Introduction to UTILITARIANISM

I. UTILITARIANISM FUNDAMENTALS (Notes)

II. UTILITARIANISM BIOGRAPHICAL (ETC.) INFORMATION SHEET
III. "GLOSSARY" (MILL READING)
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE MORAL THEORY, UTILITARIANISM
V. JOHN STUART MILL’S UTILITARIANISM
VI. An Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation

I. UTILITARIANISM FUNDAMENTALS (Notes)

1. THE TERM. First, let's examine the term "utilitarianism." It derives from the term "utility." The
American Heritage Dictionary provides the following entry:

utility n. 1. The quality or condition of being useful; usefulness: I have always doubted the utility of
these conferences on disarmament Winston S. Churchill 2. A useful article or device. 3. Abbr. util. a. A
public utility. b. A commodity or service, such as electricity, water, or public transportation, that is
provided by a public utility. adj. 1. Used, serving, or working in several capacities as needed, especially:
a. Prepared to play any of the smaller theatrical roles on short notice: a utility cast member. b. Capable
of playing as a substitute in any of several positions: a utility infielder. 2. Designed for various often
heavy-duty practical uses: a utility knife; a utility vehicle. 3. Raised or kept for the production of a farm
product rather than for show or as pets: utility livestock. 4. Of the lowest U.S. Government grade: utility
beef.

(Observe that some of the meanings of "utility" are not relevant to our discussion.)

In one sense, the "utility" of a thing is its usefulness.

utilitarian adj. 1. Of, relating to, or in the interests of utility: utilitarian considerations in industrial
design. 2. Exhibiting or stressing utility over other values; practical: plain, utilitarian kitchenware. 3. Of,
characterized by, or advocating utilitarianism. n. 1. One who advocates or practices utilitarianism.

In ordinary English, often, to call something "utilitarian" is to call it useful or practical.

utilitarianism n. 1. The belief that the value of a thing or an action is determined by its utility. 2. The
ethical theory proposed by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill that all action should be directed toward
achieving the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. 3. The quality of being utilitarian:
housing of bleak utilitarianism.

It appears that Jeremy Bentham, the founder of philosophical utilitarianism, was the first to use the
term "utilitarianism" in the philosophical sense. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy tells us that

Bentham explicitly says in the Introduction that by "utility" he means "that property in any object,
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness...or...to prevent the
happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness." The rightness of actions depends on their utility; and
the utility is measured by the consequences which the actions tend to produce...For Bentham the

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 principle of utility, interpreted in terms of pleasure and pain, is the only appropriate measure of value
because it is the only comprehensible one. (85)

In the context of moral theory, "utilitarianism" is a name of the theory that is discussed below, and
"utilitarian" is an adjective (like "Christian") that describes something as being of this theory. An individual
who espouses utilitarianism is called a "utilitarian." (See the above dictionary entry.) He or she often claims
to believe that "utility" is the central concern of morals, where "utility" is often used to refer to happiness,
pleasure, or the promotion of either.

2. A COMBINATION OF TWO THEORIES. Utilitarianism is actually a combination of two

doctrines or theories. One is a theory of value; the other a theory of rightness. A theory of value seeks to
answer the question, "Which things have value or worth?" (I.e., what is worth pursuing?) A theory of
rightness seeks to answer the question, "Which action are right?" (I.e., what is the definition or test of
rightness?)

3. THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF VALUE: HEDONISM. The utilitarian theorist typically

answers the first question in this way: only pleasure has value, ultimately. That view, which is associated
with the Ancient philosopher Epicurus, is called "hedonism."

hedonism n. 1. Pursuit of or devotion to pleasure, especially to the pleasures of the senses. 2.

Philosophy The ethical doctrine holding that only what is pleasant or has pleasant consequences is
intrinsically good. 3. Psychology The doctrine holding that behavior is motivated by the desire for
pleasure and the avoidance of pain.

Typically, in saying that only pleasure is good, the hedonist means to imply, not only that pleasure is
good, but that pain is bad.

4. THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF RIGHTNESS: CONSEQUENTIALISM. Utilitarians are

"consequentialists." This means that they interpret the rightness (or wrongness) of an action purely in
relation to the "goodness" of its consequences. Most typically, this means for utilitarians that an action is
right only if it produces pleasure--or the greatest possible amount of pleasure. Here, "amount of pleasure"
needs to be understood as the amount of pleasure plus the absence or prevention of pain. One might say that,
according to many utilitarians, an action is right only if it "maximizes" the net quantity of pleasure over pain.

5. UTILITARIANISM'S IMPARTIALITY. According to the utilitarian doctrine, one must (always)

maximize pleasure or happiness. But whose pleasure or happiness? They answer: simply pleasure or
happiness--not any particular person or group's pleasure or happiness. In other words, utilitarianism demands
impartiality with regard to the maximization of pleasure.

impartial adj. 1. Not partial or biased; unprejudiced.

partial adj. 2. Favoring one person or side over another or others; biased or prejudiced: a decision that
was partial to the plaintiff.

bias n. 2. A preference or an inclination, especially one that inhibits impartial judgment.

6. GREATEST PROPONENTS. Understood as a combination of hedonism and consequentialism,

utilitarianism was founded by Jeremy Bentham. The theory was also propounded by his friend James Mill,
whose son, John Stuart, became the greatest champion of the doctrine.
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 7. CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANS. Proponents of utilitarianism are still among us. For
instance, Peter Singer, the famous animal "rights" theorist, is a utilitarian.

THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF VALUE

1. Again, a theory of value is a theory that seeks to answer the question, "What, ultimately, has
value?" The typical utilitarian answers that, ultimately, only pleasure has value. All other things have value
as a means to securing pleasure (or preventing pain). Hedonism.

2. Critics accuse utilitarians (i.e., hedonists) of demeaning humans, for, say the critics, if "pleasure" is
the only ultimate end (goal), this lowers humans to the level of brutes (animals) such as pigs. The critics
assume, of course, that, "pleasure" refers to physical or bodily pleasure, the pleasure of senses:

To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure--no better and nobler object of
desire and pursuit--they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine….

3. Mill turns the table on such critics. He says that it is they that demean humans, for they are
assuming (falsely) that humans are only capable of enjoyments of the kind available to pigs--sensual
pleasures. Not so, says Mill. Hedonists, he says, have always insisted that humans are capable of higher and
more refined or elevated pleasures than are available to beasts. In fact, the ancient Epicureans advised the
pursuit of intellectual, not bodily, pleasures.

4. Here, Mill relies heavily on the distinction between physical or bodily pleasures, on the one hand,
and intellectual pleasures on the other: pleasures "of the body" vs. pleasures "of the mind." Humans, he says,
are capable of various pleasures of the mind, and beasts are not (or they are far less capable of such
pleasures).
When referring to the higher "intellectual" pleasures, he often refers to "imagination," "feeling," and
"morality." Think of such activities as playing chess, reading books, conversing, writing poetry, and similar
activities as examples of higher (non-bodily) pleasures.

5. Mill admits that the ancients recommended pleasures of the mind, not because they are
(intrinsically) better, but because they are permanent, safe, and uncostly. (That is, they afford various
practical advantages.) This means the ancients did not really view the pleasures of the mind as superior in
themselves (to pleasures of the body). But, says Mill, nothing prevented them from taking that view.

6. That, of course, is exactly what Mill does. He tells us that the pleasures of the mind are just better
than the pleasures of the body.
Here, he introduces his famous distinction between the "quantity" of pleasures (i.e., intensity and
duration--how long they last) and the "quality" of pleasure. He seems to say that some pleasures, though
unimpressive in "quantity," are nevertheless impressive in quality.
Think of CD collections. Sam, the owner of over 500 CDs, has an impressive collection,
quantitatively speaking. But his CDs are in fact lousy, for they amount to endless piles of teen idol dreck.
Sally, the person across the street, has only 50 CDs, but every one of them is a gem: Van Morrison's "Astral
Weeks," the Rolling Stones' "Exile on Main Street," etc. One might say that her's is the better collection. It's
a matter of quality, not quantity. She wouldn't trade her little collection for a million Shawn Cassidy and
Bobby Sherman albums. (Does anyone remember those guys?)
Mill claims that some pleasures--pleasures of the mind--are of so high a "quality" that one would not
give them up for any quantity of other (e.g., sensual) pleasures:
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Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of
appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which
employs their higher faculties.

Think of a magic moment in contemplation of the coast at sunset. Or: a moment in which one sees a
small (and pleasant) child playing with her kitten. Or: a successful session in which one composes a new
song. Or: an evening reading a new novel. Mill thinks that people who have had such experiences prefer
them to sensual enjoyments.

6. But wait! Isn't it clear that most people would rather be watching a Jackie Chan flick while eating a
meat-ball sandwich than contemplating sunsets or reading novels? In fact, don't most people prefer sensual
enjoyments (especially crass ones!) to refined or intellectual enjoyments? So isn't Mill just wrong?
Mill says No. In ranking pleasures, he says, we need to heed the judgment of "competent" judges.
The competent judge of the preferability of one pleasure to another is one who has experienced (and,
perhaps, has learned to experience) both.

[T]he test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, [is] the preference felt by those who
in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-
observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison.

Most people haven't had these "opportunities of experience"; they have experienced only the baser, crasser
pleasures of the senses, remaining oblivious or indifferent of more refined pleasures. Further, they have
given no thought to their own enjoyments. Their preferences, then, are irrelevant; they prove nothing. What
matters are the preferences of those who have experienced both lower and higher pleasures and have
reflected concerning them, and those people, thinks Mill, in fact prefer the higher to the lower pleasures.
Is that true? Certainly there is something to what Mill is saying. How might one criticize his
reasoning here?

7. Mill makes some very famous remarks here:

Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the
fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no
instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and
base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with
his lot than they are with theirs.

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a
fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own
side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides. . . .

8. Of course, one might say in response that, in preferring "higher" activities to lower ones, one is not
merely preferring pleasures. Rather, one is valuing leading a particular kind of life, whether or not it contains
"more" or "better" pleasure. Is it really so obvious that the bookish person is experiencing more or better
pleasure? Why not just say that she is experiencing a better experience. Why must the superiority of the
experience be described in terms of pleasures?

9. Mill perhaps effectively counters critics who charge the utilitarian theory of value with demeaning
humans by lowering them to the level of swine. It doesn't seem to do that.
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 But there is a related criticism that Mill may not be able to rebut. A pleasure, of course, is an
experience. The hedonist/utilitarian seems committed to the idea that the only thing of ultimate value is a
certain kind of experience (namely, one that is pleasant). But it seems clear that we value other things than
things that can be experienced.
A "thought experiment" known as the "experience machine" helps us to see the point. Suppose that
there is a machine to which one can attach oneself which allows one to experience false experiences, even a
false life. Once attached, it appears that one is leading the life of, say, Socrates, or Rod Stewart. One has no
idea that, in reality, one is lying in a bed next to a machine.
Suppose that, before attaching and starting the machine, one can fashion any sort of "life" to
experience. Thus, one can create for oneself a highly pleasurable (but false) life--such as the philosophical
life of Socrates or, if one prefers, a life of debauchery. From the "inside," one won't recognize the illusion.
From the inside--that is, experientially--there is no difference between the real life and the fake one.
Would you attach yourself? Let's suppose that, if you're going to attach yourself, you'll have to do it
for the rest of your life. Would attaching yourself be an attractive idea?
Many would say No. It is better, they say, actually to lead a life--that is, live a real life--than to only
seem to lead one, albeit a very pleasant one. Someone who is attached to the machine isn't leading a life at
all, though, from his perspective, he seems to be.
Suppose that that is correct. Suppose that we really do value the genuineness of our experiences and
life-journeys, not just the quantity (or quality) of pleasure they contain. And suppose that that is no mistake.
That would be bad news for the utilitarian theory of value. For if, as utilitarians say, only pleasure, an
experience, has ultimate value, then one should prefer to be attached to the machine, for, by doing so, one
would have superior experiences (in terms of pleasure). (Keep in mind that one can select a false life full of
"higher" pleasures if one prefers. Being attached to the experience machine doesn't mean that one will
experience only sensual pleasures. Any pleasures can be selected.) And yet it seems clear that it would be a
mistake to attach oneself.
This seems to show that the utilitarian theory of value fails to take into account at least one thing of
value that is not a kind of pleasurable experience: our genuinely leading a life. Again, the genuineness of our
experiences and efforts is not "felt from the inside." It is not experienced as such. From the inside, there is no
difference between leading life X and seeming to lead life X. Thus, if (as utilitarians say) only pleasurable
experiences have value, seeming to lead highly-pleasurable life X is better than really leading less-
pleasurable life Y. That is, if only pleasurable experiences have value, then we should prefer to attach to the
machine. And yet we don't want to do that.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE MORAL THEORY, UTILITARIANISM

Though some of its elements (e.g., hedonism) are ancient, the full theory did not emerge until the late 18th
Century (Jeremy Bentham, Englishman: 1748-1832).

It is the combination of a Theory or Rightness and a Theory of Value. These are two distinct kinds of theory.

A theory of rightness: a theory that is supposed to explain the essence (or definition) of right action. E.g., the
DCT is a theory of rightnesss. It says that rightness is simply obedience to God’s commands.

A theory of value: a theory that is supposed to explain what is worth having or experiencing; the constituents
or nature of the “good life.”

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The Utilitarian theory of rightness is “the Greatest Happiness Principle” (or the Principle of Utility). That is,
according to U’sm, the morally right action is that action that brings about the greatest happiness for the
greatest number (where happiness is understand as the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain).

The Utilitarian theory of value is “hedonism,” the Ancient view that ultimately, only pleasure has value; all
other things have value as an instrument to preventing pain or promoting pleasure.

Utilitarianism as a kind of naturalism: You’ll recall three metaethical theories mentioned earlier: naturalism,
intuitionism, and emotivism. These theories seek to shed light on the nature of moral justification, truth, the
meaning of moral terms, etc.

Naturalism defines moral concepts in terms of natural concepts (i.e., concepts about the concrete and
observable world; the scientist’s world). (The DCT might be called “supernaturalism,” for it defines
rightness in terms of an alleged supernatural event: God’s issuing commands.)

According to the Utilitarian, to call an action “right” is to say that it maximizes happiness. To call an action
wrong is to say that the action fails to maximize happiness. These are empirical matters. (Empirical: having
to do with observation. The natural sciences are empirical studies par excellence.) Ultimately, they are not
matters of opinion. They are matters of fact.

(Digression: it can be silly debating empirical issues, e.g., whether the earth has a moon or not. Go and look!
It either does or it does not. Not a matter of opinion as is, say, whether vanilla is the best flavor of ice cream.)

Some, if not all, Utilitarians prided themselves on their “empirical” approach. For instance, at one point, Mill
seems to argue in favor of pleasure being valuable/desirable by noting that it is in fact desired. This is a
matter of fact, not speculation.

As noted earlier, “ethics’ and “morality” can seem to be arbitrary or mysterious, as though moral demands
come from out of nowhere and do not reflect some unity and logic. The Utilitarians can be seen as going
very far in the other direction: bringing morality down to earth, to what people really want and to something
we can really understand: promotion of happiness.

More detail:

The Utilitarian theory of rightness.

There is but one ultimate moral principle: one should always act to bring about the greatest happiness for the
greatest number.

Thus, the Util theory of R is a “consequentialist” theory; that is, it is a theory that definess rightness in terms
of the production of something in the world (namely, happiness). A consequentialist views morality as a
causal thing: bringing about what is good, eliminating or preventing what is bad.

This kind of theory is often contrasted with a “deontological” theory: a theory that defines moral rightness in
terms of types of action, independent of (or somewhat independent of) what they cause.

Clearly, most of us have at least some “deontological” intuitions. (Do you recall what we mean by
“intuitions”? How things strike us pre-theoretically.) For instance, if my best friends extracts from me a

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deathbed promise to give his money to the Irvine Beautification Project, I will do so, even knowing that it is
a foolish action in view of the much greater good that can be done giving to, say, Oxfam America.

Will one betray one’s best friend? For some, such an action looms so largely bad and unacceptable that it
trumps even fairly powerful moral considerations. The famous remark by E.M. Forster:

Forster’s rejection of creeds.

Three values: tolerance, good temper, and sympathy

Points first published in The Nation on July 16, 1938.

Forster argues that one should invest in personal relationships: “one must be fond of people and trust
them if one is not to make a mess of life”. In order to do so, one must be reliable in one’s
relationships. Reliability, in turn, is impossible without natural warmth. Forster contrasts personal
relationships with causes, which he hates. In an often quoted sentence he argues: “If I had to choose
between betraying my country and betraying my friend I hope I should have the guts to betray my
country”. He goes on to explain:

Such a choice may scandalize the modern reader, and he may stretch out his patriotic hand to the
telephone at once and ring up the police. It would not have shocked Dante, though. Dante places
Brutus and Cassius in the lowest circle of Hell because they had chosen to betray their friend Julius
Caesar rather than their country Rome.

Forster’s thinking is robustly deontological. (A Room With a View, Howard’s End, A Passage to India, etc.)

Utilitarian impartiality: note that, according to U, one is to maximize happiness without partiality or bias
toward oneself or toward anyone. It is a radically impartial doctrine.

Observe that a unit of happiness is as valuable as a unit of unhappiness is disvaluable. Thus a situation that
contains a unit of happiness and a unit of unhappiness is a net 0 of happiness.

Observe also that (contrary to the impression sometimes left by their words), according to U, there are no
degrees of rightness. An action either maximizes happiness or it does not. If it does, then it is right. If it does
not, then it is wrong. (There may be degrees of wrongness, then.)

Thus, if I have three actions available to me, and each would cause net happiness, only the one that
maximizes net happiness would be right; all others would be wrong.

John Jake Jill NET

Action 1: +1 +1 +1 +3

Action 2: -1 -1 +5 +4

There was some confusion about these issues at first, but eventually Utilitarians saw that their view
demanded that action 1 be regarded as wrong, since it did not maximize happiness.
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See also that the ambiguity of “the GHP” is thus addressed here. THE AMBIGUITY OF GHP: If one seeks
to make the greatest number happy, one must choose 1. If one seeks to bring about the greatest amount of
happiness, then one must choose 2. The GHP is ambiguous. We need a clarification.

The clarification: drop “for the greatest number.” It is the greatest net happiness that should be secured or
promoted.

This aspect of Utilitarian rightness is perhaps its doom as a theory. (We’ll see why.)

Later, we’ll see a somewhat serious reinterpretation of the GHP such that it allegedly overcomes these
difficulties. (But then it takes on new difficulties.)

The utilitarian theory of value:

According to the U theory of value, known as “hedonism,” only pleasure has value in itself. Other things
have value, not in themselves, but as instruments to preventing pain, maximizing pleasure, etc. Pain has as
much disvalue as pleasure has value.

Can pains and pleasures be quantified (and thus can rightness and wrongness be quantified)? Bentham
attempted that. “Hedonic calculus.” These efforts now seem very unsuccessful. On the other hand, it is clear
that some pains are worse than others and some pleasures are better, or more desirable, than others.

Mill famously broke with earlier Utilitarians: pleasures should be weighed not only in terms of quantity
(duration and intensity) but quality. (Pleasures of the mind are better than pleasures of the body.)

Again, we see one of the hallmarks of Utilitarianism: simplicity. In the end, only pleasure has value. Value is
demystified. It is pleasure—and that which brings pleasure (or prevents pain). And it is “empirical” in that it
is plain that human beings (and other animals) seek and desire pleasure.

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