Sirin Sung, Gillian Pascall (Eds.) - Gender and Welfare States in East Asia - Confucianism or Gender Equality - Palgrave Macmillan UK (2014)

GENDER
GENDER AND
AND WELFARE
WELFARE STATES
STATES IN
IN
EAST
EAST ASIA:
ASIA: CONFUCIANISM
CONFUCIANISM OR
OR
GENDER
GENDER EQUALITY?
EQUALITY?
EDITED
EDITED BY
BY
SIRIN
SIRIN SUNG
SUNG && GILLIAN
GILLIAN PASCALL
PASCALL
Gender and Welfare States in East Asia
Gender and Welfare States
in East Asia
Confucianism or Gender Equality?
Edited by
Sirin Sung
Queen’s University Belfast, UK
and
Gillian Pascall
University of Nottingham, UK
Selection and editorial matter © Sirin Sung and Gillian Pascall 2014
Individual chapters © their respective authors 2014
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To everyone who has contributed to this volume, whether
through their chapters, or through their responses to questions
about their lives. They have enhanced our understanding of
gender equality and inequality across East Asia, and of the
experience of women in Confucian contexts.
Contents
List of Tables ix
List of Figures x
Acknowledgements xi
Notes on Contributors xii
1 Introduction: Gender and Welfare States in East Asia 1

Sirin Sung and Gillian Pascall
2 Work–Family Balance Issues and Policies in Korea:

Towards an Egalitarian Regime? 29
Sirin Sung
3 Rhetoric or Reality? Peripheral Status of Women’s

Bureaux in the Korean Gender Regime 49
Sook-Yeon Won
4 Continuity and Change: Comparing Work and Care

Reconciliation of Two Generations of Women in Taiwan 66
Jessie Shu-Yun Wu
5 Gender, Social Policy and Older Women with

Disabilities in Rural China 90
Xiaoyuan Shang, Karen R. Fisher and Ping Guo
6 Confucian Welfare: A Barrier to the Gender Mainstreaming

of Domestic Violence Policy in Hong Kong 114
Lai Ching Leung
7 Emerging Culture Wars: Backlash against ‘Gender Freedom’

(Jenda Furi in Japanese) 137
Kimio Ito
8 Prime Ministers’ Discourse in Japan’s Reforms since

the 1980s: Traditionalization of Modernity rather than
Confucianism 152
Emiko Ochiai and Ken’ichi Johshita
vii
viii Contents
9 Conclusion: Confucianism or Gender Equality? 181

Gillian Pascall and Sirin Sung
Index 193
List of Tables
5.1 Marital status of older people by disability,

gender and location (%) 98
5.2 Education level of older people by disability,
5.3 Primary income source of older people by disability,
5.4 Average annual income by disability and location (RMB) 103
5.5 Poverty rates of households with an older person by
disability and location (%) 104
5.6 Disability certification among older people with
disabilities by age, gender and location (%) 105
5.7 Social and medical insurance of older people with
disabilities by gender and location (%) 106
5.8 Minimum living security and social relief benefits of
older people with disabilities by gender and location (%) 107
5.9 Older people with disabilities who received no
formal support services by gender and location (%) 108
ix
List of Figures
1.1 Life expectancy at birth: women, 2009 3

1.2 Public and private social expenditure, as a
percentage of GDP, 2007 4
1.3 Public social spending, as percentage of GDP,
for selected OECD countries, 1980–2012 4
1.4 Policies for gender equality 11
1.5 Gender gap in employment rates, 2008 12
1.6 Proportion of women (aged 15–64) in the labour market,
1995–2009 13
1.7 Gender gap in median earnings for full-time employees,
2000 and 2010 (or nearest year) 14
1.8 Public expenditure on childcare and early
education services, as a percentage of GDP, 2005 16
1.9 Total fertility rates, 1980 and 2009 17
1.10 Parental leave, weeks, OECD Family Database, 2010 19
1.11 Minutes of unpaid work per day, 1999–2009 20
1.12 Percentage of employees who work more than
45 hours per week, years around 2002 21
1.13 Share of women in parliament, 1995 and 2011 23
8.1 Freqency of statements on ‘family’ and ‘home’ by
prime ministers in post-war Japan, 1948–2011 158
8.2 Freqency of statements on women by prime ministers in
post-war Japan, 1948–2011 160
x
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Cambridge University Press and the OECD for the use
of their figures.
xi
Notes on Contributors
Editors
Sirin Sung is Lecturer in Social Policy at Queen’s University Belfast, United

Kingdom. Her research interests include gender and social policy, gender
and employment, work–life balance policies and gender and benefits in
East Asian countries and the UK. She won the Leverhulme Study Abroad
Fellowship in 2010 to study work–family balance issues in the United
States and United Kingdom. Her publications include ‘Women Reconciling
Paid and Unpaid Work in a Confucian Welfare State: The Case of South
Korea’ in Social Policy and Administration (2003), and ‘Dealing with Money
in Low-Moderate Income Couples: Insights from Individual Interviews’
(with Fran Bennett), in Social Policy Review 19 (2007).
Gillian Pascall is Professor Emeritus of Social Policy at the University
of Nottingham, where she has long taught gender and social policy
to students, undergraduate and postgraduate, local and international.
Relationships between welfare states and gender have been at the centre
of her research and publications from Social Policy: A Feminist Analysis
(1986) to Gender Equality in the Welfare State? (2012).
Contributors
Karen R. Fisher is an associate professor at the Social Policy Research

Centre, University of New South Wales. Her research interests are the
organization of social services in Australia and China, including disa-
bility and mental health services and community care; participatory
evaluation methodology; and the social policy process.
Ping Guo is a senior research fellow at the China Research Center On
Ageing (CRCA). His main research interests are ageing in China, social
policies for older people, health care and long-term care for older people,
living arrangements, service systems for older people and silver industry.
He has published extensively in the field.
Kimio Ito is a professor of Sociology at the Graduate School of Letters at

Kyoto University and chief director of Promotion Office at the Centre for
Women Researchers at Kyoto University. He is also president of the Japan
xii
Notes on Contributors xiii
Society for Gender Studies (since 2007) and was president of the Japan
Society for Sport Sociology (2005 to 2009). He specializes in cultural
sociology and gender studies. He worked as a member of the Specialists’
Committee for Gender Equality of the Japanese Government (2001 to
2011). His writings include ‘Otokorashisa no yukue (‘Locating mascu-
linities’, 1993), Danseigaku nyuumon (‘Introduction to Men’s Studies’,
1996), ‘The Invention of wa and the Transformation of the Image of
Prince Shotoku in Modern Japan’, in Mirror of Modernity: Invented tradi-
tion of Modern Japan (1998), ‘An Introduction to Men’s Studies’, in Gender,
Transgender and Sexualities (2005) and ‘The Formation and Growth of the
Men’s Movement’ in Transforming Japan (2011).
Ken’ichi Johshita is a research associate of Political Science at Graduate

School of Law, Kyoto University, and an adjunct instructor at Ritsumeikan
University. His research focuses on the history of Japanese politics. His
studies focus on the emergence of the so-called 1955 system, the long-
lasting rule of the LDP. His publications include ‘Kishi Nobusuke and
Conservative Merger’, Hogaku Ronso, Vol. 153, Nos 3 and 5, 2005; ‘Welfare
State and Agricultural Cooperatives: Path Dependency of Pension Scheme
in Postwar Japan’, (with Masaki Kondo) Research Journal for Creative Cities,
Vol. 7, No. 2, 2011 and ‘The Japan League for the Welfare of the Bereaved
Families: Its Political Influence during the Occupation Period’, Memoirs of
Institute of Humanities, Human and Social Sciences, No. 97, 2012.
Lai Ching Leung is an associate professor in the Department of Applied

Social Studies, City University of Hong Kong. Her research interests are
gender studies, social policy and social work. She is the author of Lone
Mothers, Social Security and the Family in Hong Kong (1998) and the chief
editor of Gender and Social Work (2006). Her publications include ‘The
Impact of Feminism on Social Work Students in Hong Kong’ in Affilia:
Journal of Women and Social Work (2007), ‘Empowering Women in Social
Work Practice: A Hong Kong case’ in International Social Work (2005) and
‘Gender and Poverty: Voices of Women in Hong Kong’ in New Global
Development: Journal of International and Comparative Social Welfare
(2002). She has worked on two related research projects: The Possibilities
of Gender Mainstreaming Social Policy on Family Violence in Hong Kong and
In Search of Discourses on Woman Abuse in Hong Kong. She is also an active
member of a local feminist organization, AAF.
Emiko Ochiai is a professor of Sociology at Graduate School of Letters,

Kyoto University. She is a family sociologist and family historian who
is also active in the field of gender studies. After finishing post-graduate
xiv Notes on Contributors
studies in sociology at the University of Tokyo, she studied historical

demography as a visiting research fellow at the Cambridge Group for
the History of Population and Social Structure and became an asso-
ciate professor at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies
(Nichibunken). Her publications include The Japanese Family System
in Transition: A Sociological Analysis of Family Change in Postwar Japan
(1997), Asia’s New Mothers: Crafting Gender Roles and Childcare Networks
in East and Southeast Asian Societies (co-editorship with Barbara Molony,
2008) and The Stem Family in EurAsian Perspective (co-editorship with
Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux, 2009). She is also the managing editor of
The Intimate and the Public in Asian and Global Perspectives series from
Brill.
Xiaoyuan Shang is an associate professor at the Social Policy Research

Centre, University of New South Wales. She is an international expert
in the study of child welfare, social welfare provision and social security
reforms in China. She has authored or co-authored several books and
many articles in the field. Her book The System of Social Protection for
Vulnerable Children in China (2008) was published in Beijing by China
Social Sciences Academic Press.
Sook-Yeon Won is an assistant professor in the Department of Public

Administration at the Ewha University in Seoul, Korea. She completed her
PhD at the University of Nottingham in 2004. Her publications include
‘Institutionalised Powerlessness? The Reality of Women’s Policy Units
and Their Gendered Dynamics in Korea’, Journal of Social Policy, (2007);
‘A Confucian War over Childcare: Practice and Policy in Childcare and
their Implications for Understanding the Korean Gender Regime’ (with
Gillian Pascall), Social Policy and Administration (2004).
Jessie Shu-Yun Wu is an associate professor in the Department of Social
Policy and Social Work at the National Chi Nan University, Taiwan. Her
current research focuses on the changes and continuities in women’s
interlinked experiences in negotiating their paid and unpaid family
responsibilities across different generations in Taiwan. She has adopted
both qualitative interviews and quantitative data to examine women’s
day-to-day practices in managing their motherhood and work demands.
Her research interests lie in work and family issues, especially in rela-
tion to maternal employment, motherhood ideology, childcare policy
and relationships between the state and the family. She is particularly
interested in women’s reconciliation of paid work and childcare in the
region of East Asia.
1
Introduction: Gender and Welfare
States in East Asia
Sirin Sung and Gillian Pascall
Introduction
This book aims to uncover gender assumptions of welfare states that

are very different from Western ones, and to understand women’s
experience of welfare states across a range of East Asian countries.
Gender inequalities in East Asian social policies are clearly important
for women across East Asia, and yet they have had too little attention
in the literature comparing welfare states. The comparative literature
has largely been concerned with Western Welfare states, whether in
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990), or in
gender-based analysis of the male breadwinner model (Lewis 1992,
2001, 2006). Are the welfare systems of East Asian countries distinc-
tive, with Confucian cultural assumptions hidden beneath the surface
commitment to gender equality? While economies have been devel-
oping rapidly, are social policies becoming less traditional in their
expectations of women? East Asian welfare regimes have been studied
since the late 1980s, but research questioning their underpinning
gender assumptions is new.
The book showcases new research in several East Asian countries,
including Korea, Taiwan, China, Hong Kong and Japan, to develop an
understanding of gender in welfare systems that have some common
history and culture. It will bring together research on gender in welfare
systems with a Confucian history. It will also ask about the extent to
which Confucian values and practices of gender difference persist in
the context of modern welfare states with gender equality legislation.
How seriously are gender equality policies promoted by governments?
What impact do gender equality policies have at the household level?
How difficult is it for households to practise gender equality in these
1
2 Sirin Sung and Gillian Pascall
contexts? Are Confucian values more powerful and gender differences

more extreme than comparable aspects of Western welfare systems?
How do such conflicts play out in China and Hong Kong, countries
with similar cultural backgrounds but contrasting political ones? Has
the communist attack on Confucian gender inequalities created soci-
eties in which women and men are equally valued and have equal
power in households? What assumptions now underpin social policies,
and how are they experienced in practice? How is the welfare system
in Hong Kong managed in the post-colonial period? Some (Chiu and
Wong 2005: 97) argue that the new SAR government’s new vision for
Hong Kong is an ‘amalgamation of Confucian values and free market
economy’. How does this affect gender equality and policy issues in
Hong Kong?
These chapters complement the broad brush debates in the introduc-
tion with detailed discussion of gender in the welfare systems of indi-
vidual East Asian countries. The book discusses the combination of change
and tradition in East Asian welfare states. Rapid economic development
makes East Asian economies remarkable, as ‘tiger economies’, bringing
a transformation of living conditions. These changes bring clear social
benefits, with women’s life expectancy in Japan the highest among OECD
(Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries,
and Korean women’s life expectancy increasing at a faster pace than any
other OECD country. Political changes bring gender equality legislation,
which is important for improving women’s rights in employment and
family law. There are signs of change in society – including gender – as
well as in economy and polity. Detailed study of women’s experience in
practice, particularly as mothers in marriage, and out of it, shows the
persistence of some traditional family hierarchies which put younger
mothers under unusual pressures, and which could not be described as
gender equal. But there is room for optimism that women’s involve-
ment in social movements and academic enquiry may be challenging
Confucian gender hierarchies (Pascall and Sung 2007).
Social and economic change
Rapid economic and social changes are a crucial backdrop for under-
standing East Asian welfare states and the changing legislative framework
impacting on gender. Korea is one of the fastest growing economies in
the OECD, sustaining rapid growth through the crisis years of 2007–2012
(OECD 2012a). Economic change brings clear benefits: life expectancies
are among the highest in the world, with Japanese women expecting
Gender and Welfare States in East Asia 3
to live to 85+, while Korean women have higher life expectancy than
UK women, despite per capita income of around two-third the UK figure
(OECD 2011). According to the Population Database from the United
Nations (2009), life expectancy in China is also rising sharply: by 2040
the average life expectancy will reach 78 years and more than 20 per cent
of population will be over 65 (in Ye 2011). China is also facing demo-
graphic transition with rapid economic growth, from a ‘high fertility,
high mortality phase to a phase of low fertility and low mortality’
(Ye 2011: 679). Figure 1.1 draws on OECD data to show the leading posi-
tion of East Asian countries in life expectancy, with Japan and Korea
above the Western social democracies:
90
Number of years
2009 or latest available year 1960 or first available year
80
70
60
50
40
M A
SA
A
A
L
D L
ZL
D L
L
T
G T
N T
P
F
D
N
S
N
R
H X
N
K
ZE
O K
SVD
N
BR
C
LD
EU
AN
X
E
N
R
R
S
N
PO
IR
BE
IS
IT
PR
ES
AU
ZA
BR
FR
ES
U
SV
LU
SW
AU
H
IN
ID
H
TU
EC
FI
IS
KO
JP
N
C
C
U
N
R
C
C
Figure 1.1 Life expectancy at birth: women, 2009

Source: OECD Factbook 2011a.
Japan has nearly the lowest Infant Mortality Rate, even among the
social democratic countries such as Iceland, Sweden, Norway and
Finland, while Korea’s is again close to the United Kingdom’s, despite
Korea’s lower per capita income (OECD 2006). Increasing life expectancy
and low infant mortality are clear indications of women’s health (Pascall
and Sung 2007).
But public social expenditure in East Asian countries remains low.
Korean public social expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, is among the
lowest shown in Figure 1.2, in contrast with Scandinavian countries at
the other end of the spectrum. Private spending fills some of the gap,
but Korea’s social spending altogether is low, suggesting that families fill
much more of the gap:
35
Public Private
30
25
20
15
10
SA
A
L
L
ZL
L
T
T
EX
R
R
R
K
ZE
N
X
AN
N
C
R
N
N
BR
LD
EU
K
W
H
IR
IS
PO
BE
IT
PR
ES
AU
FR
ES
SV
AU
LV
N
KO
TU
IS
SV
EC
JP
R
O
U
FI
SE
N
C
N
M
D
G
H
N
O
Figure 1.2 Public and private social expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, 2007
Source: OECD Factbook 2011a.
Japan’s public social expenditure is also below the OECD average.

These data give rise to doubts about governments’ commitments to the
social care activities which have tended to define women’s domestic
lives and contain their public ones. Figures for public social spending
over time (Figure 1.3) show Korea increasing from around 5 per cent in
the 1990s towards 10 per cent projected for 2012, but remaining well
below the OECD average, and even further below that of France, given
here as a contrasting Western European example:
Australia United Kingdom France

K
Korea United States OECD
35 35
30 30
25 25
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2007 2012
Figure 1.3 Public social spending, as percentage of GDP, for selected OECD coun-
tries, 1980–2012
Source: OECD 2012a Social Expenditure Database.
Policy changes, bringing gender equality legislation, are important.

In Japan, the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society in 1999 described a
gender-equal society for the first time in Japan and required the state to
promote gender participation and gender equality. The opening article
of this law proposes ‘a “gender-free” society which does not reflect the
stereotyped division of roles on the basis of gender but rather has as
neutral an impact as possible on the selection of social activities by
men and women as equal partners’ (Takao 2007: 153). Japan’s manda-
tory long-term care insurance was started in 2000, bringing entitlement
to those aged 65 and above, to institutional and community-based
care, according to need, bringing an ‘abrupt shift of gender policy’
(Takao 2007: 154) from earlier assumptions about the obligations of
daughters-in-law. The government’s perceptions of a need to bring
women into employment, while increasing the birth rate, are seen as
crucial contributing factors to this change, while women activists have
also played a vital role (Takao 2007). In Korea too, there have been
important developments in gender equality legislation. Since 2001, the
Ministry of Gender Equality has been the focus for state policy, oper-
ating through women’s bureaux and through legislation: the Gender
Equality Employment Act, Framework Act on Women’s Development,
and Employment Insurance Act (Won 2007). These are clearly signifi-
cant symbolic moments in women’s action towards gender equality,
but we need to ask about their significance in practice under Confucian
conditions.
Culture and gender: East Asian culture in transition?
Confucianism has been identified as the main cultural heritage in East

Asian countries by many Western and Eastern scholars. Some argue that
Confucian traditions, such as diligence and hard work, a great emphasis
on education, and dutifulness, helped East Asian countries to achieve
rapid economic growth. However, others downplay economic growth
in favour of the disadvantages imposed, particularly in relation to
gender: ‘in traditional Confucian societies women were in a disadvan-
taged position’ (Palley and Gelb 1992: 3). The Confucian influence on
women’s position in society can be best represented with the virtue of
three obediences: ‘to the father, the husband and the son’ (Lee 2005).
After marriage, women belong to families-in-law and become strangers
to their natal families (Sung 2003).
These strong Confucian traditions on women are indeed changing,
as a result of industrialization, changes in family structure, women’s
increasing participation in the labour market and the recent development

of gender equality policies. However, in East Asian countries, tradition
and modernity co-exist: Western influence of gender equality ideals and
traditional Confucian patriarchal family systems are intertwined within
these societies. As Lee (2005: 166) argued in her research on women and
the Korean family: ‘although the Korean family resembles the nuclear
family in structure, in terms of the actual activities undertaken within it,
the principles of the stem family and the extensive influence of the tradi-
tional conceptualization of the family have not diminished’. Married
women are still more responsible for their family-in-law than their own
families. In her research, women often felt duty and responsibility to
their parents-in-law, although they were emotionally closer to their natal
families. Women also often gave priority to their husbands’ families over
their own, while men did not feel the same way about their wives’ fami-
lies. This shows that the Confucian tradition still has a strong influence
on women in Korean families. In Japan, though with weaker influence
of Confucian traditional gender roles than Korea, women’s status was
often considered as secondary in society and resulted in limited roles for
women (Palley and Gelb 1992). In Taiwan, it still seems women’s primary
roles as carers and domestic workers have not substantially changed,
despite the increasing numbers of women entering the labour market
as wage earners (Wu 2007). According to Lin and Yi (2011), the strong
patriarchal cultural heritage in China and Taiwan influences intergenera-
tional support to ageing parents. From the 2006 East Asian Social Survey,
they found that traditional Chinese filial norms still prevail in intergen-
erational relations. For instance, it is expected that adult children – espe-
cially sons – will take the major responsibility for parental support, by
co-residence and by providing financial resources. Wong’s study (1995)
of Hong Kong found about 60 per cent of respondents agreed that
children should take the primary responsibility for the financial needs
of elderly parents (cited from Chan 2011). While women’s increasing
participation in the labour market represents social and cultural change
in East Asia, it is also important to note that traditional gender roles still
prevail within the family and wider society. In this transitional period,
East Asian women may encounter conflicts within their families and
societies, as well as within themselves.
Family law: gender equality legislation
The family’s key role in society as a provider of social welfare is common

to East Asian welfare systems. Welfare systems have been described as
‘productivist’, emphasizing economic objectives with strong educa-

tion and health services to reproduce human resources (Holliday 2000,
2005), or Confucian, to emphasize the role of the family in welfare and
of Confucian values in social harmony. Confucian values may be seen
as a cover for welfare states pursuing economic growth at the expense of
everything else: in particular, real Confucian values of social solidarity
(Chan 2006). While welfare states everywhere have a place for family
responsibility, East Asian ones draw on Confucian values to give families
a very special responsibility for social welfare. A Confucian tradition of
patri-lineal and patri-local families has influenced family living arrange-
ments, with three-generation households, sons expected to live with
their parents, and daughters expected to move away on marriage. Filial
piety underpins this, with a hierarchy based on gender and generation.
While these traditions persist in ideology and reality, households are
shrinking and becoming less complex. A change towards nuclear family
living arrangements increases younger women’s ability to make their
own decisions.
Family law has protected men’s interests and male dominance in
Taiwan and in Korea. In Taiwan, rights to property and decision-making
were seen, under family law, as belonging to male breadwinners, while
wives were pressured to leave their families of origin and take up their
husbands’ domicile. Family law also protected men’s guardianship of
children after divorce, which made it very difficult for wives to leave
unhappy marriages. Women have fought for revisions of this legisla-
tion and have achieved – by a third round of revisions in 2002 – parity
in decisions over domicile, surname and parental rights, while men’s
economic dominance in family law has been reduced (Wu 2007: 92–94).
Similarly Korean civil law protected the male line and male dominance
through the ho-ju system. Ho-ju means ‘head of the family’ and men’s
rights to be head of the family have been protected, through a hierarchy
in which – when a ho-ju dies – a male of any generation takes precedence
over the ho-ju’s wife. The father’s name was written as the head of the
family in official documents, such as identity cards, and following the
father’s death, the eldest son became head of the family, not the mother
(Sung 2003). This idea of the ‘man as the head of the family’ has been
challenged: reform of Family Law in 2008 abolished the ‘ho-ju’ system
in Korea (Kim 2008).
But differences persist between East Asian families based on Confucian
traditions and Western families. In Western families, interactions between
husbands and wives are key, while the Confucian family system cannot
be fully understood without analysing interactions between family-in-law
and daughter-in-law, as well as between husband and wife (Sung 2003).

Although the Confucian family system has faded, traditional ideas of
women’s subordination to their husbands and parents-in-law may still
prevail in East Asian families. Changing legislation is crucial to underpin
mothers’ rights to guardianship of their children and to living independ-
ently. But we should ask whether Confucian cultural assumptions continue
to bring gender inequality in East Asian societies, despite the climate of
change – and political action – bringing legislation for gender equality.
Gender in welfare regimes in East Asia:

cultural perspectives
Do social policy approaches overlook the impact of culture on societies

and social policy provision? Or do cultural interpretations overempha-
size the role of culture, providing a weapon for conservative ideology,
playing into traditional hands? Arguments for more understanding of
culture and of the interrelationship between culture and social policy are
made by some scholars (Baldock 1999; Clarke 2004; Oorschot 2007). Pfau-
Effinger (1999) argues that Lewis’s ‘male breadwinner model’ neglects
the cultural ideals behind social action: she sees welfare state policies and
culture as mutually interrelated, in complex and sometimes contradic-
tory ways. She defines the gender culture as those norms and values that
shape the desirable, ‘normal’ form of gender relations and of the division
of labour between women and men. Thus, she argues, it is important to
notice the way welfare state policies are embedded in their respective
societal context, in any theoretical framework for cross-national analysis.
Similarly, Stadelmann-Steffen (2008:391) argues that women’s employ-
ment is influenced by the ‘gender culture’. Cultural values have an
influence on the formation of a ‘women-friendly’ societal and political
framework, as well as the individual employment decisions of women.
Some studies (Pfau-Effinger 2005; Reiger and Leibfried 2003) focus on
the influence of culture on welfare states, proposing that the theoretical
framework for the comparative study of welfare has to broaden its scope
by looking at the mutual relationship between the welfare state’s policy
and culture, but without excluding structural dimensions.
Confucianism has long been the most prevalent culture in some East
Asian countries. Jones identified East Asian welfare systems as ‘Confucian
welfare states’:
Conservative corporatism without (western-style) worker participa-

tion; subsidiarity without the church; solidarity without equality;
laissez-faire without libertarianism: an alternative expression for

all this might be ‘household economy’ welfare state – run in the
style of a would-be traditional, Confucian, extended family.
(Jones 1993: 214)
Alternatively, Walker and Wang’s (2005) study emphasizes the role

of political ideology and downplays Confucianism as a contemporary
aspect of social policy in East Asia. They claim that the influence of
Confucian culture has been overestimated in the past and the present,
when analyzing East Asian welfare regimes. In their view, ‘Confucianism
is best understood as an adjunct to political ideology, which provided
powerful backing to the conservatism of East Asian governments in
the formative stages of social policy’ (Walker and Wang 2005: 229). A
rather similar argument is made in this volume by Ochiai and Johshita
about the misuse of cultural arguments by political leaders in Japan
to fix gender roles, inhibiting international influences towards gender
equality.
However, these arguments underplay the cultural role of Confu-
cianism in the lives of individuals, especially of women, considering
its impact on traditional gender beliefs in some East Asian countries.
Reiger and Leibfried (2003) highlight the impact of Confucian culture
on shaping social policy in East Asian countries. They also argue
that research focussing on either quantitative aspects of welfare state
expansion or formal, institutional features of welfare state institu-
tions often overlooks the impact of cultural factors that shape social
policy. Thus, it is important for social policy analysts to pay more
attention to culture as one of the welfare state’s important dimen-
sions as well as to political economy, given how little research is done
on the impact of culture when analyzing social policy, gender and
the welfare state in particular. We need to understand the interrela-
tionship between culture and social policy, particularly the extent to
which Confucianism has influenced gender differences in East Asian
welfare systems (Sung 2003).
The key concern of this book is to explore the influence of Confucian
culture on gender and social welfare in East Asia. As Clarke (2004:
50) argues, cultural analysis has not attempted to expel the ‘material, the
economic or the structural’ but rejected these as the sole focus, arguing
rather for culture as an objective variable exerting its influence along-
side political, economic and institutional factors. Here, the focus is on
understanding the impact of Confucian culture on gender and welfare
states in East Asia.
Gender in welfare regimes: equality legislation in

a Confucian context
How can we understand the gender logic underpinning the welfare

systems of East Asia? We will argue here that – while there are differences
between East Asian welfare states – they have some features in common:
in particular a hierarchical Confucian model of the family, prioritizing
male breadwinners, which has only recently been challenged by femi-
nist movements and gender equality legislation.
The characterization of gender regimes based on the male bread-
winner/dual earner spectrum (Lewis 1992) puts gender at the centre of
comparative analysis and is a starting point here. Gender regimes are
understood as systems of gender equality or inequality through which
paid work is connected to unpaid, state services and benefits are deliv-
ered to individuals or households, costs are allocated, and time is shared
between men and women in households as well as between house-
holds and employment. The decline of the male breadwinner model
has widespread implications in Western Europe (Creighton 1999; Lewis
2001). Welfare states are analyzed here in component parts of the male
breadwinner/dual earner spectrum: paid work, income, care work, time
and power, asking to what extent they can be seen as systems of gender
equality or as systems of traditional gender roles in each of these parts.
We thus use the (mainly western) comparative literature, but argue
that Confucian influences remain important, with strong assumptions
of family, market and voluntary sector responsibility rather than state
responsibility, strong expectations of women’s obligations, without
compensating rights, a hierarchy of gender and age, and a distinctive,
vertical family structure, in which women are subject to parents-in-law.
In rapidly changing economies, these social characteristics are changing
too. But they still put powerful pressures on women to conform to
expectations about care, while weakening their rights to security and
support. Nowhere do welfare states’ promises bring gender equality in
practice. Even in Scandinavian countries women earn less, care more,
and have less power than men. We shall compare East Asian countries
with some Western ones, to argue that some major comparative data
show the extreme situation of women in these countries.
We also need to ask about the level and nature of policy intervention.
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990) are rele-
vant to gender, because the Social Democratic countries have had gender
equality as well as social equality at their heart (Ellingsaeter and Leira
2006). Social democratic regimes have also underpinned gender equality
with social policies, social spending and social commitment to parents

and children. Elsewhere, commitment to traditional families, to gender
difference or to free markets may play a greater role than gender equality.
Figure 1.4 offers a way to understand key components of gender systems,
combined with different levels of intervention in welfare systems:
n
tio
n ta
Voice se Eq Paid work
re le ua
ep s ip l
a l r ota rinc cia ay
lp
n u p so ts
r tio Q rity g Eq
o pa n n La ua
op pi e
Pr e lo em bo l ac
Th e ve ov ur ce
D m m ss
ar to
Se ke q
s x t a ua
ti ie Ca dis tta lit
n ch y j
r tu y re cr
po ine r e
Fl re r b in
i m m ob
p
o ch ex -e re at en s
s
l t
on in arers
n
ib tr ak ion
ua a
come
m le y s
Eq wo /
n
rk
Time nd benefi eduling
plittin n rights o
ally ion
c
Tax a chool sch
Holid Shorter w
Parti edits for

Gender
s
earn
Equa
g pen
S
contr
ay an
equality
cipati
p-t w
nity to
oppo Equal
l valu
annu
divor g pensio
ol in incentive
cr
d afte rking wee
ork
for ca s. Tax
rtu
e for
hous
rights
t
ce S
o
rers.
Parental
r sch
in
redits for carer
leave Market
Time Incomes
ehold
Splitt
care services
ool s
1.
s
s
ervic
Pens h benefits
k
Daddy leave
s e
ion c
2.
Cas
Voluntary sector care

V
3.
State care services
Educational/cultural services
4.
Care work
Levels of policy intervention
1. Individual
2. Household
3. Civil society
4. Social/collective
Figure 1.4 Policies for gender equality

Source: Pascall and Lewis (2004).
Are there alternative scenarios for a more gender equal future? The idea
of making men’s lives more like women’s is at the heart of Nancy Fraser’s
Universal Caregiver model, in which all employees would be assumed
to have care responsibilities, while developments in civil society would
enable care to be shared (Fraser 1997). But it is argued here that gender
equality needs extensive and systematic support, beyond the capacity
of civil society. The French working time model also has something to
contribute to thinking about building a society in which men and women
have time to care as well as to work and to earn. Government commit-
ments to gender equality need underpinning with regulation of time and
with social investment. Comparative data clearly show that Scandinavian
social democratic countries are the most gender equal: but they have still
prioritized women’s employment over men’s care. In a model of Universal
Citizenship, gender equality would go beyond paid employment – impor-
tant as that has been – and attend to gender inequalities in care, income,
time and power: men’s and women’s obligations to paid work and care as
citizens would be underpinned by regulation of working time and elec-
toral systems and by social investment in citizenship rights.
Employment
The gaps between men’s and women’s employment have been falling in
most OECD countries. Governments have wanted and enabled women’s
labour market participation for economic reasons, and women them-
selves have increasingly seen earning as key to their independence and
security. Figure 1.5 shows gender gaps in employment across a wide
range of countries:
Gender gap employment rate Gender gap FTE employment rate

50
40
30
20
10
0
Au lia
Fi den
G key
e
Ja ly
Ko n
ch S ea
Sl Lux epu in
ak b lic
ep rg
Ire blic
Po nd
st d
lg a
N Hu ium
U Sw eal ry
te ze nd
N ing nd
r m
er ds
ni r y
St l
Fr tes
en ce
Ic ark
C land
N ada
e y
d
d ga
Sw wa
U Po an
ec
pa
Au lan
Be stri
an
Ita
R pa
he o
z a
R ou
ov em b
ra
G lan
D an
r
la
ni it a
K a
te tu
a
et d
m
g
u
r
m
re
d rl
an
nl
or
Tu
e
ew n
ze
C
Figure 1.5 Gender gap in employment rates, 2008

Source: Gender Brief (OECD 2010).
2009 1995
Iceland 77.2
Norway 74.4
Switzerland 73.3
Denmark 73.1
Netherlands 70.3
Sweden 70.2
Canada 69.1
Finland 67.9
New zealand 67.4
Austria 66.4
Australia 66.2
United Kingdom 65.6
Germany 65.2
Slovenia 63.8
United States 63.4
Estonia 63.0
Portugal 61.6
France 60.0
Japan 69.8
0EC034 average 59.6
Ireland 57.8
Luxembourg 57.0
Czech Republic 56.7
Belgium 56.0
Israel 55.6
Spain 53.5
Slovak Republic 52.8
Poland 52.8
Korea 52.2
Hungary 49.9
Greece 48.9
Italy 46.4
Mexico 43.0
Chile 42.2
Turkey 24.2
China 69.3
Russian Federation 64.9
Brazil 56.8
Indonesia 49.4
South Africa 47.1
India 34.2
0 20 40 60 80
% of female population
Figure 1.6 Proportion of women (aged 15–64) in the labour market, 1995–2009
Source: Doing Better for families (OECD 2011).
Everywhere still – even in Scandinavian countries – men’s labour market

participation is higher than women’s. As shown in Figure 1.5, among the
most economically developed countries of the OECD, Japan and Korea
have notably high gaps between men’s and women’s employment, at the
opposite end of the spectrum to Finland, Sweden and Norway.
Participation rates for women are shown in Figure 1.6: 52.2 per cent
of Korean women participate in paid work, while Japanese women
are just above the OECD average of 59.6 per cent. Both are well below
Scandinavian countries, Iceland and Norway, where women’s participa-
tion rates are well over 70 per cent. The proportion of Chinese women
in employment reflects China’s mixed history of communist and market
forces at 10 per cent above the OECD average and nearly 70 per cent.
Incomes
Earnings gaps in Korea and Japan are also strikingly high. Again, women’s
earnings are below men’s in all OECD countries, on average 16 per cent
lower in 2010. But in Korea, women earn 39 per cent less than men,
while in Japan the gap has been reducing more rapidly than in Korea,
but remains nearly 30 per cent:
%
45
40 2010( ) 2000
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
ry
ay
en
25
es
a
an
an
pa
re
ga
iu
do
w
at
ed
Ko
lg
m
al
Ja
or
EC
St
un
ng
Sw
Be
Ze
er
N
H
Ki
d
O
G
te
ew
ni
te
N
U
ni
U
Figure 1.7 Gender gap in median earnings for full-time employees, 2000 and
2010 (or nearest year)
Source: OECD Gender initiative (2012b).
High pay gaps are among reasons families prioritize men’s employ-
ment. In Korea, discussing whether fathers might take parental leave,
economic reasons were a key element in their decisions (Won and
Pascall 2004). Large pay gaps make it difficult for women to press their
claims to keeping continuity of employment and developing careers.
Despite lower pay, economic needs are prominent among women’s
reasons for labour market participation. Women’s ability to support
themselves independently of partners is less than men’s in most
countries. In Korea, Japan and Taiwan several factors keep women’s
earnings well below men’s. The high pay gap, a tendency for participa-
tion to dip (more than comparable countries) when women become
mothers, long uncontrolled working hours which make it difficult for
mothers to sustain their labour market position: all these limit the
extent to which women’s employment brings independence (Pascall
and Sung 2007).
The fragility of life outside families is evidenced by the lack of alter-
native state support through unemployment, parenthood, sickness
and old age. According to Gao et al.’s comparative study (2011) of the
Basic Livelihood Security (BLS), systems in China and South Korea,
both offer low benefits, insufficient to meet the needs of poor fami-
lies. They share strict means-testing, limited coverage and a common
culture emphasizing familism. In Hong Kong, the social security
programme was described as an ‘absolute minimum expenditure
and minimum intervention in the market or the systems of family
obligation’ (Macpherson 1993: 5). In 1999, workfare programmes in
Hong Kong were introduced to ‘change the attitude of unemployed
recipients who are less motivated’ (Social Welfare Department 1998:
15; in Chan 2011). Chan argues that the workfare scheme in Hong
Kong was not introduced to address welfare dependency with a big
social security budget but to maintain a low level of social security
benefits and a low tax regime. Under workfare, unemployed recipi-
ents are required to participate in compulsory voluntary work imme-
diately. Chan (2011) claims that the punitive nature of the scheme
impacts on the social atmosphere, discouraging citizens who need
benefits from seeking them. Taiwan also provides relatively low levels
of benefits, compared with other industrialized countries. Although
public expenditure in Taiwan has risen since the late 1990s, in the
wake of political democratization, the increase was small relative to
the growth of GDP (Huang and Ku 2011). Without state support to
meet social needs, and with low pay from employment, women, espe-
cially those with young children, are very far from being able to form
‘autonomous households’ (Orloff 1993).
Care
Childcare and care for older relatives are key components of gender differ-
ences in employment and public life. Government strategies to increase
women’s employment have included socializing childcare, regulating
employers to provide leave so that mothers can combine childcare and
employment, and – much more rarely – encouraging a new division
of labour so that men’s responsibility for childcare can be supported
through dedicated ‘Daddy leave’. Women’s increasing labour market
participation has been widely encouraged, as a solution to economic
pressures and family change. But while gender differences in care are
converging, they are also deeply entrenched (Gershuny 2000) and have
been much less subject to government policy, even in Scandinavian
countries, where fathers’ responsibility for childcare has been promoted
by governments.
To what extent are East Asian countries socialising and sharing the
costs of childcare between parents and others? Comparative data on
public spending show Korea and Japan among the countries with the
lowest public spending on childcare and early education services, at the
opposite end to Denmark, Iceland, France and Sweden:
% GDP Child care spending as a % of GDP Pre-primary spending as a % of GDP

1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Ic ark
Fr nd
e e
nl n
lg *
N ium
ew n y
al y
d
M taly
o
N ep UK
rla ic
ak Sp ds
ep *
Lu Po blic
b l
st rg
er lia
y
Ja S
Au pan
Po ria*
Sw rel nd
ar *
Ko d
C rea
G ada
e
m ga
Be nd
R ain
itz and
N Hu wa
Ze gar
an
Sw nc
Fi de
an
ic
ec
U
ha bl
Au ou
G ra
n
a
la
la
ax
xe rtu
m
et u
st
I
a
re
el
an
or
en
I
D
ch
ze
ov
C
Sl
Figure 1.8 Public expenditure on childcare and early education services, as a

percentage of GDP, 2005
Notes: * For Austria, Findland, Ireland and Spain only aggregate spending data are presented.
Source: OECD Gender Brief (OECD 2010).
OECD data also allow us to compare fertility and changes in fertility.

These reflect many different pressures, and are not a direct indicator of
pressure on mothers’ time, but they do suggest that motherhood may be
becoming difficult for mothers in Japan and Korea:
2009 1980
Israel 2.96
Iceland 2.22
New zealand 2.14
Turkey 2.12
Mexico 2.08
Ireland 2.07
United States 2.01
Chile 2.00
France 1.99
Norway 1.98
United Kingdom 1.94
Sweden 1.94
Australia 1.90
Finland 1.86
Denmark 1.84 Replacement rate = 2.1
Belgium 1.83
Netherlands 1.79
0EC034 average 1.74
Canada 1.66
Estonia 1.63
Luxembourg 1.59
Slovenia 1.53
Greece 1.53
Switzerland 1.53
Czech Republic 1.50
Slowak Republic 1.49
Italy 1.41
Spain 1.41
Poland 1.40
Austria 1.39
Japan 1.37
Germany 1.36
Hungary 1.33
Portugal 1.32
Korea 1.15
India 2.74
South Africa 2.43
Indonesia 2.17
Brazil 1.86
China 1.77
Russian Federation 1.54
0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
Children per woman
Figure 1.9 Total fertility rates, 1980 and 2009

Source: Doing Better for Families (OECD 2011).
Korea is at the lowest end among OECD countries, with just over one
child, and Japan a little above that. Korea shows one of the most rapid
declines, more than halving from over two in 1980 to just over one in
2009. The Scandinavian countries are still below replacement threshold
but have been stabilizing over this period. In Japan, the birth rate’s
rapid decline has brought policy changes towards ‘attempts to recon-
cile aspects of family and work life’ (Gelb 2003: 114). A 1997 survey in
Japan found most respondents saw the main reasons for the decline of
the birth rate as the heavy cost of children’s education (58.2 per cent of
respondents), lack of financial security (50.1 per cent) and the difficulty
of raising children while continuing work (44.7 per cent) (Foreign Press
Centre (1997: 4) in Gelb 2003: 114). Very low fertility and very rapid
decline could indicate great pressures on families in other East Asian
countries, especially Korea (OECD 2007: 8).
Debates about the relationship between government, NGO, market
and family responsibility for childcare take place everywhere. Most of
these debates are premised on the need to sustain mothers’ employ-
ment, and say nothing at all about men. Scandinavian countries and
the Netherlands are exceptions to this. Iceland has the most developed
and successful scheme of dedicated Daddy leave (with three months
for mothers, three for fathers, and three to share between them) which
encourages men to stay at home with their children for the three months
paid leave to which they are entitled. What debates flourish in East
Asian countries about who should parent, take leave and responsibility?
The Gender Equal Employment Law (2002) in Taiwan has given rights
to parental leave for men and women and obliges (in principle) larger
employers to provide childcare facilities (Wu 2007). In Korea, the Gender
Equality Employment Act was revised in 2001, to extend childcare leave
to working mothers or fathers to 52 weeks, while Infant Care legisla-
tion again makes larger employers responsible for childcare (Won and
Pascall 2004). Also, maternity leave pay has increased from 250,000 won
per month in 2001 to 500,000 won (approximately £250) in 2007 (Kim
2008). In Japan, economic pressures to bring women into the labour
market have brought expansion of the Childcare Leave Law in 1999, to
include a three-month nursing care leave, with the scheme expanded
to include a close relative as well as children, and was renamed as the
Childcare and Family Leave. In 2005, the law was revised again to allow
parents up to five days of leave a year to care for a sick child (Lambert
2007). Childcare services in Japan have also improved, as a result of the
1994 Angel plan, which was to tackle low fertility through a widened
welfare state-based social care network. The services offered extended
hours, infant care, and after-school care programmes. In 1999, the

numbers of babies admitted to public day care increased, as the New
Angel plan was introduced (Gottfried and O’Reilly 2001; Peng 2001: 46,
in Gelb 2003: 116). Figure 1.10 shows these developments in an interna-
tional context:
Weeks Unpaid leave FTE Paid Leave

156
104
52
0.0
st n
Ko ia
ak Fra lic
ep e
Fi blic
m *
Po ny
Sp d
Au in
un a
Sw ary
Ja a
N an
C ay
en a
Ic ark
d
m ly
G urg
N I ce
te rl nd
ng s
Be om
Sw or m
ar al
nd
er d
Ki d
Au ede
R nc
H stri
re
D nad
an
xe Ita
l
a
itz tug
P iu
ub
G n
ra
w
a
d an
la
U eth rela
la
d
m
g
bo
u
re
lg
el
or
ep
nl
a
R
h
Lu
c
ov
ze
ni
Sl
C
Figure 1.10 Parental leave, weeks, OECD Family Database, 2010

Source: Gender Brief OECD (2010).
Although the recent development of family policies indicates improve-

ment of gender equality policies in East Asian countries, there are still big
gaps between policies and practices. For instance, there is evidence from
Won that at least some Korean men feel that taking leave for childcare
would threaten their jobs and their reputations as men (Won 2007).
These male respondents are not unusual in dismissing taking leave
to care for children. But perhaps they are more vehement than their
Western counterparts in their negative expression of men’s responsi-
bility for childcare. European Foundation data show men and women
in Europe with gender-neutral values about childcare even if they do
not carry it out equally: ‘most people of Europe believe that childcare
is basically a nonspecific task: both mother and father are expected to
carry out childrearing’ (Fahey and Spéder 2004: 60). Korean mothers
interviewed by Won (2007) described childcare as a state of war.
The evidence above is of low social spending on childcare and
early education in some East Asian countries, especially Korea and
Japan. It is also of great distance from defamilization: ‘the degree to
which households’ welfare and caring responsibilities are relaxed’

(Lister 1997: 172). There is little relaxation of pressures on mothers
and families through social spending, with very high pressures indi-
cated through very low birth rates. There is also evidence of very little
sharing between men and women in households, as shown in the
next section.
Time
Unpaid work is one measure of men’s responsibility for childcare.

Everywhere, men’s contribution to unpaid work is lower than women’s:
Minutes Women ( ) Men

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
ay
ce
26
Au d
lia
ey
ga
te
an
n
pa
ra
w
an
rk
hi
la
a
rtu
m
Ja
or
EC
C
St
Po
st
Tu
Fr
er
Po
N
O
G
te
ni
U
Figure 1.11 Minutes of unpaid work per day, 1999–2009

Source: Gender Initiative (OECD 2012b).
Figure 1.11 shows men in Japan making the lowest contribution.

In Korea, the pattern is similar to Japan, with men spending around a
fifth of the time spent by women on unpaid work: 3 per cent of their
day, compared with women’s 14 per cent in 2004 (An 2010). In China,
gender differences are less extreme, as shown in Figure 1.11, but men
spent under 100 minutes per day, more like other East Asian countries
than Norway, France or Germany (OECD 2012 a, b, c).
One way to understand the time men give to unpaid work is to explore
the time given to paid work. Comparative data about working time, show
South Korea’s position at the top of the league for average working time,
with Japan above the OECD average, while the Netherlands, Germany,
Norway and France are at the bottom. South Korea’s lead in this respect
is distinctive, with working hours more like much less developed coun-
tries (BBC/OECD 2012).
Long working hours are a feature for men and women in East Asia, and
a part of the climate in which unpaid care work is difficult to manage and
difficult to share. The picture above of average working hours conceals
variation: between men and women, full-timers and part-times, with a
variety of working time regimes across countries. Recorded long working
hours in Japan are near the high end of the international spectrum,
with around 60 per cent of employed men and nearly 20 per cent of
employed women working more than 45 hours per week. Japan also has
few part-time workers, either male or female (OECD 2007: 19):
80
70
Men Women
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
s y g ia d y a m n d ry e d ic ic rk in al s e d m ly ia d n d e o y
nd a ur tr n an d iu e n a nc n bl bl a a g te g n o ta al n a n ec ic ke
la rw o us rla m na lg ed nla ng ra ela u u m p rtu ta ra ola d I str eala Jap cela re Mex Tur
her No emb A itze er Ca Be Sw Fi Hu F Ir Rep RepDen S Po d S ave P King Au w Z I G
et x Sw
G k h te
ni ECD d
N Lu o va zec U i te N e
Sl C O U n
Figure 1.12 Percentage of employees who work more than 45 hours per week,
years around 2002
Source: OECD Factbook 2007.
While hours recorded in these comparative data are high, there is

room to question whether – in the long hours culture in East Asia –
the real picture is of even longer hours, putting pressure on men and
women to show commitment through staying at their desks. Korean
respondents felt pressured to work beyond the legal limit. Male respond-
ents described this as putting care out of the question (Won 2007).
There is much to be said for a shorter working week, but if it applies
to women or to mothers rather than to men or to fathers, then this
may bring gender inequality, and high risks for mothers when marriages
break down. There seem to be few debates in East Asia about reducing
working hours, or even applying existing legislation on working hours:
the chapter by Kimio Ito on Culture includes a discussion of the impact
of Japan’s working hours culture on men’s ability to spend time on fami-
lies and communities. In Europe, most policy debates have been about
making women’s lives more like men’s. Sweden is the most gender-equal
country, and has achieved this through high social support and spending
on childcare, underpinning women’s labour market participation in as
continuous a manner as found anywhere. Making men’s lives more like
women’s is an alternative, advocated by Fraser’s ‘Universal Caregiver’
model, in which both men and women are assumed to have care respon-
sibilities and to need time to care (Fraser 1997). The 35-hour week in
France brings more gender equality of working time than elsewhere in
Western Europe, while allowing time for care. Research suggests that
both mothers and fathers in France are able to spend more time with
their children since this legislation (Fagnani and Letablier 2006). There
is also evidence of preferences in Europe for more equal working time,
with the current French model not far from widespread preferences in
Europe (Fagan and Warren 2001).
Power
Representation in democratic processes and institutions is only the most

visible and countable form of power. Power also exists in communities,
workplaces and families. It may be expressed as violence against women
in households (see Leung Lai Ching in Chapter 6) as well as in the legis-
lature. Power may be overt, but hidden assumptions may hold more
power than public debates (Lukes 1974). The assumptions underpin-
ning Confucian culture may be a potent force against gender equality
in households as well as in public representation and participation. If
representation in participatory democracies is an inadequate indicator
of power in societies, the indication it gives is of gender inequality in
those decision-making bodies that make the rules for the rest.
Women’s political representation in most countries is well below the
50 per cent which might be expected if power were distributed equally
between men and women: Japan is at the far end of the spectrum of
OECD countries, with – as shown in Figure 1.13 – well under 15 per cent
of parliamentary seats held by women. Taiwan has a complex quota
system with nearly 25 per cent women members (OECD, Matland 2006:
286–289) (Figure 1.13).
%
50
45 2011 ( ) 1995
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
es
y
ay
na
l
ce
26
nd
ia
ey
ga
an
pa
l
at
w
ra
hi
an
rk
D
la
rtu
m
Ja
or
St
C
EC
Po
st
Tu
Fr
er
Po
N
Au
d
O
te
ni
U
Figure 1.13 Share of women in parliament, 1995 and 2011

Source: OECD Gender Initiative (OECD 2012c).
At the opposite end of this spectrum are Sweden, at 45 per cent, with
Iceland and Finland following close behind. We might ask why these
East Asian countries have so little room for women in parliamentary
politics, with what implications, and are there prospects for increasing
this? We would argue that the small minority of women in public deci-
sion-making positions undermines women’s representation and the
representation of core issues for women, such as gendered expectations
of care. Women’s political representation in national parliaments has
been shown to relate positively to their level of employment, educa-
tion compared with men, length of time since enfranchisement, secu-
larization, social democratic political parties and electoral systems based
on proportional representation. But even where women’s employment,
education and mobilization have brought steady improvements in
representation, these have not brought parity with men. Increasingly
women’s low level of political representation is being targeted by quotas
(Dahlerup 2006, 2007).
Can these low levels of representation in parliamentary politics be
understood as women’s choices? There may be a case for this in East
Asian countries, in the context of Confucian cultural values encour-
aging women to be obedient rather than dominant. But accumulated
(Western) research evidence suggests that discriminatory processes are

more important (Phillips 1991). Scandinavian countries have achieved
high levels of women’s representation through long political work to
increase the acceptability of women in politics and decrease the accept-
ability of men’s over-representation. But arguments for equality as
parity, rather than as equality of opportunity, have brought campaigns
for quotas, which make a direct assault on discriminatory electoral proc-
esses, and hope to reduce the time lag between women’s suffrage and
their full representation in representative parliaments. In some countries
(e.g. Rwanda), these have lifted women’s participation above Sweden’s
45 per cent. There seems a good case for looking at quotas in Europe as
well as in East Asia, as a means to bring representation of women, and of
issues important to women higher up the agenda, rather more quickly
than seems likely under current political conditions.
Conclusion
The chapter has asked about approaches to welfare, about the nature of East
Asian welfare states, particularly the gendered nature of East Asian welfare
states. Scholars have asked are there distinctive features of welfare systems
in East Asia as a region, an ‘East Asian welfare model’? Goodman and Peng
(1996) argued that strong reliance on non-state agencies – family, commu-
nity and firm – distinguishes this model from Western welfare regimes. A
distinctive welfare state cluster is also argued by Holliday (2000: 709): the
‘productivist world of welfare capitalism’, in which the state’s orientation is
to economic growth, with social policies subordinated to economic/indus-
trial objectives. Similarly, Kwon argues for the East Asian welfare system
as the ‘developmental welfare state’ (2005, 2009), in which social policy is
instrumental for economic development, for example, promoting private
sources of welfare and diverting financial resources from social insurance
to investment in infrastructure (Gough 2001). But what are the implica-
tions of strong reliance on families and communities, the subordination
of social polices to economic ones, promoting private sources of welfare,
diverting financial resources from social insurance? In particular, what
are the implications for families, for women in families and for gender
equality? If these implications have been underplayed in the literature on
East Asian regimes, literature about gender and welfare states has tended
to neglect East Asia and the extreme position of women in East Asian
welfare and family systems. Are there differences between East and West
in family systems which put burdens on women while giving them fewer
rights? Are young women in East Asian families at the bottom of hierar-
chies of decision-making and power? What are the implications of China’s
shift towards market and Confucian ideology for women, especially
disadvantaged women? Is Confucianism a key to differences between East

and West, to understanding women’s position in employment, income,
care, time and power, with East Asian countries at extremes from the social
democracies in social spending, fertility and political participation, while
sharing economic and life expectations with the same social democracies?
The forthcoming chapters therefore address new questions about women’s
welfare, across the wide East Asian region.
The book asks about the impact of Confucian culture on gender
equality in East Asia. It begins with countries the authors see as the
most ‘Confucian’, Korea and Taiwan, where gender equality legislation
challenges, and is challenged by powerfully persistent and consistent
Confucian values. Sung examines work–family balance policies in South
Korea, asking how recent changes and policy reforms influenced women,
exploring through qualitative interviews the impact of Confucian culture
on women’s experience in reconciling work and family life. In the rather
similar environment of Taiwan, Wu asks about women’s experiences and
strategies in balancing motherhood and paid work, about changes in
gendered arrangements of family responsibilities, motherhood ideologies
and employment patterns between two generations. From the alternative
perspective of policy makers, in her qualitative interviews with Korean
civil servants, Won asks about the gap between policy rhetoric and the
reality, questioning the status of women’s bureaux in the Korean gender
regime. China may be the birthplace of Confucianism, but communism
directly challenged Confucian gender inequalities, bringing girls and
women into education and employment, with communist ideology
bringing – for nearly half a century – an environment that supported
gender equality against Confucian tradition. Using mixed methodologies,
Shang, Fisher and Guo address the gendered experiences of older disabled
people in rural China. They ask about the implications of communist
and post-1990 market reforms – a rapidly and radically changing envi-
ronment – on gender equality: did either communist or market reforms
challenge Confucian gender inequalities, creating communities in which
women and men are equally valued in both policy and practice? In partic-
ular, they ask about the impact of communist and market reforms on this
multiply disadvantaged group: women who are old, disabled and from
rural areas. Hong Kong – facing east and west – has also absorbed a variety
of influences. Leung Lai Ching’s chapter asks about the gender main-
streaming of domestic violence policy. She examines the gender sensi-
tivity and welfare orientation of government officials and frontline social
workers, exploring their attitudes towards domestic violence. In Hong
Kong, is domestic violence perceived as a family issue or a social issue, by
policy-makers and family workers? Does the Confucian welfare model act
as a barrier to the gender mainstreaming of domestic violence policy?
Japan experiences – according to chapters by Kimio Ito and Emiko

Ochiai and Ken’ichi Johshita – a diversity of influences including Shinto,
Buddhism and Confucianism. Kimio Ito asks about the sources and nature
of a culture which put Japan so very far down the gender equality league:
98th on the Gender Gap Index in 2011. Emiko Ochiai and Ken’ichi
Johshita draw upon a content analysis of Prime Ministers’ speeches since
the 1970s to ask about the extent to which Confucianism has affected
family ideology/policy in Japan. Can the position of women in Japan be
understood as a consequence of Confucianism? Or was Confucianism
mobilized and re-shaped as an ideology to support the modern state in
the form of the ‘traditionalization of modern gender roles?’
The evidence of the comparative data above is of countries with strong
and growing economies, overtaking the Scandinavian social democra-
cies in women’s life expectations. But the evidence is also of East Asian
countries at the opposite pole to gender-equal social democracies, across
the range of measures of gender equality in employment, income, care,
time and power. The following chapters address key questions about the
lives and welfare of women across a wide region.
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2
Work–Family Balance Issues and
Policies in Korea: Towards an
Egalitarian Regime?
Sirin Sung
Introduction
Work–family balance has become a key issue since the late 1980s in
Korea as a result of women’s increasing participation in the labour
market. There have been some cultural shifts in relation to gender
roles in combination with economic and political changes. In partic-
ular, the traditional idea of ‘the man as head of the family’ has recently
been challenged, leading to the 2008 reform of family law (Kim 2008).
In spite of these recent changes, the notion that the gendered division
of labour in the Korean family has shifted from a traditional to an
egalitarian model is highly questionable. To explore this, the chapter
asks to what extent recent policy changes have influenced women’s
experiences in reconciling paid and unpaid work in practice. It
discusses women’s views on their responsibility for unpaid care work,
including childcare and eldercare, and on the effectiveness of work–
family balance policies. Gender imbalance in unpaid care work is not
peculiar to Korean society, as it exists in the most egalitarian coun-
tries in Europe such as the Scandinavian countries. However, Korean
women may encounter particular difficulties because of their special
responsibilities for their parents-in-law embedded in the Confucian
value system. Therefore, this chapter examines the recent changes in
work–family balance policies in Korea, and it argues that in order to
make the policies effective there must be cultural shifts in relation to
gender roles.
29
30 Sirin Sung
Korean women in transition
Korean women are living in a transitional period where a traditional

society is evolving into a more egalitarian society where gender equality
can be achieved. Thus, they are encountering both change and conti-
nuity, in relation to gender equality. First, with economic development,
women’s participation in the labour market rose from 34.4 per cent in
1965 to 50.9 per cent in 2012 (KOSIS 2012). More importantly, the rate
of married women’s participation has gradually increased from 40 per
cent in 1985 to 51.4 per cent in 2005 (Statistical Yearbook on Women
2006; Kim 2007). But in a comparative context, as shown in Chapter 1
(Figures 1.5 and 1.6), women’s employment is low and the gender gap
in employment is high, at the opposite end of the spectrum to the social
democracies which have prioritised gender equality, Finland, Sweden,
Norway (OECD 2010, 2011). The gender pay gap has reduced: the ratio
of women’s monthly average wage to men’s rose from 46.6 per cent in
1985, 58 per cent in 1995 and to 63.2 per cent in 2008 (Joo 2008, 2010).
But despite recent changes in the labour market, women’s average earn-
ings are still seriously lower than men’s, with the gender gap in earn-
ings at the opposite extreme to Norway (Figure 1.7, OECD 2012). Also,
women’s responsibility for childcare continues to be the one of the most
serious obstacles to their employment, mentioned by 63.7 per cent of
women in the survey on gender equality (Ministry of Labour Korea
2010). Women’s participation rate in the labour market differs according
to their age: women of 30–34 years old have lower participation rates
compared with the cohorts of 25–29 and 55–59 because of their child-
care responsibilities (Joo 2008). Motherhood clearly brings difficulties
for women in Korea, with very low rates of public spending, including
public spending on early education and childcare, paid working hours
the highest among OECD countries (OECD 2012) and fertility declining
rapidly to the lowest among the OECD countries, just over one child per
woman in 2009 (Chapter 1).
Secondly, regarding gender roles, there has been a cultural shift from
traditional constraints towards gender equality to some extent. For
example, the Social Statistical Survey on attitudes towards the division
of housework in 2008 showed that 32.4 per cent of men and women
said that it has to be fairly shared, more than in the 1990s (Statistical
Yearbook on Women 2010). However, there was a gap between the atti-
tudes expressed and behaviour: the survey results showed a different
pattern when looking at the actual division of labour in households.
As many as 86.4 per cent of women in paid employment said that the
Work–Family Balance Issues and Policies in Korea 31
housework was done either only or mostly by the wife, while only
10.1 per cent said that it is fairly shared between the husband and wife
(Statistical Yearbook on Women 2004). The survey showed that women’s
employment status did not have a significant impact on the gendered
division of household labour. In addition, Confucian tradition retains a
strong influence on women’s role in the family and society. For example,
married women’s responsibility for parents-in-law is still emphasized in
Korean families (Sung 2003). Korean women living in cultural transi-
tion encounter a contradiction between tradition and change. Women’s
involvement in paid work reflects societal change, while their roles as
primary carers and domestic workers in the family are in line with tradi-
tional ideas. Although there were some changes in beliefs about gender
roles, it was evident in my study that women were still more responsible
for caring for children and elderly family members.
Lastly, Korean family structure is changing from the extended family
towards a nuclear one. According to the Statistical Yearbook on Women
(2004), the three-generation household – grandparents, parents and
children living together – has decreased from 16.5 per cent in 1980 to
8.2 per cent in 2000. Approximately 45.7 per cent of Korean house-
holds were nuclear families composed of a couple and their unmarried
children (Hong 2008). More importantly, the traditional idea of the
‘man as the head of family’ has been challenged recently, resulting in
the reform of family law in 2008. The reform included abolishing the
‘ho-ju’ system (Kim 2008), which specified that the father was the head
of the family in official documents (e.g. in ID cards); in the case of a
father’s death, the eldest son became the head of the family, not the
mother. Although three-generation households have decreased gradu-
ally, indicating that there are fewer women living with their parents-
in-law, married women’s responsibility for parents-in-law has not yet
dramatically reduced. Thus, the Korean family cannot be appropriately
understood without analysing interactions between family-in-law and
daughter-in-law, as well as husband and wife (Sung 2003). In contrast,
studies on Western families tend to focus only on the relationship
between husband and wife.
Work–family balance policies
In spite of its rapid economic growth, Korea has been well known as a
country concentrating on economic development with only a limited
role for government in social welfare (Jones 1993; Joo 1999; Sung
2003). However, since the economic crisis in 1997, social policy in
32 Sirin Sung
general has changed to become more egalitarian. The Korean welfare

system has shifted from selective forms to more universal ones (Kwon
2009). For example, the National Health Insurance and public assist-
ance programmes have been reformed and strengthened. Also, the
Employment Insurance Programme was extended, and social security
has become more generous. Furthermore, the Korean government estab-
lished the Ministry of Gender Equality in 2000 to improve equal rights
for women in every policy department. This was an important step
towards achieving ‘gender mainstreaming’ (Heo 2000; Sung 2003) in
Korean policy and society.
Equal opportunity legislation was introduced in 1987 through the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act and has been reformed several
times. In 1995, ‘maternity leave for childrearing’ was changed into
‘parental leave’ to emphasize the responsibility of fathers, as well as
mothers. In 2001, maternity benefit was introduced, financed by an
employment insurance scheme (Chang and Boo 2003). In 2007, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act evolved into the symbolically enti-
tled Equal Employment and Support of Work–family Balance Act. In the
reformed law, women are entitled to 90 days of maternity leave for child-
bearing (Kim 2007) and one year’s leave for childrearing. The amount
of maternity benefit has increased from £100 (200,000 Korean won) per
month to £250 (500,000 won) in 2007 (Hong 2008), but remains too far
below earnings to enable working mothers in financial difficulties to
take leave. It covers only 20 per cent of the average wage for workers in
Korea (Yun 2008).
The number of women taking maternity leave (on average three
months) increased from 22,711 in 2002 to 68,526 in 2008 (Ministry of
Labour 2010), while the number taking childcare leave (parental leave)
rose from 3,763 in 2002 to 56,738 in 2012 (ChungAng Newspaper 2012).
However, Hong (2008) found that female workers who work for small
and medium size companies are disadvantaged: they have to deal with
the pressure to work through early motherhood. Women working for
large companies and the public sector have better employment condi-
tions and can more easily benefit from maternity and childcare leave. In
addition, three days unpaid paternity leave was introduced to empha-
size fathers’ responsibility for caring for children. The childcare leave
system was also extended from one to two years, with the second year
allowed only if the father takes the leave (Hong 2008). Although the
reformed policy does emphasize fathers’ role in caring for children, its
effectiveness in practice, in particular take-up, is doubtful, as leave for the
second year is unpaid. The take-up rate for men taking childcare leave
in Korea was 1.48 per cent in 2006 (Yun 2008). Another problem with
work–family balance policy in Korea, is that maternity and paternity
and parental leave come under the ‘maternal protection’ scheme. While
it is important to protect women during pregnancy and childbearing, it
is crucial to recognize these as women’s ‘rights’ as mothers, rather than
conceiving them as ‘protection’ for mothers. Fathers’ responsibility for
childcare and fathers’ rights to take parental leave need more emphasis:
changing the name to ‘parental rights’ (Sung 2003) would help.
The Childcare Act was introduced in 1991 with some day-care centres
established since. The Korean government also increased the budget
for childcare policy from 2000. However, childcare services are largely
provided by the private sector rather than the public, which may result
in expensive childcare services and a lack of facilities. Among all child-
care facilities, 4.8 per cent were public, while 85.3 per cent were run
by the private sector (Hong 2008). An official survey showed 61.9‘ of
families with young children relying on informal care, mainly by grand-
parents and relatives (Ministry of Gender and Family 2006) because of
the lack of government schemes.
Policies for eldercare have become topical, as the elderly population
(aged 65 or over) has been increasing gradually in Korea since the 1990s
(National Statistical Office 2011). Despite the increasing elderly popula-
tion, state policy has not addressed the problem of supporting the elderly
and those women who care for them. As Palley (1992) argued, with its
growth-oriented economic policy, the Korean government of the early
1990s emphasized Confucian virtues for informal care-giving in the
three-generation family, essentially care given by the daughter-in-law,
as the basis of its social policy. Although the three-generation family is
in decline in Korean society, eldercare policy focusing on family respon-
sibility has not changed accordingly. A 2008 policy document about
welfare for the elderly, has a section ‘maintaining the family system’,
where the importance of ‘the enhancement of the spirit of respect
for the elderly and filial piety’ is emphasized (Ministry of Health and
Welfare 2008: chapter 1, Article 6). This shows that the Confucian virtue
of ‘respect for the elderly and filial piety to parents’ remains central to
policies.
Gender and welfare regimes in the Korean context
Comparative studies of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990) have

neglected gender, while gender studies have focussed on Western male
breadwinner regimes (Lewis 1992, 1997). Lewis’ argument about the
34 Sirin Sung
significance of both paid and unpaid work has been a significant step in
gender and welfare regime studies, but has little to say about the inter-
relationship between culture and welfare state policies (Pfau-Effinger
1999). The association between culture and East Asian welfare regimes
has begun to be described as the ‘Confucian welfare state’ (Jones 1993),
while Reiger and Leibfried (2003) highlighted the influence of Confucian
culture on the formation of welfare policy. Some studies have understood
East Asian states as the ‘productivist world of welfare capitalism’, which
means ‘subordination of all aspects of state policy, to economic/indus-
trial objectives’ (Holliday 2000: 709). Similarly, Kwon (2005, 2009) saw
East Asian welfare systems as the ‘developmental welfare state’ high-
lighting the instrumentality of social policy to economic development,
while Walker and Wang (2005) emphasized the role of political ideology
and downplayed Confucianism as a contemporary aspect of social policy
in East Asia. These studies have not asked about the implications of the
influence of Confucian culture on East Asian welfare systems, including
Korea, which needs to be examined further (Sung 2003). The impact of
Confucian culture has been examined in more detail in Chapter 1. This
chapter focuses on to what extent Confucianism, as a part of culture, has
influenced the lives of Korean women. What is its impact on gender-role
ideologies in Korea and beliefs about married women’s responsibility
for parents-in-law in particular? This study offers an original approach
to understanding Korean families, in particular, women’s experience of
gender equality and inequality, in the context of the cultural differences
between Western and Confucian gender regimes.
The research
Qualitative semi-structured interviews were used to explore the experi-

ences of women and the constraints that they encounter in everyday life
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998). Sixty women in paid employment were inter-
viewed in total, 40 in 2000 and 20 in 2007. All interviewees were married
more than a year and the age range was from 19 to 60, equally drawn from
the public and private sectors. The research was carried out in two phases,
first in 2000 as part of the author’s PhD and second study in 2007,1 as a
follow-up study, with a different sample. Two main reasons for drawing
the new sample were, first, difficulty in obtaining new contact details of
previous participants and, second, changes in their circumstances, which
meant that they no longer fitted into the age or employment categories.
The interviews were mainly focused on women’s experience of balancing
paid and unpaid work and their ideas about relevant policies.
Women’s understanding and experience of

unpaid care work
In Korea, in 2004 men spent 21 per cent of their day doing paid work,
compared with 14 per cent for women. In terms of unpaid work, men
spent only 3 per cent of their day, while women spent 14 per cent
(An 2010). These gender differences are not unique to Korean women
(Bundler 2010): women spend more time on care work than men in all
OECD countries (OECD 2010). However, Korean women may encounter
deeper difficulties in reconciling paid and unpaid work, as they often
have a triple burden of paid work, childcare and care for parents-in-law.
Responsibility for childcare: why women do

more than men?
According to women respondents in the interviews, women take more

responsibility for caring for their children than do their husbands. Why
do women take more responsibility for childcare? And what are their
beliefs about the gender division of labour? Some respondents said that
they did not feel more responsible for childcare than their husbands.
They considered that their husbands should take the same responsi-
bilities for childcare as themselves. Although these respondents share
the idea that men and women should take the same responsibilities for
childcare in the family, sharing responsibilities for childcare with their
husbands in practice was a different issue. They said that in practice they
do more childcare in the family than do their husbands. Only a small
minority of respondents said that they share the responsibility for child-
care equally with their husbands:
I think a husband and a wife should take responsibilities for childcare

equally, but I know it doesn’t work that way in practice, because my
mother-in-law and my husband think that it’s women’s work to do.
(Bang, Case 35, 2000)
I share the responsibilities for childcare with my husband. I want
to give more responsibility to my husband. Childcare is not just
mothers’ responsibility. So I want my husband to feel the responsi-
bility as a father. (An, Case 10, 2007)
These examples show differences: one interviewee has the idea of sharing
responsibility for childcare equally between both father and mother but
it does not work in practice, while the other has the idea of sharing
36 Sirin Sung
responsibility of caring for children equally with her husband and is also
practising it. The former seems to suggest the contradiction between
ideas of gender equality and traditions, and pressure from her mother-
in-law, while the latter represents recent – but rarely practised – changes
in the Korean family.
However, most respondents said that they felt more responsible for
childcare, although the reasons for taking more responsibilities for
childcare differed. The majority of respondents said that they felt more
responsible for caring for their children than their husbands because
they believed that it was women’s/mothers’ work:
I feel more responsible for childcare by myself because I’m a mother,

so I feel that it’s my responsibility. My husband also thinks that it’s
my responsibility. (Park, Case 12, 2007)
Ms. Park’s account is compatible with Lee’s finding (1994) that Korean
women themselves consider childcare as women’s work, and some
women showed feelings of guilt for not being good mothers because they
had to spend time on paid work. This was also evident in my findings:
I certainly feel more responsible for caring for my child than my

husband, because I am a mother. I feel sometimes guilty and sorry for
my son that I can’t spend more time with him because I have to do
paid work. (Noh, Case 24, 2000)
As Richardson (1993) suggests, the assumption that a mother is mainly

responsible for her child’s well-being, may lead women to feelings of
self-doubt and guilt. Also, it may encourage in women a tendency to
blame themselves for many of the problems and difficulties that befall
their children.
Crucially, some respondents said that they take more responsibility
for childcare, because their husbands have to work longer hours and are
not flexible in taking time off from work:
My husband works longer hours than me, and his job is not as flex-
ible as mine. So I have to take more responsibility for childcare. (Yang,
Case 3, 2007)
According to the OECD family database (2007), in Korea almost 90 per

cent of the male workforce spends over 40 hours per week in paid work,
compared with 76 per cent of the OECD average. Long working hours
may contribute to a culture in which equal sharing of unpaid care work

between men and women is problematic. As men spend more time on
paid work than women in Korea (An 2010), women need to spend more
time on unpaid care work than men.
Interestingly, some respondents explained that they take more respon-
sibility for childcare because their husbands have the Confucian tradi-
tional idea that it is women’s work to take care of children:
My husband thinks that it’s women’s work to do childcare in the

family. He said that if my son is not good at studying at school, it’s
my fault because a mother should take care of children very well. He
has a very Confucian traditional mind. (Han, Case 14, 2000)
As described above, husbands’ beliefs about responsibility for childcare

have an influence on working mothers. If the husband has Confucian
patriarchal ideas that it is women’s role to care for children in the family,
working mothers may find it more difficult to cope with both paid
work and childcare. Kim (1999) argues that in the Confucian patriar-
chal family the attitude of husbands towards responsibility for child-
care affects working women’s ability to reconcile paid work and care
work. A husband with strong Confucian patriarchal ideas of childcare
as women’s work, may bring more difficulties for working mothers. Ms.
Han’s account suggests that the idea of her husband is dominant in the
family, and her husband blamed her for not being a good mother to her
son. It is interesting that Ms. Han interpreted her husband’s ideas on
women’s role as carer in the family as reflecting Confucian influence.
More than half of the respondents said that they felt more respon-
sible for caring for their children than their husbands. They showed a
stronger feeling of responsibility for caring for their children, compared
with taking on responsibilities for domestic work. They also emphasized
the duty of mothers to care for children and some argued that mothers
have a stronger instinct for caring for children than fathers.
Who should be responsible for parents and parents-in-law?
According to the survey from the Statistical Yearbook on Women (2010)

in Korea, parental care is widely regarded as the responsibility of the
family, rather than of government or society. The 2008 survey on ‘opin-
ions on who should take care of aging parents’ shows that 40.7 per cent
said that it has to be done by the family, while only 3.8 per cent said
that the government or society should take responsibility (Statistical
38 Sirin Sung
Yearbook on Women 2010: 157). This is also evident in my findings, as

most respondents said that care for the elderly should be the responsi-
bility of children in the family, especially sons. But as care work is asso-
ciated with women’s domestic work in households, sons’ responsibility
means in practice that married women are mainly responsible, caring
for their parents-in-law, rather than their own parents. In the Korean
family, caring for parents-in-law often means living together in the same
house. It also means taking responsibility for them when they do not
live together.
Living with parents-in-law

Around half of respondents from both interviews in 2000 and 2007 had
experienced living with their parents-in-law. Amongst these respond-
ents, most are the eldest son’s wife:
I was living with my mother-in-law for 10 years. I am not living with

her now because she died years ago. I am the eldest daughter-in-law
and my husband is the only son, so I had no choice. I had to live with
my mother-in-law. (Choi, Case 23, 2000)
My husband has very traditional views and my parents-in-law are
the same. As he is the eldest son in the family, he thinks that he has
to be responsible for looking after his parents in old age. (Jin, Case
9, 2007)
These accounts show the eldest sons in the Korean family as still the
most responsible for living with their parents. As mentioned earlier, in
Korean society the eldest son is in a very important position of respon-
sibility for his family (Byun 2001; Kim 1999). Since married women
have to take care of their family-in-law, the eldest daughters-in-law have
more responsibilities than other daughters-in-law. This is mainly rooted
in Confucian patriarchy giving more importance to sons and the most
importance to the eldest son in the family, rather than daughters.
Conflicts with families-in-law

Living with parents-in-law is often considered as a traditional virtue
for Korean women after marriage. Some respondents described their
experience of conflict between their family-in-law and themselves,
while they were living together. Conflicts between mothers-in-law
and daughters-in-law have long been part of Korean society. Mothers’
emotional dependency on their sons has been reported as resulting in
conflict between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law (Yuan 1995).
Most respondents have had experiences of conflict with mothers-in-law,

whether they lived with them or not. Taking care of families-in-law as
daughters-in-law, especially for the eldest daughters-in-law, has also
long been a social custom in Korean society. Some respondents have had
experiences of living with or supporting their brothers-in-law and sisters-
in-law. Below are two illustrations of this point. The first example relates
to the conflict between mother-in-law and the respondent in terms of
taking responsibility for domestic work as a wife. The second example
relates to visiting the respondent’s own parents during celebration days.
When the respondent could not attend the ancestor worship, her sister-
in-law blamed her for not being responsible as a daughter-in-law:
I lived with my parents-in-law at the beginning of my marriage, but

now we live in different houses. I have had conflicts with my moth-
er-in-law. .. My mother-in-law came to my house without any notice
and she saw a lot of dirty shirts in the bathroom. She was so angry
and she washed them and waited for me to come home. When I came
home, she threw all the shirts to me and said ‘how can you do this to
your husband? Your mother didn’t teach you how to be a good wife?
I was very angry and felt insulted, when she talked about my mother.
I was crying the whole day and I think it took a long time for me to
recover trust for my husband, because he didn’t help me, when his
mother was insulting to me. (Noh, Case 24, 2000)
Ms. Noh’s account suggests that her mother-in-law and husband consider
her as a primary domestic worker, although she does paid work. In her
account, her husband follows the Confucian ideal of son and husband,
that as a filial son he should not make objection to his mother, when
his mother complains about his wife. The obedience of a son to his
parents comes first rather than the relationship between his wife and
himself (Sung 2003). Ms. Noh’s case also suggests that the mother-in-
law’s control over her daughter-in-law is strong in the Confucian family.
Although Ms. Noh and her mother-in-law do not live in the same house,
the mother-in-law came to her house without notice and complained
about her housework.
Ms. Ko gives another example of conflict with family-in-law:
I couldn’t attend one of the ancestor memorials because I had to be

at work. Then, my sister-in-law called me and said ‘if you miss any of
this again, then I will not let you get away with it. You have to come,
as a daughter-in-law you are responsible for this.’ ... Sometimes I feel
40 Sirin Sung
they treat me like their servant. I give some pocket money to my own
parents, which is less than half of what I give to my parents-in-law.
Even so, I have to keep it secret from my family-in-law, as they would
not like it. (Ko, Case 5, 2007)
Ms. Ko’s account illustrates the Confucian traditional ideal of taking

care of family-in-law, including attending the ancestor memorial,
as customary, not considered as an extraordinary thing for married
women in Korea. However, when it comes to their own family, it is often
regarded as a disgrace for women to take more responsibility for their
own parents instead of their parents-in-law. It is also disgrace for all their
family and for their own parents, if parents depend on their daughters
instead of their sons. In addition, married women’s responsibility for all
their families-in-law in Confucian ideology is considered crucial: thus,
the daughter-in-law’s obedience to all members of her family-in-law is
considered important (Choi 1994).
Taking more responsibilities for parents-in-law

According to their accounts in the interviews, most respondents took
more responsibility for their parents-in-law than for their own parents.
There were a few respondents among the 60, who were living with their
own parents. The main reason for living with their own parents was
to receive help from them in caring for their children. Although their
parents helped the respondents with childcare, their parents-in-law did
not approve of their living with their own parents:
I’m living with my own parents and my mother takes care of my

children. ... I decided to live with my parents because of my children,
because I needed somebody to take care of my children, while I’m
at work. ... My parents-in-law didn’t like it. ... However, they can’t
complain about it too much because my mother does everything for
my family, such as domestic work and childcare. Sometimes I feel
sorry for my mother that she is working too hard and must be tired
from so much work. (Eun, Case 36, 2000)
Although Ms. Eun is living with her own parents, she understands
herself as taking more responsibility for her parents-in-law than her
own parents, because she lives with them for her children’s sake, not for
her parents’. She also sees it as impossible to live with her own mother
because of her parents-in-law, if the reason were not caring for her chil-
dren. It is considered a son’s responsibility to live with his parents, not
a daughter’s, thus her parents-in-law do not like it, even though her
mother helps her with childcare and domestic work.
Crucially, most respondents said that they take more responsibility
for their parents-in-law, compared with their own parents, whether they
think it is appropriate or not. About one third of respondents (14 out of
40 in 2000, 3 out of 20 in 2007) argued that it was appropriate to take
more responsibility for parents-in-law than for their own parents. They
explained it as a Confucian tradition and social custom to follow:
I think it is appropriate to take more responsibilities for my parents-

in-law than my own parents. It is a Confucian traditional custom to
keep the family together. You know that my son will take the surname
of my family-in-law. (Heo, Case 25, 2000)
In my generation, it is considered appropriate to take more respon-
sibilities for parents-in-law. I feel the same: as I am married to my
husband I belong to his family now. (Seon, Case 15, 2007)
Confucian tradition appears to be entrenched in these respondents’

ideas. They do not regard it as unfair for women to take more responsi-
bility for their parents-in-law than their own parents. They consider it
as an obligation to follow, to keep the tradition that women belong to
their family-in-law, after marriage.
However, most respondents’ accounts (26 out of 40 in 2000,17 out of
20 in 2007) were of differences between their personal beliefs and their
daily lives: they argued that it was not appropriate to take more respon-
sibility for their parents-in-law than for their own parents, but in reality
they did more for their parents-in-law, compared with their own parents.
None of the respondents said they took the same responsibility for both
their parents-in-law and their own parents. Some said that their husbands
had very Confucian ideas in terms of gender roles, believing that women
should take care of their parents-in-law after marriage. Therefore, women
seem to have little choice, even if they think it is not appropriate to take
more responsibility for their parents-in-law than their own parents:
I don’t think it is appropriate to take more responsibilities for parents-

in-law than my own parents, but my husband keeps telling me that
it is right to do that. He also said that it is our good tradition to keep,
and I belong to his family now. (Jeong, Case 7, 2000)
It is not fair, but I take more responsibility for my parents-in-law
because I have to. It’s a kind of tradition in Korea and my husband
and family-in-law have traditional minds. (Woo, Case 2, 2007)
42 Sirin Sung
Both respondents do not agree with the idea that women should be
more responsible for parents-in-law than their own parents, but in prac-
tice they follow these traditions to avoid conflict with their husbands
and families-in-law. It seems that a daughter’s responsibility for her own
parents is neglected. This also illustrates male dominance over women in
the family, accepting in practice that women should follow the ideas of
their husbands, and of men as heads of the family. Even if women think
it is appropriate to take the same responsibility for their own parents as
for their parents-in-law, they cannot follow through this belief in prac-
tice because their husbands think it is right to take more responsibility
for parents-in-law for women after marriage, according to traditional
custom. Since parents were likely to have more expectations of sons
than of daughters, sons have more responsibility for their parents. This
relates directly to the responsibility for married women to care for their
parents-in-law, rather than their own parents.
Women’s views on the effectiveness of

work–family balance policies
To examine the impact of policies on women’s experiences of balancing

work and family lives, respondents were asked: ‘Have you ever heard of
equal opportunity legislation or work–family balance policies? And how
effective do you think they are?’ All respondents from the interviews
conducted in 2000 and 2007 said that they had heard about the poli-
cies, even though some of them did not know the details of the law or
policies. For those who did not have a clear understanding of the law
or policies, the details and content of policies were explained briefly in
the interviews.
Some respondents saw maternity leave provisions as effective. They
said that most female workers in the workplace were entitled to mater-
nity leave for childbearing and childrearing, including themselves. Some
also said that the employment conditions for women workers in their
workplace are improving in comparison with the past:
I had only one month’s leave for child bearing when I was young, but
nowadays women workers in my workplace can have two months’
leave. ... I think employment conditions for women workers are really
getting better than before. (Case 22, 2000)
In my time [late 1970s], we didn’t have parental leave: it was
common, if women got married or pregnant, for them to resign. So
I quit the job for a while to look after my children. But now women
workers in my workplace can take one year’s parental leave, so I think

in that way the policy has been effective. (Song, Case 19, 2007)
Although some respondents described the policy as effective, accounts of

the majority of respondents (45 out of 60) were of inadequacies. Among
these respondents, some explained that they think Korea’s work–family
balance policies are ineffective because they did not have enough leave
for childbearing and it is difficult to ask their employers or bosses for
parental leave for a year:
I only had one month’s leave for childbearing. I knew I could have
had two months for it but my boss told me to come back after one
month. And he said it is because there are many things to do but
there are not enough workers in my workplace to do everything. ... I
know that I can have two months’ leave for childbearing, and there
is a law to protect my right, but in practice it just doesn’t work that
way. It’s just a law and it’s not effective. (Case 26, 2000)
Not taking her full two months’ leave for childbearing, although she
knew her full legal entitlements, was one response. Concerns raised by
respondents included fear of losing their job after maternity leave, as
they did not think that the law would offer sufficient protection.
Similarly, one respondent from the 2007 interviews stated that she could
not take the parental leave, as she had pressure from her workplace:
I had three months’ leave for childbearing. I couldn’t apply for the
maternity leave for childrearing [parental leave], as there was a lot of
pressure from my workplace as they couldn’t find a replacement for
my job. (Case 14, 2007)
Interestingly, some respondents said that people’s beliefs (both men’s

and women’s) about gender roles need to be changed, for the policies to
be effective. There is still a male-dominant culture both in the workplace
and in society as a whole:
I think that women’s attitudes towards gender roles need to be

changed otherwise, it’s not going to change soon, although the law
or policies are there. (Jin, Case 9, 2007)
People’s attitudes, both men’s and women’s, need to be changed in
society, for the law to be effective. It is still a male dominated society.
(Case 11, 2007)
44 Sirin Sung
Crucially, a few respondents mentioned that work–family balance poli-

cies are not effective, as parental leave for fathers is difficult to take
and many are loth to request this right from their employers. One
respondent, below, described the pressures in workplaces and society
against men taking up their entitlements to leave:
I think the policies are not yet effective, as it is very difficult for
fathers to take leave for childrearing. Even if it is allowed in the law,
their boss will be likely to say ‘what’s your wife doing?’ or ‘Are you
crazy? You are not men enough.’ Therefore, in Korea it seems still a
long way to go to promote parental leave for fathers. (Case 20, 2007)
As mentioned above, only 1.48 per cent of men took up parental leave
(Yun 2008). This shows that women take more responsibility for child-
care in practice, despite parental leave for fathers being introduced in
the 2007 policy revision.
Many respondents described gender roles of men and women as
remaining traditional, with the culture of work still male dominated.
This highlights that ideologies and behaviour in relation to the gendered
division of labour need to be changed to make policies effective in
practice.
There were differences between the public and private sector in terms
of employment conditions. The majority of respondents who work for
the public sector stated that they were satisfied with their employment
conditions, such as ‘having maternity leave’, ‘equally paid’, and ‘having
flexibility in working time’. However, most respondents from the private
sector said that they were dissatisfied with their employment conditions.
They also believed that the employment conditions in the public sector
are relatively better for women, compared with the private sector:
I am not satisfied with the employment conditions I have because

it is not easy to ask for leave for childbearing and rearing in my
workplace. I had a month’s leave for childbearing but I cannot even
imagine asking to have maternity leave for a year. I know I wouldn’t
be able to get back to work after that. I have heard from a friend of
mine working in a public office who had maternity leave for a year.
(Case 17, 2000)
I am satisfied with my employment conditions, because I know I
can have maternity leave for a year to look after my child. And I can
get back to work after that, without worries about losing my job. It is
a kind of advantage of working in the public sector. (Case 2, 2007)
This shows the differences between the public and private sector, in
terms of employment conditions. Respondents from both sectors were
aware of better employment conditions in the public sector.
Conclusion: towards an egalitarian regime?
Work–family balance policies in Korea have undergone numerous

reforms and have become more egalitarian, in comparison with the
past. Policy changes have enabled some cultural and practical changes
in the gender division of labour between men and women, for example,
men taking paternity leave. However, policies still need to be improved
in ways that promote more equal sharing of unpaid work between men
and women. Although the number of women taking childcare leave has
increased, the take-up rate for men is still very low. Also, it is important
to recognise maternity, paternity and parental leave as parental rights, as
they still come under ‘maternal protection’ in law (Sung 2003).
In the interviews, most respondents’ accounts were of equal opportu-
nity legislation as not yet effective in practice, although the reasons for
its being ineffective were varied. The main reasons were not being able
to take full maternity leave, people’s ideologies about gender roles, diffi-
culties of fathers taking parental leave, and the male-dominated work
culture. There were differences between the public and private sector in
terms of women’s accounts of satisfaction with employment conditions.
The majority of respondents from the public sector claimed that they
were satisfied with their employment conditions, while most respond-
ents from the private sector showed dissatisfaction.
Care work is still regarded as women’s work: thus women are mainly
responsible for both childcare and eldercare. In particular, managing
eldercare was an important issue for Korean women, as care of parents
is still widely regarded as a family responsibility. For Korean married
women, this responsibility refers to their parents-in-law rather than
their own parents. Most respondents said that they take more responsi-
bility for their parents-in-law, compared with their own parents whether
they think it is fair or not. Most respondents argued that these expec-
tations were not at all fair: they felt that they should be able to take
responsibility for their own parents. But no one said they took the same
responsibility for their own parents as for their parents-in-law.
Findings from the interviews suggest that in practice work–family
balance policies are not as effective as they should be. Policies need
to be improved in ways that promote equal sharing of unpaid work
between men and women as well as paid work. It was also evident
46 Sirin Sung
that for policies to be effective there needs to be some change in the

wider culture. Although the work–family balance policies in Korea have
improved, it does not yet seem to be close to becoming an egalitarian
regime, as the Confucian traditional idea of gender roles still prevails in
practice. Policies for care also need to be developed further in ways that
emphasize the responsibility of governments, rather than delegating
these responsibilities to individuals and families, which makes gender
equality a distant dream.
Note
1. The research carried out in 2007 was funded by the Queen’s University of
Belfast.
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3
Rhetoric or Reality? Peripheral
Status of Women’s Bureaux in the
Korean Gender Regime
Sook-Yeon Won
Introduction
Are the women’s bureaux powerful enough to improve gender equality

as the Korean gender regime has promised? Will the policy pronounce-
ments of active intervention in gender equality and improving gender
sensitivity throughout public policy become reality? This study seeks
answers to these questions, paying special attention to discrepancies
between policy rhetoric and practical ways of functioning of women’s
bureaux in the Korean gender regime.
What makes these issues important in Korea relates to the Confucian
cultural background. Confucianism as a philosophy and a guiding
principle for social relations assumes that ‘separate’ and ‘unequal’
roles for women and men are natural (Choi 1995; Gelb and Palley
1995; Ebrey 1991). Based on this assumption, since the primary place
of women is the family (private sphere), women-related issues are
supposed to be solved within the family rather than in the public
sphere: women’s issues have not been regarded as public agenda for
state policy. Women-related issues hardly are paid close attention and
are unable to achieve high priority in the policy process. Interestingly
enough, regardless of formal arrangements of women-related state
machineries, their substantial positions reflect women’s social posi-
tion in relation to men, which is embedded in social structure as a
whole and based on Confucian gender ideology (cf. Won 2007).
Therefore, this study pays special attention to the dynamics between
Confucianism and the reality of women-related state machineries,
which superficially appear unrelated.
49
50 Sook-Yeon Won
In order to do so, this study deploys a qualitative approach, based

on in-depth interviews with civil servants in Korean government. Real
experience lies behind the superficial appearances that are reflected in
quantitative data, such as simple numerical data. The reality of women’s
bureaux is seen in the daily experiences of civil servants related here,
and their interactions with other civil servants in state bureaucra-
cies. Evidently, their experiences and interactions are idiosyncratic.
Unfortunately quantitative methods are limited in revealing idiosyn-
cratic experiences and social interactions, whereas they are stronger in
indicating the extent and patterns at the collective level (Brannen 1992;
Strauss and Corbin 1998; Bryman 1999). These situations provide some
‘good’ reasons for applying qualitative methods for this study.
Regarding recruitment of interviewees, relevant civil servants were iden-
tified through the Internet web sites of each ministry concerned. Then,
using personal networks, potential interviewees were asked to participate
in the research. As civil servants the interviewees were reluctant to reveal
what was going on inside their bureaucracy. They repeatedly asked me to
guarantee confidentiality even after they were given information about
protection of their personal identity as well as their affiliations. For this
reason, the study uses pseudonyms to identify interviewees, applying an
impersonal alphabetic letter to each respondent throughout the study.
Through their everyday experiences, the following intertwined aspects
will be explored critically: (1) the peripheral status of women’s bureaux
based on their structural aspects, (2) the comparative priority of women’s
policy in terms of staffing for related bureaux, (3) the political conflict
among policy units related to women’s issues inside the bureaucracy
and (4) the lack of cooperation between women’s bureaux and women’s
social organizations outside the bureaucracy.
A staff office or an independent ministry? The reality

of the MOGE
Since 2001 the Ministry of Gender Equality (MOGE) has become a focal
point for coordinating and formulating state policy for gender equality
at the national level. The establishment of women’s bureaux in Korea has
gathered momentum with the UN Beijing Platform for Action in 1995
calling for ‘the integration of gender issues into state policy through
effective institutional mechanisms’ (Cho 2001; Kim 2002; Sharp and
Broomhill 2002; Won 2007). Since then MOGE has experienced several
restructurings; in 2004 MOGE extended its horizon to childcare issues
under the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF). However,
it was downsized to MOGE in 2008 and returned to MOGEF in 2010.
Rhetoric or Reality 51
Regardless of physical position, the issue here is the relative status and
substantial authority of these ministries. When the MOGE was about to
be newly established as a national policy machinery, its structural posi-
tion became a matter of controversy. The keenest issue was whether the
ministerial form was appropriate (Cho 2001; Kim 2002). The majority of
public servants doubted whether there were sufficient and unique duties
to be dealt with at a ministry level. Nonetheless, MOGE was established
amid these controversies as an independent ministry.
As some argue (Chang 2001; Kim 2002; MOGE 2001, 2002; MOGEF
2010), the creation of the MOGE as a separate ‘ministry’ could be a
landmark for gender sensitivity or mainstreaming in the Korean gender
regime. However, looking more closely at its substantial reality, there
would be a different picture. In a word, regardless of its structural iden-
tity, it is highly doubtful whether the MOGE represents a vigorous voice
on behalf of gender equality and plays a strong enforcement role as
many hoped. Regarding this issue, for male bureaucrats, the MOGE is a
malformed structure so that its relative status and functions in practice
are ambiguous and confused. That is, since the MOGE was established
by ‘object’, not by ‘function’, it generates confusion regarding its status
within governmental bureaucracy and makes the MOGE function like a
staff office, rather than as a separate ministry:
The MOGE was established against the commonly applied principle,

departmentalisation by ‘function’. It was based instead on the object
of ‘women’ ... not only in Korea, but also in the vast majority of coun-
tries, it’s the function, not the object which distinguishes depart-
ments in governmental bureaucracy. Therefore ... it looks strange and
confusing. In my understanding, from the beginning the MOGE was
sort of ‘malformed’ ... . (Mr D)
More radically, some male bureaucrats propose an alternative for the

MOGE to remain as a staff office, rather than a ministry:
Women-related issues, indeed, have been dispersed across all depart-

ments ... for women’s welfare, the MOHW has taken the main part, and
for women’s education, the MOEHR, ... and so forth ... . Accordingly, the
form the MOGE takes could be subject to criticism ... . Given the situa-
tion ... it’s a staff office, rather than an independent ministry. (Mr B)
On the other hand, female bureaucrats see reality through a different

perspective. While, like male bureaucrats, they recognize that the MOGE
52 Sook-Yeon Won
has been created according to a different principle from existing minis-

tries, they do not hold such a negative position about the structural
arrangements per se. Rather, female bureaucrats pay attention to the
political aspects of gender issues. A female bureaucrat insists that the
criticism of the MOGE’s organizational form is too naive and apolitical:
It neglects the political nature of state policies for gender equality ... .
Rather, they need to be considered in political logic, not administra-
tive logic. ... To be honest ... it is hard to expect existing machineries
to deal with women’s issues through gender equality perspectives.
(Ms G)
Furthermore, a female bureaucrat expresses her strong doubt whether

the MOGE as a ministry is able to coordinate government-wide policies
via gender mainstreaming principles. And she rather urges the neces-
sity of upgrading the MOGE, which is totally different from the down-
grading alternative perspective from male bureaucrats:
As long as the MOGE remains as it is, it can’t make any difference ... The
MOGE is supposed to coordinate related policies via gender main-
streaming ... . It would be highly unlikely ... . Coordinating is extremely
difficult ... it’s also hard for the Office of Prime Minister(OPM) or even
the Blue House ... . Hence, the MOGE needs to become an equivalent
to the OPM, rather than a mere ministerial level, ... . Otherwise, the
MOGE will do nothing. (Ms E)
An interesting point here is a perceptual gap between male and female

bureaucrats regarding MOGE’s reality. As we have seen, while they share an
understanding of the marginal status of the MOGE, the underlying causes
for and possible alternatives to overcome this marginality are markedly
contrasting. Male bureaucrats insist on ‘downgrading’ as an alternative,
while female bureaucrats urge an ‘upgrading’ solution. Men and women
may recognize the seriousness or urgency of gender (in)equality in different
ways and to different degrees. In addition, the, different backgrounds of the
respondents in this study may contribute to these different perspectives.
Unlike male bureaucrats as tenured civil servants, the majority of female
bureaucrats interviewed are femocrats with feminist backgrounds and ‘are
appointed to work in women’s affairs and women’s units in the state appa-
ratus’ (Stetson and Mazur 1995: 20). Because of that, female respondents
have a tendency to focus on a political approach to gender issues, while
male participants emphasize the administrative perspective.
Moreover, male and female bureaucrats have different solutions:

‘downgrading’ versus ‘upgrading’ alternatives. Whether or to what
extent the upgrading or downgrading alternatives from bureaucrats in
this study are relevant in the Korean situation would be another ques-
tion. Rather, the issue is that it is obvious that the MOGE is in a periph-
eral position, which precludes it from taking a leading role for gender
equality via policies for gender equality, regardless of perception gaps
between male and female civil servants.
The least powerful in the less powerful? Women’s policy

units in related-ministries
Following Weber’s accounts, bureaucracy is identified as a neutral tool

for efficiency based on rational authority, far away from class, race
and gender variables. However, as many scholars have pointed out,
‘state bureaucracy, in terms of power differentials, ensures a particular
pattern of hegemonic domination’ (Mahon 1984: 38, see also Ferguson
1984; Stivers 1993, 1999). The power relationship can be witnessed
not only between bureaucrats at individual levels but also between
divisions at collective levels. While ministries of finance, treasury and
foreign affairs have been realized as more powerful and prestigious,
ministries concerned with family or childcare and women’s issues have
taken a less powerful place (Connell 1990; Watson 1990). In Korea,
power relations between ministries (departments) tend to be compli-
cated. Because of the geopolitical instability of the Korean peninsula
and ‘compressed’ economic development, the relative status of minis-
tries concerned with military and economic issues have been placed at
the forefront. On the contrary, along with self-reliance based on the
family, the Korean state has retained very residual positions on welfare
concerns (Goodman and Peng 1996; Goodman et al. 1998). As a conse-
quence, welfare-related ministries or departments have taken lower
positions. Evidently, the residual approach to welfare in the Korean
welfare regime is fairly detrimental for the relative status of women-
related policy units; the MOHW (Ministry of Health and Welfare)) and
the MOLAB in central government and bureaux of welfare for women
and children in local governments (Jin 1997; Cho 2001; Hwang 2001;
Kim 2002). Comments of two bureaucrats, one male and one female,
offer sharply contrasting views:
It’s the reality that women-related policy is under the welfare logic.
Of course, there is the notion of ‘gender mainstreaming’, ... but I
54 Sook-Yeon Won
think, it’s ineffective not only because it’s highly ambiguous ... but
also because the acceptability of the gender equality logic is very
limited ... . In contrast, welfare logic is more acceptable. (Mr B)
It seems the Korean government can’t touch the ‘core’ part. Frankly,
the Korean government itself, under male domination, certainly,
doesn’t want to do that ... The problem is ... the Korean government
relies strongly on a welfare logic(defining women as dependents),
rather than developing any logic of gender equality(defining women
as equal to men). (Ms D)
Given this situation, it is not surprising that ministries concerned with

women’s interests are articulated in peripheral places. Moreover, divi-
sions in charge of concrete state measures for gender issues have been
placed as extremely low ranking units even in these less powerful minis-
tries. The majority of bureaucrats in this study share this understanding,
regarding their marginalized status within their own ministries. A
female bureaucrat vividly describes the current status of her division as
the least powerful even in the less powerful ministry:
Unlike the MOFE, the MOCIE and the MOPB – the so-called powerful
ministries – the MOHA, MOLAB and MOGE are classified as the
powerless or less powerful ministries. For us (as less powerful), it’s
fairly difficult to make policies. ... Such a ranking is also alive within
our ministry. Our division is in the last place, so we can’t make any
powerful ‘voice’ to persuade people inside. (Ms F)
Interestingly, almost all bureaucrats interviewed argue that their power-

less position is connected with the disadvantaged social status of
women or children in Korean society. This kind of attribution tends to
be persuasive in the light of some arguments that ranking between state
apparatus is ‘linked closely to – though not a simple reflection of – the
wider gender order of the society’ (Connell 1990: 523; see also Mahon
1984; Watson 1990; Grant and Tancred 1992). As mentioned earlier,
the Confucian tradition assumes hierarchical power relations between
men and women in terms of an order of superiority and inferiority as
natural. Therefore, in Confucian gender ideology, ‘women are seen as
morally and intellectually less capable than men’ (Ebrey 1991: 49). Such
a Confucian gender ideology goes beyond the boundary of the family.
Even in the state apparatus as the main site of policy implementation
for gender equality, the conservative and male-dominated Confucian
traditions are reflected as if they are extended families. While masculine
functions of the state such as law enforcement, finance and national

defence have been placed in superior positions, feminine functions of
the state such as welfare, women and childcare have been marginalized
(cf. Mills and Tancred 1992; Won 2007). Furthermore, women-related
state machineries, which aim at improvement of women’s social rights,
are forced to act in ways less ‘threatening’ to the existing gender order and
men’s interests. Such patriarchal traditions are manifested in practical
ways in state machineries, and consequently, they function as ‘cultural
impediments’ intertwined with ‘structural impediments’ against women
(cf. Cockburn 1991). In this respect, the experiences of two female
bureaucrats draw our attention:
Our powerlessness is partly related to the status of women in

Korea. ... Policy makers [especially male bureaucrats] aren’t concerned
with women seriously at all. While they can’t neglect the ‘voice’ of
big business, they respond to the needs from women in cynical ways;
‘Why are they so noisy?’ or, ‘We “principally” agree with that, but it would
be ‘an inappropriate time’ to make concrete actions. (Ms E)
Do you think women are a powerful pressure group that forces the
Korean government to do ‘something’ for them? It’s very doubtful ... .
Although there are lots of manifestos towards women, women’s issues
are highlighted only during election campaigns. It isn’t a long lasting
attention. Certainly it isn’t ... . It’s directly reflected in our division’s
status. (Ms A)
To sum up, women’s bureaux in sectorial ministries have been suffering

due to their structural and functional marginality as much as the MOGE.
Traditionally, their parent ministries in charge of welfare and social affairs
have taken residual positions in the Korean government. Additionally,
a welfare orientation as their underpinning logic prevents them from
pursuing an active role to further gender equality. Ironically, the margin-
alization of the divisions has been sustained by asymmetrical power
relations between men and women in society at large. Women’s subor-
dination, at the same time, contributes to consolidation of the gendered
power relations through gendered state policies: a vicious circle.
Insufficient staffing arrangements in women’s bureaux

Appropriate staffing is also an important requirement for effective
implementation of state policy for gender equality. Therefore, limited
staff resources have been a major constraint in effective policy imple-
mentation. For instance, the Presidential Commission of Women’s
56 Sook-Yeon Won
Affairs (PCWA), the previous women’s national machinery, had 49

staff members in total. Moreover, only 18 out of 49 were involved
in pure policy areas such as policy development or rectification
of discrimination against women, while the majority of staff were
involved in organizational management or maintenance (Cho 2001).
At first glance, in relation to the human resources available, the
MOGE, which has 120 staff members, may be evaluated as advanced
in comparison with the PCWA. There are wide deviations in staff size
from ministry to ministry across the Korean government, ranging
from around 295 to 14,000. However, even when we take the diver-
sity in staffing arrangements into account, the fact that the MOGE
with 120 staff making it the smallest, ‘a super mini-ministry’, is still
problematic. Additionally, with respect to limited staff arrange-
ments, women’s units in sectorial ministries in central government or
women’s divisions in local governments are the same. For instance,
given that each woman’s division in local governments consists of
eight or nine staff members on average, it is very difficult to expect
them to develop or implement comprehensive policies for gender
equality (Cho 2001; Kim 2002).
The crucial points about insufficient staff arrangements may be their
political nature and detrimental consequences. In reality, as staffing
procedure is as much political as budget allocation, different parts
within government compete for adequate staffing. The minimal staff
size of women’s bureaux in Korea is evidence of their peripheral status,
as a female bureaucrat notes:
Staff size ‘demonstrates’ the power we have, indeed. We can’t ignore

it. Nonetheless, our bureau consists of two divisions, whilst a bureau is
generally composed with three or more at least. It’s true we’re treated
as just a division rather than a substantial bureau, which means we’re
neglected. (Ms E)
Unsurprisingly, this limited staffing prevents the women’s bureaux from

fulfilment of their policy objectives. According to Gordon (1984: 109),
insufficient staffing generally brings the following consequences: (1)
staff is involved in only a limited way in such programme planning
and reporting as is done, (2) where job descriptions exist they hardly
reflect the work actually being carried out, nor are they reviewed peri-
odically with a view to their updating, (3) staff appraisal procedures
are not in place, (4) training is limited and unrelated to periodic indi-
vidual or organizational needs assessment, (5) with no serious attempts
at programme planning and monitoring, there is a total absence of

programme evaluation. Drawing on their own experiences, some
respondents in this study argue these consequences. In particular, they
emphasize the ways in which limited staffing affects policy monitoring
or reinforcement. A female bureaucrat in charge of labour inspection
admits that, under a terrible shortage of labour inspectors, it is impos-
sible to monitor all the labour practices. As a consequence, it is hard to
argue that issues related to working women or equal opportunities are
taken into account seriously:
There are around 780 labour inspectors in Korea. We have to cover all
of the labour-related acts, around 35 Acts altogether, and 12,000,000
workers. How many possible cases would there be? How could we be
expected to monitor and enforce the laws sufficiently? ... I am unable
to say that problems with female employment can be taken as ‘hot’
issues such as labour-management relations, overall working condi-
tions and foreign workers. (Ms F)
In terms of the significance of monitoring or enforcement for policy

effectiveness, the negative influence of insufficient staffing is much more
severe. In order for gender equality to be more than lip service, longi-
tudinal and on-going monitoring are vital (Forbes 1989; Moser 1993;
Mazur 1995). However, the limited staffing arrangements of women’s
bureaux, which result in insufficient monitoring of the way women’s
policies operate in practice, negatively affect the situations of women
as policy-takers. A response from a bureaucrat in charge of childcare
provision is worth attention. He strongly urges the primary responsi-
bility of parents themselves in choosing childcare facilities with reason-
able service quality instead of government intervention, because of the
severe lack of staff for quality control:
I, as the only civil servant in charge of childcare provision in our city,

can’t go there (private childcare facilities) even once in a year ... . What
is at issue here is that parents have to choose childcare facilities for their
children ‘with caution’ and monitor quality of service provided more
closely ... . Theoretically, it may be problematic, but do you have any
‘magical solutions’ under the current administrative system? (Mr C)
An even more detrimental factor is the ‘tide of downsizing’ in the Korean

government. The majority of bureaucrats in this study are aware of and
concerned about the situation. A female bureaucrat complains about
58 Sook-Yeon Won
the difficulty faced by her division with downsizing of the Korean state
bureaucracy:
With objective evidence, which shows extremely limited staff

members in our division, we keep asking for an increase in staff ... .
But, under the concept of ‘Small Government’ or ‘New Public
Management’, if we keep complaining about it, they would see it as
‘agency-selfishness, and furthermore they would ‘denounce’ us as a
force resistant to governmental reform. (Ms E)
Here again it can hardly be denied that the downsizing process is also
political. Therefore a chronic shortage of staffing and a continuing
threat of cutbacks faced by women’s bureaux are closely related to their
peripheral status within the Korean government.
The lack of internal cooperation among women’s units
The highly complex and multifaceted nature of women’s policy makes

it crucial to draw cooperation from other policy units concerned,
either internal or external (Gordon 1984; Moser 1993; Stetson and
Mazur 1995; Cho 2001; Kim 2002; Won 2007). Theoretically, the effec-
tiveness of women’s policy can be achieved through concerted efforts
made by all multi-sectorial agents. However, in practice, each agent
has vastly different perspectives on and thus different approaches
to similar issues. These differences in the perspectives of each agent
apparently produce different interests and strategies in securing their
own objectives.
Throughout the interviews with bureaucrats, it is not difficult to notice
that there are conflicts, either visible or invisible, among the agents
of women-related policy in terms of their basic perspectives, interests
and concrete strategies. For instance, with respect to childcare issues,
while the MOHW tends to view childcare through the lens of childcare
welfare, the Ministry of Labour (MOLAB) views it through the lens of
women’s employment, and the MOGE view it via gender equality or
women’s independence. The following comments show the significant
differences in basic perspective on childcare policy that each ministry
has. A bureaucrat in the MOGE argues that current childcare provision
operates from the child welfare perspective. According to her view, as
long as the MOWH takes primary responsibility for it, there is little
hope of significant change. Therefore, it is necessary to change the main
agent for childcare provision from the MOHW to the MOGE in order
to achieve gender equality. She criticizes the MOHW for holding on to

childcare policy for their ‘agent-selfish’ motivation:
They (the MOHW) have dealt with it (childcare provision) in the

same way as they did in the 1970s when the majority of mothers
stayed in their homes. Hence, we’ve asked the MOHA pass it over us
in order to respond to the needs of working mothers in the 2000s.
However, they strongly hold their ‘stake’ without consideration for
policy takers. (Ms D)
On the contrary, the MOHW remains critical towards the MOGE, arguing
that if the MOGE takes over the childcare policy, it would intensify the
gendered division of childcare responsibility, rather than obtain gender
equality via childcare service provision:
I can’t understand why they (the MOGE) want to be involved in

childcare service provision ... I think there is a considerable problem
with their argument. I mean, the fact that the MOGE takes respon-
sibility for childcare provision rather strengthens the rigid gender
division of labour in childcare because it stresses women’s primary
responsibility for childcare. ... . Sometimes I wonder if the MOGE
believes that mothers, rather than parents, have to take care of their
children. (Ms B)
Additionally, with regard to on-site childcare facilities, the related agents

come into conflict rather than mutual cooperation. According to a
female bureaucrat in the MOLAB, the MOLAB retains the position that if
the government forces employers stringently to provide childcare facili-
ties for working mothers as occupational welfare, it would be a good
reason for employers to avoid female employment. According to her
view, because the MOHW focuses on childcare per se, working women
are not considered properly:
Whilst we’ve regulated its (on-site childcare facilities) practical

operation, the legal basis for it, the ICA, has been under control of
the MOHW ... . While we’ve insisted on making it a recommenda-
tion, they want to regulate it as an obligation ... . Although we keep
asking to make it reasonable with mutual cooperation, they already
briefed the Commission for Succession of the Presidency on it (as
an obligation) without ironing out conflicting views between the
MOHW and us. (Ms F)
60 Sook-Yeon Won
As indicated above, unlike other policy areas women-related issues are

scattered in wide range of policy spheres, and thus interdependence
among them is indispensable for policy effectiveness. The impact of the
lack of cooperation motivated by agent-selfishness upon policy effec-
tiveness may be severe, as the following comment shows:
When we developed our manifestos concerned with women’s policy

for the presidential election, it was really hard to figure out the exact
situations surrounding women and women’s policy. There were
huge deviations in policy data or reports from ministry to ministry
concerned. ... It was a terrible confusion ... I would say, since they
usually approach issues in the way of agent-interest maximisation,
they use the data (or information) favourable to their basic logic or
perspective. (Ms G)
Were the MOGE to coordinate the huge differences in the policy direc-
tions pursued by diverse agents properly as advocated by the law, the
problems with the lack of cooperation could be handled in reasonable
ways. As repeatedly indicated hitherto, however, coordination by the
MOGE is rather limited, due to its peripheral status in terms of loca-
tion, control over personal resources available and bureaucratic resist-
ance. Furthermore, under less cooperative situations, the lens of child
welfare, which is closely associated with the existing policy network,
takes control over the gender equality perspective.
Symbiotic relationship? Relationship between women’s bureaux

and women’s organizations
If cooperation with existing policy units in governmental bureaucracy
is one dimension, relations with social organizations of gender issues in
civil society is another. Particularly, in terms of the political nature of
gender issues, the cooperative relationship between women’s bureaux
and women’s social organizations is an indispensable factor for effective
implementation of state policy towards gender equality (Moser 1993;
Mazur 1995; Stetson and Mazur 1995; Sawer 1995). The majority of
bureaucrats interviewed are fully aware of the importance of networking
with women’s social organizations. They define the relationships with
women’s organizations as ‘symbiotic’ relationships: women’s bureaux get
political support from women’s social organizations and women’s social
organizations get funding and information from women’s bureaux.
The bureaucrats interviewed share the main reason for cooperative
relationship with women’s social organizations: the peripheral status
of women’s bureaux within bureaucratic structures. With the lack of

internal cooperation, the mobilization of support from outside plays a
pivotal role in forcing the rest of the state bureaucracy to move towards
gender equality issues:
Because of our disadvantaged status inside government and the

political nature of gender issues, we can’t help relying on the forces
from outside [women’s social organisations in civil society] in order
to do something on behalf of women. Otherwise, we almost can’t do
anything. (Ms D)
When we need to lead cooperation from other parts within govern-
ment, it’s extremely difficult unless we carry support from outside
[women’s social organisations] ... . For instance, in case of legislation
for maternity protection, the pressures from women’s social organiza-
tions played a decisive role. (Ms E)
Despite the need for cooperative relations with women’s organizations,

there also exist some difficulties in maintaining relations effectively
and consistently. There are some comments from bureaucrats inter-
viewed about their difficulties, including the unrealistic demands from
women’s organizations and interest conflicts within women’s organiza-
tions themselves:
We couldn’t take this further without their (women’s social organi-

zations) support ... Nevertheless, sometimes I wonder if they have
a realistic view of the situation ... . For maternity protection, they
complained very strongly because we couldn’t reflect their needs into
the laws as much as they wanted. However, their demands were far
from administrative reality. At that time, we kept arguing whenever
we met. It was terribly hard to go with them. (Ms E)
The problem is that women’s social organisations are not unified,
that is, there isn’t a homogenous voice from them ... They come into
severe conflicts with each other. Between them, we are in an awkward
position! (Mr D)
Interestingly enough, difficulties and dilemmas faced by femocrats are

quite different from those of ordinary bureaucrats in women’s bureaux.
The dilemmas largely come from femocrats’ special backgrounds. The
vast majority of femocrats in women’s bureaux usually worked with
women’s social organizations in civil society before entering government.
It seems that their previous connections with women’s organizations
62 Sook-Yeon Won
make it easier to retain firm relations with them. However, the reality
may not be that simple. As Sawer (1995: 34) indicated, ‘a central dilemma
for femocrats is that they need to forge alliances within the bureauc-
racy and with the women’s movement to be effective, but the compro-
mises and secrecy/trustworthiness required to maintain the former may
sour relationships with the latter’. Some bureaucrats interviewed in
the MOGE reveal how difficult it is for them to make a proper balance
between governmental bureaucracy and women’s social organizations
in civil society. According to them, some women’s social organizations
think that the femocrats in women’s bureaux have sold out and joined
the patriarchy rather than challenging its structures:
The problem is the different position between us (inside) and women’s

social organisations (outside). Sometimes our ministry tries to get
something important (budget or funding), admitting patriarchal
authority if needed (as a strategy). But the women’s organisations,
which hate to accept it, criticise us for currying favour with them
(men). They usually ask; which side do you stand on? (Ms D)
The tensions between femocrats and women’s organizations may

partly be caused by gaps between efficiency as administrative logic and
equality as women’s movement logic (cf. Forbes 1989). As long as they
are institutionalized as a women’s bureau in governmental bureaucracy
and in order to integrate women’s issues into mainstream policy agenda,
it is not ideal to neglect administrative logic. Nonetheless, for women’s
social organizations outside, it may not be understood as a strategic
choice or an inevitable accommodation. If so, are the women’s bureaux
welcomed by the rest of the bureaucracy inside? As already explored,
women’s bureaux in the Korean government have been under suspi-
cion from the other parts of governmental bureaucracy because of their
presumed closeness to the women’s movement. In a word, women’s
bureaux have been suffering from competing perspectives between
existing bureaucrats, who suspect women’s bureaux as missionaries for
pushing women’s agenda, and the women’s organizations, who often
believe that women’s bureaux have sold out. A female bureaucrat in a
bureau reveals an awkward position that women’s bureaux, including
her office, have faced between traditional bureaucrats and women’s
organizations:
We’ve got trouble between the women’s NGOs and existing policy
units. Whilst they (existing policy units) tend to view us as one of
NGOs, rather than an administrative office, women’s NGOs keep

complaining that we do not represent women’s interests, asking:
What’s the difference in women’s bureaux from the other adminis-
trative units? We can’t satisfy any of them. (Ms C)
Conclusion
Under the objective of gender mainstreaming and gender sensitivity in

state policy, a variety of women’s bureaux have been created or relo-
cated in the Korean gender regime. Unfortunately, the policy promise
of an active state role for gender equality via systemization of women’s
bureaux is in contradiction to the basic logic of the Korean welfare
regime: minimization of state responsibility for social provision. As a
consequence, a big gap between policy promise and the reality is rather
inevitable. The gap takes the primary attention of this study.
This study started with the following questions: Are the women’s
bureaux powerful enough to improve gender equality as the Korean
gender regime has promised? Will the policy pronouncements of active
intervention in gender equality and improving gender sensitivity
through public policy become reality? Throughout the study, it is diffi-
cult to find positive answers to these questions.
In terms of the physical existence of women’s bureaux, there is a signif-
icant advance in policy direction that is more responsive to women.
However, the surface level does not show everything. There is a hidden
reality behind the scene. Given the situations surrounding women-re-
lated state machineries, in terms of their peripheral structural arrange-
ments, of inappropriate human resource allocation, subtle conflict with
existing bureaux, and resistance and blame from social organizations
for women’s issues outside government, it is hard to say that gender
mainstreaming or gender sensitivity have become reality in the Korean
gender regime.
Interestingly enough, the big gap between the rhetoric of Korean
governments regarding the position of women’s state machineries
and their substantial positions is intertwined with Confucian gender
ideology and women’s social positions based on this ideology in Korea.
The marginalized status of women-related state machineries is justified
by the Confucian ideology of asymmetrical power relations between men
and women in society at large. Women’s subordination also contributes
to the consolidation of gendered power relations through gendered state
machineries; that forms a vicious circle. Moreover, Confucian tradition
64 Sook-Yeon Won
of the family as having primary responsibility for women or children

also reinforces the minimization of state responsibility for the issues
reinforcing the peripheral reality of women-related state bureaux. In a
word, unless the Korean gender regime abolishes gendered Confucian
ideology and the basic logic of state responsibility minimization, gender
mainstreaming and gender sensitivity are rather diplomatic rhetoric and
symbolic gestures.
Acknowledgement
The author is most grateful for the contribution of the respondents

in relevant ministries, without whom this research would not have
succeeded.
Note
1. This study is partly drawn from Won (2007), ‘Institutionalised Powerlessness?
The Reality of Women’s Policy Units and their Gendered Dynamics in Korea’,
Journal of Social Policy, 36(1).
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4
Continuity and Change:
Comparing Work and Care
Reconciliation of Two Generations
of Women in Taiwan
Jessie Shu-Yun Wu
Introduction
There is no shortage of statistical data shedding light on how far Taiwan

has been changing over the past 40 years. Transformations in industrial
composition, family structure and the educational system, combined
with some reworking of state welfare policy, have shifted the dynamics
of Taiwanese society. The labour market especially has witnessed a
considerable movement of married women into paid work. Compared
with less than a quarter of married women being engaged in gainful
employment in the late 1960s, the labour force participation rate had
doubled (48 per cent) by the mid-2000s (DGBAS 2005). In particular,
the employment rates in the 2000s comprise a high proportion of those
women who have pre-school children (Council of Labour Affairs 2006).
While in the late 1960s and the 1970s (Chang 1999), the cultural script
of ‘being a woman’ almost overlapped with ‘being a mother’, the role
of women today very often encompasses both mother and wage earner
(Lui 2000).
Although there have been great changes in society and women’s
employment between the late 1960s/the 1970s and the 2000s, it is not
clear what impact the socio-economic transitions have had on women’s
everyday practice in managing work and childcare. More young mothers
are engaged in economic activity and facing the challenge of balancing
work and family. But the central role of the woman in childcare has not
appeared to change significantly, even though many other aspects have,
66
Continuity and Change 67
for example, the development of the capitalist economy, in the past

four decades (Huang 2001; Xiao and Li 2002). Most studies in Taiwan
approaching the issue of work and family have tended to focus on
women’s employment trends, fertility and use of childcare from a quan-
titative perspective. A few scholarly attempts have been made to provide
qualitative analyses on women’s work and care arrangements, concen-
trating on homogenous groups of mothers in the current generation.
These studies seem to have limitations in understanding the dynamics
and the diversity of women’s experiences and strategies in reconciling
their paid work and motherhood in response to social changes. For
example, what are the divergent processes and solutions mothers apply
in order to negotiate a satisfying/acceptable way for their integration of
dual roles on an everyday basis? How do mothers adjust their commit-
ments to employment and childcare in the context of the social changes
experienced by women in different generations?
To explore these issues, this chapter draws on findings from a new empir-
ical study, involving 45 working mothers. The research examines changes
and continuities in the interlinked experiences of combining childcare with
paid employment during two time periods in Taiwan. To do so it takes the
women’s own perspectives as central to the analysis. In particular, it asks
how far the reconciliation processes and outcomes vary among women
across two generations and various social strata, acting in their individual
socio-demographic-economic contexts. These issues are pursued through
in-depth interviews with two age groups of married women,1 contextual-
ized by secondary data from existing sources. The research covers both
middle-class and working-class respondents,2 to increase the possibility of
encompassing individual variations. An approximately equal distribution
between two generations and social classes is achieved.3
The first section of the chapter sketches out the background profiles of
the Taiwanese context. The second and third sections explore how two
generations of women work towards a balance between their employ-
ment and childcare responsibilities in a particular context. It then
engages with a comparison of the divergent experiences of mothers in
two time periods. The final section considers the policy implications of
the research findings.
Women in the Taiwanese context
Previous research has shown that different cultures and historical periods
develop distinct rituals for handling the young (Pfau-Effinger 1998,
1999) and changes in maternal employment behaviour may be explained
68 Jessie Shu-Yun Wu
by shifts in the social and institutional context in which women make

their decisions (Vlasblom and Schippers 2006). Without exploring the
contexts where the caring and earning roles are performed, women’s
diverse reconciliation strategies cannot be understood. Here, the broader
framework of Taiwanese society is investigated, focusing specifically on
the two time periods: the late 1960s/the 1970s and the 2000s.
The late 1960s and through the 1970s brought significant change in
employment and education opportunities for women. The rapid rise
of modern industry and the implementation of nine years compulsory
education led to women being more economically active (Chang 1999;
Lee 2003). However, single women contributed more to this increase
than married women with young children, as indicated by the M-shape
employment pattern of women at the time. Women’s post-marital exit
from the labour force implied that women were allocated the major
responsibilities for participating in various care and family life, and thus
were restricted in their opportunities for non-familial activities (Brinton
et al. 1995). This conformed to Confucian values towards women’s family
role as a homemaker and care provider. Studies using patriarchal values to
explain women’s employment patterns suggest that during the mid-1960s
and the mid-1980s, the industrialization period in Taiwan, the traditional
view of women’s role based on Confucian teaching remained strong due
to its dissemination through the educational system and the mass media
(Gallin 1984; Brinton et al. 1995; Chen 1998). Meanwhile, women were
given inferior legal status to men within marriage and the family, as the
initial Family Part of the Civil Code regulated a relatively clear gender
division and support for the patriarchal family system (Liu 1995; Chen
1996). And while the government subordinated non-economic policy,
for example, childcare policy, to economic growth, the family loomed
large in welfare provision (Ku 1995; Holliday 2000).
The inverse U-shape has been the new profile of women’s labour force
participation for the next generation (DGBAS 2006a). The increasing rate
of full-time integration into employment by women with pre-school
children implies that the housewife type of marriage has become less
dominant, and the dual-breadwinner type has emerged as a competing
gender arrangement in everyday life in the 2000s (Wu 2007). But with the
decrease in the extended family type and increase in the nuclear arrange-
ment, it is supposed that the capacity of the family for welfare provision is
declining. This is the background against which Taiwanese women have
increasingly required the state to intervene more significantly to solve the
dilemma between work and motherhood. As a response to these demands,
a few progressive welfare reforms have been made by the government
helping mothers to combine dual responsibilities, such as introducing a

universal allowance for pre-school children and increasing the quantity
of formal childcare services. There have also been changes in family law
towards a more gender egalitarian direction after three revisions. Even
though changes in a number of aspects concerned with women’s social
practices and the social welfare system have been addressed, it is argued
that neither has the fundamental approach of the state’s emphasis on
the family/woman as a key welfare provider greatly shifted, nor has the
welfare policy itself been sensitive enough to consider the varying needs
of different groups of women (Wang and Sun 2003). Also, some gender
segregation in the labour market, wage gaps and marriage bar matter, are
caused by the traditional cultural assumption of the gender arrangement
of male breadwinner and female housekeeper (Wu 2007).
In the remaining sections, empirical findings from qualitative inter-
views with two age groups of mothers are presented. The findings are
organized according to the women’s generations, so that their experi-
ences and practices that emerged from the data can be interpreted in
their individual contexts. Also, to better understand to what extent
traditional culture and modern changes have influenced the experiences
and strategies of married women in reconciling their earning and family
roles, the mothers’ work and childcare practice is discussed in relation to
the gender division of family responsibilities within their households.
Work and care reconciliation: the older generation
Three groups emerged from the analysis of the interviews with the 22
mothers in the older generation. These are women in patriarchal fami-
lies, women in strongly sharing households and women who are the
primary maintainers in the family, as financial contributors, home-
keepers and decision-makers.
Women in limited-sharing, patriarchal households

Pfau-Effinger (1998) argues that individual behaviour refers to cultural
values and norms, and the social practices of women are heavily influ-
enced by predominant beliefs on the ‘correct’ division of labour (also see
Pfau-Effinger and Geissler 2002). Under the influence of Confucianism, the
traditional Taiwanese family was a patriarchal, male-headed unit in which
married women were restricted to their roles of obedient wives, devoted
daughters-in-law and self-sacrificing mothers. In this prevailing cultural
and legal context, it was not surprising to find that the largest proportion
of women in the older generation assumed the primary responsibilities
for both childcare and housework. Of the 22 older mothers, 14 lived in

households where husbands made a limited contribution to domestic
duties but wielded considerable patriarchal power over important family
decisions. Although these women had their housework sharing type in
common, they were distinguished by their employment adjustments
in response to the needs of their families and the resources available to
them. Some women fitted their work sequences around the course of
their family life cycle. Others maintained uninterrupted work histories to
provide a higher level of economic support for their families.
Lin4 is 58 years old, a mother-of-two, whose husband is a chandler. She
worked full-time as a music teacher until her first child was born. She
justified her career break by saying that ‘my husband and myself thought I
should take care of the baby and the family in full sail’. When her first child
became a secondary school student, she began part-time piano teaching
while her children were in school. The subsequent phase of letting go of
her children further decreased her care work and allowed for an increase
in her hours of employment. So she began to run a tea house full-time.
Mothers like Lin reported gaining better opportunities to strengthen their
labour market attachment when they had more freedom from childcare
obligations. Working part-time was regarded as an interim arrangement
to change their fully committed mothering life. This enabled the women
to maintain themselves as an involved mother by being around for their
children during the ‘mother-appropriate time’ (Garey 1999: 32), that
is, out-of-school time. According to Garey (1995, 1999), the concept of
‘being there’ carries meanings of mothers’ physical and emotional avail-
ability to their children. Mothers use this idea to convey that they are
fulfilling the cultural expectation of motherhood by positioning them-
selves in the culturally appropriate places and times.
However, adopting the part-time strategy belonged with a certain socio-
economic background, especially having a husband more highly placed in
the occupational hierarchy. Working part-time did not appear in the work/
care strategies of women with relatively limited financial resources. For
example, Fu is a 51-year-old mother with two children. Her family used to
rely solely on the earnings of her husband, a construction worker. When
she saw her family facing financial hardship along with the developing
family life cycle – an ageing husband, two growing children requiring
more money but less care – she ended her 15-year-long housewife life by
working full-time at a beauty salon to secure the welfare of her family:
He (her husband) was getting old and there was not much suitable
work left for him ... Our outgoings were raised by the additional cost
of meeting the children’s educational needs. That’s why I had to

contribute something to my family. (Fu 51)
These women left work after getting married or having their first child, but
moved back to work when they realized more money was needed within
the household. The resumption occurred most often after their children
started school. In addition to supporting the family financially, the money
making activity was to live up to motherhood ideology, in which the
mothers showed their great willingness to meet their children’s educa-
tional needs. Other considerations were also given, for instance, to main-
tain children’s self-esteem by providing them with a ‘proper appearance’:
I worked to supplement our household income, so we could purchase

more stuff, especially children’s clothing. I wished them to look as
if they were from a good family, so they would not be looked down
upon. (Yin 54)
While some mothers would accept a temporary drop in their wages to

look after their children, others considered that their household could
not afford to do without their income. Mothers who remained full-time
in employment during their parenting period expressed a strong degree
of financial necessity to work. Because buying childcare services was
unaffordable, family members (apart from the husband) were the most
active agents for childcare. This mainly took the form of intergenera-
tional reciprocity. Mobilizing family resources for childcare accomplished
both economic advantage and the principle of trustworthiness for these
mothers. Wang, a sewing worker with four children, commented on her
childcare arrangement:
My mother-in-law looked after my children. There was no point in

sending our kids to a stranger’s place. Don’t you think it’s too risky?
Besides, we had no money to send. We gave my mother-in-law some
money and she helped us with childcare. Don’t you think it’s a good
arrangement? (Wang 56)
Sometimes, family support for childcare was irregular and mothers had
to work out alternative strategies to carry on their dual roles. Working
from home was then adopted to respond to the inaccessibility of family
resources. In some cases, older children were called upon to share the
care of younger siblings to ensure their mothers’ employment was
sustainable, as has been suggested in other research (e.g. Ridge 2006).
Women in strongly sharing households
Unlike women in the previous cluster whose spouses hardly figured in

their coping strategies for balancing work and care, three mothers in this
group experienced a radically different model of family life. Husbands –
and parents-in-law in two cases – here played an important part in
domestic work. In the case of Xiao’s three-generation household, the
four adults not only shared housework but also took turns to look after
her two children, depending upon their availability:
My husband went abroad to study when our first child was two years
old, so my mother-in-law asked for one year’s leave to help with
childcare. When the children were of pre-school age, my father-
in-law took night-shift employment and thus was able to care for his
grandchildren while the rest of the adults were at work ... When our
children started school, my husband took them to and from school,
because his work schedule fitted in with their timetable. If their father
was unavailable to collect them, the grandfather would do this, as he
could drive well. (Xiao 56)
While mothers in the more patriarchal group above described childcare

responsibility as shared only when they themselves were unavailable,
for example, working outside the home, domestic duty in these more
equally distributed households did not simply belong to the mother
but to every adult member in the family. This underpinned women’s
attachment to the labour force. Previous research from both West and
East also show that maternal employment is typically higher in families
where domestic tasks are shared between father and mother (Gerson
1985; Sanchez and Thomson 1997; Garey 1999; Sullivan 2000; Elvin-
Nowak and Thomsson 2001; Hattery 2001; Sung 2002). For example,
while Garey (1999) argues that having fathers spend regular time at
home, being primarily responsible for their children, is an important
resource that enables mothers to work outside the home, Sung’s (2002)
study in Confucian impact on Korean women sees working mothers as
particularly stressed when their spouses did not participate in childcare
and domestic work. As a result of their more egalitarian style of living,
with household work distributed among all adults, sometimes of two
generations, no mother in this group experienced a gap in their work
histories.
Nevertheless, keeping a continuous career going did not mean that
there were no difficult trade-offs between women’s family and working
lives. To reduce the incompatibility, one mother took a less competitive

job, whereas the other two renounced promotion opportunities. Here is
Xiao talking about her belief that children should come first:
If I had stayed in my previous work, I could have been promoted

to a director or a managerial position. But, the longer I stayed in
my office the less time I spent with my children. I should not be
so selfish and always leave the children with their grandparents or
father. (Xiao 56)
The narrative reveals that despite this group of mothers not changing
their full-time commitment to employment, the content of their
working lives was substantially influenced by the force of their mother-
hood ideology.
Mothers as financial contributors, home-keepers and

decision-makers
As well as the above two groups, another set of women is identified

among the older respondents. The most eye-catching characteristic
among these five women is that the mother herself acted as the core adult
in the household, managing to undertake most or all family responsi-
bilities, including domestic work, childcare, financial maintenance and
decision-making. Chun is a mother of three with no more than primary
school education. After marrying her husband, she quickly became
aware of the fact that her newly formed family could not be fitted into
the male-breadwinner model, because her husband never supported his
family. As a result of this, she became the sole maintainer of the family.
She worked from home for more than 15 years while her children were
growing up. This seemed the most viable arrangement for mothers like
Chun to combine money earning with childrearing:
I brought manual work home from several factories. I did this because
no one could help me with childcare. I had no money to use a child-
minder. At the same time I needed to make money ... I had to work
hard in order to earn enough money to meet basic expenditure and
my children’s tuition fees. (Chun 49)
Chun’s account revealed a large part of her motherhood practice as

remaining in work to take on financial responsibility for her children.
Chun actually portrayed a typical figure ‘Taiwan A-Xin’. The term
‘A-Xin’ in Taiwan usually refers to a woman who suffers many a predes-

tined setback during her life, yet she is redoubtable enough to face all
adversities without receiving any support from male partners.
However, the circumstances under which this distribution of house-
hold work emerged differed. While some mothers were not doing this
out of choice, others actively chose to manage their own families. From
the time she saw that her husband was unlikely to be the kind she had
expected, Yang, a manager of an insurance company, decided to take on
the main family responsibilities:
I make decisions on my own. I used to consider his opinions, but it

turned out that he was wrong ... My husband became frustrated and
said ‘anyway, you are unhappy with what I have done; so I won’t do
anything for you’. It’s a vicious circle. (Yang 52)
In response to their particular situation, the lack of the husband’s

participation in most household responsibilities, the five women in
this category developed their own strategies to reconcile employment
and motherhood. Regarding childcare arrangements, relatively affluent
women such as Yang were able to engage individual childminders to
look after their children. Familial care, usually provided by grandpar-
ents, was also important in some cases. Women who did not have suffi-
cient financial and familial resources to negotiate had to sort out the
childcare problem themselves. Mother care seemed the only conceiv-
able solution, which was carried out simultaneously with working from
home, as in the case of Chun. Concerning their earning role, these
mothers tended to make a strong connection between their labour
force participation and the welfare of their children. Staying in work
was either for meeting children’s basic or educational needs, or for
providing them with a better life. Here Yang views her efforts as made
for the sake of her children:
The flat is the reward for my hard work. This could not have
happened if we had relied on my husband. And my son could not
have had the chance to go to France to attend a summer school last
year. (Yang 52)
With regard to housework, it is often assumed that women with a

husband who avoided family duties would mobilize their children to
share housework. This was true in some cases, but not all the mothers
agreed with this idea. The following narrative shows why Lan, a mother
of four, who was the sole breadwinner and caregiver in her family,
absolved her children from housework:
I didn’t ask my children to share chores as they were busy with their
studies ... People would not regard you as a good mother if your chil-
dren were helping with the chores, but they would admit that you
are a successful mother if your children have good educational attain-
ment. (Lan 56)
This echoes previous research in Taiwan which reveals that Taiwanese

women, who raised their children in the 1970s, identified themselves
through being a mother, and gained self-fulfilment by helping their
children to achieve success in school (Zhuang 1999).
Work and care reconciliation: the younger generation
This section explores the work and care practice of the younger mothers.
As with the classification made for the older generation, 23 younger
mothers are divided into two groups according to their family labour
allocation: women in limited-sharing households with unequal distribu-
tion of work, and women in strongly sharing households with a more
egalitarian arrangement. The third form – women as primary maintainers
in the family – is not found and therefore is not considered here.
Women in limited-sharing, patriarchal households

Twelve women in the younger age group reported that they were in
charge of the main responsibilities for housework including child-
care. Although middle-class mothers were also included, working-class
women were found to be dominant in this category. Ten of the twelve
were in jobs at lower positions in the occupational hierarchy. So were
their husbands. These women were relatively restricted in their financial
resources.
Incompatibility between work in the home and outside constantly
recurred in the interviews with this group. In the context of their
husbands’ limited contribution towards household labour, changing
their own employment was the most popular strategy for these mothers
to combine paid and unpaid duties. For example, Cai, a 33-year-old
mother, used to work as a hairdressing assistant before having a daughter,
when she decided to take another job with a different schedule, as a
receptionist working from 8.30 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. She explained this was
because working for a hairdressing salon required a 12-hour shift, from
9 a.m. to 9 p.m. For Cai, it was improper for a mother to stay long
hours at work and leave the ‘second shift’ undone, as well as missing the
evenings when she could build intimacy with her child. The movement
to another job with fewer working hours was regarded as a compromise
to meet both the need to provide for the family financially and the
need to devote time and attention to her child. Several younger women
reported that they moved from a job that required long hours to one
with a ‘normal’ schedule, usually from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., to perform their
mothering and domestic duties.
As most women in this cluster shared a working-class background,
familial care that reduced childcare costs was relied upon when the
mother was at work. This was usually arranged by cohabiting with
the family care providers, usually parents-in-law. This suggests that,
in addition to expressing the traditional value of filial piety by living
together with husbands’ parents, the sharing of living space can also
be attributed to financial reasons. According to the mothers’ accounts,
financial arrangements included smaller or no cash payment to grand-
parents for providing childcare. Even though living with in-laws further
decreased the everyday expenses, this arrangement may place mothers
in a dilemma, as sharing living space may not be easy.
Making employment changes to balance work and family life also
involved temporary withdrawals from the labour market. This was to
fill care gaps, particularly when the women lost their regular childcare
providers. In addition, there were signs that resuming employment
was most likely to take place when the mothers found new solutions
to answer their childcare needs. Ming, a 25-year-old mother with two
children, made it clear that she would not have moved back to work if
not for the aid of her mother-in-law:
My mother-in-law got sacked, so she was available to look after my

children. I went back to work as I didn’t have to take care of children
all day any more. (Ming 25)
Women in strongly sharing households

Eleven mothers evaluated their husbands as helpful men in respect of
the family labour, but the women’s employment patterns varied. Some
remained full-time at work without any significant changes; others had
chosen to interrupt their work lives for individual reasons.
In the non-break group, mainly professional women, family support
played a vital role in helping mothers to integrate their dual roles.
Especially the flexible and intensive childcare provision, including

24-hour care, available from their family networks made room for the
women to concentrate on their own career.
Relatively, these professional women were more affluent not only in
terms of their human capital but also in their family resources. As their
extended families usually had a similar socio-economic background to
them, the women reported that their parents or in-laws were wealthy
enough to invest their time and money in their grandchildren. These
educated family caregivers also shared in fulfilling their grandchildren’s
educational needs. The quotation below largely explains why these
mothers preferred using familial care to choosing paid childcare serv-
ices, even when these were affordable:
Because my parents help to take care of my daughter, my husband

and I can have our own time to do something else. More importantly,
my parents are intellectuals, so that they can educate her while they
are caring for her. (Tian 33)
In addition, this group of mothers were entitled to apply for more occu-
pational welfare than other groups of women in the population. Social
welfare for working mothers in Taiwan targets certain groups of women,
such as government employees and those who work for big compa-
nies.5 Survey data also suggests that many policies have not been put
into practice yet (DGBAS 2006b). For example, workplaces that did not
provide time adjustment for their women workers with young children
accounted for more than 70 per cent in 2005, and 47 per cent of work-
places did not grant applications for parental leave. Therefore, only a
limited number of women benefit from these.
The other set of younger women living in households where the
domestic duties were more equally distributed had taken breaks in
their work. In common with the non-break mothers, women here were
mainly of a middle-class background, in which relatively more family
and occupational resources were available. Paradoxically, these mothers
explained their career interruption in personal terms rather than in
childcare terms. For example, a mother justified her one year pause
from work as for seeking a more desirable job. Two mothers had taken
parental leave, but used this for doing a PhD or recovering their health.
The family strategy remained important in meeting childcare needs
when the mothers were not available. In few cases, women arranged
paid childminders for their children owing to different childrearing
styles between the mothers themselves and the family caregivers.
Comparing two generations: processes and outcomes

As shown above, individual mothers’ reconciliation processes were based
on and interwoven with a constellation of resources and constraints
as well as with their personal ideologies arsing from their particular
socio-demographic-economic backgrounds. This interaction, as a result,
constructed the actual practice of the women’s combination of employ-
ment with motherhood. The work and care outcomes also reflected how
individual mothers reacted to factors that appeared to influence them
in a certain context.
The process of work and care reconciliation

Within those key elements that facilitated and/or restricted the
women’s work and care negotiations, the family played a significant
role in enabling mothers to balance work and care. Familial childcare
arrangements were preferred as the best substitute for mother care.
In comparison with their older counterparts, the younger mothers
depended more heavily on this intra-familial strategy. Considering
the issues of trustworthiness, flexibility and affordability (especially
for the working-class women), family members from both paternal
and maternal sides were the most appropriate sources of childcare for
working mothers.
Family resources also impacted on women’s employment uptake.
Families’ understanding, encouragement and non-stereotyped attitudes/
actions towards gender were found to influence women’s commitment
to their work. The importance of obtaining understanding and accept-
ance from parents-in-law in their decision to work outside the home
was ever present among women from the older generation. For those
middle-class younger women who expressed their strong work commit-
ment in the interviews, their parents were described as a key supportive
factor in their career, in terms of the parental support for a longer period
of study and in not instilling conventional gender differentiated notions
of daughterhood.
Resources offered through the family networks included day-to-day
completion of housework, residential assistance and emotional support.
While the role of the family was important to most women, this does
not mean that the level and nature of family provision was consistent
among different groups. For instance, some working-class women could
live together with their in-laws rent-free, while their better-off peers were
more likely to be given/loaned money by their parents (or in-laws) to
buy their own properties. The younger women tended to seek emotional
support from their original families, but the older women considered
‘running back to the original family’ would put their families-in-law to

shame. The latter example showed that the conventional gender role
ideology was less likely to be challenged by the older working mothers.
The ideology in relation to womanhood affected different generations
of mothers’ willingness to be close to their original families.
Husbands were another crucial resource within families. The degree
of husbands’ participation in domestic work ranged from inclusive to
restrictive and was related to class differences. In general, middle-class
households had a smaller gender gap in family labour distribution than
the working-class ones. This was more observable in the young, nuclear
households. The result conforms to two main approaches in explaining
the differing degrees of men’s involvement in housework. The family
power perspective argues that mutual financial dependence promotes
mutual arrangements, so earning enables some women to enhance
their bargaining power in the family (Gerson 1985; Leonard 2001).
The cultural perspective connects the share of domestic labour with
the educational and socio-economic backgrounds, arguing that men/
women from higher status are more likely to conceive a norm of gender
parity and accordingly act more equally in sharing housework (Elvin-
Nowak and Thomsson 2001; Lu and Yi 2005).
However, a resource for one woman could be a drawback for another.
Being a wife and daughter-in-law in the Taiwanese context was a
constraint that prevented some mothers from making decisions indi-
vidually or in their own interests. Instead, they had to consider their
role and position within the whole extended families when they were
arranging their employment and childcare. As expected, the older
women were more likely to have a subordinate position in their fami-
lies-in-law, where husbands and parents-in-law wielded more patriar-
chal family power.
The impact of welfare regimes on the social practice of motherhood
and the degree and form of women’s participation in the labour market
during the childrearing period is often regarded as an important factor in
comparative welfare state theories (Esping-Andersen 1990, 2002; Lewis
1992; Sainsbury 1996; Windebank 1996; Crompton 1998; Ferrarini
2006). A dearth of support from the public sphere was a common experi-
ence shared by both generations of women, though some policy reforms
have been made in recent years and certain groups in the younger gener-
ation were able to claim more public resources. For example, a number
of young respondents with under-threes were eligible to apply for
parental leave, thanks to the Gender Equality Employment Law enacted
in 2002. Nevertheless, using parental leave might bring disadvantages in
women’s careers and finances, and this led to great hesitation in taking
up provision.
Walker and Wong (2005: 215) argue that East Asian governments
‘prefer to assign a greater role in meeting the need for social welfare to
the “welfare society” – that is, the family (women effectively) and third
sector’. The younger women in this study were found to see the state as
a potential resource in their coping strategies, while the older women
tended to assume that a work and care balance should be managed
within the private sphere of the family. Wu (2009) argues that women’s
‘undemanding’ attitude towards public support may give the state an
excuse to escape from its collective responsibilities for the family and
for working mothers. The following narrative from an older mother
described her view towards the government:
It’s not right to demand too much from the government. I never
thought about getting government help when I was raising my chil-
dren. (Rong 52)
The women interviewed also identified the importance of their

employers’ attitudes towards working mothers. This sort of ‘informal’
ingredient might help or hinder women in managing their work and
childcare. It did not exactly correspond to the women’s ages or social
strata, but depended on the employers themselves. Some women in the
study established personal networks at their workplace or in their homo-
geneous social groups to generate resources. Furthermore, a number
of younger women described good connections with other mothers
through the Internet for discussing childcare queries. However, this
connection, ubiquitous in the younger middle-class group, was almost
invisible among the older and working-class respondents.
Many studies have found that motherhood ideology plays a signifi-
cant role when women develop strategies to combine motherhood and
employment. It affects mothers’ labour market participation choices
(Garey 1999; Hattery 2001; Duncan and Strell 2004), the extent to which
they think they have to be engaged in the caring roles (Hays 1996; Uttal
1996), as well as how mothers feel about their work and care arrange-
ments (Segura 1994; Hays 1996). Beliefs about motherhood influence
the ways and capacities of individual women to combine paid work and
childcare responsibility. Respondents’ understanding of what mothering
is supposed to be and their work and family reconciliation were found
to adjust to each other. Mothers fine-tuned their work and care arrange-
ments to fit in with their perceived beliefs. For example, a group of the
older mothers interwove their paid work with their family life cycle to
stay at home while their children had not yet reached school age. The
strategy of making changes in their employment in order to accommo-
date their children’s needs and perform the work of mothering was prac-
tised by both older and younger generations. Women also constructed
an alternative idea of mothering to rationalize their own situations. For
instance, integrating earning into motherhood was justified by both low
income and better-off women, especially to meet their children’s welfare
or to fulfil their children’s educational needs.
Work and care outcomes: individual solutions
Work and care reconciliation processes were thus practised and medi-
ated by an intricate set of factors, in which a woman’s own context, the
resources and constraints available to her, and her personal ideology
became intertwined together. Another objective of the research was to
examine the mothers’ actual arrangements of work and care in the two
generations.
The reconciliation outcomes could be understood through women’s
childcare strategies and employment responses. Using a more integrated
view to present the ways, Taiwanese women combined paid work with
motherhood, five patterns emerged. These were categorized as: male
breadwinner/female caregiver, dual-earner/female caregiver, sole bread-
winner and caregiver, dual-earner/family caregiver, and dual-earner/
market caregiver. In the male breadwinner/female caregiver category,
women were viewed as being responsible for the work of childcare,
particularly when their children were too young for school. In the dual-
earner/female caregiver category, women combined paid employment
with caring work by adopting the part-timer strategy or work from home
strategy. The sole breadwinner and caregiver type presented stories of
those mothers who acted independently of their husbands’ attitudes in
taking the main family responsibilities. In the category of dual-earner/
family caregiver, mothers mobilized family members to support their
childcare when they worked outside the home. Women who used paid
childminders when they were at work were categorized as dual-earner/
market caregiver pattern.
For the older mothers interviewed, the arrangement of male bread-
winner/female caregiver was the most popular strategy when they were
raising young children. After their children started school, it was the
dual-earner/female caregiver pattern that is followed in most of the
cases. As the childcare/family responsibilities were decreasing, and for
some lower-class women the financial demands were rising, the mothers
moved back to work during their middle age. Nevertheless, the husbands
were found not to have increased their participation in domestic work.
It was the mother who managed to be available for their children after
school. In addition, the better the household financial resources, the
greater the opportunities for women to use the part-time strategy.
The second common pattern of work and care solution in the older
group was dual-earner/family caregiver. These women had continuous
working lives, owing to the share of childcare taken by family members.
The husbands in the middle-class households were more likely to be
included in the pool of ‘family caregivers’. Relatively, familial resources
were less available to working-class mothers. Once these women lost
access to familial childcare provision, they had to redeploy their work
and care arrangements to meet the need for earning and the everyday
practice of childcare. In most cases, they moved their place of work back
to the home, so that their dual-roles could be combined. As a result,
the pattern of dual-earner/female caregiver would replace that of dual-
earner/family caregiver.
While female caregiver and family caregiver types were the main
patterns found in the older age group, market caregiver type belonged
to few older mothers. Only those with adequate financial resources
could use this dual-earner/market caregiver arrangement. Moreover,
the pattern of sole breadwinner and caregiver, identified only in the
older age group, originated in the absence of the father and lack of other
resources for childcare.
Among the younger generation, the dual-earner/family caregiver
pattern was the dominant solution. First, unlike their older counter-
parts, fewer young women today interrupted their working lives for
childrearing. Second, the childcare role of the family was stronger than
it used to be. Even though both working-class and middle-class mothers
preferred mobilizing familial resources to resolve their childcare prob-
lems, these were not always available. Those who could not afford to
purchase childcare services from the market had to move between dual-
earner/family caregiver and male breadwinner/female caregiver types,
depending on the availability of family support. Similar to older women,
only a few younger mothers adopted the dual-earner/market caregiver
pattern, as childcare provided outside family boundaries did not address
their considerations of ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘affordability’.
While five categories of work and care arrangements have been iden-
tified, the dual-earner/institutional caregiver pattern has not been
included. Women’s narratives suggested that collective institutional
childcare was regarded as a supplement to children’s educational needs

during their late pre-school period rather than a substitute for mothers’
care. No mothers said they used collective childcare facilities for their
young babies. A young mother shared her thoughts:
Teachers in kindergartens are in charge of educating children ... I will do

better to register my boy in a kindergarten when he is four. (Hui 29)
Diversity existed not only across but also within groups. Each of the
mothers interviewed found her own path to reconcile and balance
her paid employment and her work of mothering. Also, commitment
towards work and motherhood varied from one woman to another.
Along with these dissimilarities, one common feature has been identi-
fied. That is, mothers applied individual solutions to ease the tensions
between work and care. Throughout the research, the state as caregiver
has not appeared, and therefore the women who fell into ‘care-poor’
cluster, such as those whose husbands did not take care of their fami-
lies, were eventually facing conflict in balancing the dual-demands.
Childcare arrangements were located mainly within family boundaries,
on an unpaid or informally paid one-to-one basis. Some childcare was
purchased in the informal market sector, in which parents must pay full
market price.
Garey (1999: 195) argues ‘analyzing individual solutions can tell us
something about what kinds of social solutions are needed’. Given the
evidence gained from this research, what are the implications for devel-
oping social solutions to respond to these Taiwanese working mothers’
dilemmas?
Policy implication: what kind of social solutions

are required?
The analysis of how paid employment and motherhood have been

reconciled in two generations of women poses a challenge for social
policy in Taiwan. The state has made a few progressive welfare reforms
for helping mothers with work and care balance in recent years. Current
Taiwanese policy towards supporting working mothers can be outlined
as follows.
First, the rights of working women are protected by prohibiting
unreasonable practices which used to exist in the labour market, such as
forcing a woman to leave her job once she had married, become preg-
nant or reached 30 years of age.
Secondly, the provision of parental leave and the right to adjust their
working time aims to reduce the work and care conflict of women with
young children. The Gender Equality Employment Law (enacted in
2002) regulates that ‘after being in service for one year, employees may
apply for parental leave without payment before any of their children
reach the age of three years old. The period of this leave is until their
children reach the age of three years old but cannot exceed two years’
(Article 16). The Law also regulates that ‘for the purpose of raising chil-
dren of less than three years of age, employees hired by employers with
more than thirty employees may request either to reduce working time
by one hour per day (unpaid) or to adjust working time’ (Article 19).
Family leave of 7 days per year is also given.
Thirdly, considering the low fertility rate in Taiwan, in 2009, the
Employment Insurance Act introduces paid parental leave. According
to the Article 19–2, ‘an insured person on parental leave shall be given
a parental leave allowance for up to six months per child. The parental
leave allowance shall be 60 per cent of the insured person’s average
insured monthly salary’.
Fourthly, the ‘pre-school education voucher’ policy, introduced in
2000, provides parents the right to claim TWD 10,000 (around £170)
per year for enrolling their five-year-old (and above) pre-school child in
a private kindergarten. It is the first time that the Taiwanese government
allocated expenditure on pre-school children universally.
Finally, the sharing in childcare responsibilities by employers is
supposed to enhance mothers’ participation in employment, as the
Gender Equality Employment Law regulates that ‘employers hiring more
than two hundred and fifty employees shall set up childcare facilities or
provide suitable childcare measures’.
Some of these policies do target certain groups of working mothers,
but not necessarily those with the most needs. Others adopt a more
universalist principle, but do not consider the different needs of indi-
vidual mothers. The evidence emerging from this research includes
working mothers’ divergent day-to-day experiences, their varied
resources/constraints and their individual solutions to work and care.
Here, responding to the issues raised by mothers, the considerations
below suggest how current policy in Taiwan could be further reformed.
A key finding of the research is that the involvement of the family
in childcare has been rising, becoming the most crucial resource for
the current generation of Taiwanese mothers in staying at work. This is
unexpected, as it is often believed that the decrease in extended families
and increase in nuclear households would reduce families’ capacity to
share care. The result could be attributed to a gap in social policy: apart
from placing a heavier burden on employers, the Taiwanese government
has not invested much attention or money in childcare provision. While
the single-peak figure for women’s employment has substituted for the
M-shape one, the state has maintained minimal intervention and left
the family, the market and employers to share responsibility for child-
care. The potential for gender equality belongs more to the better-off,
who are able to mobilize more resources. This research has found that,
unlike the previous generation, mothers now begin to expect the state
to bear/share childcare obligations. Therefore a shift by the Taiwanese
government in its social care role from regulator to provider is needed
to enable women to reconcile dual-responsibilities and to decrease the
gendered outcome of caring work.
This chapter has also revealed women’s preference for using familial
care for their young children when mother care was unavailable. This
primarily indicates a great shortage of publicly-funded childcare serv-
ices in Taiwan, as argued in the previous point. Directly addressing
this point would mean that a massive collectivization of care run by
the state for all children would be required, just as many other studies
in Taiwan have suggested. However, by using the familial childcare
strategy, the mothers have also delivered their motherhood ideology.
In brief, they saw their family members as the most appropriate alter-
native, because their children could be looked after on a home basis,
where a labour-of-love was ensured and one-to-one care was performed.
Therefore, enhancing the quantity of childcare provision may not
always be the answer for a social solution. Instead, the issue of how
mothers want their children to be cared for should be deliberated and
further investigated. Only a better understanding of women’s beliefs
concerning mothering work will make universal collective childcare a
genuine social solution.
Finally, having said that the mothers interviewed preferred an indi-
vidual form of care for their young children, nonetheless it has been
found that their work and care arrangements were conducted very differ-
ently, owing to their divergent resources and constraints. Working-class
women were shown to be powerfully restricted in taking parental leave,
both by the place in which they worked – usually private and small
companies – and by the financial damage they would suffer. Women
also expressed fears of encountering career penalties if they undertook
care themselves by using parental leave. In recent years, the Taiwanese
government has tried to install a more generous provision of parental
leave to cover a greater number of working women. However, parental
leave with disadvantages to income and career does not seem to have
extended options for all mothers. Addressing this, the policy of parental
leave has not only to be available to all parents (not only mothers) but
also be made attractive enough in terms of pay at the time, and reducing
the longer term impact on career progression. This would ensure that
no woman is excluded from using parental leave by her workplace, her
financial difficulties, or damage to her career.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the contrasts and similarities of women’s

experiences and strategies in combining motherhood with earning
in two generations, while comparing the specific situations faced by
different social groups of women at work and at home. The chapter has
identified the changes in gender arrangements of family responsibili-
ties, womanhood/motherhood ideologies and employment patterns
between different generations. Along with a clearer view on family
and childcare issues from a gender perspective has been put forth in
welfare reforms and law revisions in recent years, it seems Taiwan
possesses great possibility of developing a social care regime with less
Confucian values and more gender equality. However, the chapter has
also concluded that Taiwanese women primarily rely on their indi-
vidual solutions, rather than social solutions, to cope as workers and
mothers, though diversity exists in the ways of managing paid and
unpaid work between the two generations. In other words, women
are still left to sort out their double shifts by themselves. Beyond our
expectation, perhaps Confucian tradition is not far away from the
modern Taiwanese society.
Notes
1. One group commenced their combination of motherhood and paid work
during the late 1960s or the 1970s, and the other group managed their dual-
responsibilities in the 2000s.
2. The classification of middle-class and working-class was principally based on
women’s occupational types and monthly income. Their household income
was taken into account as well.
3. The sample coverage consists of 22 older mothers and 23 younger mothers.
Concerning social strata of the respondents, it includes 24 working-class
women and 21middle-class women.
4. All the respondents are renamed in this article for confidentiality.
5. For example, the regulation of nursery provision only applies to those compa-
nies who have over 250 employees.
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5
Gender, Social Policy and
Older Women with Disabilities
in Rural China
Xiaoyuan Shang, Karen R. Fisher and Ping Guo
Introduction
The gendered experiences of inequality of older people with disabilities1

in rural communities exemplify the effect on families of the rudimen-
tary ageing and disability support systems in China.2 This chapter exam-
ines inequality related to disability within a Confucian cultural context
from a social policy perspective. It investigates the experiences of older
people with disabilities in rural communities by analysing a national
dataset about people with disabilities and interviews with older women
with disabilities in rural communities.
The chapter applies a disability rights framework in relation to rights
to social relationships, economic security and social support. It exam-
ines the situation of rural older women with disabilities to demonstrate
how multiple vulnerabilities continue to accentuate Confucian gender
inequality, despite the goals of the Chinese communist and the 1990s
market reforms. The argument is that, in the absence of state support,
older rural women with disabilities remain one of the most disadvan-
taged groups in terms of economic security and access to health care
and social care. We compare the disadvantage of women to men, rural
to urban residents and people with and without disabilities.
The chapter introduces the concepts used in the research including
the social policy context of Confucian values and ageing and disability
rights and policies in rural China. It then describes the methodology
applied using a rights framework of analysis. Findings are presented on
the profile of older women with age-related disabilities in rural China,
90
Gender, Social Policy and Older Women 91
including relationships, education, economic status and activity, social

security and social support. The implications of the findings for social
policy responses to understanding the relationship between Confucian
culture and inequality in China are discussed.
Confucianism and older women
The Confucian cultural approach affects expectations about family

living arrangements, roles of men and women within a household, and
therefore, rights to security and support for older women with disabili-
ties. The three Confucian principles for a harmonious family affecting
older women with disabilities are: xiao, filial piety, respect, support and
obedience to parents and older people; cong, women’s obedience to her
father, husband and son; and yang, support to widowed older people,
people with disabilities and orphaned children, which is the political
ideal of Confucianism (liji-liyun, 礼䆄礼䖤). The principles are core to the
family structure and the social contract between generations and men
and women.
Confucius himself showed great respect to older people with disabili-
ties. In Lunyu (䆎䇁，Analects) (15, Wei Linggong) (Yang 1980: 170–171),
a story was told about when Confucius met a blind older musician, he
showed great respect. When the musician arrived at a step, Confucius
said, there is a step; when the musician arrived at the seat, Confucius
told him, there is the seat; and after they all sat down, Confucius intro-
duced everyone at the event to the musician. After the musician left, a
student of Confucius asked, is this the right principle to talk to a blind
musician and Confucius said yes.
The relevance of filial piety, at the core of Confucian culture and values,
to contemporary social relations has attracted much empirical research
attention within and outside China (Ng et al. 2002; Cheung and Lam
2006). For example, Cheng and Chan (2006) found that respect was the
only consistent predictor of psychological well-being rather than actual
filial care or responsibility.
Economic and social change in China has affected family structure
and the social contract between family members. Filial piety is still a
core ideal of traditional Chinese culture, but it has been shaken by offi-
cial communist ideology, while the social environment has changed
in response to political-economic transition. In this context, Chinese
scholars now see filial piety as complex, with dual traits, discussed from a
critical perspective. For example, Liao (2005) stressed that filial piety was
the typical manifestation of the traditional Chinese intergenerational
92 Xiaoyuan Shang, Karen R. Fisher and Ping Guo
ethics, with simultaneous positive and negative effects. The ideal of filial
piety is helpful for building a stable society and harmonious families,
but it also accentuates unequal gender and generational relationships,
in terms of different expectations on family members’ roles about their
respect, obligations, diffidence and obedience to each other.
Confucian values remain an important influence on people’s sense of
contemporary China. Yet, research about the impact of social change
on their behaviour shows that while people hold these values as impor-
tant to their social identity, the influence of Confucian values on their
behaviour is declining due to social and economic pressures. Even in
rural areas, a case study revealed unfilial behaviours such as adult sons
not supporting their parents (Wang 2007). Younger generations used
older family members to care for their children or demanded money,
but did not return support when the older people were in need.
When family support declines, the alternative is state or community
social support. However, social support for older people never completely
replaces family support. Filial piety continues to be an important moral
source of social security in modern China. But researchers question
whether either these attitudes to family support or newer state social
support address the unequal intergenerational and gender relations (Liao
2005). If they do not, without extra support from the government and
civil society, older people, especially disabled older women, will remain
greatly disadvantaged.
This chapter addresses these questions about the interrelationship
between changes to the influence of Confucian values on family support
behaviour and the rise of alternative social support policies. Have
older rural women with disabilities, who were traditionally disadvan-
taged compared to men, benefited from Chinese social policy change
yet? Or are they losing even the limited protection that the traditional
Confucian families could have provided and not improving their rights
under the new social structures, making them even worse off than before
the reforms?
Population ageing and social support
After 1949, Confucianism and Chinese tradition was officially replaced

with Marxist ideology, which emphasized the equal rights of men
and women in education, labour force participation, social and polit-
ical participation and the free will of women in marriage. During the
communist period, women’s status greatly improved, although in prac-
tice older women remained disadvantaged compared with older men.
During the market-orientated reforms in the 1990s, women’s tradi-

tional roles as care givers and dependent members in the family were
re-emphasized in the market. This change was evident in employ-
ment, commercial advertisements, social phenomena and the explicit
portrayal of women as sexually desired targets. Although the All China
Women’s Federation fought hard to retain the space Chinese women
had gained in the communist era, especially in paid work, the force of
the free market was almost irresistible. For example, some women left
the paid labour market. Although the labour force participation rate of
Chinese women remains high compared with many other countries, it
declined during the reform era (from 73.2 per cent in 1990 to 70.6 per
cent in 2007; Rajivan 2010: 217).
China is experiencing rapid population ageing, accompanied by an
increase in the number of older people with disabilities. Already it has
44 million older people with disabilities (older people aged over 59 years),
of whom over 23 million are older women with disabilities (OSCNSSD
2007; CRCA 2007a). A huge increase in China’s population aged over
59 years, to 248 million by 2020 and 437 million by 2050 is projected
by the Chinese government committee, the China Working Committee
on Ageing (CRCA 2007a). The increased number of older women is a
vast challenge given the population scale: in 2006, 53.24 per cent of
people with disabilities in China were aged over 59 years (OSCNSSD
2007: 16). From 1986 to 2006, older people with disabilities increased by
23.65 million people – more than one million per year (CRCA 2007b).
The current social support system for older women in China was devel-
oped before China’s transition to a market economy, and remains based
on primary social and economic protection within the family (Li and Li
2007; OSCNSSD and IPS 2007). But rapid social, economic and demo-
graphic changes are having a significant impact on all aspects of disa-
bility, including the informal system of social support, values, material
circumstances and family size of older women. This has severely reduced
the capacity of family networks to support older women, who are most
affected by these changes (OSCNSSD 2007). China’s main social security
provision, social insurance, covers the workforce in urban paid employ-
ment only. Older women in rural areas and older women without working
history in paid employment are particularly vulnerable in the new market
economy. China does not have a Western-style social welfare system for
older women: public health care does not extend to most older women,
who have insufficient paid working history in formal employment with
social insurance coverage; and less than 12 per cent of people with disabil-
ities receive social assistance benefits (OSCNSS 2007; Li and Li 2007).
The capacity of families to support family members with disability or

ageing has also declined, owing to the socio-economic changes discussed
above. The rehabilitation of Confucianism revived the call for women
to return to their traditional role in the family as care giver, obedient
dependent, supported by their husband or other male members in their
home. Such a model took no account of the reduced family capacity to
support older women when their level of disability increases with age.
China is also undergoing large changes to its economy, to the struc-
ture and location of its population, and to the nature of Chinese society
(Saunders and Shang 2001). The rapid socio-economic changes inevi-
tably have a huge impact on the lives of Chinese people in general and
on older women in particular. The sustainability of China’s economic
growth, and its impact on human development, will partly depend on
how adequately the Chinese government provides for older women
through income support, health care, disability services and other social
protection.
The Chinese government attempts to protect the rights of people
with disabilities through a national law and bureaucratic structure
organized by the Chinese Disabled Persons Federation and replicated
at all levels of government, including rural local communities (CDPF
2008). The government definition of disability, which determines eligi-
bility for support, applies medical categories of bodily impairment,
excluding people disadvantaged by other impairments (Kohrman
2005; Liu et al. 2009).
This chapter applies a disability rights framework to the analysis, and
prioritizes the perspective of older people with disabilities to under-
stand their experience of equality. How do they experience their rights
compared to other Chinese citizens? In what ways are they disadvan-
taged because of disability? China is a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006. The rights
domains relevant to analyzing social support are rights to life, care and
protection (Articles 10–17, 23); economic security (Articles 19, 27–28);
and social support (Articles 25–27). In recent years, international and
domestic attention has begun to focus on the rights of people with
disabilities in China (Shang et al. 2011; Fisher et al. 2010; Fisher and Li
2008). However, neither researchers nor governments have sought to
rigorously analyse the experiences of older women and their disability
rights in rural China.
In that absence, this chapter addresses the question of whether
Chinese social policies are ameliorating the gender inequality of older
women with disabilities, in the context of the declining influence of
Confucianism on the social protection obligations of family members

towards each other. It does this by applying a disability rights framework
to examine the equality (rights to care, economic security and social
support) of older women and men, in rural and urban communities
with and without disabilities; and discussing these outcomes in relation
to Confucian obligations within the family.
Research methods
The analysis uses mixed methodology, including quantitative analysis of

data from the Second China National Sample Survey of Disabled Persons
(SCNSSDP) and qualitative analysis of in-depth data about the circum-
stances, attitudes and experiences of older women with disabilities in
rural China based on information gathered from face-to-face interviews
in Xintai, Shandong, a semi-developed area in China. The analytical
framework examined the rights of older, rural women relative to other
Chinese citizens (Stein 2007; Dean 2008).
The quantitative data are from the SCNSSDP, carried out by the Office
of the SCNSSDP in 2006. The 2006 sample survey was a repeat of the
1987 survey. The office was set up by the China Disabled Persons’
Federation (CDPF). Household surveys included 771,797 households
with 2,526,145 people throughout China. Interviews were conducted
with 2,108,410 people at home, which accounted for 83.46 per cent of
the total. There were 142,112 households with members with disabili-
ties, totalling 161,479 people with disabilities (OSCNSSDP 2007). The
survey estimated that 82.96 million people in China have disabilities.
A random sub-sample from the SCNSSDP was available to the
authors for analysis (35,646). The sample included 24.3 per cent
of people with disabilities (women 4550; men 4098; urban 1370;
rural 6051). Older is defined as aged over 59 years in this research,
consistent with the national definition, although age-related disabili-
ties increase as people get older. All results were tested for significance
using Chi-squared (p < 0.001).
In addition to the quantitative analysis, we conducted in-depth inter-
views with older people with disabilities in Shandong in 2008. The
purpose was to gain detailed information about the living situation and
family relations of older women with disabilities and to find how the
multiple vulnerabilities affect their well-being. The research site, Xintai,
is a newly developed city in Shandong province. Most older people were
rural residents for most their lives. However, because the government
compulsorily took their land in recent years, as compensation they gained
non-agricultural residential status in the new town. For older people,

the main benefit they gain from the change is that the local government
provides them with free housing and a small old-age pension, usually
100 RMB per person per month (less than US$15 per month). In Xintai,
we conducted two focus groups and five in-depth interviews with older
people with disabilities. Three of the five older people are women with
disabilities. This chapter draws on findings from two detailed cases and
comments from other older people with disabilities.
The two cases are the experiences of Mrs Liang and Mrs Wang (names
changed). We analysed these two cases because their situation was
typical of the women represented in the quantitative data: they are both
widowed, have many children, used to be in middle income households
in their village, worked on their farm and looked after their families
when they could, without paid employment. Their children and in-laws
treat them in ways typical in their community.
The first person, Mrs Liang, is aged 74 years. She has three sons and
three daughters and lives with her youngest son and his wife. She had
a stroke six years ago, resulting in partial paralysis so she can no longer
care for herself without support. She had five years of primary education
up to junior middle school. She receives 100 RMB per month from the
local government and has no other income. The second person, Mrs
Wang, is aged 84 years. She has four sons and three daughters. Her eldest
son died a few years ago. She lives with her 65 year old, widowed daugh-
ter-in-law and a school-age grandson. She did not attend any formal
education and does not have any income apart from a small subsidy
from the government. She also had a stroke five years ago, resulting in
partial paralysis.
In addition to these two women, we organized two focus groups, with
10–15 older people with disabilities each in Xintai county. Researchers
interviewed older people with disabilities selected through convenience
sampling from one village in Xintai county. The county was recom-
mended as a research site by local staff from Shandong Research Centre
on Ageing. The topics discussed in the focus groups included: subjective
well-being in old age, relationship with adult children, who provides
care and support, how they receive health care and any experiences of
economic and other difficulties. Loneliness and depression related to
old age emerged as themes in the focus groups.
The opinions of older people with disabilities in the interviews and
focus groups are cited in this chapter. The findings are presented in rela-
tion to equality as measured by disability rights included in the frame-
work: the right to care and protection evident in the profile of older
women with disabilities and relative disadvantage in their relationships;

the right to economic security; and the right to social support. Does
the evidence show these rights are fulfilled through either Confucian
family obligations or government policy; or do older rural women with
disabilities continue to be disadvantaged? Discussion about the impact
of Confucian values and communist and market reform follows. The
implications of the findings for social policy responses to their experi-
ence of gender inequality are discussed at the end of the chapter.
Profile of rural older women with disabilities
The number of older people with disabilities aged over 59 years in

China more than doubled from 1987 to 2006 (20.51–44.16 million).
The proportion of people with disabilities who are older also increased
to over half of all people with disabilities (39.7–53.2 per cent).
Slightly more than half the older people with disabilities are women
(52.7 per cent) because of their extra longevity. Most older people with
disabilities live in rural areas (72.3 per cent). The number of older women
with disabilities in rural China is estimated to be 16.8 million.
The first set of rights is in care and protection as evidenced by the
impact of their family status. Marital status has a profound impact on
older people’s lives, affecting longevity and support (CRCA 1994, 2003;
Lu et al. 2008; Guo and Chen 2009). As people age they are more likely
to become widows and they are unlikely to remarry, particularly women.
Older people with a spouse live longer than those who are widowed
or divorced. Having been married at some time means that the older
person is more likely to have adult children to provide support, and for
most older women, this also means greater economic security (CRCA
1994, 2003; Lu et al. 2008; Guo and Chen 2009). Older people with
a living spouse can share physical and emotional support as they age.
Older people with disabilities are therefore most negatively affected by
being widowed or having never been married because they are less likely
to have household and family members to support their disability and
age-related needs (Xiong 2005; Lu et al. 2008).
Most older Chinese people are married and have a low rate of divorce,
including people with disabilities (Table 5.1). Older people with disabili-
ties are slightly less likely to be married and more likely to be widowed
than people without disabilities. Urban men without disabilities are
more than twice as likely as rural women with disabilities to be married
(86 and 42 per cent). Rural men with disabilities are the most likely to be
unmarried, although the proportion is still very small (6.5 per cent).
Table 5.1 Marital status of older people by disability, gender and location (%)
Married Widowed Unmarried
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural

With disabilities
Men 68.9 76.9 65.5 24.9 20.7 26.7 5.1 1.9 6.5
Women 42.6 43.9 42.1 56.5 54.8 57.2 0.5 0.6 0.4
Total 55.1 59.5 53.2 41.5 38.7 42.7 2.7 1.2 3.3
Without disabilities
Men 80.4 85.9 77.4 16.5 12.9 18.5 2.2 0.4 3.2
Women 61.7 62.3 61.4 37.7 36.5 38.4 0.1 0.2 0.1
Total 71.0 73.9 69.4 27.2 24.9 28.4 1.2 0.3 1.7
Note: Divorce rate is 1% or less for all groups.
Significant to p < 0.001.
Source: SCNSSDP (see Research methods above).
The gap between the proportion of older men and women with disa-
bilities who are widowed is wide. Nearly 60 per cent of older women
with disabilities are widowed, compared to around 30 per cent of men.
This gender gap is widest in the urban areas. The implication of these
patterns of marital status is that older women with disabilities in rural
areas are least likely to have secure family support. In both case studies,
Mrs Liang and Mrs Wang are widowed and live with their adult chil-
dren. Their wider family members also support them. Mrs Liang said
that since her husband died two years ago, she has been lonely because
no one else takes time to talk with her.
Both Mrs Liang and Mrs Wang had very low expectations about what
it was reasonable to expect in the remainder of their lives, given their
family situation. Mrs Liang said, ‘I wish I could stand up, move around,
go to the toilet myself’. Her desire is that ‘My son and daughter-in-law live
together peacefully, they are not angry at me, and they have a grandson’.
Mrs Wang hoped she could continue to get the land compensation
old-age pension and said, ‘I have no other expectations’. Neighbours said
about another older woman who cannot speak that it was enough for her
that her family brings her out into the sunshine to talk to people.
Even fulfilling these very low expectations depends on the time and
capacity of their families, children and particularly daughters-in-law.
The fieldwork showed that in some cases, family support is unreliable or
disrespectful to the older person, resulting in mental illness, depression
and unhappiness. Even when they have some support, it is insufficient
for the positive well-being of some older people because they know that
their families struggle to meet their needs. For example, Mrs Liang broke
down in tears saying
I feel life is meaningless. I’d rather to die now. My son and daughter-
in-law are good. But I am their burden. I cannot look after myself,
even move myself. I need someone with me all the time. I really
want to die but it is difficult to die. I cannot even drink medicine
myself.
She said nobody talks with her now that her husband is dead and she
has no way to leave her bed. She said
My husband died two years ago. I was crying for many days when
this happened. When he was alive, we could talk each other and be
company for each other. Now I feel very lonely. I like to chat with
others. However, nobody wants to talk to me now. My son works
outside; my daughter-in-law has to look after children and me,
cooking and cleaning. She is busy too. Occasionally my grandson
enters my room to give me some water and medicine. But he does
not chat with me.
Education
The second measure of inequality is economic security. Educational

background affects older people’s ability to communicate, participate
and use resources and services. Education is also predictive of their
economic security because it relates to their earlier working life opportu-
nities, social status and access to a lifestyle that might have avoided or
prevented the risks of disabilities.
In general, the educational level of old people in rural areas is low
(CRCA 2007a; Guo and Chen 2009) and access to education is highly
affected by location, gender and disability. Urban older men without
disabilities are most likely to have the highest education (15 per cent),
compared to rural older women with disabilities who are almost all illit-
erate and had no schooling (86 per cent) (Table 5.2).
Location has a bigger effect on access to education than disability or
gender. More urban older people with disabilities, including women,
have higher education than rural people without disabilities.
Women are educationally disadvantaged compared with men in
both urban and rural areas. For example, in urban areas only half the
number of women without disabilities compared to men had education
after primary school (32 and 60 per cent) and women with disabilities
experienced the same relative disadvantage (18 and 43 per cent). In the
rural areas, women with or without disabilities are worse off than men,
with twice the illiteracy rate. Only a small minority of any rural women
Table 5.2 Education level of older people by disability, gender and location (%)
Senior high/ Junior college

Illiterate/no school Primary Junior high technical and above
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
With disabilities
Men 16.3 43.2 40.6 44.6 21.9 9.2 12.0 2.7 9.2 0.3
Women 56.5 85.5 25.6 12.8 9.6 1.4 6.0 0.2 2.3 0.0
Total 37.5 65.4 32.7 27.9 15.4 5.1 8.8 1.4 5.5 0.1
Men 9.2 30.8 31.0 49.9 25.2 15.2 19.9 3.5 14.7 0.6
Women 35.4 74.0 33.1 21.6 15.8 3.5 10.6 0.9 5.1 0.0
Total 22.5 52.5 32.1 35.7 20.4 9.3 15.2 2.2 9.8 0.3
Note: Significant to p < 0.001.

Source: SCNSSDP.
received any education (14 per cent of rural women with disabilities and
26 per cent without disabilities), which was virtually all primary school
education.
Disability also affects access to education. A higher proportion of
women without disabilities attended schools in all levels, both rural
and urban, than women with disabilities. Similarly, more men without
disabilities compared to men with disabilities attended education above
primary school level education in both rural and urban areas. In the case
studies, Mrs Liang had five years education, which is unusually high
compared to other women with or without disabilities in the city or
rural areas. Mrs Wang is more typical in that she did not attend any
formal education.
Income and poverty
The most direct measure of their right to economic security is their

income and experience of poverty. Income sources for older people are
labour, old-age pension, individual minimum living security benefit
(MLS, dibao), family support and other sources, including property and
insurance. The old-age pension is the most stable income source for
older people, in contrast to labour and family support. In China, most
older people rely on pension and labour income, closely followed by
family support (CRCA 1994, 2003; Xiong 2005).
Income sources vary widely according to location, gender and disa-
bility (Table 5.3). Almost all rural older women with disabilities rely on
family support for their income (85 per cent), making them economi-
cally dependent on an unreliable income source. In contrast, over half
the older people in urban areas with and without disabilities (54 and 63
per cent) receive old-age pensions, although more men receive pensions.
In rural areas, less than 10 per cent of any rural older people receive
an old-age pension or MLS benefits. Instead, rural older people rely on
family support or labour.
Gender also affects access to old-age pensions because of its relation-
ship to former employment. Only 40 per cent of urban women with
disabilities compared to 70 per cent of men receive an old-age pension
and over 20 per cent fewer women without disabilities receive a pension
compared to men. In rural areas, almost no women receive a pension
(2 per cent of women without disabilities and 1 per cent of women with
disabilities). Women are half as likely as men to rely on their labour
for income and more likely to rely on family support. Disability also
affects access to old-age pensions, but less so than location and gender.
Disability reduces the likelihood of relying on labour-based income.
Table 5.3 Primary income source of older people by disability, gender and location (%)
Minimum living
Old-aged pension security benefit Family support Labour
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
With disabilities
Men 70.3 8.3 4.4 5.2 18.5 57.0 5.9 27.2
Women 39.1 0.8 8.0 2.2 49.1 85.2 1.9 10.0
Total 53.9 4.4 6.3 3.6 34.7 71.8 3.8 18.2
Men 74.5 11.2 2.3 2.4 9.6 30.4 12.3 54.9
Women 51.4 2.0 4.7 1.8 37.7 64.1 5.2 31.0
Total 62.6 6.5 3.5 2.1 24.1 47.4 8.6 42.8
Note: Income from property, insurance and other sources is less than 1% for all groups.
Source: SCNSSDP.
Table 5.4 Average annual income by disability and location (RMB)
Urban Rural Total
With older person with a disability 6498 2186 3483

With an older person without a disability 7936 2665 4626
Total 7411 2442 4148
Note: Income by gender is not available.

Source: SCNSSDP.
It is no surprise that the income level of older people with disabilities

and older people in rural areas is lower than people without disabilities
or in urban areas. The annual cash earnings of rural older people were
less than one quarter of urban older people (2,700 RMB compared to
12,000 RMB; CRCA 2006 national sample data).
The fieldwork cases illustrate how older rural women with disabili-
ties survive on such low incomes from unreliable sources. In Xintai,
the government pays income support to older people as compensation
for compulsory land acquisition, which provides a reliable but very
low level of income support, not available to other rural older people.
Mrs Liang receives 100 RMB per month from the local government and
her three sons pay all other costs, mainly in kind. Mrs Wang and her
daughter-in-law each receive 200 RMB per month from the government.
Mrs Wang also receives 300 RMB per month from her three sons. With
their school-age grandson, this household of three receives 700 RMB per
month, which they said is just enough for them to survive.
Many of the older people in the fieldwork area said they live in
heavy debt and poverty, mainly because of high medical costs. One
older man said
My life used to be good. But a few years ago, my wife was seriously ill
and we spent a few hundred thousand RMB, which was our lifetime
savings, on her treatment. After that, we only have debt. We can only
rely on the pension from the government now ... Our children treat
us kindly. However, they don’t have much money either.
Both disability and location affect household income. Average per person
income for rural households with an older person with a disability was
only a quarter of urban households with an older person without disa-
bility (2186 and 7936 RMB). The explanation for the lower income in
urban and rural households with an older person with a disability is
Table 5.5 Poverty rates of households with an older person by disability and
location (%)
Absolute poverty* Low income*
Urban Rural Urban Rural
With older person with a disability 2.6 13.9 2.2 8.3

With an older person without a 1.5 9.3 0.9 6.5
disability
Total 1.9 11.6 1.3 7.5
Note: * Absolute poverty for rural areas is defined as 683 RMB p.a.; low income 683–994 RMB
p.a. (National Bureau of Statistics, 2005).
Income by gender is not available.
Source: SCNSSDP.
probably the immediate and past capacity of family members to take

on paid work, including the older person and women who provide the
most of the care.
Without sufficient government income support, this lower capacity
for paid employment means that one in seven rural households with
an older person with a disability lives below the national absolute
poverty line and one quarter are below the national low income line
(13.9 per cent below 683 RMB and 22.2 per cent below 944 RMB annual
per capita income; Table 5.5). These proportions are disturbingly high
considering that the national poverty line is below the lowest interna-
tional standard (US$1 per day). Using the lowest international standard,
almost all rural families with older people with disabilities live in poverty
(CRCA 2007b). The poverty rates are worst in rural areas for households
with an older person with a disability.
Government financial support
In addition to income generating activities, government policies for

income support began during the communist era and are still in the
process of reform. If people with disabilities hold a disability certificate,
they are entitled to specialized government services and benefits. In the
SNCSSD sample, only 4.2 per cent of older people with disabilities have
the certificate compared to 34.6 per cent of all people with disabilities.
Possible reasons include differences in how the government and people
themselves define disability, particularly age-related disability. The
proportion of people with certification also varies by location, gender
and age (Table 5.6). Older rural women are the least likely to have the
Table 5.6 Disability certification among older people with disabilities by age, gender and location (%)
60–69 years 70–79 years 80+ years Total
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Rural Urban Total
Men 12.1 15.9 11.2 5.7 7.3 5.4 2.4 3.5 2.1 6.4 8.7 6.9
Women 5.2 6.0 4.9 1.9 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.3 2.4 3.2 2.6
Total 8.2 9.5 7.7 3.3 3.9 3.1 1.8 2.4 1.6 3.9 4.9 4.2

Source: SCNSSDP.
certificate. People in urban areas, younger old people (60–69 years) and
men were the most likely to have the certificate.
Social insurance is available to people who have had paid employment.
People with disabilities are less likely to have had paid employment
during their working age lives, so only one third have social insurance
and the rate is lower in rural areas and for older people (Li and Li 2007:
33–35). Social and medical insurance are highly related to location and
gender (Table 5.7). Almost none of the older people with disabilities in
rural areas has social insurance (less than 4 per cent), compared to a
third of urban older people with disabilities. Urban women are however
still disadvantaged compared to men in both social and medical insur-
ance coverage (27 and 45 per cent social insurance; 35 and 55 per cent
medical insurance).
Surprisingly, over a quarter of rural older people with disabilities
have medical insurance (29 per cent) and the difference between men
and women is not significant (Table 5.7). While this level of coverage
is higher than in the past, rural location is a disadvantage for medical
insurance coverage. In contrast, nearly half of urban older people with
disabilities have medical insurance (45 per cent).
In some locations, some people in very low income households are
entitled to MLS benefits and other relief grants. People with disabilities
are more likely to experience poverty. However, less than 10 per cent of
older people with disabilities receive any of this assistance, except relief
grants in rural areas (Table 5.8). The results are not significantly different
for men and women.
In the case studies, Mrs Liang and Mrs Wang do not receive any social
insurance, medical insurance or MLS benefits. They do receive a small
subsidy for compulsory land acquisition, as described above. Without
Table 5.7 Social and medical insurance of older people with disabilities by
gender and location (%)
Social insurance Medical insurance
Men 44.8 3.3 55.2 29.5

Women 27.4 1.3 35.3 27.8
Total 35.6 2.2 44.7 28.6
Note: Significant to p < 0.001 except medical insurance rural men and women.
The data do not include the information about older people without disabilities.
Source: SCNSSDP.
Table 5.8 Minimum living security and social relief benefits of older people with
disabilities by gender and location (%)
MLS benefits Relief grants
Men 5.7 5.6 6.3 12.5

Women 7.6 3.1 5.3 7.9
Total 6.7 4.3 5.7 10.1
Note: Significant to p < 0.001 for urban and rural differences but not by gender.
Source: SCNSSDP.
medical insurance, many families fall into greater poverty if older

people with disabilities have health care costs because medical expendi-
ture is beyond the capacity of most rural families. This has the effect of
preventing access to recurrent medical treatment, using up any financial
savings in a medical crisis and forcing some families into debt.
In both the case studies, Mrs Liang and Mrs Wang’s children bear all
the costs of health care. As a result, both older women have stopped
having medical treatment because their families cannot afford the cost.
After they each had a stroke, they received only very limited immediate
treatment then withdrew from all medical assistance, which has left
them with greater disabilities and risk of premature death. Mrs Wang
took some Chinese traditional medicine instead. They rarely visit a
doctor.
Other older women with disabilities at the fieldwork site said they
live in poverty or debt because when they were seriously ill, they had to
spend their life savings on medical treatment. For example, Mrs Zhao is
an older woman with a disability. She borrowed 10,000 RMB from rela-
tives for an operation and medical costs in 1982 and still had the debt
over 25 years later when we interviewed her in 2008. It has made her life
very difficult all these years. She is older herself now and cares for her
mother who is 90 years old and also has a disability.
Social support
The third measure of inequality is social support, from government,

community or family. Half the older people with disabilities do not
receive any government support (social assistance, medical, equipment,
rehabilitation, information and cultural activities) and so rely entirely
Table 5.9 Older people with disabilities who received no formal support services
by gender and location (%)
Urban Rural Total

Men 42.9 56.7 52.6
Women 45.1 60.1 55.6
Total 44.1 58.5 54.2

Source: SCNSSDP.
on their family (Table 5.9). Rural older women with disabilities are less
likely to receive support (60 per cent) than urban men (43 per cent).
Support for most older people with disabilities in rural areas is
entirely the responsibility of family members, mainly daughters-in-law,
consistent with Confucian values. Receiving support relies on older
people having adult children available to provide it, which is gener-
ally the case for rural older women of these generations. Whether they
receive adequate support depends on the financial and other conditions
of the family and daughter-in-law. In the case of Mrs Liang, two of her
three daughters-in-law care for her. As a result, the youngest daughter-
in-law had to give up her paid work. Even with this support, Mrs Liang
does not receive good quality support, for example, she said she has not
left her bed for more than a year. She said
I can’t do anything now. I have to rely on my sons and daughters. I

have spent a few years in the bed. What I do now is to sit up when I
am eating, and to lie down when I feel tired. I cannot move my legs.
When I need to go to toilet, they put a plastic bag on the bed ... I have
to rely on others to carry me to move around or go out. I am too
heavy to be carried by my daughter-in-law.
She said her family have tried to employ paid nurses to care for her but,
according to Mrs Liang, the paid nurses did not care for her as well as her
children and they would stay only one or two months, then leave. Mrs
Liang said she would prefer if her children could find a healthy young
nurse who could carry her outside, but usually they can only find old
or weak nurses.
Mrs Wang has had better care. Her daughter-in-law not only looks
after her personal needs but also tries to help her move around and talk
with other people. She puts Mrs Wang in a wheelchair every morning
and pushes her out into the sunshine. This gives Mrs Wang a chance to
chat with neighbours. According to her neighbour, it is rare for other

care givers to put in so much effort caring for their older family members
who cannot walk. Many older women with disabilities therefore have
no chance to get out of bed and speak with other people.
Implications for disability-related gender inequality
The impact of these findings about disability rights to care, economic and
social security is that most older rural women with disabilities remain
dependent on care, financial and social resources from their families,
and very occasionally from the state. They are likely to have very low
levels of income, social security and health care coverage and rely on
family resources for all their income, health and social support needs. If
their families cannot provide adequate support, their well-being suffers
as illustrated in the case studies.
The findings show that in the absence of state support, older rural
women with disabilities are one of the most disadvantaged groups in
terms of economic security and access to health care and social care,
which demonstrates that inequality is closely related to gender discrimi-
nation against women.
The findings have implications for understanding the impact of
Confucian cultural background of Chinese families on support for older
women. The three Confucian principles discussed at the beginning of
the chapter (xiao, cong and yang) affect expectations of family arrange-
ments, support and a social contract between generations and men
and women. The findings show that not only have these values been
disrupted for many older rural women, in terms of low family capacity
to support them, but they as yet are less likely than urban men to have
replacement formal income or service support from the community or
government.
The economic and social changes in modern China have reduced fami-
lies’ capacity or willingness to act on Confucian values. It appears that
some older women with disabilities have both lost the potential protec-
tion of a traditional family structure and social contract; and their rights
have not been fully protected in the new social policy structure. Their
needs are not yet fully addressed in the social policies for the protection
of the rights of older people, women and people with disabilities.
In the communist period, women’s status greatly improved, but the
more recent 1990s market reforms show women have lost protection,
indicated by patterns of paid labour force participation. Vulnerable
groups of women, such as older women and women with disabilities, are
easily marginalized. The changing relations between generations may

have particularly negative impacts on them.
The experiences of older people with disabilities in rural communities
illustrate the dire impact on older people and their families of an uneven
social support system in China. In all dimensions examined here,
older women with disabilities in rural areas have the worst outcomes,
including with respect to rights to protection facilitated through their
living arrangements, economic security and social support. The effect
on their well-being is that their expectations for their quality of life are
so low that they openly speak of waiting to die so that they are no longer
a burden on their families who support them.
Older women with disabilities in rural areas are generally in a more
disadvantaged position than men: they are more likely to be widowed, be
illiterate and have no schooling, rely on family members for income and
social support and receive no government social assistance from old-age
pensions, medical insurance, MLS benefits or poverty relief. Older women
with disabilities and those in rural areas, in particular, are affected by
multiple disadvantages, making it hard to realize their basic rights.
The comparison with older men without disabilities in urban areas
is extreme. In urban areas, older people have the dual advantages of
better economic conditions and a developing social support system.
The analysis shows that these conditions result in better opportunities
for access to education, income support, social assistance and support
systems, from which older men have benefited the most. In contrast,
older women with disabilities in rural areas do not even bother to dream
of such luxuries, marvelling instead at the benefit of having someone
take the time to lift them outside so they can talk to other people.
In both urban and rural areas, most Chinese older people rely on family
and household resources for income and support. Rural older women with
disabilities are in the most unfavourable position to seek supplementary
support to meet their basic needs. Social support systems are intended to
protect citizens when they face risks to their needs, rights and quality of
life. In the case of older women with disabilities, this includes their daily
life and medical needs. The coverage of social security is a key indicator
for the realization of social rights of rural older women with disabilities,
but at this stage, they have the lowest level of access.
Although most of the current generation of older people with disabili-
ties live near to adult children who meet their support needs, the next
generation of older people in rural areas is likely to be in a different posi-
tion. Families are smaller and adult children are more likely to migrate
to urban areas. If the nature of the social support system illustrated in
these findings does not change, the inequality of older women with
disabilities in these rural areas will be even more extreme as family
support is undermined.
The written rhetoric of Chinese government disability law and policy
upholds the rights of people with disabilities. This analysis shows that
the disparate application of aspirational national policies neglects the
disability support needs of people in rural communities the most.
Reasons for unequal Chinese social policy implementation are discussed
extensively elsewhere (Chan et al. 2008), including differences in local
resources, priorities and competing interests (Fisher and Li 2008). If the
Chinese central government intends to remedy the extreme inequalities
illustrated in this analysis, it will need to address these political reasons
for unequal social policy implementation.
Without government support for them and their families, women in
rural areas experience multiple disadvantages because of their gender,
age, location and bodily difference. In a social policy context where
older people must rely on personal independence and family support
and have no state support, the impact of disability strains traditional
family obligations. Rather than being in a position to claim their rights
to social support to enable equality, older women with disabilities carry
guilt for overburdening their family with their needs. Only changes to
state responsibilities for social support will address these experiences of
multiple disadvantages.
A gender perspective on ageing and disability welfare policies is still
missing in China. In order to protect disability rights effectively, China
needs to reconsider the interests of older women, particularly in rural
communities. The communist era had the potential to address the legacy
of the gender gap reflected in Confucian culture; however, the 1990s
market reforms seem to have left older women even worse off, with less
recourse to family social contracts or a replacement formal income and
service support system.
Notes
1. We use the term ‘people with disabilities’ in recognition of ‘people first’
language, consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and plain English.
2. Acknowledgements to Chen Xuejing who conducted the interviews and Li
Xiangping who assisted with the analysis. Thank you to the participants in the
research interviews and people who commented on the drafts. The research
was funded by the Australian Research Council and Chinese Research Centre
on Ageing. Ethics approval was from University of New South Wales.
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6
Confucian Welfare: A Barrier to the
Gender Mainstreaming of Domestic
Violence Policy in Hong Kong
Lai Ching Leung
Introduction
Domestic violence is a serious problem that has garnered considerable

public attention in Hong Kong in the last 10 years. Domestic violence
is a gender issue, as women constitute the main population of domestic
violence victims. Data from the Social Welfare Department show that,
among the 4,807domestic violence cases reported in 2009, 4,012
involved female victims and 795 involved male victims (Social Welfare
Department 2009a). Unless we understand violence against women as
a widespread and criminal type of behaviour with patriarchal roots, we
may not be able to help abused women to take control of their lives.
The policy response to domestic violence in Hong Kong is criticized as
being fragmented, lacking in gender sensitivity and being ineffective in
combating the problem. It has been suggested that the concept of gender
mainstreaming should be adopted in social, public and legal policies and
measures as a long-term strategy to deal with domestic violence. The
concept of gender mainstreaming is defined as a policy-making frame-
work for the purposes of achieving equality and was introduced at the
Fourth International Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995. The associ-
ated Beijing Platform for Action defined the concept as ‘not restricting
efforts to promote equality to the implementation of specific measures, but
mobilizing all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of
achieving equality’ (Council of Europe 1998). Gender mainstreaming has
become an important strategy in dealing with domestic violence issues in
Western countries since the beginning of the new millennium.
114
Confucian Welfare 115
The experiences of European countries suggest that successful gender

mainstreaming requires not only gender sensitivity but also an appro-
priate welfare orientation in the policy-making process. Hong Kong is one
of the newly industrialized countries of East Asian with a welfare regime
that is underpinned by Confucianism. However, there have been few
changes in the welfare model in the transition from the colonial to the
new SAR government, and it is basically an amalgamation of Confucian
and free-market values. The underlying philosophy of Confucianism is
the value of altruism and social integration. This has been used by the
ruling class as a means of maintaining the status quo and social stability.
Several rules prescribed by Confucianism have particularly influenced
women’s development, as they confine women to the family and to
the roles of carer and obedient wife. Confucian values are in some ways
at odds with the feminist perspective that emphasizes the individual
rights and independence of women. It is thus necessary to determine
how far the gender mainstreaming of social policy can progress given
that Confucian values are still prevalent in Chinese society, even in a
modern Westernized city such as Hong Kong, and whether Confucian
welfare acts as a barrier to gender mainstreaming domestic violence poli-
cies in Hong Kong. This chapter discusses the development of Confucian
welfare in Hong Kong and examines the extent to which the influence
of Confucianism on the welfare of women erects barriers to the gender
mainstreaming of domestic violence policy in Hong Kong.
The discussion in this chapter is based on the findings of a research
study1 to identify and understand the difficulties of and opportunities for
the gender mainstreaming of social policy on domestic violence in Hong
Kong. The research project was a two-year project conducted between
2006 and 2008. It adopted the qualitative approach of interviewing
government officials and social workers involved in policy-making and
implementation to combat domestic violence in Hong Kong.
Confucianism and welfare in Hong Kong
Hong Kong and four other East Asian countries – Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan and Singapore – are regarded as ‘newly industrialized countries.’
These five countries or territories share certain common characteristics
in terms of their welfare systems, which are based on what is described
as a Confucian welfare model. This welfare model is very different from
that found in the West (Jones 1992). All five countries are characterized
by relatively strong family ties and an emphasis on familial responsibility
and obligation in solving social problems. The Confucian welfare model
116 Lai Ching Leung
is based on popular Confucianism, which is actually a set of common

precepts, values and prohibitions, the practicalities of which vary some-
what from one place to another. For example, Confucianism is merged
with Buddhism and Taoism in Chinese societies, whereas in Japan it is
combined with Shinto and in Singapore with the local indigenous reli-
gions of Malaya (Lin 1999). Whether or not an overarching East Asian
welfare model exists has attracted much debate (Goodman et al. 1998;
Kasza 2002; Chan and Lee 2010). As Chan and Lee (2010) argue, ‘an over-
arching model for East Asia is likely to be unsuccessful since it is almost
impractical to distil a general cultural framework to understand micro-fa-
milial or community behaviours pertaining to sorting out welfare’ (p. 25).
This chapter attempts not to verify the existence of an overarching East
Asian welfare model, but to examine how far the ideological roots of the
Confucian welfare model influence the welfare of women in Hong Kong.
Welfare development in Hong Kong
Confucianism was the basic philosophy of the colonial government and

has remained that of the SAR government of Hong Kong in terms of its
welfare policy. Confucianism is characterized by the values of altruism,
social integration and social harmony, which in the East Asian welfare
systems rest on ‘the principles of familial responsibility and obligation’
(Saunder 1996: 4) or ‘the principles on ascending orders of duty and
obligation, and descending orders of responsibility and care’ (Jones
1992: 202). Given the emphasis on family values, families are expected
to be the first line of support in helping their members to solve prob-
lems, and government support is a last resort for those unable to help
themselves. The Western style of welfare is regarded as being a poor
match with Asian values and too expensive for Asian states to copy, and
as fostering laziness and dependency (White and Goodman 1998). As
Chau and Yu (2005) suggest, there are three reasons for the notion that
social welfare is un-Asian: ‘social welfare in Asia is underdeveloped; the
underdevelopment of social welfare contributes to the economic success
of Asian countries; and “Asian” values, which are influenced by Chinese
culture, specifically Confucianism, do not promote the development of
social welfare’ (Chau and Yu 2005: 22).
Non-interventionism or minimalism was the approach long adopted
by the British colonial government before 1997. It was believed that
excessive public welfare provision would destroy the traditional family
values of Chinese society and hamper economic growth. As stated in the
1965 White Paper on Social Welfare:
in Chinese tradition, social welfare measures which individuals may

need on account of poverty, delinquency, infirmity, natural disaster
and so on are regarded as personal matters which at least in theory
ought to be dealt with by the family, if necessary the extended family.
It is clearly desirable, on social as well as economic grounds, to do
everything possible in Hong Kong to support and strengthen this
sense of family responsibility. (Hong Kong Government 1965: 6)
The belief in family responsibility is still very strong, despite the

economic growth of the 1990s. Chris Patten, the last Governor of Hong
Kong, restated the importance of the family ethic in his 1994 Policy
Address: ‘the Government’s goal is to preserve and strengthen the family
as the foundation of our community’ (Hong Kong Government 1994:
15). Intrinsically linked to Confucian values, much of the social service
provision in Hong Kong focuses on supporting families. For example,
the family is the basic unit for the assessment of applications for
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance.
To maintain the status quo and stability in Hong Kong, drastic
changes in social and welfare policies were deemed unwarranted
following the territory’s return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.
Economic growth remains the chief concern of the Hong Kong SAR
government in the post-colonial era. Any policy changes so far have
been in line with the prevailing welfare ideology, and the SAR govern-
ment has largely continued with the welfare policies of the colo-
nial government. The welfare system is basically an amalgamation
of Confucian and free-market economy values. The main difference
between the colonial and SAR governments is that the latter has been
more explicit in its adoption of Confucianism as the guiding prin-
ciple for managing society in an attempt to establish its own identity
(Chiu and Wong 2005). It is stated in Article 144 of the Basic Law that
‘the Government of the Hong Kong SAR shall maintain the policy
previously practiced in Hong Kong in respect of subventions for non-
governmental organizations in fields such as education, medicine and
health, culture, art, recreation, sports, social welfare and social work’.
The Confucian welfare ideology, with its emphasis on strong family
relations, benevolent paternalism, social harmony and a strong work
ethic, is used by the Hong Kong SAR government not only as a means
to reduce the cost of social welfare provision but also as an instru-
ment to strengthen social control and the hierarchical order of rela-
tions (Chiu and Wong 2005), and to justify the unequal distribution
of resources (Chau and Yu 1997).
118 Lai Ching Leung
Confucianism and women’s welfare
Several rules prescribed by Confucianism have serious implications

for gender relations and the position of women in Hong Kong. First,
according to the five cardinal guiding principles of Confucian teaching,
the monarch guides the subject, the father guides the son and the
husband guides the wife (Chiu and Wong 2005). These principles
are enshrined in patriarchal and hierarchical social relations, which
assume that women will perform submissive and obedient roles in the
family. Women’s welfare is specifically influenced by these principles
in four respects. First, women are supposed to follow the rules set by
their father and husband and must fulfil certain familial duties. This
pattern of gender relations creates unequal power relations between
men and women. Second, Confucian values such as altruism, social
integration and harmony apply not only to society but also to the
family. Maintaining the family as a harmonious unit is assumed to be a
female responsibility, and self-sacrifice is presented as the ideal model
for women. Third, taking care of vulnerable family members is intrinsi-
cally linked to the conduct set by Confucian principles. As women are
confined to the family and expected to take on the roles of carer and
obedient wife, being the main carer or shouldering the ‘double burden’
as earner and carer is seen as women’s obligation and natural responsi-
bility (White and Goodman 1998: 20). Fourth, the strong authoritarian
and hierarchical social relations promoted by Confucian teaching have
weakened the political rights and citizenship of women. As Pateman
(1988) points out, the universal understanding of citizenship rests
on male norms and on women’s exclusion from public politics but
inclusion in society as mothers. The division of the public and private
spheres along gender lines has marginalized women as ‘second-class’
citizens.
The traditional female roles of carer, dependent wife and self-sacrificing
woman are reinforced in Hong Kong by an overarching welfare policy
of minimal intervention. Examples can be found in policies on child-
care, social security, community care and domestic violence. Women
are still regarded as the primary carers in the family. For example,
according to a Social Welfare Department document on childcare, ‘the
Administration is concerned about the well-being and the needs of
women in Hong Kong. Different forms of childcare services have been
developed to meet the different working hours and needs of working
women. Various childcare support services are in place to support and
strengthen family integrity and functioning’ (Social Welfare Department
2009: 3). It is noticeable that the government regards childcare mainly

as the responsibility of women, rather than of both parents and society.
The SAR government seemingly overlooks the need for women to be
able to choose to stay at home or to work in the labour market. Since
the 1980s, there has been a chronic shortage of public childcare facili-
ties, and the cost of childcare services is simply unaffordable for work-
ing-class families. Childcare centres are a prime example. This service is
provided for children under six whose parents cannot take care of them
due to work, ill health or the need to care for other family members.
However, the monthly charges for children aged between 0 and 2 years
range from HK$3,457 to HK$5,100, and for children aged 2–6 years
this rises to between HK$1,900 and HK$3,285.2 According to data from
the Census and Statistics Department, the median monthly household
income of two-person families in Hong Kong in 2010 is HK$13,500, and
the median household income of three-person families is HK$18,800
(Census and Statistics Department 2010). It is almost impossible for low-
income families, in particular lone-parent families, to pay for expensive
childcare services. Only parents on social security benefits are eligible
for a half- to full-fee subsidy. This childcare policy has been criticized for
trapping lone mothers in poverty (Leung 1998). Confucian Asian states
still regard children as private assets and caring for children as a family
matter, and state support for childcare is discouraged (Lin and Rantalaiho
2003). Without the socialization of childcare services, women still have
limited opportunity to choose whether to work at home or outside the
family. Some abused women even prefer to stay with violent partners for
the welfare of their children.
Social security is another system that places strong emphasis on
family integrity and responsibilities. As mentioned, Comprehensive
Social Security Assistance is assessed on family income rather than indi-
vidual income. Married women are subsumed within the family and
assumed to take on caring duties and a dependent role, and the indi-
vidual right of married women to welfare is denied. The social security
system assumes the domestic role of women in the family, not only for
married women but also for lone mothers. In 1999, the Social Welfare
Department implemented a compulsory Support for Self-reliance
Scheme to encourage welfare recipients to return to the labour market.
The policy was further amended in 2006 to oblige lone parents with
children aged between 12 and 15 years to participate in the New Dawn
Integrated Employment Assistance Scheme. To take up childcare duties
at home is seen as the responsibility of lone mothers, but cannot be
used as an ‘excuse’ for not taking up paid work outside the family. This
120 Lai Ching Leung
is illustrated by the following comment from a member of the Social

Welfare Advisory Committee:
To be a responsible person, we need to work ... Caring duties for

women should not be taken as an excuse for not working outside the
family ... Child rearing is neither an income-generating activity nor
an economically productive activity. (Ming Pao, 10 May 2005)
Clearly, women’s unpaid work is not regarded as work. Caring duties are
viewed as the natural obligation and individual responsibility of women
in the family. Confucian welfare rests implicitly on the concept of the
public-private divide and a familial ideology. Accordingly, the recently
reformed social security system is a mixture of Confucian values and a
workfare strategy that emphasizes the social and economic responsibili-
ties of lone mothers without taking into account their social citizenship
rights (Leung 2004).
The following discussion elaborates the extent to which Confucian
values influence the processes of policy formation and implementa-
tion in dealing with the domestic violence issue in Hong Kong, and
the impact that this has on women who have suffered abuse from their
intimate partners.
Confucianism: impact on domestic violence

policy in Hong Kong
In 2004, a domestic tragedy occurred in Tin Shui Wai3 that was so

alarming that the government immediately set up a review panel to
evaluate family service provision in Hong Kong. The resulting evaluation
report suggested that intensive and further training on the handling of
domestic violence cases for social work practitioners, police and other
professionals was badly needed (SWD 2004). However, the suggestions
in the report were piecemeal and failed to address the main problems
associated with domestic violence, such as inadequate social service
support for battered women, and in particular immigrant women; loop-
holes in the law; and a lack of coordination among different profes-
sionals in dealing with the issue. More importantly, domestic violence
is still regarded as a family issue rather than a gender or human rights
issue. Domestic violence is undoubtedly a gender issue, as women consti-
tute the main population of domestic violence victims, yet the gender
dimension is not taken seriously in the policy process.
Two main theoretical perspectives – the family and feminist perspec-

tives – are usually adopted by policy-makers, social work practitioners
and researchers to explain the causes of domestic violence. From the
family perspective, violent behaviour is viewed as an individual problem
that is caused by miscommunication between family members. This
means that violent acts can be symmetrical between both sexes, which
means men and women are equally the aggressors and victims of
violence (Straus 1993; Gelles 1993). The gender perspective, in contrast,
stresses that the problem of domestic violence is the oppression and
domination of men over women in marriage and makes societal male–
female relations the central unit of analysis (Dobash and Dobash 1992;
Daly and Wilson 1998).
To better understand the values and orientation of government offi-
cials and frontline social workers in the processes of policy-making and
implementation to combat domestic violence, a research project enti-
tled ‘The possibilities of gender mainstreaming social policy on domestic
violence in Hong Kong’ was conducted between 2006 and 2008. Face-
to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with two government offi-
cials, including the Secretary of the Health and Labour Bureau and the
Assistant Director of the Social Welfare Department and 12 frontline
social workers.
Views of policymakerson domestic violence
The Principal Assistant Secretary of the Labour and Welfare Bureau, Ms.
Hinny Lam, was interviewed in the study. One of her job duties is to
head the secretariat of the Women’s Commission in Hong Kong. When
asked whether she agreed that domestic violence is a gender issue, her
response was affirmative:
Lots of evidence shows that the concept of gender power has a great
impact on domestic violence issues. Besides, most of the victims are
female; therefore gender awareness is relatively high. As we have
mentioned before, frontline staff in the police force use their experi-
ence to make judgments. As most of them are male, they think that
beating up woman is not a big deal. That really happens. That’s what
Superintendent Ng had the guts to tell us. Although we have made
lots of effort, some of the police still retain old practices and behavior.
We need time to make changes to people’s mindset and behaviour.
Despite the difficulties encountered, top and middle management
122 Lai Ching Leung
have a very clear gender perspective on this issue, which will be

demonstrated in their policy making.
Ms. Lam demonstrated a high degree level of gender sensitivity in her

views on domestic violence. This is perhaps not surprising given that
Ms. Lam serves as the head of secretariat of the Women’s Commission.
She has made great efforts in the past few years to advocate for better
coordination and policy formation to deal with the domestic violence
issue. In 2006, the Women’s Commission released a report on strategy
and action plans entitled ‘Women’s Safety in Hong Kong: Eliminating
Domestic Violence’, which proposed a multi-dimensional strategy to
eliminate domestic violence. The report suggested that the role of the
Women’s Commission with respect to the safety of women was to act
as a central organizer in a multi-level push to prioritize the elimina-
tion of domestic violence in the community. The report also suggested
that gender awareness, gender equality and mutual respect should be
promoted in the community (Women’s Commission 2006a).
However, the Assistant Director of the Social Welfare Department, Ms.
Anna Mak, offered a different view:
The problem of family violence is complex. Some people may use the
gender perspective to analyze the problem; for me, I simply regard it
as a problem caused by family breakdown ... . I have reservations about
simplifying this problem as a gender issue. If you took note of the data
that we recently presented, you probably know that more males are
seeking help from us. Some theorists may regard this phenomenon as
a power struggle; others adopt the gender perspective ... . Most of the
abusers are male, but both local and overseas research indicates that
the number of female abusers is increasing, and it is also important
to offer help to the abusers. Should we use the gender perspective
to view the problem? This is the mainstream view. But is it the only
perspective? I have reservations.
According to Ms. Mak, the gender perspective is the mainstream

perspective adopted in setting domestic violence policy in Hong
Kong. However, this is simply not the case. Ms. Mak shares the view
of many other professionals, such as social workers and the police, in
regarding domestic violence as a family or gender-symmetrical issue,
rather than a gender-biased issue. Those who adopt the family perspec-
tive to understand the domestic violence issue also have a tendency
to trivialize the problem. For example, one research study showed
that front line professionals including social workers and police tend
to blame the victims for their misfortune. Police officers are more
likely than social workers to endorse common wife-abuse myths such
as ‘wife abuse is a private matter and men should not be arrested if
they only hit their wives’ or ‘a man is entitled to have sex with his
wife whenever he wants it’ (Tang 2004). In this regard, police officers
tend to view the arresting of domestic abusers as a low priority and
not their ‘real’ work. Furthermore, the legal system continues to treat
battering as an individual problem rather than criminal behaviour
(Ferraro 1989) and discourages abused women from charging their
partners (Hong Kong Women’s Coalition on Equal Opportunities
2006). Prosecution rates for domestic violence remain low in Hong
Kong as a result. Of the 1,274 cases of spousal battering recorded by
the police in 2005, 1,159 people were arrested for criminal acts such
as murder and assault, yet only 10 per cent of the alleged perpetra-
tors in the reported cases were subsequently convicted (Hong Kong
Amnesty International 2006).
According to official data, the number of male victims of domestic
violence increased from 121 in 1999 to 795 in 2009 (SWD 2009a;
Women’s Commission 2007). However, we should not jump to the
conclusion that the growing number of cases involving abused men is
evidence of growing gender symmetry in intimate partner violence, or
that the figures indicate that men and women have an equal chance of
being abused by their intimate partners. The claim of gender symmetry
has led to significant confusion among policy-makers and the general
public. Many scholars refute the claim of growing gender symmetry in
domestic violence (Dobash and Dobash 1992, Kimmel 2008). Research
studies in the West have found that female aggression and violence is
dramatically different from male violence. The use of violence by men
on women is a way of expressing the hierarchal social relations in the
family while women’s violence is often a response to feeling trapped and
helpless (Kimmel 2000). If domestic violence is viewed as a symmetrical
problem in Hong Kong,then it becomes harder to challenge the patri-
archal root of the problem, which is the gender inequality of men and
women in the family and in society.
The different views of the two government officials can be partly
explained by their positions in their respective departments. Ms. Lam
serves on the secretariat of the Women’s Commission, which promotes
women’s welfare and gender equality in society. Ms. Mak works in the
Social Welfare Department, where family interests rather than individual
welfare are seen as the priority.
124 Lai Ching Leung
Attitudes of social workers in handling

domestic violence cases
The study also interviewed six frontline social workers from family
service agencies, including the Family and Child Protection Service
Unit (FCPSU) and Integrated Family Service Centre (IFSC), and six social
workers from shelters and women’s organizations. The social workers
were selected through the purposive sampling method. It was found
that the social workers who worked in family service settings were more
likely to adopt the family perspective in dealing with domestic violence
cases, whereas the social workers who worked in shelters and women’s
organizations were more aware of the rights of abused women to welfare.
The findings also show that the family workers tended to view domestic
violence as a family dispute and a gender symmetrical issue, to empha-
size family unity, and even to blame the victims.
Domestic violence is a family dispute

The most common understanding among family social workers of
the causes of domestic violence was conflict arising from cross-border
marriages. It was widely believed that cultural differences between Hong
Kong and mainland China were the major cause of the conflicts among
couples with this background. Domestic violence was regarded as a
marital problem or family dispute:
It is because they share different views on marriage, and have different

expectations [of their relationship]. They may not have too much
problem when the woman lived in the mainland, because they didn’t
spent much time together and only saw each other a few times a
year ... They encountered the problems when they eventually came to
live together. (David, IFSC)
Cross-border marriage [for some women from mainland China]
is a means of improving their living standard. However, some of
these women find that the situation turns out to be worse than they
expected ... they may find that their relatives are better off and the
dream is broken. Some men are not good at taking care of their wives,
and only take on the role of breadwinner. (Simon, IFSC)
The family workers perceived violent acts in the family to be caused

by miscommunication between couples or unrealistic expectations of
marriage on the part of women. They ignored the social construction
of the problems of cross-border marriage. However, the problems that
arise in cross-border families are not simply marital issues but are related
to the imbalance of power in gender relationships and the shortcom-
ings of social policy in Hong Kong. Social workers in Western countries
may also adopt the family perspective in the understanding of domestic
violence, however, as mentioned, Confucian welfare ideology and free-
market value underpinning in the welfare policy in Hong Kong has
been used by the SAR government as an instrument to strengthen social
control and gender hierarchy in families. This policy orientation has
thus weakened the gender sensitivity of social workers in Hong Kong.
Domestic violence is a symmetrical issue

Domestic violence was sometimes viewed as a symmetrical issue by the
family social workers who were interviewed. They thought that in some
cases, the abuse of women by their partners was motivated by the men’s
anger and frustration due to family conflicts, that women sometimes
provoked abusive behaviour, or that some violent acts were simply
‘mutual fights’:
Men [abusers] are less motivated [to seek help]. Maybe they have
suffered, suffered from verbal abuse, maybe been verbally attacked
[by their wife]. But when the wife seeks help, they[men]become
abusers ... Men are usually the abusers in physical abuse cases, but to
my understanding, women should bear the responsibility for being
beaten. Sometimes they may verbally abuse [their husband] (Joanne,
IFSC).
There is no doubt that men use force ... but very often violent
acts are committed by both sides. They may hit each other ... Men
are usually strong and use more force. But women use their mouth
[verbal abuse]. (David, IFSC)
Some women really nag; they like to agitate their man. It [conflict]
is interactional. I don’t think that it is simply a problem with the
man. Maybe the woman has done something to scare her husband.
(Simon, IFSC)
Viewing domestic violence as gender symmetrical simply reflects that the

social workers show sympathy to the abusers instead of the abused women.
According to Confucian traditions, women are expected to be obedient
wives and to maintain the family as a harmonious unit. However, if
women are being ‘nagging’, ‘agitating’ and ‘verbally attack’ their husband
which induce conflicts in the family as a result, they are not following the
guiding principles of Confucian teaching and therefore to be blamed.
126 Lai Ching Leung
Emphasizing family unity

Influenced by Confucianism, social workers in Hong Kong, and espe-
cially those working in family service settings, strongly believe that a
‘complete’ family is always better than a ‘broken’ one. Terry and Flora
are social workers at the IFSCs and FCPSUs, respectively. They expressed
their views on the missions of their respective family service centres in
dealing with domestic violence:
Our agency thinks that the family is very important, that to maintain
the unity of a family is an important mission ... and that maintaining
the family relationship will reduce violence ... This mission has been
pursued for many years. (Terry, IFSC)
I will assess whether the family can be maintained, because the
family involves children ... I’d rather spend more time dealing with
their marriage problems. (Flora, FCPSU)
As Lau and Kuan (1995) suggest, ‘utilitarianistic familism’ is the domi-

nant value in Hong Kong, which means that family interests and
concerns are always placed above the interests of individuals. In line
with this thinking, children’s welfare is always the main concern of
social workers in dealing with domestic violence. This is reflected in the
comments of two other family workers interviewed:
If children are involved in the case we make more effort with the
case; we have to consider their safety ... we remind the woman that
you cannot simply think of your own situation, but must also think
of the children ... when he [abuser] gets mad, you are not the only one
who suffers; your children do also. (Joanne, IFSC)
We have to protect the children. When we come across abused
women with children, we pay more attention to the case. We all
understand that children are innocent ... violent behavior hurts chil-
dren. Even if they themselves are not beaten up [by the abuser], their
personal development and values will be affected. (David, IFSC)
To maintain the family as a unit has long been the basic philosophy of
family services in Hong Kong. Sometimes abused women are expected to
stay in an abusive relationship for the sake of maintaining family unity.
Most of the time, women’s role as a mother is emphasized in social work
intervention, and social workers are likely to focus on children’s benefits
rather than women’s personal rights. Divorce is becoming more popular
in the West, but it is still socially and morally rejected in Confucian
countries such as Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the discourse on keeping

the family as a unit has attracted strong criticism from women’s groups,
because it is women who are encouraged to sacrifice themselves for the
sake of family unity (Associate for the Advancement of Feminism 1990).
Blaming the victim

The Confucian welfare model tends to load the burden of welfare on the
shoulders of families. Those who are obliged to rely on social welfare
deviate from the norms of Confucian values. Abused women, and in
particular those who have emigrated from mainland China, are consid-
ered to be unreliable and a burden on society. This is reflected in the
following complaints from the family workers:
I can’t help them [abused women] to apply for any social welfare
benefits. It’s because they are not citizens of Hong Kong ... We have
to be responsible for every penny of public money. We can’t be so
careless. That’s all taxpayers’ money. They can’t abuse that money.
(Flora, FCPSU)
[The couples comprise] an old husband and a young wife. Men
want a wife from the mainland, and women just want an identity
card. They [new immigrant women] have children because they will
not be able to get an identity card or any benefits if they do not have
children. (Simon, IFSC)
Public housing is a public resource that we cannot abuse ... Most
people have to queue up. They [immigrant women]also have to wait
if it is not urgent. Or we can find another way to solve the problem.
Public housing is the last resort. (David, IFSC)
The Confucian welfare model holds that Western-style welfare fosters

welfare dependency, which may undermine traditional family life and
economic growth. Influenced by the dependency culture thesis and the
ethos of family reliance, the social workers in the study failed to realize
that the welfare dependency discourse is a government strategy to rein-
force the binary opposition whereby immigrant women are marginal-
ized as ‘others’ to justify welfare cuts.
Power and control

The other six social workers working in shelters and women’s organiza-
tions generally perceived violence against women to be an issue of power
and control. They tended to endorse egalitarian attitudes and acknowl-
edge the significance of gendered power relations in constructing
128 Lai Ching Leung
women’s experiences in intimate partner relationships. This is encapsu-

lated in the views expressed by two of the frontline shelter workers:
This is a deep-rooted social problem – men are superior to women

according to traditional Chinese culture ... When the police handle
domestic violence cases, they tend to try to pacify the victims ... Abused
women are likely to be financially dependent on their husband ... That
makes them stay in the violent relationship. (Sue, shelter)
I think that most [domestic violence] cases are caused by the control
of husbands over their wives. They don’t respect their wives ... The use
of violence is a kind of control. (Lena, shelter)
A comparison of the different views of the policy-makers and frontline

workers in the study shows that policy-makers in the Social Welfare
Department and frontline family workers tended to perceive domestic
violence more as a family issue than as a gender issue. Influenced by
Confucian values, they were likely to condemn abused women for
breaking up the family, for failing to fulfil their wifely responsibilities,
or for shifting the welfare burden onto society. In contrast, the govern-
ment official from the Labour and Welfare Bureau and the frontline
social workers working in shelters and women’s organizations were
likely to adopt a feminist perspective, viewing domestic violence as a
gender and criminal problem rather than simply a family problem. The
welfare of abused women was their priority, as opposed to maintaining
functioning families. These findings beg the question of why the family
social workers and official from the Social Welfare Department showed a
weaker gender sensitivity than the social workers working in shelters and
the official from the Labour and Welfare Bureau. One possible answer is
that the former placed the issue of domestic violence in the discursive
framework of welfare, and did not view it as an issue of human rights or
gender that needs to be addressed by the collaborative effort of different
government departments and the public.
Gender mainstreaming domestic violence

policy in Hong Kong
The concept of gender mainstreaming first appeared in international

documents following the United Nations Third World Conference on
Women. It was clearly established as a global strategy for promoting
gender through the Platform for Action at the United Nations Fourth
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. The concept of gender
mainstreaming is defined as ‘the (re)organization, improvement, devel-

opment and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality
perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels at all stages, by the
actors normally involved in policy-making’ (Council of Europe 1998:
15). Strategies for implementing the concept of gender mainstreaming
involve not only the reorganization of policy processes so that gender
issues are dealt with by mainstream policy-makers, as argued by Krizsan
and Zentai (2006), but also the action of society as a whole to change
the norms and practices that are at the root of gender inequality. This
will encourage gender sensitivity at all levels of the policy process and
lead to continuous sustainable actions in which gender objectives are
permanently highlighted.
Since the concept of gender mainstreaming was adopted as a global
strategy for achieving gender equality in 1995, all of the member states
of the United Nations are obliged to apply a gender perspective in the
public policy process to transform policy outcomes. In response to the
demands of both the United Nations and society, the Hong Kong SAR
government set up the Women’s Commission in January 2001. It func-
tions as a central mechanism to give the government a strategic overview
of and advice on women’s issues (HKSAR Government 2003). A Working
Group on Gender Mainstreaming was set up one year after the estab-
lishment of the Women’s Commission. The Women’s Commission has
also urged the HKSAR government to apply the Gender Mainstreaming
Checklist to all aspects of its work on domestic violence, and to promote
gender-related training for their officers (Women’s Commission 2006b).
Adopting the concept of gender mainstreaming in social, public and
legal policies and measures to deal with domestic violence is a long-
term strategy. Despite the work by the Women’s Commission, whether
gender mainstreaming can be successfully applied in domestic violence
policy in Hong Kong is still a matter of debate.
Barriers to gender mainstreaming domestic violence policy
The experiences of Western countries regarding the gender main-

streaming of domestic violence policy indicate that it is not an easy task.
It involves much effort on the part of government, such as exercising due
diligence in preventing, investigating and, in accordance with national
legislation, emphasizing the prevention of violence. This includes the
prosecution of offenders, the allocation of adequate resources within the
government budget and the mobilization of community resources for
activities related to the elimination of violence against women (Platform
130 Lai Ching Leung
for Action 1995). The likelihood of the successful gender mainstreaming

of domestic violence policy is also associated with the gender sensitivity,
welfare orientation and political commitment of the government. Under
the strong influence of Confucianism, these three factors currently
represent the main barriers to the gender mainstreaming of domestic
violence policy in Hong Kong.
Level of gender sensitivity

The gender mainstreaming of domestic violence policy will not be
possible if the gender and equality dimensions are not taken account
in the policy process at the planning, implementation, monitoring
and evaluation phases. Unfortunately, the concept of gender main-
streaming is unfamiliar to the public and even to many government
officials. As mentioned earlier, government officials and front-
line social workers are not completely unaware of the gender issue
in domestic violence, yet the majorities have adopted the family
perspective to understand the problem. This adoption of the family
perspective to explain the causes of domestic violence suggests that
government officials will focus on maintaining the function of the
family or improving marital relationships, with little consideration
of the individual rights and welfare of abused women (Chan 1997,
Hong Kong Women’s Coalition on Equal Opportunities 2006). As has
been pointed out by feminists in the West, placing the problem of
the abuse of woman within the discursive framework of family prob-
lems implies that the solutions lie in improving family relationships,
which may not be in the best interests of battered women themselves
(Walker 1990; Maynard 1985).
Welfare orientation
The experiences of European countries suggest that gender main-
streaming requires gender sensitivity not only on the part of policy-
makers but also in the welfare orientation of the government. Despite
the changing family structure and the increasing participation of women
in the labour market, the Confucian influence remains important in
Hong Kong because it places the needs of the family above those of the
individual and emphasizes social harmony and stability.
Assumptions about the roles of women in the family underpin the
Confucian welfare model that currently shapes the perceptions of
both the public and government officials. Women are expected to
be obedient rather than dominant, to be responsible for maintaining
family unity rather than breaking up the family and to adopt the
role of carer rather than breadwinner. As mentioned, when domestic

violence is placed in the family and welfare discursive frameworks,
the imbalance in power between women and men and the lack of
social citizenship rights of women are overlooked. Female victims of
domestic violence are sometimes blamed as a result. Furthermore,
Confucian welfare discourages dependence on the state but makes
full use of the available resources in family or kinship networks.
The gender mainstreaming of domestic violence policy requires not
only changes in the norms and practices surrounding gender but
also the active support of victims. This will require the allocation of
adequate resources in the government budget for the implementa-
tion of an action plan (Platform for Action 1995). The Hong Kong
government has so far allocated only US$2.56M (0.8 per cent of the
2005/06 budget) to the Women’s Commission, which is equivalent
to one quarter of the budget allocation for the Equal Opportunities
Commission. There is no detailed breakdown of the annual expend-
iture on work towards gender mainstreaming (Hong Kong Women
Coalition on Equal Opportunities 2006). As Confucian values are
used by the Hong Kong SAR government as a means to contain social
welfare costs, they inevitably represent a hurdle to the gender main-
streaming of domestic violence policy in Hong Kong.
Political commitment
Since 2006, the Women’s Commission has urged the Government
to apply the gender equality checklist in its review of the Domestic
Violence Ordinance (DVO) and overall policy for tackling domestic
violence. Some improvements have been made, such as the further
amendment of the DVO in 2009 and the rolling out by the police of a
series of measures to improve its response to domestic violence cases.
Additional funding has also been provided to improve existing services
for victims of domestic violence. However, these efforts have been frag-
mented and piecemeal.
The effectiveness of the Women’s Commission in promoting gender
mainstreaming is doubtful, given the lack of strong political commitment
by the SAR government to the promotion of gender equality. Since the
Women’s Commission comes under the Secretary for Health and Welfare
rather than a high-level central mechanism, women’s issues are viewed
as welfare issues, rather than gender or human rights issues that require a
holistic approach (Association for the Advancement of Feminism 2001).
The Women’s Commission serves as an advisory body rather than an
independent monitoring body with power and resources. Furthermore,
132 Lai Ching Leung
two years ago the Chief Executive proposed to combine the Women’s
Commission with the Family Commission, which attracted strong public
criticism. This proposal indicates that the SAR government has subsumed
women within the family, and sees women’s welfare as synonymous
with family welfare. The underlying ideology is strongly associated with
Confucian values. The political rights and citizenship rights of women
have been undermined by the divided concept of separate public and
private spheres. Faced with such limitations, the Women’s Commission
is unlikely to gain the authority to ensure that government departments
and public bodies apply gender mainstreaming in government policies.
Conclusion
Gender mainstreaming is a concept that the gender equality perspec-

tive should be incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages
of the policy-making process. Since the fourth World Conference
on Women in 1995, the concept of gender mainstreaming has been
promoted in the West in the development of comprehensive meas-
ures and actions to combat violence against women. The experi-
ences of Western countries in this regard suggest that the successful
gender mainstreaming of domestic violence policy hinges on three
social factors: the level of gender sensitivity, welfare orientation and
the political commitment of the government in the policy-making
process. Confucian values, which emphasize familial responsibility
and obligation, social integration and social harmony, are strongly
associated with these three factors.
Is the gender mainstreaming of domestic violence policy possible in
Hong Kong? In an attempt to answer this question, this chapter exam-
ines the gender sensitivity and welfare orientation of government offi-
cials and frontline social workers as researched in a recent study. That
study found that policy-makers from the Social Welfare Department
and frontline family workers were likely to perceive domestic violence
as a family issue. They seemed to have weaker gender sensitivity than
social workers working in shelters and officials from the Labour and
Welfare Bureau. Abused women are often condemned for up breaking
the family and failing to fulfil their wifely responsibilities because
such behaviour does not comply with the guiding principles of
Confucian values. At the same time, abused women are often blamed
for shifting the burden of welfare onto society, and receive inade-
quate support from the government. This is because the Confucian
welfare model discourages dependence on the state and encourages

the full use of family and kinship networks to solve individual and
family problems. When government officials and frontline workers
place the issue of domestic violence against women in the welfare
discursive framework rather than viewing it as a gender or human
rights issue, it is difficult for them to take further steps to protect
the welfare of abused women. The development of gender sensitivity
and democratic ideas about welfare in society is the starting point for
the gender mainstreaming of domestic violence policy in Hong Kong.
However, gender mainstreaming will not be possible unless there is
an effective state mechanism in place for protecting and promoting
gender equality and an open system of government that is receptive
to new ways of working.
Notes
1. The research project entitled “The Possibilities of Gender Mainstreaming
Social Policy on Family Violence in Hong Kong” was a two-year project that
began in August 2006. The work described in this chapter was substantially
supported by a grant from the Central Policy Unit of the Government of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Research Grants
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No.
CityU 1003-PPR-2), and partially supported by a top-up grant from the City
University of Hong Kong.
2. All the monetary figures in this chapter are expressed in Hong Kong dollars
(HK$), unless otherwise stated. The USD/HKD and GBP/HKD exchange rates
in early 2010 were approximately US$1 = HK$7.8 and £1 = HK$12.
3. Tin Shui Wan is a new community located in the Northwestern part of
Hong Kong. It is one of the poorest districts and has the highest number
of reported domestic violence cases in Hong Kong. In 2004, Ms. Kam
Shuk-ying, a new immigrant, and her two daughters were killed by her
husband.
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7
Emerging Culture Wars: Backlash
against ‘Gender Freedom’ (Jenda
Furi in Japanese)
Kimio Ito
Introduction
The year 2009 marked an important turning point in Japanese poli-

tics in the post-World War II era. In this year, the rule of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), which had lasted nearly six decades, ended.
From one perspective, the LDP can be seen as an extremely interesting
political group. It is ideologically diverse: while a significant liberal
wave exists within it, it encompasses an extremely conservative ideo-
logical stream that wishes to bring back the fascism, based on the
emperor system, of the prewar era. The question that arises, then, is
how did this party, which included both left- and right-wing elements,
maintain its unity? The party maintained, as a political ideology, the
common principles of anti-communism; it created unity by taking on
the task of promoting economic growth, with the support of industry
and the bureaucracy, and of adjusting the distribution of wealth to
domestic interest groups, leading to a Japanese model of welfare
regime.
However, the end of the Cold War at the end of the twentieth century
and the development of the socialist market economy in China deprived
the party of its basic axis, anti-communism, which had served as its
shared ideological base. In addition, the collapse of the Bubble Economy
created cracks in the economy’s steady growth curve. Further, globaliza-
tion and the expansion of market supremacy made it increasingly diffi-
cult for the LDP to maintain a system of domestic politics based on the
coordination of interests.
137
138 Kimio Ito
The Koizumi Administration, which came to power in 2001, emerged

as a response to this crisis. While promoting the neo-liberal transforma-
tion of the Japanese economy as a ‘joint struggle’ with the USA govern-
ment (that is, an integration with the USA), it simultaneously signalled
the emergence of a form of ‘politics of the spectacle’, which maintained
domestic popularity by inciting nationalism. However, there was practi-
cally no shared ideological base for this.
In the Koizumi years, the conservative stream of thought within the
LDP rapidly surfaced to fill the ideological vacuum created by the end
of the Cold War. This was achieved by raising the issue of North Korea’s
abduction of Japanese citizens. In the mid-1990s, in reaction to this ideo-
logical vacuum, an extreme right-wing ideological stream was formed. It
was composed of one section of the LDP (in particular, relatively young
second-generation politicians) and those around them (ultra-conservative
groups, such as the Japan Conference, which idealized the prewar system
of state Shinto, and political conservatives such as the Unification
Church). In a sense, this stream closely resembled the religious right that
came to the forefront in the USA in the 1980s. While ostensibly raising
the banner of ‘morality’ and emphasizing ‘traditional’ (meaning patriar-
chal) family values, which are partly associated with Confucian values, it
also promoted a rigid form of nationalism, including issuing denials of
the existence of ‘comfort women’ and of Japan’s war responsibility.
This chapter examines the attack on gender policy by the political
right, as it developed at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as a
form of ‘culture war.’ From the beginning of the first decade of the twen-
ty-first century, criticism and attacks against the gender policies that the
Japanese government had begun to implement in the latter half of the
1990s, even while dragging its feet, were launched by right-wing and
conservative forces both within and outside the ruling parties. These
attacks did not stop with the change of government. In fact, even within
the Democratic Party of Japan, which is at the core of the new govern-
ment, there are a considerable number (even if they are fewer than those
within the LDP) of politicians with ties to the Japan Conference and the
right-wing stream. The strange attack against gender policies that began
at the beginning of the twenty-first century has very important implica-
tions for Japanese politics today.
Culture wars in contemporary Japan:

gender perspectives
Historically Japan has adopted a range of religious and moral traditions,

such as Buddhism, Shintoism and Confucianism. It is not surprising that
Emerging Culture Wars 139
many Japanese people turn to Shintoism for life crises and Buddhism
for funerals, although they often claim that they have no religious
allegiance (Gelb and Palley 1992). Confucianism came to Japan much
later than Shintoism and Buddhism. The Confucian idea of women’s
role emphasized the husband as the master of his family and women’s
purpose as ensuring paternity. According to Gelb and Palley (1994), this
view restricted opportunities for women in Japan. Confucian teachings
have also been used to justify loyalty to authority, either to the lord in
feudal society or to the state or the company in modern society. This
chain of hierarchical relationships included women’s subordination
to men. Confucian culture has not affected Japan as strongly as other
East Asian countries, such as Korean and China, as mentioned in the
following chapter (Ochiai and Johshita 2014). However, it has contrib-
uted to women’s lower status and gender inequality in Japan.
In contemporary Japan, the term ‘culture wars’ (Hunter 1991) began
spreading through reports and commentaries, with the religious rightist
movement that supported Bush’s re-election in the USA in 2004. This
event affected Japan in various ways.
As is well known, ‘culture wars’, which have developed in connec-
tion with homosexual marriage, abortion and the abolition of gender
discrimination, refer to ways of life, thought, perception, speech and
behaviour; that means also to conflict, confrontation and disputes over
morality and values. The main actor in this ‘war’ has actually been the
conservative right wing. The reaction against a ‘liberal America’ – a
movement that came into existence with the counter-culture movement
from the second half of the 1960s onwards – is included in this ‘war’.
By widening the notion of the culture war that was spreading through
the USA in the 1990s, one can think of it, in a broad sense, as a hegemony
struggle over ‘culture.’
It is understood that this war has not been occurring in isolated and
closed cultural domains. One must not forget that it involves various
elements: concerns about materials and ideological interests, for
example, honour and shame, various kinds of exercise of power and
sometimes even violence (which may look like terrorism when carried
out by rightist gangster organizations).
When approaching culture wars from the point of view described
above, one may see the development, from the mid-1990s onwards, of a
sort of culture war in Japan too, although it differs from that in America.
The first occasion of this was the publication of the (still-existing)
textbook (kyokasho mondai), which attracted not only the attention
of China and Korea but also the entire Asian region. From issues of
wartime sex slaves (Ian-fu) to the Nanking massacre, one can discern the
140 Kimio Ito
appearance of conservatism and a return to tradition in various aspects

of the interpretation of the Asian Pacific War (Ito 2005).
Backlash against ‘gender freedom’
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this conservative culture

found a new subject to attack: ‘gender freedom’. Though both local
governments and the national government started, at the end of the
twentieth century, to implement policies to develop gender equality,
attacks against the administration and the people supporting these poli-
cies began to spread (Ito 2003b).
This backlash movement began in the form of a loose alliance of
people supporting the new historical textbooks, the Japan Conference
(an extremely conservative political group with a strong credo of
‘returning to the prewar structure’; this group also holds influence
over representatives in both the Diet and local administrations), as
well as activists of rightist religious organizations such as the ‘Seicho
no Ie’ (The House of Life and Eternity), the ‘Toitsu Kyokai’ (United
Church = Moonism) and so on. The media (the Sankei Shimbun, etc.)
provided this movement with an impetus. The right wing, which
managed to gain a victory in the battle of the textbook controversy,
has now turned its attention to gender issues as the new backlash
movement.
Groups that support the backlash movement (which sometimes
include representatives of the local administrations and the Diet) make
demands such as ‘Do not create laws and rules promoting too much
gender equality or gender freedom)!’, ‘Stop lectures on gender equality!’,
or ‘Hold lectures only on subjects that we support!’
The stance of these backlash groups has changed from their initial
opposition to gender equality to the opposition to too much ‘gender
freedom’. Nonetheless, they are not against the gender equality policy
of the government, per se. They limit their attacks to ‘extreme femi-
nists’, who demand too much ‘gender freedom’. They demand that in
order to counter this extreme feminism, they (the rightists) and their
allies should be established in various councils and committees. These
demands are made with the intention of making concrete contributions
to the gender policies of the national and local governments, as well as
to effect a strategic change in the rightist movement.
Regardless of gender equality or gender freedom movements, it should
be obvious to anybody who has examined their policy and education
demands that each of their points is based on misunderstandings.
Gender issues and gender policy in contemporary Japan
We now present a summary of gender issues and gender equality policy

in Japan over the past 30 years. It is well known that Japan made a late
start among the international gender equality movements which began
in the 1970s. This belatedness can also be confirmed from the following
data. Examining the Female Labour Force Participation Rates of the 24
countries with per capita GDP of over US$ 10,000 each, Japan was ranked
second, between Finland (first place) and Sweden (third place), in 1970.
By the year 2000, however, Japan had fallen to around the twentieth
place. What could be the reason for this? It goes without saying that the
social participation of women in Japan has expanded to a large degree
over the last 30 years (although the number of women working in agri-
culture and family business has also decreased). However, in the past
30 years, the social participation of women in numerous other countries
has much exceeded that of Japan (Gender Equality Bureau 2005).
The question here is how economic growth in Japan during the 1970s
and 1980s could have been achieved without the social participation of
women, unlike other countries. The reason is simple: the long working
hours of men complemented the missing participation of women.
In fact, the number of men working for long hours increased, while
the household pattern of ‘man as breadwinner, woman as housewife’
became more prevalent.
In fact, from the 1970s, Japanese men have completely become men
of ‘work’ who have no time for their own families. This may have been
effective from the viewpoint of economic efficiency: this was when the
slogan of ‘Japan as No. 1’ was born. However, this structure created a
strain in various aspects of Japanese life (Ito 1993, 1996, 2003a, 2003b).
First, as mentioned above, it led to a restriction of women’s social
participation under the maxim that ‘one cannot be focussed if there
is nobody taking care of the family’. This produced many women who
would have liked to work, but who were unable to do so. According to
government data, the so-called latent labour force participation rate
of women (who wanted to work but could not do so because they had
to take care of their families) was close to the rate of working women
in the United States). Furthermore, the pattern of men working longer
hours and women staying at home (sometimes, women take up part-
time jobs under poor working conditions, if they have the time) has
destroyed human and social relations in families and neighbourhoods.
After all, since men do not usually spend time at home or in the neigh-
bourhood, it is not possible for them to form good marital, father–child
142 Kimio Ito
or neighbourly relationships. Although supporters of the backlash

movements stress that ‘women’s social participation will destroy family
bonds’, it actually is not the social participation of women that has
destroyed family relations (after all, women’s social participation in
Japan has been restricted for the past 30 years). Rather, the reason
seems to be the long working hours that have deprived men of family
and neighbourhood life (Ito 2003a).
Thus, the borders between genders began to take shape in Japan in the
1970s.The extent of gender differences in modern Japan can be discerned
from various data too. For instance, Japan was ranked forty-third among
80 countries on the GEM list (the index of gender empowerment that
measures women’s social participation) issued by the United Nations in
2006. Moreover, on the GGI (gender gap index) of the World Economic
Forum, Japan was at the seventy-eighth place among 106 countries.
Though one can witness the growing social activity of women in the
international context, one can also see that Japan has failed to demon-
strate women’s ability (Gender Equality Bureau 2007).
This delay is quite obvious even in Asia. According to research by
MasterCard, among 13 Asian countries and areas (including Taiwan and
Hong Kong), Japan was ranked eleventh in women’s social participation
in 2005. In a world in which the maturity of a society can be seen in the
rate of women’s social participation, the above-mentioned figures can
be considered problematic.
In the international context, the Japanese government has been
dealing with gender discrimination and gender issues since the end of
the twentieth century. In 1999, it established the Basic Law for Gender
Equal Society to lay the foundation for a society with gender equality.
However, though the movement for a gender equal society finally started
to be realized in government policy in 2000, opposition to gender
freedom was also beginning in the form of grassroots movements.
Attempts at interpretation
I explain the dispute over the concept of ‘gender freedom’, since some
confusion still seems to exist over this. The term ‘gender free’ became
popular due to a pamphlet called ‘On Behalf of Young Teachers/Your
Class is Gender Free’ made by the ‘Tokyo Women Foundation’ in 1995.
This pamphlet aimed at promoting ‘gender free’ education, as can be
seen from its addressees, who were young teachers. It goes without
saying that the issue of equal rights for men and women had been recog-
nized by teachers as a significant subject in Japan. However, the efforts
of the Ministry of Education on this subject had been insufficient. In

fact, the Ministry of Education interpreted gender equality as coopera-
tion between men and women in recognition of their differences. The
Ministry failed to eliminate gender bias.
In contrast with this equality theory (danjo-byodo-ron), which the
Ministry of Education failed to address appropriately, the concept of
‘gender freedom’ meaning ‘liberation from gender bias’, was recognized
as a highly active concept. Therefore, teachers who were interested in
this subject welcomed this idea and began using it widely.
However, as discussed below, since the concept of ‘gender freedom’
included some ambiguity, the conservatives intentionally changed this
term and launched a campaign of opposition to gender-free education
and gender freedom.
The ambiguity of this concept lies in its multiple meanings. Barbara
Houston (1994), an American researcher of education, distinguished
three nuances in English in her paper entitled ‘Should Public Education
be Gender Free?’, a paper which was taken into account during the
making of the pamphlet by the Tokyo Women Foundation. I attempt
to summarize the nuances in the following way. One nuance refers to
the mechanical ‘same treatment’ of men and women. Another neglects/
ignores gender issues. The third refers to liberation from gender bias.
In fact, Houston herself did not actually support the usage of the term
‘gender freedom’; she supported ‘liberation from gender bias’ in her paper.
Mechanical same treatment (nuance 1) is weak for mothers who experi-
ence life’s demands in ways that are not ‘the same’ as men, and therefore
need society and social policy to acknowledge their different responsi-
bilities. Neglecting/ignoring gender altogether (nuance 2), removes real,
material gender differences from public view. ‘Liberation from gender
bias’ (nuance 3) is therefore a stronger interpretation, meaning freedom
from a discriminatory environment for women, including mothers and
others who care. Houston’s three nuances of ‘gender free’ prove to be
a big help in the disputes in Japan over this concept. Debates in Japan
have developed around the difference between the first and the third
nuances.
The supporters of the opposition movements identified the meaning
of ‘gender freedom’ without seeking any clarification. Furthermore,
they attacked the practice of ‘making boys and girls use the same room
in physical examinations in schools’, as well as ‘making boys and girls
sleep in the same room during school excursions’, attributing these
practices to the outcome of the ‘gender freedom’ movement. That
is to say, the supporters of the opposition movements interpreted
144 Kimio Ito
the meaning of ‘gender free’, to support their own arguments, as the

mechanical ‘same treatment’ of men and women (abolition of sex differ-
ence = seisa no kaisho), which neglects the difference between the two
sexes. The supporters of this movement attacked teachers (especially the
Japan Teachers’ Union, which promoted ‘gender-free’ education) who
supported education that promoted liberation from gender bias.
However, these teachers were not referring to the mechanical ‘same
treatment’ of men and women but to liberation from gender bias.
After all, understanding the original concept of ‘gender freedom’,
rooted in human rights, as, ‘boys and girls share the same room for
changing clothes’ and ‘boys and girls sleep in the same room (on
school excursions)’ would not just violate (the concept of) ‘gender
freedom’, but would also violate human rights, exposing girls to
sexual harassment.
Proposing and defending reproductive health and rights
In connection with the problems of gender and education, another

issue comes to the foreground, that of sex education. In the Spring of
2002, a work entitled Love & Body Book for Puberty, which was published
by the Boshieisei Kenkyuukai (Society for Mothers and Children’s
Health), an affiliated association of the Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare, and a pamphlet entitled Basic Standards for Educating the Future
Generation, with the support of the Ministry of Education, (edited by
the Japan Association for Women’s Education), were being attacked and
criticized.
The main critique against these two works was based on the assump-
tion that they encouraged free sex. Sex education may be seen as two-
edged. During puberty, one’s interest in sex deepens, as every one of us
has possibly experienced. Thus, if one provides information on sex only
during this time, it can produce negative results for the gender equality
movement. This is because information on sex that is provided at these
times has the strong likelihood of depicting sex as a commercial product
that can be sold and bought. Moreover, there is also a clear gender order
embedded in it.
For this reason, in order to not let young men and women fall easily
into the commercialization of sex (which may have been denied by femi-
nists, who, in turn, are hated by the conservatives), there is a need for
sex education that considers human rights and takes a gender-sensitive
approach.
However, there is a lack of this kind of approach in sex education in

Japan. Some argue that education of sex refers to education about the
biology of sex. That is to say, sex education in Japan is about pregnancy,
the prevention of pregnancy and abortion, while nothing is taught
about the relationship between sex and human beings and the issues
of human rights. Strong gender bias still exists. The education of sex
focuses on teaching the differences between the bodies and physiologies
of men and women; this may also contribute to the formation of a firm
gender consciousness.
Recently, the number of teachers considering gender and human
rights issues has increased rapidly. Governmental departments and
administrative organizations have also started to respond to these
movements. The Love & Body book was published in the middle of this
period. It is argued here that the problem is not about whom to lay the
blame on for free sex, but is about creating sex education that is based
on human rights.
The issue of sex has also become a subject in debates on gender
equality policy. For instance, the main dispute in a provincial assembly
(that was about to enact legislation) was over the articles concerning the
health and rights of sex and the biology of sex. With regard to repro-
ductive health, the definition given in the International Conference on
Population and Development held in 1994 in Cairo is often used. This
definition does not merely refer to the non-existence of diseases and
malfunctions in relation to all aspects of pregnancy and birth and their
related functions and processes, and also pertains to a good state physi-
ologically, mentally and socially.
Moreover, reproductive right refers to the right to a free-but-highly-
responsible self-decision concerning sexual relationships and repro-
duction, without being exposed to discrimination, compulsion and
violation.
In order to realize the self-decision rights of women, it is necessary to
promote, in the consciousness of men, respect for the rights of women
over their sexual relationships and reproduction. The creation of sexual
relationships without compulsion or reproduction is a subject that refers
to both men and women.
Although the ideas of reproductive health and rights have spread
internationally, there has been a rapid movement against them as well.
For instance, the Sankei Shimbun, in its edition of 17 February 2003,
published an article entitled ‘Gender Equality is Spreading in Deviant
Regions’, in which it attacks reproductive health and rights. With regard
146 Kimio Ito
to the ordinances of local administrations, this article points to the

usage of phrases such as ‘gender’, the prohibition of phrases that one
associates with the established roles of men and women and regulations
that leave decisions about birth and abortion to women or couples. This
is reported in detail on the front page, entitled ‘Abortion in eighteen
prefectures, “self-determination rights,” ordinance of gender equalities:
a fear of violation of law.’
The argument in the Sankei Shimbun refers to the tolerance of abor-
tion. Certainly, from the viewpoint of respecting life, abortion should
be avoided as much as possible. However, abortion cannot be avoided
in certain cases, for example, economic reasons, health problems, preg-
nancy through rape. In fact, Japan recognized and legitimized abor-
tion for economic reasons much earlier than other countries (tolerance
towards abortion appeared around the 1970s in strongly religious
European societies).
It seems unlikely that including ideas of reproductive health and rights
in law would lead to the unthinking tolerance of abortion. With regard to
the right to personal autonomy, there should be no problem with leaving
women (who become pregnant and bear children) with the final deci-
sion on birth or abortion, since it mainly concerns their bodies (though
there should be an agreement with the father as the contributor to the
pregnancy). Among existing laws in Japan, there is a restriction against
careless abortion in the Mother’s Body Protection Law. In fact, this is
a problematic law. One often hears justifications such as ‘on behalf of
the decreasing number of children’. However, it is men, (including some
politicians, who neglect human rights and who wish to maintain the
system of the commercialization of sex) who believe that ‘they would be
in trouble if they gave women the right to decide for or against abortion
in cases in which a pregnancy would be very inconvenient for them (the
men)’. Such people really need to be educated about the morality and
purity concerning sex that the conservatives are so worried about.
With regard to reproductive health and rights, there were only a
few countries that opposed this idea, such as the USA (due to the anti-
abortion ideas of the ‘pro-life’ Christian movement that supported the
Bush regime), at The Fifth Asian and Pacific Population Conference in
December 2002 in Bangkok. Yoshio KIMURA, the senior vice-minister
of Health, Labour and Welfare, who represented the Japanese govern-
ment, welcomed these ideas saying, ‘I wish that women and men, as
well as families can all enjoy happiness and good health for a whole
lifetime, [thus] let me stress the importance of reproductive health and
rights.’
The backlash movement and its rhetoric
Backlash groups stress the following themes:
1. Gender equality (‘gender freedom’) denies both masculinity and

femininity, thereby destroying traditional Japanese culture.
2. Gender equality (‘gender freedom’) denies the role of the housewife.
3. Gender equality (‘gender freedom’) is a plot by Marxist feminists who
are attempting to destroy family relations.
4. Gender equality (‘gender freedom’) and other movements of repro-
ductive health and rights that stress gender equality are promoting
‘free sex.’
5. Gender equality (‘gender freedom’) is not merely promoting equality
of chances but also equality of results.
6. Gender free-education is equal to brainwash education.
By stressing the significance of family bonds, the supporters of the back-

lash movement, are actually (but subversively) regarding the institution
of the traditional patriarchal family (which leads to the subordination
of some family members) as the ideal. They thus intend to maintain the
system that leaves indispensable jobs such as housework, child rearing
and care taking solely to women, reserves the gender-role division that
prevailed in Japan after World War II, and restricts women’s equality in
society. Moreover, by stressing the slogan ‘man is the breadwinner’, this
system deprives men of lives with their families and neighbourhoods
and neglects the fact that they are not allowed to lead full lives, some-
times even leading to death due to overwork or suicide. This system
simply ignores the international trend of creating a compatible relation-
ship between economic participation and family/neighbourhood life,
despite Japanese society facing both a heavy decline in the number of
children and a serious aging problem.
Though the backlash movement has little to say beyond demonstrating
ideological repulsion, it enjoys a certain number of supporters because
it appears to have some persuasive qualities. Why does this movement,
which has developed in connection with homosexuality, abortion and
the abolition of gender discrimination, possess this quality? I believe the
answer lies in its rhetoric.
First, it is about creating enemies. For instance, the campaign against
‘too much gender freedom (rejecting gender discrimination)’ is a repre-
sentative example. The backlash movement distorts the image of actual
‘gender-free’ education and gender policy into a stereotype. Many
148 Kimio Ito
supporters of ‘gender freedom’ initially thought that no one would pay

heed to this unreasonable propaganda. The reaction to the backlash
movement was delayed, perhaps because supporters of gender freedom
saw the backlash as nonsense, which merited little attention.
In addition, an implausible labelling attempts to lump the various
kinds of people supporting ‘gender freedom’ into one group, refer-
ring to them as ‘Marxist feminists’ or ‘a leftist plot after the end of
the Cold War’. Although this may indeed refer to some supporters of
‘gender freedom’, if this were true more widely, it would appear that
many countries, including the United Nations, are united on the basis
of Marxist feminism and leftist regimes. The mistake of this labeling is
apparent in the fact that in comparison with the former State-Socialist
Eastern countries, the gender equality movement developed from the
1970s onwards in the West. The Eastern Bloc made far more progress in
women’s participation in labour than did the West, although they were
far behind the West in liberating women from the burden of housework
and in allowing them decision-making rights. Without any clarification
of Marxist feminism and leftist power in this ‘backlash’ account, one can
perceive the idea behind blackening the ‘gender free’ image with the use
of these phrases.
Furthermore, the phrase ‘relativism,’ in the rhetoric of the conserva-
tive, is striking. That is, while the supporters of the backlash movements
depict ‘gender freedom’ and feminism as the essence of fundamentalism,
they portray themselves as moderate people of common sense in their
rhetoric.
These conservatives are far from tolerating others’ opinions. Rather,
they are quite intolerant and hostile to those who with differing opin-
ions. They offer nothing but a superficial ‘relativism and common sense’,
an ideologist fundamentalism, criticizing others, while they often avoid
clarifying their own standpoints, standpoints which are nothing but
ideology.
The social background of the backlash movement

and its multiple currents
Thus far, we have discussed the backlash movement as a whole. Actually,

however, this movement includes several trends that should not be
lumped together. There are at least three tendencies.
First, there is the traditional conservative tendency. Second is the
tendency that could be called the ‘silent supporter of the backlash’.
Third, there is the neo-conservative younger generation who can be
described as ‘anti-gender-equality on behalf of self-defense’: this devel-

oped in connection with homosexuality, abortion and the abolition of
gender discrimination. I first talk about the ideologists’ discourse. The
traditional and conservative standpoint of men and women who believe
in the prewar patriarchal family, who stress the recovery of the traditional
patriarchal family system and who believe that women’s first duties are
housework and child raising, is understandable, in some sense. Now that
our world has been going through huge changes without people being
able to discern the future, it is not strange that these men and women
attempt to secure society by reverting to the traditional social order.
In the current movement of opposition to gender freedom, there is
another, rather hidden, tendency that derives from the repulsion of
the middle-aged and elderly people to feminism. On the surface, they
do not criticize the gender equality movement and do not agree with
conservative ideology. However, they do not support the political move-
ment promoting the gender equality that started to be acknowledged
by society in the 1980s, and that then started to be developed by the
government in the 1990s. Their underlying belief is that the ideology
of feminism is destroying the proper relationship between men and
women, coexistence based on their differences. Though they talk about
progressivism, they do not understand what it is. While some conserva-
tive media are becoming the centre of this opposition, most of the mass
media do not pay attention to debates about gender issues. By avoiding
this subject, the leading media factions are turning the problem of
gender differences invisible.
The key reason for the lack of attention to gender issues among older
men, as well as the mainstream media, which are influenced by these
hidden anti-gender-free men, may be that they all regard feminism as a
kind of dogmatic ideology.
Behind the anti-gender-equality consciousness of these men, it is
possible that they are dependent on the women around them, even if
they are not aware of this fact. Although Japanese men appear strong
and proud, in reality they are very dependent on the women around
them, both in terms of labour-and-housework and mental/emotional
care. There are cases of men supporting themselves in their work,
family lives and neighbourhoods, often in the shadow of the support of
women, while the gender structure still maintains women as financially
dependent on men. Some men are very aware of this and appear to be
afraid of allowing women to stand on their own feet, since women have
supported them so far. The independence of women would endanger
men who cannot stand on their own feet themselves.
150 Kimio Ito
That is the reason why men’s awareness of gender issues, as well as

their self-reliance in everyday physical and mental and emotional life, is
one of the essential questions. There is a need to reconsider their way of
life as men and to increase their concern about the issues of women.
Finally, there is one more group that should be discussed: the group
of conservative people on the internet, the so-called ‘internet rightists’,
which widely supports the opposition to gender equality. This group/
movement is responsible for the strengthening of conservatism in
modern Japan.
What provides support to these conservatives is neither the tradi-
tional conservative idea discussed above, nor the latent anti-feminist
feeling held by many middle-aged men, but the power to confirm them-
selves as ‘ordinary people.’ This power has been described in the book
Nationalism of Healing, written by Yoko UENO, who analyzed young
people participating in Meetings for Making New Historical Textbooks
(Atarashii rekishikyoukasho wo Tsukuru Kai) (Ueno and Oguma 2003).
This appears to derive from the latent culture of hatred in modern
Japanese society. This hatred is not something that was born from a
relationship with a concrete object. Rather, it refers to the creation of
an illusory hatred community by picking something as the target of its
hatred and then attacking it.
Feminism and the ‘gender freedom’ movement have become ‘ideal’
targets of this hatred culture. Moreover, as is well known, this hatred
has now grown into a strange and distorted nationalism, in the form of
anti-Korea and anti-China movements.
However, no one can point out a clear idea or intimate community
behind this hatred, since no ideology is evident behind it. What these
men and women want is to make their unrelieved selves experience the
relief of expressing their hatred against others.
Furthermore, this ‘hatred community’ derives a sense of a missing
‘community feeling’ from attacking a common ‘enemy’. This kind of
community, however, is nothing but an illusion. What these men and
women want is not social solidarity or a community, but the recognition
by this imagined community (Ito 2004).
Conclusion
Gender culture in Japan has changed and developed throughout history.

Although Confucian culture impacted on Japanese women much less
than other East Asian countries, some influence can be seen on gender
hierarchies in the family and wider society.
The culture wars over gender in Japan continue. Nevertheless, the

gender equality movement has sustained itself and government gender
equality policy to a certain degree and has defended itself against the
fierce attacks of the conservatives. The movement of the internet right-
ists is not as strong as it used to be. Gender issues may have become
an old target for people who are constantly looking for new subjects
of hatred. On the other hand, people in favour of gender equality have
grown into a grassroots movement through internet meetings. However,
in local administrations, which seem to be a little behind the times,
the intense repulsion of the conservatives to gender equality policy has
recently strengthened. The mass media, still led by men, pretends igno-
rance of the opposition to gender equality, and even seems to support
‘gender freedom.’
It goes without saying that the direction of politics concerning gender
as the border between men and women will be one of the most impor-
tant subjects in the future in Japanese society and politics.
References
Gelb, J. and Palley, M. L. (1992) Women of Japan and Korea, Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Gelb, J. and Palley, L. (1994) Women of Japan and Korea, Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Gender Equality Bureau, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2005) International
Comparison of the Social Environments regarding Declining Birthrates and
Gender Equality.
Gender Equality Bureau, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2007) Gender
Equality in Japan.
Hunter,J. D. (1991) Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, Basic Books.
Houston, B. (1994) ‘Should Public Education Be Gender Free?’, in L. Stone (ed.),
The Education Feminism Reader, New York: Routledge.
Ito, K. (1993) <Otokorashisa> no Yukue (The Path of Masculinities), Shinyosha.
Ito, K. (1996) Danseigaku Nyumon (An Introduction to Men’s Studies),
Sakuhinsha.
Ito, K. (2003a) <Otokorashisa> toiu Sinwa (The Myth of Masculinities), NHK
Shuppan.
Ito, K. (2003b) Danjokyoudousankaku ga Toikakerumono – Gendai Nihon Shakai
to Gender Politics (The Meaning of Gender Equality – Gender Politics in
Contemporary Japan), Impact Shuppankai.
Ito, K. (2004) ‘Hate/Fobia no Kozu (The situation of Hate/Fobia)’, Impaction, Vol.
143.
Ito, K. (2005) ‘Bunkasebnso wo domiruka (What are Culture wars)’ Impaction,
Vol. 147.
Ueno, Y. and Oguma, E. (2003) <Iyasi> tositeno Nashonarizumu (Nationalism as
<Healing>), Keio University Press.
8
Prime Ministers’ Discourse in
Japan’s Reforms since the 1980s:
Traditionalization of Modernity
rather than Confucianism
Emiko Ochiai and Ken’ichi Johshita
Confucianism and gender in Japanese history
Japan’s shallow tradition of Confucianism

As researchers into the family sociology and political history of Japan,
we feel uneasy whenever we come across a description that lumps
together the welfare states of East Asia as ‘Confucian welfare states’. It is
a common understanding in Japanese academia that the penetration of
Confucianism into traditional Japanese society was shallow, compared
with other countries of East Asia.
‘Shallow’ means two things. One is that, in terms of social class,
Confucianism affected only the higher strata. Kawashima Takeyoshi,1
a leading legal sociologist, held that ‘the dominant discourse about
family ethics in our country had adopted the standpoint of the
feudal ruling class (the samurai or warrior class), or in other words,
Confucian family ethics’. However, he continued that ‘the family
systems of the producer class, the farmers and the fishermen, as well
as of the petit bourgeoisie of the cities, were of a different type from
this’. (Kawashima 1957). He argued that it was only in the modern
era, after the 1868 Meiji Restoration, that Confucian family values
spread to the masses, particularly after the promulgation of the Meiji
Civil Code in 1898. This view has become the common understanding
in postwar Japan.
The other meaning of ‘shallow’ is that the influence of Confucianism
stopped at the ideological level, and that everyday life was little
152
Prime Ministers’ Discourse in Japan’s Reforms 153
affected, compared with other East Asian countries. To give some

examples, in Confucian teachings, there is the saying ‘a virtuous
woman does not take a second husband’.2 Young widows who did not
remarry and continued to serve their parents-in-law and, in extreme
cases, women who followed their husbands into death, were praised as
‘heroines’ and rewarded by the state in China and Korea3. However in
Japan, with its high rates of divorce, not only was remarriage common
after the death of a husband, it was also common after divorce.
Historical demographic studies indicate that the divorce rate in the
North-eastern part of Japan in the eighteenth and ninteenth centuries
was as high as current US levels (Ochiai 1999; Kurosu et al. 1999). In
the South-western part of the country, freer attitudes towards sexual
relations, known as yobai or ‘night calling’, were widespread among
young men and women – sometimes not-so-young married ones were
also involved – (Akamatsu 1994; Ochiai 2011) and resulted in around
10 per cent of births out-of-wedlock (Ochiai and Nakajima 2010). The
Confucian teaching that ‘Boys and girls should be separate after age
seven’ was not observed.
Also in societies influenced by Confucianism the division of roles
between men and women and the separation of spheres were strictly
adhered to, but in traditional Japan, women engaged in the family
business, or were otherwise employed, and both before and after
marriage engaged in productive labour along with men. A figure of
labour force participation rates of women by age in ninteenth century
pre-industrial Japan would have shown an inverse U shape, with a
level of participation as high as it currently is in the United States or
Sweden (Umemura 1988).
The influence of Confucianism on a non-Confucian society

To know why the effects of Confucianism on Japan were so shallow,
we need to be aware that Confucianism reflected the social structure
of China, the country that created it, and in particular, the kinship
structure. Chinese society has exogamous patrilineal kinship groups.
Such societies determine attribution to kinship group through ties with
the father, so, in general, women’s sexuality is strictly controlled, and
women’s inheritance rights are limited, to avoid losing inheritance
through marriage. In contrast to this, Japan, like much of Southeast
Asia, has a bi-lateral kinship structure, bringing a relatively high posi-
tion for women, and relatively greater sexual freedom.
The gender division of labour is also affected by agricultural tech-
nology. In the rice belt, from Southeast Asia to southern China, the
154 Emiko Ochiai and Ken’ichi Johshita
contributions made by women in agricultural production are consid-

erable, but in northern China, in the wheat belt where cattle are
used, men tend to take the central role in agriculture (Sechiyama
1996, 2013).
The basic structure of Japanese society shared a great deal with
Southeast Asia in both kinship structures and agriculture technology.
Women in ancient Japan enjoyed a high status4. Confucianism arrived
in Japan against such a background in the fifth or sixth century, but its
influence was limited. The Chinese civil service examination (keju 科挙)
did not take hold and the legal code (lulling 律令) was modified, and in
the end it was Buddhism that had the greater influence.
The situation changed somewhat in the seventeenth century.
Established early in the century, the Tokugawa Shogunate drew on neo-
Confucianism for the core of its governing ideology, and Confucian educa-
tion spread throughout the ruling samurai class. However, there were
some Japan-specific modifications in the application of Confucianism,
such as loyalty to master overriding piety to one’s parents.
Mobilization of Confucianism by the modern state

The influence of Confucianism in Japan reached the whole popu-
lation only once the modern period had started after the 1868 Meiji
Restoration. The Meiji Government spent its first decade following
strong Westernization policies, but later there was a movement to return
to traditional Eastern cultural background, and Meiji leaders promoted
the use of Confucian moral education texts. Promulgated in 1890, the
Imperial Rescript on Education (kyoiku chokugo) placed emperor worship
at its core, but at the same time it strongly reflected Confucian values
such as loyalty and filial piety. Being recited by the children each day at
school, it penetrated deeply into national mentality.
Nevertheless, the Meiji Confucianism that filtered into modern Japanese
society was too complex to be categorized as merely a return to tradition.
In the tripartite face-off of national learning (kokugaku), Chinese learning
(kangaku), and Western learning (yogaku), Chinese learning provided
the conceptual resources for the translation and acceptance of Western
learning. At times Chinese learning was rejected for nationalistic reasons
(to promote national learning) and at other times it was considered as
one of the ideological pillars opposing the West, in combination with
national learning, as a building block for Japanese thought. In other
words, Confucianism was mobilized in a number of ways to create an
ideology to support the modern Japanese state.
A similar history was experienced in countries such as Korea, where,

although there was a system of partible inheritance among sons and
daughters until the seventeenth century, women later lost their inher-
itance rights, while state glorification of chaste women increased.
In Vietnam, although women have been economically quite active
throughout its history, it was considered a virtue for women to sacri-
fice themselves for their husbands and families (Pettus 2003; Ochiai
and Aoyama 2013). We must not be naïve when it comes to using
Confucianism as the key factor to explain the contemporary state
of East Asia. Confucianism is not simply traditional, but has been
imported, reshaped and used to suit the aims of rulers of the era.
‘Good wife and wise mother’ as a new woman

The intellectual history of ‘ryōsai-kenbo’, the concept of the ‘good wife
and wise mother’, provides us with a good example of the twisted rela-
tionships between Confucianism and ‘rulers’ purposes’. This phrase was
often used in Japan as the ideal role for women, as in China (where it
is ‘wise wife and good mother’) and Korea (where it is ‘wise mother and
good wife’), and has generally been thought of as an ancient precept
that came from Confucianism and tradition (Jin 2006).
However, in the 1980s, research questioned this view. Koyama Shizuko
discovered that the phrase ‘ryōsai-kenbo’ was not to be found anywhere
in records from the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Its first appear-
ance was at the end of the ninteenth century and actually followed the
influence of European ideas of women in the early Meiji period (Koyama
1991, 2013).
One of the key roles of the good wife and wise mother was to take
the lead in educating her children. In contrast, the Confucian view of
women in the Tokugawa Period did not rate the intelligence of women
highly, and there was no expectation that mothers would actually
educate their children. The roles of the good wife and wise mother
were actually closer to the role models promoted in modern Europe
(Koyama 1991, 2013). Girls who were educated to become good wives
and wise mothers in girls’ high schools at the time were proud to fulfil
their new role of contributing not just to the family but to the state.
The role of women as good wives and wise mothers was also exported
to nearby countries in Asia from the late ninteenth to early twentieth
centuries. In these societies, the ‘good wife and wise mother’ was
accepted as a modern, advanced role for a woman (Jin 2006, Ochiai
and Aoyama 2013).
Traditionalization of modern gender roles

The intellectual history of the good wife and wise mother does not end
here. The educational ideal showed some changes following World
War I: increased emphasis on the concept of building the nation and
strengthening Confucian values in women made the good wife and wise
mother concept more conservative.
In China, with the impact of the May Fourth Movement (1919), atten-
tion was given to a new image of women as ‘independent individuals’ à
la Ibsen’s Nora (Jin 2006: Ch. 6). In the late 1920s, there was increasing
criticism of the unthinking Westernization of China, and the wise wife
and good mother made a comeback, but its meaning had changed, with
a new emphasis on woman’s role in the household, and connections
with traditional Chinese Confucian ideas (Jin 2006: Ch. 7).
In this way, both China and Japan came to show what could be called
a ‘traditionalization’ of the good wife and wise mother by the period
after World War I. The force acting here was what we may call the
cultural geopolitics of ‘Asia’. The superiority and threat of the West led
to the introduction of the European good wife and wise mother idea,
but at the same time the spirit of resistance to the West required the
creation of an Eastern image of women. The ‘new woman’ appeared
as an individual, equal to a man, but was recast as a Western image
of women, while the ‘good wife and wise mother’ ideal was recast as
part of Eastern tradition. This shift perhaps owed less to shared tradi-
tions such as Confucianism than to a sort of identity politics. In this
way, the modern domestic role of women was made into an ‘Asian
tradition’.
Japan’s unique path and its political background
The emergence of Japanese uniqueness since 1970s

The rest of this chapter discusses changes in gender and family, the
development of related policies and the influence of Confucianism on
both in Japan since the 1970s. At this time, Japan started heading down
a different path, diverging from Western societies, in regard to gender.
Was it because Japan had a different cultural tradition from the West
and its core was Confucianism?
In Japan, where women’s economic activity was high, according to
Southeast Asian tradition, women’s labour force participation declined
in the first half of the twentieth century as modernization spread
(Umemura 1988). In this era, the gender division described by Jane

Lewis as the ‘male breadwinner/female carer model’ was born among
Japan’s urban middle class. It became widespread among all social strata
after World War II, bringing an M-shape pattern to women’s workforce
participation by age (Ochiai 1997). Readers may be surprised to learn
that, even at the start of the 1970s, the overall rate of women’s partici-
pation in the labour force in Japan was higher than in most Western
countries. Later, as is well known, participation rates dramatically
increased in the West, while the increase in Japan was far smaller, and
the M-shape pattern remained clear even in the most recent data in
2005 (Ochiai 2010).
According to Iwai Hachiro, who compared longitudinal changes in
life course patterns of men and women in Sweden, the United States,
Germany and Japan, the Japanese life course became unique quite
recently. Iwai emphasizes that, from the 1970s on, life course patterns in
Japan did not change as they did in the other countries, making Japan’s
retention of existing patterns unique (Iwai 2010).
An analysis of Prime Ministers’ discourse

To examine the importance of policy and ideological factors in changes
in family and gender in Japan from the 1970s, we analyse the state-
ments made by prime ministers, using the online database of National
Diet proceedings because their discourse enables understanding of the
ideology promoted by governments.
First, to understand long-term trends, we count the frequency of use of
the words ‘family’ (kazoku) or ‘home’ (katei) in speeches or remarks made
by the twenty-nine prime ministers since Yoshida Shigeru – Yoshida was
prime minister in 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed,
returning sovereignty of the country to Japan – until, Noda Yoshihiko.
We examine their remarks in the Diet (including plenary sessions of
the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, Budget
Committee meetings and other committee meetings). This method
was employed in one of the authors’, Johshita Ken’ichi’s, previous
work on prime ministers’ attitudes towards the family (Johshita 2011).
If the word is mentioned once or more in one meeting, it is counted
once, so we are not counting the number of times words were used
but the number of meetings where they were mentioned. To compare
the frequency, we need to measure the length of tenure for each prime
minister: the number of meetings where these words were uttered, as
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
Hata Tsutomu 94
Yoshida Shigeru 48–54
Hatoyama Ichiro 54–6
Ishibashi Tanzan 56–7
Kishi Nobusuke 57–60
Ikeda Hayato 60–4
Sato Eisaku 64–72
Tanaka Kakuei 72–4
Miki Takeo 74–6
Fukuda Takeo 76–8
a shi 78–80
Suzuki Zenko 80–2
Nakasone Yasuhiro 82–7
Takeshita Noboru 87–9
Uno Sosuke 89
Kaifu Toshiki 89–91
Miyazawa Kiichi 91–3
Hosokawa Morihiro 93–4
Tomiichi 94–6
Hashimoro Ryutaro 96–8
Obuchi Keizo 98–00
Yoshiro 00–1
Koizumi Jun’ichiro 01–6
Abe Shinzo 06–7
Yasuo 07–8
Taro 08–9
Yukio 09–10
Kan Naoto 10–1
Noda Yoshihi ko 11–
Aso T
Ohira Masayo
Fukuda Y
Hatoyama Y
Mori Y
Y
Murayama T
T
Y
K
Figure 8.1 Freqency of statements on ‘family’ and ‘home’ by prime ministers in
post-war Japan, 1948–2011
a ratio of each prime minister’s tenure in office in days, is shown in

Figure 8.1.
Some supplementary information may be useful here for readers unfa-
miliar with Japanese political history. From 1955, a ‘conservative alli-
ance’ (hoshu gōdō) of the Liberal Party (Jiyūtō) and the Japan Democratic
Party (Nihon Minshutō), the Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyū-Minshutō; or
LDP) ruled Japan for an uninterrupted 38 years, from the third Hatoyama
Cabinet to the fall of the Miyazawa Cabinet in 1993.5 A merger of left-
wing political forces created the Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō;
JSP) which was the main opposition to the LDP during this period.
Known as the ‘1955 System’, this was a very stable period in Japanese
politics. The system broke down in 1993, since when there has been a
succession of governments, led by new parties such as the Japan New
Party or the Japan Renewal Party, followed by a coalition government led
by the JSP, then a series of other coalition governments headed by the
LDP, from Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutarō’s to Asō Tarō’s government.
Finally, in 2009, the Democratic Party (Minshutō) assumed power.
Families and women as political issues

Figure 8.1 shows a marked trend (Johshita 2011). During the conserva-
tive alliance, there was an increase in statements regarding the family
and home, starting with Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who created the
core structure of post-war Japanese politics by entering into the Ampo
Treaty with the United States.6 The ways in which family and home were
discussed also changed after Kishi. In the immediate post-war period the
family, particularly the family of war victims, was depicted as a recipient
of welfare to which the state owed protection, but from Kishi and more
especially from Ikeda Hayato on, there was increasing emphasis on the
family’s obligation as welfare provider to serve the state (Johshita 2011).
The frequency of references to the family or the home during the period
of single-party rule by the LDP, from Kishi to Miyazawa, fluctuated, but
statements can be encompassed in roughly the same range (roughly
between 0.04 and 0.06 per day) (Johshita 2011). The only exception was
Nakasone Yasuhiro, whose frequency was 0.08 per day. Nakasone, who
served in as prime minister from 1982 to 1987, was proud of his close
personal relationships with then British Prime Minister Thatcher and
the US President Reagan, and is known for working with them to bring
about neoliberal reforms. The LDP became the ruling party again when
this book was in the publication process.
Following the collapse of LDP single-party rule in 1993, and with the
first non-LDP prime minister, Hosokawa Morihiro as an exception, there
was a leap to around twice as many statements about the family and
home during the next period of LDP rule. This level has been main-
tained to the present (Johshita 2011). From the mid-1990s, the family
and the home have been political issues. They were aggressively pushed
to the fore in 2006 by the new prime minister that year, Abe Shinzō. Abe
is known for being a reactionary cultural nationalist.
Statements about women are much harder to pinpoint than those about
the family or the home because many words are used to refer to women.
In this research, we studied the number of times the words ‘female’ (onna),
‘married woman’ (fu), ‘wife’ (tsuma), ‘mother’ (haha), ‘spouse’ (haigūsha),
or ‘madame’ (okusan) were used, but as many of them were used in unre-
lated ways (e.g. ‘mother ship’), the frequency of their use is less indicative
of trends than is the use of ‘family’ and ‘home’. With that understood,
the frequency of statements was calculated using the same method as the
previous figure and the results are shown in Figure 8.2.
There is a greater range between highs and lows than in Figure 8.1,
but when we consider that almost all of Prime Minister Uno Sōsuke’s
statements were actually not related to women, we see that Nakasone
truly stands out in the LDP-dominated period, just as for ‘family’ and
‘home’. There is also an increase in the post-1993 period, but among
the post-’55 system’ prime ministers, Hata, Hashimoto, Abe and the first
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
Hata Tsutomu 94
Yoshida Shigeru 48–54
Hatoyama Ichiro 54–6
Tanzan 56–7
Kishi Nobusuke 57–60
Ikeda Hayato 60–4
Sato Eisaku 64–72
Tanaka Kakuei 72–4
Miki Takeo 74–6
Fukuda Takeo 76–8
a oshi 78–80
Suzuki Zenko 80–2
Yasuhiro 82–7
Takeshita Noboru 87–9
Uno Sosuke 89
Toshiki 89–91
Miyazawa Kiichi 91–3
Hosokawa Morihiro 93–4
Tomiichi 94–6
Hashimoro Ryutaro 96–8
Obuchi Keizo 98–00
Yoshiro 00–1
Koizumi Jun’ichiro 01–6
Abe Shinzo 06–7
Yasuo 07–8
Taro 08–9
Yukio 09–10
Kan Naoto 10–1
Noda Yoshihik o 11–
Aso T
Fukuda Y
Hatoyama Y
Ohira Masay
Mori Y
Ishibashi T
Y
Kaifu T
Murayama T
Nakasone Y
T
Y
K
Figure 8.2 Freqency of statements on women by prime ministers in post-war
Japan, 1948–2011
Democratic Party prime minister, Hatoyama7 are all high for women’s
issues. It should also be noted that Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro,
who carried out the neoliberal ‘Koizumi Reforms’ while maintaining
power for five-and-a-half years during the LDP coalition government,
mentioned ‘family’, ‘home’, and women-related issues less frequently.
Abe became the Prime Minister again in 2012.
From the above, we can see that there are two periods when family
and women were political issues. The first is the Nakasone government
during the LDP single-party rule (1982–1987). The second is from the
mid-1990s, after one-party rule collapsed. Both are in periods when the
situations of families and women in Japan headed in different directions
from those of the West. The following part of this essay focuses on these
two periods, asking how the prime ministers referred to families and
women. It also examines the nature of policies for women and families
adopted in these periods.
Familialist reform in the 1980s
Neoliberalism and Japanese-style welfare society

Nakasone Yasuhiro, who made the most comments about families
and women during the LDP one-party rule era, was the pre-eminent
politician of post-war Japanese politics. As noted above, his neoliberal

policies were in step with Thatcher and Reagan. One of the best exam-
ples was the 1987 privatization of Japan National Railways. In social
welfare, he maintained the idea of a ‘Japanese-style welfare society’ (LDP
1979) created under Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi: both emphasized
self-help and mutual assistance from family and local community.
The Japanese government named 1973 ‘Welfare Year One’, aiming to
move the country towards a welfare state resembling those in Europe.
Ironically, however, 1973 was also the year Japan was hit by the Oil
Crisis, and the government rapidly changed course to the ‘Japanese-
style welfare society’.
Nakasone’s other face was that of a Japanese nationalist. On appoint-
ment as prime minister, he announced a ‘final settlement of post-war
politics’. An economic growth strategy designed to catch up with the West
and a foreign policy following in the wake of the US had been the corner-
stones of post-war Japanese politics. These were adjusted by Nakasone,
who embarked on a new course based on Japanese culture. The concept of
a ‘Japanese-style welfare society’ belonged with these ideas.
Nakasone’s confidence in being able to adopt a unique path for Japan
was bolstered by a strong economy. Japan had experienced an ‘economic
miracle’ of an average yearly growth of 10 per cent in the 1960s, and
the annual growth rate averaged 4 per cent (the ‘stable growth’ period)
even after Western nations entered a period of long-term stagnation.
Japan did not merely achieve its economic target of catching up with
the West; it overtook it, and became the leader of the global economy.
In 1979, Ezra Vogel (Harvard University) published his Japan as Number
One, and the idea that Japan’s economic success was due to Japanese
cultural traits and unique Japanese management practices became
popular worldwide.8
Nakasone’s administration brought about major changes in gender
and family policies too. The laws and regulations which govern gender
construction in Japan to this day were formed during this period. These
include the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1985), the
establishment (as the 1985 revision to the Working Women Welfare Act)
and promulgation (1986) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law,
the abolition of protection for women under the Labour Standards Act9
(revised in 1985). The Variable Working Hours System, the Discretionary
Working System and the Flexitime System were introduced in the Labour
Standards Act (revised in 1987). The Worker Redundancy Act (Worker
Dispatching Act in Japanese Law) was enacted in 1986. The marital tax
deduction (1987) and National Pension No. 3 Insured Persons System

relating to housewives’ pensions (1986), were also established, whereby
a housewife (defined as a married women with an income of less than
1.3 million yen a year) whose spouse has joined Employee’s Pension
Insurance or Public Servant’s Pension Insurance could join the National
Pension Insurance without paying insurance premiums or her husband
paying additional premiums. This system had the very powerful effect
of holding down the earnings of those married women who received the
tax benefits of the spouse deduction and the special spouse deduction to
a level below the limits it set on incomes as an eligibility requirement.
The laws and regulations concerning gender established during this
period appeared to promote the employment of women based on the
idea of gender equality. However, they also increased flexibility of labour
and gave new tax and pension benefits to housewives and housewives
with low part-time earnings. Consequently, women in Japan became
divided into three types: elite women, who pursued careers equal to
those of men; part-timers and those who worked in non-standard and
unstable employment; and housewives. It has the appearance of an
ingenious set of moves designed to divide and rule women. To what
extent did Nakasone intend this when he constructed this system? And
are there Confucian influences? The next section looks at the statements
made by Nakasone regarding families and women.
Statements of Prime Minister Nakasone in the 1980s

In his earliest policy speeches, Nakasone clearly made ‘the family’ a
political issue.
The second political goal is to make Japan a country with a strong

culture and social welfare. ... At present, through its period of rapid
economic growth, Japan has grown into the Free World’s second
largest economic power. In addition to the material wealth now in
our hands, our people are seeking in their hearts, spiritual richness
and genuine culture. We hear voices earnestly calling for a Japanese
type of welfare centred on the home, different from the Western
model of a welfare state.
Above all else, I would like to aim for the construction of a society
that is rich in ‘propriety’ (reisetsu 礼節) and love, a society where our
hearts and minds can connect with one another. [Applause] Especially
I want the light of politics to reach the home, that domain called the
household. It is the importance of this that I want to stress the most.
Just where is it exactly, this tangible happiness of the people? The
times when people rush home to their families to gather around a

warm evening dinner table, this is when true, deep affection is in the
air. Is it not at moments exactly like these that an ineffable tender-
ness and happiness exist? At the dinner table, a grandchild on the lap,
three generations of parents and children living together. I am sure
that moments like these are an irreplaceable joy for our elderly. ... The
home, which is the foundation this happiness rests upon, must be
treasured. I firmly believe that this is the basic social unit that must
be strengthened and enriched as the source of our culture and our
welfare. [Applause] (House of Representatives, Plenary session, 12
March 1982)
This was a declaration that the government would seek ‘A Japanese-

style welfare society’.10 The expression ‘welfare centred on the home’,
indicated that this would be policy positioning ‘the family as welfare
provider’, to apply Johshita’s typology. The envisioned family was not
the traditional farm family or a family managing its own business, but
a family headed by a company employee who commuted to work. The
characteristic of the believed-to-be ‘traditional’ pattern of three genera-
tions living under one roof11 was tacked onto this image of the family.
Interestingly, the Confucian concept of ‘propriety’ was set up alongside
the modern concept of ‘love’.12
In practice, this Japanese model of a welfare society was a proposal for
a welfare mix. While using the expression ‘uniquely Japanese’, he added
the idea of making full use of the ‘vitality of the private sector’ (House
of Representatives, Plenary session, 8 February 1984). This revealed that
he was in step with the world trend of neoliberalism.
While he spoke eloquently and with a set of well-developed beliefs
on ‘the family’, his statements on women seemed difficult or somewhat
painful.
In the age that is developing, we can no longer view the woman ques-
tion the way we have until now. I am sure that most of you are aware
of what Europe and America are already experiencing. I think Japan is
beginning to experience something that appears to be new. ... I think
1985 will be the year that we must ratify the U.N. Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. (House of
Councillors, Budget Committee, 19 March 1984)
In contrast to the prime minister’s logic contrasting Japan with Western

Europe in his statements on the family, he cited American and European
examples to justify his policies on women. Ratifying the UN Convention

on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women was
the great assumption underlying the Nakasone administration’s poli-
cies on women. It was difficult to establish domestic conditions condu-
cive to supporting legislation on equal employment opportunity for
men and women. Opposition from the organization of employers was
joined by criticism by some feminist groups because it was coupled
with the abolition of women’s protection in the workplace. Feminists
were divided into pro-equality and pro-protection groups. In this diffi-
cult circumstance, the efforts of Akamatsu Ryoko and other progres-
sives among women government officials helped pave the way for these
measures. Nakasone offered the following remarks in the final period
of his administration:
Regarding the issue of raising the status of women, I believe that I am

the one working the hardest among politicians. (House of Councillors,
Budget Committee, 06 October 1986)
Nevertheless, in his political statements on other occasions, his personal

view of women was revealed, and it seemed out of step with the inter-
national trend.
I think that, first of all, education should start in the home. It is in the
home where mothers play such an important role properly training
their children. ... After all, men and women are biologically different.
Men don’t give birth to children. Childbirth is a woman’s privilege.
Accordingly, this special work that women perform must be respected.
Since they have this special work to do, compared with men they are
not as able to give complete attention to other work. So, it would be
harsh to women if we tell them to do every kind of job in various
fields. We should strive for a harmonious society to make the most
of the special characteristics of each sex. (House of Representatives,
Foreign Affairs Committee, 31 May 1985)
I am at risk of being called old-fashioned I suppose, but I still want
to see women, first of all, become one hundred percent fully capable
of being splendid mothers. (House of Councillors, Budget Committee,
19 March 1984)
This, it appears, is a belief ... deeply rooted in Japanese culture. When
it comes to issues such as these, each country has its own traditions
and history and customs. We should think carefully about this as we
seek to move in the direction indicated by the United Nations. That
is what I would like to say. (House of Councillors, Budget Committee,

04 April 1983)
Nakasone clearly believed in a division of labour based on biological

differences between the sexes. This is exactly contradictory to the idea
that such a division is a special characteristic of Japanese culture.
So a leader with these ideas on gender roles felt the political need
to speak in favour of measures promoting gender equality such as the
Equal Employment Opportunity Law. He did so, although his heart was
not in it. It should come as no surprise that these laws were accompa-
nied by others that were deliberately planned to undermine their effect,
measures such as providing special tax benefits to housewives and a law
providing ‘flexibilization’ in labour regulations. However, the political
process involved in the passing these laws was hardly a systematic appli-
cation of his opinion.
In regard to women’s pensions, the wives of male company employees

could voluntarily join the National Pension. However, a serious cause
of concern was the insecurity involved. The wife faced the risk of losing
her benefits if her situation changed ... if she divorced, for example.
The revisions to the programme mean that all wives can become
members of the plan and that every member’s pension is assured. I
think that this measure establishes pension rights for women. ... At
any rate, to a certain extent, this provides security for those who
had been unable to receive pensions, and, greatly expanding support
for male salaried employees, this is progress. (House of Councillors,
Cabinet Committee, 19 December 1985)
Thus, the National Pension No. 3 Insured Persons System was created
to give individual women the right to a pension and at the same time it
was designed as part of an election strategy to win votes from the class of
male salaried employees (Horie 2005). A serious political issue at the time
was the fact that the tax system contained many loopholes enabling the
self-employed to avoid taxes. Salaried employees were complaining that
the system was treating them unfairly. Some members broke away from
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to form the ‘New Liberal Club’, a
group claiming to represent the interests of the new urban middle class.
This forced the Liberal Democratic Party to enter into political alliances
to form the second Nakasone Administration. From a broad perspec-
tive, one can see that, with the era of high economic growth coming
to an end, conservative parties felt the need to seek support from the
new urban middle class as well as their traditional supporters among

farming families and the self-employed. As a result, new policies drafted
by conservatives targeted company employees and their wives. These
politicians adopted new rhetoric aimed at housewives, with speeches
praising the value of housework, which meant, in practice, a tax deduc-
tion for their husbands.
We are reducing taxes for housewives who stay at home, who are
not employed even part-time.13 We are rewarding the contributions
made by the women who stay at home. ... These women are the key to
our success or failure in elections. That is the reason I made speeches
showing respect for them. (House of Councillors, Budget Committee,
06 October 1986)
We have examined Nakasone’s political statements. His reforms were

neoliberal, nationalist and, at the same time, familialist in nature. As
a nationalist, he tied his policies to Japanese culture in many ways.
However, this does not mean that we can see direct Confucian influ-
ences in his policies. Nakasone seldom mentioned Confucian concepts.
The only word we found in his statements about the family and gender
was ‘reisetsu’, which is ‘lijie’ in Chinese. It is important to note that
Japanese nationalists tend to avoid mentioning Confucian influences
in Japanese culture, first because Confucianism gained a negative
value after WWII as a basis of Japanese authoritarianism in the war
period and secondly because they want to erase traces of Chinese influ-
ence in Japanese culture. Some might argue the indirect influence of
Confucianism via educational ethics in the pre-war period, for example,
in the Imperial Rescript on Education, in Nakasone’s emphasis on the
three-generational households and the happiness of the elderly. The
current authors do not deny this, although co-residence with elderly
parents and the cultural value of respect to them are widely observed
within and outside the Asian region, regardless of the influence of
Confucianism.14
However, the point that deserves more attention is the predominantly
modern nature of Nakasone’s statements. Even when the Confucian
term ‘propriety’ was used, it was coupled with the modern concept of
‘love’. The specific form of the family that Nakasone envisioned was
one of a corporate employee, not of a farmer, even though he assumed a
three-generational structure. The wife was presumed to be a housewife.
He made this type of family a primary target in his policies because
these families were the target of his party’s electoral strategy. He also
emphasized the importance of the role that mothers should play in their
children’s education. As was pointed out, this was a manifestation of the
‘good wife, wise mother’ idea and a break with the Confucian tradition
in which litttle was expected of mothers in the area of education. At the
core of Nakasone’s reforms was an image of the modern family of the
male breadwinner–female housewife type.
It is interesting that Nakasone linked the type of family mentioned
above, a type of family that once became a universal norm in modern
societies, to the Japanese cultural tradition. Just as we have seen in our
look at the concept of the ‘good wife, wise mother’, a form of cultural
geopolitics was involved here. It caused what we call ‘traditionaliza-
tion of modern gender roles’, a way of collective misunderstanding
that commonly happened in Asian modernity. Nakasone was not free
from it.
Incomplete reforms since the 1990s
Structural reforms in recession

The collapse of the bubble economy at the start of the 1990s finally
brought an end to Japan’s economic growth. Japan had flourished for
two decades longer than the Western regions, where the oil crisis had
ended the ‘affluent society’, but its end finally came. The 1990s also
marked a period of change in the demographic structure. The propor-
tion of the population over 65 in Japanese society was lower than most
countries in the West in the 1980s, but in the 1990s it rose rapidly, over-
taking the countries of Europe, and by 2010 it reached 23 per cent (IPSS
database), making it the world’s greyest society. There has also been a
rise in the divorce rate, age at marriage, and proportion never married,
all of which caused concern for the family.
In this context, by the 1990s both government and people consid-
ered ‘structural reform’ to be an issue. In 1994, economic groups such
as the Keizai Dōyūkai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) and
the Nikkeiren (Japanese Federation of Employers’ Association) proposed
a multi-track, diversified and fluid approach to employment (Osawa
2002: 119–124). This declared change including to the ‘Japanese-style
management’ that assumed lifetime employment and age-based wages.
The ‘Japanese-style’ systems that Nakasone and other 1980s politicians
so proudly trumpeted became, just ten years later, a target for criticism.
There were also demands for reforms in the social welfare system.
In 1994, the Advisory Council on Social Security stated that ‘there is
a need to change from a household-based unit to an individual-based
unit’ (Osawa 2002: 127–128). The same year the Ministry of Health and
Welfare put together its ‘Welfare Vision for the 21st Century’ in which
it proposed its New Gold Plan for care of the elderly, its Angel Plan for
childrearing and a policy for social support that did not leave care up to
the family.
The most comprehensive reforms in the 1990s were those declared by
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō (1996–1998) who pushed ahead with
six major reforms in the areas of administration, finance, economics,
social security, banking and education. Hashimoto also considered the
achievement of a gender-equal society to be the ‘great key’ to Japan’s
structural reform (Osawa 2002: 133).
As a condition for allowing this sort of policy transformation, along
with changes in economic conditions and demographics, we can
suggest the collapse of the LDP’s single-party rule and the three-party
coalition government made up of the LDP, the SDP (Social Democratic
Party, which was formerly the JSP) and the New Party Sakigake (NPS)15
from 1994 to 1997. The Hashimoto government started in the three-
party coalition then continued as a coalition outside the Cabinet with
the SDP and NPS. In the agreement with the two parties to form an
extra-Cabinet coalition with the Second Hashimoto Cabinet, phrases
such as ‘strengthen and expand the domestic head office to promote
gender equality and establish a basic law for women’ were included.
There was a lot of influence from powerful female politicians such
as SDP Chairwoman Doi Takako, NPS Councillor Dōmoto Akiko and
Inoguchi Kuniko of the LDP (Osawa 2002: 147). In addition, the
academic results of the Japanese feminist movement, termed ‘Eighties
Feminism’,16 provided an academic basis and direction for reform, and
feminist researchers such as Osawa Mari of the University of Tokyo were
assigned to the policymaking process.
Some key points about gender in Hashimoto’s reforms should be
mentioned. The new establishment of the Cabinet Office in 1998 was
given functions and duties for planning, proposals and negotiations
relating to gender-equal participation in society. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Law was revised in 1997 to prohibit sexual discrimination
in recruiting, hiring, placing and promoting, to prevent sexual harass-
ment and strengthen positive action. Provisions for the protection of
women in the Labour Standards Act were dissolved. The Long-Term
Care Insurance system was created, with legislation in 1997, enacted in
2000. The revision of the Child Welfare Act in 1997 changed the system
whereby children would enter day-care facilities as a municipal measure
to one where the parents would select the facility. And the special edition
of the White Paper on Health and Welfare for 1998 brought measures
against decreasing fertility, mostly based on feminist arguments (1998).
The culmination of the Hashimoto government’s gender policies is
perhaps best seen in the 1999 Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society.
However, Hashimoto himself was criticized for the failure of economic
policies in the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 and had already
resigned by 1998. Just as Welfare Year One was cast aside by the Oil
Crisis in 1973, so too were the reforms of the 1990s stopped in their
tracks by an economic crisis.
Later, the neoliberal Koizumi Jun’ichirō assumed power. Koizumi was
Minister of Health and Welfare in the Hashimoto Cabinet, and had been
actively involved in women’s’ issues, but by permitting the expansion of
the income gap, he promoted the non-regular workforce participation
of women. Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, who succeeded Koizumi, was a
nationalist, and a leader of the right-wing political forces that carried
out an anti-feminist campaign.
Let us now look at the statements made by the prime ministers
during the 1990s and later regarding the family and women. Was
Confucian ideology the reason that reforms during this period ended
up incomplete?
Statements by Prime Minister Hashimoto in the 1990s

Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō made statements from the start of his
appointment promoting the social activities of women and the elderly,
and presenting a new direction in the socialization of elderly care and
childcare. Despite this, Hashimoto had not believed in this direction
from the time he first entered politics, as he frankly admitted
When I was appointed Minister of Health and Welfare under the First
Ohira Cabinet, I wanted to retain the concept of the household unit,
to carry on in that direction. […] I asked whether a tax system should
encourage living together, or should we promote the construction of
houses that allowed multiple generations to live together. However,
when we look at the way things have moved on in the world, then
in fact the birth rate has been dropping more than we could have
conceived back then. (House of Councillors, Budget Committee, 6
March 1997)
When I look back, I see that one area that was lacking greatly here
was the worsening problem of care as society ages. Also, talking
of generations living together was just vainly creating a miscon-
ception about wives and daughters at home, and in particular
daughters-in-law, having to take care of the elderly ... I think we need

to back up, socially, the functions of the family, and work towards
further enhancing of the Angel Plan and New Gold Plan, and in addi-
tion, work towards creating a new system for elderly care as well.
(House of Councillors, Plenary session, January 25, 1996)
Hashimoto was the Minister of Health and Welfare in the Ohira Cabinet
which formed the framework for the ‘Japanese-style welfare society’.
However, when he later observed the demographic and family changes
in the country, he realized that this direction could not be sustained.
This was underscored by his personal experience of caring for his
own mother for more than eight years after she collapsed (House of
Councillors, Budget Committee, 11 December 1996).
He was also aware of the trends towards reform in Europe which were
redesigning the social security system around individuals as units:
In our first debates, we carried on for a long time with the idea of
seeing the family as the unit, the household unit. However, during
that period, phrases like the ‘wife’s pension rights’ were created,
and the idea that social security was targeted at each individual
was already well established. This move from the household unit
to the individual; this I think has been a turning-point. (House of
Representatives, Budget Committee, 12 February 1997)
However, the demographic changes of population ageing and low

fertility were also connected with the financial and economic crisis. The
focus of the Hashimoto Reforms was on reconstructing finances with a
neoliberalist bent for that reason.
As this rapid population ageing proceeds, then naturally demands

from the citizens will change. How should we respond to this appro-
priately? And we also have the problem of how to strike a balance
between benefits and burdens in the various fields of medicine,
pensions, and welfare, and to then select services which will enable
us to balance this with economic activities. Here we have to consider
how we should bring private sector vitality into this. (House of
Representatives, Budget Committee, 12 February 1997)
Rapid demographic changes gave the Hashimoto government the task

of pursuing several issues at the same time, which were hard to balance:
the reforms of social security, the social support for family functions and
reconstruction of finances and revitalization of the economy.
In terms of gender, the basic direction of the Hashimoto government
was ‘to have both men and women share in family responsibilities’
and ‘promoting measures that allow both men and women to strike
a balance between work and private life’. (House of Representatives,
Plenary session, 06 May 1997). However, in pursuit of a neoliberal policy,
the expansion of non-regular employment was seen as a positive trend,
expanding the diversity of choices.
I consider that part-time work and dispatch work are important

as choices for diverse working styles, and I do not see that, as the
esteemed member has said, they have any sort of different nuance
[in terms of discrimination – author]. (House of Councillors, Plenary
session, 26 May 1997)
Similarly, the emphasis on home care for the Long-term Care Insurance
cannot be said to be a simple remnant of old ways of thinking. Rather,
it was connected to privatization, which had become a world trend.
Hashimoto’s explanation is as follows:
These days it is natural for us to debate the issue of home care.

However, until about 1970 or so, constructing large-scale facilities was
seen as an advance, not just in the world of medicine but in the world
of welfare, too, and no one doubted this. However, we ended up with
the problem that building large facilities would not lead to happi-
ness for everyone, as we saw with the National Colony in Takasaki
City. And then came a period when some said facilities should be
built as close at hand as possible: some held that when the care-home
director saw the faces of the people living there then he should also
understand the family as well. Now we are debating home care both
in medicine and welfare. I think this is an amazing step forwards.
(House of Councillors, Budget Committee, 06 April 1998)
Asking whether nursing home/residential care or home care was better,

as we can also see in debates and trends in Europe, where care facilities
were well developed, it was not easy to find an answer. A flexible combi-
nation of both was probably needed. There were similar debates on day
care for small children. Hashimoto was also involved in the systematiza-
tion of childcare leave:
I was involved in writing the member’s bill to start the childcare

leave system. […] To be honest, at the time I was one of those
opposed to institutional childcare for those under one year of age.
In fact I argued for an expansion of the child-care leave system, with
the child remaining with his or her mother for at least a year after
birth. However, this was soundly criticized at the time as trapping
the mother in the home. (House of Representatives, Committee to
Promote Financial Structure Reforms, 22 October 1997)
If we look at the debates over recent years that emphasize the right to
care, and the evaluation of care work, then the criticism of Hashimoto at
the time was one-sided. His policy could have been interpreted as a posi-
tive familialist one, employing Leitner’s typology of familialism (Leitner
2003). To understand the Minister of Health and Welfare of the govern-
ment that proposed the ‘Japanese-style welfare society’ as continuing to
emphasize the care role of women from a conservative ideology, may be
simplistic.
Statements by Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe

in the 2000s
After two more prime ministers, the next to take power was Koizumi
Jun’ichirō, who had been Minister of Health and Welfare under
Hashimoto. He was active in systematizing the Long-term Care Insurance
and forward-looking in terms of gender equality . However, once he
became prime minister, Koizumi made surprisingly few statements
about women and families.
His few statements follow the pattern laid down by Hashimoto. They
share a stance of starting from actual changes in society. In terms of
gender equality and low fertility measures, he started ‘the campaign
for ‘a zero waiting list for nursery schools’ with the goal of increasing
the number of children in nursery care by a further 100,000 by 2004’
(House of Representatives, Plenary session, 31 January 2003), to meet
the increased demand for childcare facilities from those wishing to have
both spouses working to counter the economic downturn.
Koizumi may have his own unique spin in a clearer neoliberal direc-
tion than Hashimoto:
A question is debated about those who have lost their jobs and are
facing the destruction of their homes. As I have been saying for a
while now, we cannot have reform without pain. However, the
pain will grow worse, if we do not proceed with reform. (House of

Representatives, Plenary session, 06 February 2002)
When we consider that since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the divorce
and suicide rates have both gone up in Japan and in other Asian coun-
tries, this sounds a very cold-blooded statement. However, to defend
Koizumi a bit, he won election to Chairman of the LDP with the slogan
of ‘Destroy the LDP’ and the destruction of the post-war Japanese system,
and expulsion of the leeches of vested interests, gained him the over-
whelming support of the people. Citizens were hoping for thorough-
going reform. However, Koizumi appeared to lack deep ideas about what
he was going to build once he had destroyed, did not proceed with the
reconstruction of the social security system, and left behind a society
where the losers fall as far they do without a safety net (Yuasa 2008).
Koizumi’s successor, Abe Shinzō, was a politician who puts principles
first. If there was any prime minister who espoused Confucian ideology,
he was most likely to be the one. But did Abe make any Confucian
statements?
Abe placed the nuclear family, the increase in the number of homes
with both parents working and changes in local communities as causes
of a decline in the ability to educate:
In this, the point that there are many behaviours lacking in what we
might refer to as morals, awareness of rules, and public spirit, I am
repeating what many others are noting. So among them are many
who believe that the Basic Education Law should be revised. (House
of Councillors, Special Committee Related to the Basic Education
Law, 14 December 2006)
In other areas, Abe noted ‘various values that go beyond profit and loss’
(House of Representatives, Special ... Related to the Basic Education Law,
30 October 2006) and ‘morals, a spirit of judging oneself, public spirit,
contributions to peace and the development of international society’
(House of Councillors, Plenary session, 17 November 2006) as points
that should be emphasized as the basis of education. These are not so
much Confucian as more general principles.
He grants a high value to families, but at the same time, gives them
responsibilities.
In this Basic Education Law, we see the importance of this sort of family
education, and it clearly regulates that the primary responsibility
towards children’s education is held by their parents or guardians.

(House of Councillors, Plenary session, 17 November 2006)
The view of the family as ‘welfare provider’ makes a reappearance

after a break that was longer than a decade. Moreover, it is given legal
backing. However, in specific policy areas, Abe was forced to continue
the family support measures of the 1990s. He described these as a
strategy for a ‘Japan that supports children and families’ (House of
Councillors, Budget Committee, 05 March 2007). Abe’s ideological
position was similar to Nakasone but, as the social condition was
different from the 1980s, Abe was not able to carry out the same poli-
cies as Nakasone.
We can say the same about gender policies. Abe believed in respecting
the ‘traditional’ Japanese norms of distinction between ‘masculine and
feminine’, but as prime minister of a country that had laws about gender
equality, and in the context of demographic and social changes since
the 1990s, he could not make statements in the Diet that greatly devi-
ated from existing lines.
Finally, we look at what sort of ‘Beautiful Country, Japan’ Abe was
aiming for. He always mentioned this as his final goal:
The beautiful country I aim for is one that values, first, the beautiful
nature of Japan, and its long culture and history, and can show pride
in its history and culture to the world […] A beautiful country is one
which protects the values of the family fostered here, and the warmth
of the community. […] In a sense, if we see it as a tapestry, then
one thread of that warp is the Emperor. (Joint Session, Joint National
Committee for Basic National Policy, 16 May 2007)
This is a simple expression of patriotism. He does not go deeply into

the conceptual details of ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’, merely referring to the
beauty of nature and Japanese people’s graceful ‘movement of body’
(House of Representatives, Budget Committee, 09 February 2007) or
‘manners’ (House of Representatives, Plenary session, 17 April 2007).
Then he suddenly mentions the ‘Emperor’. As already argued, it is char-
acteristic of Japanese nationalism that it does not mention Confucianism
as part of the tradition. It is because they wish to erase China’s influ-
ence, deliberately or unconsciously. Then, not much is left at the core of
their culture other than admiration of the beauty of nature, people and
people’s manners.
Discussion
Since the 1970s, in contrast to the dramatic changes in gender and

the family experienced in Western societies, Japan experienced these
changes partially, and, as a result, a Japanese uniqueness was created.
This chapter examined the hypothesis that these differences were related
to political factors, and the differences in policies affected by ideological
causes. It has analyzed statements in the Diet by prime ministers since
the 1980s, the period when the family and gender were made issues in
Japanese politics.
We have seen major differences in the direction of policy and the
contents of prime ministerial statements between the 1980s and the
1990s and later. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone made numerous
statements about the family and women, with the goal of a Japanese-
style welfare society. The big picture here is that Nakasone’s political
choice to create a different path from the West, based on a nationalist
ideology and confidence in Japan’s economic success, resulted in policy
designs including the privileged treatment of housewives in the tax and
social security systems. This halted the increasing labour force participa-
tion of Japanese women, forming a uniquely Japanese reality, different
from many Western societies. The policy decisions and ideological
factors behind these obviously played important roles.
However, we find it difficult to classify this ideology as ‘Confucian’.
He seldom used Confucian terms in his speeches. Even if we admit some
indirect influences, it is clear that the family model Nakasone had in
mind was the modern ‘male breadwinner–female housewife’ type. To
make things complicated, Nakasone seemed to believe that this gender
role division was a part of Japanese tradition; but he was being deceived
by the ideological mechanism that we called the ‘traditionalization
of modern gender roles’, a type of ‘invention of tradition’, that was
common in Asian societies. In the 1980s, Europe and North America
passed through the Second Demographic Transition, strengthening
individualization of the family and gender equality: Western societies
came closer to the stereotypical image that people in the East have of
Western society. The image of the family around the table at dinner that
Nakasone drew as the foundation for happiness was also the ideal image
in Western societies in the 1960s, but subsequent changes in Western
society meant that Japan, which modernized later, was left behind.
Classical modernity was re-interpreted and defended as their own tradi-
tion by the Japanese people.
Policies from the 1990s were different from those under Nakasone in
the 1980s, created by actual social changes rather than by ideology. As
Prime Minister Hashimoto himself confessed, he had aimed to create
welfare based on the family with the household as the unit. But, faced
with rapid fertility decline and population ageing, he changed his mind
to accept the necessity for creating a social backup for family functions.
In Johshita’s classification, this was a change to a view of the family as
welfare recipient. The social conditions would not change for the better
later on, so Prime Minister Abe, who assumed office in 2006, was, despite
being a conservative and anti-feminist ideologue, unable to abandon
the policies of society supporting the family.
However, ironically, the same social realities brought about a wors-
ening of the economic situation and pressure on the national finances,
so just at the time when enhancements to welfare were most required,
the state lost the financial ability to fund them properly. Hashimoto,
Koizumi and Abe were all forced to adhere to the ideas of neoliberal poli-
cies. The construction of the welfare state that Hashimoto had intended
had to be stopped before it was completed. In contrast to Nakasone,
who intentionally did not choose the path of constructing a welfare
state on the Western model, Hashimoto attempted to do so, but was
unable thanks to the worsening economic and financial conditions. The
reasons may vary, but in both periods, in the 1980s and the 1990s, Japan
did not become a Western-style welfare state.
The pain of trying to proceed with the creation of a welfare state in
an economic recession is being experienced by other Asian countries.
For example, in Korea, President Kim Daejung attempted to create a
welfare state while dealing with the ‘IMF crisis’ (the Korean term for the
drastic changes in society caused by the forced intervention of the IMF
to promote liberalization in the Asian Financial Crisis). He was forced
to create the concept of ‘productive welfare’ to enhance welfare while
making it useful for economic growth. In other words, Hashimoto was
faced with the double-bind situation all Asian nations were in at the
time, and lost heart.
Looking at it this way, we see that what was truly unique for Japan was
the prolonged period of prosperity in the 1980s, which other Asian soci-
eties did not have, due to their highly compressed modernity (Chang
2010; Ochiai 2010). Compared to them, Japan’s modernity was less
compressed or semi-compressed modernity (Ochiai 2012). Even though,
economically, it was the most successful in the world, Japan avoided
creating a welfare state, and consolidated the 1960s-style system.
The familialist reform by Nakasone was, in reality, a counter-reform.
The system that was reinforced in this period had its institutional inertia
in the 1990s (Osawa 2002), and broke its fetters in order to change to
adapt to the environmental changes in Japanese society, leading to the
‘lost decades’ (Ochiai 2010). It is an irony that Japan is even slower and
less successful in reforms than Asian neighbours which face the same
difficulty, because it had the period of prosperity when it could freeze
the old system.
Here we should question again if ideology was the only reason Japan
stuck to the old system rather than conducting reforms when it had
abundant time and resources. We have already seen that the key reason
for the treatment of women as housewives was an election policy aimed
at large-firm employees and their wives, who were housewives. It was
real, not only ideological, that Japan still had a solid middle class with
male-breadwinner-type modern families. According to Iwai Hachiro, the
gendered life course became even clearer after the 1970s (Iwai 2010).
Japan had its prime time of modernity in the 1970–1980s, a little later
than Western societies. In the 1980s, Japan enjoyed the strongest
economy in the world, and, demographically, reaped the benefits of
a population dividend.17 However, politicians and researchers of the
period overlooked those beneficial conditions and mistakenly assumed
that Japan’s success was due to its cultural features. Then they neglected
to design a system allowing for the loss of these positive conditions in
the near future and reinforced the system of classical modernity, again
mistakenly believing it to be their cultural tradition.
The conclusion of this chapter is that in order to explain the current
situation of families and women in Japanese society, political factors
are important, but there appear to be few direct effects of Confucianism
on policies. A nationalist ideology that emphasized Japanese culture
and tradition affected policies in Nakasone’s familialist reform in the
1980s, but, for Japanese nationalists including him, Japanese culture
and Confucianism meant different things. Instead, what they actually
emphasized in the name of Japanese tradition were mostly the products
of modernity. The mechanism of the ‘traditionalization of modernity’
was at work. In contrast, policies in the 1990s and later were mostly
affected by actual social changes, just as in other Asian countries. Japan
was slower and less successful in reforms than its neighbours because
the structure of old modernity that was consolidated in the 1980s func-
tioned as an obstacle for change. Ironically, the ideological reforms in
the 1980s led the country to the ‘lost decades’.
Finally, we should add the importance of the international environ-
ment in determining policy for a nation. The reason Nakasone set up
the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, in contrast to his own views

on gender, was because he had little choice in fitting with an interna-
tional environment that was moving towards gender equality. What
would happen if the categorization of East Asian societies as Confucian
is widely accepted? It might function as a barrier to stop global values
entering the region. If that should happen, we are concerned that
East Asia may end with the same fate as that of Japan since the 1980s.
Confucianism may play a role in fixing modern gender roles, a role
which was never originally part of it. And East Asia may not be able
to reform itself. Researchers need to learn from past experiences that
theories which emphasize cultural distinctiveness fix social systems in
stone, when adopted by politicians, and often create negative practical
consequences.
Notes
1. Japanese names in this chapter are shown in the original order putting
the surname first followed by the given name, except for the names of the
authors of the chapter.
2. From Shiji (Historical Records), the Biography of Tian Dan, the original being
‘Zhongchen bushi er jun, zhen-nu geng er fu’.
3. For the Korean case, see Kang, Myeong-kwan (2009).
4. Japan was ruled by a shamaness queen Himiko in the third century, which
is known to us through the Chinese history book Weishi. The intellectual
quality and sexual freedom of noble ladies in the Heian Era is depicted in
Genji Monogatari (The Tail of Genji), penned by Murasaki Shikibu, a court
lady, in the tenth century.
5. It was the period of single-party rule with an exception for about two and
a half years while Nakasone Yasuhiro was prime minister, due to a coalition
government with the New Liberal Club.
6. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States
and Japan, to give it its full name, is usually shorted to ‘Ampo Treaty’ from
the Japanese abbreviation.
7. This was Hatoyama Yukio, not to be confused with the Prime Minister
Hatoyama mentioned earlier, who was his grandfather, Ichirō.
8. There was also a similar transformation in Japanese academism. Bunmei
toshite no Ie Shakai (Ie Society as Civilisation) was published in 1979, by the
authors, Murakami Yasusuke, Kumon Shunpei and Satō Seizaburō, who were
advisors to the Nakasone cabinet.
9. The abolition of the prohibition of late-night work and the limits to over-
time. The provisions for the protection of motherhood remained.
10. The basic idea of the Japanese-style welfare society, where family and
community would be the welfare providers is said by some to be Confucian.
However, the community is not a key concept in Confucianism, where the
bond of kinship is considered to be essential.
11. Co-residence of the family of a married child with the parents was not a
universal rule in traditional Japan. There were various regional patterns
including those where co-residence of a married son and his father was avoided
by branching-out of retired parents (inkyo-bunke) (Hayami and Ochiai 2001).
12. The link between love and the three-generation family was a uniquely
post-war feature of Japan. Confucianism was more about order than love.
13. The tax deduction and exemption from the pension insurance premium
(National Pension No.3 Insured Persons System) was expanded to include
the housewives employed part-time, within a certain income level, through
political negotiation in spite of the original intention of the Prime Minister.
14. These norms and practices are also strong in Southeast and South Asia where
the influence of Confucianism is much weaker or close to none. The exist-
ence of three-generational households or respect for the elderly cannot be
recognized as sufficient evidence of Confucian influence.
15. ‘Sakigake’ means forerunner in Japanese.
16. The results include Ehara (1988), Ochiai (1989) and Ueno (1990).
17. A population dividend is a positive condition for the economy, as well as for
the family. This is as the number of children and the elderly is low relative to
the number of working-age population.
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9
Conclusion: Confucianism or
Gender Equality?
Gillian Pascall and Sirin Sung
Introduction
We have asked about gender assumptions in welfare states that are very
different from Western ones, trying to understand women’s experience
of welfare states across a range of East Asian countries. Are the welfare
systems of Korea, Taiwan, China, Hong Kong and Japan distinctive, with
Confucian cultural assumptions hidden beneath the surface commit-
ment to gender equality? While economies, demographies and families
have been developing rapidly, are social policies becoming less tradi-
tional in their expectations of women? How different are East Asian
welfare states in their assumptions about gender from Western welfare
states? And how different are they from each other, in the context of
varied national policies about Confucianism, from the powerful attack
on Confucian gender inequalities under Chinese communism to the
embrace of Confucianism under the national governments of Korea and
Taiwan? What has been the impact of policies in China, designed to
replace Confucian traditions, through the communist period, and of
more recent free-market-based policies? Communism had a profound
effect, particularly in bringing women into education and paid employ-
ment. But what assumptions now underpin social policies, and how are
they experienced in practice?
We aimed to uncover gender assumptions of welfare states that are very
different from Western ones and to understand women’s experience of
welfare states across a range of East Asian countries. Gender inequalities
in East Asian social policies are clearly important for women across East
Asia: if women have more obligations and fewer rights within Confucian
families and welfare systems, millions may lack not only gender equality
but also rights to respect, to be cared for, to be brought into daylight
181
182 Gillian Pascall and Sirin Sung
and company when they are old and disabled. But gender inequalities
in East Asian countries have had too little attention in the literature
comparing welfare states. The comparative literature has largely been
concerned with Western welfare states, whether in The Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999), or in gender-based
analysis of the male breadwinner model (Fraser 1997; Lewis 1992, 2001,
2006, 2009). So we have asked whether the welfare systems of China,
Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Taiwan are distinctive, with Confucian
cultural assumptions hidden beneath their surface commitments to
gender equality.
While comparative literature has focused on the West, East Asian
accounts of welfare states have often ignored gender. Debates about distinc-
tive features of welfare systems in East Asia as a region include Goodman
and Peng’s ‘East Asian welfare model’ (1996), Holliday’s ‘productivist
world of welfare capitalism’ (2000) and Kwon’s ‘developmental welfare
state’ (2005, 2009). These focus on the political economy of welfare states.
Political ideology was the focus of Walker and Wong’s (2005) study, which
downplayed Confucian culture. Some studies have highlighted the influ-
ence of culture on the formation of welfare policy (Reiger and Leibfried
2003), while Jones (1993) explained the East Asian welfare system as a
‘Confucian welfare state’. But the extent to which Confucianism has
influenced East Asian welfare systems needs further exploration (Sung
2003). A key concern of this book has been to understand the role of
Confucian culture in East Asian women’s lives and its impact upon poli-
cymaking and practice in East Asian welfare states. The aim has not been
to ignore the importance of political and economic influences, but to
include culture in the analysis of gender and welfare states.
We have analysed comparative approaches to ask whether they can
help us to understand the gender assumptions underpinning East Asian
welfare states. We have drawn on statistical data to compare East Asian
countries with Western ones, and have drawn together studies from
different nation states with different methodologies, aiming to enhance
understanding of gender in diverse East Asian welfare systems. The
chapters include some fine qualitative studies, which have given us a
close insight into women’s experience of social policies in South Korea,
Taiwan, China, Hong Kong and Japan. Drawing together recent studies
of gender in varied East Asian contexts, we have begun to understand the
gender assumptions of social policies and welfare states, and in partic-
ular the position of those women who are most disadvantaged, such as
those who are also disabled or experience violence, whose experience
illuminates the character of the welfare regimes in which they live.
Conclusion: Confucianism or Gender Equality? 183
What assumptions now underpin social policies, and

how are they experienced in practice?
East Asian governments have legislated for gender equality, developed

Ministries for Gender Equality and policies for parental leave to enable
mothers to join the workforce and changed family law to allow women
to be heads of households. The activity of women’s movements is
evident in this progressive legislation, which begins to turn the tide from
traditional – mainly Confucian – societies, in which hierarchy of gender
and generation was widely assumed – towards assumptions of gender
equality, increasing women’s place in public life, especially in education
and employment. But low levels of public spending – especially social
spending including spending on early education and childcare – are the
first evidence of assumptions about the minimal character of the state
in official understandings of welfare in OECD countries and Taiwan,
and also in China, which is not a welfare state in the Western sense.
South Korea and Japan – despite high levels of economic development
and very high life expectancies – are at the opposite end of the spectrum
of public social spending from Western welfare states, especially social
democracies of Denmark and Sweden.
The evidence of interviews is also of people who do not turn to the
state as a positive, collective way to share risks and meet needs, as is
evident in Sweden, for example. Although some Korean respondents
highlighted the importance of social policy for elder care, most empha-
sized children’s responsibility in caring for parents (Sung 2003). In the
context of the state’s emphasis on family responsibility (Lee 1995; Kwon
2001), it seems difficult for Korean women to imagine the state sharing
responsibility. East Asian mothers are not alone in their experience of
governments. In Western countries too, governments have legislated for
gender equality but failed to provide the means to support it. However,
the state of war described by these mothers is extreme. Confucian
values appear to lurk beneath governments’ powerful sense of family
responsibility, and the limits to policy implementation in practice.
Embarrassment about responsibility for ‘women’s issues’ appears to
characterize men as policymakers.
The family is seen as the key to welfare across these welfare systems,
from South Korea to China. Especially in rural China, minimal state
provision leaves rural disabled women without income or care, let alone
the ability to participate in politics or local communities, unless they
have families to support them. Many millions in rural China do not
have such families, as migration to urban areas has reduced the capacity
of children to support their ageing parents. While the Confucian ideals

of respect for parents and responsibility for parents-in-law may appear
to give older parents an expectation of resources of income, time and
care from younger relatives, the reality for those stranded on the edge
of China’s economic transformation by disability, age, gender and rural
status is much harsher. Where families cannot or do not offer support,
the minimal state brings harsh lives. While communism had the poten-
tial to address the gender gap of Confucian culture, market reforms may
well be worsening the expectations of those most disadvantaged by
markets: especially China’s 23 million older disabled women.
Mothers of young children in South Korea and Taiwan have little
support outside the family. While there is increasing expectation of
women working, earning, combining motherhood and paid employ-
ment with care for family members, the expectations of men combining
work and care are minimal. So, family responsibility means – in most
cases – mothers’ responsibility. Young Korean women’s accounts of
their responsibility in Sung (Chapter 2) and Taiwanese women’s in Wu
(Chapter 4) are of a family system in which they have obligations – to
care, to provide for elders – but few expectations of governments or
husbands. South Korean women in Sung (Chapter 2) inhabit a persisting
environment of traditional beliefs about traditional gender roles, with
few women able to use rights to time for care through parental leave,
find quality public childcare or call on their husbands’ time for care,
or in the cause of gender equality. Wu and Sung share a concern with
change over time: both find some change towards egalitarian beliefs,
but an intransigent cultural environment in which practising equality
remains difficult for men and women and motherhood means care.
South Korean policymakers in Won’s study show some of the obsta-
cles to gender equality in practice in the assumptions and processes of
government, especially in the traditional assumptions of men, as poli-
cymakers and as parents. The Ministry for Gender Equality has few
resources to fight its corner in battles between different ministries, or
to supervise the childcare facilities for which they are responsible. Men
working for the Ministry feel embarrassed by their low status, embar-
rassed to admit they work for gender equality, while women colleagues
feel excluded from serious decision-making, as well as from the networks
of support among feminists outside the Ministry that they need if they
are to make policy change that has an impact on women’s lives. So,
lacking co-operation inside the civil service, or outside with women’s
groups, civil servants in the Ministry for Gender Equality see themselves
as the ‘least powerful policy units’.
In these East Asian countries – even the most developed ones – the
state is not widely seen as the key resource for social welfare, especially
not by those in power. Governments tend to promote family obligation
as key to social welfare. Gender equality legislation exists, and has made
crucial changes in family law, motherhood and care, but it is not seen as
a high priority. Government social spending is at the opposite end of the
spectrum to such spending in Scandinavian social democracies. Most
governments see the family as key to care, for children and older people,
promoting family responsibility over state responsibility.
How different are East Asian welfare states in their

assumptions about gender from Western welfare states?
East Asian welfare systems are not alone in their emphasis on family
responsibility as the key to welfare, or in their promotion of family as
tradition. Western welfare states – especially corporatist welfare states,
such as Germany, have also preferred the family as a traditional source of
care for children and for older people. And Western welfare states have
also worked with gendered assumptions, relying on women as informal
carers, producing gender divisions in public life and private. Even the
social democracies have gender differences in the key components
of welfare systems: employment, care, income, time and power. But
Scandinavian welfare states have been working towards gender equality
as well as social equality over decades. Their commitment to the state
as a public realm for social good is evident in the highest levels of social
spending, at the opposite extreme to Japan and Korea, as shown in the
introduction.
As described by Shang et al., in Chapter 5 about China, ‘the Confucian
cultural approach affects expectations about family living arrangements,
roles of men and women within a household, and therefore, rights to
security and support ... . The three Confucian principles for harmonious
families are: xiao, filial piety, respect, support and obedience to parents
and older people; cong, women’s obedience to her father, husband and
son; and yang, support to widowed older people, people with disabili-
ties and orphaned children. The principles are core to the family struc-
ture and the social contract between generations and men and women’.
These principles have clear advantages in enabling harmonious fami-
lies in a stable society. But they also: ‘accentuate unequal gender and
generational relationships, in terms of different expectations on family
members’ roles about their respect, obligations, diffidence and obedi-
ence to each other (Shang et al.). Chapters about South Korea, Taiwan,
China and Hong Kong show Confucian cultural principles underpinning

expectations about ‘unequal gender and generational relationships’,
though there is more room for debate about Japan, where Confucianism
is seen as one influence among several, rather than a dominating force
(Ochiai and Johshita, Chapter 8).
So the hierarchical East Asian family structure, shown in chapters
about Korea, by Sung and Won, Taiwan, by Wu and China, by Shang,
is distinctive. Changes in family law, changing the legal status of men
as automatic heads of households, have taken place. And Ministries to
promote gender equality exist. But change in reality is slow. In prac-
tice, women are still assumed to belong in families, to be subservient to
men, to care, to make peace, as shown by Leung Lai Ching in Chapter 6
about women’s ‘responsibility’ for domestic violence in Hong Kong. The
expectations and responsibilities of daughters-in-law are quite different
from those of Western daughters-in-law. If sons’ – especially first-born
sons’ – obligation is to live with their parents, their wives’ obligation to
care for parents-in-law is greater than to their own parents. Husbands’
loyalty to mothers may over-ride their loyalty to their wives. The tradi-
tional hierarchy of gender and generation puts younger women at the
bottom, with obligations to support parents-in-law, but without expec-
tations of reciprocity. Some mothers of young children turned to their
own parents, finding mutual support with childcare, income and house-
hold tasks, but needing to disguise this from parents-in-law. Childcare
is described by mothers as a battle-ground in which they negotiate with
parents- in-law from a position at the bottom of the family hierarchy.
Some men see themselves as responsible for care. But – if embarrass-
ment about anything to do with women’s issues characterizes male poli-
cymakers – embarrassment about responsibility for childcare seems to
characterize men as fathers too.
Respect for elders, obligations to parents and parents-in-law might be
expected to bring rewards to an older generation, if at the cost of younger
women. Shang’s study of older, disabled women in rural China shows that
we cannot assume that – in time, as they age – women become benefici-
aries of this hierarchical family system. Rapid socio-economic and polit-
ical changes, with industrialization, urbanization, economic growth and
marketization: these have brought more benefits to urban men than to
rural women, especially China’s many millions of older disabled women,
whose access to markets, to choice, to human dignity are limited. Some
had attentive families, who took them into daylight and company, but
others lay in bed, and would prefer to die now than to continue a life in
which they felt a burden on relatives and had no respect.
And how different are they from each other?
The countries considered here have different political, economic and

social histories, which might bring differences in social policies, in the
nature of assumptions about welfare, about the share of responsibility
between individual, family, community and state, and about gender rela-
tions in families, communities and states. China, in particular, stands
out for its two political transformations. Marxist ideology replaced
Confucian ideals in 1949 with principles that emphasized gender
equality as well as social equality, giving women and men equal rights
and obligations at work, in education, social participation, political
participation and choice in marriage. Ideology and reality were never
the same, but changes in ideology brought real changes in women’s
lives, in particular bringing high levels of participation in education and
paid employment. The more recent transformation towards markets in
the 1990s has brought rapid economic development, and also increasing
inequalities, socio-economic inequalities and gender inequalities. In the
latter transformation, Confucianism has been rehabilitated as China’s
cultural heritage and the basis of social welfare. Current political
messages for women re-affirm their obligations to elders, to provide and
care for family members.
At the other extreme, political ideology in South Korea and Taiwan
has been more consistently pro-Confucian, pro-family responsibility for
security and care. Confucian culture has been embraced, in opposition
to outside influences, and also as support for rapid economic develop-
ment, with state resources focussed on economic growth, while women
in families could take responsibility for welfare. Women’s obligations to
families remain strong, both as mothers and as daughters-in-law, within
a powerful, persisting ideology, challenged from below by the women’s
movement, but not from above as under Chinese communism.
Hong Kong, historically, has faced East and West. Now, under the
SAR government, it combines Confucian values with an orientation to
markets. Leung argues that the combination of Confucian values with
market orientation is an unfriendly environment for mainstreaming
gender, in particular for uprooting violence against women. If women
are the peacemakers, they are likely to take the blame for family violence
rather than having their weak position in the family and needs for
protection and safety recognized.
And Japan shows a more complicated picture: Ochiai and Johshita
argue against Confucianism as the key influence. They identify alter-
native influences to Confucianism, particularly Buddhism, arguing the
lesser impact of Confucianism through Japanese society, with penetra-

tion of Confucian ideas through different social layers less consistent
than in other East Asian societies. They also see the identification of
Confucian culture as a risky strategy, allowing politicians to claim cultural
identity against women’s rights. Ito’s account is of a culture hostile to
women’s freedom, in which arguments for liberation are opposed by
forces which include Confucianism. Either way, Japan is similar to other
East Asian countries, in being difficult territory for women and women’s
movements. Such movements exist but have made limited impact on
traditional hierarchies of generation and gender. Despite its high level
of economic development, exceptional life expectancy and apparent
political and legislative commitment to gender equality, Japan appears
hostile territory for women and for feminist movements.
Most contributors share a view of their countries as profoundly
influenced by Confucian values. In Japan, a more complex picture
is drawn, with alternative sources of tradition and reaction against
women. In China, communist ideology has had a profound influence
against Confucianism, but market reforms from the 1990s have pushed
the country back to Confucian values, especially in promoting family
responsibility for elders. If Confucianism is powerful across most East
Asian countries, including China, it is also a powerful force against
women’s movements and gender equality.
Confucianism or gender equality in welfare?
The chapters have asked about the influence of Confucianism across

East Asia, exploring the depth and spread of Confucian values in
families, societies and governments. They have asked about poten-
tial conflict between Confucian values and gender equality in nations
which have variously dedicated themselves to communist ideology,
with values against gender inequality, signed up to international agree-
ments promoting gender equality, such as CEDAW, legislated for gender
equality, developed ministries for gender equality. These countries
include nations at the highest economic level, the rapidly growing ‘tiger
economies’, and China, fast becoming the world’s major economy: all
with the resources to support gender equality. Their response to feminist
movements, to forces for change has implications for very many men
and women.
The three key Confucian principles: xiao, filial piety, respect, support
and obedience to parents and older people; cong, women’s obedience
to her father, husband and son; and yang, support to widowed older
people, people with disabilities and orphaned children: these enable and
promote harmonious families within stable societies. But they clearly
also promote hierarchies and gender difference against the international
and national movements for gender equality.
Implementing these principles in practice has shown profound prob-
lems in promoting gender equality at every level. In Japan and South
Korea, as seen in Chapter 1, public social spending is small, in great
contrast to the social democracies, suggesting that commitment to
social and public purposes outside families is also small. Policymakers
in South Korea feel marginalized by any connection with gender issues,
and also lack the resources to implement gender equality policies force-
fully. Japan’s policymakers have responded to social movements with
legislation, but not with continued social investment. Japan’s culture,
including Confucian influences, has supported a backlash against
feminist movements (Chapter 7). In Hong Kong, social workers imple-
menting domestic violence policy are drawn to Confucian family ideals,
and therefore also to understandings of violence in which mothers are
to blame because they should be making peace (Chapter 6). Mothers in
Taiwan and South Korea (Chapters 2 and 4) feel obligations to support
families-in-law, and also feel the lack of mutuality: they experience a
hierarchy of gender and generation in which they have obligations, but
few rights, in marriage, or from society or from the state. And in China,
despite the communist years supporting gender equality in paid work,
participation and education, the experience of many millions of disa-
bled older women, especially those in rural areas, is of painful social
exclusion and lack of respect.
Conclusion
To develop new approaches to understanding gender equality in East

Asia, we have drawn on a framework for the analysis of gender equality,
examining dimensions of care, paid work, income, time and power,
and different levels of social provision. We have argued the importance
of analysing gender and welfare states in East Asia, through political,
economic and cultural dimensions. We have drawn together original
research in contributions from diverse nation states, offering an under-
standing of women’s lives, policymaking, and the impact of policy on
women’s lives, to understand the meaning of gender and gender equality
in women’s experience across this wide and diverse region.
The book has explored the combination of change and tradition in
East Asian welfare states. Rapid economic development makes East
Asian economies remarkable, as ‘tiger economies’, bringing transforma-

tion in living conditions. These changes bring social benefits as well
as economic ones, with women’s life expectancy in Japan the highest
among OECD countries, while Korean women’s life expectancy is also
above the Western social democracies of Sweden, Norway and Denmark.
However, evidence here is that women’s experience, in practice, shows
the persistence of traditional family hierarchies putting younger mothers
under unusual pressures to support and care for parents-in-law as well
as their own children; while weakening family networks bring older,
disabled women in rural China little support: gender inequality for both
young urban and older rural women.
The evidence of public social spending of policymakers, of policy
implementers, of those socially excluded through gender, age, disability,
who experience policy, is of powerful forces for tradition and against
gender equality. Can these forces be resisted?
Several sources of change are key to change and future possibility.
Reducing fertility and ageing populations are features of East Asian soci-
eties, as elsewhere, with trends in China and Japan more extreme than
world-wide. Declining fertility and increasing levels of education mean
that the potential of women as part of the paid workforce is increasing,
bringing increasing rewards to governments which support women’s
paid employment through work/life balance policies. In Germany, these
have brought quite radical changes to expectations of men and women,
with rights to parental leave, flexible working, returning to shorter
hours of employment after birth for both parents and obligations of
local authorities to provide childcare. These turn a country with cultur-
ally conservative family traditions, into one of the best places in Europe
to bring up young children while maintaining employment for fathers
and mothers. Meanwhile ageing populations bring new needs which are
hard to meet within traditional family structures. These have brought
legislative change in Japan, as even traditionally inclined govern-
ments have introduced insurance to cover elderly people’s need for care
(Ochiai and Johshita: Chapter 8). The inadequacy of family support for
rural disabled older women is evident in Shang et al. (Chapter 5) about
China, but also the lack of any other resources.
Social movements are challenging Confucian gender hierarchies, as
they have challenged Western gender hierarchies. Ministries of gender
equality may be weak, and resources for gender equality too limited,
but their existence is evidence of success in persuading governments of
the need for legislation that changes women’s position in family law,
employment and social policy. Political changes bring gender equality
legislation, crucial for improving women’s rights in employment and

family law. Chapters by Wu (Chapter 4) on Taiwan and Sung on South
Korea (Chapter 2) show evidence of some signs of change in society –
including gender relations – as well as in the economy and social policy.
Legislation may not produce its objectives at once, but over time, the
culture is affected by the existence of equal rights for men and women,
even if the time is long. Women’s fight for equal franchise in the United
Kingdom was long indeed, while political representation and govern-
ment remain male dominated. But the right to vote has brought a
change in the culture, in which men and women are more likely to be
assumed to be equal, and a change in policies towards more recognition
of the voices and needs of women as well as men. Women’s movements
have been crucial in bringing about these changes. And women’s move-
ments are national and international. International movements have
brought international standards, to which governments sign up, even
reluctantly, but which bring more sense and acceptance of the need for
gender equality in rights and obligations.
Academic enquiry contributes to understanding of forces that inhibit
gender equality as well as those which promote it. Contributors Ochiai
and Johshita, writing about Japan, argue the risks of understanding
Confucian culture as an immovable force, of playing into forces of reac-
tion, which may use it as an argument against international movements
for gender equality:
Confucianism may play a role in fixing modern gender roles, a role

which was never originally part of it. And East Asia may not be able
to reform itself. Researchers need to learn from past experiences that
theories which emphasize cultural distinctiveness fix social systems
in stone, when adopted by politicians, and often create negative prac-
tical consequences. (Ochiai and Johshita, Chapter 8)
Yes, the idea of culture can be misused as a force for defending tradition
as key to national identity. But better understanding of culture can also
be used to resist traditional barriers and to develop alternative social poli-
cies. Unless we understand the forces of reaction against gender equality,
we will find it hard to enable change. If the culture of Confucianism
is inaccurately applied to Japan then we need the more sophisticated
account offered by Ochiai and Johshita. But our contributors’ accounts
of gender across East Asia have deepened our understanding of the
particular dimensions and power-dynamics of Confucian families. These
are not the same in every country or for every generation. But they are
a powerful force for millions of women in South Korea, Taiwan, China

and Hong Kong and a force – albeit a less powerful one – in Japan. Social
policy’s comparative turn is a key to understanding national policies for
gender equality within an international context. Of course, academic
understanding plays a small part in the play of social change. But it is a
crucial one.
References
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) Social Foundations of Post-industrial Economics,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fraser, N. (1997) Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the ‘Postsocialist’ Condition,
New York and London: Routledge.
Goodman, R. and Peng, I. (1996) ‘The East Asian Welfare State’, in G. Esping-
Andersen (ed.), Welfare State in Transition, London: Sage.
Kwon, S. M. (2001) ‘Economic Crisis and Social policy Reform in Korea’,
International Journal of Social Welfare, 10(2): 97–106.
Lee, H. K. (1995) ‘Women and Welfare Policy’, in Nam, S. J. (ed.), The Choice of
Korean Social Welfare, Seoul: Nanam Press.
Lewis, J. (2001) ‘The Decline of the Male Breadwinner Model: The Implications
for Work and Care’, Social Politics, 8(2): 152–170.
Lewis, J. (2006) ‘Gender and Welfare in Modern Europe’, Past and Present,
Supplement 1, 39–54.
Lewis, J. (2009) Work-Family Balance, Gender and Policy, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
342–360.
Walker, A. and Wong, C. K. (eds) (2005) East Asian Welfare Regimes in Transition:
Index
Abe, Shinzō, 173–4, 176 gender equality and, 5–9, 181–92

abortion, 139, 145, 146, 147, 149 gender roles and, 49
ageing populations, 3, 92–5, 170–1, impact on women, 23–6, 34–46, 68,
176, 190 115, 118–20, 139
age-related disabilities, 90–111 influence of, 153–4
Asian financial crisis, 173 in Japan, 139, 152–5, 175, 187–8
older women and, 91–2, 108, 109
Basic Livelihood Security (BLS), 15 power relations and, 54–5
birth rate, 5, 16–18, 20 social policy context of, 90–111
Buddhism, 138–9, 187–8 welfare model and, 34, 115–33,
bureaucracy, 53–64 152–3, 188–9
cultural transitions, 5–6
care work, 119–20 culture, 8–9, 182
see also childcare; elder care see also Confucian values
gender differences in, 16–22 culture wars, in Japan, 137–51
reconciling with work
responsibilities, 29, 35–45, 69–86 Daddy leave, 16, 18
by women, 35–45 see also parental leave policies
childcare, 16–20, 22, 30–7, 66–73, daughters-in-law, 5–8, 10, 37–42,
75–86, 118–19, 184 98, 108
Childcare Act, 33 day care, 19, 33
Childcare Leave Law, 18 demographic transitions, 3, 170–1
childcare services, 119, 171–2 developmental welfare state, 24,
China, 1, 2 34, 182
changing gender roles in, 92–4 disability-related gender inequality,
Confucian values in, 91–2 109–11
demographic transitions in, 3 disability welfare policies, 90–111
disability welfare policies in, 90–111 divorce, 7
life expectancy in, 3 domestic responsibilities, 6, 20, 30–1,
market reforms in, 93 38, 69–86
May Fourth Movement in, 156 see also care work; childcare
older women in, 90–111 domestic violence, 25, 114–33, 187
population ageing in, 92–5 blaming victim of, 127
social insurance in, 104–7 Confucianism and, 120–1
social supports in, 92–7, 107–11 family perspective on, 121,
traditional values in, 6 124–5
civil society, 12, 60–3 family unity and, 126–7
Cold War, 138 gender mainstreaming, 114–33
communism, 2, 25, 92, 109 gender perspective on, 121–3
Confucian values, 1, 2 male victims of, 123
domestic violence and, 120–1 police response to, 114
family responsibilities and, 29, 31, policies on, 121–3, 128–32
37–42, 68, 108, 109, 116–18 power and control issues, 127–8
193
194 Index
domestic violence – continued family power perspective, 79

social workers’ attitudes toward, family structures, 6, 7, 10, 31, 68, 186
124–8 family unity, 126–7
as symmetrical issue, 125 fathers
dual earners, 10, 81–2 childcare and, 16, 18–20, 32–3,
35–7
earnings gap, 14–16 parental leave for, 16, 18, 44
East Asia feminism, 148, 149, 150
see also specific countries fertility rates, 3, 5, 16–18, 20, 30,
culture, 5–9 83, 190
economic development in, 2–5, filial piety, 7, 33, 76, 91–2, 154, 185,
189–90 188
gender assumptions in, 181–92 Finland, 23, 30
life expectancy, 3 France, 12, 22
social changes, 2–5 Fraser, Nancy, 11–12, 22
social expenditures, 3–4, 16, fundamentalism, 148
19–20, 189
welfare states in, 1–26, 181–92 gender
economic development, 2–5, 7, 30, Confucianism and, 181–92
142, 189–90 culture and, 5–6
economic security, 99, 101 disability and, 109–11
education, 68, 83, 99–101 old-age pensions and, 101
egalitarian regime, 29–46 older people with disabilities and,
elder care, 6, 16–20, 33, 37–42 90–111
employment, 5, 12–14, 18, 30 gender culture, 8
see also labour market gender division of labour, 35–45, 59,
conditions, 44–5 69, 153–4, 157
motherhood and, 66–86 Gender Equal Employment Law, 18
work hours, 20–2, 142, 190 gender equality, 1–2, 22, 24–6, 30, 34,
employment insurance, 32 36, 49–63, 86, 123, 129, 131–3,
Equal Employment 140–51, 162, 165, 168, 172, 174,
Opportunity Act, 32 178, 188–9
extended families, 31, 54, 68, 77, 79, Gender Equality Employment
84–5, 117 Law, 83
gender equality legislation, 1–12, 25,
familial care, 74, 76–8, 82, 85 190–1
families Japan, 142–3
extended, 31, 54, 68, 77, 79, Korea, 31–3
84–5, 117 on work-family balance, 42–5
in-laws, 7–8, 10, 29, 31, 37–42, gender freedom
72–3, 76, 78–9, 186 backlash against, 140–4, 147–51
Japanese, 141–2 concept of, 142–4
nuclear, 6, 7, 31, 68, 79, 84–5, 173 gender gaps
patriarchic, 6, 7, 69–71, 75–6, 149 in employment, 12–14, 141–2
as political issue, 158–60, 162–3, in income, 13–16, 30
173–4 gender mainstreaming, of domestic
traditional, 11 violence, 114–33
Western, 7–8 gender regimes, 10–12
family law, 6–8, 186, 190 gender roles
Index 195
attitudes toward, 43–4 gender equality policies, 4–5

Confucianism and, 49 gender issues and policies in, 142–3
traditional, 6, 43–4, 68, 79, 84, 93, gender roles in, 156, 157
118–19, 156, 157, 184 ideal woman in, 155–6
in transition, 30–1 infant mortality rates, 3
Germany, 190 life expectancy, 2–3
‘good wife and wise mother’, 155–6 neoliberalism in, 160–2, 172–3, 176
parental leave policies, 18
Hashimoto, Ryūtarō, 167–72, 176 political representation in, 22
health insurance, 32, 106 politics, 137–8, 157–60
ho-ju system, 7, 31 prime ministers’ discourse in,
homosexuality, 149 157–60, 162–7, 169–74
Hong Kong, 1, 2 religious and moral traditions in,
British colonial government in, 138–9
116–17 reproductive health/rights, 144–6
childcare services in, 119 social expenditures, 4
Confucian welfare model in, social policies, 160–8
115–20 stuctural reforms in, 167–9
domestic violence in, 25, uniqueness of, 156–7, 176–7
114–33, 187 welfare regime in, 160–2
economic growth, 117 women’s status in, 6
social security in, 15, 119–20
welfare system, 2 Koizumi, Jun’ichirō, 138, 172–3
workfare programmes in, 15 Korea, 1, 155
housework, 30–1, 38, 69–70, 74–5 economic development in, 2, 30
see also domestic responsibilities family law in, 7
husbands, see fathers; men family structures in, 6, 31
fertility rates in, 18
Iceland, 18, 22 gender equality policies in, 5
income gaps, 14–16, 30 infant mortality rates in, 3
income sources, for older people, life expectancy in, 3
101–4 parental leave policies in, 18
infant mortality rates, 3 political representation in, 22
in-laws, 6–8, 10, 29, 31, 37–42, 72–3, social expenditures in, 4
76, 78–9, 186 social policies in, 31–3
intergenerational relations, 6, 71 welfare regime in, 32–4
internet rightists, 150 women in transition in, 30–1
women’s bureaux in, 49–64
Japan, 1 work-family balance issues in,
backlash against ‘gender freedom’ 29–46
in, 140–4, 147–51 work hours in, 20–1
Confucianism in, 139, 152–5, 175,
187–8 labour market
culture in, 26 see also employment
culture wars in, 137–51 men in, 12–14
demographic changes in, 170–1 women in, 5, 6, 12–14, 16, 29, 30,
economic development, 142 66, 68–9, 142, 157, 175
familialist reforms in, 160–7, 176–7 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
fertility rates, 18 137–8
196 Index
life expectancy, 2–3 old-age pensions, 101

long-term care insurance, 5 older women
in China, 90–111
male breadwinner model, 1, 7, 8, 10, Confucianism and, 91–2, 108, 109
29, 31, 33–4, 73, 81, 142, 147, with disabilities, 92–111, 185–6
157, 175 education and, 99–101
marital status, 97–8 expectations of, 98–9
married women, in labour force, 66 gender inequality and, 109–11
maternity leave, 32–3, 42–3 government financial
May Fourth Movement, 156 support for, 104–7
men income and poverty, 101–4
contributions to domestic duties, marital status of, 97–8
70, 72–3, 76–7, 79 social support for, 92–7, 107–11
family law and, 7 overtime hours, 21–2
fathers, 16, 18, 20, 32–3,
35–7, 44 paid work, 34, 66
in labour force, 12–14 see also employment; labour force
unpaid work by, 20 parental leave policies, 16, 18–19,
work hours, 142 32–3, 42–4, 79–80, 83, 85–6
Ministry of Gender Equality (MOGE), parents, care of elderly, 6, 16–20,
50–64, 184 37–42
lack of internal cooperation and, parents-in-law, 6–8, 10, 29, 31, 37–42,
58–60 78–9, 186
power relations with other conflicts with, 38–40
ministries, 53–8 contributions to domestic duties,
staffing levels, 55–8 72–3, 76
women’s organizations and, living with, 38, 76
60–3 responsibility for, 40–2
Ministry of Gender Equality and parliaments, share of women in, 22–4
Family (MOGEF), 50 patriarchy, 6, 7, 69–71, 75–6,
MOGE, see Ministry of Gender 118, 149
Equality (MOGE) pay gaps, 13–16, 30
motherhood, 2, 17, 25, 30, 80–1 people with disabilities, 90–111,
mothers, 7–8, 35–7 185–6
childcare and, 16–20, 66–7, 69–73, educational levels, 99–101
75–86, 118–19 government financial support for,
employment of, 18 104–7
as primary breadwinners, 73–5 income and poverty, 101–4
working, 32–3, 35–7, 42–3, social supports for, 107–11
66–86, 184 political ideology, 9, 34
political representation, 22–4
Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 160–7, 175–7 poverty, 101–4
neoliberalism, 138, 160–2, 172–3, 176 power, 22–4, 127–8
Netherlands, 18 power relations
non-interventionism, 116 Confucian values and,
North Korea, 138 54–5
Norway, 30 hierarchical, 54
nuclear family, 6, 7, 31, 68, 79, between ministries, 53–8
84–5, 173 pre-school education, 83
Index 197
Presidential Commission of Women’s traditionalization, 156

Affairs (PCWA), 55–6
private sector employment, 44–5 United States, 138, 139
public sector employment, 44–5 Universal Caregiver model, 12, 22
Universal Citizenship model, 12
relativism, 148 unpaid work, 20–2, 29, 34,
religion, 138–9 35–45, 120
reproductive health/rights, 144–6 see also care work
Scandinavian countries, 3, 10, 12, 14, Vietnam, 155

16, 18, 23–4 violence against women, 22, 25,
sex education, 144–6 114–33
Shintoism, 138–9
social changes, 2–5 wage gap, 14–16, 30
social democratic regimes, 10–12, welfare capitalism, 34, 182
24–5, 30 welfare model, Confucian, 34,
social expenditures 115–33, 152–3, 188–9
on childcare, 16, 19–20 welfare states
as percentage of GDP, 3–4, 189 comparative studies in, 1
social insurance, 24, 93, 104–7 Confucian, 34, 152–3, 188–9
social movements, 190–1 culture and, 8–9, 33–4, 182
social policies developmental, 24, 34
assumption underlying, 2, 183–5 differences among, 185–8
China, 92–111 East Asian, 1–26, 181–92
Confucian values and, 90–111 gender and, 10–12
culture and, 8–9 gender assumptions in, 181–92
for gender equality, 10–12 Hong Kong, 2
gender inequalities in, 1 Japan, 160–2
Japan, 160–8 Korea, 32–4
Korea, 31–3 role of family in, 6–8
political ideology and, 9 Western, 182, 185–6
Taiwan, 83–6 Western families, 7–8
social security, 32, 104–7, 119–20 Western welfare states, 182, 185–6
Sweden, 21–2, 24, 30 widows, 97–8, 153
wives, see mothers; women
Taiwan, 1 women
family law in, 7 care work by, 16–20, 35–45,
fertility rates in, 83 119–20
gender roles in, 6 Confucian values and, 5–6, 23–6,
generational change in, 66–86 34–46, 68, 115, 118–20, 139
parental leave policies in, 18, 83, educational level, 99–101
85–6 ideal, 155–6
political representation in, 22 income gaps and, 14–16
social policies in, 83–6 Korean, 30–1
social security in, 15 in labour force, 5, 6, 12–14, 16, 29,
social welfare in, 77 30, 66, 68–9, 142, 157, 175
societal changes in, 67–9 life expectancy, 2–3
working mothers in, 66–86 older, with disabilities, 90–111
traditional families, 11 as political issue, 158–60, 163–7
198 Index
women – continued workfare programmes, 15

reproductive health/rights for, work hours, 20–2, 142, 190
144–6 working mothers
social participation of, 142 balancing work-care responsibilities,
unpaid work by, 20, 29, 35–45, 120 66–86
violence against, 22, 25, 114–33 childcare and, 32–3, 35–7, 42–3,
women-related policies, 53–60 118–19, 184
women’s bureaux, 49–64, 184 employers’ attitudes
women’s health, 4 toward, 80
women’s organizations, 60–3 rights of, 82
work-family balance, 29–46, 69–86, social policies affecting,
141–2, 190 83–6

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Notes on Contributors xii

1 Introduction: Gender and Welfare States in East Asia 1

2 Work–Family Balance Issues and Policies in Korea:

3 Rhetoric or Reality? Peripheral Status of Women’s

4 Continuity and Change: Comparing Work and Care

5 Gender, Social Policy and Older Women with

6 Confucian Welfare: A Barrier to the Gender Mainstreaming

7 Emerging Culture Wars: Backlash against ‘Gender Freedom’

8 Prime Ministers’ Discourse in Japan’s Reforms since

9 Conclusion: Confucianism or Gender Equality? 181

5.1 Marital status of older people by disability,

1.1 Life expectancy at birth: women, 2009 3

Sirin Sung is Lecturer in Social Policy at Queen’s University Belfast, United

Karen R. Fisher is an associate professor at the Social Policy Research

Kimio Ito is a professor of Sociology at the Graduate School of Letters at

Ken’ichi Johshita is a research associate of Political Science at Graduate

Lai Ching Leung is an associate professor in the Department of Applied

Emiko Ochiai is a professor of Sociology at Graduate School of Letters,

studies in sociology at the University of Tokyo, she studied historical

Xiaoyuan Shang is an associate professor at the Social Policy Research

Sook-Yeon Won is an assistant professor in the Department of Public

This book aims to uncover gender assumptions of welfare states that

contexts? Are Confucian values more powerful and gender differences

Social and economic change

Figure 1.1 Life expectancy at birth: women, 2009

Japan’s public social expenditure is also below the OECD average.

Australia United Kingdom France

Policy changes, bringing gender equality legislation, are important.

Culture and gender: East Asian culture in transition?

Confucianism has been identified as the main cultural heritage in East

increasing participation in the labour market and the recent development

Family law: gender equality legislation

The family’s key role in society as a provider of social welfare is common

‘productivist’, emphasizing economic objectives with strong educa-

and daughter-in-law, as well as between husband and wife (Sung 2003).

Gender in welfare regimes in East Asia:

Do social policy approaches overlook the impact of culture on societies

Conservative corporatism without (western-style) worker participa-

laissez-faire without libertarianism: an alternative expression for

Alternatively, Walker and Wang’s (2005) study emphasizes the role

Gender in welfare regimes: equality legislation in

How can we understand the gender logic underpinning the welfare

with social policies, social spending and social commitment to parents

Parti edits for

redits for carer

Voluntary sector care

Figure 1.4 Policies for gender equality

Gender gap employment rate Gender gap FTE employment rate

Figure 1.5 Gender gap in employment rates, 2008

Everywhere still – even in Scandinavian countries – men’s labour market

% GDP Child care spending as a % of GDP Pre-primary spending as a % of GDP

Figure 1.8 Public expenditure on childcare and early education services, as a

OECD data also allow us to compare fertility and changes in fertility.

Figure 1.9 Total fertility rates, 1980 and 2009

hours, infant care, and after-school care programmes. In 1999, the

Weeks Unpaid leave FTE Paid Leave

Figure 1.10 Parental leave, weeks, OECD Family Database, 2010

Although the recent development of family policies indicates improve-

which households’ welfare and caring responsibilities are relaxed’

Unpaid work is one measure of men’s responsibility for childcare.

Minutes Women ( ) Men