Cabral Krane 2016

International
Review of
Administrative
Article Sciences
International Review of
Administrative Sciences
0(0) 1–21
Civic festivals and collaborative ! The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0020852315615196
Sandro Cabral* ras.sagepub.com
Federal University of Bahia and Insper, Brazil
Dale Krane*
University of Nebraska at Omaha, USA
Abstract
Civic festivals offer an exceptional laboratory for the study of collaborative governance
because these events are ubiquitous and are characterized by public and private part-
ners engaged in joint activity. Using the Carnival festival of Salvador, Brazil, as an
example, we analyze the current models of collaborative governance to determine
whether they apply to the context of large civic festivals. Drawing primarily on Ansell
and Gash’s (2008) model, our qualitative analysis shows that some constructs of col-
laborative governance models are present. However, our results uncover other factors
affecting the collaboration process such as informal relationships and the basis of deci-
sion-making. Our results also suggest that trust, a factor commonly argued as necessary
to collaborative action, may be less critical than received theories suggest.
Points for practitioners

Large civic festivals are a unique laboratory for studying inter-organizational collabor-
ation because these events normally involve a myriad of public and private actors
working in an interdependent fashion. Our study reveals some factors not covered
by previous research that influence the dynamics of collaboration. We observe that
repeated interactions between technical experts can foster informal (and effective)
networks of collaboration and circumvent the problems generated by political disputes.
The bases on which decisions are taken are also important factors to enhance collab-
oration. We found that trust, a factor commonly argued as necessary to collaborative
action, may be less critical than received theories suggest.
*Both authors contributed equally and list their names alphabetically on joint work.
Corresponding authors:
Sandro Cabral, Federal University of Bahia – School of Management, Av. Reitor Miguel Calmon, s/n – 3. Andar
Salvador, Bahia, Brazil 40110-903.
Email: scabral@ufba.br
Dale Krane, University of Nebraska at Omaha – School of Public Administration, 6001 Dodge Street, Omaha,
NE, USA 68182.
Email: dkrane@unomaha.edu
Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at INST DE ENSINO E PESQUISA Pare on October 31, 2016
2 International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)
Keywords
civic festivals, collaboration, collaborative governance
Introduction
Inter-organizational collaboration becomes particularly crucial in situations where
the desired objectives and the proposed missions cannot be achieved by a single
entity alone and a myriad of individuals and organizations are required. Studies of
collaboration affirm that the shift from conflict to cooperation does not come easily
because several conditions are necessary for collaboration to emerge, including the
need for financial resources and sharing of risks, disposition to collaborate, high
levels of interdependence, goal congruence, leadership capacity and style, and trust
(Alter and Hage, 1993; Bryson et al., 2006; Thomson and Perry, 2006).
Collaborative governance involves the participation of public and private actors
in the formulation and implementation of a good or service (Bryson et al., 2006).
Collaborative governance models posit that actors in a collaboration develop
shared understandings, mission, and decision rules (Ansell and Gash, 2008) and
their scope is beyond the problem solving approach of collaborative management
theories (Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010).
Previous studies on collaborative governance have addressed policy areas
such as disaster response, environmental protection, human service provision,
and regional planning (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012). One of
the areas neglected by studies on collaborative governance is the organization of
large civic festivals. These events are important because they may yield social,
cultural, and economic impacts at the local level (Jago and Shaw, 1998).
They might also be useful to build community identity, develop and even regener-
ate urban areas, and create new industries. Furthermore, large festivals are
not limited to the United States and Europe – their use is global (Miles and
Paddison, 2005). Large festivals are a typical case of collaborative governance
because they depend on a diverse set of resources – human, financial, political,
technical – that are possessed by several public and private stakeholders
(Andersson and Getz, 2008). Since festivals involve diverse public and private
goods and services (artistic content, public security, city cleaning, transit manage-
ment, and so on) and operate on a time schedule, the decision process cannot
become bogged down in protracted conflict (Cabral et al., 2013). Consequently,
the inter-sectorial arrangements, which are a key component of civic events, require
a collaborative style of governance that should be examined through a public
administration lens.
Typically, studies of festivals have examined their planning and manage-
ment from a business perspective with an interest in how the event contributes
to a community’s economic base and/or serves to attract visitors to the
locality (Gotham, 2011; Jago and Shaw, 1998). Few analyses examine the complex
interactions among public, for-profit, and nonprofit entities and individuals
Cabral and Krane 3
that are necessary to event success (Andersson and Getz, 2008; Getz, 2002).
Sometimes these studies suggest that collaboration is an important element of
festival operation (Savage et al., 1991). To the best of our knowledge, studies
focusing on how collaboration occurs in large civic events utilizing the recent
theoretical developments on collaborative governance in a systematic fashion
are scant.
In this sense, our main question is: Do models of collaborative governance
apply to civic festivals? The study of collaborative governance in the context of
large festivals helps us to evaluate whether the main constructs of the current
models are valid when analyzing sectors not commonly studied and if other mech-
anisms that affect the collaboration dynamics can emerge from studies in unusual
contexts, thus informing and enhancing the existing theories on collaborative
governance.
To tackle these objectives, we analyze the Carnival of Salvador, Brazil,
which offers an unusual example of collaboration among public and private entities
that normally engage in non-cooperation and conflict. Compared to the US
and European countries, Brazil presents distinct cultural and institutional
features (Baer, 2001) that allow an assessment of the non-culture bound nature
of collaborative models. Salvador’s Carnival is a representative example of
civic festivals because it is a special event that has a theme and involves a
celebration (Jago and Shaw, 1998). Reputedly one of the largest popular festivals
in the world, Salvador’s Carnival depends on a high degree of cooperation among
and between municipal and state governments, private firms, independent artists,
and neighborhood associations. Policy-making in Salvador is characterized typic-
ally by frequent outbreaks of inter-organizational conflict that prevent public
action in a timely fashion. Recent history contains numerous examples of budget
cuts for municipalities who oppose the political coalitions governing their states
(Souza, 2003).Yet, surprisingly, this normal condition of non-cooperation does not
stymie Carnival activities. Inter-organizational collaboration may take place in the
official discussion forums (the Municipal Council of Carnival – COMCAR – for
planning the event, and the Office for Integrated Management, for taking
actions during the event’s realization) and in informal networks formed by private
entrepreneurs, politicians, and prominent public organizations, such as the Bahia
State Military Police Department (BMPD) and the municipal tourism agency
(SALTUR).
Salvador’s Carnival provides a unique laboratory for the assessment of the
generalizability of collaboration models. Although festivals demand a high
degree of collaboration, in our theoretical framework we posit that collaboration
is not easy to achieve. Given the existence of several channels of negotiation and
collaboration, we rely on the Ansell and Gash (2008) (abbreviated below to A&G)
model to substantiate our analysis. Subsequently, through an analysis of Carnival,
we identify some converging points between our case and the extant models, and
we also identify aspects of Carnival operation that are treated as secondary elem-
ents or are omitted from the A&G model.
Models of collaborative governance: definition, barriers,

and influencing factors
Definition
Public managers now function in an ‘age of collaboration’ (Agranoff and McGuire,
2003: 20) because they must operate in a world of ‘shared power’ where the chal-
lenge of creating and sustaining joint action by multiple individuals and organiza-
tions across societal sectors is increasingly required to be effective (Bryson and
Einsweiler, 1991). In the past four decades a prodigious list of articles and books
on collaborative governance has been produced and several definitions have been
offered (Agranoff, 2012; Aiken et al., 1975; Alter and Hage, 1993; O’Leary and
Bingham, 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, in the present article we
adopt the definition of Ansell and Gash (2008). According to them, collaborative
governance can be defined as ‘a governing arrangement where one or more public
agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making
process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to
make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets’ (2008: 545).
Barriers to implementation
However, implementing collaborative governance to solve public problems is not
straightforward, given the inherent pathologies associated with bureaucracies and
the existence of fragmented strategies to societal problems (Dewulf et al., 2011).
In this matter, O’Leary and Bingham (2009: 259–264) confirm that research dem-
onstrates that efforts to encourage agencies to work together may well provoke
conflict rather than cooperation. Significant obstacles to collaboration must be
recognized in any study of collaborative governance – not all attempts to collab-
orate will succeed.
Impediments to cooperation and collaboration consist of several large categories
of barriers, including organizational, fiscal, legal/technical, and political (Jennings
and Krane, 1994; Johnston et al., 2011; Termeer, 2009). Organizational obstacles
are rooted in mission differences, laws and regulations, standard operating proced-
ures, issues related to budget and finances, and structural arrangements (Agranoff,
2012). Political jockeying among an agency’s units and between politically
appointed managers and career civil servants can easily block movement toward
collaboration (Wilson, 2000). Public administration scholars have long lamented
the negative effects of interagency conflict on public policy and collective action
(Haughton et al., 1997). Hence, advocates of collaboration and those who study
collaboration cannot easily deny the presence of these pervasive impairments.
Influencing factors
A crucial focus of research is the identification of those factors that public officials
utilize in their efforts to overcome inter-organizational conflict and build
Cabral and Krane 5
collaboration among the stakeholders that populate a public program’s

implementation structure. A related feature of collaboration is the type of inter-
organizational network created – not all networks are alike in their purposes,
governance, operations, or structures (Mandell and Steelman, 2003; Provan and
Kenis, 2008). Collaboration can be a quite simple affair existing for cooperative
purposes such as information exchange; other networks take additional steps to
educate members and build member capacity, while some networks initiate
new programming by members, and other collaborations adopt formal arrange-
ments designed to achieve joint goals (Agranoff, 2007). Variation in these factors
significantly affects whether collaboration occurs, whether agency rivalries are tran-
scended, and whether public purposes are achieved.
Contrasted with the diversity of collaboration definitions and theoretical
roots, work on developing models of collaborative governance is converging
around a set of similar elements and relationships (Ansell and Gash, 2008;
Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson et al., 2012; Thomson and Perry, 2006). Early efforts
sought to sketch the antecedents of collaboration, and then attention turned to
outcomes. More recent models incorporate antecedents, processes, outcomes, and
add institutional design, leadership, number and variety of groups, issues and
incentives, structure and governance, and contingencies and constraints.
Different models may label a given factor differently from another model, but
the factors in the various models are increasingly similar. Here we address one
of the most prominent models.
Ansell and Gash model of collaborative governance

Johnston et al. (2011: 701) assert that ‘the ‘‘contingency model’’ of collaborative
governance proposed by Ansell and Gash is, perhaps, the most sophisticated
account of the complex conditions necessary to initiate and sustain collaboration
to date’. Ansell and Gash (2008) conducted an extensive literature review of col-
laboration studies. Using an inventory of 137 cases, they proceeded to create a
model of collaborative governance. Among factors hypothesized to influence col-
laborations are: (1) Starting conditions composed of power–resource–knowledge
asymmetries, incentives and constraints on participation, and prehistory of cooper-
ation or conflict; (2) Collaborative process consisting of face-to-face dialogue, trust-
building, commitment to process, shared understanding, intermediate outcomes;
(3) Institutional design based on participatory inclusiveness, forum exclusiveness,
clear ground rules, process transparency; (4) Leadership including empowerment;
and (5) Outcomes, which are seen as process based.
In their model, Ansell and Gash (2008: 559) view the level of commitment to the
process as the critical variable in explaining success or failure because negotiations
and trust-building are time-consuming activities and impose costs on those seeking
to create collaboration. Ansell and Gash suggest that shared understanding takes
the form of a common problem definition, a clear mission for joint action, and the
identification of common values. Intermediate outcomes, or ‘small wins’, reinforce
the collaborative process and increase the chances of successfully achieving desired
outcomes. Given the obvious costs of joint activity, stakeholders are more likely to
participate if they anticipate that collaboration will yield meaningful results. An
exclusive forum for decision-making and the perceptions of interdependence
among the parties increase incentives to participate. Political and policy contexts
with their histories of conflict or cooperation (or both) among stakeholders also
affect the likelihood of starting a collaborative dialogue.
An important role in initiating the collaborative process is the guidance of
facilitative leaders able to manage the dialogue through arbitration, facilitation,
and mediation. Especially where power imbalances and/or antagonistic percep-
tions exist, facilitators are vital to bringing parties together and guiding the nego-
tiations through tense situations. It should be noted that Ansell and Gash
locate facilitative leadership outside the collaborative process as do Faerman
et al. (2001), but unlike Bryson et al. (2006) who place leaders inside the process.
Also located outside the collaborative process and shaping its operation are vari-
ous institutional design features. A&G emphasize institutional design features
in the form of protocols and rules that need to be established so as to imbue
the process with procedural legitimacy and foster trust-building. However
their description of the forum for collaborative decisions is unclear as to whether
it is an existing venue or one created specifically by the stakeholders as a product
of negotiations.
Carnival and the city of Salvador, Brazil: a large civic festival

Nearly every locality hosts one or more civic festivals because these events add
value to the community – culturally, economically, politically, and socially
(Angiola et al., 2013). Opportunities for social and economic development may
drive government’s efforts to attract and fund large-scale events. Nevertheless, the
success of a festival depends on the ability of the organizers to secure and sustain
resources, and this can be critical in a setting plagued by interdependencies between
several stakeholders (Getz, 2002). Carnival in Salvador presents a higher degree of
interdependence because festival planning and execution depends on city and state
government administration and resources as well as private sources. Carnival
entails combinations of public–public interaction, public–private interaction, and
private–private interaction for decisions about particular aspects or activities
Simply put, no one possesses sufficient power, resources, and knowledge to carry
out Carnival singlehandedly, and using Ansell and Gash’s (2008) words, the event
would not occur without the participation of non-state stakeholders.
Miguez and Loiola (2011) estimate that 668,000 revelers per day are in
Salvador’s streets enjoying the party, including local people and tourists (15 per-
cent of the total). Organizing this annual cultural event occurring over six days
requires enormous exertion by public agencies, private enterprises, and voluntary
associations and the work must be completed on time. Unlike other major events,
such as the Gay Parade in New York City and Independence Day in Washington,
Cabral and Krane 7
DC, the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the streets is allowed during

Carnival, which creates additional challenges for crowd management.
Description of the festivity

Located a little more than 1000 miles north of Rio de Janeiro, Salvador is the
capital of the State of Bahia and, with a population of almost three million, is
Brazil’s third largest municipality. The Afro-descendent population of Salvador,
comprising nearly 80 percent of the city’s inhabitants, created a distinctive local
culture and a form of Carnival different from the style in Rio and other Brazilian
cities. Trios ele´tricos (wagons with a small group of musicians) are the hallmark of
Salvador’s Carnival. Originally, groups of friends (blocos) developed to sponsor a
trio and participate in its annual procession. Over the years the festival grew in
numbers of trios, and three routes around the city were established to accommo-
date the crowds which followed.
By the 1980s the wagons were replaced by huge cargo trucks modified with
stages carrying one or more celebrity singers, bands, dancers, sound systems,
lights, and advertising. Some trios are free of charge for revelers (costs are sup-
ported by private companies and/or public authorities), while others are structured
in a business fashion. The crew of each commercial trio creates a large cordoned
space around the vehicle and people purchase a special costume (abadá) to accom-
pany the trio in close proximity which separates them from the throngs in the street
or standing along the route. Accompanying the trio within the cordoned area is a
support truck (carro de apoio) which provides sanitary facilities, food and drink,
and medical assistance for those who paid to be in the restricted area close to the
trio. The typical paid audience moving with a trio numbers about 3000 each night
and the number of employees (performers and support staff) often exceeds 1000.
Ticket revenues (abadás’s prices range from U$30 to US$400 per person per day),
advertising, and sponsorships cover the trio’s costs (and can be as high as US$1m).
The past two decades have been characterized by the professionalization of the
trios and of the festival itself. In one sense, those who buy abadás partially subsidize
the non-paying masses that dance and sing in the streets to the music of the com-
mercial trios.
Enterprising individuals and organizations construct bleachers and acquire spaces
in buildings which are turned into fee-based locations (balconies or camarotes) from
which to observe the parade of trios. These balconies cater primarily to middle- and
upper-class persons who can afford the entry fee (US$50 to US$500 per day) to
observe the street throngs and trios from a comfortable perch. Carnival creates large
numbers of customers for hotels, restaurants, and other tourist-related industries as
well as for information technology, mass media, healthcare, private security, and
transport. Official records estimate that annually Carnival accounted for between
US$200m and US$250m volume of business (Infocultura, 2007). Loiola and Miguez
(2009) estimated that Carnival generates 110,000 temporary jobs, which corresponds
to around 5 percent of the economically active population.
The municipality of Salvador is responsible for the organization of the Carnival.

It is up to the municipality to synchronize the efforts of the multiple public
(including state level), private and civilian organizations, and to exert administra-
tive control over issues related to the festival. The event’s growth prompted the city
to establish agencies to administer Carnival. The Municipal Council of Carnival
(COMCAR) is the lead agency responsible for planning Carnival. It is composed of
26 public and private stakeholders and its mission is to ensure that Carnival is
managed in a democratic and participative fashion. However, participating entities
differ in their objectives and this may engender conflicts (see Table 1). While some
groups have a cultural interest, others may be profit oriented. Public agencies from
Table 1. Municipal Council of Carnival (COMCAR) members.*
Artistic associations
Association of Popular Carnival Groups from Salvador (Assoc. dos Blocos de Salvador – ABS)
Association of Carnival Groups (Associação dos Blocos de Trios – ABT)
Association of Modern Plastic Artists from Bahia
Association of Independent Music Groups from Bahia
Popular Groups of Indian Culture
Popular Groups of African Culture
Popular Groups of Percussionists
Popular Groups of African Religious Culture
Federation of Social Clubs from Bahia
Federation of Carnival and Cultural Entities from Bahia
Unions and workers’ associations
Association of Street Bars from Popular Parties (Assoc. dos Barraqueiros de Festas Populares)
Musicians’ Union
Association of Carnival Journalists
Street Vendors Union
Association of Sound and Equipment Entreprenurs
State government
Bahia Tourism Office
Civil Police
Military Police
Secretary of Health from Bahia
Special Court for Childhood and Youth
Tourism State Council
State Governor Representative
Municipal government
Salvador Tourism Office (SALTUR)
Secretary of Health from Salvador
House of Local Representatives
Mayor Representative
* As defined in article n. 261 from Major Law of Municipality.
Cabral and Krane 9
different government levels may strive for control and legitimacy, especially when
local and state government are run by different political coalitions. Under these
circumstances, collaborative efforts are not straightforward. Indeed, there are
claims that COMCAR’s decisions are biased toward the tangled interests of muni-
cipal politicians and business leaders (Miguez, 2011), and although this is the offi-
cial forum for planning Carnival it is possible to observe informal instances of
negotiation. Last, although this may vary, in some years local and state govern-
ment have created parallel structures to deal with the event.
Method
Since civic festivals, and Carnival in particular, have not been a topic of research in
public administration, we chose to follow the standard recommendation to conduct
an exploratory and in-depth qualitative analysis (Berg, 2009). Accordingly, our
research concentrated on the actions and perceptions of individuals, agencies,
and organizations that influence decisions on the festival’s operation.
Field interviews were conducted with the most relevant actors who participated in the
planning and implementation of Carnival in the past 28 years. Selection was based on
whether an informant could provide accurate and reliable information (Johnson, 1990).
We interviewed 16 professionals between May 2011 and February 2013. Following the
suggestion of Burawoy et al. (1991), we entered the field with the support of a previous
theoretical orientation, thus our questions were inspired by the main components of the
A&G model. The vast majority of the interviewees’ declarations reflect actions already
taken and narratives of what has happened over the years. The in-depth interviews took
between 45 and 150 minutes, and total about 25 hours of dialogue.
We also analyzed ancillary documents related to Carnival and used an obser-
vation approach in which there was no interaction between the observer and the
people being observed (Myers, 2009). During the 2013 Carnival, one of the authors
was allowed to observe the planning and the operation of the festivity, including
restricted meetings with the Mayor of Salvador and other city and state govern-
ment officials who were part of the public bodies established to coordinate and
monitor Carnival activities. The researcher observed several conflicts and instances
of collaboration between the members of the collaborative arrangement and how
they were addressed. Several of our interviewees were present in these observations,
thus reinforcing the credibility of our sources and the pertinence of our inter-
viewee’s testimonies. This privileged participation totaled almost 30 hours during
five days. Field reports were made immediately after each activity. Both authors
participated as observers of festival activities (one author in 2011 and the other
author in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014), totaling more than 110 hours of festival
observation. Table 2 summarizes our main data sources.
Data analysis proceeded as follows. All interview transcripts were independently
analyzed by each author and observations collated. In an attempt to find the fit
between the data and the received literature, we codified the interviews using the
main constructs of the A&G model. As is usual in qualitative research, coinciding and
Table 2. Data sources.

Interviewee Interview date Interviewee Interview date
Vice-Mayor and May 2011 City Cleaning April 2012

Head of Carnival Representative in the
in 2010 and 2011 COMCAR (for 2008
to 2012 Carnival)
Events Director (SALTUR) June 2011 Chief of the Department April 2012
for Street Vendor Control
Carnival’s Manager (SALTUR) July 2011 Afro-Group President August 2012
State Governor’ Representative October 2011 Samba-Group President September 2012
in the COMCAR
(for 2012 Carnival)
Mayor’s Representative in the November 2011 Historian of the Carnival September 2012
COMCAR (for 2012 Carnival)
Military Police’s Representative November 2011 Head of Carnival in 2013 February 2013
in the COMCAR
(for 2012 Carnival)
Transit Director January 2012 Leading Carnival January 2013
(Transit and Transport Impresario
Department)
President of an Artistic Union January 2012 State Secretary of February 2013
Tourism
Average experience of interviewees 15,4 years Total time of 1520 min
in Salvador’s Carnival the interviews (25,3 hours)
Main documents analyzed Decrees, local legislations, meeting notes and internal resolutions
(between 2011 and 2014) of the collaborative forums), local and state level internal reports
(e.g. economic ans touristic impacts), official communications,
newspaper stories including interviews with Carnival participants
Direct observation Festival – 110 hours
Planning and Operation of 2013 Festival – 30 hours
conflicting perceptions on the phenomena under investigation arose from the different
sources of information. To increase the reliability of our findings we triangulated all
data, as suggested by Myers (2009). Discussions between the co-authors and eventually
with an independent researcher helped us to implement constant comparisons between
coding and scrutinizing data (Walker and Myrick, 2006). The extensive inspection of
interviews, documents, and notes from direct observation helped clarify convergent
and dissonant points between our data and collaborative models. These procedures
decreased the dependence on interviewees’ declarations and our own observations and
enhanced the robustness of our findings.
Carnival and collaboration

We observed in our fieldwork that Carnival’s organization requires several support
services such as public security, health, city transit, mass transportation, and
Cabral and Krane 11
sanitation control. Municipal authorities have to work with state-level agencies to

ensure the provision of some services that are crucial for a successful event (i.e.
health services and public security). Consequently, public opinion holds state-level
authorities, especially the State Governor, accountable for the success or failure of
the Carnival. This aspect demands the involvement of state-level agencies in
Carnival planning and operation in order to preserve and/or boost the reputation
of state government authorities.
Naturally, such interaction is not conflict free, and political and technical ten-
sions may arise. Actually, struggles and lack of collaboration between different
public agencies are persistent features of both state and local levels. These conflicts
are even more evident when municipal and state governments are run by different
coalitions, giving rise to altercations between rival political groups at the expense of
efficiency in the delivery of public services. Several decisions must be taken and can
affect the festivity operation. For instance, the city transit department may prohibit
street vendors or parking in some areas near the procession routes and this may
conflict with political actors connected to social causes or with middle-class citizens
who experience additional difficulties accessing the festivities. Parade sequences are
also a source of conflict because some time slots may provide increased visibility to
some artists, but could be detrimental to other artistic groups. Security recommen-
dations may also conflict with artists’ and revelers’ interests, and so on.
Nevertheless, the usual condition of non-cooperation does not hinder the deliv-
ery of the ‘Carnival product’. The healthcare example is a good illustration of how
collaboration in the Carnival occurs despite the inherent difficulties in coordinating
several actors. Given that almost 700,000 people are in the streets at the same time
and there is no impediment to the consumption of alcoholic beverages, healthcare
is crucial. Outside of the period of the festival, decisions are taken autonomously
by each agency. However, for Carnival existing agencies engage in an unusual level
of collaboration. As we found in our research, city and state health agencies use
geo-referencing systems for jointly deciding the location of health units throughout
the 16 miles of Carnival routes. State and city officials jointly define which hospitals
will serve different health issues and coordinate efforts with other emergency sys-
tems, including helicopters from the federal government. During one of the admin-
istrative meetings held each morning during the event, the representative of the city
presented statistics identifying problematic areas of the routes (based on the med-
ical calls of the previous day). Besides improvements in health assistance, the col-
laboration of health departments spills over to other functions. Indeed, based on
the data presented, public security forces from the state level could reshape their
plans for the remaining days of the festivity. As a result, public security can be
improved on a daily basis.
Our analysis indicates that most of the A&G constructs explain the collabora-
tive dynamics in the Carnival context. However, our triangulated data suggest
that some elements not identified by the model appear to be relevant, while
trust, a prominent concept in collaborative models, must be seen in perspective
(see Table 3).
Table 3. A&G model constructs and the Carnival case.
A&G constructs useful for Power–knowledge asymmetries

the analysis of the Carnival case Incentives for participation
Pre-history of cooperation
Transparency
Rules of the game
Participatory inclusiveness
Face-to-face dialogue
Shared understanding
Commitment to process
Small wins
Empowerment and leadership
Observed Results
A&G construct to be seen in perspective Trust
in the Carnival example
Relevant elements not identified Networks and informal connections;
by the A&G model Basis of the decisions taken
Carnival and collaborative models: convergent concepts

Power asymmetries shape collaboration (Ansell and Gash, 2008). We detected
several conflicts between public agencies and private firms over the level of fees
that could be charged, the taxes to be paid, the location of privately operated
facilities, the routes taken by trios and blocos, the type of media coverage groups
receive, the type of subsidy a group would be given, and the designation of a
specific company as a sponsor. Conflicts have also occurred between various art-
ists, blocos, and trios over the routes and schedules of the procession, and between
blocos and neighborhood associations over the hours and noise levels of the pro-
cessions. Some of these conflicts are recurrent and although some of them consume
considerable energy of the participants, an ‘us versus them’ mindset did not prevent
participation.
We have verified that in the case of Carnival, incentives for participation can be
direct and tangible. In the early 1990s, sponsorship arrangements changed so that
‘major national brands began to pay for the realization of the festival with their
profits’ (City Tourism Office Director). In return, the mayor permitted private
companies, principally banks and beer distributors, to participate more directly
in Carnival planning and operation. Incentives may also be tangible but more
indirect. While tangible economic returns prompt individuals and groups to par-
ticipate cooperatively, another basic motivation is the widespread concern for pro-
jecting the distinct culture of Bahia and Salvador to the nation and the world via a
successful event. Public officials, in particular, gain considerable prestige when the
festival is well orchestrated and enjoyable.
Cabral and Krane 13
Decision-making arrangements for Carnival have evolved from informal inter-

actions in the pre-history of collaboration. During this period public and private
actors did not act in an organized fashion within the institutionalized bodies of
collaboration. Over time, formal interactions became more frequent, thus shaping
and establishing the rules of the game. Formal entities have been established over
time to serve as forums for planning, operating, and assessing event activities.
COMCAR is an important vehicle for carrying its members’ views to the mayor
and city council as well as to the state governor. Another important forum of
cooperation is the Office for Integrated Management, which is responsible for
operational decisions during the week of Carnival. These bodies foster participa-
tory inclusiveness in the collaborative process and transparency in the decision-
making.
A necessary but not sufficient condition for collaboration is face-to-face dia-
logue. Carnival, one of our respondents noted, is a cultural event that ‘. . . takes
place on public streets but a major part of its content [is provided] by private
entities’; therefore, ‘it is necessary to dialogue. And where there is dialogue,
there is participation’ (President of the Municipal Tourism Office). This increases
the shared understanding about the importance of collaborative efforts and also the
commitment to process. In this respect, one particularly apt description of Carnival
negotiations we were given is:
It is fundamental to listen to all the participants, principally when they are dealing
with a very technical issue, listen to the specialists and not assert a political desire.
(Bahia state government representative for 2011 Carnival)
The growth of Salvador’s Carnival from an amateur event put on by friends and
neighbors for their own enjoyment to a city-wide spectacle of 200-plus Carnival
entities managed by public and private professionals demonstrates that an iterative
process of collaboration has been developed and produces successful ‘small wins’
(Ansell and Gash, 2008: 561). Not only are more and more individuals from other
parts of Brazil and from around the world attending the event, but more and more
local groups continue to form and seek to be included in the festival’s schedule of
events. The demand by local groups to participate is so great that one respondent
noted ‘we are having discussions to expand the space . . . because the three [main]
routes are overloaded . . .’ (Street cleaning department’s representative).
The inter-organizational cooperation found in Salvador can be attributed in
part to the actions of public and private persons who take the lead in creating
and sustaining collaborative mechanisms and processes. Empowerment and lead-
ership seem to be crucial. Several interviewees recognized the role of certain leaders
in facilitating relationships among parties when disputes were present: ‘He
[a former coordinator of Carnival] was crucial to promote integration, dialogue,
and to convince people to adopt new ideas’ (City Tourism Office Director).
Another interviewee adds about this facilitative leader: ‘He used to get all of us
together, followed-up the decisions previously taken . . . his absence was felt after he
left the coordination’ (City Transit Department representative). Whatever the dif-
ferent positions staked out by the different participants in the decision process,
ultimately, as several of the respondents emphasized, leaders are those who direct
others toward a common objective, possess competence and technical skills, con-
trol the decision process without hurting sensitivities (of others), think through
everything not just from an isolated point of view, have a vision of the future
and a capacity to communicate, and have a capacity to adjust to change.
Observed outcomes can be measured in financial terms. The economic impact of
the festival is crucial to the treasuries of city and state government. In 2007 the
event generated R$5.8m (US$2.5m) in direct municipal receipts and R$171.1m
(US$85.5m) in only private formal revenues (Miguez and Loiola, 2011: 290). In
2014, the municipality of Salvador announced the biggest sponsorship deal for
Carnival – US$20m were raised.
Trust: a necessary condition for collaboration?

Although A&G do not provide their own definition of trust, they consider trust as
an essential feature in collaborative models. Indeed, they see ‘trust-building as a
common starting point for collaborative governance’ and they assert that ‘the
collaborative process is not merely about negotiation but also about building
trust among stakeholders’ (Ansell and Gash, 2008: 558). Surprisingly, not one of
our respondents mentioned trust (confiança). We double-checked with additional
interviewees and the results were the same. Considering that ‘to trust someone is to
be confident that in a situation where you are vulnerable to that person’s behavior,
she will be disposed to act in a manner consistent with your interests’ (Alford and
O’Flynn, 2012: 124) and that trust is one of the ‘three core contingencies’ of col-
laboration (Ansell and Gash, 2008: 562), then an important question is: how does
Carnival function without the presence of an element deemed absolutely necessary
for collaborative governance?
One answer may be cultural. A common Brazilian adage is ‘business is business,
friendships are separate’. Friends imply trust, whereas business negotiations do not
depend on trust because parties to a non-friendship based dialogue can arrive at an
agreement. What each can gain makes collaboration possible, trust is not required.
Actually, low-trust situations ‘could be managed collaboratively if the stakeholders
are highly interdependent’ (Ansell and Gash, 2008: 563). In our context, inter-
dependence is high and is illustrated in the following quotes ‘. . . personal agendas
would be compromised in case of Carnival’s failure . . . I need to cooperate with the
other party because I need the other party to do my job well’ (Street cleaning
department’s representative). Similarly: ‘Until today, this underlying collective con-
sciousness, where all who are involved recognize the importance to act so as to
produce a correct Carnival so that each one of them will have their respective
benefits in their area of performance, is still an important factor for explaining
the inter-organizational cooperation present during Carnival’ (Carnival manager –
City Tourism Office).
Cabral and Krane 15
Another possible answer is that the governance of Carnival supports the thesis
that trust is not crucial to collaboration (Hill and Lynn, 2003; Wood and Gray,
1991). Trust may be less important to collaborative success than the ‘delicate
balancing act of bringing together individuals and organizations with both similar
and different goals’ (Connelly et al., 2008: 18) and the careful management of the
conflicts that arise out of the different goals and expectations that partners bring
(Vangen and Huxham, 2012: 757). In the absence of trust, the annual nature of
Carnival decision-making may induce collaboration to a point in which failing to
collaborate would imply an undesired outcome as illustrated in the following
quote: ‘. . . [for someone] to cause a sensational failure [and not just the immediate
problems that always occur] would be ‘‘political death’’’ (City Tourism Office
Director). Because rewards and punishments (material and symbolic) are at
stake, the diverse agencies, groups, and organizations are motivated to take a
collaborative approach, different from more normal behavior in other policy
areas where non-action and non-cooperation are typical.
Hence, our analysis suggests that at least in our context the relationship between
trust and collaboration is multifaceted. Similarly, when an unusual example is
explored, other elements not covered by extant models may emerge, as we discuss
in turn.
Additional aspects affecting collaboration in civic festivals

Networks, informal connections, and collaboration
Ansell and Gash (2008) view the organisms of collaboration as an inclusive forum
of stakeholders that exercises exclusive authority to make decisions. But other
authors find strong evidence that collaboration usually results in the creation of
a network and the purpose of the network established will shape the collaborative
process (Agranoff, 2007; Provan and Kenis, 2008). Collaborative networks develop
an organizational culture and specific methods of operation which affect their
continuation (O’Leary and Bingham, 2009: 263). The annual Carnival process
depends on several networks of artists, commercial sponsors, production impres-
arios, neighborhood associations, and political figures. Our analysis suggests that
institutional design is more than a contingent influence on the process of collab-
oration; it is also a product of collaboration. Since the festivity occurs every year,
repeated interactions foster collaborative arenas (formal and informal), in which
even members of rival groups may cooperate. One interviewee stated: ‘Everybody
who sits at this table to discuss Carnival topics knows each other for a while and
this enables collaboration’ (City Transit Department representative). Other studies
have shown that continued collaboration depends on the establishment of one or
more new structures designed specifically to administer the collaborative activities
(Krane and Lu, 2012).
Laws and formal agreements have been enacted to govern Carnival. Records of
meetings are kept and published as well as any changes in rules governing the event.
While clear rules insuring broad access and procedures guaranteeing transparency
are important, a solely rule-based definition of institutions ignores the influence
that structures exert not just on their members, but also on the interaction with
other structures. In our research we discovered that informal interactions occur
and shape the dynamics of collaboration, which reinforce the role of informal
governance in collaborative arrangements. The case of Carnival offers several
examples of topics that are not deliberated in official forums. The large blocos
and the celebrity trios have direct access to key decision-makers (e.g. the mayor;
the military police), as stated by one important stakeholder: ‘Because of their size
and number of people, larger blocos and camarotes have a closer relationship with
Military Police. As these entities involve increased transferring of people and
materials, particular strategies should be designed and the discussions take place
out of COMCAR’ (BMPD representative).
Although the relative success of the event is related to these informal mechan-
isms, the privileged access enjoyed by some people and groups generates
complaints from excluded organizations and from supporters of a ‘less business-
based’ Carnival. Nevertheless, our case suggests that networks and informal con-
nections are an important element of institutional design in successful collaborative
arrangements.
Basis of the decision taken and legitimacy

Studies of collaboration, including the A&G model, hypothesize that the develop-
ment or emergence of a common definition of the problem that the various actors
wish to solve is a necessary element or step to a functioning collaborative.
However, A&G (and most other studies) do not address the basis on which deci-
sions are taken. How decisions are justified (technical data, political leverage, or
shared community values) can affect not just whether a decision to cooperate
occurs, but the justification also affects its acceptance and legitimacy by multiple
stakeholders. As one interviewee stated, ‘collaboration is aided not only by the
capacity to negotiate nor less by imposed authority, but more by a base of con-
sistent data’ (President of the Municipal Tourism Office). SALTUR’s use of annual
evaluations to guide planning for the next year’s event is another example of how
technical data are used not just to make decisions, but also to foster cooperation.
These examples reinforce that consistent historical data and knowledge can be ‘the
currency of collaboration’ (Emerson et al., 2012: 16).
Our results highlight the importance of legitimacy in the collaborative network.
O’Leary and Bingham (2009) point out that the different degrees of power of some
stakeholders may impose some barriers to collaborative arrangements. Some stake-
holders may decide not to cooperate if they perceive that their participation is
ceremonial or if the decisions are taken by technical experts (Futrell, 2003). In
our empirical case, since much of the planning and operation revolves around
logistics, technical experts from public agencies exercise significant influence on
the decisions of councils composed of many non-technical participants. Similarly,
Cabral and Krane 17
where items to be decided are about artistic matters, persons from the artistic com-
munity are more influential, and when commercial interests are at stake, the interests
of relevant actors tend to be preserved. These types of mutual adjustment confirm that
there is more to dialogue than its face-to-face nature – who communicates and what is
communicated also influence whether collaboration occurs.
Although technical experts ‘are not infallible nor they are politically neutral’
(Futrell, 2003: 474), the legitimacy of some groups is crucial to foster collaboration,
provided they conduct their activities in a desirable and proper fashion (O’Leary
and Vij, 2012). In our example, it seems to be the case with the BMPD. Indeed,
during Carnival military police officers carry out rapid interventions to contain
violent revelers and to ensure public security for other participants. The respon-
siveness of the military police results from a detailed planning process covering all
logistic aspects to ensure interventions in a timely fashion. A respondent notes,
‘. . . there is a respect [for the police] based on experience accumulated over many
years . . . on the operational level that exists . . . whatever decision that could be
taken only by an established authority, they still listen to the experience of the
technical [police] experts’ (President of the Artistic Producers Association).
The collaborative governance of Carnival also results in learning which can be
applied to other aspects of city functioning. The military police gain valuable
experience in tactics and strategies used to manage performances and revelers
which ‘can be adapted and applied to day-to-day policing . . . It is possible to say
that Carnival is to daily policing what Formula 1 is to the automobile indus-
try . . . many innovations arise in these different contexts and migrate . . .’(BMPD
representative).
Concluding remarks
Our large civic festival example offers a unique venue for the assessment of current
theorizing about collaboration and the applicability of extant models of collabora-
tive governance in the context of large civic festivals. The case reveals factors that
Ansell and Gash (2008) may not have considered in developing their widely
accepted model or that must be seen in perspective. Trust, a factor commonly
argued to be necessary to collaborative action, may be less critical than received
theories suggest. We observe that gains to be made and fear of failure are inde-
pendent bases for collaboration and are distinct from trust. This may well be the
case when the costs of non-collaboration, collectively and individually, are high,
especially in an interdependent setting. That we provide a discussion of this neg-
lected factor is also an important contribution of this article. We observe that
networks formed by prominent and legitimized actors can evolve and foster col-
laborative practices, oftentimes outside of the formal collaborative forums. In this
way, repeated interactions between technical experts can foster informal (and
effective) networks of collaboration. Further, how or on what basis the actors
accept decisions and the base of decision-making is an important, yet is not well
studied in collaboration research. The usual limitations of case studies apply to the
analysis and inferences drawn by the present research. Perhaps some of the diver-
gent findings are merely a function of the research focus on a civic festival –
a policy domain that has been ignored by public management researchers. Some
avenues for future research are possible. Our results imply that cultural aspects
may enable collaboration. Actually, some large civic events, such as Carnival, are
embedded deeply in the local culture. Additional investigation may explore the
relationship between the shared senses of community identification and the inten-
sity of collaboration. Subsequent works could explore how the tensions between
formal and informal aspects may affect (non-)collaboration and under which
circumstances these dimensions can coexist in collaborative arrangements.
Future studies may also evaluate whether the experience of enhanced collaboration
in a given civic festival may induce actors to cooperate in other complex projects.
Definitely, civic festivals offer an exceptional laboratory for the study of collab-
orative management because these events are ubiquitous and are characterized by
multiple partners engaged in joint activity.
Acknowledgements
We thank our interviewees for their availability, Edvaldo Brito and Guilerme Belintani for
their invaluable help, Fagner Dantas for the useful research assistance, and seminar audi-
ences at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (São Paulo) and the Univeristy of Nebraska
(Omaha) for comments and suggestions. We also thank CNPq (Brazilian National
Council for Scientific and Technological Development – grant 306378/2012-4) and the
Fulbright Foundation for the financial support. The usual caveats apply.
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Sandro Cabral is an Associate Professor at the Federal University of Bahia

(UFBA) (on leave) and at the Insper Education and Research Institute, both in
Brazil. He has been a Fulbright Visiting Professor at NYU Wagner (2013/14). His
research focuses on the interactions between public management and strategy. He
has published in the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Long
Range Planning, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, International Public
Management Journal, Public Choice and Public Money & Management, among
others.
Cabral and Krane 21
Dale Krane is Professor Emeritus, School of Public Administration, University of

Nebraska Omaha. He has been a Fulbright Professor at the Federal University of
Bahia, Salvador, Brazil (2011) and at the Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo
Horizonte, Brazil (1985). His scholarship includes books as well as articles in the
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Administration
Review, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Policy Studies Review, International
Political Science Review, International Studies Quarterly, and The Journal of
Politics, among others.

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International

Points for practitioners

Models of collaborative governance: definition, barriers,

collaboration among the stakeholders that populate a public program’s

Ansell and Gash model of collaborative governance

Carnival and the city of Salvador, Brazil: a large civic festival

DC, the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the streets is allowed during

Description of the festivity

The municipality of Salvador is responsible for the organization of the Carnival.

Table 1. Municipal Council of Carnival (COMCAR) members.*

Table 2. Data sources.

Vice-Mayor and May 2011 City Cleaning April 2012

Carnival and collaboration

sanitation control. Municipal authorities have to work with state-level agencies to

Table 3. A&G model constructs and the Carnival case.

A&G constructs useful for Power–knowledge asymmetries

Carnival and collaborative models: convergent concepts

Decision-making arrangements for Carnival have evolved from informal inter-

Trust: a necessary condition for collaboration?

Additional aspects affecting collaboration in civic festivals

Basis of the decision taken and legitimacy

Sandro Cabral is an Associate Professor at the Federal University of Bahia

Dale Krane is Professor Emeritus, School of Public Administration, University of

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