Williams’ Integrity: Is The Utilitarian’s Calculus Too Inhuman for Morality?

Alexander Raby

Introduction

Bernard Williams’ article "A Critique of Utilitarianism" has been consistently

referred to as the definitive work that refutes utilitarianism.1 In this article, Williams

builds an argument against consequentialist ethical theories in general and utilitarianism

specifically. According to Williams, all forms of consequentialism are concerned solely

with consequences and are indifferent to the personal integrity of a person, something

that is formed by their deepest held moral principles.2 By forcing a person to reject her

conscience and compelling her to perform lesser evils, utilitarianism requires us to

discard integrity and should be rejected on these grounds, or at least so says Williams.3

It can be difficult to understand Williams’ argument without making clear the

charges he makes against utilitarianism and why they are considered to be effective

attacks against the view. To get the clearest conception possible of the charges made, one

should have a firm grasp of the utilitarian position so that one may successfully relate

Williams’ criticisms to the theory. First, the utilitarian moral theory must be clearly

formulated. Then I will present and clarify some of Williams’ objections against this

theory. Finally, I will explore some utilitarian responses to Williams’ objections.

1
See Sneddon, “Feeling Utilitarian,” Utilitas 15, no. 3 (2003): 330; Ashford, "Utilitarianism,
Integrity, and Partiality," The Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 8 (2000): 421; Lenman, “Utilitarianism and
Obviousness,” Utilitas 16, no. 3 (2004): 322; Smart, Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1973: 77-180; Braybrook, Utilitarianism: Restorations; Repairs;
Renovations. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004: 81. Michael Stocker and Bernard Williams are
claimed by Sneddon to be “particularly important” proponents of the argument that utilitarianism’s
alienation, a central point in Williams’ article, is an influential reply to utilitarianism. Ashford also claims
the integrity objection to be highly influential. Lenman, in his introductory excerpt of his article, claims that
the purported counterexample of Jim and the Indians, proposed by Bernard Williams, is highly influential
and claims it is one of the most discussed examples in contemporary moral philosophy. Baybrook refers to
Williams’ Jim and the Indians thought experiment as “famous.”
2
Smart, 94.
3
Ibid.

1
 Articulating Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is a moral theory that is traditionally attributed to Jeremy Bentham

and John Stuart Mill.4 In his essay An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and

Legislation, Bentham illustrates his view on the notion of utility by stating at the very

beginning that:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign

masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we

ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.5

He goes on to explain that utility itself is the grand decider of all actions, stating:

By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disproves of

every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to augment

or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question.… An action

may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility when the tendency it has

to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish

it.6

John Stuart Mill expands this notion into a more developed one in the construction of

his own theory in his book entitled Utilitarianism. In it, he explains the role of pleasure

and pain and how those concepts form the nucleus of the utilitarian ethical theory.

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest

Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to

promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By

4
Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. Routledge, 2003: 28. "It was Hume and
Bentham who then reasserted most strongly the Epicurean doctrine concerning utility as the basis of
justice."
5
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford:Clarendon Press,
1789: 1.
6
Ibid., 2.

2
 happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and

the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the

theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the

ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But

these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this

theory of morality is grounded- namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are

the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as

numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the

pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the

prevention of pain.7

The “Greatest Happiness Principle” is presented as the core of morality according to

Mill. It is this principle that serves as the foundation for utilitarianism. Still, for the

purposes of this essay, the principle will require some further refining. This refinement

must maintain the spirit of the principle while providing some clarity that may not be

immediately apparent in Mill’s quotation without the aid of supplementary explanation.

U: An act A is morally right iff no other alternative to A would produce a greater

balance of pleasure over pain than A would.

When articulated in this way, one can see how the theory is meant to operate. First, it

avoids the pitfall of trying to maximize two independent variables. It combines pleasure

and pain into a calculation known as “hedonic utility,” which is the result of subtracting

the amount of pain an act would produce for the world from the amount of pleasure that

act would produce for the world. Second, it also accommodates the “ties at the top”

phenomenon because it does not demand that there be a single alternative that has a
7
Mill, Utilitarianism. London: Navill, Edwards, and Co., Printers, 1871: 1.

3
highest hedonic utility. A “ties at the top” case is said to occur when at least two

alternatives have equal hedonic utility with no available alternative possessing a higher

hedonic utility than they do. The definition employed in this paper implies that either

would be morally acceptable, and thus no conflict arises.

A typical utilitarian scenario has a specific conceptual form. An agent has several

alternatives A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5. For each alternative, begin by calculating the utility

for the agent, then calculate the utility for the rest of the world; finally, sum the numbers.

The result is the total hedonic utility of the alternative. Following this method, consider

the following utilities for A1-A5:

A1) HU= 100

A2) HU= 50

A3) HU= 50

A4) HU= -25

A5) HU= -50

In this abstract case, A1 is the morally right answer on the utilitarian scheme, while

its alternatives are morally wrong because they fail to produce the greatest possible

balance of pleasure over pain for the world. If A1 were eliminated from the case, then

either A2 or A3 would be permissible without any problem (a “ties at the top” scenario).

If A4 and A5 were the only options open to the agent, utilitarianism would deliver the

classic “lesser of evils” response, implying that A4 is the morally acceptable alternative

despite the fact that only negative outcomes could result.

Williams’ Opening Attacks

4
 Now that utilitarianism has been made clear, we may move to examine Williams’

unique objection to this style of ethical reasoning. Williams attempts to reconcile ethical

behavior with our feelings and emotional responses to moral problems. Any ethical

theory that fails to do this should not be rated as an acceptable ethical theory. Williams

argues, near the end of his essay, that:

…[utilitarianism] runs against the complexities of moral thought: in some part

because of its consequentialism, in some part because of its view on happiness and

so forth. A common element in utilitarianism’s showing in all these respects, I

think, is a great simple mindedness.8

Williams goes on to say that what he means by simple mindedness is that utilitarianism

recognizes too few thoughts and feelings that reflect the world the way it actually is, both

in the way it appears, and the way people go about their lives.9 This is not to say that

utilitarianism doesn’t recognize them at all, but it requires that we grant them no special

treatment. According to utilitarianism, the way others feel or act in certain situations may

force us to act against our own feelings.10 Williams claims that:

…our moral relation to the world is partially given to us by such feelings, and by

a sense of what we can and cannot ‘live with,’ to come to regard those feelings

from a truly utilitarian point of view, that is to say, as happenings outside one’s

moral self, is to lose one’s sense of moral identity; to lose, in the most literal way,

one’s integrity.11

What is Integrity?

8
Smart, 149.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid., 103-104.
11
Ibid.

5
 The concept of integrity seems to play a key role in Williams’ rejection of

utilitarianism, but it is unclear from his article exactly what integrity is supposed to mean.

Elizabeth Ashford suggests that integrity is meant to be understood in the classic sense of

“wholeness” or a unified sense of self. Adherence to integrity, with this understanding,

will mean that some moral feelings serve as a constraint or limitation on what an

acceptable moral theory can demand.12 They are not to be simply disregarded on such a

view. They create a “moral self-conception,” which, Ashford suggests, is what is

preserved by maintaining your integrity.13 However, we must not make the mistake of

interpreting a moral self-conception merely as a coherent self conception that happens to

include moral feelings. These feelings must not be the result of the agent being seriously

deceived or detached from reality. It must be grounded in her leading an actually morally

decent life. This kind of integrity is called “objective integrity.” To maintain this

integrity, we must abide by our moral commitments and these commitments must stem

from moral obligations we have in reality.14

This integrity is seen to be the central guiding point of morality for Williams, and

utilitarianism would have us disregard it. This is why we must, it is argued, disregard

utilitarianism. Williams’ claim is that utilitarianism is not a complete theory that

encompasses how actual acts of morality are performed; thus, it is not grounded

realistically.15 For example, utilitarianism fails to recognize the (alleged) moral nuances

associated with someone attempting to force you by threats. Williams claims that you

can’t always be held responsible for the actions of others, and your moral responsibilities

12
Ashford, 423.
13
Ibid., 422.
14
Ibid., 425.
15
Cf. Ibid., 150.

6
should not be held hostage by the threats others make.16 Utilitarianism, on the other hand,

entails that there is no limit to the harm we are permitted to cause in efforts to stave off

worse things that others threaten to do.

It is the concept of negative responsibility, the idea that you are just as responsible for

the things you indirectly cause or fail to prevent as for the things you directly cause, that

allows for this kind of hostage taking. Williams rejects this concept by claiming that you

have an obligation to, in a sense, make sure that your hand plays no part in the

performance of ‘bad’ acts, regardless of what others may threaten. To illustrate both of

these points, he uses two thought experiments that are designed to show how we would

be mistaken to disregard our integrity. The first case involves George, our agent, and

chemical weapons development.

The First Test Case: George and the Chemical Weapons

George, who has just taken his Ph.D. in chemistry, finds it extremely difficult to

get a job. He is not very robust in health, which cuts down the number of jobs he

might be able to do satisfactorily. His wife has to go out to work to keep them,

which itself causes a great deal of strain, since they have small children and there

are severe problems about looking after them. The results of all this, especially on

the children, are damaging. An older chemist, who knows about this situation,

says that he can get George a decently paid job in a certain laboratory, which

pursues research into chemical and biological warfare. George says that he cannot

accept this, since he is opposed to chemical and biological warfare. The older man
16
Smart, 109. Williams says that “If the captain had said on Jim’s refusal, ‘you leave me with no
alternative’, he would have been lying, like most who use that phrase. While the deaths, and the killing,
may be the outcome of Jim’s refusal, it is misleading to think, in such a case, of Jim having an effect on the
world through the medium (as it happens) of Pedro’s acts; for this is to leave Pedro out of the picture in his
essential role of one who has intentions and projects, projects for realizing which Jim’s refusal would leave
an opportunity.”

7
 replies that he is not too keen on it himself, come to that, but after all George’s

refusal is not going to make the job or the laboratory go away; what is more, he

happens to know that if George refuses the job, it will certainly go to a

contemporary of George’s who is not inhibited by any such scruples and is likely

if appointed to push along the research with greater zeal than George would.

Indeed, it is not merely concern for George to get the job… George’s wife, to

whom he is deeply attached, has views (the details of which need not concern us)

from which it follows that at least there is nothing particularly wrong with

research into CBW. What should he do?17

The Second Test Case: Jim and the Indians

The second example is the case of Jim and the Indians:

Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American town. Tied up

against the wall are a row of twenty Indians, most terrified, a few defiant, in front

of them several armed men in uniform. A heavy man in a sweat-stained khaki

shirt turns out to be the captain in charge and, after a good deal of questioning of

Jim which establishes that he got there by accident while on a botanical

expedition, explains that the Indians are a random group of inhabitants who, after

recent acts of protest against the government, are just about to be killed to remind

other possible protestors of the advantages of not protesting. However, since Jim

is an honoured visitor from another land, the captain is happy to offer him a

guest’s privilege of killing one of the Indians himself. If Jim accepts, then as a

special mark of the occasion, the other Indians will be let off. Of course, if Jim

refuses, then there is no special occasion, and Pedro here will do what he was
17
Ibid., 97-98.

8
 about to do when Jim arrived, and kill them all. Jim, with some desperate

recollection of schoolboy fiction, wonders whether if he got hold of a gun, he

could hold the captain, Pedro and the rest of the soldiers to threat, but it is quite

clear from the set-up that nothing of that kind is going to work: any attempt at that

sort of thing will mean that all the Indians will be killed and himself. The men

against the walls, and the other villagers, understand the situation and are

obviously begging him to accept. What should he do?18

How does Williams Utilize These Cases?

The main structure of both examples is clear. The agent is faced with a choice, either

to perform act A or not to perform act A. The agent may want to refuse to perform act A

because a consequence of performing it includes the introduction of some amount of evil

or badness into the world. Additionally, the agent may feel that the performance of A is

wrong in principle. If she does refuse to perform A, however, then the consequences that

result from her refusal will be even worse than if the agent had performed A.

Utilitarianism requires agents to secure the “lesser of evils” in all circumstances of this

sort, disregarding how the agent’s principles may conflict with the performance of and

participation in the task.

First Angle of Attack: Numerical Superiority

In all of these sample cases, utilitarianism will demand that the agent choose to act in

a way that is guided primarily by the feelings of others over his own because their

unhappiness is collectively greater than his. Williams says that this is an unacceptable
18
Ibid.

9
scenario. It is absurd, in Williams’ view, to disregard the agent’s feelings merely because

people who feel contrary to the agent are more numerous; in fact, Williams thinks the

agent’s feelings ought to play a larger role in how the agent should act.19 The reluctance

to act in a certain way should serve as an indicator as to which of the alternatives is

morally permissible, and these feelings should not be discarded so easily simply because

of the numerical superiority of the opposition.20

Jim and George, in the thought experiments, are faced with the numerical superiority

of those whose lives they might save. In the test cases, the number of people who would

ask that Jim and George abandon their moral convictions —so that the greater populace

might preserve their own goals—outnumbers those who would support them. To the

utilitarian, even if there were no lives at stake, the simple fact that more would be

displeased than pleased if Jim and George were to act in accordance with their moral

feelings is reason enough to ignore them. Williams is adamant that our feelings are

indicators of what is right and wrong, and utilitarianism would have us discard those

feelings, with which we would intuitively agree, solely because of the greater numbers of

the opposition and not because of the nature of the act itself or how we feel about it. That

utilitarianism does this too often is an indicator that the theory is problematic, or so

Williams suggests.21 Rather than having the morality of certain actions generated from

the integrity and character of the agent, the moral statuses of actions, instead, are

determined for the agent by the state of the world. How the agent thinks and feels in these

situations plays too small a role according to Williams.

19
Ibid., 104.
20
Ibid., 105.
21
Ibid., 107. Williams says that calculations of the effect must be realistic about how people
actually think and operate, which is why he believes that discounting ‘squeamishness’ is the reason
utilitarianism fails.

1
 Second Angle of Attack: Negative Responsibility is Too Strong

A second angle from which Williams attacks concerns negative responsibility.

Utilitarianism entails that Jim and George are both morally responsible for what they fail

to prevent and allow others to perform. Utilitarianism does not grant any special moral

status to the fact that both of these men are forced into a situation by the actions of others:

if Jim does not kill the one Indian, then he will become responsible for the deaths of the

other nineteen. A utilitarian evaluation ignores the fact that Pedro is the one who

performs these acts of killing and not Jim. Williams suggests that it is a mistake to hold

Jim responsible for Pedro’s actions and that the true culprit of their deaths is Pedro alone.

Jim’s only responsibility, according to Williams, is to make sure that his hand does not

take part in immoral acts: Pedro’s actions will be Pedro’s moral responsibility, and

nothing about the situation will make Jim responsible for them if it is Pedro performing

the acts. 22

Third Angle of Attack: Integrity

The final attack from Williams’ essay concerns the importance of integrity to the life

of the agent. Utilitarianism will require that the agent refrains from giving any special

weight to his own personal projects solely in virtue of those projects being his. Suppose

that Jim has a personal project of refraining from killing any innocent people, and recall

that George has a personal project of refraining from engaging in biological and chemical

weapons research. According to the utilitarian, if Jim were to feel badly for shooting the

Indian or George for participating in chemical and biological weapons research, then to

act favorably towards these negative feelings and refuse to act would amount to self

22
Ibid., 109. Williams says: “That may be enough for us to speak, in some sense, of Jim’s
responsibility for that outcome, if it occurs; but it is certainly not enough, it is worth noticing, for us to
speak of Jim’s making those things happen.”

1
indulgent squeamishness. George could have saved his family from starvation and Jim

could have saved nineteen Indians. If they were to refuse, it would have been because it

would have made them feel bad. Utilitarianism asks you to distance yourself from your

feelings and projects in a plethora of cases. For Williams, to demand this is contradictory,

since you are your feelings and they make you who you are. Everyone has projects and

commitments that they wish to pursue. Williams claims that these projects are integral to

who you are.23

This is a different charge from the first one discussed. Earlier, it was suggested by

Williams that the numerical superiority of the opposition should not be the determining

element of whether certain acts are morally permissible or not. In this objection, we are

asked to focus upon the importance of the agent following through with his commitments

and, in failing to do so, the possibility of being harmed. In the case of Jim and the

Indians, utilitarianism requires that Jim ought to drop his project not to kill any innocent

people in light of Pedro’s projects, ignoring his own desire not to be part of an innocent

killing. To deny these commitments and moral feelings that one has spent a lifetime

building up, is to deny what is essential to being a moral person. This is your integrity.

On Williams’ view, to live in a way that is in accordance with your moral integrity is too

valuable to give up.24

In addition, the utilitarian desire to discard such commitments for the benefit of the

hedonic calculus may rob the agent of a flourishing life. To illustrate this, imagine a

scenario in which our agent, Anna, considers three possible paths for her life to follow

before her. In life A, Anna leads a life with a great career and personal relationships but
23
Ibid., 116-117. “How can a man, as a utilitarian agent, come to regard as one satisfaction among
others, and a dispensable one, a project or attitude round which he has built his life, just because someone
else’s projects have so structured the causal scene that that is how the utilitarian sum comes out?”
24
Ibid.

1
gives nothing to charity or to help alleviate other people’s suffering. In life B, Anna gives

a considerable amount to charity but still leads a moderately pleasurable personal life. In

life C, she follows a life similar to that of Mother Theresa, the whole of her time

dedicated to suffering people, thinking nothing for herself or her wants. On the

assumption that living life C would usher into the world the greatest possible balance of

pleasure over pain, utilitarianism requires Anna to choose C as the morally worthwhile

life. It is this sacrifice of self and of one’s own personal desires and commitments that

brings harm to the agent —unnecessarily so on Williams’ view.25

Utilitarian Responses

In response to the first charge leveled by Williams—that of numerical superiority—it

is not clear that utilitarianism always requires following the whims of the most numerous

groups. There are many possible scenarios where the good utilitarian will find herself

acting in favor of the minority, especially in cases where favoring the minority group

would—in the long run—be most beneficial for the world as a whole. It is true, however,

that utilitarians believe that personal sacrifices are necessary in order to serve the greater

good. Utilitarianism does not necessarily require that ease or comfort always be enjoyed

by the agent of the act; instead, it implies that the lives of anyone within causal range of

the agent be improved to the greatest possible degree (from an overall perspective),

regardless of whether or not the agent herself is benefitted by the act. The whole conflict

Williams describes is not one of numbers alone, but that, all things being equal, there are

more lives that can be saved by one action than another. This is not, however, a tyranny

of the masses but an adherence to the greatest good. In Williams’ account, the greater

good rarely plays a part in his consideration, and he seems preoccupied by the state of the
25
Ashford, 428.

1
agent, particularly with his ability to “live with” his actions. Until an account for the role

the “greater good” ought to play in determining the moral statuses of acts is provided,

Williams’ account will remain incomplete.

Note that in another piece by Williams, he does mention that morality would require

someone to act to benefit those who are considered to be in an “emergency situation.”26 If

Williams believes that this obligation holds true regardless of geographical distance,

given the capabilities of modern technology, then it would seem an agent’s integrity runs

the risk of being eroded by the constant state of people’s emergencies around the world.

If Williams is correct in this account of obligation, then it seems to be inconsistent with

his criticism of utilitarianism, since they both appear to demand that the agent set aside

his personal projects and commitments to act on behalf others.

A utilitarian may respond to Williams’ rejection of negative responsibility (his second

angle of attack) by examining the nature of moral obligation even further. The basis for

Williams’ rejection of negative responsibility is that actions performed by other agents

are not the responsibility of the primary agent. Pedro’s actions are Pedro’s responsibility.

But in other writings, Williams’ account of obligation involves being required to help

those people in emergency situations, including those who are geographically and

socially distant from the agent.27 What Williams seems to be saying about negative

responsibility is that it unfairly makes the agent responsible for the failures of others to

act morally and should be rejected on the grounds of this unfairness. However, the claim

of unfairness is obviously outweighed by the pleas of people whose lives would be saved

by a choice to act on their behalf.28 This unfairness is irrelevant in this case, as a

26
Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard, 1985: 185-186.
27
Ibid.
28
Cf. Ashford, 433.

1
utilitarian would still claim that this does not alleviate an agent’s responsibility to act for

the greater good.

Additionally, it seems odd that the presence of Pedro, as another agent, is presented

as a possible excuse to keep Jim from having to act to save the Indians. We can compare

Jim’s case to a modified version of the trolley thought experiment. Judy Jarvis Thomson

proposes a similar “trolley” thought experiment in her influential article “Killing, Letting

Die, and the Trolley Problem.”29 Imagine that a trolley is running out of control on the

track. The conductor, who is a friend of Jim’s, contacts him by radio and informs him

that the trolley cannot stop. He also tells him that if the trolley continues down the track,

it will crash into a group of twenty people socializing near the end of the track. To

prevent this, Jim could pull the track lever, causing the trolley to switch to another track.

However, doing so will still result in the death of at least one bystander who is walking

along that track. Without time to warn any of the people on the tracks, Jim must decide to

pull the switch or not. If Jim fails to act to save the bystanders, he takes the blame in the

absence of other agents. Nothing about Jim’s personal projects or integrity could justify

his inaction. Yet, Jim’s alternatives in this scenario are nearly identical to the ones

involving Pedro. Preserving your integrity, it seems, is only a concern when you have

others to blame. Meanwhile, in George’s case, what valuable moral ground has he

preserved that is more important than the lives he has saved? Will having his wife and

child starve to death make him feel better than if he worked on biological weapons?

The final charge of integrity seems to be related to the question of whether or not

utilitarianism is too demanding. By requiring the agent to abandon his moral self

conception, it strips him from his humanity and identity. Williams may have been poetic
29
Thomson, "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem," The Monist 59, (1976): 204-17.

1
in portraying it this way, as it is difficult to imagine that what one accepts as moral norms

is essential to one’s identity in some literal way. There are many times when one may

shed whole sets of beliefs and may arguably still be the same person. It is even more

troublesome, however, to believe that what makes you moral or immoral is adherence to

a set of feelings. Williams does not question where one obtains these sorts of moral

beliefs; he merely suggests that they are important because they were built up over a

lifetime. This seems to imply that those who grew up in a pro-Nazi family or as a racist

slave owner ought to struggle as hard as they can not to be swayed by the lives and pleas

of other human beings for fear of having their integrity tainted. The Nazi and the

philanthropist may differ on the content of their moral feelings, but the sensation of these

“moral feelings” may be identical. Williams does not suggest how we may be able to

discriminate true moral feelings from misguided ones. Societal norms determine many

people’s moral self-conceptions, and this in turn will become part of their integrity, as

formulated by Williams. Obviously, we would require that the slave owner and the Nazi

question their moral feelings about these beliefs and, hopefully, be guided away from

them. An appeal for them to remain true to their integrity, lifelong projects, or moral self

conceptions would only drive them deeper into their harmful beliefs.30 That utilitarianism

would require them to question this and run contrary to their moral feelings is, perhaps,

more a benefit than a blemish. In the end, the utilitarian may claim that many moral

feelings are of dubious origin, and it is doubtful that they are the result of any intuitive

and truthful grasp of what is moral and what is not.31 As a result, they are unreliable (or at

least questionable) in matters of morality.

30
Cf. Ibid,. 423-424.
31
Ibid.

1
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Lenman, James. "Utilitarianism and Obviousness." Utilitas 16, no. 3 (2004): 322-325.

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Rosen, Frederick. Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. Routledge, 2003.

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1
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