People of the Philippines vs.

Felipe Sangil
G.R. No. 91158, May 8, 1992
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J

Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan convicting the accused-appellant Felipe Sangil guilty of the crime of rape.
The victim-complainant Joselyn Sangil, 19 years of age, filed the first complaint at
Municipal Police of Calumpit, Bulacan which contained her “sinumpaang salaysay”
dated January 27, 1989 and was not actually sworn to before the Municipal Judge.
Joselyn Sangil testified that she was raped by her father Felipe Sangil at the night
of September 1983 and November 1984 when she was 13 years old at the place
where her brothers and sisters were likewise sleeping. They reported the incident
after Alicia, sister of the victim became pregnant. The sisters made a
confrontation along with their mother and then found out that Araceli and
Lourdes also was been raped by the accused. When the mother learned this, she
got mad and confronted the accused, waiting for him to ask for forgiveness
instead the accused got angry that forced them to file the complaint at the
Municipal Police of Calumpit, Bulacan, where the accused was arrested.
The accused, Felipe Sangil denied all the allegations, he said that the only
reason why her daughters complained against him was because of his cruelty. He
box and kick them because of their hard headedness and refusal to follow his
order.
Issue: Whether or not the pursuant to Section 5 Part 3 of Rule 110 on the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure was satisfied in this case.
Held: Yes, the jurisdictional requirement that a prosecution of rape should be
commence by a complaint of the aggrieved party, by her parents, grandparents or
guardian, pursuant to Section 5, Par. 3 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was satisfied in this case and the appeal is bereft of merit.
The purpose of the complaint is merely to initiate or commence the
prosecution of the accused. The “sinumpaang salaysay” which was prepared in
Tagalog and the complaint in English, complement each when read together, and
satisfy the legal definition of complaint. The court is not inclined to disregard her
“salaysay” for mere lack of an oath for that would amount to suppressing her
anguished cry for redress.
Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the decision of the trial court.
 Susan V. Llenes v. Hon. Isaias P. Dicdican
G.R. No. 122274, July 31, 1996
Davide Jr., J.

Facts:
This is a petition filed by Susan Llenes for the denial of motion to reconsider
by the Regional Trial Court, per public respondent Judge Dicdican on August 23,
1995.
Vivian Ginete filed a complaint for grave oral defamation against the
petitioner Susan Llenes on the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman on October 13,
1993 allegedly committed on September 23, 1993. The petitioner was required to
file a counter-affidavit but failed to do so. The petitioner filed a motion to quash
the information at Municipal Trial Court presided by Judge Bajarias on the ground
that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished because of the crime
had been already prescribed in months filed on October 13, 1993 to March 28,
1994 or 186 days or 6 months and 6 days after the alleged commission. She cited
that Court ruled that the filing of an information at the fiscal’s office will not stop
the running of the prescriptive period for crimes in “Zalderia v. Reyes Jr., G.R.No.
102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277”.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of a complaint or information with the Office of
Ombudsman against public officer interrupts the period of prescription.
Ruling: Yes, the filing of a complaint or information with the Office of the
Ombudsman against public officer interrupts the period of prescription. The
petitioner being an Education Supervisor II of Regional Office of Department of
Education is a public officer whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the
performance of the functions of government. The Ombudsman has the authority
to conduct preliminary investigation for grave oral defamation as per Section 15
of R.A. No. 6770 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and since the complaint was filed
on October 13, 1993, barely twenty days from the commission of the crime and
the filing of the information on March 28, 1994 was very well within the six-
month prescriptive period.
Wherefore, the instant petition is dismissed for want of merit.
 G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial
Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS:

On July 2, 1991, petitioner Rolito Go entered a one-way street and started travelling in the
opposite or “wrong” direction, he almost had a collision with another car driven by Eldon Maguan.
Petitioner got off his car, shot the driver and left the scene. An eyewitness was able to take down
petitioner’s plate number. Verification at land transportation office showed that the car was registered
to one Elsa Ang Go. On the following day, the police returned to the scene, they were informed that the
petitioner had dined at Craving’s Bakeshop shortly before the shooting. The security guard of the
bakeshop was sown a picture of petitioner and positively identified Go as the same person who shot
Maguan.

Having established, the police launch a manhunt operation for petitioner Go. On July 8, 1991,
petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two(2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness who was at the station identified the petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police
promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal.

The prosecutor informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of
is right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code. The prosecutor filed an information for murder before the RTC. The prosecutor
certifies that no preliminary investigation had conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and
proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and
that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed.

ISSUE:

- (1) whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in
respect of petitioner Go;
- (2) Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

RULING:

1. NO. The court do not believe that the warrantless "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the
instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge."

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning
of Section 5 of Rule 113.
2. No. The Court believes and so holds that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary
investigation. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it
has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice.

The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a
criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably
exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a
valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him
the full measure of his right to due process.
 G.R. No. 59241-44 July 5, 1989

PEDRO TANDOC, ROGELIO ERCELLA, RUDY DIAZ, JUAN ROSARIO, AND FRED
MENOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RICARDO P. RESULTAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the City Court of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), ARNULFO PAYOPAY, MANUEL
CANCINO, and CONRADO PAYOPAY, SR., respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petition for certiorari assailing the Orders of the City Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
dated 13 August 1981, finding reasonable ground to believe that petitioners Pedro Tandoc,
Rogelio Ercella, Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred Menor had probably committed the crimes
of "Trespass to Dwelling", "Serious Physical Injuries", "Less Serious Physical Injuries" and
"Grave Threats", denying petitioners' motion for a re-investigation of the complaint by the Office
of the City Fiscal of San Carlos City.

Subsequently, Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay and Manuel Cancino filed a criminal complaint
against petitioners for "Serious Oral Defamation", "Grave Threats" and "Physical
Injuries”. The Office of the City Fiscal recommended the dropping of said charges on
the ground that they "were found to be in a nature of a countercharge, the same having
been filed after more than one (1) month from the date of the alleged incident.
On 13 August 1981, the City Court of San Carlos City issued several Orders which are the
subject of the petition at bar, whereby the court a quo, after conducting a preliminary
examination of the four (4) aforementioned cases, found reasonable ground to believe that the
offenses charged may have been committed by the accused (now petitioners) and that the latter
were probably guilty thereof. The issuance of warrants of arrest was ordered against herein
petitioners, although said warrants were later suspended upon motion of the petitioners. A
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution was filed by petitioners, but it was denied.
They moved for a re-investigation of the cases by the Office of the City Fiscal. On 21 October
1981, the court a quo denied said motion. Petitioners sought a reconsideration of said order, but
it was likewise denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the city court has the power and authority to conduct anew a preliminary
examination of charges, which were previously the subject of a preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal and thereafter dismissed by the latter.

RULING
NO.
A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense
and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt
shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is
taken in jeopardy.
The re-investigation sought by petitioners applies only to instances where a case is cognizable
by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for purposes of preliminary
investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the latter on the ground that no prima facie case
exists. However, for cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed with the same not only for
purposes of preliminary investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City Fiscal has
no authority to re- investigate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 110436 June 27, 1994
ROMAN A. CRUZ, JR., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsianlo for petitioner.
The Solicitor Generalfor the People of the Philippines.

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Government Service Insurance System filed two separate criminal complaints
against petitioner Roman A. Cruz, Jr., a former public official who used to be the President and
General Manager of the GSIS and, also, the President of the Manila Hotel, for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended and Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents.

The said complaints were consolidated into Criminal Case No. 14252 pending before the First
Division of Sandiganbayan. Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, remanded the consolidated
cases against petitioner to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation.

During the preliminary investigation conducted anew by the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner
submitted his counter-affidavit. After the completion of said investigation, Prosecutor Tamayo of
the Office of the Ombudsman prepared a Resolution which recommended the withdrawal of the
Information in Criminal Case No. 14252. However, despite of the recommendation, Respondent
Ombudsman ordered to proceed.

Petitioner thus filed with Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information.
However, it was denied for lack of merit. He then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
also denied for lack of merit. Hence, petitioner filed this petition.

Petitioner contends that respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing the information considering that the Ombudsman’s approval of the order dismissing
the complaint did not state the factual or legal basis therefor, in not requiring the production of
the record of the preliminary investigation in wanton disregard of petitioner’s right to due
process, in not dismissing the information considering that, as found by the investigating
prosecutor, the money received by petitioner was a cash advance; and in not requiring the
Office of the Ombudsman to conduct further proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion.

RULING

NO.
It is settled that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is like court proceedings, subject to
the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process. This is because, a
preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or
investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer.
As aptly pointed out by respondent court in its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, "to the Ombudsman, the narration of facts by Prosecutor Tamayo, . . .
demonstrated adequate cause to prosecute the accused Cruz."

In the exercise of the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
respondent Ombudsman is DIRECTED to produce the pertinent records of the preliminary
investigation before the Sandiganbayan.

G.R. Nos. 70565-67 November 9, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERT POCULAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Amadeo D. Seno, Antonio P. Barredo and Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Azcuna &
Bengzon for accused-appellant.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Three (3) separate complaints were filed by Conchita Rone, 28 years of age, worked as a clerk
in the Office of the Mayor of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, accused-appellant Robert Poculan
with Rape.

At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 March 1980, a certain Servolo Herodias told her that
Appellant wanted her to go to his house to do some paper works. After finishing her work, Rone
asked for permission to leave at 6:30PM. Appellant told her to take the motorcab nearby where
he followed saying that he is going to the adjoining barangay Mapang and he would just drop
her at her boarding house. They rode with two more people. After travelling for a while, Rone
noticed that the motorcab did not proceed to her boarding house. She wanted to get out of the
cab but the Appellant threatened to kill her.

Upon reaching the small creek of Nilabo, the appellant forcibly pulled her uphill. He then started
his first sexual advancement to the complainant. Approximately two hours later, he again forced
and succeeded in having sexual congress with her despite her resistance and the moving of her
body.

At about 4:00 or 4:30 in the morning, a little farther from the poblacion, the wagon they were
riding stopped. Appellant consummated his third carnal assault on Complainant by intimidating
that if she will not agree, two other men will take turns to rape her. Later on, she was brought to
her boarding house.

With the complainant’s search for help and justice, her Aunt Bartolome advised her to proceed
to her friend, Rev. Fr. Paulo Briones who was also a lawyer. They went to the NBI Central Office
to submit herself for a medicolegal examination. The conclusions of the Dr. Reyes were no
signs of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body and genital findings compatible with
sexual intercourse with man on or about alleged date of commission.

On 7 May 1980, complainant subscribed and swore to her Affidavit and on 17 May 1980,
Appellant was arrested and detained.

In the Appellant’s defense, he maintains that it was physically impossible for him to ride a
motorcab because he is suffering from leg injury caused by bullet wounds. He also said that the
Complainant was his querida. His witnesses corroborated all his statements.

After evaluation, the lower Court pronounced him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentenced him to three sentences of Reclusion Perpetua.

The defense stressed on the complainant’s inconsistent testimony on the accusation that he
was “armed with a revolver” while the information filed by the Fiscal did not so state.
The prosecution’s own evidences also proved that external evidence did not show rape, no
indication of rape in the examination of complainant’s organ, no torn panties nor bra and that the
appellant was charged in the informations with offenses different from her charges in her own
complaints.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Conchita Rone’s testimony bearing inconsistencies is substantial in proving
her allegations to Robert Poculan

RULING

YES.
In People v. Gan, this Court, through Justice Antonio, held: "It is an accepted rule that
the force employed in rape need not be so great nor of such character as could not be resisted.
It is only that the force used by the accused be sufficient to enable him to consummate his
purpose."
In People v. Olden, the then Justice now retired Chief Justice, Makalintal, reiterated such
a view: "Appellants point out that even assuming that they had sexual intercourse with Edwina
Maranga, there is no evidence that they employed force or intimidation. It is true that she could
have shown greater physical resistance to their advances than she actually did. Another woman
would probably have tried to fight them off, even to the jeopardy of life or limb. But not all
women are of the same mettle. ... (People vs. Equac, 80 SCRA 665, 671 [19771)
While there may have been some inconsistencies and inaccuracies, they were not on
substantial matters nor on pivotal issues. We did not discern any intent on her part, “to web a
fanciful story”.
The consistent ruling of this Court has also been that when a woman testifies that she
had been raped, she says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been committed
(People vs. Soterol, L-53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400), provided her testimony
meets the test of credibility. Complainant has successfully met that test. The prosecution
evidence considered by itself is adequate to sustain the judgment appealed from and is not
dependent on the "weakness of the evidence of the defense."
All told, we conclude that Appellant's culpability for three (3) separate crimes of Rape,
with the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his public position, and without any
mitigating circumstance, has been established beyond doubt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with separate costs
in the three (3) cases against accused-appellant Robert P. Poculan.
SO ORDERED.
7. Ebarle vs. Sucaldito, 156 SCRA 803
8. Quiambao vs. Osono, G. R. No.48157, March 16, 1988
9. Donato vs. Luna, G.R. No.53642, April 15, 1988

Ebarle vs. Sucaldito, 156 SCRA 803

G.R. No. L-33628
December 29, 1987
J. Sarmiento

Facts
The petitioner, Buenvinido Ebarle, a Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate
for reelection in the local elections of 1971 has been charged for violation of certain provisions
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and various provisions of
the Revised Penal Code. On his defense, the petitioner claims that the City Fiscal and the Anti-
Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "Outlining The
Procedure By Which Complainants Charging Government Officials And Employees With
Commission Of Irregularities Should Be Guided, preliminary to their criminal recourses.

Issue
Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and not to criminal
complaints.

Held
EO No. 264 has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The title speaks
of “commission of irregularities”. There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal
"offenses," say "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could
have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable
thereto.
This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals as one involving pure questions of law pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Quiambao vs. Osorio

G. R. No.48157
March 16, 1988
J. Fernan

Facts
The petitioner, Ricardo Quiambao was alleged for surreptitiously and by force, intimidation, strategy, and
stealth, entered a 400 sq. m. and began construction in portion of land which is legitimately possessed by
the respondents. These were unlawful per se and entitled private respondents to a writ of preliminary
injunction and to the ejectment of petitioner from the lot in question.

Issue
Whether or not the administrative case(?) between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of
the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.

Held
The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, therefore
no prejudicial question to speak of. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal
case.
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the
Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Stance of Manila should be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative.
We sustain him.

Donato vs. Luna

G.R. No.53642
April 15, 1988
J. Gancayco

Facts
The petition for bigamy was filed against Leonilo C. Donato by Paz Abayan. Before the petitioner’s
arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a
civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz
consented to entering the marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous knowledge that
Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping. Prior to the solemnization of the second
marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5
years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite
marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live
with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously
married.

Issue
Whether or not a pending criminal case for bigamy should be suspended in view of a civil case for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

Held
The petitioner cannot apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can only
be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proven that
petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to
show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for
the crime of bigamy.
CASE #10
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 104 of Quezon City, and ALEXANDER DIONISIO Y MANIO, respondents. HON.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman, intervenor-respondent.
G.R. No. L-108208
March 11, 1994
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:

On 31 July 1991, private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in
Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble there. Dionisio
proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang. On 7 August
1991, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an Information charging Dionisio with
the crime of homicide. Petitioner maintains that the term “regular courts” does not include in
Sandiganbayan while the respondent Judge and the intervenor-respondent hold otherwise.

ISSUE:
Whether the term "regular courts" includes the Sandiganbayan
RULING:
Yes. The term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts. There could
have been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to remove from
courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in
the courts within the judicial system, the civil court which, as contradistinguished from court-
martial, are the regular courts. The Sandiganbayan, although trying only certain special classes of
crimes, still can be classified as a regular court functioning within the framework of the judicial
department of the government.
CASE #11 SEND KO LANG BUKAS ANG 11 HEHE <3
G.R. No. 101421 February 10, 1994
CONSTANCIO C. TORRALBA, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE OMBUDSMAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 101422 February 10, 1994
ALEXANDER H. LIM, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE OMBUDSMAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE #12
G.R. No. 103613       February 23, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ELADIO C. TANGAN, respondents.
x------------------x
G.R. No. 105830       February 23, 2001
ELADIO C. TANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

At around 11:30 p.m. of December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving
alone on Roxas Boulevard heading south. At the same time, Generoso Miranda At the same time,
Generoso Miranda Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him to
swerve to the right and cut Tangan's path. Dispute between the two driver started and Tangan got
his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat and shot Generoso Miranda. He was rushed to the
Philippine General Hospital but he expired on the way. Tangan was charged with the crime of
murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. After a reinvestigation, however, the information
was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm, and he was separately charged with
illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.

Issue:
Whether or not Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense.

Held:
Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating
circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the information is not shifted to
the accused. In order that it may be successfully appreciated, however, it is necessary that a
majority of the requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either
of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete selfdefense. Absent the unlawful
aggression, there can never be selfdefense, complete or incomplete, because if there is nothing
to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no basis. The element of
unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending himself but from
the victim. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. Likewise, the exchange of
insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how
objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with
physical assault. There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of
incomplete self-defense falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but the Mirandas
tried to wrestle the gun from him. It may be said that the former had no intention of killing the
victim but simply to retain possession of his gun. However, the fact that the victim subsequently
died as a result of the gunshot wound, though the shooter may not have the intention to kill,
does not absolve him from culpability. Having caused the fatal.

The petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. The appealed decision subject of G.R. No. 105830
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties.

(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P42,000.00 as
funeral and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
 ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA
G. R. No. 160188
June 21, 2007
TINGA, J
FACTS:
The case states in an information charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner)
and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft. Petitioner and Calderon were sighted
outside the Super Sale Club by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at
the open parking area of the supermarket. They are loading several cartons of Tide detergent
on to a taxi. All of these were seen by Lago and asked the petitioner for a receipt of
merchandise. They failed to present the said receipt instead they flee but they were arrested,
and recovered the merchandise stolen. After an act committed by Valenzuela and Calderon, the
Assistant City Prosecutor filed an information to the court charging them with theft.
The petitioner and Calderon denied all the allegations against them and claimed they
were both innocent. They testify that they have not stolen the cartons and detergents. In the
decision promulgated by the Regional Trial Court, the petitioner and Calderon were both
convicted of the crime of consummated theft. They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of two years of prision correccional as minimum to seven years of prision mayor as
maximum. The accused filed a notice of appeal and the petitioner asserted that he should only
be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was arrested, he was never placed in a
position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.

ISSUE:
Whether under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely
frustrated.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that there is no crime of frustrated theft under the Revised
Penal Code. It is frustrated crime when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. A felony is consummated when all
the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. As held by the court,
the petition is denied. The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property by one with intent to gain. Hence, it is insubstantial that the offender is able
or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of
execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Wherefore,
theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.
 GELACIO V. SAMULDE
vs.
RAMON M. SALVANI, Jr.
G.R. No. 78606
September 26, 1988
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner Municipal Judge Gelacio Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation
of Pelayo Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed by Maria Magbanua because of the
allegation that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly abutting Arangale's
property of land. After conducting a preliminary investigation based on the affidavits of the
complainant and her witnesses and counter-affidavits of the respondent and his witnesses.
Judge Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Ramon Salvani with his
finding that there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charge in the complaint. The fiscal
returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records to his
office was "premature" because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest against
the accused.
Judge Samulde sent back the records to Fiscal Salvani. He said that under Section 6, Rule
112, he may issue a warrant of arrest if he is satisfied that a probable cause exists and that
there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. Although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not
believe that Arangale should be immediately placed under custody so as not to frustrate the
ends of justice. Hence, he refused to issue a warrant of arrest. A special civil action of
mandamus was filed by Provincial Fiscal Salvani against Judge Samulde in the Regional Trial
Court of Antique because of not issuing the aforesaid warrant of arrest.
In this case, since the robbery charge was the offshoot of a boundary dispute between
two property owners, the investigating judge did not believe there was any danger of the
accused absconding before the filing of the information against him by the fiscal, thus, he found
no need to place him under immediate custody.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a warrant of arrest should issue against the accused.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that it is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers,
for the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest
the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or
discretion.
The provision of Section 5, Rule 112 simply means that the warrant of arrest, if one was
issued, shall be transmitted to the fiscal with the records of the preliminary investigation. If the
investigating judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, decides not to issue a warrant of
arrest, then none need be transmitted to the fiscal, and he may not be compelled by
mandamus to issue it. The fiscal's speedy and adequate remedy, if he believes that the accused
should be immediately placed under custody so as not to frustrate the ends of justice, is not to
file a mandamus action.
 PANFILO S. AMATAN, COMPLAINANT
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE AUJERO, RESPONDENT
A.M. No. RTJ-93-956
September 27, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Philippine National Police Station Commander filed a criminal complaint against Rodrigo
Umpad for committing a crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. A fatal
shooting was done against Genaro Tagsip that caused the death of the latter. After conducting
preliminary investigation by the office of the provincial fiscal, an information charged Umpad
with the crime of Homicide. Upon arraignment, the parties entered into plea bargaining that the
accused would plead guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide as
originally charged in the information. Upon arraignment, the parties, the offended party and
the public prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining whereby, with the approbation of the
judge, the information was amended to attempted homicide and the accused pleaded guilty
thereto. The accused would suffer imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of
prision correccional.
Amatan filed an administrate suit against Judge Aujero for gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law and gross misconduct for approving the plea bargaining agreement and
sentencing the accused for the crime of attempted homicide, the Judge explained that what he
did was in accordance with Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
which he is reprimanded and fine one thousand pesos. The judge was held administratively
liable for a verdict that could in no way be legally or factually sustained or justified. Respondent
judge's erroneous exercise of his judicial prerogative was neither tainted with malice nor bad
faith. The phraseology of Sec. 2, Rule 116 is not crafted with such precision as to entirely
eliminate possible misinterpretation. This observation is bolstered by the fact that the same
provision prompted the Department of Justice, on July 31, 1990, or three months after
respondent judge took cognizance of the case on April 17, 1990, to issue Circular No. 35, later
amended by Circular No. 55 dated December 11, 1990, clarifying and setting limitations on the
application of Sec. 2, Rule 116. The fact also that respondent reached compulsory retirement
age on April 5, 1995 after a long period of service in the judiciary entitles him to a certain
measure of leniency. Nonetheless, the case at bench stands unique because of the potently
absurd result of respondent's application of the law.
 ESMAEL ORQUINAZA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 165596 November 17, 2005
Puno, J.:

FACTS
In February 2003, Edelyn Arida, together with Julio Espinili as witness, filed a complaint
regarding the alleged act of Orquinaza of kissing her and touching her breast while she was taking a nap
inside the Development Room of Calamba Model Makers factory. Consequently, SPO4 Manaig referred
the case of sexual harassment to the City Prosecutor who then issued a subpoena ordering both parties to
appear at the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
Orquinaza filed a petition to dismiss the complaint arguing that the affidavits of Arida and
Espinili do not contain allegations that constitute the crime of sexual harassment. Assistant City
Prosecutor Paderayon affirmed that there was no transgression of anti-sexual harassment law but the
petitioner’s act of grabbing complainant’s breast and kissing her is punishable under the law of acts of
lasciviousness, and accordingly filed the appropriate information.
A warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. He filed an omnibus motion and motion for
reconsideration where he prayed that the warrant of arrest be recalled, the information be quashed, the
arraignment be invalidated and set aside, and the case be dismissed. He also argued that information for
acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor was for
sexual harassment and not for acts of lasciviousness and that he has been deprived of his right to due
process. Both motions were denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not there is a need to conduct a new preliminary investigation for the offense of acts
of lasciviousness
HELD
No. The petition is denied.
Arida's statement contains all the allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness, (2) under any of the following circumstances: (a) using force or intimidation, (b) the offended
party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) offended party is under 12 years of age.
Petitioner had the opportunity to refute all the allegations made by Arida when the Assistant City
Prosecutor required him to submit his counter-affidavit. The conduct of another preliminary investigation
for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be
presenting the same facts and evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor. The Court
frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal
complaint.
 JOSE C. LUCIANO V. HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO
G.R. No. L-32950 July 30, 1971
TEEHANKEE, J.:

FACTS:
This is a sequel case of Luciano v. Wilson where in prior to assumption of his mayorship,
petitioner Luciano, together with Florentino S. Rolls, were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Law. In the said case, the court issued an order in Criminal Case No. 19346, suspending
the accused Jose C. Luciano from public office pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 3019. "(I)t
appearing that in the information charging the accused is sufficient in form and substance and the validity
of said information is apparent."
The petitioner assailed the decision arguing that that he was denied his day in court when the
respondent Judge reached the conclusion that the information is valid, without affording him opportunity
to be heard and that the information does not charge an indictable offense under Republic Act 3019, and
that no preliminary investigation was conducted in accordance with law.
On 30 June 1970, Wilson filed a motion to the effect that he was willing to confess judgment in
all material points relevant to the issue of holding a hearing to determine the validity of an information
filed under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act Counsel for other respondents. The court granted the
motion. The respondent court terminated the hearing after securing the parties' stipulation "that at first
instance, the case which was filed is falsification against the accused in this case. That it was dismissed
after Fiscal Barot conducted the preliminary investigation and that then Provincial Fiscal Benjamin
Aquino, now Judge of the Court of First Instance considered the evidence that while it may not sustain the
charge of falsification it can sustain the charge of violation of the Anti-graft (Law).”
On December 15, 1970, respondent court issued its disputed order, wherein it hold and so rules
that there has been a preliminary investigation held and that the information is valid.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there had been a proper preliminary investigation for the graft charged against
the petitioner.
2. Whether or not information was valid.
HELD:
1. No. The Court finds that since the information for alleged violation of the Anti-graft Law was
filed without any previous notice to petitioners and due preliminary investigation thereof, and despite the
dismissal of the original charge for falsification as being "without any factual or legal basis", petitioners
are entitled to a new preliminary investigation for the graft charge, with all the rights to which they are
entitled under section 1 of Republic Act No. 5180.
2. Should respondent fiscal, after such preliminary investigation, find sufficient evidence to
establish prima facie the guilt of the accused and therefore maintain the information for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 as filed and so inform the lower court, then the trial court must hold a hearing on
the validity of the information and make an affirmative finding of validity thereof, before it can issue the
order of suspension from office of petitioner Luciano.
This procedure was first indicated in the leading case of Luciano vs. Prov. Governor, supra,
where we stated that "in line with the statutory text of Section 13, the suspension spoken of follows the
pendency in court of a criminal prosecution under a "valid information". Adherence to this rigoristic
requirement funnels us down to no other conclusion than that there must, first of all, be a determination
that the information filed is valid before suspension can be effected. This circumstance militates strongly
against the notion that suspension is automatic. Suspension is however, mandatory." In the subsequent
case of Luciano vs. Wilson, supra, the Court, in requiring such pre-suspension hearing, held definitely
that "a hearing on the validity of the information appears conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into
account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elected public official, even
before his conviction and that public interest demands a speedy determination of the issues involved in
(the) case."
 JESUS LAVA V. LT. COL. OSCAR C. GONZALES
G.R. No. L-23048             July 31, 1964
PAREDES, J.:

Facts:
The Petitioner applied for writ of habeas corpus with application of temporary restraining order
or ex parte preliminary investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the application for writ of habeas corpus with application for temporary
restraining order or ex parte preliminary injunction be granted.
Held:
The Petition is dismissed and the restraining order or preliminary injunction prayed for is denied.
A new preliminary investigation is not necessary after the amendment of the information, for the
reason that there had been no change in the nature of the crime charged, which is rebellion, and moreover,
the accused petitioner who was already in custody when the amended information was filed. Granting
arguendo, that the warrant of arrest in question is defective, still petitioner’s arrest is legal, because an
offender can be taken into custody, by any officer of the law, or by any private individual even without
any warrant of arrest, when an offense has in fact been committed and the arresting officer or individual,
has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it (Sec. 6-b, Rule 113, Rev.
Rules), and forthwith deliver the arrested person to the judicial authorities, as was done in this case (Sec.
17, ibid). Normally, a writ of preliminary injunction should not issue to restrain the prosecution of
criminal offenses (Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 103; Gorospe v. Peñaflorida, L-11583, July
19, 1957). In view hereof, it is deemed unnecessary to pass upon the issues raised, in connection with the
warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 2043 and 2044 of the Bulacan Court of First Instance
CASE NOS. 19 TO 21 TO FOLLOW
 FRANCISCO S. TATAD V. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 72335-39
March 21, 1988

YAP, J.

FACTS:
Antonio de los Reyes filed a report" to the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command
(PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then
Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The report was made to "sleep" in the office of the
PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet.

On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint
filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on the
complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was
accepted by Pres. Marcos. Referring the complaint to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS),
Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report.

On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of
charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October
25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the
Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan,
recommending the ring of the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad.
Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner
Tatad alone.

ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had
deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the
cases against him.

HELD:
Yes, delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant
case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor
to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. A delay of close to three (3)
years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at
bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in
the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the
Tanodbayan. In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected.
 FELIX P. GONZALES v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
G. R. No. 94750 
July 16, 1991

REGALADO, J.

FACT:
Petitioner Felix R. Gonzales is the former Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR), while private respondent Antonio B. Baltazar is the former Chief of the Deep Sea
Fishing Demonstration Division of the BFAR. Criminal Case No. 13563, subject of this petition, arose
from an agreement entered into between BFAR, represented by then Director Gonzales, and Roberto F.
Palanca for the use of the "Otoshi-Ami Net," also known as "Lambaklad," for experimental test fishing.
This net was subsequently installed by Palanca through the assistance of the BFAR.

November 11, 1975, an affidavit-complaint3 was filed by Baltazar against Gonzales for malversation of
public funds and property involving the alleged illegal use of M/V Albacora. Complaint affidavit 5 was
filed by Baltazar charging Gonzales with illegal use of the M/V Albacora and loss of the "Otoshi-Ami
net" with the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) where it was docketed as TBP Case No. 83-01547
constitute violation of Sections 12 and 3(e), respectively, of Republic Act No. 3019.

Additional 2 cimininal cases filed to the accused in violation of the Sections 12 and 3(e), respectively, of
Republic Act No. 3019. to wit

A. TBP Case No. 84-02338, where the act complained of is the accused-movant's entering into an
agreement regarding the Lambaklad which is disadvantageous to the government and over which he had
no power to do; and

B. TBP Case No. 84-00787, where the act complained of is accused-movant's allowing Victorio San
Antonio to retire in spite of the pendency of the administrative charge against him instituted by the
complainant.

On December 12, 1989, Gonzales filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash the information before the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that there has been a long delay on the part of the Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman) in the termination of the preliminary investigation of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)long delay in the termination of the preliminary

investigation of the case had deprived petitioner of his constitutional right for speedy disposition of the
cases against him.

HELD: No,
right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

Moreover, Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied
his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both
the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from
the delay, are considered.26
 MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA
228 SCRA 214
December 2, 1993

QUIASON, J.

FACT:

Petitioner Miriam Defensor Santiago, then Commissioner for Immigration and Deportation (CID) , was
charged in Sandiganbayan criminal case No. 16698 for violation of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was allegedly committed
by using the benefits of the aliens legalization program to favor “unqualified” aliens. Santiago approved
the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens who arrived in the Philippines.

Petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars stating that while the information alleged that she had
approved the application for legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it
lacked a list of the favored aliens.

Petitioner contended in this case that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against her,
after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information. Moreover,
Petitioner claimed that the Amended Informations filed against her did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized
under EO 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of
approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens"
even though they had arrived in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed one crime and should only be one information that should be
filed against her.

HELD:
Yes, there should be one crime and one information that should be filed against the petioner.
When the petioner approved the legalization of the 32 aliens and was committed in the same period of
time, the 32 information filed against her shall be combined and consolidated into only one crime.
For delito continuado(referred to as "continuous crime”) to exist there should be a plurality of
acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the
same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. A delito
continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.
G.R. No. 111153 November 21, 1994
GILBERT DEE, PETER DEE, ROBERTO UYQUIENCO and OSCAR BLAZA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE CHUA and BETTY CHUA, respondents.
Isidro S. Escano for petitioners.
Puno and Puno for private respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
On March 21, 1990, spouses Jose and Betty Chua (hereinafter referred to as the Chuas) filed a
Joint Affidavit/Complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor of Pasay City accusing petitioner Gilbert Dee,
et al., of the crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document alleging that the latter
fraudulently made it appear that they signed a promissory note in the amount of Fourteen Million Pesos
when in fact the said promissory note, signed in blank by them was executed for the purpose of
obtaining a "bills purchase line" not exceeding Two Million Pesos. After several months of investigation,
First Assistant City Prosecutor issued a resolution dated September 30, 1991 finding a prima facie case
for the filing of an information for estafa.

Consequently, the corresponding information was filed before the Regional Trial Court in Pasay
City on October 3, 199. The accused filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice but the
same was denied by the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor. However, on reconsideration, the petition for
review was granted by then Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III who set aside the resolution
dated September 30, 1991 and directed the City Prosecutor of Pasay to move for the dismissal of the
information. On February 3, 1992, the Chuas filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was
denied on September 2, 1992. On September 15, 1992, the subject information was ordered withdrawn
by the trial court upon manifestation of Assistant City Prosecutor Manuel A. Ortega that the same has to
be withdrawn per the directive of the Acting Department of Justice Secretary. A Motion for
Reconsideration of the order was filed by the Chuas on September 29, 1992 but the resolution of the
same was suspended because they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the
resolution of the Department of Justice Secretary on October 14, 1992. Finding that respondent
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withdrawal of the information.
On February 10, 1993, a manifestation with motion was filed by the Chuas with the conformity of the
City Prosecutor informing the trial court of the decision. The City Prosecutor likewise prayed for
immediate arraignment of the accused and hearing of the case. The trial court granted the motion and
ordered the reinstatement of the information. On February 18, 1993, a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Court of Appeals decision was filed by the Dees, et al., as private respondents. The same was
however denied in a resolution of the appellate court dated July 13, 1993. Public respondents did not
move for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for review by the Dees, et al., which merely
reiterates the grounds and arguments raised before the respondent court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withdrawal
of the information.

RULINGS:

NO. More to the point is our ruling in Manuel P. Martinez v. Court of Appeals, et al., which involves
antecedents similar to those in the instant case. There, we set aside the order of the trial court
dismissing a criminal case for libel solely upon motion of the fiscal after the latter was directed to move
for dismissal by then Acting Justice Secretary Silvestre Bello III. Here, the trial court ordered the
information withdrawn on the basis alone of the motion and manifestation of Assistant City Prosecutor
Manuel A. Ortega that he was directed to move for such withdrawal of the same by then Acting Justice
Secretary Silvestre Bello III. In both cases, no independent evaluation or determination of the evidence
or merits of the case was conducted by the trial judges before the cases were ordered dismissed,
resultantly tainting the dismissal with grave abuse of discretion. We reproduce our ruling in Manuel P.
Martinez below for clarity and emphasis, viz.:

(T)he dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice that no libel was
committed. The trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the
case. Reliance was placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that "there is no sufficient
evidence against the said accused to sustain the allegation in the information" and on the supposed lack
of objection to the motion to dismiss, this last premise being, however, questionable, the prosecution
having failed, as observed, to give private complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss.

In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the judge's
own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to approve or
disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like
this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the
accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the
possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of
such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to
accept the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency.