Cai WordsMightierHacks 2015

Words Mightier Than Hacks: Narratives of Cyberwar in the United States and China
Author(s): Cuihong Cai and Diego Dati

Source: Asian Perspective, Vol. 39, No. 3, Special Issue: The Abe Effect in Regional
International Order: Japan and Asia (July-Sept. 2015), pp. 541-553
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43738130
Accessed: 17-06-2023 13:16 +00:00
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Asian Perspective
This content downloaded from 130.104.138.249 on Sat, 17 Jun 2023 13:16:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Asian Perspective 39 (2015), 541-553
COMMENTARY
Words Mightier Than Hacks:

Narratives of Cyberwar in the
United States and China
Cu i hong Cai and Diego Dati
In recent years cyberwar has been a regular topic in both offi-

cial and unofficial commentaries in China and the United States.
As there is not yet a universally accepted definition of cyberwar,
use of the term has become very broad and sometimes confusing
in both countries. Charges of crime and espionage have been
raised to the level of war, amplifying existing conflicts among
countries, in particular between the United States and China. Nar-
ratives of cyberwar have also provided justification for policies
supporting the development of offensive capabilities in cyber-
space and the implementation of intrusive surveillance systems.
Such narratives, combined with several incidents between the
United States and China, have led the two governments to under-
take protectionist measures to reduce possible vulnerabilities in
cyberspace, creating repercussions for both countries' economies
and societies.
Our commentary aims at raising awareness about the differ-
ences and similarities between US and Chinese narratives of
cyberwar and explaining some of the reasons underlying them. We
might be able to shed light on how the two countries understand
these issues and suggest ways to improve mutual understanding.
Media, experts, and government officials are among the
most influential contributors to the proliferation of cyberwar
narratives. Although the narratives produced by media and
experts in the United States and China are slightly different in
their tone, emphasis, and content, they are very similar in some
respects, especially their tendency to excessively broaden the
definition of cyberwar. US and Chinese government narratives,
on the other hand, tend to differ in their terminology, priorities,
541
542 Words Mightier Than Hacks
and identification with the unofficial narratives produced by the

media and experts.
Narratives of Cyberwar Produced by the Media
In both China and the United States, media often use narratives of
cyberwar to warn of a foreign threat. Cyberwar has been making
the headlines during the last several years not only for events
related to armed conflicts but also for malicious cyber activities
such as theft of intellectual property rights, the operations of the
hacker group Anonymous, Internet censorship, and espionage. In
both countries these narratives have been exploited in the same
way, but the threats highlighted are different.
Generally, media produce three kinds of narratives about
cyberwar. The first kind stresses the threat of foreign actors. In
the US narrative these are Russia, China, and a few others, while
in China it has recently become the United States. The second
kind of narrative focuses on cyberweapons such as Stuxnet1 that
act as proof of the existence of new and terrible cyberthreats
endangering the regular functioning of both civil and military sys-
tems. These first two narratives are often combined with stories
concerning cyber espionage and cyber crime to create a height-
ened sense of danger, encompassing a wide array of cybersecurity
issues. The third narrative, which is probably the least popular
and is most common in the West, claims that cyberwar has not
happened yet and that it still does not represent as much of a
threat as many believe.
Narratives stressing the threat of cyberattacks by foreign
actors were first produced by the US media and were responsi-
ble for popularizing cyberwar narratives more broadly. Russian
hackers were the source, causing a disturbance in Estonia and
later supporting Russian government military operations in
Georgia. US media pointed to Russia as being the first
cyberthreat to US national security, but since then China has
increasingly been depicted as the main threat because of alleged
cyber operations conducted against US industries and military
suppliers.
Cuihong Cai and Diego Dati 543
In China the same kind of narrative exists, but the threat is

said to come primarily from the United States because of its
advanced military capabilities in cyberspace and also because of
the National Security Agency operations against Chinese net-
works revealed by Edward Snowden. Nevertheless, until now
Chinese media have been mainly using reports produced in the
West instead of investing their own resources to prove their point
and argue against the choices of the US government. China still
relies on foreign research to respond to the accusations, and media
do not provide much evidence to show the source of cyberattacks
directed toward China. But China's media may be at a disadvan-
tage, since they might not be allowed to publish articles endan-
gering diplomatic relations between China and the United States.
On the other hand, in the United States, accusations of China are
openly published in mainstream media outlets like the New York
Times, and US officials often support the production of such nar-
ratives since cybersecurity is a priority for the US government.
That tendency has had several side effects, such as more censor-
ship and blockages of US media by Chinese authorities.
Another distinctive phenomenon is that Chinese media are
becoming more and more aggressive on the topic of cyberwar,
since Snowden's leaks made it possible for them to use foreign
reports to justify their arguments. Nevertheless, there is a lack of
trust of Chinese media outside China, since they are usually seen
as an instrument of propaganda, particularly in the United States.
The Chinese government's tightening of control over the Internet
is also limiting the foreign media's activity and causing more crit-
icism toward the country. In sum, the recurrent wàrnings against
foreign threats underlying the narratives of cyberwar háve become
very dangerous and destructive for US-China relations.
The second kind of narrative focusing on cyberweapons is
also important because it actually provides a valid justification for
the term cyberwar. Cyberweapons like Stuxnet are designed to
achieve destructive outcomes, and they could potentially endanger
physical infrastructure and even human life. This narrative is
present in both US and Chinese media, but one interesting differ-
ence can be noted in this narrative: Chinese media mainly echo
the voice of foreign media and do not provide as much insight as
the US media do. US media sometimes highlight the skills and

knowledge necessary to create such weapons, almost celebrating
them as an achievement (more or less as though cyberweapons are
akin to a new hydrogen bomb). On the other hand, some Chinese
media point out the military advantage the United States has
achieved by developing this kind of weapon, stressing the neces-
sity for China to catch up. On both sides we can witness the prop-
aganda machine in action.
The third kind of narrative claiming cyberwar to be far from
real is also an interesting and important one, because while it
helps mitigate the hysterical fear of a cyber-Pearl Harbor, it might
also downplay threats that can be prevented with the right poli-
cies. This narrative has been developed mostly in the West and
exists in China mainly in the form of translation of US media
reports without much original content. This narrative has not
appeared in China and has instead been initiated in the West as the
consequence of an intense debate about securitization and cyber-
war - a debate that reflects concerns also about privacy and civil
rights.
In China, however, the debate about cybersecurity, especially
cyberwar, is still not very lively. Policies aimed at developing
cyberwarfare capabilities or hardening Chinese cyberspace are not
matters of public debate, hence there is no need in China to "secu-
ritize" cyberthreats and overemphasize the issue in the media.
China's online community mostly has access to information pro-
duced locally; the tight control limiting access to foreign websites
and content impacts only a small part of the population. Surveil-
lance is taken for granted by many in China, since it is deemed
necessary for ensuring the country's social stability. Therefore the
government does not really need narratives of cyberwar to justify
surveillance, and officials do not support the media as they do in
the United States. Moreover, since Chinese narratives of cyberwar
are not as catastrophic as those produced in the United States,
there is no need to worry about cyberwar narratives becoming
overhyped. If the threat of cyberwar garners more attention from
the leadership, things might become different, but at the moment,
the government is prioritizing internal security issues, and these
are the focus of public debate in the media.
Narratives of Cyberwar Produced by Experts
The concept of cyberwar has become all-encompassing, probably

because of its multidisciplinary character. Cyberwar, and cyberse-
curity, are the domain of computer science, military strategy,
international law, and international relations. Experts and scholars
from different backgrounds have joined the debate, and they
ascribe meaning according to their particular perspective and the
interests they are trying to protect. For instance, the word attack
does not have the same meaning for international law scholars and
cybersecurity experts. Whereas for a state, an attack indicates an
act of aggression causing physical damage or human loss, for a
cybersecurity expert any malicious attempt to penetrate a system
is an attack. Policies that address this kind of issue need to be
based on definitions that are narrow enough to guide defense,
retaliation, and punishment. In order to involve more countries in
the debate it is necessary to find common ground for and a com-
mon understanding of attack and related concepts. That becomes
all the more difficult when countries are at a different stage of
development and therefore have different interpretations. China
and the United States obviously have different cultural back-
grounds, values, and priorities, making communication on cyber-
security and related topics problematic at best.
Some similarities between US and Chinese experts' cyberwar
narratives can be identified. On one hand, experts and scholars in
both countries have contributed to the popularization of cyberwar
by making it a metaphor indicating the chaos and danger of cyber-
space. In many instances what is called cyberwar is not a war iń
the strict sense of the term but just chaos, disorder, crime, espi-
onage, or even hacktivism. On the other hand, some experts in
both countries agree on the importance of narrowing the defini-
tion of cyberwar, making physical destruction and human loss
necessary conditions of actual cyberwar. The Tallinn Manual on
the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Schmitt
2013) is an attempt to provide a strict definition of cyberwar.
Schmitt's work as well as the US-sponsored research of Martin
Libicki (2009) of the RAND Corporation are of great value, since
they analyze the issue of cyberwar in detail.
Still, some differences in cyberwar narratives exist in China

and the United States, such as the type of expert who creates the
cyberwar narrative. While US experts of different domains con-
tribute to the narratives of cyberwar because the threat has
become a national security priority, in China military experts are
primarily responsible for the narratives because the issue has not
yet been given official priority. In the United States, experts who
debate cyberwar bring cross-disciplinary perspectives to it, and
the variety of topics analyzed is second to none. This variety cre-
ates issues of consistency in the definition of cyberwar and the
types of cases used to justify the existence of such a concept. An
advantage of variety is lively debate, a brainstorming that is nec-
essary to create the appropriate definitions and a common knowl-
edge base. But in China the prevalence of experts from the mili-
tary domain makes for much less lively debate, and even among
experts in the same field, cyberwar is understood in different
ways - one of the side effects of inadequate debate.2
For instance, Chinese military experts do not share the same
lexicon when describing cyberwar. For some it is synonymous
with netwar or hacking, while for others it is a way to conduct
military operations through the use of networks. Also, the sets of
cases they use are not uniform: some count the Morris Virus
(1988), an incident with no political objectives, as the first case
of cyberwar, while others cite Kosovo (1999), when pro-Serbian
hackers attacked North Atlantic Treaty Organization, US, and
British websites and computers as one of the first cases. Never-
theless, in the last two years the intensification of cybersecurity
issues between the United States and China has pushed experts
from different backgrounds, in particular from the fields of
international relations and international law, to produce related
content.
What are the main reasons behind such differences? If in the

United States cyberwar has become as great a threat to national
security as terrorism and climate change, in China the priorities
are threats to internal stability such as terrorism, unemployment,
food safety, and territorial disputes. This means that in the United
States the issue has gained so much relevance as to attract experts
from both the private and public sectors, since cyberthreats
endanger both civil and military infrastructures. Although China

has similar concerns, emphasis on cyberwar at the civilian level is
not as great. Only very recently, after Mandiant Intelligence Ser-
vice's APT1 report on the hacking of US facilities by People's
Liberation Army Unit 61398 (Mandiant 2013) and Snowden's
leaks, have nonmilitary experts started paying more attention to
cyberwar.
Another point to be mentioned here is that cybersecurity
experts might end up entangled in conflicts of interest. When poli-
cies to tackle cyberthreats are adopted, cybersecurity experts are
among the first to profit because they provide services to compa-
nies and governments. After releasing the APT1 report, Mandiant
reportedly acquired $100 million in contracts, a 60 percent
increase compared to the previous year (Associated Press 2013).
Other companies are also gaining a huge profit from the realloca-
tion of resources. There is even a flourishing black market for
selling cyberweapons to the government. However, making use of
the imagery of war to spread fears and turn a profit might prove to
be very harmful in the long run. Cyberweapons proliferation, sup-
ply-chain issues, and protectionist measures that result from this
situation may threaten peaceful relations among countries like the
United States and China.
In China, mainly military experts have been producing cyber-
war narratives. The financial resources allocated are limited and
scarce English translations of Chinese articles on cyberwar make
the impact of Chinese scholars on the international community
very small. Furthermore the inadequate debates cause the narra-
tive of cyberwar to become even more confusing in China, and
the lexicon is hardly standardized. Chinese experts tend to advo-
cate developing cyberwarfare capabilities, and many share the
belief that the Chinese military is still not prepared to face its
adversaries. Indeed, while reports and declarations from US
media and the government emphasize the threat represented by
China's PLA in cyberspace, Chinese experts and the government
tend to describe their capabilities in this domain as limited when
compared to those of the United States. Issues of cyberwar are not
yet prioritized in China, and Chinese experts' narratives are often
responses to the research done by foreign experts on the topic.
Things are very likely to change in a few years, but meanwhile

more debate should be promoted in China in order to form a com-
munity of experts able to contribute at the international level as
well. Also, US scholars and experts could focus more on compar-
ative studies and research on the narratives produced by Chinese
experts to help further comprehend the reasons behind much of
the misunderstanding between the United States and China on
cybersecurity issues.
Official Narratives of Cyberwar:

Diverse Priorities and Contrasting Strategies
Compared with the cyberwar narratives generated by the media

and experts, official narratives show more contrasting features in
the United States and China. US decisionmakers have been active
in the production of narratives of cyberwar and have made
explicit use of that term. The US Department of Defense consid-
ered cyberspace a domain to conduct military operations as early
as 2005. On the other side, Chinese officials try their best to avoid
the topic of cyberwar and have been focusing on the informatiza-
tion of the military. Although official documents have recently
started to mention cyberspace and cybersecurity, the term cyber-
war does not appear there. What this shows is that the two coun-
tries have a different understanding of cybersecurity; they do not
make use of the same lexicon, and the level of prioritization of
cybersecurity issues is not the same.
In the eyes of US decisionmakers, cyberwar represents a pri-
ority threat to national security, and while not many are keen to
make use of the controversial term cyberwar, the idea that
cyberthreats endanger vital US systems like the electric grid or
the military communications system is widespread. A belief that
has become commonly accepted in Washington is that foreign
countries hacking into US companies and defense networks have
the objective of gaining advantage in the battlefield in order to
erode US power. Other US commentators claim that in the worst-
case scenario, cyberwar or a cyberterrorist attack could cause
immense damage and shock the nation. As in media reports, deci-
sionmakers' cyberwar narratives also incorporate acts of cyber
crime and cyber espionage with China and Russia, which are
often described as the main sources of such activities.
US government documents suggest three important character-
istics of official narratives. First, the focus is on a foreign threat,
which is often represented by China. Second, the Defense Depart-
ment's attempt to foster cooperation with the private sector may
lead to conflicts of interest. Third is the willingness not only to
defend but also to develop offensive capabilities and maintain
superiority in cyberspace, which the Department of Defense offi-
cially recognized as a domain of warfare in 2010. In Presidential
Policy Directive 20 (Office of the President 2013) disclosed in
June 2013, a section on Offensive Cyber Effects Operations
(OCEO) clearly states that "the United States Government shall
identify potential targets of national importance where OCEO can
offer a favorable balance of effectiveness and risk as compared
with other instruments of national power, establish and maintain
OCEO capabilities integrated as appropriate with other U.S.
offensive capabilities, and execute those capabilities in a manner
consistent with the provisions of this directive."
Chinese official declarations and white papers do not have
cyberwar narratives; indeed, even a definition of cyberwar is lack-
ing. Instead, informatization of the military is emphasized, which
suggests a relation between the development of cyberwarfare and
electronic warfare capabilities. In the official statements, the Chi-
nese government seems to be mostly concerned about the security
of information itself, and its ability to control it. Since 1998, the
government has been regularly publishing national defense white
papers; seven have been released so far, plus a 2013 white paper
titled "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces."3
None of them mentions prioritization of cybersecurity threats or
cyberwar. Likewise, not one national congress of the Chinese
Communist Party has ever heard the term cyberwar mentioned.
The priority for many years has been to carry on the process of
modernization of the army, a process that implies building a struc-
ture combining mechanization and informatization.
But a trend toward increased focus on cybersecurity started in
2010, when the National Defense White Paper mentioned strate-
gic cyber operations. The 2013 white paper went a step further,
recognizing foreign governments' efforts to develop military
capabilities in outer space and cyberspace. China's willingness to

defend its interests in both domains has been clearly expressed.
Also worth mentioning is that at the Eighteenth National Con-
gress in 2012, Hu Jintao stressed the need to prioritize sea, space,
and cyberspace security, and in early 2014, President Xi Jinping
put forward the concept and goal of becoming a "cyber power"
when the Central Network Security and Informatization Leading
Group, the first national coordination agency for cyberspace
issues, was established. Nevertheless, official representatives usu-
ally do their best to avoid the topic of cyberwar, and they deny the
existence of a Chinese cyber command. In 2011, the media
reported the establishment of a Cyber Blue Army in the military
district of Guangdong, which according to officials had been cre-
ated for training purposes to improve cyberdefense.
Why is there so much difference between each country's offi-
cial approach to cyberwar? Why are Chinese officials so
restrained and cautious in their narratives of cyberwar? There are
several reasons. The first is the divergence in each government's
strategic thinking. Even if Chinese diplomacy and strategic think-
ing have shown increased self-confidence in the international
arena, China is still trying to keep a low profile. While the US
mentality remains focused on overseas expansion, in the spirit of
competitive development typical of a commercial civilization,
Chinese leaders are still basically following the strategy of nonin-
tervention and conflict avoidance, as dictated by Deng Xiaoping
after the Cold War. So the US government is constantly worried
about keeping its status as a pioneer in the development of cyber-
war narratives and capabilities, and is quite open about its strat-
egy and achievements. The Chinese government, by contrast, tries
to promote the development of its own capabilities, secure the
control of information, and avoid the use of concepts like cyber-
war that show aggressiveness and hostility.
The different security environments in China and the United
States account for these different priorities and choices. In China,
as suggested above, internal threats outweigh external threats, and
domestic stability is the priority national interest. Even though we
do not fully agree with the point that "China's cybersecurity strat-
egy, like its foreign policy, is driven mainly by the domestic polit-
ical imperative to 'protect the longevity of the Chinese Commu-
Cuihong Cal and Diego Dati 551
nist Party'" made in a paper released by the Center for a New

American Security in Washington (Wong 2014), we do believe
that China's massive territory and population, plus the challenge
of creating prosperity for all the population, require that resources
for domestic stability and internal development have priority. As a
result, China's focus is on defensive rather than offensive strate-
gies and consolidation of internal stability rather than foreign
adventures. US society is relatively more stable, and although the
9/11 terrorist attack caused a shift of focus toward homeland secu-
rity, the major threats hail from the outside. Hence unlike China,
external threats outweigh internal ones in the United States, and
the country needs proactive policies in order to prevent them. Fur-
thermore, having been a superpower for a long time, the US gov-
ernment has often demonstrated its desire to keep a position of
supremacy. It is therefore constantly trying to prevent competitors
from jeopardizing its position. In addition, because the United
States heavily relies on information technology systems, officials
are much more concerned about vulnerabilities in cyberspace.
Different narratives also stem from the different policymaking
mechanisms and political systems of the two countries. China's
one-party system is characterized by a policymaking mechanism
that is relatively closed, nontransparent, and controlled by a small
elite that experts, media, and public opinion cannot easily influ-
ence. Consequently, cyberwar narratives seem not to have much
impact on Chinese cybersecurity policies. This circumstance is
also reflected in divergent attitudes toward cyberwar narratives,
with experts and media on one side and the government on the
other side. In the United States, which has a bipartisan system
with lobbies, interest groups, and civic organizations influencing
policies (as well as the outcome of elections), narratives of cyber-
war are both the product of their interaction and a driving force
behind the decisionmaking process. Indeed, such narratives have
not only provided justification for new policies but have also
helped in the reallocation of financial resources. As a conse-
quence, these narratives have gained popularity and strength,
driven by political and economic interests. In short, differences in
each country's strategic thinking, security environment, and poli-
cymaking mechanisms are the reasons why their governments
cope with this issue in contrasting ways.
Suggestions for Further Research
Cyberwar narratives are produced for several reasons and they

can be exploited to achieve different objectives. Developing com-
parative studies to analyze the narratives of cybersecurity and
cyberwar in different countries could help craft better policies and
avoid counterproductive, unnecessary conflicts. Over the last few
years, cyber activities originating in the United States and China
have been spoiling the two countries' relations. The narratives
produced, their tone, and the way they have addressed these
issues have been almost as disruptive as the activities themselves.
In many instances, the narratives produced have not been able to
take into consideration the diversity of the two countries, resulting
in tension and embarrassment (for both countries) when dis-
cussing the issue of cybersecurity.
At this point several important questions are worth investigat-
ing. What kinds of outcomes are media, experts, and governments
trying to achieve through narratives of cyberwar? Are they pro-
moting the interests of their fellow countrymen or are they trying
to create tension in favor of particular interest groups? How much
influence do the cybersecurity and the cyberweapons industries
have on the creation of these narratives? Some literature about
these industries is available in the United States, but what about
Chinese perspectives? More resources need to be allocated to
develop comparative research on the topics of cybersecurity and
cyberwar in order to promote better communication, avoid a pos-
sible cyber arms race, and increase confidence and trust among
countries. We hope our commentary will spur more comparative
discussion on the topic.
Notes
Cuihong Cai is associate professor at the Center for American Studies of

Fudan University. She has published three books in Chinese: The Internet
and International Politics (2003), US National Information Security Strat-
egy (2009), and Disorder and Reconfiguration: Political Security in the
Cyber Age (forthcoming). Her current research is on cyberpolitics in the
United States and China. Diego Dati holds a master's degree from the
Cui hong Cai and Diego Dati 553
School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University. They

can be reached at chcai@fudan.edu.cn.
This research was supported by a grant from the China National Social
Sciences Fund: Cyberpolitics in US-China Relations in the 21st Century
(Award no. 12BGJ018). The authors wish to thank the three anonymous
reviewers for their criticism and comments on the original paper from which
this commentary was developed.
1. A newly disclosed National Security Agency document shows the
drastic acceleration of the use of cyberweapons by the United States and
Iran against each other. It may have started around 2008 with the Stuxnet
"worm" attack on Iran's centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear fuel enrichment
facility, an attack that involved US-Israeli cooperation. See Sanger 2015.
2. We conducted a random search on the Chinese National Knowledge
Infrastructure on the term cyberwar ( wang luo zhan) on August 4, 2014. In a
sample of 229 articles, 56.7 percent (130) were from military universities,
25.3 percent (58) were from nonmilitary civil universities, 11 percent (25)
were from government research and training institutions, 5.7 percent (13)
were from media institutions, and 1.3 percent (3) were from a corporate
research institution.
3. The 2013 National Defense White Paper, Zhongguo wuzhuang liliang
de duoyanghua yunyong [State Council of the People's Republic of China
2013], released on April 16, 2013.
References
Associated Press in Washington. 2013. "China Hacking Claims: Tech Firms

Move to Front Lines in U.S. Cyberwar." The Guardian , February 21.
Libicki, Martin C. 2009. Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. Santa Monica,
CA: Rand Corporation.
Mandiant Intelligence Center. 2013. APT1 : Exposing One of China's Cyber
Espionage Units. Alexandria, VA: Mandiant, http ://intelreport. mandiant
.com/Mandiant APT1 Report.pdf.
Office of the President. 2013. "Presidential Policy Directive/PPD20."
https://epic.org/privacy/cybersecurity/presidential-directives/presi
dential-policy-directive-20.pdf.
Sanger, David E. 2015. Document Reveals Growth of Cyberwarfare
Between the U.S. and Iran." New York Times , February 23.
Schmitt, Michael N. 2013. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Appli-
cable to Cyber Warfare. New York: Cambridge University Press.
State Council of the People's Republic of China. 2013. "The Diversified
Employment of China's Armed Forces." National Defense White Paper ,
www.gov.cn/jrzg/20 1 3-04/1 6/content 23790 1 3 .htm.
Wong, Edward. 2014. "For China, Cybersecurity Is Part of Strategy for Pro-
tecting the Communist Party." New York Times , December 3.

Cai WordsMightierHacks 2015

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Cai WordsMightierHacks 2015

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Words Mightier Than Hacks: Narratives of Cyberwar in the United States and China

Author(s): Cuihong Cai and Diego Dati

Words Mightier Than Hacks:

Cu i hong Cai and Diego Dati

In recent years cyberwar has been a regular topic in both offi-

and identification with the unofficial narratives produced by the

Narratives of Cyberwar Produced by the Media

In China the same kind of narrative exists, but the threat is

the US media do. US media sometimes highlight the skills and

Narratives of Cyberwar Produced by Experts

The concept of cyberwar has become all-encompassing, probably

Still, some differences in cyberwar narratives exist in China

What are the main reasons behind such differences? If in the

endanger both civil and military infrastructures. Although China

Things are very likely to change in a few years, but meanwhile

Official Narratives of Cyberwar:

Compared with the cyberwar narratives generated by the media

capabilities in outer space and cyberspace. China's willingness to

nist Party'" made in a paper released by the Center for a New

Suggestions for Further Research

Cyberwar narratives are produced for several reasons and they

Cuihong Cai is associate professor at the Center for American Studies of

School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University. They

Associated Press in Washington. 2013. "China Hacking Claims: Tech Firms

You might also like