You are on page 1of 107

hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.1

KUDRAT-E-ELAHI PANIR

VS

BANGLADESH

44 DLR ( AD ) 1992, 319

Bench:

Shahabuddin Ahmed C.J., MH Rahman J., ATM Afzal J.,

Judgment delivered on:


July 30, 1992

Facts in brief:

The appellants who were elected chairmen of Sonargaon and Gazipur upazilla parishads in the
election held on March 1989 have challenged the vires of the constitutional validity of the
Bangladesh Local Government (Upzilla Parishad and Upazilla Administration Reorganization
(Repeal) Ordinance, 1991 on the ground, inter alia,that this ordinance is inconsistent with articles
9, 11, 59 and 60 of the constitution and as such it is void in terms of article 7(2) of the
Constitution.

Their (the appellants) term of office were five years, but hardly a year passed when the impugned
Repeal Ordinance Repealing the parent Ordinance (No. 59 of 1982) and abolishing the Parishad
constituted thereunder. As such they also alleged that the Repeal Ordinance is itself invalid since
there was no existence of any circumstances which , according to the President’s satisfaction,
rendered it necessary to make the Ordinance just 20 days before the session of the Parliament
was called. It is alleged that article 9 requires the state to encourage local government
institutions, but the ordinance abolished a local government namely upazilla parishads. The High
Court Division dismissed all the petitions, but issued the certificate since the matters is of public
importance involving a substantial question of Law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.

Issues:

• Whether the Court can declare a law void for being inconsistent with Fundamental
Principles of State Policy or not.
• Whether the impugned ordinance being inconsistent with articles 9, 11, 59, and 59 of the
constitution, is void in terms of article 7(2) of the constitution , or not.

hjjhhgfghghf1 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Decision:

Article 9 and 11 ( as it was before the 15th Amendment) being located in Part II of the constitution
were not judicially enforceable. The Upazilla Parishad were not Local Government as the
Upazilla was not an administrative unit. Local government is an integral part of the democratic
polity of the country. The system cannot be wholly abolished which violate the articles 9, 11, 59
and 60 of the constitution. The appeals are dismissed and the leave petition is also dismissed.

Reasoning of decision:

In view of articles 59 and 60 read with article 9 and 11 of the constitution. The system of local
government institutions may be altered reorganized or re-structured, and their powers and
functions may be enlarged or curtailed by act of parliament but the system as a whole cannot be
abolished.

Upazilla Parishad is not n administrative unit as defined under article 152 is a district or other
area designated by law for the purpose of article 59 which says that a local government is
constituted in an administrative unit and is entrusted to a body composed of elected persons.

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

The repealing ordinance in its totality is inconsistent with articles 59 and 60 of the constitution.
It destroys the elected part of the body. The words ‘rights, powers, privileges occurring in the
ordinance are inconsistent with articles 59 and 60.

The repealing ordinance is liable to be declared void wholly, first, for being violative to the
preamble of the constitution and secondly for being inconsistent with articles 9 and 11. The
fundamental principles of state policy may not be judicially enforceable but inconsistency renders
a law liable to be declared void under article 7.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

The repealed ordinance was not a local government within the meaning of article 59 as upazilla
was not designated as an administrative unit for purposes of article 59 and its abolition by the
repealing ordinance is not inconsistent with the provisions of articles 59 and 60.

A law is not liable to be declaring void on the ground of inconsistency with FPSP, that article 8 of
the constitution is an execution to article 7 and that to declare a law as void is another way of
enforcing a different state of things so that there is no real distinction between enforceability
and inconsistency.

hjjhhgfghghf2 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Principles:

Principles arisen in the landmark case are as follows:

• Fundamental principles of state policy are not ‘laws’ but ‘principles' which have to be
applied by the state when making laws.
• To equate ‘principles' with ‘laws' is to go against the law of the Constitution itself.
• Article 7(2) along with article 8(2) should be interpreted in a approach.
• Besides, Local Government is democratic polity of the country which may be altered,
reorganized or restructured and their powers and functions may be enlarged or curtailed
by act of parliament but the system as a whole
……….

hjjhhgfghghf3 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.2

DR MOHIUDDIN FAROOQUE

VS.

BANGLADESH

49 DLR (AD) (1997) 1

Bench:

ATM Afzal CJ,

Mustafa Kamal J,

Latifur Rahman J,

Md Abdur Rouf J,

& BB Roy Choudhury J.

Judgment delivered on:


July 25, 1996

Facts in brief:

Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque, Secretary General of Bangladesh Environmental Lawyer’s Association


(BELA), filed the writ petition praying for issuance of a Rule Nisi upon the respondents to show
cause as to why all the activities and implementation of FAP-20 undertaken in the district Tangail
should not be declared to have been taken without lawful authority and to be of no legal effect.
In this writ petition the activities of FAP 20 and the FAPCO have been impugned on the ground,
inter alia, that the said activities would adversely affect more than a million human lives and
natural resources and the natural habitat of man and other flora and fauna and that they aroused
wide attention for being allegedly anti-environment and anti-people project.

The appellant stated in the writ petition that as an environmentally concerned and active
organization, BELA conducted investigation at various times in the FAP-20 areas. The appellants
alleged that no proper environmental impact assessment has been under taken in relation to FAP
projects. The High Court Division wrongly applied in the case that the appellant is not aggrieved.
Then the appeal is allowed and the writ petition is remitted to the High Court Division for hearing
on merit.

hjjhhgfghghf4 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Issues:

Whether the expression any person aggrieved occurring in the article 102(1) and (2)(a) of the
constitution should be liberated from the traditional and restrictive meaning .

Decision:

The association-appellant was wrongly held by the High Court Division not to be a person
aggrieved in the facts and circumstances to the case and it is held further that the appellant is
any person aggrieved within the meaning of article 102 of the constitution. The appeal is allowed
and writ petition no 998 of 1994 is remanded to the High Court Division for hearing on merit.

Reasoning of decision:

The High Court Division will grant locus standi to a person who agitates a question affecting a
constitutional issue of grave importance, posing a threat to his fundamental rights which pervade
and extended to the entire territory of Bangladesh, .

A person approaching the court for redress of a public wrong or public injury has sufficient
interest not his own interest in the proceeding and is acting bonafide and not for his personal
gain or private profits, without any political motivation or other oblique consideration has locus
standi to move the High Court Division under article 102 of the constitution of Bangladesh.

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

1. The FAP-20 is likely to adversely affect and uproot about 3 lac people within the project
area and the extent of adverse impact outside the project area may encompass more than
a million human lives, natural resources and the natural habitat of man and other flora
and fauna.
2. The words “any person aggrieved” occurring in Article 102 of the constitution have to be
read in the context of the entire constitution, not isolated article 102 is an institutional
vehicle for ventilating the rights and duties under the constitution and not a mere
procedural device.

hjjhhgfghghf5 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Arguments on behalf of respondent:

1. The appellant is not a person aggrieved, because the submission echoes the traditional
view of locus standi which found in the first classical exposition.
2. The writ petition does not disclose that the appellant as an association has suffered any
injury by FAP -20 activities. The words “any person aggrieved” if interpreted in the manner
urged by the appellant will be nothing short of legislation and an impermissible rewriting
of the constitution by the court.

Principles:

Two principles were established in this case-

• That where there is a threat to fundamental rights of citizens any one of them can
invoke the jurisdiction under article 102 of the Constitution, that any citizen from any
part can become a petitioner.
• That if a constitutional issue of grave importance is raised a petitioner qualifies himself
to be a person aggrieved.

Conclusion:

When any writ petition is concerned with the protection of the people of any country from the
ill- effects of environmental hazards and ecological imbalance. It has genuine interest in seeing
that the law is enforced and the people likely to be affected by the proposed project are saved.
This interest is sufficient to bring the appellant within the language “person aggrieved”.

……….

hjjhhgfghghf6 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.3

KAZI MUKHLESUR RAHMAN

VS

BANGLADESH

(1974) 26 DLR (SC) 44

Bench:

Sayem CJ, AM Mahmud Husain J

Judgment delivered on:

september 3, 1974

Facts in brief:

The appellant challenged the Delhi treaty signed on the 16th may, 1974 by the prime ministers of
the government of Bangladesh and the Republic of India providing therein inter alia that India
will retain the southern half of south berubari union no.12 and the adjacent enclaves and in
exchange Bangladesh will retain the dahagram and angarpota enclave. The ground of challenge
was that the agreement involved cession of Bangladesh territory and was entered into without
lawful authority the executive head of government. The high court division summarily dismissed
the writ petition holding that the appellant had no locus standi.

Issues:

• Whether the agreement between Bangladesh Government and Indian Government on


16th day of 1974 was without lawful authority or not.
• Whether the appellant has the locus standi bring this case before the High Court Division
or not

Decision:

The treaty could be implemented but a simple enactment under article 13 of the constitution.
The treaty can be concluded with the occurrence of parliament by amending article 2 which
defined the territory o the people’s republic of Bangladesh. The appeal is dismissed under article
102 of the constitution which is liable to be as premature.

hjjhhgfghghf7 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Reasoning of decision:

The appellant did not dispute the proposition that treaty making is an executive act and so also
ratification, if a treaty contains provision for ratification and that both fall within the ambit of the
executive power of the state; under article 55. It can be said that the prime minister, or one in
his authority, is thus required to exercise the executive power in accordance with the constitution
and not otherwise. The southern half of south berubari union no. 12, together with the enclaves,
thus formed an inseparable and integral part of the territory of Bangladesh in view of article 2 of
our constitution. Agreeing to their retention by India is stipulated in the Delhi treaty cannot but,
here for, involve cession of territory by Bangladesh.

The Delhi treaty had resulted only in the settlement of boundary between the county and the
neighboring friendly republic of India; article 143 of the constitution would intervene and
required enactment by parliament determining the boundary.

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

The agreement between the government of Bangladesh and of India signed o the 16th day of May
1974 by the prime ministers of the two countries was without lawful authority and of no legal
effect.

Arguments on behalf of respondent:

The prime minister exercises the executive power of the republic under article 55 of the
constitution. The article authorizes him to enter into an international agreement of the kind as
Delhi treaty.

As the appellant is not the resident of any part of the territories involved the treaty. The appellant
could not have any interest as person aggrieved in view of article 102 of the constitution.

The application before the High Court Division was premature. The mere making of a treaty does
not act the citizens who must wait till the performance of the obligations of the treaty.

hjjhhgfghghf8 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Principles:

Seven general principles are settled in this very case. Such as

• The High Court Division does not suffer from any lack of jurisdiction under article 102 to
hear a person.
• The High Court Division will grant locus standi to a person who agitates a question
affecting a constitutional issue of grave importance, posing a threat to his fundamental
tights which pervade and extend to the entire territory of Bangladesh.
• If a fundamental right is involved , the impugned matter need not affect a purely personal
right of applicant touching him alone. It is enough if he shares that ight in common with
others.
• In interpreting the words ‘any person aggrieved', consideration of ‘ fundamental rights’
in part III is a relevant one.
• It is the competency of the person to claim hearing which is the heart of the interpretation
of the words’ person aggrieved’
• It is a question exercise of discretion but the high court division as to whether it will treat
that person aggrieved or not.
• The High Court Division will exercise that jurisdiction upon due consideration of the facts
and circumstances of each case
Importance:

After all, In Bangladesh an unnoticed but quiet revolution took place on the question locus standi
after the introduction of Constitution of Bangladesh in 1972.Treaty involving determination of
boundary and more so involving cession of territory can only be concluded with the occurrence
of parliamentary necessary enactment.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf9 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.45

Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad (BSP)

Vs

The Government of People’s Republic of Bangladesh

Bench:

Judgment delivered on:

Facts in brief:

Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad (BSP) was associations of the owners of newspapers and
news organizations, registered under the Societies Registration Act, challenged section 9, 10(3)
and 11 of the Newspapers Employees (conditions of service) Act, 1974 and constitution of fourth
wage board and interim award given by fourth wage board in so far as dearness allowance,
gratituity and income tax was concerned. The act was enacted for the purpose of ameliorating of
protection against exploitation by the employees. Four wage board was constituted. The
petitioner alleged that only one wage board could be constituted under the act. Section 9, 10(3)
and 11 of the act were in violative of Article 39 of the constitution grunting freedom of press. The
HCD was held that the petitioner had no direct interest in the case under Article 102 of the
constitution as to requirement of reasons aggrieved. The petitioners seek leave from judgment
of HCD.

Issues:

1) Whether there is any Locus Standi in favor of the petitioner or not.

Decision:

The court dismissed the petition and held that the petitioner had no Locus Standi.

Reasoning:

The petitioner was not espousing the cause of downtrodden and deprived section of people of
the community unable to spend money to establish its fundamental rights and enforce its

hjjhhgfghghf10 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

constitutional remedies. It was not acting probono publico but in the interest of its members. If
the petitioner was refused to entry on threshold point that will not be the end of the world for
newspaper owners and news organizations. Locus Standi as well as means of access to the courts
were without doubt assured. It was not a public interest litigation and the petitioner was not
person aggrieved.

The petitioner might represent the employers’ in the wage board and might even have capacity
to act as the employer’s representatives in various other forums, but its Locus Standi to act on
behalf of members in an application under Article 102 of the constitution was not just there.
Dada Match Workers Union Vs Government of Bangladesh, 29, DLR, 188.

Principle:

If it has personal interest in the subject matter, there will not be any public interest litigation.
The person interested in the subject matter should be unable to file suit.

Relevant Laws:

Article 39 of the constitution read with section 9, 10(3) and 11 of the Newspaper Employees
(conditions of service) Act, 1974.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf11 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.5

ADVOCATE ZULHAS UDDIN

VS

BANGLADESH

2010 30 BLD HCD 1

Bench:

ABM Khirul Huq, Momtaj Uddin,JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


14th July 2009

Facts in brief:

Though the ‘Value Added Tax Act, 1991 excluded social welfare service from tax but medical
treatment and health care institution, dental care, pathological laboratory, beauty parlor, health
club and fitness center have not been made free from tax. As regards this issue the petitioner
filed the writ petition challenging he validity of the said act of 1991.The rule was issued under
article 102 calling upon the respondent to show cause as to why the insertion of the word in
second schedule of VAT ACT 1991 should not be declared void and illegal as being obstruction to
the improvement of public health.

Issue:

Whether the second schedule of this act should be declared unconstitutional and inconsistent
with articles 31 and 32 of the constitution.

Decision:

Exclusion of the said service from the imposition of tax under the act of 1991 is unconstitutional.
Therefore, no tax be imposed on the treatment related cost from any patient. The words in
clause(ka) of second schedule are made illegal and no legal effect.

Reasoning of decision:

The medical and health care has been exempted from the imposition of tax but it does not include
the medical institutions dental care and pathological libratory, which is inconsistent with the
spirit of the law.

The right to life in article 32 and the public health and morality in article 18 has been incorporated
in the constitution to improve the public health. Though the former is a fundamental right and

hjjhhgfghghf12 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

the latter is a fundamental principle which is not judicially enforceable. The law made by
government must be void which is inconsistent.

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

The fundamental principles of state policy have been inserted in the constitution which is not
mere decoration. The principles are the guide to interpretation and the bases of the law making
power. Article 17 says about public health. It is the duty of the state to fulfill the principles. So
the law will be void which is inconsistent with the principles.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

Bangladesh is not a developed country. The government may take steps to develop the country
but taking some effective measures. The imposition of tax is necessary for its development
because it is not possible to give free medical service by the government.

Principles:

The mandate of constitution gives the fundamental principles of state policy as directions which
will be fulfilled by the state. The government cannot make any laws which are inconsistent with
the principles on the fundamental rights.

Impact on constitutional law:

It is the duty of the state to implement the fundamental principles of state policy with the help
of other provision. The laws will be void which violates the spirit of the law.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf13 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case no.6

DALIA PARVEEN

VS

BANGLADESH BIMAN CORPORATION

48 DLR (1996) HCD 132

Bench:

AM Mahmudur Rahman J. And , Mahfuzur Rahman J.

Judgment Delivered on:

July 19th and 20th , 1995.

Facts in brief:

Dalia Parveen, the petitioner, joined the Bangladesh Biman Corporation on September 3, 1981
and on March 2, 1985. She was absorbed on permanent basis as an air stewards. At the time of
her appointment the Biman Corporation Employees (Service) Regulation was in force.

On February 5, 1995 regulation no.11 of the said regulation was substituted. According to this
substituted regulation, age of the retirement of the flight stewardess was fixed at 35 years
reducing from 57 years while the age of the flight steward (male) requirement age was fixed at
45 years.

The Managing director and personnel manager of Bangladesh Biman Corporation served notice
upon the petitioner requiring her to apply for Leave Preparatory To Retirement (LPR) as she
would attain 35 years of age. In response the petitioner filed a writ petition in High Court Division
of Supreme Court alleging that the amendment violated the article 28 of the constitution of
Bangladesh.

Issues:

• Whether the amended regulation no.11 violates article 28 of the constitution or not.
• Whether the said amendment of regulation no. 11 in the aforesaid manner is made
without lawful authority or not.

Relevant Laws :

hjjhhgfghghf14 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

• The Regulation no.11 of Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employments (Service)


Regulations, 1979.
• Article 28 of the constitution of Bangladesh 1972.

Arguments on behalf of petitioner:

Mr. Asarul Islam, the learned advocate, on behalf of the petitioner argued that the amendment
of regulation no 11(2) of the Bangladesh Biman Corporation Employees
(services)Regulations,1779 is violative of article 28 of our constitution because it is
discriminatory in nature as it is amended on ground of sex alone. So the impugned order is liable
to be struck down. Besides, the said regulation is also unenforceable being contrary to rule 3 of
Bangladesh Human Service(pension and gratuity) Rules , 1988, and s such is liable to be declared
without lawful authority. Furthermore, the amended regulation no 11 being in contradiction to
the original Regulation 11 is to the deprivation of the petitioner’s right to service.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

Mr. Khondokar Amir hossain, the learned Deputy Attorney General ,on behalf of the respondent
also argued that the amendment of regulation no. 11 does not violate article 28 of the
constitution because the petitioner has been enjoying equal facilities with her male colleagues.
The service rendered by the stewardess is different in nature from that of steward. The efficiency
and smartness of the stewardess decrease with her age.

Decision:

The impugned order passed by the respondent Bangladesh Biman Corporation has been passed
without any lawful authority and is of no legal effect,. In the result, the rule is made absolute
without any order as to casts.

Principle:

When any question arises whether retirement on completion of the age was discriminatory or
not in view of article 28 of the constitution, then any law must be void, if it is discriminatory in
nature and it is amended on ground of sex alone.

hjjhhgfghghf15 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case no .7

AFTAB UDDIN

VS

BANGLADESH

48 DLR 1

Bench:

Naimuddin Ahmed J., Md. Ruhul Amin J.,

Judgment delivered on:

February 20, 1995

Facts in brief:

Aftab Uddin, the petitioner, was the senior most in the Bangladesh Civil Service
(Judicial).According to rules and long standing practice the posts of Joint Secretary, Ministry of
law, Justice and Parliamentary affairs are filled up by the senior most District Judges in
consultation with the supreme court. But the respondent, Government of Bangladesh by the
Secretary of the said Ministry appointed three district judges other than him. They were junior
to the petitioner. As such the petitioner being aggrieved by the aforementioned promotion
approached to the court for his fundamental right as enshrined in articles 27 and 29 of the
Constitution. be a district judge in the Bangladesh civil service, has been working as divisional
special judge.

Issue:

Whether the promotion violating article 27, 29 and 116 of the constitution raises the of
inequality, discrimination and violation of fundamental rights or not.

Decision:

The action of the respondents and the issuance of the said notification are hereby held to be
ultra vires article 116 of the constitution for omission to make the aforesaid promotion issued
under the aforesaid notifications without consultation with the Supreme Court of Bangladesh by
the president and, it is therefore, declared that the aforesaid promotion and notification are
unconstitutional without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

Reasoning of decision:

The reasoning of the judgement is mainly based on the interpretation of the article 116 of the
constitution. Although the preamble to the constitution cannot be implemented, it has been held
to be a part of the constitution. The fundamental principles of state policy act as guide to the

hjjhhgfghghf16 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

interpretation of the constitution and other laws of Bangladesh in view of article 8. So article
116A is a step to realize the Principe enriched in article 22.

There is no escape from the conclusion that this article 116 applies to persons in the judicial
service wherever such persons are considered for promotion to posts outside the judicial service.
The petitioner has challenged the actions of respondents to violate his fundamental rights by the
impugned promotions in violation of certain specific provisions and mandates of the constitution
under articles 27, 29 and 102 of the constitution.

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

The appellant argued that the constitution of Bangladesh guarantees independence of the
judiciary and also separation of the judiciary from the executive in view of article 22 where the
preamble establishes rule of law, securing fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and
justice for all citizens. The constitution says that the chief justice the other judges shall be
independent under article 94 and the persons in the judicial service and judicial magistrate shall
be independent under 116A.

Arguments on behalf of respondents :

The Respondents argued that the writ petition is not maintainable and no question of
enforcement of any fundamental right to the petitioner is involved in the writ petition. The
jurisdiction of the court is completely ousted under article 117. Article 116 applies only in case of
posting and promotion in the judicial service defined in 152 of the constitution.

Principles:

The principles arisen out of the case as follows:

• Article 116 of the applies in the case of posting and promotion of the persons in the to
any position the service as the same manner as of the Judicial service
• Fundamental principles of state policy act as guide to the interpretation of the
constitution and other laws of Bangladesh. In this way, enforcing the fundamental rights
or other provisions of the constitution is a step to realize the principles enriched in
fundamental principles of state policy.
Conclusion:

A person might have concurrent remedy before any other forum including any judicial and
executive matter for redress of his grievance, if it is established on him by the constitution is
involved. ………..

hjjhhgfghghf17 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.8

AIN-O-SALISH KENDRA (ASK)


VS
GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH
19 BLD (HCD) (1999) 488

Bench:

M Fazlul Karim, M Ali Asgar Khan, JJ

Judgment delivered on:


23rd august, 1999

Facts in brief:

This application under the Article-102 of the Constitution the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, is
against the demolition of basties of Dhaka city and eviction of the inhabitants of, thereof by the
respondents without arranging any alternative accommodation and without any prior notice
required by law against the inhabitants of the basties of Dhaka city including many single woman,
minor children, developing and arising structures( e.g. dwelling huts) on the land within the area
of the basties over a considerate period of time; and many of them work in railway line but the
government has reportedly taken steps for the eviction of the poor basti people by demolishing
their houses without any notice.

Many organisations including government and non-government found the eviction of slum
dwellers not only contrary to the law of the land but also in violation of the recommendation
issued by the “UN Conference on Human Settlements” in the year of 1976 and a gross violation
of human rights including adequate housing area.

Decision:

The court held that evictions should not be carried out without following fair and reasonable
procedures in accordance with law, including resettlement of the slum dwellers.
Reasoning of decision:

The application has been moved for enforcement of fundamental rights of slum dwellers as
guaranteed under articles 27, 31 and 32 of the constitution which includes their right to life,
liberty, livelihood etc. together with article 7, 11, 15 and 19 in particular of the chapter of
Fundamental Principles of State Policy.

hjjhhgfghghf18 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

The wholesale eviction of slum dwellers is not only contrary to law of the land but against the
recommendations issued by the UN conference on human settlements in 1976 and the resolution
human settlements in 1976 and the resolution of the United Nation.

The declaration of the wholesale eviction has been made without lawful authority and to be of
no legal effect as being unconstitutional and vioative of the fundamental rights of the basti
people guaranteed the constitution,

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

Nobody has right to occupy, reside or stay on the lands belonging to the government and public
authorities and this land are used in public interest. The floating population living in slum was not
capable of being served with notice having no fixed address for the purpose of the said ordinance.
The bastis make the society detriment and annoyance by many unlawful activities.

Principles:

The government may clear up the slums growing up beside the railway lines, road side and
continue to keep the space clear under any circumstances for the purpose of security, but the
slum dweller should be rehabilitated following the guidelines.

Conclusion:

It is the duty of the state to clear up the slums growing up beside the railway lines, road side and
continue to keep the space clear under any circumstances for the purpose of security with the
rehabilitation of the dwellers.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf19 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.9

SHIKH ABDUS SABUR

VS

RETURNING OFFICER

41 DLR 30

Bench:

Badrul Haider Chy, S Ahmed, M H Rahman

Judgment delivered on:


September 1, 1988

Facts in brief:

Appellant was a candidate for election to the office of chairman of Barashi Union Parishad which
was held on 10th December 1988. He filed his nomination paper but it was rejected by Returning
Officer on the ground that he defaulted in repaying the loan from Janata Bank and Krishi Bank
and such he was disqualified from seeking election to union parishad under Section 7 (2)(g) of
Union Parishad Ordinance. He preferred an appeal before the Nirbahi Officer, but it was
dismissed. He filed a writ petition. In writ petition he claimed that the impugned provision of
disqualification of a person seeking election recently brought in by amendment of the Union
Parishad Ordinance is discriminatory in absence of any corresponding disqualification for a
person seeking election to the parliament. He appealed this this provision invoking Article 27 and
section 7 (2) (g) should be declared void.

Decision:

The disqualification was imposed by law requiring payment of high amount of filing fee which
many candidates found difficult to pay. In that case, it is the appellant who claimed the provision
in the ordinance. The provision is not discriminatory but it’s constitutionally valid. The appeal
should be dismissed.

Reasoning:

The question arises about the constitutional validity of Section 7 (2) (g) of the Local Government
Ordinance 1983. It has been contended that this provision of the ordinance is violating of the

hjjhhgfghghf20 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

equality clause of Article 27. Both the members of the parliament and the members of local
government are elected by same voter, but their functions differ widely.

While a member of the parliament has no specific function as to custody, receipt of any public
money but the union parishad has been inserted under section 44 and 45 of the Union Parishad
Ordinance with powers to the custody and application of union fund (Article 60). So a person who
defaults in repaying his own loans cannot be entrusted with wide powers of managements of
public funds.

It is considered that parliament and local government are two different types of administrative
units of government. So there is no question of the violation of equality in regards for different
legislation. Those who are disqualified to seek election to local bodies face no discrimination if
they seek election to government.

Principles:

The provisions of qualification and disqualification under the ordinance is not discriminatory in
terms with constitution because the main function to parliament is law making, whereas the man
functions of local bodies are executive in nature.

Conclusion:

Parliament is a creation to the constitution itself and the local bodies are created by their
respective states in pursuance of article 9 of the constitution. So these are not conflicting each
other.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf21 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.17

SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BANGLADESH

VS

MR. MD. MASDER HOSSAIN

20 BLD (AD) 104

Bench:

M Kamal CJ, L Rahman, B B Roy Chy JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


1999

Facts in brief:

The petitioners are either District Judges or Additional District Judges or Subordinate Judges or
other judges serving in the Subordinate Judiciary filed the said writ petition impleading the
appellant, Secretary, Ministry of Finance Govt. of Bangladesh and other Ministries and
Functionaries of the government.

The rule was issued to show cause about incorporating judicial service, pay and allowances of the
respondents, and separation of the judiciary from the executive. The writ petition concerns about
how far the constitution of Bangladesh has actually secured the separation of the judiciary from
the executive organs of the state.

Decision:

The appeal is partly allowed without any order as to cost. The directions of the High Court Division
with regard to payment of salary and other benefits will continue. The twelve directions must be
followed by the respective parties

Reasoning of decision:

Supporting the twelve directions, the constitution reveals the independent character of the
Supreme Court in view of articles 94, 95, 95, 109 and 147 of the constitution where the
constitution allots a separate and distinct existence of judicial service and magistrates exercising
judicial functions.

Articles 115, 133 or 136 does not give either the parliament or the president the authority to
curtail or diminish the independence of the subordinate judiciary by recourse to subordinate

hjjhhgfghghf22 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

legislation or rules, and the constitution provides that the state shall ensure the separation of
judiciary from the executive organs of the state.

Arguments on behalf of appellants:

The judicial offices and other officers of the civil services fall into well defined different classes
all of them being members of the service of the republic in respect of the government of
Bangladesh which includes the parliament, executive and judiciary.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

There are six broad points on behalf of the petitioners. The subordinate courts are part and parcel
of the judiciary under the constitution as a separate and independent entity and cannot be part
of the civil, administrative or executive service of the country.

Principles:

The constitution of the people’s republic of Bangladesh reveals the independent character of the
Supreme Court where the constitution allots a separate and distinct existence of judicial service
and magistrates exercising judicial functions.

Conclusion:

The constitution of Bangladesh does not give power the parliament or the president the authority
to curtail or diminish the independence of the subordinate judiciary by recourse to subordinate
legislation or rules, and the constitution provides that the state shall ensure the separation of
judiciary from the executive organs of the state.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf23 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.10

DR. NEELIMA IBRAHIM

VS

BANGLADESH

32 DLR 204

Bench:

ATM Masud, MH Rahman, JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


June 6, 1980

Facts in brief:

The petitioner was a member and President of executive committee of Mohila Somity which was
constituted in Pakistan period and after the birth of Bangladesh under the P.O 117 of 1972 an
ad-hoc committee was constituted. The ad-hoc committee made a constitution and under this
and election was held. After the expiry another election date was 28th April 1980. In 19th April
Government passed an order ceasing the committee and new ad-hoc committee was established
on the ground that this Somity is related in politics. The petitioner under Article 102 as called in
question the order.

Decision:

The decision was that order passed without lawful authority and is of no legal effect so it is void
under Article 26. So the judges direct the Government to cancel and withdraw the said order.

Reasoning of decision:

The order gives unfettered and unrestricted discretion to government to dissolve a managing
committee of an association. The public interest has not been defined. It import is no doubt wider
than the interest of morally or public order for which reasonable may be imposed. If any

hjjhhgfghghf24 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

legislation which regulates the affairs of an association, it will amount to breach of freedom of
association.

A law inconsistent with Article 26 may be intelligently administered avoiding a collision-course


with any of fundamental right, but that will not make the law constitutionally enforceable.
Another reason was that Bangladesh Mohila Somity indulging in political activities but the
respondent failed to show any material of that.
It adversely affected the petitioner.

In the facts there is no urgency in the matter that called for instant measure and exclusion of the
committee without pre-hearing.

Principles:

The constitution of an institution can be amended in any manner with the approval of the
government. This kind of plenary power can be called a reasonable restriction right to form an
association include a right to its continuance and a right manage its affairs.

Conclusion:

The president’s order 117 of 1972 can be saved in part for whatever usefulness it may have, but
its inconsistency with freedom of association is so pervasive that it ought to be held, and the act
is wholly void under article 16 of the constitution.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf25 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.11

M SALEM ULLAH

VS

BANGLADESH

47 DLR 218

Bench:

AM Mahmudur Raman, Md Asadujaman JJ.,

Judgment delivered on:


30 November, 1994

Facts in brief:

The Government took the decision to participate in the UN sponsored multinational force to
Haiti to help maintain public safety and basic civil order after restoration of the legitimacy elected
government of Haiti under the UN security council’s resolution.

The petition under article 102 of the constitution to show cause as to why the decision should
not be declare to have been taken without lawful authority and why they should not be directed
to bring back the personals of the defense services who were sent to participate in the UN
sponsored multinational force to Haiti.

Decision:

Although the fundamental principles of state policy cannot be enforced in writ jurisdiction under
article 102 of the constitution but it serves as a guide to the interpretation of the constitution for
the court. The decision of the government is not contrary to the Fundamental Principles of State
Policy and Fundamental Rights. The resolution does not infringe the spirit of article 25 of the
constitution. The petition is rejected.

Reasoning of decision:

The resolution no.940 has no expression like war which is employed in the language of article 63
of our constitution. The basis of the resolution is the request of the US president. A critical
analysis indicates that the decision was taken pursuant to the resolution and Bangladesh being
hjjhhgfghghf26 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

member state has taken the decision within authority of the constitutional frame work and
international commitments.

The decision is not derogatory to any provision of the constitution as nothing appears to us from
the language used in article 7 which says about the supremacy of the constitution. Sending of
troops to Haiti does not threaten the security or economic life of Bangladesh of any part thereof
which has been included in article 141A of the constitution. The decision to send troops to Haiti
has been taken according to the UN charters which are not against the Fundamental Principles
of State Policy of Bangladesh under article 25.

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

The decision is against the Fundamental Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights in the
constitution and there must exist a grave emergency to the satisfaction of the president that the
security or economic life of Bangladesh or any part thereof is threatened by war or external
aggression or internal disturbance which is against articles 7 and 25 of the constitution.

The decision to send troops to Haiti is violative of article 63 in as much as the decision taken to
participation in US led aggression, which is war in international law which has been taken without
the assent of the parliament.

Principles:

Any decision taken by the government of the principles enunciated in the United Nations charted
is not against the spirit of the Fundamental Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights of
any constitution.

Conclusion:

The decision of the government is in consonance with the spirit of the fundamental principles of
state policy and fundamental rights with chapter VII of the charter of UN. So the decisions are
not unlawful.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf27 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.12

H M ERSHAD V. BANGLADESH

21

BLD AD 69

Bench:

Latifur Rahman CJ, B B Roy Chy, Am Mahmudur JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


16 august 2000

Facts in brief:

The appellant, an ex president of Bangladesh and an elected member of the parliament of the
Jatiya Party, was going to London by British airways for medical checkup in London Clinic. He was
stopped from going abroad and his passport was seized by Respondents and for seizure of the
passport he gave a receipt.

In the receipt, it was stated that by order, the Ministry of Home Affairs stopped the appellant to
leave Bangladesh but neither the said order nor any order passed under Bangladesh passport
order 1973 was served upon him. The appeal by leave is directed against the judgment rejecting
the written petition.

Decision:

The manner in which the respondents acted in impounding the passport shall not act similarly. It
is allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court Division. The
responders are directed to return the passport to the appellant thereby.

Reasoning of decision:

The power conferred upon article 7 of the passport order 1973 to impound a passport is violative
of fundamental rights guaranteed under article 36 of the constitution and the rules of natural
justice is applicable in such a case in as such as it seriously interferes with the constitutional right
of the older of a passport in restricting him to leave and re-enter Bangladesh.

The provisions of Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the norms or the
covenants are not directly enforceable in national courts. But if their provisions are incorporated
in the domestic law they are enforceable in national courts.

hjjhhgfghghf28 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

The order of impounding of the passport before the writ bench on the grounds violates the
fundamental rights as guaranteed under articles 31, 32 and 36 of the constitution and violates
the ground of article 13 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the principle of natural
justice and on malafide.

The High Court Division acted illegally in rejecting the writ petition in limine in that the whole
object of stopping the appellant from leaving Bangladesh. The writ petition was filed under article
102 read with article 44 of the constitution.

Arguments on behalf of Respondents:

Sub article 2 of article 7 of Bangladesh passport order 1973 empowers the passport authority to
impound passport. The passport having been impounded under the provision of said order, the
order is not violative of article 31 and 36 of the constitution in as much as the order was passed
in exercise of the power under article 7 of the Bangladesh passport order 1973 in the interest of
sovereignty or security f the country or in public interest.

Principles:

The Universal Human Rights norms, whether given in the universal declaration or in the
covenants, are not directly enforceable in national courts. But if their provisions are incorporated
in the domestic law they are enforceable in national courts.

Conclusion:

Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country which
can be established in view of the constitution and Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf29 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.13

BANGLADESH NATIONAL WOMEN LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION (BNWLA)

VS

BANGLADESH

14 BLC 694

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Bnwla Bangladesh

Advocates Appeared:

M Fawzia Karim M Razik

…...For The Appellant …….For The Respondent

Bench:

Sayed Mahmud , Quamrul Islam J J.

Judgment delivered on:


2009

Facts in brief:

Bangladesh national women lawyers’ association (BNWLA) was formed in 1979 by a group of
women lawyers with an aim and objective to empower the women and children of their rights.
They arranged a press conference on the issue that there are no legislative provisions to address
sexual harassment of women and girl children and in the absence of the legislative provisions the
need to find out an effective and alternative mechanism to cater the need is an urgent social
imperative.

The rule was issued to show cause as to why the respondents failed to adopt guidelines, or policy
or enact proper legislations to address the issue of abuse of sexual harassment for protecting and
safeguarding the rights of the women and girl children at work palace, educational institutions
and other places wherever necessary which has been regularly reported in media, pubic and
other places.

Decision:

Certain directives are issued in the form of guidelines to be followed and observed at all work
places and educational institutions till adequate and effective legislation is made in field. These

hjjhhgfghghf30 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

directives are aimed at filling up the legislative vacuum in the nature of law declared by the HCD
under the mandate and within the meaning of article 111 of the constitution.

Reasoning of decision:

The fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution of Bangladesh are sufficient to embrace
all the elements of gender equality including prevention of sexual harassment or abuse. The
international conventions ad norms are to be read into fundamental right in the absence of any
domestic law occupying the field when there is not inconsistency between them. It is the
constitutional obligation of the government to enact law to protect the women at their
workplaces and educational institutions in order to preserve their fundament rights enriched in
the constitution.

Arguments on behalf of petitioners:

In the absence of any formal structure of complaint hearing many Bangladeshi students keep
incidents of sexual harassment to themselves out of the necessity to avoid social stigma.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

There are many laws in the country for protecting the women including Nari- O- Shishu Nirjaton
Daman Ain and as such, no new guidelines are necessary to make provisions for the sexual
harassment.

Principles:

The international conventions ad norms are to be read into fundamental right in the absence of
any domestic law occupying the field when there is not inconsistency between them. It is the
constitutional obligation of the government to enact law to protect the women at their
workplaces and educational institutions in order to preserve their fundament rights enriched in
the constitution.

Conclusion:

The government is liable to make law in the absence of any formal structure of complaint hearing
many Bangladeshi students keep incidents of sexual harassment to themselves out of the
necessity to avoid social stigma in view of international conventions.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf31 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.14

SAIFUL ISLAM DILDER

VS

GOVERNMENT

50 DLR 318

Bench:

Am Mahmudur And Jakir Ahmed, Jj.

Judgment delivered on:


1998

Facts in brief:

The petitioner is actively involved with issue of human rights at home and abroad. He is
concerned for violation of human rights, torture, arbitrary disappearance which is being carried
out by the Indian government against the freedom fighters struggling for rights to self-
determination of the Assamese people since 1979.

The petitioner is concerned with the arrest of Anup Chetia. The secretary-general of the united
liberation front of Assam, briefly called ULFA, by the Bangladesh government in 1997 and with
the issue of his extradition to India as the government of Bangladesh has decided to hand over
him to India. The rule is issued on the respondents to show cause as to why handing over of Anup
chetia to Indian government should not be stayed.

Decision:

The government of Bangladesh has sufficient legal authority to extradite Anup Chetia to India in
response to the light of India to demand extradition of Anup Chetia. The writ petition is rejected
in imine.

hjjhhgfghghf32 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Reasoning of decision:

Petitioner’s contention on the facts of the case is misconceived. Rather the government can take
help of article 25 to extradite Anup chetia to Indian authority in order to base its international
relations on the principle of respect for national sovereignty and equality, non-interference in
the internal affairs of other county.

The government of Bangladesh has sufficient legal authority to extradite Anup Chetia to India in
response to the light of India to demand extradition of anup chetia under sections 3 and 2 of the
Special Powers Act 1974 and section 4 of Extradition Act 1974.

Though fundamental principles of state policy under article 25 cannot be enforced by court, the
principles are fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh and serve as a tool in interpreting
the constitution and to the laws of Bangladesh on the strength of article 8 of the constitution.

Arguments:

Anup chetia is a freedom fighter for right of self determination of the assamese people and as
such. Right has evolved as a principle of international law which is binding on the member of the
united nation to help people struggling for freedom and liberation extradition of chetia to India
in absence of any extradition treaty would violate the provision of article 145A of the
constitution.

Principles:

The fundamental principles of state policy under article 25 though cannot be enforced by court;
the principles are fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh and serve as a tool in
interpreting the constitution and to the laws of Bangladesh on the strength of the constitution.

Conclusion:

The government of Bangladesh has sufficient legal authority to exadite anup chaetaia to India in
response to the light of India to demand extradition of anup chetia under the legal provisions and
in this response; the court can interpret the FPSF as a tool.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf33 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.15

METRO MAKERS AND DEVELOPERS LIMITED


VS.
BELA
65 DLR (AD) (2013)

Bench:

Atm Afzal, Mustafa Kamal, Jj.

Judgment delivered on:


2013

Facts in brief:

Bangladesh environment lawyers association (BELA) filed writ petition stating that the
environment of Dhaka city is being continuously endangered and threatened by various
unplanned and illegal activities originating both from private and public sectors causing
irreparable harm to human beings Where RAZUK and other respondents have taken no step to
stop such illegal activities.

The appeals and civil petition involve public importance on the environmental and human rights,
protection and preservation of environment and the construction of certain provisions of the
tenancy laws applicable in the country in the implementation various housing projects by
individuals and private companies.

Decision:

For protection of environment degradation there has to be stringent enforcement coupled with
increased level of awareness. The government should constitute expert committee to handle the
respective sectors RAJUK must prepare a master plan in respect of any area of its jurisdiction and
the metro makers are directed to refund the purchasers the amount of the money.

Reasoning of decision:

Right to life includes right to protection and improvement of environment and ecology and there
is specific law in that regard restricting use of nal lands in the areas in question which operate as
reservoir of flood and rain water in view of articles 31 and 32 of the constitution and human
rights and environmental law with Declaration of Rio.

Section 74 of the Town Improvement Act is an enabling provision regarding amendment or


alteration and it does not take away the power of a statutory authority to rescind any delegated

hjjhhgfghghf34 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

legislation including section 21 of General Clauses Act 1897. These are regulated by the Tenancy
Laws.

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

The MMDL engaged in real estate development business specially in making new township for
the purpose of facilitating housing to the less favored citizens of Bangladesh. In course of their
business, they have undertaken Making Township for housing purpose within its limit.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

MMDL has constituted with its illegal activities of earth filling in the project area and also found
that the writ respondents have taken no step to stop such illegal activities. BELA has no locus
standi to file the instant writ petition as the RAJUK is already involved in a legal proceeding with
metro makers in the writ petition.

Principles:

The government should constitute expert committee to handle the respective sectors RAJUK
must prepare a master plan in respect of any area of its jurisdiction for protection of environment
degradation there has to be stringent enforcement coupled with increased level of awareness.

Conclusion:

In view of the constitution of Bangladesh, Right to life includes right to protection and
improvement of environment and ecology and there is specific law in that regard restricting use
of the lands in the areas in question which operate as reservoir of flood and rain water in view of
articles 31 and 32 of the constitution and human rights and environmental law with Declaration
of Rio. ………..

hjjhhgfghghf35 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

No.16

Mukhtar Ahmed

Vs.

Government of Bangladesh

34 DLR (1982) 29

Bench:

Shahbuddin cj, rafiqur rahman j

Judgment delivered on: june7, 1979

Facts in brief:

In this case, The petitioner become a domicile of East Pakistan in 1952 and that his domicile
certificate was issued from Dacca and the petitioner remained in the territories of East Pakistan
which now compromises Bangladesh after liberation of Bangladesh. He swore an affidavit of
allegiance to Bangladesh in 1972 and he was a voter in the voter list prepared after liberation. As
the situation prevailed in 1972, he was mentally upset and in consequence filed an application to
the International committee of Red cross for going to Pakistan. But he did not at all pursue the
application. later on the petitioner applied for formal citizenship certificate on 17.03.75 which
has been refused by the impugned memo Annexure -1 by government of people republic of
Bangladesh informing the petitioner that he was not qualified to be a citizen of Bangladesh
because he had registered his name with the international committee of red cross for going over
to Pakistan .

Decision:

The court held that after the emergence of Bangladesh the petitioner became a citizen of by the
operation of law and continues to be a citizen of this country .

ISSUE

The question is whether the petitioner had abandoned his citizenship of Bangladesh by any
positive act or has otherwise disqualified him so as to be deprived of his citizenship?

Argument of parties: Appellant:

hjjhhgfghghf36 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

1. To deprive the citizen of Bangladesh there must be done either positive act or disqualified of
that person. in this case, mere filing an application to the International committee of red cross
with a view to going over to pakistan does not refer to any positive act.

2. The petitioner became a domicile of east pakistan in 1952 and that his domicile certificate was
issued from dacca and the petitioner remained in the territories of East Pakistan which now
comprises bangladesh as such, according to the president order 149 of 1972, the petitioner is a
citizen of this country.

Argument of parties: Defendant:

The petitioner having filed an application to the International committee of Red cross had
disqualified himself to be a citizen of Bangladesh and as such the impugned order can’t be
challenged.

Reasoning of this Decision:

The question is whether the petitioner had abandoned his citizenship of Bangladesh by any
positive act or has otherwise disqualified him so as to be deprived of his citizenship. The mere
fact that the petitioner filed an application for going over to Pakistan can’t take away his
citizenship. He could voluntarily renounce it or he could be deprived of it if he had incurred any
disqualification. President order 149 of 1972 Provides that citizenship right can’t lost by mere
filing of an application to go to a different country. In this case, the petitioner having not acquired
the citizenship of any other country. His citizenship of Bangladesh which he acquired long before
can’t evaporate and he continues to be a citizenship of Bangladesh.

Principle:

To deprive the citizenship of Bangladesh There must be a positive act or disqualified himself.

Conclusion:

Mere filing of an application to go to a different country can’t lost the citizenship of Bangladesh.
A person is deprived his citizenship by any positive act or otherwise disqualified himself.
………..

hjjhhgfghghf37 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.18

Aruna Sen

VS

Govt. of Bangladesh

Bench:

Judgment delivered on:

Fact in brief:-

The case is that the detenu is accused as an active worker of a secret subversive organization &
was carrying on the activities of the said organization remaining underground. He & the
organization are involved in committing murders, armed robberies etc. The Rakkhi Bahini
recovered a huge quantity of arms & ammunitions from his house & nearby places, certain
prejudicial documents have been found.

Issue:

Whether the grounds exposed to the detenue is sufficient to make effective representation.

Decision:-

The order of detention purported to be made under section 3(1) of the Special Power Act, 1974
in the instant case is illegal & the detenu is being held without lawful authority & in unlawful
manner.

The order of detention is quash.

Reasoning of the Decision:-

(1) Ground relating to recovery of unauthorized arms & ammunition are extremely vague &
not sufficient for the purpose of enabling the detenu to make an effective representation
at the earliest opportunity within the meaning of Art.33(5) of the Constitution.
(2) There had been lack of a proper appreciation on the part of the respondent of their duty
of producing materials before the court.

hjjhhgfghghf38 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Finally there had been no tangible & credible materials placed before Court & the detenu is
entitled to be set free.

Arguments of the Petitioners-

(1) The grounds of the detention as communicated to the detenu are relevant to the objects
as provided in the Special Power Act.
(2) The said grounds or any of them are so vague & indefinite in their terms that it can be
said that the detenu has been deprived of his constitutional right of making a pre-
presentation at the earliest opportunity as provided in Article 33.

Principles:-

(1) In codifying the writ of Habeas corpus, the framers of the Constitution have freed the
Jurisdiction from any limitation & have conferred wide power of judicial review.
(2) Every detention without trial & conviction is Prima facie unlawful & the onus is upon the
detaining authority to justify the detention by establishing the legality of its action
according to the Principles of law.
(3) The court should examine whether the materials are such that a reasonable man could
have come to the conclusion reached by the detaining authority.
(4) If detaining authority has acted on several grounds some of which are irrelevant, vague
or non-existent. The court will hold the detention to be unlawful as it is not possible for
the court to determine how far the detaining authority influenced by the irrelevant
grounds.

Conclusion:-

The objective test was adopted by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in this case which is one
of the most important in Bangladesh as well as in the commonwealth in recent years. This
case has made clear the right of any detained person who is detained under any law providing
for preventive detention.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf39 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.19

KHONDKER DELWAR HOSSAIN

V.

THE SPEAKER

19 BLD (HCD) 45

Bench:

K M Hossain, M Latifur Rahman Jj.

Judgment delivered on:


1998

Facts in brief:

Md Hasibur Rahman Shawpon and Dr. Md Aluddin were elected as members of parliament in the
general election from Sirajganj and Rajshahi respectively. They were nominated as candidates by
BNP and both of them were members of the parliamentary party of the B N P.

Ignoring the parliamentary rules and practices of the BNP, the two members crossed the floor as
Members of Parliament and too oath of office as Ministers of the present govt. of Awami League.
The rule was issued on the Respondent No.1 (Speaker) why the refusal to refer to BEC under
article 66 of the constitution shall not be declared as illegal and without lawful authority.

Decision:

The rule is made absolute. It is advised the speaker to forward the dispute as raised by the chief
whip and the deputy leader of opposition regarding the two members to the election commission
within thirty days from the receipt of this order.

Reasoning of decision:

Article 66 provides that the speaker is not to decide the question who can only refer it to the
election commission and if the later come to the opinion of members concerned, by vacating
their seat, the member can be ceased in view of rule 178 of rules of procedure of parliament and
section 3 of members of parliament act 1980.

Article 70 as referred to in article 66 does not stipulate that the resignation from a party should
be in writing. Resignation by conduct or otherwise against the party disciplines and dictates is

hjjhhgfghghf40 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

also envisaged under these articles. The HCD can prominently be invoked to correct any error of
law or any transgression of jurisdiction under article 102 of the constitution.

Arguments on behalf petitioners:

The speaker has violated several provisions and committed illegality in view of articles 66, 67 and
70 with the rules because the speaker shall have to refer the matter to the election commission.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

The seats of the two members had not fallen vacant; since they had neither resigned nor had
they voted in parliament against their party, the BNP. The speaker refused to refer the dispute
to the election commission as requires. Mere joining the cabinet as ministers do not bring their
action within the mischief of article 70 of the constitution.

Principles:

The constitution under article 70 does not stipulate that the resignation from a party should be
in writing. Resignation by conduct or otherwise against the party disciplines and dictates is also
envisaged under the provisions of the constitution.

Impact on constitutional law:

The constitution provides that the speaker is not to decide the question who can only refer it to
the election commission and if the later come to the opinion of members concerned though Mere
joining the cabinet as ministers do not bring their action within the mischief of the constitution.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf41 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.20

SHAH ABDUL HANNAN

V.

BANGLADESH

16 BLC 386

Bench:

M Anwarul Haque, AHM Shamsuddin JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


2010

Facts in brief:

The petitioners in their endeavor to portray a comprehensive scenario of the state of affairs that
have been in prevalence, surrounding gas and mineral resources exploration, existence of alleged
improperties therein and the practices other developing countries have been adhering to, figured
lengthy and detailed averment. The Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) into by the government
may not be conducive to public interest.

The petitioners, with a commitment to secure economic and social justice for all, filed the instant
public interest litigation, pro bono public under article 21. The rule was issued to show cause as
to why they should not be directed to evolve and formulate a national strategy policy through
parliament.

Decision:

The courts are only concerned with the legality of policy decision, not its correctness or wisdom
as the guardian of the constitution on the bastion of fundamental rights. No such factor being
present in the instant petition. The rule is discharged without any order as to costs. All
interlocutory orders issued earlier are hereby vacated.

Reasoning of decision:

A judge may not, on judicial review, set aside an official decision merely because he considers
that the matter would have been decided differently. Judicial review does not provide right of
appeal on the merits of the decision. It is only in some servant circumstances a decision may be

hjjhhgfghghf42 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

set aside for reasonableness and if this ground is taken, the court will have the difficult task of
considering whether a decision, that is otherwise within the powers of the maker, may be struck
off on the ground of unreasonableness in view of articles 102, 143, 144 and 145 of the
constitution.

Arguments on behalf of appellants:

It is a policy matter of the government, nevertheless, contended that there is no authority to


proclaim that policy based decisions enjoys total inoculation from judicial review. The national
energy policy was framed in 1996 and it was framed by executive, not by the parliament.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

The court would not pass a direction upon the parliament to legislate because the constitution
founded on the doctrine of separation of powers, has left legislative power to the exclusive
domain of parliament, save limited ordinance making power of the president.

Principles:

The constitution founded on the doctrine of separation of powers which has left legislative power
to the exclusive domain of parliament with limited ordinance making power of the president.

Conclusion:

Any court may not, on judicial review, set aside an official decision merely because he considers
that the matter would have been decided differently. Judicial review does not provide right of
appeal on the merits of the decision.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf43 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.21

BANGLADESH LEGAL AID AND SERVICES TRUST

VS

BANGLADESH

55 DLR 363

Bench:

M Hamidul Haque, Salma Masud Chy Jj.

Judgment delivered on:


2003

Facts in brief:

The police, by abusing the power given under sect. 54 of the Crpc, has been curtailing the liberty
of the citizens and that by misuse and abuse of the power of taking an accused into police custody
a given in section 167 has been violating the fundamental rights of the constitution.

The rule was issued calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why they shall not be
directed to refrain from an abusive exercise of powers under section 54 of Crpc on to see
unreasonable remand under section 167 of the Crpc and to strictly exercise powers of arrest and
investigation within the limits established by the law and in view of the safeguards contained in
the constitution.

Decision:

The provisions of the existing sections 54 and 167 of the code are to some extent inconsistent
with the provisions of the constitution. The sections may be amended for the purpose of
safeguarding the liberty and fundamental rights with these recommendations. The rule is
disposed of with a direction upon the respondent to implement the recommendations
immediately.

Reasoning of decision:

The power given to the police officer under section 54 of the crpc to a large extent is inconsistent
with the provisions of the consistency. In view of this position such inconsistency is liable to be
removed in view of article 35 of the constitution and sections of the Crpc.

hjjhhgfghghf44 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

This court, in exercise of its power of judicial review when funds that fundamental right of an
individual has been infringed by colorable exercise of power by the police, the court is competent
to award compensation for the wrong done in connection with articles 35 and 102.

Arguments on behalf of appellants:

The police officers, in abusive exercise of the power, are acting against the specific provisions of
the constitution under which the liberty and fundamental rights of the citizens are guaranteed.
Due to the abusive of the power given to the magistrate, hundreds of incidents of custodial death
and cases of torture took place.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

The recommendations will not be possible to implement some of the suggestions because of
some practical difficulties. Some restrictions may be there to check the abuse of the power given
under the two sections.

Principles:

The power given to the police officer under section 54 of the crpc to a large extent is inconsistent
with the provisions of the consistency. In view of this position such inconsistency is liable to be
removed in view of article 35 of the constitution and sections of the Crpc.

Conclusion:

Any provisions of any law must be removed while it is inconsistent with the provisions of the
constitution. The court also can make the law unlawful in exercise of its power of judicial review.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf45 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.22

SHAMIMA SULTANA SEEMA

VS

GOVERNMENT

57 DLR 201

Bench:

ABM Khairul, Md Mitafauddin Chy JJ

Judgment delivered on:


2004

Facts in brief:

The petitioners were elected as ward commissioners in the seats reserved for female candidates
in Khulna City Corporation, under the provisions of section 4 of the Khulna City Corporation
Ordinance 1984. While the corporation was so formed with the ward commissioners in general
seats as whole as in the reserved seats, a circular was issued specifying the duties of the ward
commissioners.

The circular specified the duties and functions of the commissioners, allowing certain functions
only to those elected in the general seats but not to the commissioners elected in the reserved
seats. Being aggrieved, the petitioners moved the court to get rule to show cause as to why the
circular should not be declared to have been issued without lawful authority and is of no legal l
effect.

Decision:

With eight findings, the circular issued under the local government division is declared illegal and
without lawful authority. Once elected the commissioners whether in the general seats of in the
reserved seats, male or female, are equal in all respects and they shall be so treated by all
concerned.

Reasoning of decision:

hjjhhgfghghf46 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

The right of equality evolved through the civilizations. The concept of a welfare state is based on
the rights which are incorporated in articles 27 and 28 of the constitution. Making of the provision
for reserved seat is intra vires and valid under article 28 of the constitution.

The city corporations are independent bodies which have legal status under articles 9, 11 and 59
of the constitution. The logic of the inequality of the reserved seats is against the spirit of the
lofty ideals under the constitution and Khuna City Corporation Ordinance 1984.

Arguments on behalf of petitioners:

The constitution proclaimed the equality of men and women in all spheres of national life
including in the elected public offices. Section 4 of the Khulna City Corporation Ordinance, 1984
provides reserved seat for women commissioners. To ensure equality, the provisions are
incorporated in articles 28 and 65 of the constitution. The circular of the govt. is ultra vires of the
constitution as well as the ordinance.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

The spirit of article 10 of the constitution read with section 4 of the ordinance was amended
providing for election of women in the reserved seats. The commissioners cannot claim to be
equal with the commissioners elected in the general seats and that reasonable classification is
permissible but the petitioners cannot be treated at par with them simply because they are
unequal.

Principles:

The concept of a welfare state is based on the rights which are incorporated in the constitution
ensuring the right of equality evolved through the civilizations. So, Making of the provision for
reserved seat is not ultra vires.

Conclusion:

The logic of the inequality of the reserved seats is against the spirit of the lofty ideals of the
constitution because the constitution ensures a welfare state by making right to equalty through
the civilizations. ………..

Case No.23

MULLICK BROTHERS V. INCOME TAX OFFICER

hjjhhgfghghf47 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

31 DLR (AD) 165

Bench:

K M Subhan, K Hossain, B H Chowdhury JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


November 30, 1978

Facts in brief:

The appellant is a registered partnership firm declared an excess income of TK 140 000 in terms
of martial law regulation known as Income Tax (Correction Of Return And False Declaration)
Regulation on malicious report from the informer taking advantage of the Martial Law prevailing
in Pakistan. The appellant was forced by the illegal proceed and was forced to accept abnormal
high income and taxes assessed against the threat of prosecutions.

Being aggrieved by the notice of the respondents, the appellants served a notice demanding
justice and withdrawing the said notices demanding justice and withdrawing the said notices of
demand. The appeal by special leave is from the judgment and order of HCD.

Decision:

The imposition of the impugned tax was totally unauthorized and lacked legal foundations. It
creates no liability, and so the question of doubt does not arise. The appeal is allowed. The
impugned demand notices are declared to be of no legal authority.

Reasoning of decision:

The regulation made by the authority against whose authority the proclamation of independence
is directed and could not legally legislate for Bangladesh. If such legislation was inconsistent with
the proclamation of independence the martial law regulation promulgated by the martial law
regulation promulgated by the martial law regime lack the trappings of law.

Tax assessed under the regulation was not imposed under any law in force in Bangladesh
immediately before the commencement of the constitution. Article 83 authorized levies or
collections only under the authority of any act of parliament regulation being a martial law
regulation has not been saved by any legal instrument.

Arguments on behalf of appellants:

hjjhhgfghghf48 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

The martial law regulation came to an end and after the revocation of martial law, it cannot be
included in the definition of law or existing law or regulation as provide in the constitution of
Bangladesh. Any action taken or proposed to be taken under the martial law regulation is,
therefore, illegal.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

The assessment made in pursuance of the said regulation has remained valid and as such the
appellants were obliged to pay the tax imposed. The demanded tax from the appellants is debt
due to the government of the then Pakistan and became debt to the government of Bangladesh.
President’s order no. 147 if 1972 has amended the definition of the government which is effective
from 26th day of March 1972.

Principles:

Any action taken or proposed to be taken under the martial law regulation is, therefore, illegal
when the martial law regulation came to an end and after the revocation of martial law the
provisions will be effective.

Coclusions:

If any legislation is inconsistent with the proclamation of independence under the martial law
promulgated by the martial law regulation, it lacks the trappings of law for the validity of the
laws. ………..

hjjhhgfghghf49 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.24

MD. SHAMEEM VS. BANGLADESH


47 DLR (AD) (1995) 109; 15 BLD (AD) (1995) 138

Bench:

Mh Rahman CJ, Atm Afzal, Mustafa Kamal, JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


March, 14, 1995

Facts in brief:

The appellant’s brother, Md. Shaheen Shorab, a businessman, was returning from Kazipara to his
residence. The police arrested him under the Special Powers Act, 1974 and taken into custody at
Mirpur Police Station. Then Magistrate sent him to the central jail by making and order of
detention of 30 days. Later, the tenure of detention was being increased on the ground that he
is a person upon whom the local police are dissatisfied. Moreover, a criminal case was running
against the detenu on the same alleged offence. The High Court Division Judges found a relation
between the order of detention and grounds of the order of detention. It (HCD) discharged the
government. Then Mr. Shameem moved to the Appellate Division.

Issues arose:

1. Whether the order of detention is appropriate or not when a specific criminal case is
running against the detenu.
2. Whether the government has taken proper steps to protect the right to life of the detenu.

Relevant Statutes:
1. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972. Article 102 (Habeas
Corpus)
2. The Special Powers Act, 1974.

Referred cases:
1. Habiba Mahmud vs. Bangladesh 45 DLR (AD) 89
2. Md. Shahabuddin vs. District Magistrate, 24 Parganas and others (1975) 4 SCC 1114
3. Altaf Ahmad Matoo vs. State and others, 1989 Crl. L. J. 1270

hjjhhgfghghf50 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Decision:
The detenu is being detained without lawful authority. The judgment and order of the HCD is set
aside. The appeal is allowed the detenu be released forthwith, if not wanted in connection with
any other case.

Reasoning of decision:

The detenu may be detained if the government can prove the severity of the offence and any
other reasonable ground. But nobody appeared before the Court. That means they failed to
understand the importance of the right of the detenu and thus the detenu was being deprived
of his right to life and (means living with honour and dignity) and right to make an effective
representation before an advisory board. So, the court issued an order of releasing the detenu
forthwith.

Principles:

The detaining authority making return to the rule is to place relevant facts before the court.
Where the respondents do not file any return, as in this case, the court cannot satisfy itself as to
the justifications of the detention.

Conclusion:

The court cannot satisfy itself as to the justifications of the detention; the detaining authority
making return to the rule is to place relevant facts before the court. Where the respondents do
not file any return, as in this case.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf51 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No. 25

MRS. SAJEDA PARVIN BANU V GOVT. OF BANGLADESH


40 DLR (AD) 178

De

Bench:

Badrul Haider Chy, MH Rahman, ATM Afzal JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


March 20 1988

Facts in brief:

The Government had no apprehension that the detenu Syed Makbul Hussain the husband of
petitioner Sajeda Parvin would be indulging in smuggling activities.27th March 1986 detenu’s
brother Syed Altaf Hussain allegedly made a confessional statement involving the detenu in the
commission of contravening Foreign exchange Regulation Act. Then the issues arises whether
article 102(2)(b) and article 32 regarding the right to life and personal liberty is applicable or not.

Judgment:
Order of detention was passed for collateral purposes. In the result, therefore, the appeal was
allowed and the detention of Syed Makbul Hossain was illegal and without lawful authority.

Reasoning of decision:

Considering the nature of enquiry it is stated that the HCD has erroneously taken the view that
the rule has become in fructuous as because fresh order had been passed which was not,
speaking technically, a subject matter of the rule. The view was taken in the case of Abdul Latif
Mirza. Vs State, 31 DLR (AD) 1 was overloaded, leave was granted considering article 102 of the
constitution.

Arguments:

hjjhhgfghghf52 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

The detention is illegal and without lawful authority, in as much as, was passed only to frustrate
the order of bail which was passed by the special tribunal and for unseating the detenu would be
indulging in smuggle activities as alleged although the government had materials. The detenu
was absent from the country from November and he had under gone his treatment in a London
hospital.

Principles:

Any order must be illegal or unlawful authority which cannot prove the detenu as the main
offenders. The order is not valid because it has no reasonable ground to prove the connection
with the original act.

Conclusion:

The rule could not be discharged without deciding the case of detention on merit, even after
revocation of the original order of detention which was substituted by the so called fresh order.
The reference of the High Court Division missed the provisions of the article 102

………..

hjjhhgfghghf53 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.26

NASRIN KADER SIDDIQUE


VS.
BANGLADESH AND OTHERS.
[44 DLR (AD) 16]

Bench:

MH RAHMAN, ATM AFZAL, M KAMAL, JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


1991

Facts in brief:

In that writ petition the appellant challenged the detention of her husband, Abdul Kader
Siddique, by an order under the Special Power Act 1974. He was arrested on 17 th January 1991
and impugned order of detention was shown to him. It was contended that the impugned order
was violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under article 27, 28, 31, 32 and 33. The
respondents did not controvert the statement made in the writ petition. Their case is that the
order of detention under the Special Power Act is withdrawn and so writ petition had become
infructuous.

The detenu was in custody as a convict, upon conviction by Special Martial Law Court under the
Martial Law Regulation 1975. Then the respondents produced before the court a copy of warrant
of commitment issued by Additional District Magistrate, Tangail.

Decision:
The order of detention is without any lawful authority and on that score alone the detention of
the detenu is liable to be set aside.

Reasoning:

hjjhhgfghghf54 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

There was a proclamation, dated 7thApril 1979, revoking The Proclamations of 1975, 1976 and all
martial law regulations and orders and making provision consequential incidental thereto. Clause
(k) of the said proclamation provides that, the every sentence of imprisonment or whipping
passed in any case by Special Martial Law Courts, shall, after the commencing day, be putting to
execution under the warrant of the session judge of that area as if the sentence is passed by him.

The sentence remained unexecuted for 14 years. If the sentence is to be executed now, it can
only be executed by the authority and in the manner prescribed by the saving clauses and by no
other authority and in no other manner whatsoever. So the custody order passed by Additional
District Magistrate, Tangail would be irregular, illegal and unlawful. That order could only be
issued by the session judge.

Principles:

Where a prisoner is in custody of an order of conviction the onus of the respondent is discharged
as soon as the return relating to the appellant’s custody shows that there is an order of conviction
justifying the custody, but the conviction is to be placed before the court for its satisfaction.

Conclusion:

The onus of the respondent is discharged where a prisoner is in custody of an order of conviction
and when the return relating to the appellant’s custody shows that there is an order of conviction
justifying the custody, but the conviction is to be placed before the court for its satisfaction. Then
the custody order would be irregular, illegal and unlawful.
………..

hjjhhgfghghf55 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.27

HABIBA MAHMUD

VS

BANGLADESH

45 DLR (AD) 89

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Habiba Mahmud Bangl adesh

Bench:

Mh Rahman, ATM Afzal, M Kamal JJ.

Judgment delivered on:

Facts in brief:

The appellant’s husband Kazi Mahmud Hossain who was arrested on 20, 1991 in pursuance of
an order of detention dated august 18, 1991 under section 3(1) (a) of the special powers act,
1974.This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment and order dated March 2, 1992 of the
HCD, discharging the rule issued in appellant’s writ petition no.1883 of 1991 under Article 102(2)
(b) (I) of the constitution.

The detenue has been engaged in various anti-social activities & unlawful activities-has been
stated in the grounds of detention. For that reason there created resentment & hatred against
him in the minds of the public. For his being twice arrested, (because of these terrorist activities)
he was suspended from the post of chairman of kotwali para upazila against that he armed an
illegal bahini. If a turbulent man like him is kept outside it will be a threat to general law & order
in the country-causing serious deterioration in law & order situation.

Decision:

The learned council for both the parties relied on “Abdul Latif Mirza Vs.BD”.-though the court
held that the principal ground lost its cogency and became irrelevant and that other grounds of
detention which were superstructures on to review the law of preventive detention.

So, an illegal order of detention can’t be continued by a subsequent order of detention.-Under


the special powers Act ,the detaining authority’s satisfaction is to a great extent subjective but
the order of the detaining authority must be based on some materials which will satisfy a

hjjhhgfghghf56 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

reasonable person that a conclusion could be so drawn on such materials. The detenue was
released because of being detained without lawful authority.

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

(1)The appellant contended that his younger brother kazi Feroz Roshid, minister in the last govt
–the order of detention was passed for ulterior & malafide purpose to harass and humiliate the
detenue.
(2)The operative portions of the grounds are vague and insufficient.
(3)No specific reason would have been found for the order of detention before his arrest.
(4)In Sk. Serajul Vs.State Bengal (1975)-in this case, the appellate division set aside that
judgement and declared that the order of detention was without lawful authority.
(5)No live link between the grounds of criminal activity and the purpose of detention.

Arguments on behalf of respondent:

(1) The detenue being involved in anti-social activities and in a mission to hit the highest law
officer in the country.
(2) His mixing up with some anti-social activities in a proper ground of detention which is based
on sufficient materials.
(3) The respondent contends that there is no bars in law to pass an order of detention where
the detenue is proceed against in a criminal proceeding.
(4) No mechanical proceeds /test to determine the proximity of the detenu’s past prejudicial
activities.
(5) No live link between the grounds of criminal activity and purpose of detention.
(6) In Gora vs. State of west Bengal (1975)-“The order viewed as one passed in anticipation of
the detenue being released as a result of dropping of the case of against him as no one was
willing to dispose against him.

Principles:

The court is to hold the balance among the states needed to prevent prejudicial activities and
citizen’s right to enjoy his personal liberty. Again in Art. 35(5)-‘no person accused of offence
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself’ and -in Art 102-“powers of High court
Division to issue certain orders and directions etc.

Conclusion:

No person accused of offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, the court is
bound to make balance the situations on the provisions of the constitution of Bangladesh.
………..

Case No.28

hjjhhgfghghf57 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Md. Faruque Reza

Vs

Bangladesh

29, DLR, HCD, 1997, 5

Bench:

Judgment delivered on:

Facts in brief:

Synopsis of the Facts: The detenue Mrs. Tahera Begum was the wife of Mr. Gulam Mostafa who
was a freedom fighter and an activist of Jatya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD). He was absconding and his
wife went to her father’s house from where she was arrested and detained in the local police
station, then the house of SP and finally was sent to the central Jail of Jessore on 29-4-1976. This
arrest was claimed to have been made under sub rule 1 of Rule 30 of the Emergency Power
Rules,1975. Thereafter, the District Magistrate being satisfied from the material issued the order
of detention.

Rules of law: Rule 5(1) of the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975.

Issue:

1) Whether the detenue was detained by lawful authority in lawful manner or not?

hjjhhgfghghf58 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Arguments on behalf of the Petitioner: The order of detention was vague and it was passed
illegally for harassing the detenue for her husband’s political activities.

Arguments on behalf of the Respondents: The District Magistrate had sufficient reason to satisfy
himself that the detenue was connected with JSD and active in a manner prejudicial to security,
the public safety and interest of Bangladesh.

It was not reported that the detenue was served with ground of detention under the Emergency
Powers Rules, 1975. The detenue had got the right to move this court for the writ of habeas
corpus.

Decision: The court was held that the detenue was being held in custody without lawful authority.
The respondents were directed to set aside the detenue at liberty at once.

Reasoning: It was impossible to gather from the order of detention or from the affidavit of the
respondents, for prevention of prejudicial acts, the detenue was being held in custody.

Vagueness in an order of detention may not beautiful but if this court finds it difficult to satisfy
itself, because of the vagueness of the order as to the lawful authority of the order, then the
lawful authority of the order, then the such order ought not be continued.

hjjhhgfghghf59 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.29

AHSANULLAH

VS

BANGLADESH

44 DLR 179

Bench:

Abdul Jalil and Naimuddin Ahmed JJ.

Judgment delivered on:

1991

Facts in brief:

The petitioners were elected for five years by the election in 1989 and they had been performing
their functions as elected chairman for 5 years terms in office and they cannot be removed from
the office other than in manner of the said ordinance. The ordinance was repealed for abolishing
all upazilla parishad and taking over by the government all assets and liabilities of the abolished
uazillas and its powers and functions.

The rule was issued to show cause as to why the impugned ordinance should not be declared to
be ultra vires of the constitution.

Decision:

The impugned ordinance is not inconsistent with any article of the constitution rendering it to be
neither void nor ultra vires of any provision of the constitution.

Reasoning of decision:

The provisions of local government institutions as provided in article 9 of the constitution are not
mandate provisions. They are only direction to encourage local government institutions.

In practical, there is a substantial question about the local government to be interpreted in


accordance with the articles 7, 88, 9, 11, 59, 60 and 152. Whether circumstances exist is not a
matter to be decided by the court it depends exclusively on the satisfaction of the president
which cannot be questioned in court in view of article 93.

hjjhhgfghghf60 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Arguments on behalf of appellants:

The impugned repealing ordinance violates the mandate of the constitution by removing the
functions of the local government. They are also vioative of the basic structure of the
constitution.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

The local government bodies are to share with the parliament. The president promulgated the
impugned ordinance in exercise of his power under article 93. Article 9 does not impose any
mandate on the abolishing upazilla parishads as administrative units.

Principles:

There is a substantial question about the local government to be interpreted in accordance with
the articles of the constitution that repealing its functions depends exclusively on the satisfaction
of the president which cannot be questioned in court.

Impact on constitutional law:

There is no express mandate provision under article 9 of the constitution. They are only direction
to encourage local government institutions. Repealing its functions also depends exclusively on
the satisfaction of the president.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf61 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.30

ABDUS SAMAD AZAD V. BANGLADESH

44 DLR 354

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Abdus Samad Azad Bangladesh

Advocates Appeared:

Amir Ul Islam Aminul Huq

…...For The Appellant …….For The Respondent

Bench:

Anwarul Haque J.

Judgment delivered on:


1992

Facts in brief:

In the fact, the petitioners claimed a proper valid piece of legislation and the election of the
president held in accordance with the said provision and other provisions as not to be valid and
legal. The rule were issued as to why the impugned legislation, the President’s Election Act, 1991
known as Act no. 27 of 1991 with the Presidents Election Rules 1991 made by the Chief Election
Commissioner should not e declared to be void being inconsistent with the constitution and
without legal authority or no legal effect.

Decision:

A writ matter in motion is always scrutinized by the court and if the court does not find a prima
facie case for issuance of the rule, the court certainly would be at liberty to reject it. There is no
substance in the writ petitions. The impugned ordinance having been withdrawn that petition is
disposed of accordingly.

Reasoning of decision:
hjjhhgfghghf62 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Freedom of conscience guaranteed under the constitution would relate to private liberty. Right
to vote or secret vote is nowhere spelt out in the constitution. Democratic institutions are
provided in the constitution spelt out no narrowing of choice of representatives either by direct
or by secret ballot.

Voting by secret ballot or by open ballot or by a division are all accepted modes of voting and
different ways of choosing representative are not foreign to out of constitution in the view of
the articles 7,8,11,39,and 70 of the constitution with sections 4 and 10 of the President’s Election
Act 1991.

Arguments on behalf of petitioners:

The election of the post of president shall be by open ballot by the members of the parliament,
each member of the parliament having one vote, is ultra vires of the constitution. Article 70 had
already put in a self imposed restriction on the power of the members of the parliament to vote
in the parliament.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

The right of voting is not a fundamental right. It is nowhere guaranteed in the constitution but is
a right given by statute and having been guaranteed by statute it need be regulated by the
statute.

Principles:

Under the constitution Freedom of conscience guaranteed would relate to private liberty. Right
to vote or secret vote is nowhere spelt out in the constitution the constitution does not narrow
the choice of representatives either by direct or by secret ballot for Democratic institutions.

Conclusion:

The election of the post of president shall be by open ballot by the members of the parliament,
each member of the parliament having one vote, is ultra vires of the constitution.

………..

Case No.31

MD. ASADUZZAMAN V. BANGLADESH

42 DLR (AD) 144

hjjhhgfghghf63 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Md. Asaduzzaman Bangladesh

Bench:

MH Rahman, ATM Afzal, M Kamal JJ

Judgment delivered on:


1990

Facts in brief:

The appellant’s case is that he has been a member of the society since its inception in 1973 and
its life-member since 1976; that he is the elected vice-chairman of the Magura district unit; that
after the election held on 7th December, 1988 the appellant including all other office-bearers of
the district unit has been functioning normally; that respondent no. 3, by the aforementioned
memorandum, directed the chairman, the vice- chairman, the secretary and other members of
the district unit to hand over charges to the chairman of the Magura Zilla Parishad and other
nominated government functionaries.

The appellant challenged the validity of certain amendments in the Bangladesh Red Crescent
Society Order, 1973 and the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society Act, 1989.

Decision:

In the context form for applications for enrolment and renewal for membership may be made
available to all those who desire to be members or renew their existing membership, and all such
applications be disposes of in accordance with the order. The appeal is dismissed.

Reasoning of decision:

Whatever rights the appellant has as a member of Red Crescent Society has been given under
the order and he can legitimately claim protections under article 102 of the constitution for
enforcement of the statutory right. But the appellant cannot claim that his right under the statute

hjjhhgfghghf64 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

cannot be modified, altered or affected by an amendment of P. O. No. 26 of 1973, validly passed


by the legislature.

The right under article 38 implies that several individuals having a community of interest can join
together to form a voluntarily association for furtherance of a common lawful object. Article 38
cannot be invoked for support, sustenance, or fulfillment of every object of an association.

Principles:

Several individuals having a community of interest can join together to form a voluntarily
association for furtherance of a common lawful object under the provisions of the constitution.

Conclusion:

Article 38 cannot be invoked for support, sustenance, or fulfillment of every object of an


association but the right under article 38 implies that several individuals having a community of
interest can join together to form a voluntarily association for furtherance of a common lawful
object.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf65 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.32

Monwara Begum Vs Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Advocates Appeared:

…...For The Appellant …….For The Respondent

Bench:

Judgment delivered on:

Facts in brief:

Synopsis of the Facts: The detenue was detained under section 3(2) of the Special Powers Act,
1974 for 30 days from the date of service of the order passed by Additional District Magistrate.
The said was passed to the detenue on 08.01.88 containing grounds that the detenue was a
member of organized gang which committed forgery in respect of various documents and papers
which was prejudicial to law and order. The senior Assistant Secretary extended the order of
detention for three months from 6.2.88 and further extended the order of detention for two
months from 21.4.88. The government revoked the order. But instead of releasing, the Minisitry
of Home Affairs extended the order of detention under section under section 3 (1)(a) of the
Special Powers Act.

Rule of Law: Article 33 of the constitution read with section 3 (2) of the Special Powers Act, 1974.

Issues:

hjjhhgfghghf66 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

1) Whether the Article 33 of the constitution was contravened or not in the connection of
detention without order of Advisory Board or not?

Decision: The decision dated 23. 5. 88 was set aside. The court directed that the detenue be
released and set at library at once.

Reasoning: The detenue was never placed before advisory board within 6 months from his first
detention on 8.1.88. Therefore, the order of detention dated 23.5.88 was illegal and without
lawful authority. It would not become within the scope of the Special Powers Act and was in
contravention of Article 33(4) of the constitution. According to Article 33(4) of the constitution,
“No law providing preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a period
exceeding six months unless an advisory board reported before the expiration of the said period
of 6 months that there is in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention.

hjjhhgfghghf67 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

………..

hjjhhgfghghf68 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.33

DR. AHMED HOSSAIN V. BANGLADESH

44 DLR (AD) 109

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Dr. Ahmed Hossain Bangladesh

Advocates Appeared:

Dr. Ahmed Hossain A W Bhui yan

…...For The Appellant …….For The Respondent

Bench:

M H Rahman, A T M Afzak K Kamal J J.

Judgment delivered on:


1992

Facts in brief:

The petitioner, a senior advocate, unsuccessfully challenged the vires of the constitution (tenth
amendment) act, 1990 in writ petition before the High Court Division. In the constitution of
Bangladesh, in article 65 for clause (3) of the following were substituted.

The following was substituted by the impugned amendment where it has been said that until the
dissolution of parliament occurring next after the expiration of the period of ten years beginning
from the date of the first meeting of the parliament, there shall be reserved 33 seats exclusively
for women members, who shall be elected according to law by the members.

Decision:

A system of indirect election cannot be called undemocratic. It is provided in the constitution


itself. The amendment is not violative of article 28, because article 28 provides that nothing in
that article shall prevent the state, which expression includes parliament from making special
provision in favor of women. So the petition is dismissed.

Reasoning of decision:

hjjhhgfghghf69 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

There is no substance in the contention that after the period for reservation of thirty seats
expired; no extension as made by the Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1990 could be done.
Clause 3 of article 65 was never deleted. It remained in the constitution. The substitution by the
new provision cannot be challenged as ultra vires.

Arguments on behalf of appellant:

The impugned amendment by providing for indirect election for the seats reserved exclusively
for women has destroyed the principle of democracy as expressed in the preamble, articles 7, 8
and 11 of the constitution.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:

A system of indirect election cannot be called undemocratic. It is provided in the constitution


itself. Because clause 4 in article 28 provides that nothing in that article shall prevent the state
from making special provision in favor of women. So, it is not violative of the provisions of the
constitution.

Principles:

Any indirect election cannot be called undemocratic because provides that no article shall
prevent the state from making special provision in favor of women. So, it is not violative of the
provisions of the constitution.

Conclusion:

The provisions cannot be said violative of the provisions of the constitution which make indirect
election undemocratically because the constitution says that no article shall prevent the state
from making special provision in favor of women.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf70 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.34

DR. NURUL ISLAM VS BANGLADESH

33 DLR AD 1981

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

D R. NURUL ISLAM BANGLADESH

Advocates Appeared:

Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed K A Bakr

…...For The Appellant …….For The Respondent

Bench:

K Hossain CJ, F Munim, B H Chy JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


1981

Facts in brief:

Dr. Nurul Islam, Professor of medicine, was relieved from his practising post and continued as
director of the institute. He challenged the order in this regard in High court division and
succeeded in his writ. As the High court division declared the order is made without any lawful
authority. In reaction to this order, the government gave him mandatory retirement under
section 9(2) of the public service retirement act, 1974. The High court division refused to interfere
with government decision in this regard and the appellant moved to the appellate division against
the aforesaid decision of High court division.

Decision:
The section of the act is ultra vires being violative of the articles 27, 29 and 135 of the
constitution. The said invalid provision as law causing premature retirement of the appellant
from govt service is illegal and void. The appeal is allowed.

Issue of the case:

hjjhhgfghghf71 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

1. Whether section 9(2) of the public service retirement act conferred a wide and unsolicited
power of authority to the government?
2. Whether Article 27, 29,133, 134, 135 of the constitution is contradictory with the order
issued by the government?

Arguments on the behalf of petitioner:


Section 9(2) of the public servants retirement act violates the article 27 and 29 of the constriction
as it gives discriminatory and discretionary power of the government on the matter of selecting
government servant for recruitment. As a reputed doctor the appellant cannot be retired on the
ground of inefficiency or misconduct. As the appellant is not given the opportunity of being hard
before the retirement it violates the article 135 of the constitution.

Arguments on behalf of respondents:


Section 9(2) of the public servants retirement act does not violate Article 27 and 29 of the
constitution because the discretionary power would be exercised only in fulfilment of 25 years
of service and it is applicable equally to all. No guidance was necessary in exercising it.

As the public servants retirement act had been made in terms of Paragraph 10(2) of the fourth
schedule of the constitution it would prevail in spite of any inconsistency of the constitution.
Article 133 and 134 should be taken into consideration in determining the equality clause of the
constitution. As the article 133 and 134 subjects the terms of the service and tenure to the
pleasure of the president, Section 9(2) of the public servants retirement act should not be
conformity with article 27 and 29.

Reasoning:
According to Badrul Haider Chowdhury J. as Section 9(2) does not provide any principal or
guideline for exercise of discretionary power it provides scope for arbitrary exercise. In this view
section 9(2) is bad and ultra virus to the constitution.
Ruhul Alam J. states that the statutory provision exhibits a total disregard of the guidance
provided by article 135 of the constitution.

Principle:

Any act must be void or illegal which violates the provisions of the constitution of Bangladesh
because the constitution must remove discriminatory and discretionary power of the
government on the matter of selecting government servant for recruitment.
………..

………..

hjjhhgfghghf72 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.35

KHONDKER DELWAR HOSSAIN VS ITALIAN MARBLE WORKS

62 DLR (AD) 298

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Khondker Delwar Hossain Italian Marble Works

Bench:

Tafazzul Islam CJ, A Hossain, S K Sinha JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


2010

Facts in brief:

The respondent referred as to the company along with its managing director, filed the writ
petition stating that the company was registered with the joint stock companies of erstwhile East
Pakistan as a private limited company in the name. It constructed a cinema hall known as Moon
Cinema Hall; after liberation of Bangladesh in or around the last week of 1971, some people
taking advantage of poor law and order situation prevailing at that time, tool over forcible
possession of the coon cinema hall from the staffs of the company.

After the withdrawal of martial law, the company filed the writ petition as to why the releasing
moon cinema hall and also directing the authority to hand over the possession of the same to
the company should not be directed to make over possession of the cinema hall in favor of the
company.

Decision:

The High Court Division held that there was no legal existence of martial law and consequently
of no martial law authorities, as such all proclamations etc. were illegal, void ab initio and non-
est in the eye of law. So it was directed the authority to hand over the possession of the cinema
hall to the company and to make over possession of the cinema hall in favor of the company.

Reasoning of decision:

hjjhhgfghghf73 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Parliament though may amend the constitution under article 142 of the constitution but cannot
take the constitution subservient to any other proclamation etc. or cannot disgrace it in any
manner since the constitution is the embodiment and solemn expression of the will of the people
of Bangladesh, attained through the supreme sacrifice of nearly three million martyrs. The
parliament, by amendment of the constitution cannot legitimate an illegitimate activity.

Arguments on behalf of petitioners:

The property in question is not an abandoned property it was unnecessary to go on the


constitutional issue and to declare the 5th amendment unconstitutional ignored. So, it cannot
pass any order for the release of the property because of the provisions of MLR.

Arguments on behalf of Respondent:

The petitions involve constitutional issues, the petitioners having failed to show any prima facie
defects in the judgment. It can be said that the 5th amendment is valid as to what extent the
doctrine of necessity is playing a great role.

Principles:

Though Parliament may amend the constitution but cannot take the constitution subservient to
any other proclamation etc. or cannot disgrace it in any manner since the constitution is the
embodiment and solemn expression of the will of the people of Bangladesh, attained through
the supreme sacrifice of nearly three million martyrs.

Conclusion:

There was no legal existence of martial law and consequently of no martial law authorities, as
such all proclamations etc. were illegal, void ab initio and non-est in the eye of law.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf74 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.36

AMINUL ISLAM VS BANGLADESH BIMAN CORPORATION


2 BLD 1982 1

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Aminul Islam Bangladesh Biman Corporation

Bench:

ATM AFZAL J.

Judgment delivered on:


1982

Facts in brief:

One Abdul Quddus, an employee of the Biman challenged a circular of the Biman authority
granting antedated seniority to the freedom fighter employees. The circular was struck down by
the appellate division on the ground that no law or regulation empowering the authority to
prepare such a list was to be brought to the notice of the court.

After the judgment of the appellate division the Division of the government of Bangladesh issued
a direction to all Ministry/Divisions/Corporations and Autonomous bodies to make rules
protecting the interest of the freedom fighters in the light of the Government Servant (Seniority
of Freedom Fighters) Rules, 1979, a seniority list giving the freedom fighter two years seniority
over others was prepared.

.
The petitioner Aminul Islam moved the High court division seeking a mandamus to cancel the
seniority list.

Arguments:

hjjhhgfghghf75 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

The ground of attack was that classification done by the 1980 Rules was against the notion of
equality and equal protection of law under Article 27 and 29.

Decision:
It appears from the memorandum dated 18 march 1978 and Rule 6 of the rules that certain
benefits were extended to those employees of the PIAC who had participated in the liberation
war and suffered imprisonment detention on dismissal in hands of the occupied Army in 1971.
The employee who participated in the liberation war cannot be called a person in similarity
situated with those who are not freedom fighters.

Principles:
Classification of freedom fighter employees and non-freedom fighter employee is reasonable as
they do not belong to the same class and situations which could be struck down on the principles
of equality.

Conclusion:
The employee who participated in the liberation war cannot be called a person in similarity
situated with those who are not freedom fighters but it can be done by reasonable way.
………..

hjjhhgfghghf76 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.37

SALEEMULLAH VS. THE STATE


44 DLR (AD) (1992) 309 = 13BLD (1993) (AD) 3

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Saleemullah The State

Bench:

SHAHABUDDIN AHMED CJ, MH RAHMAN J AND ATM AFZAL J.

Judgment delivered on:


23rd JULY, 1992

Facts in brief:

Mr. Rahimullah Chowdhury and another filed a suit on June 10, 1952 in the Sub-ordinate Judge,
3rd court, Dhaka for declaration of title and khas possession of their land Kakrail against two
persons namely Awlad Hossain and Fazlul Karim and stated that they acquired the lands of the
plaintiffs and after death substituted by heirs. The defendants enterd appearance and filed
written statement that they are owner of rightful possession and denied plaintiffs’ right, title and
interest. The said suit was dragged on for 10 years and held that the plaintiffs have the title of
the properties while the defendants are in illegal occupation and had constructed some buildings
there. The plaintiffs filed another suit for appeal in 1961 in the same court for assessment of
damages and it was also kept pending for 10 years. The defendants preferred appeal from the
decree passed in 1952 but the court dismissed it; the defendants preferred appeal to Supreme
Court of Pakistan but same was also dismissed.

The plaintiffs filed execution case in 3rd court, Dhaka in 1963. The execution matter was also
dragged on different pleas and was still pending and the manse profit suit was still delayed till
1984 and the suit ultimately came up for final hearing after 25 years. The Learned Sub-ordinate
Judge stated that the plaintiff and other factors, beyond the control of the court were responsible
for delay in the disposal not the court and the judgement has been grossly misrepresented giving
the impression that he is impotent; unable to comprehend the law and a point of law. The
appellant admitted that he was the author of the report asserted the caption was designed
written by sub-editor. But no rules are issued against the editor, printer and publisher of the
newspaper.
Decision:

hjjhhgfghghf77 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

It was held that the journalist having a master degree in journalism and also a practising advocate
did not submitted fair comment on the merit of the case. In our country, where the rate of literacy
is low and words in print are generally revered, the court may consider what impact a written
criticism of court will have in the minds of the public.

Reasoning:
Freedom of press being recognised in our constitution, a court is to suffer criticism made against
it. In the case as the journalist was also an advocate he may decide wisdom on the report-
worthiness of the matter but it is little more onerous when he was a journalist. As to article 39 of
the constitution this press freedom is subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in
the interest of the security of the State.

The right of freedom as well as freedom of press is a landmark judgement for the establishment
of the right of freedom of expression. Our Parliament may consider updating the law of contempt
of courts in the light of our constitution, recent changes in media communications and practice
in comparable jurisdiction in other countries. It is a suggestion for parliament to update the law
of contempt of court.

Principles:

As to article 39 of the constitution the freedom of press is subject to any reasonable restrictions
imposed by law in the interest of the security of the State. The right of freedom as well as freedom
of press is a landmark judgment for the establishment of the right of freedom of expression.

Conclusion:

The freedom of press is subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of
the security of the State. The reasonable restrictions must be followed on the provisions of the
constitution of Bangladesh.

………..

………..

hjjhhgfghghf78 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.38

BANGLADESH VS MD. AZIZUR RAHMAN


46 DLR (AD) 19

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Md. Azizur Rahman & Others Bangladesh

Bench:

SHAHABUDDIN AHMED CJ, MH RAHMAN J, ATM AFZAL J, MUSTAFA KAMAL J

Judgment delivered on:


28TH OCTOBER, 1993

Facts in brief:

Md Azizur Rahman, the petitioner had been appointed on ad-hoc basis as an Assistant Engineer
(Mechanical) in the Roads and High Ways Directorate, Government of Bangladesh for a period of
six months on 21 May 1976 or till regularization of his appointment by the Public Servant
Commission (PSC). In 1977 the PSC by an open advertisement held an interview called
Competitive Examination for appointment of Assistant Engineers on regular basis which made a
recommendation in order of merit for regular appointment. Md. Azizur Rahman was placed in
the third position in order of merit in that exam. One of his colleague, respondent no.6 who was
not qualified in any of the interview but was regularized from 30 June 1983. Along with the Ad-
hoc appointees some fresh candidates had also got recommendation for regular appointment
with effect from 16 August 1977 and their seniority counted from the date of the
recommendation of the PSC according to the General Principles of Seniority (1970).

Again their inter se seniority was determined on the basis of merit assigned by the PSC. Petitioner
claimed to have acquired a “vested right” of seniority over the respondent who were placed
before him in order of merit assigned by the PSC, but Government, by a Memorandum also called
Circular, dated 22 April 1984, tried to alter this order of seniority and directed that seniority of
the ad-hoc appointees, after regularization, would count from the date of their ad-hoc
appointment, which meant that seniority on the basis of merit was given a go-by and the
Petitioner was to be junior to respondent no. 3-11.

The provisions of this memorandum were made into statutory Rules, that is, the Ad-hoc
Appointment (Counting and Determination of Seniority) Rules, 1990, published on the Official
Gazette on 8 November 1990. The Petitioner challenged these Rules in his Writ Petition taking
the ground that these Rules not only affected his vested right of seniority, but also violated the

hjjhhgfghghf79 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

equality-clause of Article 27 and also the right to equal opportunity for public appointment
guaranteed under Article 29 of the Constitution. After hearing the parties the High Court Division
accepted the Petitioners’ contention but rejected their contention that their vested right could
not be affected by statutory Rules with retrospective effect.

Decision:
It has been decided in this case that there is no violation of fundamental rights as contemplated
in Article 27 and 29(1) of the Constitution.

Reasoning:
Classification of persons for making a law is permissible. This classification is not class legislation.
The term “equality before law’’ should not be interpreted in its absolute sense to hold that all
persons are equal in all respects disregarding defined conditions and circumstances in which they
are placed or special quality and characteristics which some of them may possess but which are
lacking in others. This term means that all persons are not equal in all respects and that persons
similarly situated should be treated alike. Therefore a classification is reasonable if it is made to
give special treatment to a backward section of the people.

The guarantee of “equal opportunity’’ in respect of employment is available at the stage of initial
appointment and of promotion. Merely because of chances of promotion of the Writ Petitioners
may be said to have been affected by the impugned Rules of 1990 would not amount to denial
of equality of opportunity in respect of the appointment, as chances of promotion are not
condition of service.

Principles:
As a matter of fact, no Writ Petitioners have been deprived of the right to be considered for
promotion and as such, the submission that they have been denied the right of equal opportunity
in respect of future employment is untenable and there is in fact no violation of Article 29(1) of
the Constitution.

………..

Case No.39

MD.M. RAHMAN VS WATER BOARD


1981 BCR 375

hjjhhgfghghf80 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Md. M. Rahman Water Board

Bench:

Mh Rahman CJ, Atm Afzal, Mustafa Kamal, JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


1981

Facts in brief:

In the case of right of promotion of the Diploma-holder promote Assistant Engineers and direct
recruit Assistant Engineers to the post of Executive Engineers. The direct recruit Assistant
Engineers have got no exclusive legal or vested right of promotion to the post of executive
engineers in the water development board. But they are absorbed in one cadre, they form one
class and there will be no classification for the purpose of promotion to the higher post.

Issues:
Whether art 27 is violated or not?

Rule of laws:
1. Article 27 of the constitution.
2. The Water and Power Development Board Order 1972( Po No 59, 1972)
3. Wapda Rules (Rule 21 (b)) (rule 22b)) (rule 23)

Decision:

The seniority list which was prepared under WAPDA Rules is reasonable. So art. 27 are not
violated. Prayer for a certificate under art 103 (2) (a) of the constriction is hereby refused as the
cases do not involve any question of law as to interpretation of the constitution. Prayer for ad
interim Stay of the operation of this order is also refused in this petition.

hjjhhgfghghf81 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Reasoning of decision:

The petitioner was fairly appointed as an assistant engineer by the Bangladesh water
development Board. The petitioners and the diploma holder engineer having passed the AMIE
examination could be promoted to post of Executive Engineer. It was also decided by the
chairman of the board that 10 percent of the post of Executive Engineer would be filled up by
promotion from diploma holder Assistant Engineers.

The order of the deputy secretary of ministry of finance informed that a common seniority list
should be maintained for promotees and direct recruits. Due to the publication of the list the
chance of promotion, the petitioner has been adversely affected because petitioner was one of
the few senior most Degree-holder Engineers appointed on 26.12.1978.

Unreasonable classification can be interfered with the court. In this petition the petitioners are
aggrieved because there has not been any classification between Degree holder and the Diploma
holder Assistant Engineers. They have got no legal grievance that the court can redress. Mr. Pal,
the learned advocate appearing for the Diploma holder promotee in writ petition no 660 of 1980
had pointed out The Roshan lal’s Case. This ease laid down that direct recruit and promotees lose
their birthmarks on fusion in to common steam of service and they cannot thereafter be treated
differently though they were recruited different sources.

Conclusion:
The petitioners and the diploma holder engineer having passed the AMIE examination could be
promoted to post of Executive Engineer. The post of Executive Engineer would be filled up by
promotion from diploma holder Assistant Engineers. Here Art 27 of the constitution ensures that
All citizens are equal before law and entitled to equal protection of law.
………..

hjjhhgfghghf82 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.40

BANGLADESH V. PROFESSOR GOLAM AZAM

46 DLR (AD) 192

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Bangladesh Professor Golam Azam

Bench:

M H Rahman, ATM Afzal, M Kamal And Latifur Rahman JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


1994

Facts in brief:

Professor Golam Azam, the respondent, had been staying abroad since before liberation of
Bangladesh as a citizen of Pakistan; that for his anti-liberating role and active collaboration with
the Pakistan army in raising irregular force like the Rajakers, Al-Badars and Al-Shams and placing
his party, the Jamat-E-Islam, at the dispose of the Pakistani army, and because of his conduct
during and after the liberation war, and his voluntarily residing in Pakistan as a citizen of Pakistan
he could not be deemed to be citizen of Bangladesh.

The appeal by special leave at the instance of the government is directed against the judgment
and order of the HCD passed in 1992.

Decision:

While acting under the law a court’s anxiety in decision-making must be limited to the questions
of facts and law and the interest of justice in circumstances of a particular case. It should not
brook any doubt while making a decision. And it should not also have any conceit that it is the
perfect decision. The appeal is dismissed.

Reasoning of decision:

hjjhhgfghghf83 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Though citizenship is not mentioned as a fundament right in the constitution, it is to be


considered as the right of all rights as in it depends one’s right to fundamental rights expressly
provided for a citizenship in part III of the constitution and the right to seek court’s protection of
those rights.

By citizen it is meant a person who is member of an independent political community having


rights and obligation under the constitution and law of the country. What sovereignty is to a
state, citizenship gives a person membership in the political community of his country.

A court may not have the prescience to foresee the impounder abilities of the future. While acting
under the law a court’s anxiety in decision-making must be limited to the questions of facts and
law and the interest of justice in circumstances of a particular case. It should not brook any doubt
while making a decision.

Principles:

The right of all rights as in it depends one’s right to fundamental rights expressly provided for a
citizenship in part III of the constitution and the right to seek court’s protection of those rights
though citizenship is not mentioned as a fundament right in the constitution.

Conclusion:

The right of citizenship is to be considered as the right of all rights as in it depends one’s right to
fundamental rights expressly provided for a citizenship in part III of the constitution and the right
to seek court’s protection of those rights.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf84 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

hjjhhgfghghf85 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.41

BANGLADESH VS AMIRUZZAMAN KHAN

(1977) BLR (HCD) 21

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Bangladesh Amiruzzaman Khan

Bench:

Ruhul Islam, CJ and M H Rahman J.

Judgment delivered on:


6 April, 1977

Facts in brief:

In the fact, there is a drama of mistaken identity used by a brain-transplant. A neuro-surgeon


transplants the brain of a sane, a victim of road-accident, in the place of a damaged brain of a
deranged man. Before the court decides, the resulting confusion gets worst confounded and the
sane man turns in to an insane person.

In the court scene the dialogue between the judge and the bench clerk, the role of the contesting
parties and their lawyers, and the conduct of the members of the public present in the court and
the décor of the court room are depicted in a shockingly scandalous manner.

Decision:

If, however, any one exceeds the limits or fairness and fails to take heed in his duty he owes to
the court, he will only do so at his own peril. Whatever literary merit the drama may have can
well be saved by expunging the offensive portions from its court-scene.

Reasoning of decision:

hjjhhgfghghf86 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

The court in our country is an open institution, and there is no wall around it. As the court is for
welfare of the people, members of the public are entitled to make fair, reasonable or legitimate,
or even out-spoken comment on, or make fair dramatic representation of, court affairs, If,
however, any one exceeds the limits or fairness and fails to take heed in his duty he owes to the
court, he will only do so at his own peril.

The condemners created a court scene which has, even if not calculated the tendency to bring
the court into disrepute. The court scene has hardly any artistic value or merit to redeem itself
relating with the freedom of expression.

Principles:

Any person owes to the court, he will only do so at his own peril if, however, he exceeds the limits
or fairness and fails to take heed in his duty when the conduct of the members of the public
present in the court and the décor of the court room are depicted in a shockingly scandalous
manner.

Conclusion:

As the court is for welfare of the people, members of the public are entitled to make fair,
reasonable or legitimate, or even out-spoken comment on, or make fair dramatic representation
of, court affairs, If, however, any one exceeds the limits or fairness and fails to take heed in his
duty he owes to the court, he will only do so at his own peril.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf87 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.42

ZAINAL ABEDIN V. GOVT. OF BANGLADESH

34 DLR 77

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Zainal Abedin Govt. Of Bangladesh

Bench:

S M Husain, M H Rahman Jj.

Judgment delivered on:


14 December, 1981

Facts in brief:

The petitioners were permanently appointed to and confirmed in, the cadre of postal service
while respondent no.4 was provisionally confirmed. They were promoted in 1973 to the junior
administrative grade. The respondent was promoted to the grade. The petitioners grievance is
that respondent, junior to them by over two and a half years, has been given two years ante-
dates seniority in violation of departmental rules and constitutional protections available to
them.

The rule was issued as to show cause why the order of the director-general, Bangladesh post
office, should not be declared to have been made without lawful authority.

Decision:

The prayer for certificate for leave to appeal is allowed and the records of the case may be
transmitted to the appellate division of thus court along with the certificate leave to appeal.

hjjhhgfghghf88 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Reasoning of decision:

The prayer for a certificate for leave to appeal to the appellate division of this court under since
it involves the interpretation of articles 27, 29, 13 and 136 of the constitution. Conferment of
certain benefits on the government servants who participated in the liberation struggle, or
abstained or defected in favor of the government of Bangladesh, or dismissal or detention in the
hands of the occupation army for the cause of the nascent struggling government of Bangladesh
cannot be objected on the ground of alleged violation of article 27 of the constitution.

This provides that Service of all persons who were in service of the republic, immediate before
the date of commencement of the constitution, were continued as a transitional measure with a
clear provision of law for varying or revoking their conditions of service.

Principles:

Service of all persons who were in service of the republic, immediate before the date of
commencement of the constitution, were continued as a transitional measure with a clear
provision of law for varying or revoking their conditions of service.

Conclusion:

The impugned rules as directed to certain problems, made manifest by experience, in the service
of the republic, in the year following the liberation war. And in order to sustain the presumption
of its constitutionality the court may take into consideration the background of the legislation.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf89 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.43

DHAKA WARE HOUSE LTD VS ASSISTANT COLLECTOR

11 BLD (AD) 227

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Dhaka Ware House Ltd Assistant Collector

Bench:

MH Rahman, ATM Afzal JJ.

Judgment delivered on:

8 january 1991

Facts in brief:

Each of the four appellants are owners of owners warehouse and doing business of selling duty
free goods to diplomatic and other privileged persons under licenses issued by the customs
authorities under section of the customs act, 1969. In the impugned demand notice the assistant
collector customs alleged that the appellants improperly removed goods from their respective
warehouses and when that was detected by a high level enquiry he imposed customs duties upon
the goods removed without clearance, and issued the demand notices to pay the duties within
15 days as required under the act.

The High Court Division summarily rejected the writ petitions and refused to exercise their
jurisdiction under article 102 of the constitution. In each of the writ petition, the act was
challenged.

Decision:

The writ petitions ought not to have been summarily rejected for the appellants’ failure to comply
with the provision of the act. The appeals are allowed. All the four matters are remanded to the
high court division for rehearing of the appellants’ respective writ petitions for issuance or
otherwise of rule nisi.

hjjhhgfghghf90 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Reasoning of decision:

In these appeals, a huge sum has been demanded in the impugned notice. It is alleged that this
notice violates the principles of natural justice, in as much as no notice was served upon the
appellants to show cause as to why they should not be ordered to pay the duties as above. The
appellants’ case stands or falls along with the correctness or otherwise of this allegation.

Where alternative statutory remedy is available whether application under article 102 may be
entertained-in spite of alternative remedy, whether an aggrieved person may take recourse to
article 102.

Where an alternative statutory remedy is available as an application under article 102 of the
constitution may not be entertained to circumvent a statutory procedure. There are, however,
exceptions to the rule. In spite of an alternative statutory remedy, an aggrieved person may take
recourse to article 102 of the constitution where the vires of a statute or a statutory provision is
challenged; where the alternative remedy is not efficacious or adequate; and, where the wrong
complained of is inextricably mixed up.

Principles:

The constitution says where alternative statutory remedy is available whether application under
article 102 may be entertained-in spite of alternative remedy, whether an aggrieved person may
take recourse to article 102.

Conclusion:

There are, however, exceptions to the rule. In spite of an alternative statutory remedy, an
aggrieved person may take recourse to article 102 of the constitution where the vires of a statute
or a statutory provision is challenged; where the alternative remedy is not efficacious or
adequate; and, where the wrong complained of is inextricably mixed up. Where an alternative
statutory remedy is available as an application under article 102 of the constitution may not be
entertained to circumvent a statutory procedure.

……….

hjjhhgfghghf91 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.44

ABU YUSUF V. BANGLADESH

45 DLR (ad) 162

Defendant-Appellant Petitioners Plaintiff-Respondent opposite Parties

Abu Yusuf Bangladesh

Bench:

Mh Rahman, Atm Azal, L Kamal Jj.

Judgment delivered on:


11 august, 1992

Facts in brief:

The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the government’s decision to liquidate Bangladesh


consumer’s supplies comp. ltd and terminate the services of the petitioner and other employees
of respondent on payment of six month’s salaries. In view of the recurring loss, government
decided for a voluntary winding up of the company in 1988.

That decision was challenged by one of the employees of respondent in the petition of 1980 and
then the liquidation proceeding was pending before the High Court Division in company matter
no. 7 of 1992.

Decision:

The liquidation of respondent, a company registered under the companies act cannot be
challenged in writ jurisdiction of the high court division when in its company court the liquidation
proceeding itself is pending for disposal. The petition is dismissed.

Reasoning of decision:

Though the ordinance was promulgated to provide for the co-ordination of management of the
affairs and business of certain pubic corporation for a limited purpose, the liquidation of a

hjjhhgfghghf92 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

company registered under the companies act cannot be challenged in writ jurisdiction when in
the company court the liquidation proceeding itself is pending for disposal.

Principles:

The liquidation of a company registered under the companies act cannot be challenged in writ
jurisdiction when in the company court the liquidation proceeding itself is pending for disposal.

Conclusion:

In applying the provisions of the constitution, the liquidation of a company registered under the
companies act cannot be challenged in writ jurisdiction when in the company court the
liquidation proceeding itself is pending for disposal though the ordinance was promulgated to
provide for the co-ordination of management of the affairs and business of certain pubic
corporation for a limited purpose.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf93 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

hjjhhgfghghf94 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.46

Md. Nurul Hoque Miah

Vs

Government of Bangladesh

17, BLT, AD, 2009

Bench:

Judgment delivered on:

Facts in brief:

Synopsis of the Facts: When the appellant was not found to be unfit for promotion, his juniors
were awarded promotion. The appellant being senior was not considered the promotion to those
posts with his juniors.

The Administrative Appellate Tribunal was held that the petitioner was entitled to get anti dated
seniority above opposite party no.3 that the petitioner was entitled to get promotions.

The respondents preferred leave to appeal to the AD but it was dismissed. The petitioner applied
to the respondent no.2 for execution of order passed by AAT but it was refused.

Being aggrieved the appellant filed mischallaous appeal to the AAT but the AAT dismissed the
appeal. The appellant preferred the leave to appeal to the AD.

Rule of Law: Articles 26, 27, 29 (1), 150(2) and 140(2)c of the constitution.

Issues:

1) Whether promoting a junior above senior is violating of constitution or not?

hjjhhgfghghf95 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Arguments on behalf of the petitioners: The AAT failed to understand the General Principle of
Seniority,1970 made an error of law by not giving subsequent effect of promotions which was
gross violations of Article 29, 135(2) and 140(2)c of the constitution.

The respondents was acted illegally in not complying with order of the AAT promoting the
Appellant was illegal and violative of Articles 26, 27, 29(1) and 135(1) and 140(2) (C) of the
constitution.

In service matter cases all person eligible for promotion and a senior person can not be hypassed
unless he is found unfit for promotion over others. Abdul Motalib Mian Vs Secretary,
Establishment Division and others, 1982, BLD, 144. The appellant having been found senior and
fit the respondents acted illegally in not promoting him.

Arguments on behalf of the Respondents:

The appellant could not be promoted to the commissioner of Tax as meanwhile he retired from
his service. As because there would be financial complication for promoting him unless he served
the department during the said period as a commissioner of Taxes.

Decision: The appeal was allowed without any order as to costs. The court directed to treat the
appellant promoted to the commissioner of Taxes.

Reasoning: The authority had acted illegally and without lawful authority in not considering the
appellant’s case of promotion though he was not found to be unfit for the purpose.

Though the promotion could not be claimed as if right but the case of the appellant was not
considered when his juniors were awarded promotion, more so, when the appellant was not
found to be unfit for promotion. The act of respondents were against principle of natural justice
and in violation of Articles 26, 27, 29 (1), 150(2) and 140(2)c of the constitution.

Principle: Promoting a junior without considering the case of a senior who has fulfilled the
qualifications for promotion is in violation of 26, 27, 29 (1), 150(2) and 140(2)c of the constitution.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf96 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.47

Govt. of Bangladesh

Vs.

M.S Ispahani

40 DLR (AD) 1988

Bench:

Judgment delivered on:

Facts in brief:

The respondent was the son of M.A Ispahani born at Calcutta on 17 September 1941. His father
migrated to the then East Pakistan in 1947 and settled in east Pakistan. In 1952, respondent was
sent to England with an international passport issued from Dhaka by the then Government of
Pakistan. In this passport his permanent address was given at Dhaka. After liberation, he
surrendered his Pakistani passport and applied for British passport on 14.4.1972 and succeeded.
As he was no longer citizen of Bangladesh, government treated his house as abandoned property.

In this appeal against the judgment, order is passed by the High Court Division at Dhaka declaring
the suit property is not an abandoned property and directing the appellant to restore the same
to the respondent within three months.

Issues

hjjhhgfghghf97 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

• Whether respondent will be considered as a citizen of Bangladesh despite of obtaining British


citizenship?
• Whether the suit property is abandoned property or not?

Argument by the appellant

The learned attorney general argued that he or his father was not born in Bangladesh, that he is
not permanent resident of Bangladesh. Therefore as article 2A are not applicable to him that
means he cannot be deemed to be a citizen of Bangladesh. Hence his property is abandoned
property.

Argument by the respondent

Respondent argued that he was a permanent resident of Bangladesh. By virtue of citizenship


order automatically he became the citizen of Bangladesh in spite of obtaining British passport.
He also argued that his relatives including mother was living here and he paid tax, revenue
regularly.

Reasoning:

Though respondent obtained the citizenship of UK, he would be entitled to the citizenship
Bangladesh according to art.2(ii )in view of the fact that he was a permanent resident of
“territories now comprised in Bangladesh” on the 25 march 1971.he did not physically continue
to reside in Bangladesh but on the strength of art.2a of president’s order 149 of 1972, in spite of
his residence in the UK, he shall be deemed to continue to be permanent resident of Banglades,
since Bangladesh recognized dual citizenship .

The property was not abandoned property defined under article 2i of P.O 16 of 1972 because
respondent did not fall within the expression “whereabouts are not known” nor did “manage to
supervise his property”. His resident outside Bangladesh was not prejudicial to the interest of the
country, nor did he engage in war against Bangladesh. So his property was not in purview of
abandoned property under article 2 of P.O 16 of 1972.

Decision

hjjhhgfghghf98 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

By a majority decision, the appeal is dismissed, no order as to the cost.

Principle:

Citizenship is solely a creature of domestic law. Citizens are those who have full political rights as
distinguished fromforeigners who may not enjoy full political rights.

Conclusion:

In the case the court distinguished citizenship from nationality. Nationality has attached to one
by ones birth but citizenship imposed by law.

Case No.48

Mofizur Rahman

Vs

State

34 DLR , 1982 (AD)

hjjhhgfghghf99 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Bench:

Judgment delivered on:

Facts in brief:

The appellants were retired from the service under section 9(2) of the public servant retirement
act 1974 which empowered the government to retire any person after completion of 25 years
without showing any reason in doing so. Appellant challenged the validity of his retirement on
the ground that it was malafide. He also challenged the validity of section 9(2) of the said act as
it gave unguided direction to the government violative of article 32 and 35. High court declared
the validity of law as well as retirement but the court held section 7 of the act to be ultra vires.
In the case of Borhanuddin, High Court Division held that section 9(2) of the act was ultra vires of
article 27, 29 of the constitution. Subsequently, Government amended the section 9(2) of the
act with retrospective effect that had been validated the retirement and also amount to set aside
the order of High Court Division.

Issues:

i- Is parliament empowered to set aside the court decision by enacting law?


ii- Whether court has power to examine law passed by parliament validating an invalid
law.
iii- Can any act of executive be exempted from interference of court in plea of public
interest?

Argument by appellant

Firstly, it was argued that section 9(2) of the said act empowered the government with unguided
direction, providing that government may retire any person after completion of 25 years without
showing any reason. So it is violative of article 27 and 28. Afte being amended with retrospective
effect, it was argued that where the contravention is concerned the legislative cannot pass any
law retrospectively validating an action taken under an invalid law. It was also contended that
government action was malafide not for public interest.

Argument by the government

hjjhhgfghghf100 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

The attorney general contended that the legislature has constitutional power to pass any law
retrospectively validating an action declared invalid by a court. Denying the appellant contention,
he argued that legislative power extended to even where invalidity resulted from lack of
legislative competence or from contravention of a fundamental right.

Reasoning

The parliament has power to legislate validating invalid law declared by court but it must have
its competency in subject matter, remove defect and infirmity court found as ground of
invalidating the law, and validating will be in consistency with the constitution. On the fulfillment
of the above condition, any law made by Parliament validating invalid law may operate both
retrospectively and prospectively. Finding no defect in the amended section, the court was
opinion of the constitutionality of the sad law. Now the court scrutinized the purpose of public
interest. Under new amended law retirement order was made in public purpose, yet the court
shall have power to see whether the order is malafide exercise of power. The record showed that
the retirement order was not mlafide.

Decision

The order of pre mature retirement cannot be taken as an order passed in public interest.
Interference with High Court Divisions order is not at all called for. In the result both appeal are
dismissed.

Principles

I. Parliament is empowered to make a court order ineffective only by removing defect found by
the court.

ii. The court has power to examine the law validating an invalid law,

iii. The court has also power to scrutinize the action of executive whether the act is really for
public purpose or malafide .

Conclusion:

Parliament has no unfettered power to legislate .every law passed by parliament must be in
accordance with the constitution and the guidelines provided by the court.

………..

hjjhhgfghghf101 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.49

Bangladesh ANJUMAN-E-AHMADIYYA

Vs

Bangladesh45 DLR 1993,185

Bench:

Judgment delivered on:

Facts in brief:

Facts In Brief:

In this case, a book titled Islam-e- Nabuyat published by the Ahmedia Muslim Jamat contained
the argument that Prophet Hazrat Mohammad (SM) was not the last prophet and there may be
further revelation in future according to the promises of Allah. The book contained that as a
fulfillment of His promise, Allah sent Hazrat Mirza Golam Ahmed in the first part of 1400 Hizri
as prophet to rescue the mankind. Concerning the religious sensitivity it may create in the
public mind, the government confiscated the copies of the book and prohibited its marketing.
Challenging the decision of the government, the petitioner filed a writ petition under art 102 of
the Constitution.

Issue:

1. Did the government violate the fundamental right of the petitioner warranted by art 41
of the Constitution by confiscating the aforesaid book?

Argument Of the parties:

Petitioner:

The petitioner submitted that they had freedom of religion and expression under art 41 and 39
of the constitution and as such the order of forfeiture of the book should be held to have been
made and passed illegally and without any lawful authority, and should be set aside and
cancelled. The petitioner further asserted that the book itself was a researchical one on
religious thoughts and beliefs, i.e a systematic investigation towards the development of

hjjhhgfghghf102 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Quaranic knowledge and therefore did not outrage the religious feeling of the Muslims of
Bangladesh and did not create any ill-feeling or hatred between communities.

Respondent:

The respondent submitted that the book contained objectionable materials which could
promote ill feeling, enmity or hatred among different classes of Muslims; by the publication and
circulation of the book it was intended to outrage the religious feelings and beliefs of the
Muslims of Bangladesh and as such the government was justified under sec 99A of the CrPC to
forfeit the book.

Decision:

The writ petition was dismissed and it was held that the government was justified in putting
restriction over the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Reasoning of the decision:

It was held that undeniably the petitioner had a right to profess, practice and propagate any
religious belief but he had no right to propagate any religious belief or any other matter in a
book which would outrage the religious feeling of the Muslims of the country. The right of the
Ahmediya community to preach their religious belief was held to be subject to law, public order
and morality.

It was held that, Muslims of Bangladesh are devoted to their religious beliefs and have firm
belief that, Prophet Hazrat Mohammad (SM) is the last prophet and AL-QUARAN is the last
book of revelation and that there shall be no prophet after him. In view of these religious
feelings of the bulk of Muslims of this country, the tenor and theme of the book was offensive
to their religious belief and faith. Therefore it was held that, the book being outrageous and
offensive to the belief of the bulk of the Muslims of this country, the government was justified
in putting restriction over the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Principle:

Every citizen has the fundamental right to profess, practice or propagate any religion, but this
right is not absolute, rather subject to restrictions imposed by law; but any such restriction
must be reasonable. What is reasonable may depend on the facts and circumstances under
which such restriction is imposed.

Conclusion:

In this case it has been established that, the enjoyment of fundamental right mentioned in art
41 may be restricted by any law or order on the ground of public order and morality.
hjjhhgfghghf103 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.49

B S A ASSOCIATION

VS

BANGLADESH

Judgment delivered on:

27 june 1980

Facts in brief:

Bangladesh steamer agents group applied to the respondent, the ministry of commerce for
license for its registration and incorporation as a limited company. The respondent approved the
memorandum of the petitioner after about 3 year of its submissions. Then the petitioner asserts
that the services of a licensed measurer’s department are essentially required for the business
of steamer and shipping agents.

After liberation, as the shipping agents and steamer agents were facing great difficulties because
of inadequate service, the petitioner applied for and obtained a license solely to do its activities
as per objects of its memorandum.

All on a sudden, the ministry directed the petitioner to discontinue its LMD work forth with and
to delete clause 3(36) from its memorandum of association, Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed
the writ petition.

Decision:

The rule is discharged. The prayer of the learned advocate of the petitioner for a certificate under
article 103(2)(a) of the constitution is rejected, but the prayer for stay of the order for three
weeks is allowed.

Reasoning of decision:

The state has power to control foreign trade and, its fitness of things; it should discharge the
functions ancillary and incidental to such. It is the business of the state to issue certificate of
origin for certificate of weight, measurement or quality of goods that may be exported or

hjjhhgfghghf104 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

imported. The state may designate or authorized any person or a group of persons to do the
same on its behalf. No one can claim by way of right to trade or made business out of such
function of the state.

In examining the nature and extent of restriction with freedom of profession or property, article
40, 42 and 47 of the constitution ensures that there is no such qualification that restriction is that
may be imposed by law should be reasonable, though it is to be so with regard to some other
fundamental freedom.

Principles:

The state is obliged to control foreign trade and, its fitness of things; it should discharge the
functions ancillary and incidental to such. It is the business of the state to issue certificate of
origin for certificate of weight, measurement or quality of goods that may be exported or
imported with the nature and extent of restriction with freedom of profession or property.

Conclusion:

The constitution ensures that there is no such qualification that restriction is that may be
imposed by law should be reasonable, though it is to be so with regard to some other
fundamental freedom. In examining the nature and extent of restriction with freedom of
profession or property,

hjjhhgfghghf105 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

Case No.50

PROFESSOR NURUL ISLAM

VS

BANGLADESH

52 DLR 413

Bench:

M Fazlur Karim, M Abdul Wahab JJ.

Judgment delivered on:


7th February, 2000

Facts in brief:

In the writ petition, the rule was issued cling upon the respondents to show cause as to why
section 3 of the Tmakjato Samogri Biponon Niontroner Jonno Pronito Ain, 1988 should not be
enforced properly and as to why the respondents would not be directed to enact law in the light
of the ordinance no 16 of 1990 for the prohibition of all forms of tobacco advertisements and
such other or further order or orders passed as to this court may seem fit and proper.

The two ruled were heard together since both the rules relate to the same and similar subject
matter and are disposed of by this single judgment.

Decision:

It is directed the respondents and the authorities performing the functions in connection with
the affairs of the republic that advertisement in any form of cigarette beedi, tobacco related
products must not be continued in any manner in newspapers, magazines, signboards or in any
electronic media beyond the period of the existing contract or agreement with the manufactures
or their agents.

Reasoning of decision:
It violates the right to life of Article 32 because through the advertisement the illiterate people
and especially the young generation influenced. And there will have large possibilities to become
addicted and by the by their and also the innocent people’s right to life violated, here right to life
means right to sound and healthy wealth life.

It violates Article 18 because the State shall adopt effective measure to prevent consumption of
alcoholic and other intoxicating drinks, drugs etc. except for medical purposes and other

hjjhhgfghghf106 | P a g e
hjjjhjjhhgygt

purposes prescribed by law. As the advertisement was not for the medical or purposes prescribed
by law, it violates article 18.

It violates Section 3 of the Tobacco Related Goods Marketing (Control) Act 1988 because the
respondents did not follow the rules said by this act and they did not contain adequate warning
anyway like displayed prominently the words “smoking is injurious to health”.

Principles:

To ensure the mandate of the constitution the government may take steps to stop production of
tobacco or restrict the issuance of license or prohibit the importation or prohibit such
promotional ventures or prohibit smoking in pubic place.

Impact on constitutional law:

The government shall take steps to prohibit the promotional activities which violate the mandate
of the constitution. In this way the State shall adopt effective measure to prevent consumption
of alcoholic and other intoxicating drinks, drugs etc. except for medical purposes and other
purposes prescribed by law.

………..

………..the end……...

hjjhhgfghghf107 | P a g e

You might also like