities. ‘The perceptive <soul>,
being one [‘in respect of that which underlies’], is able to be aware and judge several
different things simultaneously because it possesses several capacities’63 that are
57
Perhaps Alexander identified Aristotle, de An. 3.2, 427a2–5 as the Apple Analogy, but left it treated in
general terms, and dropped as inadequate (Alexander, Q. 3.9, 95.27–96.4).
58
Aristotle Sens. 7, 449a13–14. A thorough account of the Apple Analogy is given by Gregoric 2007: 137–
40.
59
Alexander, in Sens., 165.25–26, 166.2.
60
61
Alexander, in Sens., 166.11–13; cf. Aristotle Sens. 7, 449a16.
62
Alexander, de An., 31.2–4; Translation: Caston (2012). For the whole discussion of the analogy, see
Alexander, de An., 30.26–31.6.
63
Alexander, in Sens., 166.2–4. ὡς μίαν οὖσαν τὴν αἰσθητικὴν πλειόνων καὶ διαφόρων ἅμα ἀντιληπτικήν
τε καὶ κριτικὴν εἶναι τῷ πλείους δυνάμεις ἔχειν. The inclusion is from in Sens., 167.8.
‘different from each other, in respect of which it is possible to be active at the same
time’.64
Alexander disapproves of the Apple Analogy as a solution in the end, because it
implies that the diverse heterogeneous objects are perceived by different capacities of the
soul.65 But what is required is exactly the reverse: one capacity perceptive of all
perceptible objects (according to the General Account). Moreover, even though this
analogy fits with heterogeneous objects, it does not offer an account for homogeneous
opposites.66 Just as the apple cannot be white and black at the same time,67 the soul cannot
perceive these qualities with different capacities, for they are objects in the same genus,
being perceptible by the same capacity.68
The other aspect of the analogy—that it involves a single body, the apple—makes
it attractive to commentators.69 They argue that the role of simultaneous perception, and
esp. this analogy is to explain the perception of physical objects. It will become clear that
this function is not identical with simultaneous perception, rather perceiving physical
objects as one thing is an additional act that depends on simultaneous perception (Sect.
5.1).
4.3 Point Analogy
In order to use his preferred explanation, Alexander interprets Aristotle’s dense remark
(Sens. 7, 449a10–13) as invoking the Point Analogy, and finds a reference immediately
preceding it (Sens. 7, 449a9–10) to explicate the analogy in Aristotle, de An. 3.2, 427a9–
23. We may ask two questions in this regard. First, whether or not this is a plausible
interpretation of these lines in Aristotle—i.e. is it the Point Analogy that is meant here?
Second, whether Alexander’s interpretation of the analogy itself is a plausible and
satisfactory solution for the problem of simultaneous perception? Once we have seen
Alexander’s account itself, we may attempt to answer these questions in Sect. 6.
64
Alexander, in Sens., 167.8–9; cf. 166.15–167.4. πλείους δυνάμεις καὶ διαφόρους ἀλλήλων ἔχει, καθ' ἃς
ἅμα οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἐνεργεῖν.
65
See Alexander, in Sens., 168.5–10. We can see this also from the fact that the Apple Analogy does not
appear in the parallel passages (de An.; Q. 3.9) that are dealing with the connected issue of perceptual
discrimination.
66
Alexander, in Sens., 167.10–21. Gregoric (2007: 142–43) suggests that Aristotle merely extends the
Apple Analogy to homogeneous perceptibles a fortiori, in line with principle (3) (in Sect. 2.2). However,
later (p. 149) he admits that this does not suffice for homogeneous perceptibles. He offers a dubious account
for not identifying the core of the Apple Analogy as one in number and different in account (as in Aristotle,
de An. 3.2, 427a2–5), contrary to his own claim (p. 137).
67
Pace Marmodoro (2014: 252–53) who simply asserts that it can be: at different parts. But this ruins the
analogy.
68
Alexander, in Sens., 168.13–15. Ross (1906: 231–32) thinks the Apple Analogy should rather be
complementary to the Point Analogy, explicating that the relation between the perceptions is like that
between their objects. Gregoric (2007: 156–61) argues even for the identity of the two accounts.
69
E.g. Charlton 1981; Modrak 1981; but also Gregoric 2007. Cf. Marmodoro 2014: 177, who does not find
the analogy fully adequate, but invokes Aristotle, De Somno, 455a12–22 as the final account, referring to a
further power of common sense (Marmodoro 2014: 255–61). Cf. Osborne 1983; Osborne 1998.
16 Attila Hangai
Alexander sets out the analogy briefly in his commentary (Alexander, in Sens.,
164.5–165.20) and adds further details in the parallel passages: de An., 63.6–64.11 and
Questiones 3.9, 96.8–97.20. Hence, I shall use all these treatises too to interpret the
account. Let me first set out the easier side of the analogy, the point, before turning to the
difficult question of how it works for the soul. In this section I focus on how the Point
Analogy can solve the problem of heterogeneous perceptibles.
For Aristotle, a point in this context is one indivisible unity, but it divides a line into
two segments, hence it can be taken as many.70 Alexander transforms this image so that
the point is the centre of a circle, which, by being numerically one and without extension
or parts, is one indivisible; and as being the limit of several lines beginning from it or
ending at it, it may be said to be many.71 It is divisible into these different lines, being the
centre in which all the radii are joined.72 The different radii run from the periphery to the
centre, hence the centre itself—their limit—has relations to the other limits: the different
points on the periphery, thus it is divisible accordingly.73 Understood either in Aristotle’s
or Alexander’s way, the point is a numerical unity (one in subject, kata hypokeimenon74),
but it has plurality in its being, in its relations to the lines terminating in it. In Alexander’s
account the point has plurality also in its relations to the end-points of the radii on the
circumference of the circle.
Thus, there are quite a few items involved in Alexander’s picture: (a) the centre of
the circle; (b) the radii; (c) the different termini of the radii on the circumference.
Translating the image to the soul, Alexander, in the Questiones, claims ‘each of these
[things that judge] judges the affection on its own particular line’.75 Hence we may
identify a further item: (d) the affections on the lines. It is clear that what judges
(perceives) is (a) the centre. Again, what is judged is (d) the affection corresponding to
(b) a particular radius. It seems prima facie obvious that what is judged is identical to (c)
the points on the circumference. However it shall soon be clear that this is not the case.
As we have seen, the perceiving thing must be one in number, indivisible, just like
the point taken in itself:
For in so far as it is itself taken and thought of in itself as being an indivisible limit of
all the sense-organs, it will be in activity and by its own nature an indivisible one, and
this will be able to be aware and perceptive of all perceptibles. [...] In this way, in so far
70
Aristotle de An. 3.2, 427a9–14; cf. 3.7, 431a20–24. Most commentators agree that Aristotle means a point
that divides a line: Rodier 1900: 394; Ross 1906: 230–31; Hicks 1907: 450; Henry 1957: 433; Ross 1961:
36; Hamlyn 1968a: 128; Charlton 1981: 106; Accattino and Donini 1996: 230; Beare (1906: 280) specifies
it as a point on the time-line i.e. a now. For interpreting Aristotle as meaning the intersection of several
lines (as Alexander) see Marmodoro 2014: 245; Polansky 2007: 399; Modrak 1981a: 417–18; and Kahn
1966: 56. Gregoric (2007: 150–53) argues that the two images of the point should be taken to explain two
distinct phenomena: the divided line—the discrimination of opposites; the center of the circle—the
discrimination of heterogeneous objects.
71
Alexander uses several words for the point: limit (ὅρος); point (σημεῖον); terminus (πέρας); centre
(κέντρον).
72
Alexander, in Sens., 165.17–20; cf. Q. 3.9, 96.14–18, 20–22; de An., 63.8–12.
73
Alexander, Q. 3.9, 96.19–20, 22–24.
74
Alexander, in Sens., 165.18.
75
Alexander, Q. 3.9, 96.25. ὧν ἕκαστον κριτικὸν ὂν τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ γραμμῇ πάθους ὄντος.
as it is one thing in respect of the underlying subject, that which perceives all the
perceptibles and judges them will be the same thing.76
But it also has to be many, for it has to be able to apprehend many different things at the
same time:
When it is divided by the activities in respect of the sense-organ, it will be many. [...]
Insofar as it is divided by the activities in respect of the sense-organs, coming to be
many in a way, it will perceive several different things together.77
First, it is noteworthy that in these passages Alexander is commenting properly: he

describes the distinction between oneness and multiplicity in terms of indivisibility and
divisibility in activity—just as one can find it in the corresponding passage of Aristotle
(De Sensu 7. 449a10–13). In this way, he makes a strong connection between this remark
of Aristotle’s and the Point Analogy—even though Aristotle does not indicate that the
distinction should be understood in these terms.78 Thus, Alexander secures his
interpretation as plausible. On the one hand, the perceiving thing is said to be one thing,
hence it must have one activity at one time—recall (8) from Sect. 2.2. On the other hand,
it is not prima facie obvious what it means that ‘it is divided by the activities in respect of
the sense-organs’. What Alexander says about this here, referring to Aristotle’s De
Anima, is quite dense:
For being a limit of all the sense-organs in the same way, when the activity comes about
in respect of several sense-organs, it is taken as divided and more than one. To the
extent that it comes to be a boundary of several things together, the same <limit> in the
activities in respect of several sense-organs, to this extent one thing would perceive
several things of different genera together.79
As it stands, this is an explanation of simultaneous perception only of heterogeneous

perceptibles. It seems to involve several activities in respect of each sense-organ that is
being used in perceiving the relevant perceptible. For example, in perceiving white and
sweet together, by sight and taste, there will be activities in respect of the relevant organs:
the eyes and the tongue. To see what these activities might be, we should turn to the
parallel passages, especially to Questiones 3.9.
76
καθόσον μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ λαμβανόμενόν τε καὶ νοούμενον ἀδιαίρετον πέρας τι ὂν πάντων τῶν
αἰσθητηρίων, ἐνεργείᾳ τε καὶ τῇ αὑτοῦ φύσει ἀδιαίρετον ἕν τι ἔσται, καὶ τοῦτο πάντων αἰσθητῶν
ἀντιληπτικόν τε καὶ αἰσθητικόν·. [...] οὕτω δὲ καθὸ μὲν ἕν τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ταὐτὸν ἔσται τὸ
πάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἰσθανόμενον καὶ κρῖνον αὐτά (Alexander, in Sens., 165.3–6, 8–9.)
77
ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἐνεργειῶν διαιρεθῇ, πλείω ἔσται. [...] καθὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὰ
αἰσθητήρια ἐνεργειῶν διαιρεῖται, πολλά πως γινόμενον πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων ἅμα αἰσθήσεται.
(Alexander, in Sens., 165.7–8, 9–11.)
78
Although Aristotle mentions divisibility according to actuality at de An. 3.2, 427a5–9, just before
presenting the point analogy, he explicitly rejects this option as not allowing for simultaneity.
79
πάντων γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ὁμοίως ὂν πέρας, ὅταν κατὰ πλείω γίνηται ἡ ἐνέργεια αἰσθητήρια, ὡς
διῃρημένον καὶ ὡς πλείω λαμβάνεται· καθόσον δὲ ἅμα πλειόνων γίνεται πέρας τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ πλείω
αἰσθητήρια ἐνεργείαις, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἂν καὶ ἓν τῶν πλειόνων τε καὶ ἀνομογενῶν ἅμα αἰσθάνοιτο.
(Alexander, in Sens., 165.13–17.)
18 Attila Hangai
Alexander offers two alternative interpretations. According to the first one, the
Point as Organ interpretation (Questiones, 3.9, 96.31–97.8) the point is to be identified
with the primary sense-organ. Hence the point should be a body, a magnitude with
extension. In this case the lines were the connections between the peripheral sense-organs
and the central organ, and along these lines were the affections transmitted80 from the
periphery to the central organ. But together with the view that perception involves
affections, i.e. material changes, the familiar Problem of Opposites arises. The different
affections from opposed objects cannot come to be in the same part of the central organ—
just like it does not come to be in the same part of the peripheral organs, or the appearance
of them in the same part of mirrors. Thus the central organ as a body or magnitude will
not only be divisible, but indeed the affections would be in different parts of it, hence it
would not be one single thing as is required by the analogy.
It is clear from this that the radii do not only contain the affections, but they are
indeed responsible for the transmission of the affections. This is further confirmed by the
alternative, preferred, interpretation: the Point as Capacity. Accordingly (Questiones, 3.9,
97. 8–19, see in Sect. 5.2), the point is to be identified with the capacity of the central
sense-organ, the common sense81. This capacity, being the form of the body in which it
resides, senses and judges the things that produce alterations in that body, according to
the transmission from the peripheral sense-organs. As a capacity, it is single, incorporeal,
indivisible and similar in every way and every part. It can become many, however, by
perceiving (in the same way) the changes in each part of the ultimate sense-organ. Thus,
by the judgements of the several different parts the capacity becomes several in a way.
Now, the Point as Capacity interpretation is most probably the same as the account
we find at Alexander, in Sens., 165.13–17. Hence we may identify the activity that comes
about in respect of a sense-organ as the perceiving activity coming about according to
the transmission. This latter notion seems to be this.82 In perception, first the peripheral
organ is affected by the perceptible object. Then this affection is transmitted from the
peripheral organ to the primary sense-organ. The result of the transmission is assimilation
to the perceptible object. In cases when there are several such assimilations in the primary
organ (in different parts), the common sense perceives several objects at the same time.
It is related to the different objects in virtue of perceiving by means of being related to
the different assimilations. Since each affection is transmitted on a single route, and
different affections on different routes, the common sense is related to different means of
transmission from periphery to centre. If the different objects are heterogeneous, their
transmissions are through different routes and from different sense-organs. Thus, in
simultaneous perception of heterogeneous perceptibles the objects are judged by
alterations produced in the primary sense-organ according to the transmissions from
different sense-organs.
This can be intererpreted as follows. The common sense is able to determine to
which sense-modality a given perception belongs by the route of transmission of the given
80
’Transmit’ renders diapempein: Alexander, Q. 3.9, 96.33, 36; and diadosthai: Q. 3.9, 97.5, 6.
81
It is clear from Alexander, de An., 63.6–28 that Alexander identifies this capacity as the common sense.
82
See also the parallel account at Alexander, de An., 64.4–9. Cf. Alexander, in Sens., 19.17–20.
perceptual change.83 This is possible, because the routes from the different organs differ.
This interpretation can be corroborated by appealing to the last parallel passage. In his De
Anima (de An., 63.12–64.3), Alexander emphasizes the connection between the activity
of common sense and the affections in the primary sense-organ. This sheds light on the
way the different objects are perceived according to the transmission. For the sense
capacity is many on account of being the terminus of the several different movements
transmitted from the different peripheral organs.84 When several such movements arise
in the primary sense-organ, several objects are perceived simultaneously. Since the
movements are transmitted from different organs, heterogeneous perceptibles are judged
in virtue of the difference of the peripheral organ that transmits or reports85 the affection.
Granted that the theory is consistent in the three treatises, it is noteworthy that the
expression of it is not only less explicit in the Commentary on De Sensu than elsewhere,
but it is less satisfactory too. For, in the commentary, Alexander understands the division
of the activity in terms of the peripheral sense-organs, so that this account can work only
for heterogeneous perceptibles. Alexander needs to clarify what he meant to apply his
solution for homogeneous opposites too—and he does this rather concisely, a few pages
below (at in Sens., 168.2–5, see in Sect. 5.2). The Questiones 3.9 and De Anima passages,
on the other hand, connect the division of the activity to the different parts of the central
organ and to the movements coming about in those parts; the transmission is mentioned
only to explain how the different genera of perceptibles are to be distinguished—and they
explain this rather clearly (see Sect. 5.2 for details).
Now, the picture is this. First, (a) the centre of the circle is what perceives: the
perceptive part or capacity of the soul—the common sense. Then, (d) the affections on
the lines are the things that are judged, and (b) the lines themselves are the routes of
transmission from the periphery to the centre. Hence (c) the points on the periphery must
be the peripheral sense-organs themselves, rather than the objects perceived.
There is, however, a difficulty with the image: it applies—as it stands—only for
heterogeneous perceptibles. Two heterogeneous objects may be distinguished on account
of being transmitted by different lines. But two homogeneous perceptibles should have
been transmitted by the same line, and be present together at the same time at the
terminus—which is impossible, since they are opposites.86 Thus, if this analogy is to
83
Cf. Aristotle, De Inslsomniis 3, 461a28–b3.
84
’For insofar as the perceiving capacity is the terminus of all movements which come about through the
[peripheral] sense-organs in the ultimate sense-organ (for the transmission from the perceptible objects
through the sense-organs extends to it and is towards it), it will be many, coming to be a terminus of many
and different movements.’ Alexander, de An., 63.13–17.
85
Caston (2012: 146–147, n. 362) emphasises the subservient role of the special senses in reporting or
transmitting perceptual information to the common sense.
86
This is why the Point as Capacity interpretation in itself is insufficient for the explanation. Polansky
(2007: 400) too emphasizes that it is the sense which is represented by the point, but he interprets affection
in a non-material sense, hence believes that the Problem of Opposites does not arise. The same
interpretation is expressed by Gregoric 2017 for Alexander’s theory. We shall see below that the Problem
of Opposites does arise.
20 Attila Hangai
answer the Problem of Opposites too, it must be refined.87 How Alexander does this shall
be the topic of the next section.
5 Judgement and Affection
Now we may turn to the Problem of Opposites as expressed in Sect. 3. Recall the
argument.88
(10) Perception is a sort of movement or it is by means of movement.
(11) Movements of opposites are opposed.
(12) Opposites cannot coexist in the same thing at the same time. Nor can opposite
movements.
Hence, opposites cannot be perceived together.
Since (11) and (12) are obviously true, the question is how (10) should be understood to
allow simultaneous perception of opposites. Alexander’s solution is this: ‘perception,
even if it seems to come about by means of an affection, is nevertheless itself
judgement’.89 We have to see first (Sect. 5.1) what it means to be a judgment; then (Sect.
5.2) how judgement relates to the material change involved in perception; so that we can
assess (Sect. 5.3) how this account can solve the Problem of Opposites by the Point
Analogy, but (Sect. 5.4) not by the Apple Analogy.
5.1 Perception as Judgement—Opposition in Judgement
Judgement (krisis)90 is the activity of all kinds of cognitive capacities: not only of
perception, but of representation (phantasia), opinion (doxa), knowledge (epistēmē), and
intellect (nous).91 Among the features of judgement Ebert (1983) identifies, the most
87
Modrak (1981a: 418) thinks that the Point Analogy is easily adoptable to opposites, for ’one can envision
the lines moving in opposite directions’. I doubt that it is easy to envision this.
88
I shall restrict the investigation in this section to the features of the solution that are highly relevant to the
Problem of Opposites. However it is desirable to give a comprehensive account of the solution (which I do
plan to give at another occasion) in order to assess its consequences for Alexander’s theory of perception,
and in general for his philosophy of soul.
89
Alexander, in Sens., 167.21–22; cf. Q. 3.9, 97.25–27, 98.6–10; de An., 63.28–65.1, 84.4-6.
90
Krisis (κρίσις) picks out the active side of perceiving—together with awareness: antilēpsis (ἀντίληψις)—
the two terms being used mostly interchangeably. The term is translated (esp. in Aristotle) in different ways:
judgement—e.g. Towey 2000; Sharples 1994; Emilsson 1988: 121–25; discrimination or discerning—
especially Ebert 1983; cf. Shields 2016; Corcilius 2014; Gregoric 2007; cognition—Caston 2012: 139–40
n. 346; cf. Ross 1906: 217, 233. Two features that Caston attributes to judgement need to be disregarded:
that it involves concepts (otherwise animals could not have it); and that it involves endorsement. Since
phantasia does not involve endorsement (Alexander, de An., 67.18–20, 71.10–21) this clearly is not meant.
Even though the generality of the term ‘cognition’, and its clear contrast to practice (Alexander, de An.,
73.20–26, 75.13–15) renders it a quite good translation of krisis, if we bear in mind the restrictions
concerning concepts and endorsement, ‘judgement’ picks out the propositional type of content more clearly.
91
Alexander, de An., 66.9-19. Cf. de An., 78.10–21, where in addition antilēpsis (awareness), synkatathesis
(endorsement or assent), hypolēpsis (supposition), logizesthai (calculation), dianoeisthai (thinking), and
katalēpsis (securing) are also subsumed under krisis.
important is that it can be true or false, hence erroneous, so that its content is
propositional.92 It is a sort of deciding—as in perceptual discrimination. Moreover, it is
arguable that its propositional content is of predicational form: ‘S is F’.93 In the case of
perception (and phantasia), there are restrictions for the terms in the content: the subject
S has to be an individual that might bear perceptible properties; the predicate F must be a
perceptible feature predicated of S. This kind of content is most apparent in our passages,
though there are independent reasons to take Alexander to attribute it to perception.94
Given this, we can see how identifying perception with judgement can solve the
Problem of Opposites. The problem stemmed partly from (11) ’movements of opposites
are opposed’. The solution that
(10*) Perception is judgement.
is an adequate solution, because
(11*) There is no opposition in a judgement of opposites.95
So,
(12*) Judgement of opposites that they are opposites can be simultaneous.96
Hence simultaneous perception of opposites is possible.
To see the solution in detail we need to look at the explication of (11*): what it is to be
opposition in judgement. This also supports the understanding of krisis as judgement
involving predicational content. Let us see Alexander’s explanation.
That which is opposite in affection is different from that which is <opposite> in

judgement. For in affection white <is opposite> to black but in judgement the judgement
{1}97 concerning the white <thing> that it is white and the <judgement> {2} of the black
<thing> that it is black are not opposites. For these <are> true together; and it is
92
Cf. Emilsson 1988: 122. Note the use of ‘saying’ in connection to this activity, which occurs also in
Aristotle (see Sect. 4.1), cf. Hicks 1907: 448; Polansky 2007: 396; Bergeron and Dufour 2008: 307.
93
Pace Ebert 1983, who argues that content expressing sameness or difference (e.g. ‘x differs from y’) is
operative, being more basic—hence krisis should be translated as ‘discrimination’. Corcilius 2014—
rightly—objects that the discrimination of difference is not that basic act. Instead, he interprets krisis
(discrimination) as transforming the sensory input into phenomenal content, separating the perceptible form
from its matter. This is not yet awareness, the latter being the immediate consequence of the separation,
leading to motor responses in the animal. Since neither interpretation admits predicational content, they
cannot be applied for Alexander; and I am inclined to think that not for Aristotle either, esp. in case of
simultaneous perception.
94
First, since perception provides motivation for action in animals, it has to be able to present external
objects to the animal as to be pursued (or avoided), or, more specifically, as food, as nutrient, as dangerous,
Sorabji 1974; 1992. Though this argument is restricted to accidental perception, which is quite
unproblematic. Second, concept formation—if it depends on perception—requires that what is general is
somehow already in the content of perception, the perceptible features have to be applicable to multiple
subjects. In seeing a white wall the subject has to perceive the wall as white, or, in general, has to perceive
S as F, cf. Caston, Aristotle on Perceptual Content (unpublished). Third, the explicit treatment of the truth-
conditions of phantasia (Alexander, de An., 70.23–71.5) implies that its content is ‘S is F’. For a true
phantasia is about a real thing in the world (S) which is such as the thing (F).
95
96
97
I numbered the examples of judgements in this and the following text for ease of reference.
22 Attila Hangai
impossible for opposite judgements to be true together. But what is opposite to the
judgement {1} concerning the white <thing> that it is white is the <judgement> {3}
concerning the white <thing> that it is black. For this reason these latter <judgements>
never exist together in {4} the judgement in accordance with perception, but the former
ones are—for they are not opposite.98
In this way in judgement it is impossible to suppose that {5} what is white is white and
black together; and for this reason, again, in judgement what is like this cannot exist
together. But to say that {2} black is black and that {1} white is white is not impossible,
because it is not even opposite.99
We may identify two kinds of proposition in this account as the content of perception.100
First, there are propositions with a singular subject and one feature predicated of it: x is
F—‘the white is white’ {1}; ‘the black is black’ {2}; ‘the white is black’ {3}.101 Second,
there are propositions in which several predicates are combined: x is F and G—‘the white
is both white and black’ {5}, viz. ‘the same thing is white and black’102.
Now, Alexander’s point here is that when propositions of the former type are
combined to form propositions of the latter type, some combinations will be possible,
while others will be impossible. Possibility of combination depends on whether the
combined elements are contradictory or not. If they do not contradict each other—can be
’true together’103—they can belong together to the judging subject104. That is, they can
exist together (συνυπάρχει, synyparkhei) in a single judgement. This single judgement is
the perceptual judgement: the ‘judgement in accordance with perception’ (ἡ κατὰ τὴν
αἴσθησιν κρίσις).105
Thus, two items are involved in an opposition in judgement and in the
corresponding lack of opposition, since at least two items might be either opposite or not.
The two items are two judgements that together compose a complex judgement: {1}
together either with {2} or with {3} compose one judgement {4}. When the subject in
the two simple propositions is the same and the predicates are opposed, there will be
opposition in judgement, for these cannot hold together: ‘x is F and x is G’—e.g. {1} and
98
ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐν πάθει ἐναντίον καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ἐν κρίσει. ἐν πάθει μὲν γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι, ἐν κρίσει δὲ
οὐχ ἡ κρίσις {1} ἡ περὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ ὅτι λευκὸν οὐδ' {2} ἡ τοῦ μέλανος ὅτι μέλαν ἐναντίαι· αὗται μὲν γὰρ
ἅμα ἀληθεῖς· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰς ἐναντίας κρίσεις ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι. ἀλλ' ἔστι {1} τῇ περὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ κρίσει
ὅτι λευκὸν ἐναντίον {3} ἡ περὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ ὅτι μέλαν. διὸ αὗται μὲν οὐδέποτε συνυπάρχουσιν ἐν {4} τῇ
κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν κρίσει, ἐκεῖναι δέ· οὐ γάρ εἰσιν ἐναντίαι. (Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Sens., 167.22–
168.2; cf. Q. 3.9, 97.28–30; de An., 64.12–17)
99
ἐν κρίσει πάλιν ἀδύνατον τὸ {5} τὸ λευκὸν ὁμοῦ μὲν λευκόν, ὁμοῦ δὲ μέλαν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι. διὸ
πάλιν ἐν κρίσει τὸ οὕτως ἔχον ἀσυνύπαρκτον. {2} τὸ μὲν μέλαν μέλαν, {1} τὸ δὲ λευκὸν λευκὸν εἰπεῖν οὐκ
ἀδύνατον, ὅτι μηδ' ἐναντίον. (Alexander, Questiones 3.9, 97. 32–35, translations of Q. 3.9, are Sharples’.)
100
In the interpretation I am generally in agreement with Accattino and Donini 1996: 233. See also
Alexander, de An., 64.12–17. This passage uses ’saying’ (legein) to describe the judging activity.
101
Even though there is linguistic ambiguity in ‘the white is white’ (to leukon lekon esti) as to whether the
subject ‘the white’ (to leukon) picks out the thing that happens to be white or the whiteness (of a thing), the
reference is clearly to the thing. Otherwise it would be not only false but nonsensical to say that ‘the white
is black’—i.e. whiteness is blackness—or that ‘the same item is white and black’—i.e. the same quality is
whiteness and blackness.
102
See also Alexander, de An., 64.16.
103
Cf. Alexander, in Sens., 167.25–26.
104
Cf. Alexander, de An., 64.16.
105
Alexander, in Sens., 168.1; cf. Q. 3.9, 97.34.
{3}: ‘w is white and w is black’. On the other hand, when the subjects of the different
predicates differ, the predicates may be opposed without thereby being a contradiction:
‘x is F and y is G’—e.g. {1} and {2}: ‘w is white and b is black’. Since the components
of the composite judgement are judgements themselves, the composite judgement is
formed by a conjunction of its components.106
Thus, Alexander’s solution for simultaneous perception invokes judgements having
propositional content with such complexity. Hence (11*) ’there is no opposition in a
judgement of opposites’.
It also becomes clear from this how perceptual discrimination and perceiving
physical objects differ from, yet depend on simultaneous perception. These acts can be
understood as further judgements in addition to the judgement of simultaneous
perception. In perceptual discrimination the difference of the objects is judged by means
of the difference of the items in the content (in ‘x is F and y is G’ x differs from y; and F
from G) and that ‘F differs from G’ is an additional judgement to simultaneous perception.
Similarly, in perceiving one object, the sameness is judged by means of the sameness of
some item in the content: the sameness of the subject (if x=y, i.e. ‘x is F and x is G’),107
and the judgement that ‘it is one thing’ is additional to simultaneous perception. Hence
simultaneous perception is a more basic phenomenon than either discrimination or
perceiving one physical thing. All the arguments suggest that simultaneous perception is
the unity of consciousness in which all perceptual states are conjoined.108
5.2 Material Change and Judgement
Even though Alexander asserts that (10*) ’perception is judgement’, he also maintains
that (10#) ’perception is by means of movement’. It seems that he rejects any attempt to
solve the Problem of Opposites by eliminating all physical change.109 He has strong
106
A similar suggestion is made by Beare 1906: 281.
107
E.g. the bile is perceived to be both bitter and yellow, cf. Aristotle, de An. 3.1,. 425a30–b3. On this see
Kahn 1966: 54; Hamlyn 1968b: 199–200; Marmodoro 2014: 166–67.
108
Emilsson (1988: 94–100) explicitly identifies it thus, and emphasizes the Stoic influence on the unity of
consciousness in the ruling part of the soul (hēgemonikon). Cf. Hamlyn 1968a: 128; 1968b: 199; Charlton
1981; Modrak 1981a; Shields 2016: 272–73.
109
At de An., 61.30–63.5 Alexander plays with the idea. And even though he does not explicitly reject it,
at the end he offers remarks that tell against it (de An., 62.22–63.5)—namely, the case of the sense-organ
and the medium are disanalogous: affections remain in the former, but do not remain in the latter—in line
with everything he says elsewhere, e.g de An., 39.10–18; in Sens., 5.19–8.13. The role of this suggestion in
the argumentation is by no means clear, however, cf. Bergeron and Dufour 2008: 42, 308–9; Accattino and
Donini 1996: 228–30; Emilsson 1988: 99.
Gregoric (2017: 56-62) takes the remarks at de An., 62.22–63.5 too as supporting the thesis that perception
requires no material change, but is a different kind of change. He argues, then, that this ’immateriality’
thesis is the first step towards the solution, leaving for the point analogy to decide if the special senses or
the common sense do simultaneous perception and perceptual discrimination. Against this interpretation
the following can be considered. First, this obscures why the Problem of Opposites still arises, and why
there is need for separate parts of the sense-organs for receiving incompatible affections (cf. note 86).
Again, later (p. 59-60) Gregoric confuses this immateriality thesis with the thesis that the common sense as
a form is immaterial—which Alexander clearly endorses, but which does not follow from the immateriality
thesis concerning the perceptual change. Moreover, Alexander does not appeal to the thesis that perception
24 Attila Hangai
reasons to do so: e.g. a causal connection to the object is necessary to trigger the activity
of the capacity; moreover, the fact that the affection is assimilation to the object explains
the intentional (and phenomenal) content of the perception. In addition, it would be
anachronistic to suppose that perception does not involve material change at all.110
For this reason, Alexander has to provide a satisfactory explanation how the
material change (the movement) is related to the perceptual activity of judging. In
particular, he has to offer an account of the role of material alteration in simultaneous
perception of opposites (as well as of heterogeneous perceptibles).
In his commentary he just summarizes the findings that are explicated in detail both
in Questiones 3.9, and in De Anima.111 Thus, in this section, I appeal to the parallel
passages to complete the account of simultaneous perception provided in the
commentary.
However when that body is affected in which this <i.e. the perceptive> soul <is
located>, and which it is habitual to call the ultimate sense-organ, <it is affected> not in
respect of the same part by both <opposites> but rather <the affections> are generated
in different <parts> by different <opposites> just as we see in case of the eyes and
mirrors when the opposites appear simultaneously.112
The problematic proposition was that (12) ’the same thing cannot admit two incompatible
(in particular: opposite) affections at the same time’. This involves three factors: the
subject, the affection, and the time. Two of these cannot be altered. First, we are
considering the possibility that the affection involved in perception is affection in the
strict sense. Again, since what has to be shown is the possibility of simultaneous
perception, simultaneity cannot be dropped either. The remaining factor is the subject.
Hence, instead of a single subject there must be different subjects for the incompatible
affections.
We learn elsewhere that the affection involved in perception is assimilation to the
perceived object.113 This is a consequence of the Aristotelian theory of causation.114 For,
if a acts upon b (in virtue of F), then before the process a and b were dissimilar (F and
non-F), and in the change a assimilates b to itself, by making b actually F. Perceptual
assimilation comes to be through a qualitative change, for the special objects of
perception are qualities.
Again, since the affection is physical, it requires a body as its subject. Thus it is not
the capacity that receives the affection, otherwise the Problem of Opposites would still
arise. But the incorporeal capacity is not even a suitable subject for material affection.
is a different kind of change; rather, he puts forward the thesis that perception is a different type of activity:
judging.
110
Nevertheless it has been supposed for Aristotle: Burnyeat 1992; 2002. But this idea is conclusively
rejected, e.g. by Sorabji 1992; Sisko 1996; Everson 1997; Caston 2005; Lorenz 2007.
111
Cf. Alexander, Q. 3.9, 97.22–25; 98.2–15; de An., 64.4–11; 64.17–65.1.
112
πάσχοντος μέντοι τοῦ σώματος ἐν ᾧ ἥδε † ψυχή, ὃ ἔθος ἐστὶ λέγειν ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον, οὐ κατὰ τὸ
αὐτὸ μόριον ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου γίνεται, ὡς γὰρ ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν κατόπτρων ἅμα ἐμφαινόμενα τὰ ἐναντία. (Alexander, in Sens., 168.2–5.)
113
See Alexander, de An., 38.20–40.3, 40.20–41.10; cf. Aristotle, de An. 2.6. Cf. Marmodoro 2014: 80–86.
114
Aristotle, Physics 3.1–3; GC, 1.7. For a recent analysis of the relevance of the causal theory in Aristotle’s
views on perception, see Marmodoro 2014.
Hence, the subject has to be the sense-organ.115 But being corporeal implies that it is an
extended magnitude, so that it is divisible into several parts.116 Now, since a part of a
magnitude is still a magnitude, and a part of a body is still a body, the parts of the sense-
organ are suitable subjects for receiving affections. Indeed, Alexander appeals to the
observation that different colours affect different parts of the eye as well as appear in
different parts of a mirror.117 Hence the proper subject that receives perceptual change is
a part of the sense-organ.118 So, assimilation takes place in parts of the primary sense-
organ. It comes to be there by being transmitted there from the different peripheral sense-
organs.119
This explains why the respect in which the one capacity is many may have been
cashed out in different terms (see Sect. 4.3). Since all these items—the transmission-
process itself, the route of transmission, the affection as the product of transmission, and
the part of the primary organ as the end-location of transmission—are phases of and items
in a single process (the transmission), the claims that the one capacity becomes several in
accordance with ‘the transmissions’, ‘the activities in respect of the sense-organs’ (i.e. the
transmission-processes themselves), ‘the lines’ (corresponding to the routes), ‘the
affections’, and ‘the parts of the organ’ are all equivalent. The last of these—the parts—
is the most proper item according to which the distinction can be made. For the parts of
the sense-organ might differ irrespective of the kind of affection and the corresponding
kind of perceptible features involved—heterogeneous or homogeneous perceptibles in the
same way (requirement (vi) in Sect. 2).
Now, since the affections are related to (present in) different parts of the sense-
organ, no impossibility arises from the fact that sense-organ is being affected by opposites
simultaneously. However, that the affections are of diverse subjects seems to contradict
the requirement of a single subject.120 Even though the subject of the perceptual activity
is claimed to be the capacity, it must be explained how it is the case that there is only one
single capacity if there are several parts of the sense-organ that each may receive different
affections simultaneously. How might there be one activity of this capacity, which is
related to several parts of the sense-organ?
This capacity senses and judges the things that come about in that body, of which it is
the form and capacity, according to the transmission from the sense-organs. For this
115
Alexander, Q. 3.9, 97.35–98.4. In the passage where Alexander introduces the issue of perceptual
change, he carelessly writes as if its subject were the capacity rather than the body, see esp. Alexander, de
An., 39.11–13, 16–18. This attribution can be dismissed, however, as introductory, especially because it is
followed by an explicit statement that the subject is the body (de An., 39.18–21). Cf. Corcilius 2014: 43–
48. However, see Lorenz 2007.
116
Alexander, Q. 3.9, 96.31–97.8.
117
Alexander, in Sens., 168.3–5; Q. 3.9, 97.1–4.
118
Alexander, in Sens., 168.3–4; cf. de An. 64.4–9, 18–19; Q. 3.9, 97.5–8, 22–25, 98.4–6.
119
Alexander, de An., 64.2–3, 7–8, 19–20; Q. 3.9, 97.22–25.
120
Cf. Emilsson 1988: 104–5. Emilsson argues that: “Plotinus’ view of the matter is much simpler [than
that of Alexander]. Basically all he does is to develop one of Alexander’s two solutions so that a uniform
account can be given in terms of it.” This solution is what I explicate below: that the soul as incorporeal is
uniformly present to the body. The achievement of Plotinus’ that Emilsson refers to is his disregarding of
the transmission from sense-organs to a central organ as unnecessary addition. Cf. Henry 1957.
26 Attila Hangai
capacity is single and, as it were, the terminus of this body of which it is the capacity,
since it is to this that the changes are transmitted as their ultimate [destination]. [The
capacity,] being incorporeal and indivisible and similar in every way, as being single,
in a way becomes many [capacities], since it senses similarly the changes in each part
of the body of which it is the capacity, whether the change comes about in it in some
one part or in several. For in the judgement of several [parts] the single [capacity] in a
way becomes several capacities, since it is taken as the proper terminus of each part.121
What Alexander offers is insisting on hylomorphism. Accordingly, as the sense-organ is

the matter of the perceiver, the capacity of perception—which makes the judgement—is
the form.122 Just as any form, the perceptive capacity enforms the sense-organ throughout
uniformly. That is, it is the same form in relation to the whole sense-organ as well as to
all its parts. Thus, there is one single form, and it is incorporeal, and similar throughout.123
In a sense the perceptual movements are taken to it, ‘for the transmission from the
perceptible objects through the sense-organs extends to it and is towards it’.124 For the
capacity is the last item concerned with the movements in making the judgement by
means of them, hence, in a sense, it is the limit of the sense-organ. The capacity might be
called a limit of the body insofar as it might be called the limit of the bodily movements
in the diverse parts of the organ, or the limit of the parts themselves.125 Certainly it is not
a physical limit in virtue of being the end-location of the transmission of the movements.
Rather, being incorporeal (not a magnitude), hence also indivisible, it might be a limit by
analogy. The capacity is the limit of the movements, insofar as when the capacity makes
judgements based on the movements the movements terminate in the judgement.126
Again, being the form in the same way of each part of the sense-organ, the capacity
can judge the affections in each part in the same way.127 This is a crucial point for two
reasons. First, this allows that only one activity may be there to judge several things
(requirement (iii) in Sect. 2), by being related to each part of the primary sense-organ
uniformly. I.e. picking upon the affections in the parts and judging that corresponding to
the affection there is a quality in the environment. The same relation allows that each
perceived feature comes into the perceptual content as a predicate of its given subject.
Second—and most importantly—the uniform relation allows that the objects are
perceived distinctively, without any interference, hence as they are (requirement (i) in
Sect. 2). For in case several things are perceived, since the affections are in diverse parts,
121
ἴσως δ' ἂν ἐφαρμόζειν δύναιτο μᾶλλον τῇ δυνάμει τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνου, ὃ λέγομεν ἔσχατον
αἰσθητήριον, οὗ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις εἶδος, ἥτις δύναμις αἰσθάνεται καὶ κρίνει τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι, οὗ δύναμις
καὶ εἶδός ἐστιν γενόμενα κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διάδοσιν. ἡ γὰρ δύναμις αὕτη μία οὖσα καὶ ὥσπερ
πέρας τοῦ σώματος τούτου οὗ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔσχατον αἱ κινήσεις φέρονται, ἀσώματός
τε οὖσα καὶ ἀδιαίρετος καὶ ὁμοία πάντῃ, μία οὖσα, πολλαί πως γίνονται τῷ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον μόριον τοῦ
σώματος, οὗ δύναμίς ἐστι, κινήσεων αἰσθάνεσθαι ὁμοίως, ἄν τε κατὰ ἕν τι μόριον ἡ κίνησις ἐν αὐτῷ
γένηται, ἄν τε κατὰ πλείω. ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν πλειόνων κρίσει πολλαί πως δυνάμεις ἡ μία γίνεται ὡς ἑκάστου
μορίου πέρας οἰκεῖον λαμβανομένη. (Alexander, Q. 3.9, 97.10–19.)
122
Alexander, Q. 3.9, 97.9–10.
123
Alexander, de An., 63.17–19, 64.9–11; Q. 3.9, 97.14–15, 98.6.
124
Alexander, de An., 63.15–16; see Sect. 4.3.
125
Alexander, Q. 3.9, 97.13–14, 18–19; de An., 63.14–17.
126
Alexander, Q. 3.9, 97.14, 17–18.
127
Alexander, Q. 3.9, 97.15–17; de An., 63.20–28.
they do not need to affect each other, hence they may remain affections as they would be
were only a single thing perceived. The lack of interference also allows the objects to be
perceived as two (requirement (ii) in Sect. 2).
This implies that there are as many objects in the perceptual content as many
affections are co-occurring in the several parts of the primary sense-organ. When there is
only one affection, what is perceived is only one thing. When there are many affections,
all of them will be perceived at the same time. And in this latter case the one capacity as
it were becomes several.128
5.3 The Solution for the Point Analogy
Now that we have seen the elements of the solution, let us see how it applies for the
analogies. The solution that (10*) ’perception is judgement’ seems to be applicable to
both the Apple Analogy and the Point Analogy similarly. It certainly applies to the Point
Analogy. As we have seen (Sect. 4.3) the account of the Point Analogy describes the point
in the same terms as we have just seen for the capacity: single, incorporeal, indivisible.
Moreover, the connection is also made in terms of the uniformity of relation. For just as
the point is ‘insofar as what is from them all [the lines] is one undifferentiated and in
every way the same129, the capacity as well is the ‘limit of all the sense-organs in the same
way’.130 There is not only no spatial differentiation in the point and the capacity, but they
are also related to the different items with the same kind of relation. The point is the limit
of the lines in the same sense, and the capacity is present to its parts, is judging the
affections in the parts, and is presented with the affections in the parts through the
affections having been transmitted, etc., in the same way.
It is clear that if the unity is given on the level of capacity, there has to be something
on a different level that accounts for the required plurality. In the point analogy: the point
is one, and there are several lines. The lines and the point are on different level, for the
lines are 1D items whereas the point is 0D. Since the capacity is on the level of form, the
only possible subject remaining, then, is something bodily.131 Plurality is indeed
accounted for by the several parts of the primary sense-organ. Hence the analogy with the
point requires that there are several bodily items (parts of the sense-organ) involved in
the solution as subjects for the diverse perceptual affections: viz. (10*) is necessarily
supplemented with (10#).
128
Alexander, Q. 3.9, 97.17–18, 98.8–15; de An., 64.20–65.1.
129
καθόσον δὲ ἓν τὸ ἐκ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορον καὶ πάντῃ τὸ αὐτό. (Alexander, Q. 3.9, 96.26.)
130
πάντων γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ὁμοίως ὂν πέρας. (Alexander, in Sens., 165.13.)
131
Pace Gregoric 2007: 132. Cf. Gregoric 2017.
28 Attila Hangai
5.4 The Solution for the Apple Analogy
Again, the fact that (10*) ’perception is judgement’ is introduced, at in Sens., 167.21, in
the context of the Apple Analogy132 suggests that it fits this analogy too. In the Apple
Analogy there is one body underlying the affections on the one hand, and many capacities
perceive them on the other. However, both these aspects of the analogy strongly tell
against the applicability of the solution (10*) for it. First, (10*) involves one act of
judging, although with complex content. But according to (8), one act requires one
capacity being active. The many capacities in the Apple Analogy conflict with this
requirement. Again, as we have seen (Sect. 5.2), the solution (10*) involves that the body
in which the affections are present has many parts; and these different parts can be unified
precisely because one capacity is their form. So whereas the Apple Analogy involves
unity of body and multiplicity of capacities, (10*) involves multiple bodily parts unified
by one single capacity.
More generally, the purpose of (10*) is to reconcile that (10#) ’perception involves
material changes’ with (11) ’material changes of opposites are opposed’, so that one
single subject can perceive opposites together without one single body being affected with
opposite motions (which is impossible (12)). But if the solution that (10*) ’perception is
judgement’ is combined with an analogy that insists on the singularity of the body
involved, then even though (11*) ’judgement of opposites does not involve opposition’,
the opposite movements involved by (10) and (11) will affect this one single body,
contrary to the fact that (12) this is impossible. But if it is dropped that there is only one
body, the analogy with the apple is just ruined.133
6 The Adequacy of Alexander’s Account
Let us see whether Alexander’s solution reconstructed in Sect. 5.2 and 5.3 answers the
issue adequately, especially in relation to the requirements identified in Sect. 2.
(i) The two items that are perceived simultaneously must be perceived distinctly in
the same way. This is clearly met both on the level of the content of the perceptual
judgement and that of the material change. First, since the perceptible features enter into
the content (x is F and y is G) as predicates (F, G), the two features come into the one
judgement in the same way as predicates and as distinct, for they are predicates of
different subjects (though the subjects might be identical: if x=y). Again, the perceived
objects produce perceptual affections in the primary sense-organ in the same way and
distinctly. For the affections come to be in distinct parts of the organ, but similarly, insofar
as they are assimilations to the objects perceived by means of alteration through
transmission.
132
It is a second alternative to the interpretation according to which the Apple Analogy rules out
simultaneous perception of opposites, see Alexander, in Sens., 167.10–21.
133
This problem is the same as that with the Point as Organ interpretaion, i.e. the point in the Point Analogy
corresponds to the primary sense-organ, to a body, as it is discussed by Alexander in Q. 3.9, 96.31–97.8.
(ii) The two items must be perceived as two. Since the content is a complex of two
simple perceptual propositions: ‘x is F’ and ‘y is G’, the two objects are perceived as two:
x, and y as well as F and G. The fact that the corresponding affections are in distinct parts
of the sense-organ prevents their interference.
(iii) There has to be a single activity of simultaneous perceiving. There is one
activity: judging that ‘x is F and y is G’. This can be a single activity, for the difference
between a judgement with a simple content (x is F) and one with a complex content (x is
F and y is G) is not that the former involves one activity and the latter two, but that the
latter involves a more complex activity than the former. It is more complex, for it involves
also the conjoining of two simple propositions. But it is still one activity, for it is a
judgement with a single truth-condition (even though this depends on the truth conditions
of the component simple judgements). Again, judging relates to the objects and to the
corresponding parts of the sense-organ uniformly, for there is a single form (i.e. capacity)
enforming the organ, which thereby has a single activity.
(iv) The single activity must be at one time indivisible in any respect. The main
desideratum having been simultaneity, this requirement has never slipped notice.
However, one might ask how the several components of a judgement (‘w is white’ and ‘b
is black’) might be simultaneous, if judgement is like saying or pronouncing. For the
saying of the terms, and even more, the saying of the component judgements, involves
temporal distinctions: since in the judgement ‘w is white and b is black’ the component
‘w is white’ is pronounced before ‘b is black’, hence not simultaneously, so they cannot
be judged simultaneously either. But this objection is based on confusing the role of
saying in the account. What it serves to illuminate is merely the type of content—i.e.
propositional content—not that it is a process having some duration.134 The simultaneity
of the component judgements is best seen in the image in the final account. The judgement
of simultaneous perception involves two contemporaneous affections in two parts of the
primary sense-organ, hence two contemporaneous relations between the judging capacity
and the affections. Since the judgement consists in the relations the capacity has to the
several affections, if these affections are simultaneous, the judgement will be
simultaneous too. The account does not mention any pronouncing.
(v) There has to be one capacity which is perceptive of all kinds of object. The Point
Analogy explicitly fits this, emphasizing the uniqueness of the capacity as the form of the
primary sense-organ—the perceptive part of the soul or the common sense—and that this
capacity uses the peripheral sense-organs in its activities. Since the capacity is related to
each part of the central organ, hence to all transmitted affections in those parts, it is able
to perceive all kinds of perceptibles. As we have seen, the Apple Analogy is defeated on
this point, as it involves several capacities.
(vi) There has to be a homologous account for heterogeneous and for homogeneous
perceptibles. This is also clear in the final account. For what matters is that the perceptual
changes affect different parts of the sense-organ, so that they are perceptible
134
Rodier (1900: 388) notes that judging is an activity (energeia) rather than a movement (kinēsis), hence
occurs instantaneously and does not have a coming to be.
30 Attila Hangai
simultaneously without causing any physical inconsistency—the formal inconsistency

having been resolved by (10*) the judgement-account. Thus, even though only the
affections from heterogeneous perceptibles are transmitted through specifically different
routes (through different sense-organs), the end-result is similar: different parts of the
primary sense-organ are affected by different perceptibles, regardless of how the objects
may differ.
7 Conclusion
Alexander provided an adequate solution for the problem of simultaneous perception,

which can be identified as an important psychological notion: the unity of (perceptual)
consciousness. The problem is already set out, but never resolved by Aristotle. Aristotle
merely provided some analogies to show the possibility of an account. Alexander solves
the problem by extending Aristotle’s analogy with a point (depicting a circle with its
centre, see Sect. 4.3) and connecting all of Aristotle's remarks about the issue in different
works; thereby remaining a faithful Aristotelian. Alexander’s interpretation of Aristotle
gains plausibility from the plausibility of his solution for the problem of simultaneous
perception. Even in cases when Alexander apparently supplies additional elements to the
account—perception as judgement (Sect. 5.1); assimilation in different parts of the sense-
organ (Sect. 5.2)—we may find the roots in Aristotle, and there is nothing written by
Aristotle that contradicts Alexander’s account. Thus, Alexander’s treatment of
simultaneous perception can be taken as a coherent and powerful interpretation of
Aristotle; though the final assessment would require the examination of the consequences
of Alexander’s solution, and a thorough comparison of them with Aristotle’s theory.
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Alexander of Aphrodisias On Simultaneous

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Forthcoming in D. Bennett J. Toivanan (eds.

), Philosophical Problems in Sense

Abstract Alexander of Aphrodisias picks up Aristotle’s insufficient treatment of

There is a growing interest in the notion of simultaneous perception in Aristotle.1 The

2 The Problem of Simultaneous Perception

2.1 Argument from Mixed Perceptibles

(b) from one genus and of different intensity;

2.2 Argument from the Numerical Correspondence of Activity and

(4) It is impossible to perceive simultaneously two homogeneous objects.

2.3 First Attempt: Different Parts of the Soul

together (Alexander, in Sens., 157.11–162.11; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 7, 448b20–449a5).

4 Simultaneous Perception of Heterogeneous Perceptibles

4.1 General Account

Alexander provides a general account, at Alexander, in Sens. 162.12–164.4, in

Moreover, immediately after this, closing his investigation on simultaneous perception,

4.2 Apple Analogy

4.3 Point Analogy

First, it is noteworthy that in these passages Alexander is commenting properly: he

As it stands, this is an explanation of simultaneous perception only of heterogeneous

5 Judgement and Affection

5.1 Perception as Judgement—Opposition in Judgement

That which is opposite in affection is different from that which is <opposite> in

5.2 Material Change and Judgement

What Alexander offers is insisting on hylomorphism. Accordingly, as the sense-organ is

5.3 The Solution for the Point Analogy

5.4 The Solution for the Apple Analogy

6 The Adequacy of Alexander’s Account

simultaneously without causing any physical inconsistency—the formal inconsistency

Alexander provided an adequate solution for the problem of simultaneous perception,

Alexander of Aphrodisias. 1887. De Anima. Ed. I. Bruns. Berlin: Reimer.

Beare, John I. 1906. Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition: From Alcmaeon to

Emilsson, Eyjolfur Kjalar. 1988. Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study.

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