TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF

SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS

(START I)

https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaties-between-united-states-america-and-union-soviet-
socialist-republics-strategic-offensive-reductions-start-i-start-ii/

https://media.nti.org/documents/start_1_treaty.pdf (testo del trattato)

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS (START I)

Last Updated: October 26, 2011

Overview

Signed: 31 July 1991

Lisbon Protocol: Signed 23 May 1992

Entered into Force: 5 December 1994

Duration: 15 year duration with option to extend for unlimited five year periods, if all parties agree

Expired: 5 December 2009

Parties: United States, Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine

Background

The U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as START I, was signed 31 July 1991 by U.S.
President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

START I was the first treaty to provide for deep reductions of U.S. and Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear
weapons. It played an indispensable role in ensuring the predictability and stability of the strategic balance
and serving as a framework for even deeper reductions. Even though many elements of START I — first and
foremost the limits on the number of warheads and delivery vehicles — quickly became outdated, its
verification and transparency provisions maintained their value until the treaty's last days. At the same
time, START I proved to be excessively complicated, cumbersome and expensive to continue, which
eventually led the United States and Russia to replace it with a new treaty in 2010.

Negotiations that led to the signing of START I began in May 1982. In November 1983, the Soviet Union
"discontinued" talks after the United States began deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe. In
January 1985, U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko agreed
on a new formula for three-part negotiations that encompassed strategic weapons, intermediate-range
forces and missile defense. These talks received a significant boost at the Reykjavik summit between
Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. In December 1987, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty was signed. Negotiations subsequently turned to the reduction of strategic weapons.
START I entered into force on December 5, 1994. The break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and
the need to make arrangements with regard to its nuclear inheritance contributed to a three-year delay
between the signing of the treaty and its entry into force. Principles for adapting START I to new political
realities were agreed upon in May 1992 in the Lisbon Protocol. According to that agreement, four post-
Soviet states — Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine — were recognized as parties to START I in place
of the Soviet Union, but only Russia was designated a nuclear weapon state, while the other three assumed
an obligation to join the NPT as non-nuclear states and eliminate all START I accountable weapons and
associated facilities within seven years (the period of reductions mandated by the treaty). Whereas Belarus
and Kazakhstan quickly joined the NPT and ratified START I "as is," Ukraine experienced intense domestic
debates over how to deal with its nuclear inheritance that dragged on for more than two years; its first
START I ratification resolution was rejected by the United States and Russia.

Although the entry into force of START I took more than three years, some important activities were
conducted shortly after its signing, most notably exchange of data on strategic weapons and associated
facilities, as well as inspections to verify data on technical characteristics of strategic missiles and
implementation of provisions on test launches and telemetry exchanges.

START I had a duration of 15 years. Reductions mandated by the treaty were to be completed no later than
seven years after its entry into force. Parties were then obligated to maintain those limits during the next
eight years. In fact, both the United States and Russia continued reductions after reaching START I
mandated limits. By the time of the treaty's expiration, their strategic nuclear arsenals were significantly
below those stipulated in the treaty.

During the 1990s, the United States and Russia undertook several attempts to replace START I with a new
treaty that would have provided for deeper reductions. The 1993 START II treaty never entered into force
due to what Russia perceived as serious deficiencies of that treaty. Consultations on another treaty,
sometimes referred to as START III, were conducted from 1997-2000 but ended without result. The
Moscow Treaty provided for significantly lower limits on strategic weapons, but lacked verification and
transparency provisions.

START I remained in force until December 5, 2009. It contained the option of extending the treaty for five-
year periods, but Washington and Moscow decided against extension — negotiations were already
underway on a new, replacement treaty, and START I was allowed to expire.

Treaty Obligations

START I established an aggregate limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads for each party (a
reduction from 10-12,000 warheads in 1991). Within that limit, the Treaty established three sub-limits:
4,900 warheads for ICBMs (land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles) and SLBMs (submarine-launched
ballistic missiles), 154 heavy ICBMs (defined as having a launch weight greater than 106t or a throw-weight
greater than 4,350kg), 1,540 warheads for these heavy ICBMs (Only the Soviet Union possessed this type of
missile), and 1,100 warheads for mobile ICBMs (de facto applied only to the Soviet Union and Russia
because the United States, shortly after the signing of START I, decided to forego deployment of such
missiles). The Treaty also established a limit of 3,600 metric tons (t) for the throw-weight of ballistic
missiles.

The construction of new types of heavy ICBMs and SLBMs is banned, although modernization programs
and, in exceptional cases, new silo construction, are permitted.
The treaty bans the testing of missiles equipped with a greater number of warheads than established in the
treaty, and bans any new ballistic missiles with more than 10 warheads. Parties to the treaty may also
reduce the number of warheads attributed to a specific missile. However, no more than three existing
missile types may have the number of warheads reduced, and the total reduction may not exceed 1,250
warheads.

While the treaty counts each ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicle as a single warhead, counting rules for
warheads attributed to heavy bombers are more complicated. Each Russian heavy bomber equipped to
carry long-range nuclear ALCMs (defined as having maximum range of 600km or more), up to a total of 180
bombers, counts as eight warheads toward the 6,000 warhead limit, even though existing Russian heavy
bomber types can carry between six and 16 ALCMs. Each Russian heavy bomber above the level of 180 has
its actual number of ALCMs counted toward the 6,000 warhead limit. Similarly, each U.S. long-range
nuclear ALCM-carrying heavy bomber, up to a total of 150 bombers, counts as 10 warheads toward the
6,000 warhead limit, and each bomber in excess of 150 has the actual number of ALCMs it can carry
counted toward the warhead limit. Bombers not equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs are counted
as one warhead.

Verification and Compliance

START I contains extensive provisions for verification. These include:

1. National Technical Means (NTMs), together with a ban on actions that impair the effectiveness of NTMs
of the other party;

2. Data exchange: Accompanying the START I treaty is a Memorandum of Understanding drafted by the two
parties, which contains an extensive set of data, including numbers and locations of all strategic delivery
vehicles, both deployed and non-deployed, as well the locations and diagrams of all facilities associated
with strategic delivery vehicles, such as bases, storage and production facilities, etc. Each party is required
to provide notification about any change in that data shortly after it occurs. In addition, parties must
exchange the entire set of data contained in the Memorandum every six months;

3. On-site inspections to verify the accuracy of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.
Some of those inspections are short-notice (baseline data, data update, reentry vehicle, etc.) while others
are "planned" (verification of technical data, the right to observe elimination of missiles and facilities, etc.).
The treaty also provides for a special verification regime for mobile ICBMs. During the first seven years (the
period of reductions), the United States conducted 335 inspections; Russia conducted 243.

4. Perimeter and portal monitoring of plants that produce mobile ICBMs. Because the United States
decided not to deploy such missiles, this measure only applies to Russia: the United States established
monitoring at the Votkinsk plant (or, rather, continued, because its monitoring began under the INF
Treaty);

5. A ban on encryption of telemetry transmitted from ballistic missiles during test launches and exchange of
all such telemetry.