From Questions and Answers about the Nuclear Arms Race (Fall, 1991), by Frank Munley

85. HOW SURE CAN WE BE THAT TREATIES WILL BE ADHERED TO? HASN'T THE U.S. CHARGED
THE SOVIETS WITH TREATY VIOLATIONS?
In recent years, there have been four main charges against the Soviets:
(1) Violating the 11:3T's 150-kT limit on underground nuclear
explosions.
(2) Violating the ABM treaty by constructing a large phased-array radar (LPAR) in the interior of the country, near
Krasnoyarsk. Such radar systems are allowed only on the periphery of each country and must look outward. If
placed in the interior of the country, they can track incoming warheads until they are very close to the targets, and
this makes it easier to target and destroy the warheads.
3) Violating SALT II by constructing two new missiles instead of one.
(4) Violating SALT II by encrypting data from missile flight tests.
86. IS THERE ANY SUBSTANCE TO THESE CHARGES?
In some ones, yes; in others, no. In the same order as above:
(1) Initial seismic data indicating Soviet violations of the 150-kT limit were based on incorrect "calibration" of the
geology of the underlying ground where the tests were conducted (see Question 17 above). In simple terms, U.S.
geologists originally thought that Soviet underground test sites were situated in a geology similar to that at the U.S.
Nevada test site. Nevada is a region of recent earth deformation and/or volcanic activity ("recent" meaning within
the past several million years). Now it is believed that the Soviet test sites have not been significantly affected by
deformation or volcanic activity for hundreds of millions of years. Such a solid substrate will propagate a stronger
signal than the Nevada site for the same explosive yield. Ironically, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty provides for
exchange of seismic data, but this has not happened because the U.S. Senate hasn't ratified the treaty. But the recent
thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations has greatly increased the chance that the Treaty will be ratified, perhaps as early as
1990.
(2) The Soviets agreed in September, 1989 to dismantle the radar at Krasnoyarsk. Construction of the radar began in
1983 and was never completed. In November, 1989 the Soviets admitted that Krasnoyarsk is a violation of the ABM
Treaty. Until September, 1989, the Reagan and Bush administrations vociferously complained about the radar, so it's
worth while taking a close look at the seriousness (or lack thereof) of the U.S. charge.
Krasnoyarsk is located inland and hence is a technical violation of the ABM Treaty. The radar, oriented
toward the Northeast, would be able to detect sub-launched missiles from the Bering Sea or Gulf of Alaska, thus
closing a gap in Soviet early-warning coverage. But the radar is useless for ICBMs launched over the polar region
toward the heavily-populated western (i.e., European) part of the Soviet Union, because its angle of view is only
about 90 degrees. Even the U.S. CIA has recognized these facts. It is speculated that this radar system was located
far inland so that it wouldn’t be vulnerable to U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles, whose range President Reagan
allowed to increase in 1982. A more convincing reason is that, if placed near the Bering coast, another radar would
have to be built farther north in a region of permafrost. It is very difficult to construct large structures in permafrost,
and in addition, rail links to Arctic regions of the Soviet Union are poor.
In September, 1987, a delegation of U.S. Congresspeople and technical experts were allowed to tour the
Krasnoyarsk facility and take pictures of it. According to Science magazine,82 an electronics expert in the
delegation figured that the facility will operate at a frequency of 180 MHz. This would give the radar
an early warning capability, but the frequency is too low to accurately track warheads. (A beam of such low
frequency suffers uncontrollable deflections when passing through the atmosphere.) Such a low frequency also
makes the facility vulnerable to blackouts from EMP effects. The delegation also found the radar to be shoddily built
and very vulnerable to blast effects.
(3) The forbidden new Soviet missile has been dubbed the SS-25 by the U.S. The Soviets insist it is a modification
of the older SS-13. According to SALT II, existing missiles may be changed as much as 5% in length, diameter,
launch weight, and throw weight (payload). The dispute is over throw-weight.
According to Scientific American, "In the opinion of the nonpartisian Arms Control Association, the data
collected during the SS-13's flight test program in the 1960s are inadequate to determine conclusively whether or not
the difference in throw weight between the two missiles is more than 5 percent of the SS-13's throw
weight...Recently, it was reported that the Soviet Union has carried out several test launches of the SS-13 to allow
the U.S. to adjust its data, but it is not yet known if the Administration feels reassured." So this charge is still up in
the air.
(4) The prohibition against encryption applies only to information necessary for verification of treaty compliance.
But as discussed above in Question 83, it is difficult for the U.S. to determine if information withheld by encryption
is indeed necessary for verification of compliance, since the information, being encrypted, is unknown. At the same
time, it is easy to guess that the encrypted information might be useful. For example, any test of a MIRVed missile
should broadcast information on the number of warheads released.
87. WHAT HAS THE U.S. BEEN CHARGED WITH?
(1) Violating the ABM Treaty by upgrading antiaircraft systems for a potential ABM role. The Patriot missile
system was supposedly being upgraded with the capacity to shoot down Soviet missiles.
(2) Violating the missile number limit of SALT 11,84 which states that the provisions of the treaty shall not be
circumvented "through any other state or states." The Soviets charged that Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western
Europe circumvented the SALT II ceilings on numbers of missiles.
(3) Violating the ABM treaty by constructing two LPAR radar systems in the U.S. which can possibly be used to
manage an ABM system. The U.S. is also charged with violating Article IX of the Treaty (barring the use of foreign
territory to build an ABM system) by modernizing two others, in Thule, Greenland and Fylingdales, England, so that
they have an ABM capability.
(4) Exceeding the limits of SALT II by equipping more than the allowed number of bombers with nuclear-armed
cruise missiles.
(5) Constructing two new missiles (MX and Midgetman) instead of one, as allowed by SALT II.
88. ANY SUBSTANCE TO THESE CHARGES?
In the same order as in the previous question:
(1) This issue may be moot. According to Scientific American,85 there are reports that the purportedly illegal
upgrading of the Patriot has ceased. However, a more recent report points out that it still being used in anti-tactical
missile (ATM) tests. SDI opponents and supporters of the ABM treaty are concerned that SDI research and testing
may be carried out under the guise of such ATM tests.86
(2) The SALT II treaty is specifically oriented toward strategic ballistic missiles, which is usually taken to mean
intercontinental ballistic missiles (and SLBMS) with ranges greater than 3,000 miles (5000 km); the U.S. missiles in
question are not intercontinental. On the other hand, the SALT II provision about violations "through any other state
or states" seem designed to prohibit deployment of any U.S. missiles in Western Europe which could hit the Soviet
Union. One could argue that placement of these U.S. missiles in Europe is comparable to placement of Soviet
weapons in Cuba (which the U.S. would not tolerate), so there is substance to this charge.
It might appear unfair for the Soviets to be able to deploy INFs in Europe without violating SALT II while the U.S.
can't, but the United Kingdom and France have the opportunity to offset any Soviet advantage in this area.
(3) The U.S.-based radar systems are properly located near the borders, one being situated about 160 miles from the
Atlantic coast, the other about 140 miles from the Mexican border. But both systems have wide-angle "wrap-
around" views, about 240 degrees, unlike the Krasnoyarsk one which covers only about 90 degrees. As a result, the
U.S. radar systems blanket a significant part of the U.S. interior, and could conceivably be used to manage an ABM
system. Strictly speaking, to look forward is not to look behind, so these wrap-around radars violate the ABM
Treaty.
The U.S. contends that the facilities in Greenland and England are old ones simply being modernized, and
modernization is allowed by the ABM Treaty. But the radar being constructed in England is at a completely
different site than the one it is "modernizing." In addition, the Treaty only allows five
categories of large phased-array radars to be constructed, and the ones in Greenland and England do not fall within
any of the allowed categories. Finally, Article IX of the ABM Treaty requires each side "not to deploy, outside its
national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty." It appears that both U.S. radars will
have the ability to track warheads and hence could eventually be part of an ABM system, so this puts them in
violation of Article IX. Indeed, the Soviets, in admitting that their Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation (see Questions 85
and 86), have promised to press the U.S. on the Thule and Fylingdales radars.
(4) The U.S. agrees it violated SALT II on this point. The U.S. announced its intention to willfully violate SALT II
in May, 1986; the violation became effective on November 28, 1986, when the U.S. deployed its 131st ALCM-
equipped B-52 bomber. This deployment pushed the U.S. over the SALT II limit of 1320 launchers which can be
MIRVed or equipped with cruise missiles.
(5) SALT II only prohibits flight-testing and deployment of more than one new missile. Midgetman has only
recently been flight-tested (May 11, 1989), which again puts the U.S. in violation, but at the time of the Soviet
complaint, it had not been.