1NC

1
NATO is an international system of hegemonic masculinity which reinforces gendered
hierarchies through a masculine protection logic
Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19
Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in
Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the
Gender Advisor. “NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.” NATO, Gender, and
the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 23-35.
LJS
In order to understand how institutions can come to be ‘institution of hegemonic masculinity’, we first need to consider how they are
gendered. Connell (2005: 73) argues that institutions ‘are substantively, not just metaphorically, gendered’. Gender is understood as
prescriptive. It is based upon socially constructed perceptions of the activities and actions appropriate for each gender. It is also relational,
which means that masculinities and femininities do not exist independently (Kronsell, 2016: 106). Thegendering of institutions
manifests in fluid, intersecting and contradictory ways, but largely in a manner that privileges those
individuals or groups in positions of power within organisations – these are usually (though not
exclusively) men. Consequently, patterns of inequality, disadvantage and subordination result from this
gendered privileging. This means that ‘advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity
are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine’ (Acker, 1990: 146). Institutions are
gendered in the way they include, or exclude, gender from policy processes and this contributes to the
way in which power is structured and normalised (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 582). Gender and gendered identities
are intertwined in the day-to-day activities of the institution, rather than pre-existing in society or fixed to individuals (Mackay, Kenny and
Chappell, 2010: 580). Gender can therefore be viewed as an organising principle (Walby, 2009: 260). These are built upon
‘organisation history and associated with a different configuration of personal experiences and consciousness’ (Connell, 2002: 844). Taking
institutions seriously as gendered spaces equips us with an understanding of how actors, institutional
culture and structures shape policies (Gains and Lowndes, 2014: 525). Institutions, conceptualised as both formal
and informal rules and norms, do not operate in a bubble, rather they reflect wider social hierarchies
and reproduce gender norms through including or silencing gender from the policy-making process
(Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018: 1041). NATO’s role as a military actor means it falls into the category of an
‘extreme case of the gendered organisation ’ (Carreiras, 2006: 40). Britton (2000) outlines three criteria for gendered
institutions which are applicable to NATO. These are: (1) structures that make a distinction between masculinity and
femininity; (2) the preponderance of male bodies; and (3) built upon hegemonic masculinities (Britton,
2000). The formalisation of these norms contributes to the construction of gender regimes, reifying
gendered power structures. A gender regime is a ‘set of interconnected gender relations and gendered institutions that constitute a
system’ (Walby, 2009: 104, 2011: 301). Gender regimes refer to the configuration of gender relations in a particular setting, they exist in all
institutional structures and at the same time are unique to each institutional context (Walby, 1997: 6). They are built upon ‘organisation history
and associated with a different configuration of personal experiences and consciousness’ (Connell, 2002: 844). Gender regimes therefore
operate in myriad ways and at different intersecting levels, from cultural to institutional and organisational. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005:
6) identify the gender regime of an institution as ‘the patterning of gender relations in that institution and especially the continuing pattern
which provides the structural context of particular relationships and individual practices’. So,
if we accept that institutions are
gendered, what counts as an institution of hegemonic masculinity? In the broadest sense such
institutions can be defined as ones ‘largely governed by men’ that have produced and recreated norms
and practices associated with masculinity and heterosexuality (Kronsell, 2005: 281). This helps explain why
women in minority positions among men in organisation structures were likely to become ‘tokens’,
perceived of as representative of all women (Kanter, 1977: 382). However, in much the same way that
hegemonic masculinity is not ‘numerically’ dominant, the conceptualisation of institutions of hegemonic
masculinity incorporates more than the mere physical presence (or dominance) of men’s bodies.
Institutions of hegemonic masculinity serve a particular (common) purpose: they are institutions or
organisations where male power and dominance is reified and reinforced through organisational
practices and discourses (see for example, Cohn, 1987). They are spaces within which particular
masculine behaviours and practices are normalised, where particular understandings of masculinities
(and femininities) are (re)produced and formalised . As Hooper notes: ‘Masculinity appears to have no stable ingredients and
therefore its power depends entirely on certain qualities constantly being associated with men … masculine spaces are precisely the places
where such associations are cemented and naturalised’ (Hooper, 2001: 230). In this sense, institutions of hegemonic masculinity provide such a
space; where cultural norms that privilege men, and values associated with masculinity, intersect with institutional power structures and the
physical presence of male bodies, to cement male dominance. The organisational space provides the link between cultural ideals and
institutional power that Connell (2005: 77) argues is required for the establishment of hegemony. As Kronsell argues, ‘to be hegemonic, cultural
norms must be supported by institutional power’ (Kronsell, 2005: 281). Though
not exclusively ‘male spaces’, institutions of
hegemonic masculinity are also traditionally patterned through a high level of segregation between the
sexes and particular gendered divisions of labour . Institutions have traditionally constructed different spheres of activity for
women and men to occupy – and this historically constructed division (and the norms it creates around male behaviour) helps to secure the
continuity of institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2005: 285). Institutions of hegemonic masculinity therefore provide the structural
space for the (re)production of particular cultural understandings of gender, power and inequality. Institutions
of hegemonic
masculinity are organisations where male power and dominance is reified and reinforced through both
formal and informal practices and discourses. They are spaces within which particular masculine
behaviours, ways of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ are normalised; where particular understandings of masculinities
(and femininities) are (re)produced and formalised. Yet within institutions of hegemonic masculinity, masculinity itself is
usually silent, or ‘unseen’ due to its ubiquity (Kronsell, 2005). The process of normalisation, of making masculine
practices and behaviours the ‘norm for appropriate conduct’, makes masculinity appear ‘natural’ and
therefore difficult to critique (Kronsell, 2005: 282–4). Masculinity is ‘not named’ because it omnipresent, all-
encompassing within these particular institutions. Indeed, as Acker argues, ‘as a relational phenomenon, gender is difficult to
see when only the masculine is present’ (Kronsell, 1990: 142). Masculinity is not a stable construct and appears to have no ‘stable ingredients’
(Hooper, 2001: 230).
Institutions of hegemonic masculinity provide a key site for this contestation; where
cultural norms which privilege men, and values associated with masculinity, intersect with institutional
power structures and the physical presence of male bodies, to cement male dominance. The
organisational space provides the link between cultural ideals and institutional power that is required
for the establishment of hegemony (Connell, 2005: 77). It is important to stress here that existence of hegemonic masculinity in
the military context does not preclude transformation of military institutions through challenging hegemonic masculinities. Such a
transformation would create an institution which ‘equally values “masculine” and “feminine” traits, so much so that they cease to be masculine
and feminine’ (Duncanson and Woodward, 2015: 12). Duncanson and Woodward argue that a ‘regendered military’ is one where: soldiering is
not a masculine identity, but becomes much more fluid, and is constructed through relations of equality, empathy, care, respect, and
recognition of similarities and shared experiences. The displacement of gendered dichotomies is immediately recognizable in this
conceptualization. Not only are the meanings of masculinity and femininity questioned, but so is the valuing of masculinity over femininity and
therefore the hierarchical thinking and material domination that has characterized gender relations. There therefore remain possibilities to
displace hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Even if these possibilities have been lost in application
empirical case studies. As Duncanson (2015: 244) argues, to realise this, ‘hierarchical relations must be replaced with relations of equality,
mutual respect, or empathy’. She critiques Connell’s (2002) suggestion that the transition phase should be one where a masculinity open to
equality within women is hegemonised. Rather, the transitory stage has to be one where traditionally disparaged, feminized traits are newly
valued and incorporated into ‘softer’ or hybrid masculinities. The forging of more equal relations is the ultimate, more challenging stage. The
hybrid stage may make it more likely that relations of equality, mutual respect, empathy, and so on, are formed, however, so rather than
dismiss the New Man syndrome in all its contexts, assuming it always camouflages the continuation of patriarchy, militarism, and neoliberalism,
we can look to expose its contradictions and to push for those relations of equality. (Duncanson, 2015: 244) Implications for the masculinist
protection logic Gender is an issue for the military (and military institutions) which ‘is often obvious, apparent and visible’ at the same time that
it is ‘obscured, normalised, lived with and ignored’ (Woodward and Winter, 2007: 3). Hurley’s (2018: 16) study of men ‘doing’ gender work at
NATO draws out the contradictions underpinning the way in which ‘women’s rights’ and equality are expressed within the institution. This is a
recurring theme which manifests itself in NATO’s development and understanding of a gender perspective as we go onto discuss in Chapter 5.
This finds gender issues articulated within a masculinist protection logic. Entwined with understanding NATO as an
institution of hegemonic masculinity is therefore the logic of masculinist protection (Young, 2003).
Understanding masculinist protection logic requires moving away from using gender in an explanatory manner or as a variable. For example,
through attempts to connect the violence of states and institutions to particular behavioural propensities of women and men. Rather, it is
necessary to understand gender as an element of interpretation. As Young (2003: 2) argues: viewing issues of war and security through a
gendered lens … means seeing how a certain logic of gendered meanings and images helps organise the way people interpret events and
circumstances, along with the positions and possibilities for action within them. The
logic of masculinist protection extends
the position of the male head of household as a protector of the family, to encompass male leaders
more generally as protectors of a given population (Stiehm, 1982; Young, 2003). The logic of masculinist protection is
premised on an understanding of variation and plurality in masculinities; specifically, the relationship between ‘dominative masculinity’ and
that of the ‘protector masculinity’ (Young, 2003: 4). Masculinist protection recalls a ‘rather more benign image of masculinity’: ‘the role of this
courageous, responsible and virtuous man is that of protector’ (Young, 2003: 4). Thisis constructed in opposition to an ‘other’
masculinity embodied by ‘bad’ men who exploit, harm and abuse the vulnerable for the pleasures of
domination (Young, 2003: 4). The flip side to this coin is that ‘feminine subordination, in this logic, does not constitute submission to a
violent and overbearing bully’ (Young, 2003: 5). Feminist subordination is not submission to a ‘dominative
masculinity’ or the ‘bad men’. Subordination is this sense forms part of an exchange between the
protector and the protected: ‘In return for male protection, the woman concedes critical distance from decision-making autonomy’
(Young, 2003: 4). As a consequence of this exchange the protected woman defers to the protectors
judgement, looks up to him with gratitude for his manliness and admiration for his willingness to face
the dangers of the world (Young, 2003: 5); this gratitude in turn reinforces his perception of his own masculinity and worth. And
yet, power inequalities, domination and subordination persist within this logic : ‘the role of the masculine
protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’ (Young, 2003:
2). Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of pastoral power, Young suggests that masculinist protection is a power marked out by virtue and love
(Young, 2003: 6), appearing ‘gentle and benevolent both to its wielders and to those under its sway’ (Young, 2003: 6 ). Military
masculinity is as much about performance as it is about action (Partis-Jennings, 2017: 3). This understanding has
parallels with Kronsell’s understanding of the presence and persistence of gendered norms in institutions. Here, gendered norms
have been built into the ‘walls’ of institutions, whose structure appears so natural and ‘supportive’ that
it becomes difficult to see them also as exclusionary barriers (Kronsell, 2005: 291). Couching gender
mainstreaming initiatives and framing the gender perspective in a ‘supportive’ logic of masculine
protection reinforces particular inequalities and barriers whilst projecting an image of care and
consideration for women working both inside and outside of NATO. The logic of masculinist protection provides one
particular way in which the hegemonic masculine norms of the organisation imprint on, condition and control understandings of the gender
perspective. Inthis sense a logic of masculinist protection can be seen to be embedded within the
hegemonic norms of NATO. At the more abstract level, NATO can be seen as a collectivisation of the
security state, protecting its citizens from an ‘other’ and external threat, beyond the imagined borders
of the alliance. The citizen, in this reading, as ‘protected’, defers decision-making autonomy to the nation state as protector and by
extension the NATO alliance. In this sense NATO itself can be viewed as a masculinist protector, a role that
reinforces the hegemonic militaristic ideals and norms that were identified above. This gendered logic
helps NATO to define and locate itself and frame the gender perspective in a broader sense (Hurley, 2018).
NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity We argue that NATO is an international military institution constituting a
particular gender regime. This leads NATO to function as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity .
NATO is characterised by a particular gendered division of labour (both in regard to particular jobs that women and men ‘traditionally’ occupy,
and to those that women are still excluded either formally or informally from) (Connell, 2002, 2006: 7). NATO is also characterised by
gendered relations of power expressed through gendered institutional practices, symbolism and
discourses. Although a complex institution with a dual political-military structure, NATO’s purpose is as a military alliance committed to
collective defence, cooperative security and crisis management (NATO, 2010). NATO armed forces composed of national militaries are
therefore a focal point of alliance activity. Yet, the national armed forces of NATO member states are still overwhelmingly male-dominated
(Schjølset, 2013). This offers one way in which we can argue that NATO is premised upon hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2012). At this point,
it is worth offering a note of caution when extrapolating from the ‘national’ to the ‘international’. As Connell and Messerschmidt note when
discussing a ‘global gender order’: ‘it is tempting to assume a simple hierarchy of power and authority, running from global to regional to local’
(Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 850) – or indeed from the national to the international. Power, authority and gender are constructed and
contested at multiple, multifaceted levels. NATO is an institution made up of the military forces of multiple and varied national armed forces
with particular cultural practices and variation and, in this sense, there is a danger of oversimplifying the concept of ‘the military’. However, as
Goldstein (2001) has identified, militaries are ‘institutions that have largely been governed by men and have produced and recreated norms and
practices associated with particular forms and ideals of masculinity that are surprisingly consistent across cultures and time’ (in Kronsell, 2012:
44). It can be legitimately argued that one of the reasons why NATO works effectively as a collective military alliance is the similarity in the
military norms and practices across its 29 member states. Similarly, NATO’s supranational institutional structures have been developing and
integrating for 70 years and have proved adept at accommodating various phases of expansion and the incorporation of new member states’
militaries. Invoking Enloe (2000: 131) to ask ‘where are the women?’ provides a valuable starting point for the study of international institutions
and understanding if, and how, they operate as institutions of hegemonic masculinity. This question makes men visible in a way they were not
before (Enloe and Zalewski, 1999: 138). It draws attention not just to the reliance of institutions on women, but on the relationship between
women and men (Enloe, 2014: 131). The
location of women and men within an organisational structure is
indicative of the value ascribed to them . To understand the ways in which military institutions are gendered it is necessary to
investigate not only the meanings of masculinity and femininity, but also to ask ‘how these meanings determine where women are and what
they think about being there’ (Enloe, 2014: 8). Military institutions analyse their own gender and racialised cultures, often to support
operational effectiveness (Henry, 2017b: 187). Such analysis is something NATO engages in, albeit selectively. As we discuss below,
NATO has been elusive in publishing up-to-date figures on gender balance and diversity in NATO HQ in
recent years. This stands in contrast to the push for transparency from the NCGP on gender and
diversity among NATO armed forces. As we discuss in Chapter 2, the NCGP now publishes an annual report detailing the status of
women and engagement with Women, Peace and Security across NATO member and partner states (NATO, 2017). There is therefore a
significant discrepancy between the transparency expected of NATO member and partner states,
compared to that practiced by NATO as an institution itself. Despite this opaqueness on sharing data on those employed
at NATO HQ, efforts to address gender and diversity have emerged since the early 2000s. However, as Ahmed (2007) draws
attention to, the language of diversity is problematic. For postcolonial scholars, it ‘reifies difference as
something that exists “in” the bodies or culture of others, such that difference becomes a national
property’ (Ahmed, 2007: 235). Management studies scholars have highlighted the commodification of
‘diversity’ and how it is bound up with neoliberal logics. Difference is individualised, and the term
distracts from continuing systemic inequalities (Ahmed, 2007: 236). When institutions embrace
‘diversity’, it can be read as a lack of commitment to change (Ahmed, 2007: 236). In the context of a military institution,
diversity takes on new meanings. Diversity for NATO is understood narrowly as referring to national
representation or gender, rather than race, disability or other characteristics (NATO, 2011). For example,
NATO does not collect data on the ethnicity of its staff (NATO, 2011). The focus on national representation is to be
expected given this has proved a highly sensitive issue for an expanding multilateral institution (Dijkstra, 2015: 13). Yet, the silence in
respect to race and ethnicity in NATO’s understanding of, and data on, diversity serves to depoliticise
‘diversity’ through divorcing it from wider intersectional understandings (Henry, 2017b: 185). The absence of efforts
to address diversity beyond national representation and gender could indicate that this is a controversial issue among NATO member states.
NATO relies on consensus-based decision making, reflective of its position as an alliance, rather than an supranational body. No member can be
forced to take a position it does not agree with (Pouliot, 2016). The conflation of gender with diversity by NATO (NATO, 2016) is also
problematic, but is perhaps reflective of a broader articulation of diversity within military contexts (Woodward and Winter, 2006; Kronsell,
2012). This understanding of diversity at a national level may help explain why diversity has been introduced at NATO in this way. Diversity
as ‘gender diversity’ means adding women to existing structures, rather than seeking to ‘regender’ them
(Duncanson and Woodward, 2015). An approach which ‘adds women and stirs’ does not challenge gendered
structures. As Hudson (2009: 291) argues such liberal approaches ‘add’ women to the ‘discourse with
the assumption that they will behave like men when given men’s roles and that the fundamental
frameworks … though they were created by men for men, are unproblematic and will remain intact’ . This
contradicts the lived experiences of many women (Hudson, 2009: 291). Moreover, the gender diversity argument is
problematic because it rests on the assumption that women are something inherently different to men,
and will perform the diversity expected of them (Kronsell, 2012: 67). The result, as Kronsell (2012: 67) argues, is that ‘the
majority is simultaneously constructed as homogenous and as naturally associated with the organisation’. In 2002, the NATO Prague Summit
established a task force to address imbalance in gender, age and national representation. The subsequent report opposed the imposition of
quotas to support representation but did recommend the creation of an Action Plan (NATO, 2011). These efforts predate NATO’s engagement
with WPS and, until 2014, the two were treated as separate in NATO policies. This is despite the fact that UNSCR 1325 calls for the ‘increased
representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions’ (United Nations Security Council,
2000). The Action Plan produced by the task force covered the period from 2007 to 2010. It is not available publicly.1 However, the NATO
website states that the Action Plan had three key objectives: (1) to maintain a NATO Diversity Framework and Policy; (2) to improve NATO’s
work environment; and (3) to promote the image of NATO as an ‘employer of choice’ (NATO, 2011), the third objective drawing attention to the
instrumental benefits of being seen to engage with gender and diversity issues for improving NATO’s image .
This is also reflected in
NATO’s more recent engagement with WPS which has identified NATO’s engagement with the agenda
as a positive public relations story (Wright, 2019: 98). It is not evident whether NATO revised the 2007–10 Action Plan as the
related webpage has not been updated since 2011 (NATO, 2011). The approval and implementation of a revised Diversity Action Plan is an
outcome for the 2016 NATO/EAPC Policy, yet the existence of such a document has not been made public. This could also indicate that there
has not been one in place since the previous one expired in 2010. A revision of the Action Plan should be accompanied by the public release of
up-to-date gender and diversity data so it is possible to review what progress NATO has made. Despite some advances in women’s
representation, it is of little surprise that NATO has been accused of being an anachronistic ‘men-only
club’ (Harrison, 2014). Reports on gender and diversity within the International Staff have not been made publicly available since 2012 (NATO,
2012c). The latest data on gender balance at NATO Headquarters comes from the Global Study on the Implementation of the WPS agenda
commissioned by UN Women. The report finds that at NATO Headquarters in Brussels just six of the 38 (16%) executive leadership positions are
held by women (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 258). NATO’s international military command structures (NATO HQ, Allied Command Operations -ACO,
Allied Command Transformation – ACT) are also largely staffed by men. The NCGP is currently the only NATO committee to be headed by a
woman. At the highest levels of NATO’s governance structures, some small progress has been made towards women’s inclusion. For example,
representation of women in NATO’s principle decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), has significantly improved in recent years
with women now making up 28% of permanent representatives (NATO, 2018c), compared to 11% just four years ago (Fellin, 2014: 22). In
contrast, there are no women representatives on the Military Committee (NATO, 2018a). This could be viewed as surprising given women now
account for 24% of NATO defence ministers (NATO, 2018b). However, it also reflects the fact that NATO armed forces member states are still
overwhelmingly male-dominated (Schjølset, 2013), at an average of just 10.9% women (NATO, 2017). So
while gendered institutions
can and are found in all areas of social and political life, military institutions represent an ‘extreme’ case
(Carreiras, 2006: 40). ‘Gender war roles’ have been shown to be a hardy feature , serving ‘to organise men’s
bodies into military organisations and women’s bodies out’ (Kronsell, 2016: 2). The under-representation of women is the
responsibility of member states, and in respect to the Defence Ministers, reflective of a wider absence of women in politics from key
government portfolios (Annesley and Gains, 2012). Yet, the improvements made in working towards gender balance among permanent
representatives, and in NATO defence ministers, also suggest that there is an appetite among member states for women to be better
represented. NATO remains an institution dominated by men in decision-making roles. It is also a long way from even considering the possibility
of a woman as Secretary General (Harrison, 2014). Yet the few senior women within NATO are increasingly visible in outward-facing roles. For
example, Rose Gottemoeller became the first woman to hold the position of Deputy Secretary General in 2016. The NATO Spokesperson, Oana
Lungescu, is another example of a woman appointed to a position central to the alliance’s public presentation, and the Press Office remains an
exception as a department to reach a gender balance (six women to six men) (NATO, 2018d). The Assistant Secretary for General Public
Diplomacy also provides an exception among the Assistant Secretary General Portfolios as one held more than once by a woman. The
appointment of an Assistant Secretary General is much coveted by allies because of the prestige and influence which comes with the post. This
has historically been a legacy position and dominated by the larger allies. However, Secretary General Rasmussen was successful in opening all
positions, including Assistant Secretary General, to open competition (Dijkstra, 2015: 12). This paved the way for the Croatian Kolinda Grabar-
Kitarović2 to take office in 2011. It is also noteworthy that GrabarKitarović became the unofficial figurehead for NATO’s engagement with
Women, Peace and Security prior to the creation of the NATO Special Representative on WPS in 2012 (Baker, 2015). The position has also been
held by two other women: Stefanie Babst (acting, 2010–11) and Carmen Romero (2016–). This demonstrates a trend for senior women within
NATO to be appointed to roles with high public visibility, rather than those roles considered to constitute the core business of NATO as a
defence and security institution (Wright, 2016: 358). The outsider observer could be left with the impression that there has been a greater
challenge to the dominance of men’s bodies within NATO than there actually has been. Directing our scrutiny upwards to take intersectionality
seriously through identifying the gendered and racialised structures upholding military institutions is also necessary. This requires moving
beyond understanding multiple differences and their impact upon the individual. It requires exposing ‘intersecting oppressions or systems of
oppression’ (Crenshaw, 1989; Crenshaw et al., 1991) in order to provide the tools to challenge the ‘hegemonic position of men (or some
women)’ in military structures (Henry, 2017b: 195). An intersectional lens exposes the ‘privileges, benefits, and power gains maintained and
crystallized through either the power of the military or the patriarchy itself’ (Henry, 2017b: 195). As Henry argues, only by re-politicising
intersectionality through this understanding does it become possible to ‘smash imperial white supremacist capitalist heteropatriarchy’ (Henry,
2018). Perhaps reflective of NATO’s reluctance to address diversity as an issue related to race and ethnicity, the characteristics of the military
male body within NATO are also noteworthy. From a visual analysis of Figure 1.1 (below) we see the dominance of white men’s bodies in the
NATO Military Committee. This is also reflected in the composition of the NAC (although as noted above there are some women at the table)
(NATO, 2018c). The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s pre-eminent decision-making body might be more diverse in terms of gender, yet it also
glaringly white. Like the NAC, which is composed of member states’ permanent representatives to NATO, the Military Committee is made up of
member states’ Military Representatives.3 Both forums rely on member states to populate them. NATO member states have a sizeable number
of non-white citizens who are not reflected here. The composition of the NATO Military Committee also mirrors the European Union’s Military
Committee (Kronsell, 2015: 9). The defining characteristics of elite military leaders across Europe and the West has changed little, bar a few
exceptions, since NATO’s foundation 70 years ago. Militaries, particularly in a European and a North American context, are exemplars of
institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995: 213). The national armed forces of NATO member states are still overwhelmingly male-
dominated (Schjølset, 2010). Traditionally, it is men and men’s bodies that have (almost exclusively) occupied the structures of military
institutions, at every level in varying positions of power and subordination (Higate, 2003).NATO as an institution 33 The dominance of men’s
bodies and masculine practices (Kronsell, 2015: 284) and a division of labour along gender lines both in terms of roles and physical space (Acker,
1990: 146–7) are evident within NATO. This recreates norms and practices associated with masculinity and heterosexuality, which when
coupled with institutional power results in hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2005: 281). However,
in much the same way that
hegemonic masculinity is not ‘numerically’ dominant among men (Connell, 2005), the conceptualisation
of institutions of hegemonic masculinity incorporates more than the mere physical presence (or
dominance) of male bodies. Describing an occupation as feminised or masculinised, or more generically as gendered, is not at the
same as noting that it is dominated by men or women. Identifying where women and men are within the organisational structure is a useful
starting point because military institutions are built on gender war roles, which tend to organise men’s bodies in and women’s bodies out
(Kronsell, 2015). However, conflating the two can keep us from seeing contexts in which work dominated by men, for example, is more or less
masculinised. It may also obscure the historical process through which definitions of gender-appropriate work are shaped. In
addition to
this dominance of men’s bodies, the norms, behaviours and discourses of NATO, transferred up and
through national military structures, are also heavily masculinised . ‘Internal’ hegemonic masculinity (in Hinojosa’s
(2010) conceptualisation) is also produced as a configuration of everyday social Figure 1.1 179th Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence
Session, May 2018, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium.34 NATO as an institution practice (Hurley, 2018a). For example, perceived
transgressions from the ideal type militarised masculinity are policed through trivialisation and
feminisation (Hurley, 2018a: 4) or the ‘rules-in-use’ (Leach and Lowndes, 2007: 186). In this sense NATO is taken
as a site of hegemonic masculinity wherein particular processes and relationships are located, through
which individual and collective groups of men and women conduct gendered lives (Connell, 2005a: 71). NATO
also occupies a position within the international security infrastructure and in this sense its actions (as a
collective organisation) are situated, and saturated in international security discourses that value and
privilege the masculine – ‘strength’, ‘rationality’ – over the feminine – ‘weakness, emotion’ (Via, 2010:
43; Tickner, 1992; Hooper, 2001) and are imbued with narratives of masculinist protection (Young, 2003)
as we outline above. This leads us to argue that NATO is not just an institution of hegemonic masculinity but an institution of
international hegemonic masculinity. This extends the understanding of NATO’s as a ‘teaching machine’ sharing
lessons on the integration of women in the military and the value of WPS (Enloe, 1981; Wright, 2016). There are two
co-constituting elements to NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity (see Figure 1.2 below). First, NATO, we
argue, through socialisation of 29 member states and a growing number of partner states, the value of
military masculinity is ‘learned’. NATO states meeting at the level of the North Atlantic Council, through the Military Committee or
in other fora such as committees (including the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives), learn from each other what NATO’s role in the world
is and how this should be embodied. Through NATO operations, including the former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and current
operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, NATO, member and partner states work together and learn in practice what these values are.
Second, NATO, as we argue above, has therefore taken on the role of masculinist protector which
reinforces hegemonic militaristic, masculine ideals and norms . The enactment of this masculine protection logic further
reinforces the notion of NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. This feeds into, and is further reinforced
through, NATO’s role as ‘teaching machine’. Figure 1.2 Conceptualising NATO as an institution of international hegemonic
masculinity. The two aspects of NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity are therefore co-constitutive. As we go
into discuss in Chapters 2 and 5, this helps explain why NATO’s engagement with Women, Peace and Security and a gender perspective has
been outward-facing, something NATO can engage with and utilise externally rather than being used to reflect inwards on NATO itself.

Crisis-based environmental threat construction is incompatible with the alternative

Detraz, 2010. (Nicole, Assistant Professor in political science at U Memphis, “the genders of
environmental security,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 104-106; spp)
The environmental conflict perspective is the approach that most clearly links traditional -security concerns to the environment. Most
authors who examine environmental conflict focus on the possibility that groups within society will
engage in violent conflict as natural resource stocks diminish due to environmental degradation. These
conflicts are understood to threaten the stability of the state. There are several broad trends that are identified as increasing the likelihood of
environmentally induced conflicts, "including: expanding and migrating human populations; water, arable land and other resource and
environmental scarcities; ... globalisation which brings people (and disease) into closer proximity; and increasing recognition of the injustice of
Northern-induced underdevelopment of the South."6 Central to these discussions is the concept of scarcity. Thomas Homer-Dixon identifies
resource scarcities as being potentially so severe that they can seriously undermine human well-being. He identifies three types of scarcities:
supply-induced scarcity, demand-induced scarcity, and structural scarcity. 7 The main argument is that some types of scarcity, coupled with
other factors, can contribute to violent conflict. 8 Given the similarities between the environmental conflict approach and "mainstream"
security, a number of feminist criticisms of the environmental conflict approach can be read into the core feminist work in Security Studies.
Specifically, feminist theories would criticize the environmental conflict approach's narrow definition of security, its state-centrism,
its focus on scarcity, and its neglect of gender as a possible cause for environmental conflict . First, feminists argue
that the environmental conflict approach holds an inadequate understanding of what security is.
Environmental conflict scholars are focused on the potential for environmental degradation and scarcity
to cause violent conflict, rather than looking at what happens to people and their environment during
wars. To term something a "security" issue and then to leave important elements of insecurity
untouched is problematic. Including gender means including the assessment of potential insecurities
during wartime as well, given that women often face particular security risks during times of conflict. A second problematic element of
the environmental conflict literature from a gendered perspective is its state-centrism. Feminists often engage in a multilevel analysis, with
particular attention paid to individuals and groups within societies. Environmental
conflict scholars typically restrict their
attention to the level of the state, again demonstrating the close links between this approach and
traditional Security Studies. 11 Feminists contend that it is necessary to pay attention to security at levels
above and below the state in order to understand how women participate in and are affected by
international security issues. Third, ecofeminists will take issue with the assertion of a link between environmental conflict and
scarcity because they see that treatments of scarcity in this literature are largely anthropocentric, suggesting that the environment is made up
of resources for human consumption. Authors like Carolyn Merchant call for the acknowledgement of a dynamic relationship between human
and nonhuman nature, with each having a, degree of power over the other. 12 To use terms like "scarcity" implies that the environment is
something of a stockroom of resources for humans that may become depleted, which disregards the deeper relationship between the two
entities. Finally, feminists, in their concern for the gender-differential impacts of proposed cases of conflict are themselves gendered. The
factors often put forward as potentially contributing to resource scarcity and conflict in environmental conflict literatures include population
growth, human migration, globalization, and unequal resource distribution. Each of these topics has particular implications for gender analysis
that are largely unaddressed within this literature. For example, environmental conflict scholars argue that increases in human populations can
directly contribute to both supply-induced and demand-induced scarcities, which could result in violent conflict. This tells us very little if we do
not consider where these populations are located and who they are made up of. Also, the issue of population has specific gendered
implications. Impacts may be different if populations have “youth bulges” typically made up of young males. This group disproportionately
engages in crime, commits suicide, or join militias, all of which are important security concerns. Additionally, by identifying populations increase
as a contributor to environment conflict, these authors are automatically making women the potential target of “solutions” because of their
role as child bearers. When issues are securitized, certain actions are seen as justifiable – and it is likely that men and women will experience
these actions differently. Similar arguments can be made for a number of the other causal factors privileged in the environmental conflict
approach. These instances of male/female differential impacts have implications for the security of particular individuals.

Vote negative to act from a feminist foreign policy – this stance takes principles of
care, responsibility, and empathy seriously as a normative framework for how states
should act. Abandoning the self-fulfilling prophecies of realism is a pre-requisite to
creating a lasting peace between nations.
Aggestam et al. 19 (Karin Aggestam, professor of Political Science and holds the Pufendorf Endowed
Chair at Lund University; Annika Bergman Rosamond, associate professor at the Department of Political
Science, Lund University; Annica Kronsell, Professor of Political Science at School of Global Studies,
Gothenburg University. [“Theorising feminist foreign policy,” International Relations, Volume 33, Issue 1.
Sage Publishing, 2019.)
Embedded in feminist notions of foreign and security policy is an ethical commitment to the care and
nurturing of distant others , who reside beyond the confines of one’s own political community. As noted above, scholarship on
ethical foreign policy is surprisingly void of gender analysis and feminist ethical engagement despite the
fact that it is situated within the subfield of normative IR that engages widely with issues related to global justice and equality.
We therefore propose that the ethics of care provides fertile ground for thinking through the analysis of feminist-
inspired foreign and security policy discourse and practice as well as identifying the limits to such engagement. Ethics of care
scholarship has been inspired by social psychology. 51 Carol Gilligan argues that care is a form of moral
development distinct from the justice-oriented moral dimension stemming from Enlightenment
thinking. In the first generation of studies on ethics of care, there was an explicit association with female
experiences as an alternative to maleled justice reasoning. A key contention here is that the mother’s distinct
relationship with her child gives her a set of caring and nurturing skills that are transferrable beyond the
immediate family and nation. Sara Ruddick, among others, suggests that maternal and caring relations can bring
about peace.52 Still, while maternal care is strongly associated with women’s bodies, Ruddick insists that
mothering is not a practice confined to women alone .53 Yet, in realpolitik, women, and mothers in
particular, are frequently depicted as innately peaceful, which is an assumption that has been contested
and rejected in feminist IR scholarship.54 Instead, feminist ethical theory has been attentive not to
essentialise all women as peaceful, but instead to fully recognise the differences that exist between
women. The second generation of care ethics scholars understand care in broader terms. For example, Joan
Tronto defines care as ‘everything we do to maintain, continue and repair our world so that we can live
in it as well as possible’.55 We find the broad range of scholarly efforts to globalise ethics of care 56 useful to
theorise feminist foreign policy because it can shed light on how care principles may be used in foreign policy in
an effort to address global gender inequalities, violence and protection across borders. This necessitates
taking issue with the assumption that ethics of care is inapplicable to the study of global gender politics
because of its essentialisation of women’s experiences and universal lack of agency. Fiona Robinson rightly notes, concerns over the
essentialism of care ethics must be taken seriously , I would argue that it is only a narrow, orthodox, ethics of care – the
view of care as essentially a morality for women, belonging in the private sphere and valorising ‘dependence’
over ‘independence’ – to which these criticisms actually apply … clearly, the importance of an ethics of care, and its
transformatory potential, does not, and indeed must not, rest on its association with women. While it is
crucial to avoid undermining its feminist origins … the ethics of care is significant because it represents
an alternative view of ethics which is relevant beyond the role of women within the family … ‘it’ extends beyond the
personal to the political and, ultimately, to the global context of social life. 57 In line with Robinson’s argument,
we challenge orthodox conceptions of care ethics as a ‘morality for women’ only, while maintaining that
its emphasis on dialogue and care is a useful approach to critically unpack the moral ambitions of a feminist
and gender-based foreign policy-making. Moreover, we argue that the ethical foundations of feminist foreign
policy, by and large, are consistent with the normative imperative of a globalised ethics of care , which
contends that ‘those who are powerful have a responsibility to approach moral problems by looking
carefully at where, why and how the structures of existing social and personal relations have led to
exclusion and marginalization’.58 In contrast, the
orthodox notions of foreign policy do not consider
situatedness of the state within distinct cultural, political and ethical settings nor
the intersectional subjectivities and moral preferences of the citizens inhabiting that sphere. However, an
ethics of care approach to
the study of foreign policy is sensitive to such variation because it is based on a relational ontology ,
which addresses the moral relations between human beings. Hence, an ethics of care approach to the study of feminist
foreign policy takes into account the situated moral stories and experiences of individuals and in
particular women whose voices have not been considered in traditional foreign policy analysis and IR.59 With an
increasing number of states advocating pro-gender norms in foreign policy and principles of care and empathy,
ethical foundations for the actual conduct of foreign policy become important to analyse. Yet, theoretical
tools developed for such analysis need to embrace the criticisms that the ethics of care essentialises
women’s aptness for care and nurturing, and, as such reduces their agency and actual engagements in
global politics and participation public life. 60 The emphasis on care and relationality also provide fertile ground
for ethically unpacking the situated contents of a feminist foreign policy. As mentioned, an increasing
number of states are resolutely pushing for a distinct feminist stance on foreign policymaking regarding
the inclusion and representation of local women in world politics. Canada’s feminist development policy , for instance, is
grounded in the assumption that women and girls have the ability to achieve real change in terms of
sustainable development and peace, even though they are often the most vulnerable to poverty, violence and climate change. So
we will work closely with local women’s rights groups , particularly in the areas of sexual and reproductive
health … we will make sound decisions based on evidence and closely track our progress, but in a manner adapted to the needs
of different stakeholders in different contexts. 61 Swedish feminist foreign policy is grounded in a
commitment to engage with distinct ethical reflections, experiences, needs and wants of local populations
as a way of gaining insights and knowledge how to support local peace, conflict resolution and the eradication of
gendered violence. Moreover, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2015) highlights the significance of
‘the participation of women and girls as actors in peace processes in conflict countries, including by
encouraging parallels to the Swedish network for women mediators and supporting local women leaders,
women’s rights activists, women’s organisations’ as well as ‘ensuring that women and girls are included and that their
experience is taken into account in the design of mechanisms and systems for early conflict warning and in conflict analyses’.62 The
unpacking of such discursive foreign policy statements enables a critical analysis of the presence of care
values in states’ actual foreign policy practice. In this way, prevalent inconsistencies in the making of feminist foreign policy
can be identified, which in turn can show in what ways they may impede its operationalisation in practice. For instance, both Canada and
Sweden can be criticised for not sufficiently matching their care for distant other women living in conflict
or poverty-struck zones with an empathetic commitment to their own indigenous or marginalised
refugee populations. While feminist IR theory remains alert to and critical of the structural
underpinnings of world politics, the ontological relationality of the ethics of care provides a key
contribution because it takes stock of the experiences of the people at the receiving end of feminist
foreign policy. In contrast with orthodox foreign policy practice and theory, which tends to disregard the lived
histories of women and colonial subjects, an ethics of care approach would actively seek to uncover
their stories to enable intersectional and situated analyses of foreign policy . This
involves investigating whether states and other actors actually employ care and empathy as a normative
ideal in their pursuit of foreign, security, defence and development policies. States tend to vary in their commitment to such
dialogue, but this does not mean that a global ethics of care should be dismissed in the context of foreign and
security policy analysis. Instead a critical analysis of feminist-oriented foreign policy should seek to address the
ethical question how our view of security in global politics would change once we recognize and
accept … the ways responsibilities and practices of care grow out of relations of dependence and vulnerability of people in the
context of complex webs of relations of responsibility.63 This entails exploring to what extent the makers of feminist foreign policy
take note of ‘the everyday’ and whether Robison’s notion of ‘a feminist ethics of security’ which centres on
‘marginalised sites’ has some resonance with actual policy-making.64 Ethics of care as foreign policy conduct is often
expressed in notions of gender-just protection of such marginalised groups, in particular, the protection of
women and children from gendered violence and discrimination. Here ethics of care scholar Joan Tronto
highlights the shift in global relations from what previously was a ‘right to intervene’ and sovereign-based
logic to ‘the responsibility to protect’ and an ethics of global care. 65 We propose here that protection, though
at times requiring military means, should always rest on the act of listening to marginalised voices – a
diplomatic tool that is key to the successful conduct of feminist foreign policy. A foreign policy, which
builds on the ethics of care as its foundation, rests on the idea of inclusive and ethical dialogues as well as
acts oflistening across borders and intersectional confines. Virginia Held holds that
emotions, such as empathy, sensitivity and responsiveness, are sentiments that
need to be cultivated as a significant element when making moral decisions. 66 Central to the analysis of
feminist foreign policy then is the extent to which care, the act of listening and dialogical engagement really are key norms in the
implementation of gender-just external relations? Here we find Christine Sylvester’s 67 concept of empathetic
cooperation particularly useful and closely associated with the ethics of care. 68 Empathetic cooperation
challenges sovereign rights and national interests as the sole platforms for international interactions in
favour of empathy across intersectional and ethical boundaries. Laura Sjoberg also suggests that emphatic
cooperation is a fruitful platform for the development of a feminist international security ethic, which
pays attention to care and justice as well as the gendered structures that have led to the marginalisation
of vulnerable groups across international society.69 It may also lead to ‘a form of knowledge of other persons that
draws explicitly on the commonalty of feelings and experiences to enrich one’s understanding of another in his or her
own right’.70 If empathy is an expressed willingness and ability to appreciate the other then empathetic

listens seriously to the

cooperation is ‘a process of positional slippage that occurs when one
concerns, fears and agendas of those one is unaccustomed to hearing’ .71 In short, we
argue that empathetic cooperation, as part of the making of a feminist foreign policy, may be a way of opening up for a
global ethic and concrete expressions of politics, which do not privilege statist interests and notions of
security. Moreover, it moves the agenda towards human security while respecting cultural difference. 72
Thus, to explore the presence of empathetic cooperation in the conduct of feminist and genderbased
foreign policy is key to the analysis of feminist foreign policy and to ethical investigations into ethically minded foreign
policy more broadly.
 2
“In the area” means all of the activities.
UN 13. United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty.
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part1.htm. // MNHS NL

PART I INTRODUCTION Article 1

Use of terms and scope 1. For the purposes of this Convention: (1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; (2) "Authority" means the
International Seabed Authority; (3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and
exploitation of, the resources of the Area;

Vote neg―allowing the aff to cooperate over miniscule parts of each of the three
topic areas exponentially multiplies the number of topical affs and makes quality neg
ground impossible because the aff is indistinct from the status quo
 3
Their calls for widespread change fall into the same logic of progress that has resulted
in speciesist violence and the destruction of the environment
Kochi and Ordan 08 [Tarik Kochi, Queen’s University School of Law lecturer, and Noam Ordan,
linguist, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity,"] JB
In another sense  the ethical demand to respond to historical and present  environmental destruction runs
onto and in many ways intensifies the question of radical or revolutionary change which confronted the
socialist tradition within the 19th and 20th centuries.  As environmental concerns have increasingly since the 1970s come into greater prominence,
the pressing issue for many within the 21st century is that of social-environmental revolution. [9] Social- environmental revolution involves the

creation of new social, political and economic forms of human and environmental organisation which
can overcome the deficiencies and latent oppression of global capitalism and safeguard both human and
non-human dignity. Putting aside the old, false assumptions of a teleological account of history, social-environmental revolution is dependent upon widespread political action
which short-circuits and tears apart current legal, political and economic regimes. This action is itself dependent upon a widespread change in

awareness, a revolutionary change in consciousness, across enough of the populace to spark radical
social and political transformation. Thought of in this sense, however, such a response to environmental
destruction is caught by many of the old problems which have troubled the tradition of revolutionary
socialism. Namely, how might a significant number of human individuals come to obtain such a radically enlightened perspective or awareness of human social reality (i.e. a dialectical,
utopian anti-humanist ‘revolutionary consciousnesse’) so that they might bring about with minimal violence the overthrow of the practices and institutions of late capitalism and colonial-
speciesism? Further, how might an individual attain such a radical perspective when their life, behaviours and attitudes (or their subjectivity itself) are so moulded and shaped by the
individual’s immersion within and active self-realisation through, the networks, systems and habits constitutive of global capitalism? (Hardt & Negri, 2001). While the demand for social-
environmental revolution grows stronger, both theoretical and practical answers to these pressing questions remain unanswered. Both liberal and social revolutionary models thus seem to run
into the same problems that surround the notion of progress; each play out a modern discourse of sacrifice in which some forms of life and modes of living are set aside in favour of the
promise of a future good. Caught between social hopes and political myths, the challenge of responding to environmental destruction confronts, starkly, the core of a discourse of modernity
characterised by reflection, responsibility and action. Given the increasing pressures upon the human habitat, this modern discourse will either deliver or it will fail. There is little room for an
existence in between: either the Enlightenment fulfils its potentiality or it shows its hand as the bearer of impossibility. If the possibilities of the Enlightenment are to be fulfilled then this can
only happen if the old idea of the progress of the human species, exemplified by Hawking’s cosmic colonisation, is fundamentally rethought and replaced by a new form of self-

This self-comprehension would need to negate and limit the old modern humanism by a radical
comprehension. 

anti-humanism. The aim, however, would be to not just accept one side or the other, but  to re-think the
basis of moral action along the lines of a dialectical, utopian anti-humanism. Importantly, though, getting past
inadequate conceptions of action, historical time and the futural promise of progress  may be dependent
upon radically re-comprehending the relationship between humanity and nature in such a way that the
human is no longer viewed as the sole core of the subject, or the being of highest value.  The human
would thus need to no longer be thought of as a master that stands over the non-human . Rather, the human and the
non-human need to be grasped together, with the former bearing dignity only so long as it understands itself as a part of the latter.

focus on how environmental degradation impacts HUMANS is an explicit link – the

species that have been long subjugated by humans need to be valued – especially on a
topic so intertwined with the war and the species that live in them – don’t allow them
to kick these impacts – leads to late breaking debate and kills fairness – their disregard
for species is exemplary of their tainted pedagogy – rejection of the team is k2
education
The alternative is that the judge should vote negative to reject the 1AC’s human
survival ethic. This rejection enables an understanding of the species-being. That
solves the ethical contradiction of their speciesism.
HUDSON ‘4 [Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations
journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23_2_04.pdf] JB

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending
of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this
recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that
what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a
new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The
bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom.
Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and
freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance  across the particular
divisions of society. Furthermore, the
concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete
idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact,
that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a
kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to
species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not
merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the
features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world . It is an absence
of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to
inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in
order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort
of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction
between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life
would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming.
Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it
through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general
becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we
may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The
structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and
political life, which are never truly separable . Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of
the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the
decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and,
with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most
developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation,
how are we to envision the future of politics and society?
 4
The 1ACs quest for NATO deterrence against Russia stems from Western delusion of
liberalism that reinforces the oriental narrative of East vs. West
Blachford ‘20 [Kevin; Kevin Blachford (PhD) (Kevin.Blachford@baltdefcol.org) is a Lecturer of
International Relations at the Baltic Defence College, Estonia and the Estonian School of Diplomacy.; 6-
30-20; “Western orientalism and the threat from Russia”;
https://www.academia.edu/43769141/Western_orientalism_and_the_threat_from_Russia;
Comparative Strategy; accessed 7-8-2022; AH]
The expansion of the EU as a civilian power was largely interpreted as devoid of geopolitical or security significance. John Mearsheimer has
been one of the most vocal critics of these “liberal
delusions” and argues the West is to blame for provoking the
Ukraine crisis.90 With the return of tensions between NATO and Russia, critics now lament “Europe’s
Shattered Dream of Order.”91 Such optimism always presumed that a Russian democracy would ultimately show “acquiescence to
American foreign policy preferences.”92 The revival of tensions therefore challenges this narrative. As Neumann argues, the post-Cold War era
believed in an idea of Russia “as a learner” of Western ideas.93 Implying that Russia would inevitably become more like the West. Zbigniew
Brzezinski argued that the “only path” was for “Russia, like Ukraine,” to “become a real democracy.”94 Theformer American
ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul asked “who lost Russia?”95 Such a question implied Russia is
essentially a bad student that has not learned the lessons of Western modernization and has become
lost on the path to Western modernity. The climate between Russia and the West has now radically changed from the optimism
of the immediate post-Cold War era. Observers now conclude that the Euro-Atlantic community and
Russia seem to “live in different worlds.”96 Russia’s development has not followed the lines of
Western liberal democracy and Russia’s willingness to use military force has created a stream of self-
doubt and questioning over Western narratives. Russia’s use of force in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria has challenged Western
narratives and understandings of international order. This can be seen with the way that the conflict in Syria raised many difficult
choices for the NATO alliance in regards to ideational norms of human security and the responsibility to
protect. President Obama called the use of chemical weapons within Syria a “game-changer” and warned this would be a “red line” that the
US could not accept.97 But while the US refrained from a full scale intervention, Western powers intervened through air strikes, covert means
and the sponsorship of local armed groups. As the philosopher John Gray observes, for Western leaders ISIS could only be destroyed if Syria was
“reconstituted as a democratic polity under the rule of “moderate forces.”98 Russia’s
intervention in support of Assad
changed the tide of the conflict and challenged Western ideas about liberalism and order. Russia’s
“obstruction” of Western intervention99 has been interpreted as part of a “crisis” in the lack of
American leadership.100 Former Vice President Joe Biden called to “defend the liberal international
order” and he argued that resistance to liberal internationalism and a desire for a return of spheres of
interest was a movement that “is principally led by Russia.”101 The Western liberal international order
is challenged by many structural and systemic problems, but the resurgence of concerns surrounding
Russia has created a renewed sense of insecurity. This has led to an outpouring of “nostalgia”102 and
questioning of are we now seeing “The End of Liberal International Order?” 103 Hal Brands argues that the divisions
between Russia and the West are not just clashes over geopolitical influence, but are about fundamentally different conceptions of
“governance, political values, even morality.”104 He
further argues that the US should engage in this ideological
competition to defend a liberal order. The vision of a liberal international order assumes a relative
homogeneity of the West that does not reflect reality. It also creates a cultural divide between those
considered seen as part of the “West” and those considered as outside this order. Russia’s failure to acquiesce
toward the policies of a self-identifying liberal democratic order are therefore increasingly seen in civilizational terms in which Russian culture
has rejected the West. The
NATO alliance has reacted to tensions with Russia through a crisis of ontological
insecurity, which has sought an “attempted restoration of a known normative order for the North
Atlantic alliance.”105 This has involved shoring up alliance commitments and reestablishing NATO’s
ability to deter Russian power. For many Western observers, Russia’s intervention in Georgia was a
precedent that would encourage Russian aggression against post-Soviet and new NATO states.106 The
annexation of Crimea and the use of hybrid war was also seen as a particular threat to the Baltic states.
Analysts expected a “domino” like repetition of hybrid war being used in the Baltics107 and this
allowed NATO to reinforce a narrative of an Atlantic alliance built on Western liberal democratic norms.
The significance of these developments are reflected in the way that Russia and the NATO alliance are
now seen as radically different identities.

Western-centric political discourses like the 1ac fuel a process of constant othering,
where “The Orient” is always depicted as subhuman and subjected to endless violence
– turns case
Garcia 19(Paola Garcia, Sep 22, 2019, "On Orientalism and the Dehumanization of the Other," Inside
Arabia, https://insidearabia.com/on-orientalism-and-the-dehumanization-of-the-other/)//BRownRice

The dehumanization of the “Other” is at the core of most of humanity’s tragedies . It is responsible for all
manner of violence, whether physical, spiritual, or intellectual. Nationalism necessarily places one’s culture as superior to all others,
making that which is culturally different inferior and less human, rendering it at worst inert material to be subjugated for one’s benefit and at
best a mere source of entertainment. We live in a time plagued by these issues. We are encountering terrifying ideologies and
politics that are racist to their core. We are dealing with the resurgence of fascism, neo-Nazism, white supremacism, institutionally
endorsed racial, sexual and gender discrimination, walls, apartheids, anti-immigrant laws, and it goes on and on. These catastrophes all
stem from “othering,” that is, from thinking that those who are different from us are inferior and
threatening by default. Behind the othering lens, there is little room to acknowledge the humanity
inherent in every single culture and individual. The Quran fittingly states, “We have . . . made you into nations and tribes, so
that you might come to know one another.”[2] Citing scripture carries the risk of being perceived as irrational and unaware of what is
appropriate in intellectual discourse. However, if we disregard the source and focus on the idea itself, we will find it extremely pertinent to the
discussion. The notion of knowing one another is crucial because it implies a relationship of equals. It assumes the existence of a common
denominator between them: humanity. This understanding appears, regrettably, to be lacking in today’s world. In Timothy Mitchell’s excellent
book, Colonizing Egypt, we
learn that “We” have been attempting to know not each other, but the “Other,” the
lesser object of our exploitative designs. This “We” can stand for any individual, discipline, institution or
nation that systematically views cultures other than its own as inferior and often, even subhuman, a
view which nationalism tends to produce and promote . In the United States, we presently have a president who
unapologetically brags about his racist views and boasts about the supposed inferiority of cultures different from his own. This tragically
deranged man has fought and continues to fight tooth and nail to have these chauvinistic views implemented as the laws of our land: travel
bans for Muslims, a wall to keep “threatening intruders” away, racial slurs turned into political slogans, immigrants in cages, children dying in
detention centers, away from their parents, etc. The appalling examples abound. In
the Trump era, xenophobia, narcissism,
and anger have become normalized and even glorified, seen as an effective means to make our country
“great.” In the Trump era, xenophobia, narcissism, and anger have become normalized and even glorified, seen as an effective means to
make our country “great.” The situation is heartbreaking, and only by reflecting and fixing our hearts about how each of us sees “others” can
we begin to veer from the destructive path we are on. Professor Edward Said 1935 2003 Professor Edward Said (1935-2003) This type of bigotry
has its counterpart in the intellectual world. As Edward Said articulately explains in Identity, Authority and Freedom: “ If
the authority
granted our own culture carries with it the authority to perpetuate cultural hostility, then a true
academic freedom is very much at risk, having as it were conceded that intellectual discourse must
worship at the altar of national identity and thereby denigrate or diminish others .”[3] Said, who had several
conflicting identities, including Palestinian, American, and academic, asserted that he found it impossible to identify with the “triumphalism of
one identity because the loss and deprivation of the others are so much more urgent.” Similarly, citing Said, Nora Akawi explains that “‘to
make the practice of intellectual discourse dependent on conformity to a predetermined political
ideology’ or predetermined canon of learning, western or other . . . ‘ is to nullify intellect altogether.’”[4]
And this is what has happened in much of our learning about “other” cultures, learning which promotes
the views that lead to today’s devastating politics . “We” have “triumphed” in defining “our” culture as
superior and this gives “us” the right to look down at whatever “we” want, in whatever form “we” want
and for whatever purpose “we” deem worthy. This triumph has come at a great loss. The price of excluding all
the others is actual poverty of the spirit, allowing us to keep only “dust”, projections, and imaginings that stand in for reality. The price of
excluding all the others is actual poverty of the spirit, allowing us to keep only “dust”[5], projections, and imaginings that stand in for reality:
“‘Think of it no more!’ wrote Nerval to Théophile Gautier, of the Cairo they had dreamed of describing. That Cairo lies beneath the ashes and
dirt, . . . dust-laden and dumb.’ Nothing encountered in those Oriental streets quite matched up to the reality they had seen represented in
Paris. Not even the cafés looked genuine. ‘I really wanted to set the scene for you here’, Nerval explained, in an attempt to describe the typical
Cairene street, ‘but . . . it is only in Paris that one finds cafés so Oriental.[6]’” The reality for these “travelers” was the French representation of
the “Orient.” Anything else, was unacceptable. The Orient itself, in this case, Cairo, appeared to them completely chaotic, incomprehensible,
disappointing. The “Orient” they found existed outside of their “world of exhibition,” lacked “genuine” cafes, and was empty of most of what
they expected to encounter. The “Orient” Europe had produced was a much better “Orient” than the one inhabited by other (lesser) types of
human beings. They desperately wanted foreign countries to mirror the “Orient” they had brought with them. But, to their disillusionment, this
foreign, non-European “Orient” would reflect everything but the image embedded in their imagination. This foreign “Orient” seemed to have
nothing to do with their manageable, easily representable, homegrown “Orient.” Later, colonialists attempted to force and forge their “Orient”
into being, in the European mold of “order” and “progress” that, in their view, should reign globally. The alleged preeminence of western
culture and Euro-American supremacism are promoted and exported all over the globe, unconsciously accepted by many everywhere as the
truth. Althoughmost cultures have engaged in some form of othering throughout history, in western
modernity and post-modernity, othering has been taken to an unprecedented level, with the most
atrocious consequences: genocides, apartheids , all forms of colonialism, the destruction of native
peoples and cultures, atomic bombs, nuclear weapons, etc. The alleged preeminence of western culture
and Euro-American supremacism are promoted and exported all over the globe, unconsciously accepted
by many everywhere as the truth. It takes, however, little awareness to realize that these supposedly
superior cultures are built, to a lesser or greater degree, primarily on the edifice of an overarching
underlying value: pure material progress at the expense of ethics and human values. In other words, the
chief value of our time and culture is the worship of material wealth above all else. This “theology of
progress” makes us believe that unbounded economic and material prosperity is the ultimate aspiration
of human beings, and what will make one “happy.” This “theology of progress” makes us believe that unbounded economic
and material prosperity is the ultimate aspiration of human beings, and what will make one “happy.” In reality, it leaves people spiritually
bankrupt, mentally and emotionally sick, willing to do pretty much anything, including poison their own people (the food industry/medical
industry mafias), for profit. These are values that come directly from our western liberalism and monstrous form of capitalism and which, sadly,
most of the world is striving to adopt. It is, therefore, worth
approaching the issue of “Orientalism” as just another
expression of “Othering,” a toxic and inhumane perspective on the differences that in actuality make our
society a vibrant and powerful melting pot. For without the mosaic of races, cultures, languages and
heritage, society will wither and die. Diversity is the mother of creativity and expansion, it is to be valued
and encouraged. The mark of a great society is its ability to embrace others, cultivate their uniqueness,
and mold their contributions into a sacred wholeness. The “others” are Us, the separation is but an
illusion.

Only reorienting our thinking eastward through ecologies of knowing can disrupt
colonial notions of supremacy - vote neg to resist the Western epistemology that
serves as the basis for global oppression and environmental destruction.
Misiaszek ‘21 [Greg; Dr. Greg William Misiaszek is an Assistant Professor at Beijing Normal
University’s (BNU), Faculty of Education, Theories of Education Institute. He also holds various positions
including Co-Editor, WCCES’s journal Global Comparative Education and Associate Director, Paulo Freire
Institute, UCLA. His current work focuses on critical analysis of environmental pedagogies, with specific
emphasis on ecopedagogy, through theories of globalizations, citizenships, race, gender, migration,
Indigenous issues, and media, among others. 3-24-21; “Teaching to read the Eastern ‘threat’ through
critical comparisons, de-Orientalism, and ecologies of knowledges”;
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00131857.2021.1897573; Educational Philosophy and
Theory; accessed 7-8-2022; AH]
Far from being an expert in China or East Asia, 16 I read Peters’ article through my own work that, in part, centers on critical
theories/pedagogies, and comparative and international education (CIE). Through
critical pedagogical lenses, I see Peters’ overall
argument as calling for (re-)reading the politics of the ‘threat’, questioning if it emerges from
(neo)coloniality and epistemologies of the North . Peters details a histography of sociopolitical
delegitimization on how non-western othering has encouraged Western assimilation and the need to
disrupt the politics of Western supremacy. Comparative work is essential here, but comparative fields inherently
form contested terrains. CIE work becomes problematic when non-contextually positioning one educational system as ‘best’ for all others to
blindly assimilate to. Opposingly, critical CIE is crucial for better understanding the commonalities and differences between educational systems
to allow for true contextual lending and borrowing. Two important notations need to be given. First, critically reading the world is largely
comparing what we ‘know’ with new knowledges, so such comparative problematizing the self’s ingenuous knowledges is also needed beyond
the professionalized CIE field. This includes critically reading our own comparisons guided by Western benchmarking. Second, ‘education’ here
is beyond schooling to include non-formal and informal models (e.g. public pedagogy through Hastie’s comparisons with Nazism). Largely
avoiding giving explicit self-analysis, Peters calls on readers to reflect upon what needs to be (un)learned from
hidden curricula of Western supremacy. I read Peters’ article through the lenses of Said’s (1979)
Orientalism and Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2016, 2018) calls to counter epistemologies of the North’s
dominance and resulting oppressions. As such, Peters critiques Western policymaking to thwart
‘threats’ of losing global hegemony through de-Orientalization and dethroning epistemologies of the
North. I see two conundrums which are difficult but not impossible to overcome through teaching for
critical literacy. First, such reflectivity is meaningless and without transformative praxis if epistemological
dominance is not critically problematized. Hidden curricula of untethered Western supremacy without contextuality that Peters
argues hardens the difficulty of its disruption, but also amplifies its necessity. For example, this coincides with my article on
being a self-defined Freirean scholar in China in which I problematize both Western-centric rubrics of
‘quality’ academics and how, ironically, Western academics too-often do not critically compare
themselves within their self-legitimized rubrics (see Misiaszek, 2018). The second conundrum I see is the perceived ‘threat’ of
a global paradigm shift of epistemologies of the North eastward and thus Orientalism is disrupted, not by ceasing epistemological dominance
Two issues come to mind here. One is de Sousa Santos’ framing the grounding
but rather shifting them eastward.
of epistemologies of the North with coloniality, patriarchy, and capitalism. Peters argues China’s lack of
histories of being the colonizer and China is ‘becom[ing] a vast and encompassing global capitalist
power’ but not the Western perception of a ‘capitalism and liberal democracy [a]s a holy combination’.
Second, epistemologies of the South should not replace Northern epistemological dominance, but
rather exist to counter them for teaching, learning and decision-making through ecologies of knowing
(Santos, 2018). Without question, global epistemological shifts will occur, but their processes and
emergent outcomes should be read as possibilities rather than fatalistically determined already. Not writing in a fatalistic
manner, Peters’ leaves open the possibilities for these upcoming shifts by learning from the politics of
supremacy and dominance to avoid global oppressions and planetary unsustainability from
continuing/reoccurring. Unfortunately, if we learn or not is questionable.
 5
Invocation of death impacts is necrophilia, an obsession with body counts that ends in
extinction. Vote neg to reject death impacts---this is a gateway issue.
Dr. Erich Fromm 64, PhD in Sociology from University of Heidelberg and Professor of Psychology at
Michigan State University, “Creators and Destroyers,” The Saturday Review, 1-4, p. 22-25 [language
modified]
People are aware of the possibility of nuclear war; they are aware of the destruction such a war could bring with it--and yet they seemingly make no effort to avoid
it. Most of us are puzzled by this behavior because we start out from the premise that people love life and fear death. Perhaps we should be less puzzled if we
questioned this premise. Maybe there
are many people who are indifferent to life and many others who do not
love life but who do love death.
There is an orientation which we may call love of life (biophilia); it is the normal orientation among healthy persons. But there is also to be found in others a deep

attraction to death which, following Unamuno's classic speech made at the University of Salamanca (1938), I call necrophilia . It is the attitude which a
Franco general, Millán Astray, expressed in the slogan "Long live death, thus provoking Unamuno’s protest against this "necrophilous and senseless cry."

Who is a necrophilous person?

He is one who is
attracted to and fascinated by all that is not alive, to all that is dead; to corpses, to decay, to
feces, to dirt. Necrophiles are those people who love to talk about sickness, burials, death. They come to life
precisely when they can talk about death. A clear example of the pure necrophilous type was Hitler. He was fascinated by destruction, and the smell of death was
sweet to him. While in the years of success it may have appeared that he wanted only to destroy those whom he considered his enemies, the days of the
Götterdämmerung at the end showed that his deepest satisfaction lay in witnessing total and absolute destruction: that of the German people, of those around him,
and of himself.

The necrophilous dwell in the past, never in the future. Their feelings are essentially sentimental; that is, they nurse the memory of feelings which
they had yesterday--or believe that they had. They are cold, distant, devotees of "law and order." Their values are precisely the reverse of the values we connect
with normal life; not life, but death excites and satisfies them.

If one wants to understand the influence of men like Hitler and Stalin, it lies precisely in their unlimited capacity and willingness to kill. For this they'
were loved by the necrophiles. Of the rest, many were afraid of them and so preferred to admire, rather than to be aware of, their fear. Many
others did not sense the necrophilous quality of these leaders and saw in them the builders, saviors, good fathers. If the necrophilous leaders had not pretended
that they were builders and protectors, the number of people attracted to them would hardly have been sufficient to help them seize power, and the number of
those repelled by them would probably soon have led to their downfall.

While life is characterized by growth in a structured, functional manner, the

necrophilous principle is all that which does not grow,
that which is mechanical. The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform the organic into
the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all living persons were things. All living processes,
feelings, and thoughts are transformed into things. Memory, rather than experience--having, rather than being--are what counts. The
necrophilous person can relate to an object--a flower or a person--only if he possesses it; hence, a threat to his possession is a threat to himself; if he loses
possession he loses contact with the world. That is why we find the paradoxical reaction that he would rather lose life than possession, even though, by losing life,
he who possesses has ceased to exist. He loves control, and in the act of controlling he kills life. He is deeply afraid of
life, because it is disorderly and uncontrollable by its very nature. The woman who wrongly claims to be the mother of the
child in the story of Solomon's judgment is typical of this tendency; she would rather have a properly divided dead child than lose a living one. To the

necrophilous person justice means correct division, and they are willing to kill or die for the sake of
what they call, justice. "Law and order" for them are idols, and everything that threatens law and order is
felt as a satanic attack against their supreme values.
The necrophilous person is attracted to darkness and night. In mythology and poetry (as well as in dreams) he is attracted to caves, or to the depth of the ocean, or
depicted as being blind. (The trolls in Ibsen's Peer Gynt are a good example.) All that is away from or directed against life attracts him. He wants to return to the
darkness {23} of the womb, to the past of inorganic or subhuman existence. He is essentially oriented to the past, not to the future, which he hates and fears.
Related to this is his craving for certainty. But life is never certain, never predictable, never controllable;
in order to make life controllable, it must be transformed into death; death, indeed, is the only thing about
life that is certain to him.
The necrophilous person can often be recognized by his looks and his gestures. He is cold, his skin looks dead, and often he has an expression on his face as though
he were smelling a bad odor. (This expression could be clearly seen in Hitler's face.) He is orderly and obsessive. This aspect of the necrophilous person has been
demonstrated to the world in the figure of Eichmann. Eichmann was fascinated by order and death. His supreme values were obedience and the proper functioning
of the organization. He transported Jews as he would have transported coal. That they were human beings was hardly within the field of his vision; hence, even the
problem of his having hated or not hated his victims is irrelevant. He was the perfect bureaucrat who had transformed all life into the administration of things.

But examples of the necrophilous character are by no means to be found only among the inquisitors, the Hitlers and the Eichmanns. There are any number of
individuals who do not have the opportunity and the power to kill, vet whose necrophilia expresses itself in other and (superficially seen) more harmless ways. An
example is the mother who will always be interested in her child's sickness, in his failures, in dark prognoses for the future; at the same time she will not be
impressed by a favorable change nor respond to her child's joy, nor will she notice anything new that is growing within him. We might find that her dreams deal
with sickness, death, corpses, blood. She does not harm the child in any obvious way, yet she may slowly strangle the child's joy of life, his faith--in growth, and
eventually infect him with her own necrophilous orientation.

My description may have given the impression that all the features mentioned here are necessarily found in the necrophilous person. It is true that such divergent
features as the wish to kill, the worship of force, the attraction to death and dirt, sadism, the wish to transform the organic into the inorganic through "order" are all
part of the same basic orientation. Yet so far as individuals are concerned, there are considerable differences with respect to the strength of these respective trends.
Any one of the features mentioned here may be more pronounced in one person than in another. Furthermore, the degree to which a person is necrophilous in
comparison with his biophilous aspects and the degree to which a person is aware of necrophilous tendencies and rationalizes them vary considerably from person
to person.

Yet the concept of the necrophilous type is by no means an abstraction or summary of various disparate behavior trends. Necrophilia
constitutes a
fundamental orientation; it is the one answer to life that is in complete opposition to life; it is the most
morbid and the most dangerous among the orientations to life of which man is capable. It is true perversion; while
living, not life but death is loved--not growth, but destruction. The necrophilous person, if he dares to be
aware of what he feels, expresses the motto of his life when he says: "Long live death!"

The opposite of the necrophilous orientation is the biophilous one; its essence is love of life in contrast
to love of death. Like necrophilia, biophilia is not constituted by a single trait but represents a total orientation, an entire way of
being. It is manifested in a person's bodily processes, in his emotions, in his thoughts, in his gestures; the biophilous orientation expresses itself in the whole
man.

The person who fully loves life is attracted by the process of life in all spheres. He prefers to construct, rather than to retain. He
is capable of
wondering, and he prefers to see something new to the security of finding the old confirmed. He loves
the adventure of living more than he does certainty. His approach to life is functional rather than
mechanical. He sees the whole rather than only the parts, structures rather than summations. He wants to mold and to influence by love, by reason, by his
example--not by force, by cutting things apart, by the bureaucratic manner of administering people as if they were things. He enjoys life and all its manifestations,
rather than mere excitement.

Biophilic ethics has its own principle of good and evil. Good is all that serves life; evil is all that serves
death. Good is reverence for life (this is the main thesis of Albert Schweitzer, one of the great representatives of the love of life--both in his
writings and in his person), and all that enhances life. Evil is all that stifles life, narrows it down, {24} cuts it into

pieces. Thus it is from the standpoint of life-ethics that the Bible mentions as the central sin of the Hebrews: "Because thou didst not serve thy Lord with joy and
gladness of heart in the abundance of all things."

The conscience of the biophilous person is not one of forcing oneself to refrain from evil and to do good. It is not the superego described by .Freud, a strict
taskmaster employing sadism against oneself for the sake of virtue. The biophilous conscience is motivated by its attraction to life and joy; the moral effort consists
in strengthening the life loving side in oneself. For this reasons the
biophile does not dwell in remorse and guilt, which are, after
all, only aspects of self-loathing and sadness. He turns quickly to life and attempts to do good.
Spinoza's Ethics is a striking example of biophilic morality. "Pleasure," he says, "in itself is not bad but good; contrariwise, pain in itself is bad." And in the same
spirit: "A free [person] man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of
life." Love of life underlies the various versions of humanistic philosophy. In various conceptual forms these philosophies are in the same vein as Spinoza's; they
express the principle that the same man loves life; that man's aim in life is to be attracted by all that is alive and to separate

himself from all that is dead and mechanical.

The dichotomy of biophilia-necrophilia is the same as Freud's life-and-death instinct. I believe, as Freud did, that this is the most fundamental polarity that exists.
However, there is one important difference. Freud assumes that the striving toward death and toward life are two biologically given tendencies inherent in all living
substance that their respective strengths are relatively constant, and that there is only one alternative within the operation of the death instinct--namely, that it can
be directed against the outside world or against oneself. In contrast to these assumptions I believe that necrophilia is not a normal biological tendency, but a
pathological phenomenon--in fact, the most malignant pathology that exists in mail.

What are we, the people of the United States today, with respect to necrophilia and biophilia? Undoubtedly our spiritual tradition is one of love of life. And not only
this. Was there ever a culture with more love of "fun" and excitement, or with greater opportunities for the majority to enjoy fun and excitement? But even if this is
so, fun and excitement is not the same as joy and love of life; perhaps underneath there is indifference to life, or attraction to death?

To answer this question we must consider the nature of our bureaucratized, industrial, mass civilization. Our approach to life becomes increasingly mechanical. The
aim of social efforts is to produce things, and. in the process of idolatry of things we transform ourselves into commodities. The question here is not whether they
are treated nicely and are well fed (things, too, can be treated nicely); the question is whether people are things or living beings.

People love mechanical gadgets more than living beings. The approach to man is intellectual abstract. One is interested
in people as objects, in their common properties, in the statistical rules of mass behavior, not in living individuals. All this goes together
with the increasing role of bureaucratic methods. In giant centers of production, giant cities, giant countries, [people] men are
administered as if they were things; men and their administrators are transformed into things, and they
obey the law of things. In a bureaucratically organized and centralized industrialism, men's tastes are manipulated so that
they consume maximally and in predictable and profitable directions. Their intelligence and character
become standardized by the ever-increasing use of tests, which select the mediocre and unadventurous over the original and
daring.

Indeed, the bureaucratic-industrial civilization that has been victorious in Europe and North America has created a new type of man. He has been described as the
"organization man" and as homo consumens. He is in addition the homo mechanicus. By this I mean a "gadget man," deeply attracted to all that is mechanical and
inclined against all that is alive. It is, of course, true that man's biological and physiological equipment provides him with such strong sexual impulses that even the
homo mechanicus still has sexual desires and looks for women. But there is no doubt that the gadget man's interest in women is diminishing. A New Yorker cartoon
pointed to this very amusingly: a sales girl trying to sell a certain brand of perfume to a young female customer recommends it by remarking, "It smells like a new
sports car."

Indeed, any observer of men's behavior today will confirm that this cartoon is more than a clever joke. There are apparently a great number of men who are more
interested in sports-cars, television and radio sets, space travel, and any number of gadgets than they are in women, love, nature, food; who are more stimulated by
the manipulation of non-organic, mechanical things than by life. Their attitude toward a woman is like that toward a car: you push the button and watch it race. It is
not even too farfetched to assume that homomechanicus has more pride in and is more fascinated by, devices that
can kill millions of people across a distance of several thousands of miles within minutes than he is frightened and
depressed by the possibility of such mass destruction.
Homo mechanicus still likes sex {25} and drink. But all these pleasures are sought for in the frame of reference of the mechanical and the unalive. He expects that
there must be a button which, if pushed, brings happiness, love, pleasure. (Many go to a psychoanalyst under the illusion that he can teach them to find the button.)
The homo mechanicus becomes more and more interested in the manipulation of machines, rather than in the participation in and response to life. Hence he
becomes indifferent to life, fascinated by the mechanical, and eventually attracted by death and total destruction. This affinity between the love of destruction and
the love of the mechanical may well have been expressed for the first time in Marinetti's Futurist Manifesto (1909). "A roaring motor-car, which looks as though

running on a shrapnel is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace. … We wish to glorify war--the only health-giver of the world-militarism,
patriotism, the destructive arm of the Anarchist, the beautiful Ideas that kill the contempt for woman."

Briefly then, intellectualization, quantification, abstractification, bureaucratization, and reification--the very

characteristics of modern industrial society--when applied to people rather than to things are not the principles of life

but those of mechanics. People living in such a system must necessarily become indifferent to life, even attracted to

death. They are not aware of this. They take the thrills of excitement for the joys of life and live under the
illusion that they are very much alive when they only have many things to own and to use. The lack of
protest against nuclear war and the discussion of our "atomologists" of the balance sheet of total or half-total destruction show how far
we have already gone into the "valley of the shadow of death."1
To speak of the necrophilous quality of our industrial civilization does not imply that industrial production as such is necessarily contrary to the principles of life.
The question is whether the principles of social organization and of life are subordinated to those of
mechanization, or whether the principles of life are the dominant ones. Obviously, the industrialized world has not found
thus far an answer, to the question posed here: How is it possible to create a humanist industrialism as against the bureaucratic mass industrialism that rules our
lives today?
The danger of nuclear war is so grave that man may arrive at a new barbarism before he has even a chance to find the road to a humanist industrialism. Yet not

all hope is lost; hence we might ask ourselves whether the hypothesis developed here could in any way contribute to finding peaceful solutions. I believe it
might be useful in several ways. First of all, an awareness of our pathological situation, while not yet a cure, is nevertheless a first

step. If more people became aware of the difference between love of life and love of death, if they
became aware that they themselves are already far gone in the direction of indifference or of
necrophilia, this shock alone could produce new and healthy reactions.

Furthermore, the sensitivity toward those who recommend death might be increased. Many might see through the pious
rationalizations of the death lovers and change their admiration for them to disgust. Beyond this, our hypothesis would suggest one thing to those concerned with
peace and survival: that every
effort must be made to weaken the attraction of death and to strengthen the
attraction of life. Why not declare that there is only one truly dangerous subversion, the subversion of life? Why do not those who represent the traditions
of religion and humanism speak up and say that there is no deadlier sin than love for death and contempt for life? Why not encourage our best brains--scientists,
artists, educators--to make suggestions on how to arouse and stimulate love for life as opposed to love for gadgets? I know love for gadgets brings profits to the
corporations, while love for life requires fewer things and hence is less profitable. Maybe it is too late. Maybe the neutron bomb, which leaves entire cities intact,
but without life, is to be the symbol of our civilization. But again, those of us who love life will not cease the struggle against necrophilia.
 Case
CRISPR unsafe-causes cancer
Chang ND Chang, ND, "CRISPR: The Promise and Controversy," No Publication,
http://www.uhnresearch.ca/news/crispr-promise-and-controversy [AJL]

The development of CRISPR

technology brings promises of major medical advances in a wide range of areas. However, it does come
with potential technical pitfalls and ethical considerations .(link is external) Firstly, safety is a major concern
because there is risk for off-target mutations that may result in unwanted side effects. For example,
unintended modification of a tumour suppressor gene or oncogene can result in cancer. Secondly, there
are serious moral and ethical concerns regarding justice and equity in society . For example, how will the
technology be used to enhance normal human traits? Should editing germline DNA be permitted so that modified traits are
passed on for generations? These concerns were recently thrusted onto the world stage (link is external)when a rogue scientist (link is
external)claimed to have used CRISPR technology to create the first gene-edited babies. The incredible power of CRISPR gene-editing
technology serves as an important reminder about the relationship between ascendancy and obligation. As humanity learns of new powerful
ways to control its own evolution, humanity must also learn to wield such power with reason, responsibility and
careful due diligence.

CRISPR technologies ethically troubling-ethical alternatives should not be used

Hunt 20 Katie Hunt, Cnn, 10-7-2020, "What is CRISPR and why is it controversial?," CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/07/health/what-is-crispr-explainer-scn-trnd/index.html [AJL]

While it has immense potential to transform our lives, the technology has raised many ethical questions . Chinese scientist He
Jiankui was jailed for three years in 2019 after announcing that twin girls had been born with modified DNA to make them resistant to HIV,
which he had managed using the gene-editing tool CRISPR/Cas9 before birth. An associate professor at the Southern University of Science
and Technology in Shenzhen at the time, he said that he was "proud" of the achievement. But
he was condemned by many of his
peers, with the experiment labeled "monstrous," "unethical" and a "huge blow" to the reputation of
Chinese biomedical research. Claes Gustafsson, secretary of the Nobel committee in chemistry and a professor of biochemistry and
biophysics at Stockholm University, said that with "every really powerful technology, in life sciences or elsewhere,
there's a possibility of misuse." CRISPR co-inventor slams Chinese scientist behind "world's first gene-edited
babies" CRISPR co-inventor slams Chinese scientist behind "world's first gene-edited babies" 04:50 "Clearly this Chinese researcher was
way out of line in applying it in this particular way," he told CNN. "Everyone has agreed that it cannot be used for germline
engineering. You can't make heritable changes to human DNA. That is far too uncertain at this point ,"
added Gustafsson. "There are specific genetic diseases you can think of curing for the individual but not in a heritable way." Scientists
have called for a moratorium on human germline editing , while efforts are being made to better regulate use of the
technology. An international commission said in September it was too early for gene-edited human embryos to be used to create a pregnancy.
Doudna has expressed deep concern about He's work, telling CNN it was not medically necessary and there
was no way to defend
using an experimental technology when there were established ways of avoiding HIV transmission.

Superbug - Superbug impact is hype

Tyson 12{Greg, syndicated science columnist, PhD student in microbiology (Northwestern), “Tipping
Point: The Threat of Antibiotic Resistance,” Helix, 8/17, http://helix.northwestern.edu/article/tipping-
point-threat-antibiotic-resistance}
 
What happens if we stand pat? We won’t return to the Middle Ages, where plague wiped out one third of Europe’s
population. The truth is that many of the  most dangerous and widespread  bacterial pathogens that truly
deserve the moniker “superbug” have been tamed, especially in the United States. This is because for the
healthy person, pathogens like MRSA are not an immediate threat. But people hospitalized and already sick
with other conditions are in danger of contracting bacterial infections we are sometimes powerless to treat.  It truly is a shame that
we are constantly making medical advances in other fields, but have taken a step back in this area. Some potential solutions include
treating infections with multiple antibiotics and offering greater incentives for the pharmaceutical
industry to produce these products. Also, more specific therapies directed at toxins the bacteria produce could
be used in conjunction with antibiotics to more effectively control infections. Stories about MRSA as a
“superbug” are often overblown, causing unnecessary panic among people unlikely to get
sick. Nevertheless, it rightfully draws attention to a public health problem that requires new solutions. The appropriate response is concern
and action. But if we continue to ignore the problem, it can only get worse.

Effective global governance prevents unregulated emergent tech – prevents extinction

Robert Bailey 18, Vision of Earth contributor and computer science masters, 9-5-2018, "Why do we
need global governance?," Vision of Earth, https://www.visionofearth.org/social-change/global-
governance/
Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both problems and opportunities
that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems such as violence and pandemics routinely reach
across borders, affecting us all. At the same time, the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary
foundations for peace and spectacular prosperity . Effective global governance will allow us to end armed
conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological risks and automation, and to
achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before seen .1 The most important challenge for
humanity to overcome is that of existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is
to quantify the level of global coordination needed to deal with it.  While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum only require that a
single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require
literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for failure.2 3 We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology

The progress of
the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day.  

technological research exposes us to new dangers such

as bioengineered superbugs, nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-
control artificial intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to
combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier. There are other problems that don’t
necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we know it, but which are holding back the
development of prosperity and progress. Armed conflict , around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though
wars between great powers appear to be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and

loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4 Other problems have emerged precisely because of our successes in the
past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and prosperity over the past century has been

based in large part on the use of fossil fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread
automation, already a stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric
of our societies over the next few decad es. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways – we refer the interested reader to the very
detailed work in Ruling Ourselves. Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human
wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human

Effective global governance is global

wellbeing can be accomplished with existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination. 

governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the world can
independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems. Without it, we may not be able to
avoid weakest-link existential risks or regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be
able to prosper as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global governance
can be achieved.

Chinese leadership is key to solving all global problems – that solves the case
Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies,
China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the
Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491
As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international
power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional
governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is
expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese
solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system
are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces
are seriously imbalanced. The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural
problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation.  These countries
have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization
and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability
to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into
an interference factor to global governance . Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively
lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased
dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing
countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth . These
countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among
themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance
mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in
addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are
developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas.  With the diversification and in-depth
integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated.  As relevant efforts are

usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of
“diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions . Since the beginning of this year,
there have been risks of running into an acephalous state in such key areas as global economic
governance and climate change. Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international
terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics . The governance areas in deficit, such as
cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to
respond hastily. All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call
urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of
Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing

hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political

Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played
dejection. 

by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting
globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy,
as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the
world and is an exclusive “circle club ”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the
global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing
countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the
law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations , but also is
an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space
corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the
framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s
diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-

Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the
interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and
harmoniously with other civilizations . So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap
in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background
of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to
“integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and
integration among civilizations. Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-
introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving

to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations

and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in

predicament”, etc.  China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and
with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so
as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual
learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an
inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full

of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of
world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn.  Encouraged by the “four
confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced
innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and
realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake

responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to

comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-

cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic

principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and

the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive
more recognized”. Third, 

cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global
development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a
brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and
maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability
to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and
“sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people
for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global
governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious
commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To
Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as

well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and

mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise

interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and

rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction

of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world

over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt

The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the
and Road” initiative. 

old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-
driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations,
stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and
having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by
the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice
in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent,
centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance
systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced . China has been engaged in reform and
innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and
method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of
global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the
global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming
process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO , perfecting them through practice, and
boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue,

Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New

Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public

rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure

Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance

on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. 

system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged
in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has
to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems
facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the
existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a
platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global
imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has

On the contrary, the interests and

made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. 

agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future
“will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more
precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice
more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global
governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world
should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the
principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and
differences through consultation . Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt
and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views

on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global
village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we
cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on
a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies
on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By

hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to

the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the

“BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot

international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively

promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through

negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh

water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries.

D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to

which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global

As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the
governance have been correspondingly strengthened. 

same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy
coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the
increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has
pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance
to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while
making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate
interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including
supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the
reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the
emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other
developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries
to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt
forgiveness and assistance.

No Russian War – Deterrence, Resource disparity, expert opinion

Bandow ‘17--- JD from Stanford
(Doug Bandow, 3-6-2017, "What Russian Threat? Americans Shouldn't Be Running Scared of Moscow,"
Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/what-russian-threat-americans-
shouldnt-be-running-scared-moscow)
Yet the  fear-mongering is nonsense. Russia’s presumed attempt to influence America’s election was more smoke than fire. Moscow is accused of a private hack which
released emails detailing the sleaze afflicting one of the presidential candidates. Although illegal like other cyber-attacks, that’s pretty mild, especially compared to Washington’s routine
interference in other nations’ political affairs, including their elections. Although American officials proclaim their commitment to democracy, their activities almost always promote parties,

leaders, and movements friendly to the U.S. More serious are claims that Moscow poses a security threat . Military capabilities are more
the spending disparity between the U.S. and Russia is vast : Washington’s outlays are
than formal military budgets, but 

almost  ten times  as much as Moscow’s. President Donald Trump just proposed an annual jump in outlays, $54 billion, which is nearly as much as Russia will
spend all year. Russia lacks the  global reach  to challenge America. As Putin noted  in an interview with an Italian

journalist: “Publish a world map and mark all the U.S. military bases on it. You will see the

difference between Russia and the U.S.” Moscow also lacks the  economic foundation  to match the
U.S. According to the  I nternational  I nstitute for  S trategic  S tudies, “One effect of the country’s deteriorating economic
situation has been the delay in concluding the next State Armament Program; originally intended to have been started in 2016, this has now
been pushed back to 2018.” Russia possesses the world’s second most powerful nuclear arsenal , capable of destroying America many times

over. But  even Moscow’s sharpest critics   don’t believe  Vladimir Putin plans to commit suicide. That nuclear threat acts

more as Russia’s guarantee against U.S. coercion.  Neither side  can allow the stakes of any conflict to race out of control. Beyond

inaugurating nuclear Armageddon, how does Moscow threaten America? An invasion seems unlikely , since the two countries don’t share

a land boundary. An attack across the Bering Strait to retake Alaska is more than a little unlikely. Which means there is no direct threat to the U.S. How about isolating America
by controlling sea and air and interdicting commerce? That’s almost as implausible. The vaunted Red Navy is gone. Moscow deploys one decrepit aircraft carrier, no match for Washington’s
multiple carrier groups. And the U.S. is allied with European nations which also possess capable if smaller fleets. Russia is upgrading its forces, but it lacks the resources to equal America.
Moscow is no more likely to dominate the air above or around the U.S. Russia’s air force is capable and has gained valuable combat experience over Syria, but remains no match for America’s
globe-spanning force. More dangerous may be Russian air defenses, which would ensure that hostile U.S. air operations were not the cakewalk like in Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Nor
is there any obvious reason why Moscow would inaugurate war with the U.S. Russia’s critics notwithstanding, the Cold War is over. There is only one aggressive ideological power, and that is
America. Putinism is a simpler, practical authoritarian nationalism. The concerted campaign by Republican hawks like Lindsey Graham and Democratic partisans of all stripes to turn Moscow
into an enemy is not just counterproductive. It is dangerous. That’s obviously not a congenial home for anyone who believes in America’s classical liberal heritage. The vision of a limited
government dedicated to protecting individual rights has few takers in the Russian Federation. The real problem posed by Vladimir Putin is not that he’s an unpleasant thug, but that he seems
to represent a substantial number—a strong majority if polls are to be believed—of Russians. Still, Moscow’s policy reflects much more a defensive than aggressive stance. Its role in the world
looks a lot like that of pre-1914 imperial Russia. The Putin government wants its interests to be respected and its borders to be secure. It especially doesn’t like seeing its friends, such as
Serbia, dismembered without so much as a nod in Moscow’s direction. Russia also opposes a potentially hostile alliance pushing ever eastward, absorbing lands such as Ukraine that once were
integral to the Russian Empire as well as the Soviet Union. The U.S. (and Moscow’s neighbors) might wish that Russia would accept America’s not always so benevolent hegemony. However,
Boris Yeltsen’s rule proved to be but a brief interregnum until age-old Russian nationalism reasserted itself. That Moscow now stands up for what it considers to be its interests is no cause for
alarm in Washington unless the latter has aggressive designs on Russia itself. The belief that such a nation and people would voluntarily, even enthusiastically, submit to American “leadership”
always was a fantasy. Of course, Moscow’s policies sometimes run contrary to Washington’s desires, but that doesn’t mean Russia poses a threat. Moscow generally has been helpful in
Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea, all significant concerns of the U.S. Russia has moved closer to China, despite major differences between the two, but largely in response to Washington’s
hostile policies toward both great powers. In this way the Obama administration inadvertently reversed Richard Nixon’s geopolitical masterstroke of 45 years ago. Washington is similarly
displeased with Russia’s intervention in Syria, but Damascus long has been a Russian ally. America has no monopoly on the “right” to wage war in the Mideast. And the U.S. nevertheless
remains the region’s dominant outside power, allying with Israel and the Gulf States, maintaining multiple bases in multiple countries throughout the region, and fighting endless wars for

There is no Red
years. If there is a “Russian threat” to America it must come in Europe, generously defined to include Georgia and Ukraine. Yet the Cold War truly is over.  

Army poised to plunge into the Fulda Gap and race to the Atlantic Ocean . The very idea of Russian domination of Eurasia is
fantastic. Europe has recovered economically from World War II and consolidated politically into the European Union. The continent enjoys about three and a half times Russia’s population
and almost 15 times its GDP. Indeed, Germany alone almost has three times Russia’s economic strength. The economies of the United Kingdom, France, and even Italy are larger than Russia’s

economy. Despite their shameless defense lassitude, Europeans still collectively spend nearly four times as much as Moscow
on the military. The UK alone comes close to Russia’s levels . For all of the sound and fury at recent NATO meetings,  no
one  seriously contemplates a Russian attack on “Old Europe,” or even most of “New Europe.” What would Moscow gain
by triggering a potential nuclear war while trying to overrun large populations of non-Russians who would resist Moscow’s rule? Theoretical capability
does not equal intent. Last year the faculty of the Naval War College assessed the Russian “threat.” The NWC subsequently issued a “Sense of
the Faculty” report which revealed that a majority believed “Russia’s fear of potentially ‘hostile’ forces on its doorstep and within its historical sphere of influence” was “the most

fundamental cause of the Ukraine Crisis.” Moreover , 71 percent considered the likelihood of an attack on the Baltics to be  low

or very low. The latter are seen as most vulnerable to Russian pressure. Yet Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are irrelevant to America’s security. Washington

is treaty-bound to defend them, an unfortunate result of the foolish go-go years of NATO expansion. However, Russian aggression is  very

unlikely .

China is a good developed of CRISPR and only wants to help

Gao et at 19, Caixia Gao and Jia Chen, "CRISPR Adventures in China," CRISPR
Journal, https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/crispr.2021.29129.gao
China has established itself as one of leading nations in the CRISPR revolution due to the immense
scientific curiosity of the research community and generous support from the Chinese government,
including heavy investment from central, provincial, and city governments in China. Both the National
Natural Science Foundation of the central government and the Ministry of Science and Technology have
approved multiple projects in various disciplines. In September 2017, China launched the Committee of
Genome Editing, Genetics Society of China, which became a platform for accessible communication
and cooperation between scientists to accelerate the development of CRISPR research and
applications in China. At this annual workshop, scientists working in agriculture, basic research,
biotechnology, and medicine shared their group's progress. CRISPR systems are derived from
sophisticated adaptive immune systems found in bacteria and archaea. 4