Name: Ryan Paul S.

Aquino / SN: 22-00258 / Quiz # 5

In a protest rally' along Padre Faura Street, Manila, Pedrong Pula took up the stage and
began shouting "kayong mga kurakot kayo! Magsi-resign na kayo! Kung hindi, manggugulo
kami dito!" ("you corrupt officials, you better resign now, or else we will cause trouble
here!") simultaneously, he brought out a rock the size of a fist and pretended to hurl it at the
flagpole area of a government building. He did not actually throw the rock.

1. Police officers who were monitoring the situation immediately approached Pedrong Pula
and arrested him. He was prosecuted for seditious speech and was convicted. On appeal,
Pedrong Pula argued he was merely exercising his freedom of speech and freedom of
expression guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Decide with reasons. - 5 pts.

Answer:

Pedrong Pula should be acquitted.

Under the Constitution, “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances.”

In the case of David v. Arroyo and Reyes v. Bagatsing, the court held that state action is
proper only if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the state has a
right to prevent. Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. In the case at bar, the
protest rally where Pedrong Pula shouted "kayong mga kurakot kayo! Magsi-resign na kayo!
Kung hindi, manggugulo kami dito!” and brought a rock size pretending to throw at the
flagpole area of the government building but did not actually throw it did not commit any
unlawful act or violence that will cause clear and present danger of a substantive evil.
Therefore, Pedrong Pula should be acquitted for seditious speech.

2. Explain briefly the following tests for freedom of speech and expression:
a. Dangerous tendency – 5 pts.

In the case of Cabansag v. Fernandez, citing Gitlow v. New York, the Court explained that
under the dangerous tendency rule, the question is whether the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It
is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that
the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

In each case, courts must ask whether the gravity of the “evil”, discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger (Dennis v. US). It is
sufficient if the natural tendency and the probable effect of the utterance were to bring about
the substantive evil that the legislative body seeks to prevent (People v. Perez).

b. Clear and present danger – 5 pts.

In the case of Chavez v. Gonzales and Schenck v. US, the Court explained that clear and
present danger as formulated is the question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.

The burden of proof rests with the government. This rule also requires that “the danger created
must not only be clear and present but also traceable to the ideas expressed.” It must be clear
and there must be a connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance
questioned. It is present that it involves the time element, identified with imminent and
immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable (Gonzales
v. COMELEC).

The evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be “extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high” before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the “substantive evil” sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the
“disorderly and unfair administration of justice.” Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will
harm the administration of justice (Cabansag v. Fernandez).