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Edited by

Jonathon E. Lynch & Gary Wheeler


Cultures of Violence:

Papers from the 5th Global Conference 2004

Edited by

Jonathan E. Lynch & Gary Wheeler

Oxford, United Kingdom


Dr Robert Fisher
Series Editor

Advisory Board

Dr Margaret Sönser Breen Professor John Parry


Professor Margaret Chatterjee Dr David Seth Preston
Professor M ichael Goodman Professor Peter Twohig
Dr Jones Irwin Professor S Ram Vemuri
Professor Asa Kasher Professor Bernie W arren
Revd Stephen Morris Revd Dr Kenneth W ilson, O.B.E

Volume 13
A volume in the At the Interface project
‘Cultures of Violence’
First published 2005 by the Inter-Disciplinary Press
Oxford, United Kingdom

© Inter-Disciplinary Press 2005

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any
form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval systrem,
without permission in writing from the publishers.

ISBN: 1-904710-12-3
Table of Contents

Introduction
Jonathon E. Lynch; Gary Wheeler 1

Contemplating and Considering Violence


1. Globalization and Structural Violence
Stefan Bucher 9

2. The Bullying Culture in High Schools


Dorothy Lenthall 25

3. “An Insider’s Look” – A Phenomenological Enquiry into


the World of Battering Men and Battered Women
Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz & Eli Buchbinder 37

4. On Violence From a Phenomenological Point of View


Michael Staudigl 51

Representing Violence
5. Violence and Perversion in J. G. Ballard's Crash
Eunju Hwang 65

6. Being Hit Artistically


Maria Jose Alcaraz León 71

7. Gloom and Boom - Representations of Violence in


Taiwan and Hong Kong Gangster Films
Ying Chih Liao 79
8. Thrill-Kill Culture and the Beautiful Wound
Emily McMehen 89

9. Visual Expressions of Violence and Symbolic Speech:


Gendered Arts of War
Gary Wheeler 97

10. Visual Representations of Violence in the Visual Arts


Pei-Ying Wu 107

Scales of Conflict
11. On Periphery Marginalisation and Conflict in Sudan
Aleksi Ylönen 115

12. Politics, Violence, and Expression: The Role of Memory and


Identity in Guatemala’s War-Torn Past
Patricia Seminetta 131

13. “You’re Old Enough to Kill, But too Young for Votin’.”
Critically Reflecting on the ‘Child Soldier’ Issue
Graeme Goldsworthy & Frank Faulkner 147

Violence and Conceptions of Rights


13. Animal Rights Activism, Marginalization, and Violence
Elisa Aaltola 169

14. The Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain


Javier Jordan & Nicola Horsburgh 181

15. The Terrorists’ Best Ally: Media Coverage of Terror


Raphael Cohen-Almagor 195

Notes on Contributors 209


Introducing and Re-introducing Violent Cultures:
Some New and Some Renewed Insights
Welcome to this e-book! The book contains a total of sixteen papers
from those that were presented over four days at Mansfield College, Oxford,
England, in September, 2004. The event was a conference entitled Cultures of
Violence, the 5th Global Conference in a series of annual events staged under
the banner At the Interface. The Cultures of Violence theme first emerged at
the 3rd conference, held in Prague in 2002. As a persistently important and
popular theme, it became an independent project, and the meeting in 2004 was
the third conference with this title.
Together, these well focused, thought provoking papers constitute an
exciting and intriguing selection of perspectives on the theme of human
violence. At the Interface aims to facilitate discussion and shared learning by
bringing together people from a range of areas and backgrounds, thereby
offering opportunities to hear and engage directly with the informed
perspectives of individuals from other disciplines. We think you will agree
that this collection not only achieves the goal of a broad, eclectic approach to
the subject, but satisfies the need to explore issues in a focused and somewhat
precise manner, despite the inevitable restrictions on space that accompany
publications of this nature.
The book has been divided into four sections. The first of these
contains six papers on the theme Contemplating and Considering Violence. As
might be expected, the papers in this section provide theoretical and reflective
perspectives on violence, and there is a balance of foci on specific and general
issues pertaining to cultures of violence. Stefan Bucher utilises a broad
definition of violence as he discusses the effects of globalization and the
concept of structural violence. Unperturbed by controversy, he draws upon a
comprehensive and intriguing range of sources in order to illustrate key points
in social and global contexts. With concern about a range of basic human
needs, Stefan emphasises the need for tolerance and respect for all aspects of
human cultures. Dorothy Lenthall retains a precise theme, writing about
violence in the form of bullying in high schools. This paper includes some
recent research and presents a selection of qualitative data that is rich in both
detail and insight. Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz and Eli Buchbinder adopt a
phenomenological approach as they examine ‘Battering Men and Battered
Women’. Blending quotes from their own and others’ research, Dalit and Eli
harness clear conceptual frameworks and unpack many of the intricacies
associated with intimate interpersonal violence. Aspects of inner, subjective
Introducing and Re-Introducing Violent Cultures 2
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worlds reveal the intense bonds which effectively shackle some victims to
their aggressors. Though this may constitute a startling contradiction to some,
expositions such as this can constitute important steps towards understanding
the complexities of violence in the home and eventually reducing the extent of
harm that is experienced -by women, by men and by children- in domestic
settings. Michael Staudigl’s paper extends our contact with the theme of
phenomenology, providing a meticulous yet rounded focus on violence,
supported in part by use of Schutz’s perspicacious theoretical approach to the
components of subjective world-experience. Michael urges perseverance with
efforts to analyse violence in systematic ways without either narrowing the
concept or blurring the issues unnecessarily.
From the earliest expressions of violent action on the walls of
paleolithic caves, artists have pictured and tried to represent an understanding
of violence. Since that time human beings have become ever more creative in
their violent activities, matched by the beauty of the artistic representations.
Whether the aesthetic representations are visual or textual, the artist creates a
palpable sense of violence recognized. In the representations we see the allure
and the terrible. Yet, what are we to make of these images and
representations? Does the presence of the visualised action express solidarity
with the victim, the victimiser— or does it reference something else, some
base instinct thrilled and chilled in the presence of violence? The section
themed Representing Violence explores several possible responses to these
questions.
Eunju Hwang explores the attractions and presence of pain relived
and rehearsed in the 1973 novel, Crash, which involves characters endlessly
obsessed with automobile accidents. In this paper, Hwang provides insights
into how one might approach this violent narrative. She introduces ways to
consider psychological explanations for the fascination with violence—why
are we drawn to it? How is this particular instance different from others?
While Hwang doesn’t explore the role of dangerous, yet thrilling technology
(automobiles) as the agent of the described accidents and their toll on the
body, she does indicate forcefully the elements of the narrator’s concerns that
the wounds caused by the violent accidents are openings for a “new sexuality”
of the modern era. Similar issues are described at length in Maria Jose Alcaraz
León’s paper. León provides a historical overview with a focus on the
presence of violent representation within contemporary art performance. In
this case, the artist is seen as moving away from traditions of rationality by
returning to performance as a transformative ritual containing sheer cliffs of
emotional content. Indeed, the performative is to be seen as containing a
greater range of artistic possibility through emotional subject (with clear
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reference to physical and psychological violence or its potential) than it does
through the many centuries of traditional reliance on observed truths and
rationality. This theme of the embodiment of attractive violence, carried into
the genre of film is continued by Ying Chih Liao, whose focus is the gangster
films of Taiwan and Hong Kong. In this genre Liao describes the cinematic
and social complexities of contemporary (Westernized) China (Taiwan and
Hong Kong) through films of the 1990s. The films show the choices being
made by individuals caught up in social environments with few visible paths
for family and economic survival other than through the expression of
violence. Liao takes on this narrative and explores the mechanisms whereby
the films show conflicting ways for certain people to gain a sense of identity
as Chinese and also as individualistic strongmen. The terrible choices appear
to be the additional layer of violence. Emily McMehen most clearly addresses
the questions of representation, modernity, and violence as her paper takes on
popular media with its role in displaying and disseminating violence as fetish
(wound). Within the context of media and its hot-blooded products, McMehen
notes that contemporary cultures gain a multitude of sensory and sensual
relationships to the world of violence: “[f]rom the wound extend issues of
anxiety, validity and identity….” Each of these papers describe the impact of
conflict and violence while asserting the appealing beauty of the
representation. People are attracted despite themselves.
Pei-Ying Wu and Gary Wheeler provide papers less focused on the
terrible and attractiveness of the violent action or representation and more on
the ways in which visual art has been used to sublimate, or at the least,
mediate the presence of violence. In the case of Wheeler’s paper, this takes the
form of examining the roles and purposes of fabric—on the one hand, the
woven textiles and their images of war weaponry, known as “war rugs”, and
on the other, the reflections on the clothing of some Muslim women who wear
the burqa. Wu’s paper describes three paintings and the historical accounts of
the artists who incorporate battle scenes of war, but who are creating dignified
artwork also. The paintings can be interpreted as enabling a wide array of
people, at the time of their creation and after, to begin to recognize and
understand their own violent impulses for war.
Scales of Conflict comprises three papers and are among the most
powerful and memorable of the collection. Aleksi Ylonen provides a most
thorough overview of the recent history of conflict in Sudan and addresses
explanatory frameworks for understanding the occurrence of civil conflict in
the country. Taking issue with the use of a single, economic paradigm, Aleksi
contends that the underpinning issues are complex rather than straightforward,
and that a range of political, economic and social factors must be scrutinised if
Introducing and Re-Introducing Violent Cultures 4
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large-scale violence in the country is to be appreciated. This is an especially
timely contribution given the recent recurrence of Sudan as an international
humanitarian priority. In a paper that possesses numerous similarities as well
as many differences, Patricia A. Seminetta focuses on the war-torn past of
Guatemala, and examines the connections between collective memory and
what she terms the perpetuating culture of violence in the country. Once again,
complex historical influences can be seen to have contributed to the creation
of unique and composite socio-political circumstances. Patricia provides
overviews of some revealing and touching issues which remind us of the value
of efforts to heal the ongoing pain that often follows violence. The importance
of attempting to grasp these and other complexities is the chain that joins
many of the papers, because without a true understanding of the many crucial
underpinning features, efforts to reduce the potency of the violence in human
cultures can have little hope for success. Graeme Goldsworthy and Frank
Faulkner tackle the complex and poignant issue of the child soldier, the
ineffectiveness of international legislation, and the lack of political will among
the world’s leaders to effectively implement solutions which will protect the
young from being absorbed into regional cultures of violence.
The fourth and final theme is among the most contentious and the
most debated in social, political and other circles around the globe. Violence
and Conceptions of Rights offers some insight into a range of perceptions of
violence that is used in pursuance of a particular cause. Questions of how and
under what circumstances violence is perceived are not new, and a range of
academic and other challenging texts have ensured that the issues remain on at
least some agenda. Nevertheless, history has shown us that political and other
forms of categorization are not necessarily fixed, and intricate debates still
rage about the use of violence as a tool to acquire change. In circumstances
that are often -though by no means always- markedly different from
conventional notions of large-scale (military) conflict, how can we
conceptualise the use of violence that is purportedly for rights, when the right
to peaceful life or even life itself is obviated in particularly traumatic or
horrific circumstances? Elisa Aaltola focuses on animal rights activism, a
subject that is under-researched and, arguably, somewhat overlooked. Elisa
challenges matters ranging from moral authority and definitions of terrorism
to contemporary public portrayals of activists, and urges readers to ponder not
only the treatment of animals but the relationships between people, their
governments, law and the pharmaceutical industry. In another contemporary
and pertinent contribution, Javier Jordan and Nicola Horsburgh address
Jihadist networks in Spain. Following a clear, detailed analysis, they highlight
concerns about the potential held via the discrete nature of some subcultures
5 Jonathon E Lynch & Gary Wheeler
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and urge ‘a politics of integration’. In our final paper, Raphael Cohen-
Almagor focuses on the coverage of terrorist violence by the news media.
Setting the specific issue of publicity as the backdrop, Raphael provides
examples from real events in order to highlight the dangers and some of the
controversies that can accompany the reporting of a particularly topical and
frequently emotive subject.
Before we progress to the papers themselves, it is worth considering
this theme of human violence, and the variety of cultural and social modes of
expression that it is capable of inspiring. Why is Cultures of Violence a
conference topic that can be revisited annually, and can continue to attract
many delegates from a striking range of backgrounds? Furthermore, why is
this a subject that is consistently capable of inciting strong expressions of
opinion and providing new insights? In many societies, violence is ostensibly
frowned upon, and those who engage in such actions are disparaged and often
punished. Governments, politicians, citizens, teachers, and journalists express
concern, disbelief and distress about violent acts and their potential to
undermine and destabilise micro and macro social entities. Yet around us there
exist countless examples of violence. Threatened, implied, verbal and physical
episodes may be ignored, unnoticed, played down or accepted. Violent acts
can excite, justify, avenge or ‘not really’ be violent acts. It is because so much
depends upon interpretations, including those of the actors as well as those
who receive and respond to their acts, that there remains incalculable scope for
us to explore, to learn, and to appreciate much more about violent human
cultures. Only through discursive, evaluative and re-evaluative approaches can
we aspire to the goals of prevention and minimisation of human violence,
whether it be directed at those with whom there is disagreement, those with
whom particularly precious issues are contested, or those whom some of us
are tasked to oversee or to contain.
The authors make no claims to instant or easy solutions to human
violence. Rather, these papers constitute a valuable contribution to the study of
an increasingly urgent human, and, indeed, global priority, and form a
supportive framework for the movement towards the understanding and
reduction agenda. Together, they provide an array of perspectives of great
relevance to all those who seek a safer future not only for the young, but for
generations to come. In personal, familial, local, national and international
contexts, violence touches more lives each day, and this often challenging
contribution offers analyses of complex interactions and meticulous
descriptions and insights that will, once again, appeal to a wide audience. As
some of these papers (individually and collectively) highlight for us, certain
accounts, exposures and representations of violence are capable of holding our
Introducing and Re-Introducing Violent Cultures 6
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attention in its entirety; some issues are infinitely complex and abstruse,
though contemplation of the matters they raise is nevertheless rewarding and
enlightening; and the miserable consequences of violence can be plainly
distressing and even utterly disheartening. The supportive and facilitative
frameworks of violent cultures and milieus are frequently multi-dimensional.
The corollary of this is that tackling and reducing relevant features requires a
range of coordinated strategies, not one or two, and inter-disciplinary
collaboration promises a great deal.

Jonathon E. Lynch
Gary Wheeler
Part 1:

Contemplating and Considering Violence


Globalization and Structural Violence

Stefan Bucher

This paper is based on a broad concept of violence following the


peace researcher Johan Galtung, who suggested speaking of violence
whenever one of the following basic needs of mankind is infringed and
violated: the very survival of an individual, general physical well being,
personal identity, or the freedom to choose among various options. This
extended concept helps us to coherently integrate a range of phenomena in a
holistic and interdisciplinary approach to violence and facilitates the study of
cases of violence in the context of an entire “culture of violence”. Structural
violence is a mostly invisible form of violence, embedded in social structures,
thus it appears to be normal and is often hardly noticed. However, like direct
violence, structural violence produces suffering and death. My paper explores
the relations between direct violence and structural violence in the current
development of global hegemonic structures and includes examples from the
economic sphere, where so many people die as a result; however my main
focus is on language and culture. In the linguistic world we can see, roughly
speaking the emergence of structures with an Anglophone “centre” and a
periphery of other languages. This creates asymmetric relations and leads to
linguistic imperialism, colonization of the mind and a loss of languages, which
are all forms of linguistic structural violence. The paper ends with a concept of
linguistic human rights and an outlook towards overcoming structural
violence.

1. What is Structural Violence?


First of all we should clarify what is understood by the term violence.
I suggest an extended concept of violence following the Norwegian peace
researcher Johan Galtung, who says we should speak of violence whenever
one of the following basic needs of mankind is infringed and violated: The
very survival of an individual, his general physical well being, his personal
identity, or the freedom to choose among various options1. He also states that
it is violent to influence people in such a way that they cannot live the life they
would otherwise be able to live. An example quoted by Galtung is that a life
expectancy of just 30 years was not an expression of violence in the Stone
Ages, while today the same life expectancy (whether due to wars, social
injustice, or both) would by all means be a form of violence according to our
definition.
10 Globalization an Structural Violence
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This is obviously based on an underlying distinction between nature
and culture (economic and political structures). Nature causes harm, not
violence. Nature does not act. Humans do. Natural hazards often cause serious
casualties or constrain human potential. But to call this violent is an
anthropomorphization: speaking of the violence of an earthquake, a typhoon,
even giving human names to typhoons etc. These cannot really be considered
as “violence”, as there is no act which would imply intentionality.
Besides anthropomorphization of natural events we can also find the
opposite, naturalization of violence, which is a much more serious matter.
Actually, most violence today is hidden, it is quasi-natural2. As there is no
visible direct violent action, no direct intention to harm somebody else can be
identified3. But it is not natural. It is structural and these structures are created
and maintained or changed by humans. Thus, if people starve to death when
there is food to feed them, or die from sickness when there is medicine to cure
them, then structural violence exists because alternative social and economic
structures could prevent such casualties. One explanation for the naturalization
of violence is that ‘natural’ causes make it somehow easier for us to grieve
and to accept the natural events that cut lives short or constrain human
potential.
Galtung complements action-oriented views of human society with
structure-oriented ones and defines the dominance system in the world in
terms of the pattern of structural violence, where violence is seen as avoidable
deprivation of basic human needs and an inegalitarian distribution of
resources. Like direct violence, structural violence produces suffering and
death, yet this form of violence is mostly invisible, firmly embedded in social
structures and institutions. It is found inside societies as well as between
societies, and we experience them (and, arguably, their violence) as familiar
and normal. Because it seems they have always been like that, these structures
tend to appear ordinary and become second nature.
I am aware that extending the concept of violence to structures might
provoke criticism4; however I believe that the extended concept helps to
integrate coherently a range of phenomena in a holistic and inter-disciplinary
approach to violence that enables us to see cases of violence in the context of
an entire “culture of violence”. And of course there is a political and moral
effect: calling structures violent differs from other descriptions (social
injustice etc.) by conveying a much stronger appeal and urgency to change
them and to work towards an alternative culture of peace.
Stefan Bucher 11
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2. The Circular Relationship of Structural and Direct Violence
While structural violence is problematic in itself, it is also dangerous
because it frequently leads to passivity, to apathy or to actions of personal
direct violence. Aristotle knew that poverty was the parent of revolution and
crime. Generally, those who are excluded, oppressed or abandoned are often
those who resort to direct violence, today again more frequently, as in the
process of globalization they have lost other ways to get noticed or to gain
influence5. “Macht kaputt was euch kaputt macht” (destroy what destroys you)
is a German slogan expressing a highly questionable attitude. Too often
scapegoats are victimized in the process, whether they be people who are
considered to represent the repressive structures, or even other groups on the
periphery, like foreigners, who can become easy targets. Also problematic is
the fact that suffering seems to be very hard to accept and to cope with in a
society where full self-control over one’s life and one’s success is expected.
Those in power often feel they must use direct violence to curb the
unrest produced by structural violence. Structural violence often requires
police states to suppress resentments and social unrest. Huge income
disparities in many countries are protected by correspondingly huge police or
military operations, which in turn drain resources away from social programs
and produce even more structural violence6.

3. Global Markets, Consumerism & Economic Structural Violence


The ideology of the free market and unlimited competition
accelerates the growth of conflicts7. DuNann Winter and Leighton (1999)
write: “As global markets grow, income disparity increases around the world.
Relaxed trade regulations and increased communication networks are helping
powerful multinational conglomerates to derive huge profits off under-paid
labourers in developing countries. The result is horrific structural violence to
workers who toil under brutal conditions”.
In his book Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism, Richard
Robbins pointed out that as long as people have access to the means of
production -land, raw materials, tools- there is no reason for them to sell their
labour as they can sell the product of their labour. Robbins continues:

For the capitalistic mode of production to exist, the tie between


producers and the means of production must be cut; peasants
must lose control of their land, artisans control of their tools.
These people once denied access to the means of production must
negotiate with those who control the means of production for
permission to use the land and tools and receive a wage in return.
12 Globalization an Structural Violence
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Those who control the means of production also control the
goods that are produced, and so those who labour to produce
them must buy them back from those with the means of
production. Thus the severing of the persons from the means of
production turns them not only into labourers, but into consumers
of the product of their labour as well.

Perhaps we should say it turns them into potential consumers, as they often
cannot afford to buy these products. Religious thinkers have deplored the
commodification of more and more aspects of our life; for example in his
book Following Christ in a Consumer Society, Jesuit Father John Kavanaugh
discusses the “Commodity Form of life”8 , and groups together “consumerism
and liberal capitalism” (p. 28). And even consumerism contains a competitive
element, as we can see in Vittachi’s humorous definition of Hong Kong
society: “People spending money they haven’t earned to buy things they don’t
need to impress people they don’t like.”9
Globalization also leads to cultural homogenization, in which people
throughout the world identify the good life with western values of
individualism and consumerism. This tendency leads to the disintegration of
traditional societies which in the past provided meaning and care for their
members.10 One of the genocidal aspects of globalization is the conversion of
subsistence lands in the Third World into cash-crop farming, depriving
populations of relatively simpler access to subsistence food. This means
denying food to the hungry and feeding the markets.
Also, physical and psychological harm results from unjust or
exploitative social and economic systems. The number of casualties that result
from the unequal distribution of wealth between countries dwarfs all other
forms of violence other than nuclear war. For example, the figure for
casualties from structural violence is 60 times greater than the average number
of battle related deaths per year since 1965.11 Thirteen to eighteen million
human beings, most of them children, die each year as a result of hunger,
while our planet has enough resources and know-how to provide enough for
every person on earth.
This is not just happening to us, we are creating it. Today, the
world’s poor are the main victims of structural violence. The poor are not only
more likely to suffer; they are also less likely to have their suffering noticed.
Always, where there is a centre and a periphery, people in the centre tend to be
apathetic about understanding and respecting the people in the periphery.
Noting the fall of the Berlin Wall, Chilean theologian Pablo Richard has
warned us to be aware that another gigantic wall is being constructed in the
Stefan Bucher 13
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Third World, to hide the reality of the poor majorities. A wall is being built
between the rich and the poor. This ensures that poverty does not irritate or
annoy the powerful and obliges the poor to die in the silence of history.
Capitalism is a system of exchange12, based on markets for goods,
services and labour power. As Brian Martin points out, oppression in
capitalism is built into the exchange system, for example in the surplus
extracted by owners, in the alienation of workers, in the degradation of the
environment and in dependency of Third World economies. Social inequality
is fostered within and between societies: the rich become richer and the poor
become poorer. There is nothing in systems of exchange that promotes
equality and the ability of governments to control and compensate for the
tendency of markets towards inequality is decreasing in the process of
globalization. The welfare state has become more and more dismantled,
privatization is moving forward everywhere and world politics comes
increasingly under the control of a single power.

4. Military Hegemony and Structural Violence


The violence of globalization is further manifested in the global
military hegemony. The only superpower attempts to make the global market
an absolute order, ensuring this through unipolar military hegemony over the
world. This situation could lead beyond mass destruction to the total
annihilation of life on earth. The violence of these wars and the weapons used
is often hidden by the terminology: there are “(military) operations”, “targets”
and “collateral damage”. The latter seems to include damage to humans as
well as to the environment. By the way, this would be another good starting
point to introduce the term “structural violence”-as the collateral damage of
unbridled capitalism.
And of course the military is connected to capitalism: market forces
drive the arms trade throughout the world; half the world’s countries spend
more on arms than health and education combined13. Excessive militarization
produces structural violence on a global scale, especially in the Third World.
Market forces are also hidden motives for wars, e.g. the role of oil in the
Middle East. “Market forces” doesn’t mean these forces are anonymous or
inescapable; there are people involved and they should be held responsible.
For example, a look at the Bush administration in the US can yield a lot of
insights into the workings of the military–industrial complex, particularly
dangerous in connection with neo-conservative aspirations for global
dominance. Furthermore, the Iraq war has underscored once more the
arrogance and might of power over morality and international law.
14 Globalization an Structural Violence
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5. The Globalization of Language-Linguistic Structural Violence
It is not only economic exchange that is unequal, the inequality of
communicative exchange is an important issue. In the following pages I will
analyze the hegemonic structures of global communication with English as a
global language. While this type of structural violence is more subtle and
won’t kill people, it causes severe disadvantages, discrimination, exclusion
and threatens identity. These violations of human dignity should not be
underestimated.
A. Global English and the Historic Background of the Dominance of English.
Currently, we witness the development of English as the global
lingua franca14. This is evident in the rising number of people the world over
who use English as their first foreign language. English is in the process of
taking on the same role as Latin in medieval Europe as a common tool of
communication across cultural and national boundaries. However for the first
time in history we witness the rise of a lingua franca universalis: universal in
a functional sense, i.e. going beyond the limited (commercial, religious etc.)
functions of the past and in the sense of gaining a truly global reach, covering
the most remote parts of the world. i.e. some of these are remote not only
geographically, but also linguistically and culturally. In the past many
attempts have been made to construct an artificial global language, with
Esperanto being the most prominent example. However, these attempts were
not very successful15 and Esperanto doesn’t seem to be a viable alternative.
The main reason for the spread of English can be found in history.
Imperial expansion of European and US power changed the linguistic patterns
among millions of people and superimposed English (and some other
European tongues) in many parts of the world. When the imperial nations gave
up their colonial empires, their languages remained16.
B. Linguistic Homogenization and Cultural Hegemony
Today for the English-speaking countries English is a commodity
that can be exported throughout the world. English-speaking countries have a
larger linguistic capital than countries using other languages. Because of this
great communicability and acceptability, English-language-related products
like movies, videos, MTV, CDs, T-shirts, etc. are exported and consumed all
over the world17.
How do non-native speakers feel about using English as the global
language? On one hand there is excitement about global participation or about
being part of a local elite or at least about pretending to be part of an elite with
the commodified language serving as a status symbol. On the other hand, we
often find a general feeling of resentment; especially where the hegemonic use
of this language is perceived as an encroachment over local cultures. Mahatma
Stefan Bucher 15
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Gandhi wrote the following extract in the magazine Young India, in 1921; it
relates to an ambivalence about using English and the interaction between
inside and outside:

I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my


windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to
be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse
to be blown off my feet by any, I refuse to live in other
people’s homes as an interloper, a beggar or a slave. I refuse
to put the unnecessary strain of learning English upon my
sisters for the sake of false pride or questionable social
advantage. I would have our young men and young women
with literary tastes to learn as much English and other world
languages as they like, and then expect them to give the
benefits of their learning to India and to the world. But I
would not have a single Indian forget, neglect or be ashamed
of his mother-tongue, or to feel that he or she cannot think
or express the best thoughts in his or her vernacular.18

The difficulty of identity maintenance and the violent tendencies of the


dominant language and culture are described here in the colonial context and
contrasted with an ideal of intercultural openness, understanding and fairness.
Isn’t it puzzling how much our current globalizing world resembles the
colonial hegemonic situation, and how little it resembles the open and fair
one?

6. Communicative Inequality
A leading critic of the dominance of English in international settings
is the Japanese scholar Yukio Tsuda. According toTsuda, the use of English as
the lingua franca in international contacts does not facilitate communication
because it creates inequality between native speakers (NSs) and non-native
speakers (NNSs).
Communicative inequality is generated by the power that NSs have,
being able to use their mother tongue while others have to use a foreign (or
second) language. NSs are in a better negotiating position: they are fluent in
the language and can concentrate on content while NNSs often have to focus
on the linguistic form which reduces their ability to participate in the
conversation19. This can also lead to linguistic and social discrimination as
NSs tend to perceive NNSs as inferior due to their linguistic limitations.
16 Globalization an Structural Violence
_______________________________________________________________
Finally, it causes NNSs to develop linguistic, cultural, and
psychological dependency upon, and identification with, the NSs, their
cultures and people. “Colonization of the mind” (a term also used by
Skuttnab-Kangas and Phillipson together with “neo-neocolonialism” and
“linguistic imperialism”) occurs as a result of linguistic domination. In their
mental universe, the dominated, “the colonized”, act as colonizers in their own
culture. They turn the foreign power into their own power, undervalue their
own culture, and replace it with the culture and values of the colonizer - this
leads to a new form of colonialism.

7. Other Aspects of Inequality: Time and Money


The expenses for language learning, caused by the fact that people
need common languages in order to be able to communicate, are not shared
evenly. The teaching of English worldwide is paid for by everybody else but
the native English speakers. It continues to amaze and puzzle me how heavily
not only countries but also individuals, especially Asian parents, are investing
in English education. There seems to be hardly any awareness of being
victims. Even in Korea which has witnessed so many demonstrations in the
nineties (e.g. against the Uruguay Round), global English with all of its related
inequalities is taken for granted. But let me return to inequality. It is to some
extent the Anglophone monolingualism20 that forces all others to learn their
language while they do not learn other languages, which saves them time and
money. Ulrich Ammon reports that he often heard American colleagues
expressing the view that Europeans had no chance to compete with the US
technologically because they have to spend time on language learning instead
of working more intensively on science and technology21. This seems to
indicate a conscious choice of monolingualism as a competitive advantage,
which, by the way, would be even stronger in relation to Asians. Personally, I
heard from American colleagues in the humanities that they had to give up
their struggle for common language requirements due to strong opposition
from the scientists in their university.
Finally, Anglophone countries not only save time and money from
not learning languages, they are even able to make money from the learning of
the others: English teaching is a multibillion dollar business for Britain and the
US; linguistic capital can be turned into monetary capital.

8. The Asymmetry of the Globalized Language World: Linguistic


Homogenization and Cultural Hegemony
Critics of globalization have often pointed out asymmetries. The
same can be said about the linguistic world where we can see, roughly
Stefan Bucher 17
_______________________________________________________________
speaking the emergence of an Anglophone “centre” and a periphery of other
languages which is aptly expressed in the cute acronym LOTE (“languages
other than English”22). And it’s not only the language itself which is spreading
from the centre; there is a massive flow of information from central countries
to the periphery which is not counterbalanced by a similar flow in the opposite
direction. This is not only the case with the mass media, but with the fact that
anything written in the Anglophone centre can be read in the periphery while
it is rare that things written in the periphery can be read in the centre.
NSs and NNSs play different roles. NSs are active dispensers of
knowledge, which is submissively taken by the NNSs. This is the case not
only in relation to cultures that are remote or small. I have noticed that many
great European scholars are unknown in the US. The prevalent belief seems to
be “What is important is translated into English” or “If it’s not translated, it’s
not important”. One example is from the movie theatre, invented more than a
century ago in France. Today, 80% of films shown in Western Europe are of
Californian origin, while only 2% of films shown in the whole of North
America are of European origin23.
Apparently there are asymmetric relations in many areas ranging
from academic discourse to popular culture. During the GATT negotiations in
the nineties, one question that arose was whether the liberalization of trade
should also cover cultural goods and services. The French introduced the
concept “exception culturelle” into the discussion of international relations:

cultural goods and services are something more than


commercial objects. This doctrine holds that if cultural
industries were governed exclusively by market rules they
would be unable to compete against the products of the large
media conglomerates. Thus states should reject trade
liberalization in cultural goods and services-film and
audiovisual materials in particular, and remain free to adopt
their own internal cultural policies, including subsidies for
the production and distribution of cultural products.24

This has been partly successful for Europeans and others in preventing cultural
homogenization. While the US urged liberalization, the EU and others
followed the French suggestions.
To achieve equality and fairness in communication Tsuda makes the
following suggestions:
18 Globalization an Structural Violence
_______________________________________________________________
• Linguistic localism: the use of local languages by all the
participants in communication.

• “Neutralingual communication” (third language use): interlocutors


who are NSs of different languages communicate with each in a
third (neutral) language

• Use of both languages: interlocutors speak in their native languages


and compel each other to listen to each as a foreign language.

I believe that “linguistic localism” is unrealistic and its enforcement would not
lead to desirable results: indeed, avoidant behaviour might be seen. The other
two suggestions seem to be viable and actually compatible with the spread of
English as a global language, but not English alone. In particular, these
suggestions would give English NSs some obligation to learn foreign
languages and develop an intercultural awareness of sharing the burden of
using and learning foreign languages. Similar to Tsuda´s second suggestion is
another proposal by Piron, “to decide that nobody in the UN family has the
right to use his or her mother tongue”25. This effectively promotes the notion
that nobody can expect to use his/her mother tongue in international contacts,
and that there is [or could be] some stigma on mother tongue usage, at least in
the sense that it would be against conventional etiquette.

9. A Linguistic Human Rights Approach


UNESCO’s recently adopted Universal Declaration on Cultural
Diversity26 calls for action against the homogenization that results from the
disappearance of languages:

Cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity


is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity
and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present
and future generations27 (Article 1).

The main argument for the need of linguistic diversity lies in the concept of
linguistic relativity which was developed by Sapir and Whorf and goes back to
Humboldt28. It means that language is not just an instrument for
communication, which could easily be exchanged, but each language reflects a
unique world-view and culture and, as UNESCO puts it, the means of
expression of the “intangible cultural heritage” of people. This and the fact
that the mother tongue is the primary medium of socialization through which a
Stefan Bucher 19
_______________________________________________________________
child becomes part of a community make it a central symbol of individual and
collective identity.
Unfortunately, a language becomes extinct every two weeks and a
unique world-view, culture and source of human identity disappears with it.
The intensive spread and promotion of English threatens linguistic diversity29.
The emergence of a variety of “Englishes”30 does not mean real diversity.
Arguing this way would be like arguing that the burger chain McDonalds
contributes to diversity, by including local dishes for sale from time to time. It
is a partial re-localization after homogenization31.
Aggressive promotion of English threatens the linguistic rights of
speakers of other languages. With the human rights approach we can work
towards the maintenance of linguistic diversity by stipulating the linguistic
rights of speakers of languages which might be threatened, especially by
subtractive learning of English or other dominant languages. “Subtractive”
means at the cost of the various mother tongues. They could be learned in
addition to them, additively. Unfortunately people often have either-or
attitudes (if you want to maintain your L1, it means you won’t learn L2 well;
or: learning L2 may mean sacrificing your L1, at least to some extent).
Subtractive language learning as the only alternative offered is in my view a
violation of minorities’ linguistic human rights.
In order to humanize globalization and to create a fair world language
order the following have to be considered:

• Counter-balancing the market-an aspiration towards fairness and


equality (the market is obviously not a level playing field but an
arbitrary and unfair mechanism)

• The right to mother tongue and an official language (important for


minorities)

• Freedom from imposition of language shift

• Language requirements in educational systems

These would be steps to implement an antihegemonic globalization as an


alternative to that being so vigorously pushed by market forces, creating
linguistic and cultural violence. Instead there would be an atmosphere in
which everyone’s culture and language are valued and not reduced to their
market value. In addition, the financial inequalities could be diminished
through something like a linguistic version of the Tobin tax/resource tax,
20 Globalization an Structural Violence
_______________________________________________________________
charged on monolinguals and used to compensate foreign language
learners/users and support other language related services (interpreting etc.).

Notes
1
Galtung, 1969.
2
According to DuNann Winter and Leighton (1999), structured inequities
produce suffering and death as often as direct violence does – I would say they
do so even more often!
3
It is often invisible both to its perpetrators and to its victims. Wherever
violence becomes visible and conscious, we cannot help but be repelled and
strive to reduce and avoid it. Therefore our first task is to become aware of it
in all its forms.
4
An entire range of such critical views can be found in Daase (1996), who
tries to blame the failures of critical peace research on its terminology.
However, it seems to me that the main failure of post-Cold War peace
research, at least in Germany, was its unpreparedness for rising nationalisms
(Balkans etc.) and global terrorism due to ideological and theoretical biases.
5
cf . Beck (1997, 166): „Zugleich haben die Ausgeschlossenen – anders als
das Proletariat im 19. und beginnenden 20. Jahrhundert – jegliches
Machtpotential eingebüsst, da sie nicht mehr gebraucht werden. Ihnen bleibt
nur die nackte Gewalt, um ihre Lage zu skandalieren.” Also Waldenfels
(1997, 133): „Auf die weiche Gewalt der Systeme antwortet eine harte Gewalt
der Körper…” - Besides, this leads to a rise in violent crime; for example,
cross-national studies of murder have shown a positive correlation between
economic inequality and homicide rates across 40 nations as DuNann Winter
and Leighton (1999) report, referring to various empirical studies.
6
cf. DuNann Winter and Leighton, 1999.
7
Actually, the so-called free market is a myth, as it is largely controlled by big
monopolies and oligopolies.
8
“The Commodity Form,” says Kavanaugh, “reveals our very being and
purpose as calculable solely in terms of what we possess. We are only insofar
as we possess. We are what we possess. We are, consequently, possessed by
our possessions, produced by our products” (p.26). Maybe we could assume
an “I consume therefore I am” as the founding principle of the Commodity
Form of life.
9
Vittachi, 1995, 72.
10
DuNann Winter and Leighton, 1999.
Stefan Bucher 21
_______________________________________________________________
11
Gilman, 1983, p.8. He continues: “It is 1.5 times as great as the yearly
average number of civilian and battle field deaths during the 6 years of World
War II. Every 4 days, it is the equivalent of another Hiroshima”.
12
Martin, 2001; Nonviolence Versus Capitalism, Chapter 2.
13
cf. DuNann Winter and Leighton, 1999.
14
English is not only the most taught foreign language across the world; it is
also designated as an official language in 62 countries. Even in countries like
Japan and Taiwan the option to make it a second official language is currently
in public discussion.
15
Artificial or planned languages can actually be learned fast due to their high
degree of regularity. However, while Esperanto is still taken serious by a
number of sociolinguists like Phillipson or Ammon, it seems to be difficult to
motivate people to learn an auxiliary language that serves only limited
functional purposes and refers to no “real” sociocultural context.
16
English is still spoken in much of Africa, the Indian subcontinent, the
Philippines, and certain areas of the Pacific islands. In most areas it functions
as language of the educated elite and of government, commerce, and higher
education.
17
cf. Tsuda 1999, Chapter 2.3.
18
Gandhi, 1921: Young India.
19
This gap is hard to overcome especially for speakers whose mother tongues
are linguistically distant from English who are increasingly facing this
challenge in a world using a global lingua franca (cf. above).
20
Monolingualism is rising. In 1910, one out of every four Americans could
fluently speak some language other than English. Only 14 % could in 1990,
which is also due to the shrinking of minority languages. This is despite an
increase in minority population and demographic predictions that the end of
the white majority in the United States is near, and that there will be a
majority of minorities. Only Spanish speakers have had long-term success in
keeping their language. In Britain, 66 % are mono-lingual according to
Eurobarometer, 2001.
21
Ammon 1994, 240.
22
It should be noted however, that this term has been used mainly inside
multicultural societies with English as the official language.
23
Hamelink 1994, 114. In this regard also: “(…) the competitive ad-vantage
against local cultural providers, the obstruction of local initiative, all converge
into a reduction of local cultural space.” (Hamelink, 1994, 112)
24
Tardif 2002, 5.
25
Piron 1998, 1.
22 Globalization an Structural Violence
_______________________________________________________________
26
Adopted at the 31st session of UNESCO’s General Conference, Paris,
October 15 - November 3, 2001.
27
Taking the link between biodiversity and linguistic/cultural diversity further
is the so-called Ecology of Language Paradigm (e.g. Mühlhäusler, 1996;
Skuttnab-Kangas, 2000) who see a correlational or even causal relationship
between them and develop the new paradigm as a counter-strategy to the
hegemony of English.
28
According to Humboldt the diversity of languages doesn’t mean languages
use different signs meaning the same – they actually refer to something
different: „Ihre Verschiedenheit ist nicht eine von Schällen und Zeichen,
sondern eine Verschiedenheit der Weltansichten selbst”; Hum-boldt GS IV,
27.
29
On the state of minority languages and the processes of language shift and
language loss, cf. Skuttnab-Kangas 2000, Chapter I. Instead of “language
loss”, she prefers the strong term “linguistic genocide”. A comparison with
proper genocide can be found in Romy-Masliah, 1999: “…we cannot remain
silent on the sad fact that the policy of the founding fathers of Australia has
consistently consisted, for over a century in humiliating or suppressing the
speakers of over 270 indigenous languages in conditions which are quite
similar to a proper genocide”.
30
These are variations of English which have been summed up under the
concepts “New Englishes” or “Post-Colonial Englishes”.
31
Phillipson/Skutnabb-Kangas point out, with reference to Mazrui and
Kachru, that these Englishes are not decolonized or deculturized, stripped of
their Anglo-American heritage. This would be as naive as hoping that
imperialism and racism are eradicated from textbooks by substituting Lagos
airport for London and by changing the skin colour of the arche-typal middle
class text-book nuclear family. (Phillipson / Skutnabb-Kangas 1985, 167f.).
Unfortunately, educational projects supported by the IMF allow local
languages only at the primary level.

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Wissenschaft und Politik. In Sprache zwi-schen Markt und Politik, edited by
K. Ermert, 13-52. Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akade-mie Loccum.
Beck, Ulrich Was ist Globalisierung? Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997.
Daase, Christopher ,,Vom Ruinieren der Begriffe. Zur Kritik der kritischen
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Friedensforschung”. In Eine Welt oder Chaos?, edited by B. Meyer, 455-490.
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996.
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The Bullying Culture in High Schools

Dorothy Lenthall
In response to evidence that bullying in schools persists in the
presence of bystanders, this paper reports on a study that sought to add to
existing, mainly quantitative findings about its reinforcing effects. Seeking
and utilising qualitative data, the enquiry sought to answer questions about
why bullying is so prevalent. The objectives were to investigate non-
intervention in bullying incidents by Year 8 high school students. This multi-
dimensional investigation examined emotional, cognitive and behavioural
factors from the bystander’s perspective. In-depth and group interviews,
participant observation, case studies and the input of a focus group of teachers
formed the data. Year 8 students were chosen because this age group is the
most susceptible to bullying. Previous findings have indicated that fear
prevents bystanders from taking action, although this does not explain why
students do not report bullying anonymously. It was found that there are
several sources of fear. Students feared embarrassment at misinterpreting
violence, rejection from the dominant group and marginalisation within the
school culture. They were unmotivated, lacked empathy and enjoyed watching
violence. Therefore, anti-bullying policies are likely to be ineffective unless
the emotional deterrents of fear, excitement and apathy are addressed and the
school culture changes to one where the expectations are that students are
motivated to intervene. Only recently have schools focused on enlisting the
involvement of bystanders to prevent bullying. Since Latane and Darley’s well
known research in 1970 into the bystander effect, there has been little
investigation into why people do not take action in aggressive incidents.
The culture of a school quickly establishes itself amongst new,
incoming Year 8 students. In their heightened state of anxiety, students will
adhere to the norm more readily, and, in an atmosphere of fear, they do not
question or challenge the prevailing culture. When asked, most students said
they would intervene in bullying incidents, yet very few actually took any
action at all, and failed even to report it anonymously. It became clear that the
vast majority of school community members accepted aggressive behaviour
unquestioningly, as if it were inevitable.
The Year 8 students’ induction session at the beginning of the year
makes it clear that there are a number of steps in place to reducing bullying,
and that it is not necessarily expected that they intervene directly in any such
incidents. Possibilities are suggested such as speaking to any of the teachers or
members of the Pastoral Care team. The anonymous Anti-Bullying e-mail
26 The Bullying Culture in High Schools
_______________________________________________________________
system, with its icon on every student computer in the school is carefully
explained.
In spite of this, the students resisted taking responsibility for
intervening, claiming variously that it was not their job, that it was none of
their business, that it would be stupid to do so because that would be asking
for trouble, and that they could end up as victims themselves. Interviewees
also said they would not intervene because they did not want to defend a
person if they had done something to deserve it. They perceived this as justice,
albeit a little rough, and that the so called victim should be abandoned to
receive whatever retribution s/he “deserved”. Students did not view this as
bullying, and avoided responsibility for stopping it if they did not know what
had started an incident. Once again, the risk of being ‘wrong’ and then
rejected by the group overrode the desire to help.
In this school’s culture, both staff and students normalized bullying
as if it were innate behaviour. What was particularly disturbing were the views
of some of the staff, who made such observations as, “It’s been going on since
the beginning of time – you’re never going to change it”, and “If you get
involved, you only make it worse for the victim”. While the latter reflected
their recognition that adult intervention can indeed make things worse for the
victim, it also was evidence of their resistance to making any change. In spite
of professional development training, outlining appropriate ways of dealing
with bullying, changing the acceptance of violence within this culture could
never be easy if the staff were reluctant to embrace change.
One incident, however, provides evidence that aggressive behaviour
does not have to be accepted. A male teacher at the school, “Charles”, held
this view. When I asked him to send to me one Year 8 boy who was being
bullied in class, Charles became quite stern and said, “Not in my class, he isn’t
– no-one is”. Later, I found this statement to be true through the grateful
reports of many a victim.
Teachers’ responses to bullying were much more important than
might be imagined. The teachers in this school were surprised at how sensitive
the students were to their reactions to bullying. They were inadvertently
teaching these new students that bullying was part of the culture, and that they
were somehow deficient not to realize this. The meanings that students made
of the teachers’ inappropriate responses to reports of bullying were interesting.
If a teacher gave even slightly disapproving verbal or nonverbal messages
such as asking a question about what part the informant had played in the
incident, students translated these into criticisms of them not being aware of
the culture. The students translated even very subtle responses such as a
frown, or a slight pause before the teacher spoke as disapproval of them for
Dorothy Lenthall 27
_______________________________________________________________
reporting aggressive behaviour. They quickly absorbed these messages and
resolved never to report bullying again and so the violent culture was
perpetuated.
Students were angry that staff did so little to counter bullying. That
bullying is rejected by Catholic ideals is largely detached from and has little
practical impact on students’ perspectives. The term “anti-bullying” is not
linked in any convincing manner with the school’s Catholic ethos or anti-
bullying policy. The students’ view was that teachers did not care that they
were being bullied, that they did not know what to do or that they had simply
given up trying to prevent it. They drew these meanings from times when
teachers took little notice of what was often quite violent behaviour. One boy
was repeatedly subjected to obscene insults in class. When he eventually
defended himself by shouting at his antagonists, he was sent outside. Later, the
teacher said she thought they were all friends because so much laughter
surrounded the behaviour. In other instances, teachers were far too ready to
accept bullies’ claims that they were just mucking around. The worst situation
for students was when teachers did intervene, but took action such as
punishing the bully. This usually led to renewed and more forceful attacks
from the bully and his/her supporters, as soon as the teacher’s back was
turned.
At this school, staff members were shocked to realize that they were
actually supporting bullying by their apparent complacency. In fact, staff
members were not at all complacent, and were often bewildered by the
intensity and frequency of bullying. They felt that the administration did little
to promote an anti-bullying culture.
The most effective protection for bullying was the code of silence
that surrounded the behaviour. It is already well known that bystanders do not
intervene and do not even report bullying because they fear being bullied
themselves as a result. However, the study found that this was only one of
their fears. The influence of the school culture, particularly the fear of being
excluded from it, was the most important factor in determining their responses
to bullying. They were very afraid of being embarrassed if they mistook
friendly fighting for bullying. Their fear was that they would be rejected for
not reading the culture accurately. This, of course, reinforced the bullies’
claims that they were “just mucking around” when accosted by teachers or by
the occasional brave peer.
It is recognised in many countries that being a “dobber”, as we would
say in Australia, is a label to be avoided by pupils in schools around the world.
However, if fear of being caught reporting bullying is the reason for non-
intervention, then why would students not report bullying anonymously? This
28 The Bullying Culture in High Schools
_______________________________________________________________
question revealed some unexpected information. Interviewees did not report
bullying because they did not want to take responsibility, maintaining that it
was not their business and that it was the teachers’ responsibility to stop
bullying. They said they did not care enough anyway and they categorised
victims according to their relationship with them. Others said that the victims
might deserve it, although it was taken for granted that one protected one’s
friend or sibling, no matter what they had done to “deserve” it. Excitement,
the need to belong to the popular group, a self-image of being tough and a
negative attitude towards being a “goody-two-shoes” were all strong
deterrents to taking action.
Bystanders claimed that they did not intervene because they feared
being told to mind their own business. They maintained that it only became
their business when the victim was a friend or sibling. The bully therefore
enjoyed the protection afforded by a culture which upheld minding your own
business as an expectation because this maintains the fear of being accused of
“sticking your nose in” – a cardinal offence.
Even the victims maintained the silence through loyalty to the bully.
As one Year 8 interviewee said, “The victim says it’s [bullying] just mucking
around to stay in with the crowd and [due to] the fear of being bullied
themselves”.(1) One boy, victimized relentlessly by his peers, excused himself
from class to see me to complain about his “mates” getting into trouble on his
behalf. He wasn’t even angry with them, maintaining a fierce loyalty for his
antagonists. One wonders how much humiliation he would have endured
before he would consider them non-mates.
A tragic example of this was a thirteen year old Japanese boy who
was robbed of $U.S.8,000 over time, and was kicked, punched and had his
face pushed into a river when he tried to refuse them money. Eventually, he
committed suicide. When his father had suspected bullying, the boy had
presented a “close friends” façade and passed off the bullying as just
horseplay. It is very difficult to get victims to leave a group, even when there
are other groups willing to befriend them, possibly because they believe that
control is in the hands of powerful others.
Students felt that now they were in high school they had to be tough
and deal with their own problems. Both boys and girls had the expectation that
they were on their own and could not expect assistance from staff. This was
more than simply a fear of their peers finding out that they had reported
bullying. They had high self-expectations, concerning self-image, being
independent and being capable of managing difficult situations.
It emerged that the thrill of watching aggression also served to
control the bullies, putting them under pressure to perform and to please their
Dorothy Lenthall 29
_______________________________________________________________
audiences. When viewed from the bully’s point of view, one has to question
who is the victim these situations. One girl said she had become the class
clown, bullying every day to provide laughs for her classmates. She felt she
had to keep up the act because that was what was expected of her. Her
classmates even booed her one day, when, after being in considerable trouble,
she deprived them of their entertainment and sat quietly in class. She felt their
rejection keenly and it was more than she could bear. Wanting to get into their
good books again, she resumed bullying at lunchtime with a vengeance. She
called another girl names – “boong” (a derogatory, racist term for
Aboriginals), “slut” and so on. Then she threw large, hard nuts from the
eucalyptus trees at her, all the while being cheered on by a growing crowd of
delighted bystanders.
This girl experienced inner tension. She admitted that she did not
really want to hurt anyone, but felt obliged to maintain her class clown image
as it seemed the only way to please her friends. Her conscience was the clear
loser in this struggle as there was not much she would not do to become an
admired part of the group again. She said she felt a lot better afterwards
because she had reclaimed high status among her peers. Her peers also felt
better because she had returned to her rightful place in the fold. Everyone was
happy.
Recognising the protection of bullying that silence provides, some
interviewees suggested the public exposure of bullying. Their ideas were often
confronting, perhaps reflecting a hidden anger towards bullies. Suggestions
included naming the bully and describing the offence in front of peers, or even
the whole school. Less controversial proposals were: discussions in various
settings in the school, at assemblies and House meetings; involving students in
the effort to reduce bullying; having certain students on break duty and
wearing distinctive clothing; and making bullies more accountable for the
damage they cause.
Taking pleasure in the violent culture, bystanders often encourage
and accelerate events so that minor incidents become serious. One interviewee
said:
People know what’s right in their head, but it’s like they’ve
forgotten when it comes to one of those situations. They
want to see the result. (1)

The thrill of watching bullying is thus a strong deterrent to bystander


intervention. I wrote in my field notes of a group of Year 9 boys circling a
Year 8 boy, pushing, kicking and punching him and calling him unimaginably
insulting names:
30 The Bullying Culture in High Schools
_______________________________________________________________
One of the Year 9 boys spotted Chris and nudged one of
his friends, grinning. The other boy looked around and
quickly called the others’ attention to the small Year 8
boy. This was obviously a source of some exciting
entertainment, and they turned toward Chris with interest. (2)

When his grandmother once picked him up, they jeered to Chris that
she was fat and ugly. She subsequently could not understand why he chose to
catch three buses home rather than take a lift with her. When he stood away
from them at the bus stop, an older student told him off for standing in the
wrong area. He could not win. This child, whose daily life was filled with fear,
still chose silence over getting some help to stop them. When we finally did
intervene, the reason the bullies gave for picking on him was that he was the
only Year 8 student on the bus.
Bystanders play an enormous part in perpetuating and adding to
aggressive behaviour. When bullies name-call, the victims have to endure the
taunts of the supportive bystanders, which serve to elevate the bullies to
immense levels of power. No one admits to having seen bullying and the
whole group galvanizes towards the bully, protecting him or her against
teachers who are trying to find out what is happening.
The idealised type of masculinity occupies a dominant position
within schools and gives rise to bullying not only of girls, but other boys who
do not fit the stereotype. These behaviours were the accepted constructs of
masculinity in the school. They determined the school culture and set the
positions of others in relation to the dominant male. For example, only very
brave boys took part in drama because they were ridiculed. This stereotypical
masculinity is given a significance in the school which goes beyond that
suggested by the numbers of boys who practise it. Some boys take over the
playground and physically intimidate other students and even some teachers. It
presents a powerful icon and students must position themselves either with it
or against it. It encapsulates many of the problems of hegemonic masculinity
and schooling, creating a culture which is conducive to bullying. The
following comment on the culture of masculinity prevailing in a Sydney high
school describes it:

....…a culture of youthful self-congratulatory ‘Aussie’


masculinity, which highlighted standing up for oneself
and one’s mates, against authority or anything else;
physical, especially sporting, prowess; and daring or
exciting escapades.(3)
Dorothy Lenthall 31
_______________________________________________________________
The use of homophobic terms, denoting “otherness”, was a way of
controlling male behaviour and male students were eager to distance
themselves from anyone being called a “faggot” or a “poof”. These terms were
paired with anything which placed them in opposition to the stereotype of
masculinity – even being academic. To be associated with weakness, as these
terms imply, was something to be avoided by boys.
This ideology placed non-violent boys, who may have been sensitive,
creative and not physically strong, in a difficult position, unable to share their
counter-cultural values and fears with anyone. The need to be seen as “tough”
was a need shared by both boys and girls at the school, but boys particularly
avoided being thought of as afraid to fight physically. A Kids Help Line
survey conducted in 2003 highlighted the pressure boys felt to conform to this
stereotype. Boys between the ages of ten and fourteen were the least likely to
talk about their feelings, usually because they were afraid of being teased or
laughed at. Displaying any show of emotions positions boys as weak and
feminine and inferior to the more highly valued dominant masculinity. In the
survey, many of the boys expressed the wish to be able to talk freely about
their feelings, as they thought girls did. They were of the opinion that such
restrictions on masculine behaviour led to a build up of emotional pressure
that often resulted in suicide.
Lillico predicted that until boys are able to express their masculinity
in a variety of ways, other than just the macho display of male behaviour, they
will continue to be the major bullies. In the study, boys were found to have
limited avenues for expressing their feelings. Common answers to the question
of how they felt when bullied were limited to “bad” or “not good”. Even when
pressed, they simply did not have the vocabulary to describe their emotions.
Mac An Ghaill draws attention to the longevity of the macho culture by citing
Willis’s 1977 study, which found the same masculine stereotype existed where
prevailing interests were being tough and “looking after your mate”. Male
students at that time considered mental activities to be feminine, and thus
inferior. Unless institutionalised aggressive attitudes are addressed, any
attempts to introduce anti-bullying programmes would seem to be futile.
These behaviours marginalise anyone in the school community who does not
fit this narrow, violent stereotype.
Girls’ bullying has traditionally been played down because of the
subtlety of the strategies of aggression used by girls, and the tendency for staff
to dismiss their aggression as “just girls being bitchy”. Because girls are under
pressure to be nice, they have to disguise their aggression, making it relatively
invisible and making the perpetrator harder to detect. Nevertheless, its
32 The Bullying Culture in High Schools
_______________________________________________________________
invisibility does not mean it is any less damaging. Simmons makes this clear
in her description of the way girls’ bullying works:

This is the world I want the reader to enter. It is where,


beneath a chorus of voices, one girl glares at another,
then smiles silently at her friend. The next day a ringleader
passes around a secret petition asking girls to outline the
reasons they hate the targeted girl. The day after that, the
outcast sits silently next to the boys in class, head lowered,
shoulders slumped forward. The damage is neat and quiet,
the perpetrator and victim invisible.(4)

Girls engage in indirect forms of bullying behaviour to destroy


reputations or harm the self-esteem of victims. They manipulate relationships
within the group to gain power and set up situations to foster lack of trust, fear
and insecurity. In this study, female interviewees reported that girls bullied by
creating insecurity among the group of friends. They said it was often unclear
who was in the group and who could be trusted. The heightened tension
seemed to provide a challenge and became magnetic, attracting girls to the
group. They reported struggles for power through the spreading of rumours to
damage rivals’ reputations, the revealing of secrets, entrapment, and breaking
promises. These invisible forms of bullying are extremely hard to detect.
Additionally, when they are detected, the receivers of this emotional
aggression often do not want any action taken because that would threaten
their tenuous positions within the group. Girls frequently have better social
skills than boys, so these subtle strategies of aggression are usually found
within the repertoires of girls in schools. However, when boys enter
adulthood, they, too are expected to be nice, so their aggression also needs to
be disguised. As they acquire better social skills they employ the same, subtle,
aggressive techniques.
Another reason for students not reporting bullying anonymously was
that they simply did not care enough. Within the school’s bullying culture, it
was alright to be surrounded by verbal and physical aggression, as long as it
was happening to someone else. In-depth interviewing did reveal, however,
that they did not like bullying. Students agreed that there was a lack of
empathy, but thought that an empathic school culture could be achieved by
teaching empathy, especially through role-plays.
It is clear that the potential to make a real change lies with the
students, but without empathy it would be difficult to motivate bystanders to
help. With this in mind, Salmivalli et al devised a role-play activity which
Dorothy Lenthall 33
_______________________________________________________________
requires five players – the bully, the victim, the defender, the reinforcer and
the outsider. In the first role play, the players support the bully. Then the role-
play is reversed and they support the victim. This role play is a powerful way
to show the role of the bystanders in controlling what actually happens in the
playground. Participants experience the emotional state of each player and
they feel the swing of power, which can just as easily be towards the victim,
thus rejecting and controlling the bully’s aggressive behaviour. Anti-bullying
measures now need to go several steps further - past the obvious, into the
minds of students, who are, after all, the experts - and address those more
subtle factors that act as barriers to bystander intervention.
Victim empowerment helps the victim to gain confidence, become
independent and resist bullying. Some programmes teach the victims how to
answer bullies, to disarm and confuse them, thus reducing their power. This is
an area where more research is urgently needed. Maines and Robinson’s well-
known No Blame Approach needs to be adopted by all staff members when
dealing with bullying. Most students are remorseful about their bullying, if
they are given the opportunity to reflect on their aggression without blame.
Critical to the creation of a non-violent, peaceful culture is the visible
involvement of the whole school community. The perception of students in
this study, however, was that they had no support from the principal, teachers,
non-teaching staff and the entire student body. Information-based anti-
bullying policies will therefore be ineffective unless students are motivated to
intervene. It is crucial that programmes now address the emotional deterrents
of fear, embarrassment, group affiliation, excitement and apathy. Future
policies need to examine the culture of the school, which dictates the
behavioural code for incoming Year 8 students.
There are millions of children in schools suffering from the effects of
bullying – they are victims, bystanders and bullies. Children often take their
experiences with them into adulthood and perpetuate them. Many victims
suffer from post-traumatic stress, have reduced academic performance and
suffer long-term psychological and physiological distress. Bystanders also
suffer, experiencing stress when confronted with bullying. Schools are an
excellent training ground for adult bullying behaviour and the acceptance of a
violent culture as normal.
The perception in many communities may be that bullying is a
problem that only effects schools, but it is an issue that extends much further
than this. School bullies grow up to be adult bullies: one in four male bullies
can expect to have a criminal record by the age of thirty and they are likely to
have convictions for violent crime, to be abusive to their wives and children,
34 The Bullying Culture in High Schools
_______________________________________________________________
and to have children who bully. In other words, the bully suffers as well as the
victim. Some bullies endure the pain of remorse:

Some guys think teasing makes them happy but in the


end they’re going to look back and say, ‘What have I
done?’(5)

Our communities worldwide are suffering from domineering,


aggressive and bullying behaviour and it is clear that schools must play a key
role in addressing this problem. By putting the whole school community
culture under the magnifying glass, committing to make changes and enlisting
the free advice of world experts, schools can create cultures of peace, where
students tap bullies on the shoulder and say, “Excuse me, we don’t do bullying
at our school”.

Notes
1
Lenthall, 2004, 203
2
Ibid, 205
3
Walker, 1988, 3
4
Simmons, 2002, 4
5
Martino & Pallotta-Chiarolli, 2001, 124

Bibliography
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California: Open University Press, 1988.
Besag, V. Bullies and Victims in Schools, Bristol: Open University Press,
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Besag, V., Keynote Speaker, School Psychologists Association of Western
Australia (Inc.) Conference. Perth, Western Australia, 2002.
Bjorkvist, K., Lagerspetz, K.M.J., and Kaukainen, A. “Do Girls Manipulate
and Boys Fight? Developmental Trends in Regard to Direct and Indirect
Aggression”, Aggressive Behaviour 18 (1992): 117-127.
Crick, N.R. & Grotpeter, J.K. “Relational Aggression: Gender and Social-
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“Aggression and its Correlates Over 22 years”. In Childhood Aggression and
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Allen & Unwin, 1998.
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Worlds of Adolescent Girls at Emma Willard School, Cambridge,
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Schools, Doctorate Thesis, Geelong, Vic: Deakin University, 2004.
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Mac An Ghaill, M. The Making of Men: Masculinities, Sexualities and
Schooling, Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1994.
Maines, B. & Robinson, G. The No Blame Approach. Bristol: Lame Duck
Publishing, 1992.
Martino, W. & Pallotta-Chiarolli, M. Boys’ Stuff. Sydney: Allen & Unwin,
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Adolescence 24 (2001): 15-23.
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A. “Bullying as a Group Process: Participant Roles and Their Relations to
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Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988.
“An Insider’s Look” – A Phenomenological Enquiry into the
World of Battering Men and Battered Women

Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz and Eli Buchbinder


This paper attempts to integrate a number of key concepts designed
to aid workers in understanding the multi-layers of intimate violence, as
perceived by those who experience it, namely battering men and battered
women. The concepts are based primarily on the phenomenological approach,
which maintains that understanding the experience of those involved in
intimate violence is solely conditional on the assumption that the world is
perceived subjectively and in a variety of forms, and that there is no single
correct and predetermined way of understanding and experiencing violence in
intimate relationships (1). Moreover, the subjective understanding is a crucial
phase in intervening. The paper leans on research conducted by the authors
and other researchers in accordance with the phenomenological tradition,
which places emphasis on a person’s lived experience and the significance of
this experience to him or her. The correctness of the phenomenological
statement is independent of other statements or facts, but rather seeks to
provide as accurate a description as possible of the phenomenon it seeks to
describe (2). In the course of our research and therapy we seek to gain an
understanding of violence from the “inside”, that is to say, how those involved
articulate the violence and explain it to themselves. How do they experience
their states in a violent setting – do they perceive themselves as victims or
aggressors, or do they perhaps experience themselves in both states? What
characterizes their emotional worlds and their perceptions of self? And in
general terms, what are “their stories”? We hope that this paper can provide an
opportunity for workers to understand complex situations on a ‘both/and’
level, and not only an ‘either/or’ approach (3).
The citations presented here are not necessarily “representative”,
since phenomenological research is always grounded in specific contexts.
Through citations and examples the authors seek to explain and demonstrate
the dialogue that can be created between the theoretical concept and the
citation, thus gaining a more profound understanding of violence.
Consequently, we are employing a number of principal concepts from the
phenomenological theory. The first concept is that of language, which is
recognized as the principal means by which experiences and inner meanings
are revealed and actualized, as well as relations with the “outside world”,
namely the other. The second concept is emotion, which scholars from the
phenomenological tradition (as well as from the phenomenological-
38 “An Insider’s Look”
_______________________________________________________________
existentialist school) view as the best and most authentic definer of existence
and reality (4). The third concept is intentionality. Thought, willpower, and
emotions are all directed towards one object or another, either real or
imagined. Intentionality is one of the principal concepts employed in the
efforts to understand how the inner language of emotions is directed towards
one object or another outside the self, and is actively manifested in language
and behaviour.

1. Language Use
Language constitutes the key to creating meanings. Through its
symbolic qualities, language makes it possible for people to organize,
describe, and give meaning to their experiences, behaviours, and the totality of
their existence (5). Language is not only a means of communication, it also
creates a reality that exists both internally in a person’s world and self-
perception, and externally in his or her verbal interactions with others.
Language labels and frames experiences and thus directs our experiences time
after time (6) (7).
Employing language to understand the phenomenon of intimate
violence is particularly significant since the structure of language allows us to
focus on two discrete aspects. The first is in the structural tradition that
focuses on sociocultural constructs as a basis for conceptualizing and
understanding the world, for instance by employing cultural references as a
means to accord social justification to violence. A good example is the
following statement by a battering man:

With us oriental Jews there’s a lot of respect for tradition.


It is written that “He that spareth his rod hateth his
son”, which means that first of all you have to educate
the ones you love most. That’s why I’ll say again that it
[the violence aimed at his wife] comes from love,
from caring”. (8)

The speaker uses the words of the bible as a cultural reference that is used to
bridge between two seemingly contradicting phenomena: his violence towards
his wife and his love for her (9).
The second aspect examines the subjective experience as a basis for
inquiry in the various human sciences. For example, analysis of the language
employed by batterers reveals three main categories of metaphors. The first of
these is war metaphors that are employed to describe structured conflict and
violence. “She knows where my weaknesses are… but believe me I also know
Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz & Eli Buchbinder 39
_______________________________________________________________
her weaknesses” (10). Or a further example: “There was no equality between
us. It was either ‘I win and you lose, or you lose and I win’ ” (11). Intimacy is
portrayed as a battlefield on which each side tries to identify and target the
other’s weaknesses. The experience of war transforms the relationship into
one that has only one possible course – victory or defeat.
The second category is self metaphors that are employed to portray
the self and the inner world as a “dangerous place” and a zone of conflicts. It
is described thus by a battering man: “I felt like I was exploding in that instant
when I hit her. (Interviewer: What do you mean by exploding? What did you
feel?) It’s something inside you that you can’t stop, I can’t control myself in
that instant, can’t control myself…”. The man uses explosives to describe the
inner world that forms prior to the violent incident. Emotions are processed
into a metaphorical perception of explosives amassing tremendous, dangerous,
and uncontrollable strength. The man describes his inability to contain his
emotions; his inner space seemingly disengages from the self, and is
transformed into a threat, a powerful enemy of itself. His inner self cannot
control the outer, violent, self.
Thirdly, metaphors that are used to describe halting the escalation
and a return to equilibrium. For example, the account of a violent man in
reference to the conclusion of a violent incident: “…I told her, do you want us
to stop fighting and go back to being OK? I’ll watch my hands and you watch
your mouth”. The man relates to violence through limbs and organs that
metaphorically become weapons. Just as the violence is dependent on limbs
and organs, consequently reducing the violence and danger is also dependent
upon them (12).
Various studies show that men employ heroic language to describe
violent incidents with other men, and their descriptions are detailed even when
they are the losers in the struggle. In contrast, when they describe outbursts of
violence towards their partners they “shed” the heroic words and details, and
descriptions of injuries and blood, and the language becomes sparse, shrouded
in silences, and characterized by difficulty of expression and minimization of
the severity of injury (13).
An additional role played by language is to describe and frame
expectations. Explanations are a linguistic ploy used to bridge between
aberrant behaviours and normative expectations. The literature describes two
types of explanations: excuses and justifications (14), which are employed
when a person is accused of acting improperly or immorally. Justifications are
explanations in which a person accepts responsibility for the act but considers
it justified. For example: “I always hated myself for being violent, I swore I’d
never be like that. My excuse was always that she made me do it… I knew
40 “An Insider’s Look”
_______________________________________________________________
deep down that it wasn’t true but it granted me the permission to do it [be
violent]” (15). The man recognizes that he has been violent but denies that the
act is immoral and justifies it by saying that the victim deserved what she got.
Excuses are explanations in which the person recognizes that his act was
improper, but denies full responsibility for it. For example: “I pushed her
unintentionally. She hit her head on the wall, fell down and lost consciousness.
Don’t think I did it on purpose, it just turned out that way…”. Or a similar
excuse by a battered woman: “Sometimes he pushes me because he’s freaking
out… but he doesn’t really mean to hit me” (16).

2. Intentionality
The literature on phenomenology speaks extensively of a concept
termed “intentionality” as a central component of understanding human
action. Intentionality means that statements describing the essence of human
experience and behaviour can only be made about actions performed with
intention (17). The word “intentionality” does not refer to directing intention
towards an object, but is rather an adjective attributed to an intentional act, and
simply stated could be said to mean “done intentionally”. Four questions
should be posed regarding intentional acts: (1) Who performed the intentional
act? (i.e. who has acted?); (2) What was the act? (i.e., the action or a
description of the action); (3) Who or what was the action directed at? (i.e. the
object of the action); (4) In what conditions or situations was the particular act
performed towards the particular object (i.e. the conditions or contexts of the
act)? Acts of intentionality are distinctive in that they describe an act that is
performed intentionally and consciously. The question of whether a particular
description is correct or not is not examined according to any “objective”
truth, but according to the account provided by the person who has performed
the act and the nature of the act. For example: “I felt that I was always hitting
her after she nagged and irritated me”. It is impossible to judge or evaluate the
correctness of this statement according to “external” knowledge or facts -a
contradictory statement by the woman, for example- since it is the inner
intentionality (in this instance, the feeling of the subject) pertaining to the
circumstances of the act (violence towards his wife when he felt she was
nagging or irritating him) that is relevant to and true of this statement.
Consequently, the correctness or incorrectness of a statement that describes
intentionality cannot be empirically proved (17 [sic]). This is apparently what
Sartre meant when he claimed that science is concerned with facts, whereas
phenomenology deals with the knowledge of essences (18).
Violence is considered an intentional act insofar as it constitutes a
means through which people choose to react to meanings of their inner world,
Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz & Eli Buchbinder 41
_______________________________________________________________
and, equally, to react to their own interpretation of the actions of others. The
concept of intentionality enables us to understand how the woman or the man
frames the interaction between them and their being in the world (19). Thus,
we can understand, for example, the man’s interpretation of his violence as
resulting from his experiencing himself in the world as the woman’s victim. In
the words of a violent man:

Women can be verbally violent against you, they can skin


you alive without laying even a finger on you, the way
women know how to speak, to talk. But men don’t know
this. Well, they haven’t been brought up to talk as much
as women have, to talk like women have learned to do. So
I’d escape into violence when I couldn’t reach her with
words, I felt lost, weak (20).

The subject perceives himself as a victim (“I felt lost, weak…”), as


being skinned and not having the tools to cope with the injury (“Men don’t
know this”), and therefore being exposed (it is no coincidence that he uses the
metaphor of “being skinned”). He presents the fact of being violent against his
partner as an “escape into violence”, a result of being a “lost” and “weak”
victim. The subject in this instance, who is a violent man, presents the
performer of the act (himself) as a weak and lost victim; his violence as an act
of escaping from attack; the object (his wife) towards whom the violence is
directed as belonging to a powerful and dangerous group (“they can skin you
alive without laying even a finger on you”); and his situation as one of
inferiority (“Men don’t know this… they haven’t been brought up to talk”)
and emotional weakness (“…when I couldn’t reach her with words, I felt lost,
weak”).
Violence can also be presented as an automatic reaction that the
attacker cannot control. In the words of another battering man:

When I lose it it’s like it isn’t me. Do you understand? When


I’m not in that state, when I’m not irritated, I’m completely
different, I’m a really good person… That night when I hit
her I was so out of control that I don’t even remember
hitting her… Many times when I get angry I black out
and I don’t know what’s happened until someone tells me.(21)

In this instance, the subject presents the act as unintentional and does not
accept responsibility for it. He does this both by renouncing the performer of
42 “An Insider’s Look”
_______________________________________________________________
the act (“It’s like it isn’t me”) and by blaming the situation he is in (“When I
lose it” and “I black out”).
For the battered woman, intentionality can be constructed by means
of the way in which she perceives the incidents as constituting an element of
the gender roles, and her perception of her obligations as a woman. For
instance, her beliefs vis-à-vis her fidelity, and her feelings towards the attacker
and the integrity of the family are liable to keep her in the violent relationship.
Together they serve as her explanation for doing so. In the words of one
woman:

It’s not that I, God forbid, rejected him [in the marital
bed]. This man, even now, after everything he’s done
to me, I still love him… He’s deep down inside me and
I can’t just come and cross him out in one day. It’ll take
some time (22).

Or in the words of another battered woman:

I think there’s a lot of connection between love and


violence: I mean violence, it brings a couple closer
because if he beats her then he obviously cares, loves
the woman, he wants everything to be all right with
her… I don’t accept beatings with love, that’s for sure,
but I think it happens because of love (23).

Both women describe their love for the battering man and the fact
that they remain with him as the result of choice. With the first woman, this
stems from love originating in a profound sense of belonging - “He’s deep
down inside me”. With the second, violence is perceived as a sign and
evidence of her partner caring for her, “Because if he beats her then he
obviously cares”. In both instances, the intentional act (i.e. remaining with the
battering partner) is presented as bound to an emotional state (love) that is
constructed as part of her understanding of the relationship. The group
comprised women who were already divorced from their violent husbands,
women who were separated from their husbands (most were in the process of
divorce), and four married women (one married for the second time). They
were asked about their experiences in their families of origin and their lives in
the present (24). Most of the women presented their narrative as a progressive
one. Despite the difficulties, fears, continuing conflicts, unresolved feelings,
and the financial cost entailed in the struggle for survival, and loneliness, these
women experience their lives as clearer, more structured, and bearing greater
Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz & Eli Buchbinder 43
_______________________________________________________________
hope than in the past. It can be said that schematically, the curve of this
group’s life story inclines upwards.

3. Summary
This paper aimed to present the inner, subjective world of individuals
involved in intimate violence. Domestic violence occurs within the day-to-day
routines of raising children, relating to the extended family and to friends,
employment, and other contexts. Understanding the day-to-day lives of each
couple necessitates examination of the descriptive aspect and the meanings
ascribed to the life they share. We have endeavoured to illustrate how use of
language constructs meanings and explanations that bridge the gap between
expectations and reality. It is important to remember that although it is the
aggressor who bears full responsibility for the violence, there are two partners
involved in intimate violence against women: the aggressors and the victims.
Yet while they seemingly represent opposing interests, they are bound to one
another by an unbreakable bond. Consequently, each constructs a whole inner
world. The dialogue with the inner world of battering men and battered
women reveals the complexity of the human soul, which is not only “the head
behind the striking hand” or “the emotion behind the suffering body”. Our
purpose is to present a deeper and more complete view of the inner context
that shapes life in a violent ecology.

Notes
1. Eisikovits & Buchbinder, 1996
2. Becker, 1992
3. Goldner, 1992
4. Denzin, 1984
5. Berger & Kellner, 1975
6. Akillas & Effan, 1989
7. Effran, 1994
8. Yassour, 1994, p.56
9. Yassour-Borochowitz & Eisikovits, 2002
10. Eisikovitz & Buchbinder, 1997, p.488
11. Reitz, 1999, p.151
12. Eisikovitz & Buchbinder, 1997
13. Yassour-Borochowitz, 2003
14. Scott & Lyman, 1968
44 “An Insider’s Look”
_______________________________________________________________
15. Gondlof & Hanneken, 1987, p.182
16. Eisikovits, Goldblatt & Winstock, 1999, p.610
17. Schmitt, 1972
18. Sartre, 1963
19. Spinelli, 1989
20. Ptacek, 1988, p.145
21. Reitz, 1999, p.158
22. Kacen, 2000, p.149
23. Yassour, 1994, p.104
24. Buchbinder, 2001
25. Berger & Luckmann, 1971
26. Eisikovits & Edelson, 1986
27. Eisikovits, Goldblatt & Winstock, 1999
28. e.g. Shupe, Stacy & Hazelwood, 1987
29. Kacen, 2000, p.133
30. Dutton, 1996

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Appendix
1. Language
Couples in intimate relationships develop a common language in
addition to shared history and experiences. In order to preserve their
relationship, the couple needs justifications that are acceptable to both
partners, for these justifications become the cornerstone of their
intersubjective world (25). For couples who live with violence, personal and
shared justifications constitute the bridge that enables them to link between the
normative expectations of a tranquil and secure family life and their violent
reality, between ambivalent emotions and violent incidents. Various studies
conducted in Israel among couples cohabiting in violence show high degrees
of similarity between the explanations of each partner vis-à-vis the causes and
48 “An Insider’s Look”
_______________________________________________________________
evolvement of violence. An ongoing negotiation apparently exists between
them, which creates a common language and shared categories of
interpretation that reflect the lives of the couple in violence (26) (27).

2. Emotion
For example, shame as a central emotion associated with violence
among couples. For batterers, shame is an emotional experience that places
them in a position of inferiority and vulnerability on a personal, interpersonal,
and social level. The abuser judges himself as being weak and a loser, and his
female partner as the source of and reason for his vulnerability. From a social
perspective, he experiences himself as being deviant. For the battered woman,
shame may be the root for being a victim. She frequently judges herself as
being the cause of the violence and experiences feelings of shame for
remaining in the violent home. As such, she also feels shame and guilt for
being unable to competently protect herself and her children. Her sense of
shame frequently causes her to keep the violence a secret and refrain from
appealing for help or support from her environment (1).
The psychodynamic approaches propose an entirely different
correlation between emotions and violence (28). Advocates of this approach
maintain that relationships can be experienced as insecure in two contradictory
ways: The first, with isolation and detachment, when members of the family
are alienated from one another due to anger and jealousy; and the second, with
absorption and suffocation, when members of the family are so bound up in
one another that it is impossible to distinguish between each family member’s
boundaries of the self. These approaches highlight the correlation between
dependence and violence: The greater the violence, the greater the dependence
created. This description has been extensively corroborated. Kacen writes:
“Married couples living in a violent relationship develop economic, social,
and psychological interdependence” (29)(30). Economic dependence occurs
when one of the partners is out of work or when the violent partner takes
control of all the family’s resources, frequently preventing the battered woman
from leaving her violent husband despite her suffering. Social dependence
stems from the couples’ feelings of guilt, and frequently from the violent man
forbidding his wife to associate with others. The man’s emotional dependence
on his wife leads to jealousy over any external social attachments she forms.

3. Life Story
There are three elementary narrative models.
Stable Narrative: In which the individual evaluates his or her life as having a
plot structure in which objects, events, and people shape the self that remains
Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz & Eli Buchbinder 49
_______________________________________________________________
essentially unchanged. The stable narrative can present the life story as
constantly negative (continuous distress), or constantly positive (continuous
satisfaction).
Regressive Narrative: In which the individual combines experiences, events,
and people so that on a timeline, his or her life is described as a basic process
of regression from the beginning state.
Progressive Narrative: In which the individual combines experiences so that
on a timeline they have a structure of progress.
On Violence From a Phenomenological Point of View

Michael Staudigl

In the very beginning I want to clarify the general objective of


phenomenological research with regard to its application to the social
sciences. It needs to be emphasized that phenomenology never aims at
explanations of human experience. Contrarily, phenomenology insists, by way
of suspending all pre-given understanding and taken-for-granted judgements
(epoché), on an eidetic description of the invariant ways in which
consciousness makes sense of what is experienced as objectively given.
Phenomenological analysis consequently assesses lived experience in terms of
‘being directed towards’ and reveals the mostly overlooked trait of
consciousness which consists in intending something as something, e.g. an
object through a manifold of subjective appearances shading into one another
as a table. By analysing consciousness this way in terms of intentionality, the
unquestioned stability of the world one inhabits is recovered in its dependence
upon a manifold of subjective acts of sense-bestowal1. Phenomenology
thereby aims at understanding our perceptual and volitional life as a “third
dimension” (Merleau-Ponty), as the pre-given in-between of subjective sense
and objective being, and to finally overcome the Cartesian dichotomy of
subject and object.
Social sciences today show a strong interest in phenomenology. One
particular aspect that is noteworthy is the turn towards the so-called pre-
objective “life-world”, which pre-delineates the subject’s socially derived
world-view. Nevertheless, the social sciences face severe difficulties in
applying its methodical principles, above all to adapt a pure constituting ego
as its starting point, as in Husserl.2 Indeed, from this viewpoint the other
appears as a necessary partner in the transcendental constitution of the
objective world, but not in its concrete personality i.e. not in its embodied
otherness. The status of the empirical subject experiencing a common but at
once foreign world as well as others who are never completely accessible3,
undoubtedly remains a problematic point of Husserl’s phenomenology. In fact
the concrete other, considered from a solitary ego’s perspective, seems to be
silenced in his own claims. Taking this into account, one is not surprised by
the fact that violence, which is a purely social phenomenon (a totally social
fact in Mauss’ words), a phenomenon transcending this solitary ego’s point of
view radically, has not become a theme in phenomenology yet. If Husserl’s
approach to the full, that is social, phenomenon of the other remains at least
problematic,4 we ought to look for another starting point in order to consider
52 On Violence from a Phenomenological Point of View
_______________________________________________________________
violence from a phenomenological perspective. Current sociological debates
on violence which emphasise its corporeal dimension offer such a clue i.e. the
“lived body’s” vulnerability.
Unfortunately things are not that easy. If we reflect upon this shift of
interest, we immediately have to acknowledge that exactly by focusing on the
vulnerability of the body5 and the concrete modalities of suffered violence6 (in
the sense of phenomena which are presupposed to be intelligible in
themselves) sociology tends to transcend its limits.7 It is, consequently, not by
chance that we can observe a strong drive towards the integrative function of
other disciplines here, which might provide these attempts with the
methodological rigour and the descriptive potential that they lack. As a matter
of fact, it is exactly phenomenology which has been nominated such a
candidate on several occasions.8 Unfortunately, this reception of
phenomenology is afflicted with problems. It is guided by unclear assumptions
concerning its appropriate aims and methods. What is most precarious is the
fact that phenomenology—mostly understood against the background of
Husserl’s transcendental approach—is too easily reduced to its descriptive
potential.9 Nevertheless, the phenomenological method must neither be
reduced to an allegedly neutral style of description of empirically given facts,
nor to a rationalistic project, since both remain unmindful of their pre-
reflective anchoring in the world.10
According to this I propose to take into account a broader conception
of phenomenology, which enables us to consider violence against the
background of our pre-reflective openness towards the world and others in a
more comprehensive way. Following Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I will firstly
explain how phenomenology conceives of the manifold vulnerability of the
subject’s embodiment. Secondly, I will turn to Schutz’s idea of a “pragmatic
theory of the life-world” in order to clarify how embodied subjects come to
experience a given violation as violence. I will then finish by drawing some
general conclusions concerning an interdisciplinary use of these analyses.

1. Phenomenology of the Body as a Starting Point


The reassessment of the body as a philosophical problem sui generis
is indeed a major achievement of phenomenology. Whereas the body has been
denounced to be a marginal condition or even a confinement of the subject
within the metaphysical tradition, phenomenology succeeded in retrieving it as
a constitutive condition of subjectivity and experience. Becoming aware of the
fact that only an embodied subject is enabled to actually perceive transcendent
objects11, Husserl reflected upon it as early as he conceived of phenomenology
in transcendental terms. From his point of view the synthetic character of
Michael Staudigl 53
_______________________________________________________________
intentional experience is not only based on the consciousness of “internal
time”,12 but also upon the primordial experience of the so-called subjective “I-
can”.13 The “I-can” is irreducibly tied to an embodied subject, which moves
and perceives in the world without disposing of a lucid awareness of its
embodiment in the sense of a “continuously ongoing act”.14 Consequently, the
“I-can,” which might be called the “texture of bodily life itself”,15 is a pre-
reflective knowledge of the subject’s ability to move and perceive itself as
well as worldly objects.
Being embodied, i.e. being endowed with a practical kinaesthetic
horizon of manifold possibilities of moving, perceiving, and acting, the subject
experiences itself as a “zero-point”16 of orientation. To inhabit this “point”
from within is phenomenologically distinguished by the fact of being
absolutely near to oneself,17 whilst being able to conceive of itself in terms of
objective i.e. distanced reality as well. Husserl’s essential insight accordingly
consists in differentiating between a primordially “lived body” (Leib) and an
objective body (Körper) in the sense of two different ways of subjective self-
apperception. But this insight also attests to a point Husserl was never able to
account for completely. As it becomes intelligible here, the body is not only a
perceivable thing—indeed Husserl rather acknowledges it to be an
“imperfectly constituted thing”18—but partakes in the constitution of the same
objective world, to which he undoubtedly belongs. The idea of a “pure ego”
accounting for the transcendental constitution of the objectivity of the world
accordingly becomes at least problematic, and Husserl undoubtedly felt forced
to modify this position, as can be seen in his late writings.
Following these revolutionary insights of a still little known other
Husserl, insights which undermine the idea of an absolute and constituting
ego, Merleau-Ponty conceived of a different type of phenomenology. His
major aim was to re-establish those relations our body sustains silently with
the world, which are presupposed in the reconstitutions the objective sciences
offer. By excavating a “third dimension” in-between subject and object, a
dimension unfolding in the embodied subject’s perceptual openness to the life-
world, he insistently tried to overcome rationalistic and empiricistic accounts
of the human condition. Emphasising the irreducible role of the “lived body”
within the generation of experience, his work consists in a thorough
reconsideration of the subject’s pre-reflective relationships with the world and
the others in terms of embodiment. What Merleau-Ponty finds to precede the
objective world is a “pre-existent logos”19 unfolding itself in the reciprocal
openness of body-subject and life-world. Perception, therefore, has to be
understood as a creative pre-reflective communication of the subject with a
world in the making, but not as a passive reception of sensory stimulation. It is
54 On Violence from a Phenomenological Point of View
_______________________________________________________________
not a possession of the subject, but realised through the “intermediary of the
body”20. It has to be understood as an “inspired exegesis” dependent upon the
body’s being-in-situation. Hence, incarnated consciousness is most originally
an “I-can” responding to this situatedness and consequently a relational
constitution, but it is not the “I-think that”21 of an autonomous subject. This
reciprocity unfolded in perception refers, at least for Merleau-Ponty, to a
primordially “unbroken preobjective harmony of body and world”.22
Following Sartre, Merleau-Ponty emphasises the absence of a
positing consciousness of the “lived body” in everyday experience. The “lived
body” is mostly passed over in silence, ready-at-hand in its absence, but
becomes a problem only in experiences of crisis, such as sickness, ageing, or
violation. Experiencing itself exclusively as the object it also is, the body loses
its immediate availability and irreducible nearness,23 as well as the potential of
being used to actively project oneself into the world.24 Experiencing itself to
appear in a dysfunctional way, the incarnated subject becomes aware of the
fact of its (normally dis-apparent) embodiment. If this happens, the
manifestation of the functioning body as an object results in the emergence of
a problem. If the pre-objective stance of the “lived body” is shaken,25 (e.g. in
being violated), the “comprehensive bodily purpose”26 loses its physiognomy
and the “intentional arc” subtending the life of consciousness “goes limp”.27
Due to this the subject is no more able to “immediately ‘come to grips’ with
its body”28 and consequently loses it in the sense of the ever-near “place where
this appropriation occurs”.29 Given that the body persistently strives to reach
an affective “equilibrium” with the world,30 the process of embodiment then
needs to be reinstalled (or at least modified actively) in order to embody this
violation and to retrieve the pre-objective condition of a smoothly ongoing
embodiment.
This last point, which underlines the primordial unity of the pre-
objectively “lived body” and the subject in action, demands closer attention.
To decide if the vulnerable body30 is intentionally violated, injured, or
damaged31, is, undoubtedly, only possible with regard to the way in which the
autonomy of one’s pre-objective body is dealt with. Bearing this in mind, the
limits within which a phenomenological approach to the body might
contribute to a deeper understanding of violence become transparent. It is only
from an embodied and acting person’s point of view that this difference can be
rendered intelligible.
Merleau-Ponty’s account offers stunning perspectives concerning the
description of a subject which is vulnerable in and due to its pre-objective
embodiment. Nevertheless, to conceive of the subject’s vulnerability does not
render any violence directed against it intelligible. To account for violence
Michael Staudigl 55
_______________________________________________________________
contrarily implies to conceive of reciprocally32 typified violations of this
subject’s embodiment. To sum up: on one hand violence is irreducibly bound
to the subject’s vulnerability, but on the other, the subject might experience
something as violence only inasmuch as it conceives of it as the result of
somebody’s preconceived intention to violate it. Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s
appraisal of our common pre-objective being is not able to take this fact into
account33, Schutz’ pragmatic theory of the life-world can serve to integrate
both points of view.

2. Violence According to Schutz’s ‘Theory of the Life-World’


Schutz’s general aim was to provide the social sciences with
philosophical foundations.34 By clarifying their basic concepts (e.g. conduct
and action, subjective and objective sense, etc.) with regard to their
constitution in the subject’s lived experiences this project became an explicitly
phenomenological task. According to Schutz, behaviour, action and
working—i.e. action gearing into the world—must not be considered as self-
evident notions sociology can presuppose. As he shows, any “subjective
sense” is dependent on the reflective attention of consciousness towards the
ways in which it experiences whatever is given to it. Such meaning-bestowing
activity renders itself manifest in the signifying indications of bodily actions
and the symbolic systems of language, thereby becoming accessible to
foreign, potentially intersubjectively shared (i.e. objective) understanding
(Verstehen). According to Schutz, only a phenomenological analysis of the
motivational structures of lived experience enables us to become aware of the
basic structures of a world shared with others, which is undoubtedly always
founded on such acts of implicitly reciprocal understanding.
Schutz’s analyses are concerned with the “paramount reality of the
everyday-world”35 wherein human reality appears from the point of view of an
embodied intentionality. The structures of this world are the threads which
allow us to study the linkage between social reality and the subject’s
intentional life. According to Schutz the everyday-world is distinguished from
other “finite provinces of meaning” -like fantasy, dream, science, etc.36- by the
fact that the subject dwelling in it is concerned about its factual pre-givenness.
To use his terms, the subject deals with it according to a “pragmatic bent”.37 It
acts in it and works on it in order to cope with the conditions this world
imposes, in the last analysis with regard to a “fundamental anxiety”38 that
governs, at least implicitly, all our superordinated projects. According to
Schutz, this sphere, the so-called “world-as-taken-for-granted”,39 functions as
the “archetype of our experience of reality”.40 Its constitutive features consist,
to put it very briefly, in the fact 1. that we can conceive of it and handle it in
56 On Violence from a Phenomenological Point of View
_______________________________________________________________
terms of projects imagined in “inner time”; 2. that we are able to change it by
way of using our body through which we are able to move and work according
to these preconceived projects; and 3. that it is intersubjective from the very
beginning.41
According to Schutz, these structures—i.e. spatiality, temporality,
and sociality—are universal components of subjective world-experience.
From a proto-sociological point of view, they are indifferent towards
consensus or dissent, which both arise from this structuring foil.42 But it is
against this background, which provides the setting of the social constitution
of the embodied self in the pragmatic interaction of “inner” and objective
time,43 that violence can become of thematic interest. Within the everyday
world our projects are related to those relevancies selected by our attention44,
which enable the subject to define a given “problematic situation”.45 These
relevancies are partly imposed by the conditions of this situation, i.e. by others
as well as by institutional or structural settings, and partly volitionally
chosen46 according to the subject’s “stock of knowledge”.47 With reference to
this cognitive reservoir, encompassing both socially derived typifications and
individually acquired schemes of interpretation, any situation the subject finds
itself in can be understood typically, at least to some extent. Conceiving of this
situation as a potentially typical one, the subject finds itself enabled to respond
to the demands this specific situation exerts by acting in typically
accommodated ways. In order to do so, i.e. in order to define this situation
according to typical patterns of meaningful action, it needs to transform those
imposed relevancies, which prevent it from achieving projected aims, into
disposable volitional ones.
Nevertheless, the way the subject preconceives of its actions in a
given situation is fundamentally dependent upon a biographically articulated
“hierarchy of plans”.48 Within Schutz’ anthropological conception49 this
hierarchy is, as has already been emphasized, governed by the basic motive of
“fundamental anxiety”. Furthermore, if we factor in the “pre-givenness of my
body” and my “finitude”,50 which are both exemplary -and essentially
irreducible- imposed relevancies with regard to my attempt to define a
situation, the decisive point becomes intelligible. Those relevancies imposed
on my body which cannot be transformed into volitional ones, exert a demand
which transcends the style of average (i.e. typical) problems. They do so
simply because this confronts the subject, be it implicitly or not, with its
irrevocable vulnerability and, finally, its mortality. Hence, violence amounts,
from a phenomenological viewpoint, to a restriction of the subject’s access to
the world-as-taken-for-granted, both actually and virtually, which is perceived
as a violation of this subject’s integrity and claims, by way of a reciprocally
Michael Staudigl 57
_______________________________________________________________
intended asymmetric imposition of relevancies that it is not able to transform
into volitional ones. As we can infer from Schutz’s reflections on relevance,
this can happen differently with reference to the three basic structures that
channel our experience of the world.51 These are: according to spatiality by a
shrinking of the spheres of action which are centred around one’s vulnerable
body; according to temporality by a reduction of its threefold living horizons
to one’s lived presence and/or past, or to a predetermined future; and finally
with regard to sociality by contracting the basic reciprocity of interactions
which consequently appears to be signed by profound asymmetries.
Regarded from a structural point of view, violence altogether
amounts to a confinement of those socially derived and personally acquired
“systems” and “zones of relevancies” which underlie and concretely structure
the subject’s socially derived access to the world. Given that the constitution
of the self is an ongoing process grounded in “inner time” (for Husserl, Mead
and Schutz), violence in general consists in an asymmetrically imposed
restriction of the self’s projecting, i.e. of its openness to the world.52 Hence
“structural violence” undoubtedly amounts to, at least from a socio-
phenomenological point of view, a sort of violation. Whether it is
denominated as violence depends solely on a society’s sensibility towards
recognising and ascertaining it as such, and as being intended -be it
deliberately or not- by an “agent” to whom responsibility can be imputed. The
merits of Schutz’ work,53 which focuses on anonymous relevancies exposing
the subject to hetero-typifications that might become part of one’s experience,
consists in rendering their invisibility visible.54

3. Conclusion
Even if “no isolated, basic treatment of violence”55 seems to be
possible, we must not abandon our efforts to elaborate methodological
procedures to analyse it systematically without either narrowing this concept
nor without blurring it unnecessarily. Undoubtedly the “lived body”, taken in
the whole spectrum of its embodiment,56 is at stake in violence primarily. If
we take this fact into consideration, the foundational meaning of
phenomenological analysis for every interdisciplinary research on violence,
which rests on an underexposed notion of human corporeality, is quite evident.
It is, consequently, exactly from the perspective of a “pragmatic theory of the
life-world”, which is anchored in the vulnerability of the “lived body”, that a
phenomenologically grounded theory of violence complying with these
demands becomes conceivable.
58 On Violence from a Phenomenological Point of View
_______________________________________________________________
Notes
1
Alfred Schutz, On Phenomenology and Social Relations. Selected Writings
(The Heritage of Sociology), edited by Helmut R. Wagner (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press 1970), 62ff.
2
This concept, introduced by Husserl in the thirties, underwent a great, but
partly misleading career in the social sciences. The general importance of
phenomenology for the social sciences, which rehabilitated the devaluated
doxa (belief) within philosophy, was emphasized by Schutz in his early article
on “Phenomenology and the Social Sciences,” in Philosophical Essays in
Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. Marvin Farber (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1940), 164–186.
3
As Husserl puts it, they are accessible only in an “intrinsic inaccessibility”
(Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter
Teil: 1929–1935 (The Hague: Nijhoff 1971), 631).
4
This criticism, which has been widely accepted within the
“phenomenological movement,” must nevertheless not be regarded as a
definitive rejection of Husserl’s position, which is—as a consideration of the
great number of his working manuscripts shows—much more elaborated.
5
Heinrich Popitz, Phänomene der Macht (Tübingen: Mohr, 1992), 48ff.
6
See Wolfgang Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer 1996),
65ff.
7
In fact a “sociology of the body,” which would be a precondition for a
genuine “sociology of violence” does not exist yet. See Brigitta Nedelmann,
“Gewaltsoziologie am Scheideweg. Die Auseinandersetzung in der
gegenwärtigen und Wege der künftigen Gewaltforschung,” Soziologie der
Gewalt (Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft
37), ed. Trutz von Trotha (Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 1997),
59–85, here 74; von Trotha, “Zur Soziologie der Gewalt,” in Soziologie der
Gewalt, ibid., 9–56, esp. 27–28.
8
See e.g. von Trotha, “Zur Soziologie der Gewalt,” 20; Ronald Hitzler,
“Gewalt als Intention und Widerfahrnis. Zur Differenz zwischen einer
handlungs- und einer definitionstheoretischen Perspektive,” in Grenzenlose
Konstruktivität. Standortbestimmung und Zukunftsperspektiven
konstruktivistischer Theorien abweichenden Verhaltens, ed. Birgit Menzel and
Kerstin Ratzke (Opladen: Leske + Budrich 2003), 99–108, p. 101; with regard
to the hermeneutic tradition see Burkhard Liebsch, “Gewalt verstehen:
Hermeneutische Aporien,” in: Gewalt verstehen, ed. Burkhard Liebsch and
Dagmar Mensink (Berlin: Akademie 2003), 23–57, esp. 52.
9
See von Trotha, “Zur Soziologie der Gewalt,” 13–14.
Michael Staudigl 59
_______________________________________________________________
11
See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London et al.:
Routledge, 2002).
12
On Husserl’s theory of the body see Dan Zahavi, “Husserl’s Phenomenology
of the Body,” Etudes phénoménologiques 19 (1994): 63–84.
13
See Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure
Phenomenology (Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer, 1982), §§ 81f., 192ff.
14
Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology
of Constitution (Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer, 1989), §§ 5 and 59f.
15
Richard M. Zaner, The Problem of Embodiment (The Hague: Nijhoff,
1964), 249.
16
Elizabeth Behnke, “Embodiment Work for the Victims of Violation: In
Solidarity with the Community of the Shaken,” in Essays in Celebration of the
Founding of Phenomenological Organisations, ed. Chan F. Cheung et al.,
available on: www.o-p-o.net/essays/BehnkeArticle.pdf; Internet (accessed 28
August 2004), 3.
17
Husserl, Ideas. Second Book, 166.
18
Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, 496, 507; cf. Behnke,
“Embodiment Work,” 8.
19
Husserl, Ideas. Second Book, 167.
20
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xxiii.
21
Ibid., 160.
22
Ibid., 159.
23
Behnke, “Embodiment Work,” 8.
24
See Drew Leder, The Absent Body (Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1990), 69ff.
25
See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 124ff.
26
See Behnke, “Embodiment Work,” 7ff.
27
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 113.
28
Ibid., 157.
29
Ibid., 124.
30
Ibid., 178.
31
Ibid., 177. If it is not only shaken but shattered, e.g. in torture, the lived
body’s pre-objective integrity will not be recovered completely and the
attempt to embody violation will finally result in a violation of the subject’s
patterns of embodiment as such (cf. Behnke, “Embodiment Work,” 11),
resulting in e.g. dissociating strategies (see. ibid.). If in such cases violence
delimits the socially derived schemes of interpretation, thereby unmaking the
structures of the subject’s world-view (see Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain.
60 On Violence from a Phenomenological Point of View
_______________________________________________________________
The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press
1987), 27ff.) to the extent that experience encloses itself completely within a
“finite province of meaning”, this subject becomes a traumatized self cut off
from the everyday-world. As current research on PTSD shows, “embodiment
work,” to use Behnke’s term, is essential to overcome these extreme forms of
violations.
32
From a phenomenological point of view vulnerability is a modality of the
absolute passivity which constitutes incarnation: being embodied attests to the
fact that a subject is given to itself as an immediate and thus irrefutable access
to itself, which experiences itself as the “impossibility of recoil” (Lévinas)
even in situations this access is put at stake.
33
Undoubtedly violence might quite often not be realized as such by the
subject if it is “socially silenced” and rendered “unspeakable”; see Behnke
(“Embodiment Work,” 8). It is, consequently, a desideratum yet to develop
attention to such forms of violation from a phenomenological point of view,
too. This would indeed require not less than an “alternative theory of
embodiment”, which is able to detect the most invisible violations of
embodiment which function beyond the embodiment of visible violations (see
ibid., 11).
34
As a matter of fact this reciprocity is essentially asymmetrical, attesting to a
“broken we”. Contrarily we should also take into account a generic asymmetry
of self- and hetero-typification which might result in the fact that intended
violence might, on the one hand, not be apperceived as violence, or, contrarily,
that a non-violently intended action might be apperceived as violence; cf.
Hitzler, “Gewalt als Intention,” 106-7.
35
It is, consequently, not by coincidence, that violence is neither seen as a
problem nor even mentioned in most studies concerning Merleau-Ponty, see
e.g. Mary R. Barral’s study on social relations in Merleau-Ponty; see her The
Body in Interpersonal Relations. Merleau-Ponty (Lanham – New York –
London: University Press of America, 1984).
36
See Alfred Schutz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung
in die verstehende Soziologie (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1974).
37
Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt. Band I
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1994), 62.
38
Ibid., 48ff.; cf. Helmut R. Wagner, “Introduction,” in Schutz, On
Phenomenology and Social Relations, 39ff.
39
Alfred Schutz, Theorie der Lebenswelt 1. Die pragmatische Schichtung der
Lebenswelt (Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band V.1), ed. Martin Endress and
Ilja Srubar (Konstanz: UVK, 2003), passim; Schutz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der
Michael Staudigl 61
_______________________________________________________________
sozialen Welt, 49, 99, 121; Schutz and Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt
I, 151.
40
Schutz, Theorie der Lebenswelt, 130; Ilja Srubar, Kosmion. Zur Genese der
pragmatischen Lebenswelttheorie von Alfred Schütz und ihrem
anthropologischem Hintergrund (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1988), 187ff.
41
See Schutz and Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt I, 25ff.
42
Ibid., 51.
43
Ibid., 63ff.
44
See Martin Endress, “Entgrenzung des Menschlichen. Zur Transformation
der Strukturen menschlichen Weltbezuges durch Gewalt,” in: Gewalt, ed.
Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Hans-Georg Soeffner (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp,
2004), 174–201, here 182.
45
See Schutz, Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt I, 137; see Srubar ,
Kosmion, 169ff.
46
Wagner, in: Schutz, On Phenomenology and Social Relations, 321, defines
relevance lucidly as “the importance ascribed by an individual to selected
aspects, etc., of specific situations and of his activities and plans. In
accordance with a person’s multifarious interests and involvements, there exist
various domains of relevance for him. Together, they form his system of
relevances with its own priorities and preferences, not necessarily always
clearly distinguished and not necessarily stable for longer periods. At any
particular time, however, this system falls into specific zones of primary or
minor relevances and of relative irrelevance.” Schutz develops his theory of
relevance in detail in his Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, edited,
annotated, and with an Introduction by R. M. Zaner (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press 1970).
47
See Schutz and Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt I, 148ff.
48
On this distinction see Schutz, Reflections; Schutz and Luckmann,
Strukturen der Lebenswelt I, 229ff., Wagner, “Introduction,” 23.
49
See Schutz and Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt I, 133ff.; Schutz, On
Phenomenology and Social Relations, 74–75.
50
See ibid., 143, 169, 256–7.
51
See Srubar, Kosmion, 195ff.
52
See Schutz and Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt I, 134–5.
53
See Endress, “Entgrenzung,” 189ff.
54
If, as it might happen in the confrontation with excessive violence, the
“pragmatic bent” is broken, e.g. by a mono-thematic biasing of one’s
existence, the subject becomes a self caged up in a “finite province of
meaning”. See Endress (“Entgrenzung,” 189ff.) who gives, critically
following Sofsky’s analyses concerning the organisation of terror in national-
62 On Violence from a Phenomenological Point of View
_______________________________________________________________
socialist concentration-camps (see Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror.
The Concentration Camp (Princeton NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1999)), a
striking description how such a “switch” from “structures of the life-world
towards structures of a survive-world” has been realised.
55
For this see esp. Alfred Schutz (“Equality and the Meaning-Structure of the
Social World,” in: Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers. Vol. II: Studies in Social
Theory (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), 226–273.
56
Bernasconi lucidly shows these merits of Schutz’ account concerning his
analyses on the “invisibility of racial minorities”; see his “The Invisibility of
Racial Minorities in the Public Realm of Appearances.” in Phenomenology of
the Political, ed. Lester Embree, Kevin Thompson (Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer,
2000), 169–187, esp. 179ff.
57
Amitai Etzioni, “Violence,” in Contemporary Social Problems, ed. Robert
Merton and Robert Nisbet (New York et al.: Harcourt Brace Jonanovich Inc.,
1971), 709–741, 741.
58
According to Merleau-Ponty the „lived body” is endowed not only with an
“affective presence and enlargement for which objective spatiality is not […]
even a necessary condition” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception,
172), but—inasmuch as he is “our general medium for having a world” (ibid.,
169)—also with the ability to “take its place in the realm of the potential”
(ibid., 125). With regard to our topic, these phenomenological findings would
require much deeper investigation.
Part 2:

Representing Violence
Violence and Perversion in J. G. Ballard's Crash

Eunju Hwang
“There is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons.”
Giles Deleuze. “Postscript on the societies of Control”

“People can be never happier than when they’re inventing new vices.”
J. G. Ballard. Concrete Island. (p .115)

James Ballard, the narrator of Crash, has a car accident with Dr.
Helen Remington’s car and Helen’s husband is instantly killed at the crash
site. James begins to be aware of his real sexual desire aroused by the car
crash, and the crash becomes a real experience for him, which lets him know
that he is alive; “The crash was the only real experience I [James] had been
through for years. For the first time I was in physical confrontation with my
own body, an inexhaustible encyclopaedia of pains and discharge, with the
hostile gaze of other people, and with the fact of the dead man.” James and Dr.
Helen Remington are soon found by Dr. Robert Vaughan who is always
searching crashes, broken cars and sectioned bodies, sexualising and
anthropomorphising automobiles. Vaughan repetitively tries to die from a car
crash with Elizabeth Taylor. James and Helen begin to understand the sexual
implication of the combination of leaked liquid from broken cars and fluids
from mutilated bodies and begin to explore the newly formed sexuality that
streamlined cars and deformed bodies obtained by crashes can provide.
Crash is a masochist story unlike it looks like. The protagonists in
Crash hardly show sadistic interests; they are rather related to masochism
though they want to kill others for their own pleasure. What they are actually
involved in is their own death rather than victims' death and in pleasure from
the repetitive death trials therefore they are obviously not interested in other
people’s suffering. They do not concern with victims' pain and when they look
at crash victims' mutilated bodies, they rather envy those sectioned bodies.
Characters enjoy the pain voluntarily. Sado-masochism is inseparable from
voluntary actions since humans feel contradictory pleasure from pain when
they are ready to accept the pain; therefore, pleasure comes from the death
drive is the self-drive. Sado-masochists are active in terms of performing in
order to pursuit their pleasure and enjoyment as protagonists drive their cars to
die. Deleuze says, “Seduction means giving one’s word, and words for the
pervert are strictly logical demonstrations correlated with acts.” Juliet Flower
66 Violence and Perversion in J. G. Ballard’s Crash
_______________________________________________________________
MacCannell cites the statement of Kirby Dick, “A large part of masochism is
mental training”. In the same context that she gives another example of a
young masochist girl who says “I like testing my limit.” In a positive sense,
masochism can be understood as a trial to overcome physical and mental pain
and to find the absolute subject: “Who’s the boss- you or the pain? Come on,
show me who’s the boss?”
Freud once suggests the Oedipus family model to explain almost all
human desires. However, Deleuze thinks it is lamentable that all the desires
are confined in triangular familial relation of father-mother-son, however, he
does not deny existence of the Oedipus complex. When he figures out the
formation of masochism, Deleuze actually uses the Oedipus complex. Deleuze
clarifies that the masochist’s aim is to escape from the consequences of the
transgression against the father. The masochist proceeds to identify with the
mother and offers himself to the father as a sexual object; however, since this
would in turn renew the threat of castration which he is trying to avert, he
chooses, ‘being beaten; both as exorcism of ‘being castrated’, and as a
regressive substitute of ‘being loved’. As for the reason that the mother who
does the beating and not the father, Deleuze suggests three main reasons:
avoidance of the homosexual choice, preservation of the first stage where the
mother was the desired object and graft onto it the punishing action of the
father, and the need to present the whole process as a kind of demonstration or
plea addressed solely to the father (“You see, it is not I who wanted to take
your place, it is she who hurts, castrates and beats me.”)
Sado-masochism under the control of the superego can be expressed
in a “safe” way, which does not followed by physical violence. Modern
humans release their sadism through computer games or heavy metal music of
strong languages. Similarly, masochists can be found in sports games, health
clubs, and the Guinness book. However, it is noticeable that blood rituals, the
gothic culture, the punk or body piercing is prevailed on modern society as a
common sado-masochist form. Juilet Flower MacCannell says that sadists
resolve the castration complex through blood rituals when there is a failure of
Oedipus and here, the real blood must flow as a sign of the mortal danger. For
masochists, they are willing to get castrated to resolve the castration complex.
During the pre-Oedipal period, the child believes that it is a part of the mother,
therefore, there is no separation and no absence; there is only identity and
presence. However, when the child enters the Oedipal stage, the father splits
up the dyadic unity between mother and child and the father forbids the child
further access to the mother and the mother’s body. In the Lacanian term, the
primary repression means the loss of the maternal body. When the father
intervenes to break up the dyadic unity between mother and child, the child
Eunju Hwang 67
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takes up its place in the symbolic order and thus comes to define itself as
separate from the other. The symbolic order opens up the unconscious because
the primary repression caused by the broken relationship between mother and
child creates the desire, and the unconscious is the result of the repression of
desire.
Freud fails to give an explicit explanation of masochism. Freud
believes that masochism is nothing more than an extension of sadism and a
sadist is always at the same time a masochist although he characterises sadism
as an active aspect of perversion and masochism the passive form of
perversion. Freud bears the dual structure in his mind- such as activity and
passivity, masculinity and femininity, love and hatred, affection and hostility,
sadism and masochism, scopophile and exhibitionism – and says that every
active perversion is accompanied by its passive counterpart. Here, Deleuze
points out Freud’s problematic twofold idea, which makes sadism and
masochism transferable. For Freud, sado-masochism accounts two dualities:
the duality of sexual and the ego-instincts, and the duality of the life and the
death instincts. In the duality of sexual and the ego-instinct, masochism is seen
as deriving from sadism by a process of reversal, with the superego acting
sadistically upon the ego without the ego itself being masochistic. For
Deleuze, masochism has to do with a reactivation of the Oedipus complex. As
to the binary structure of the sexual and the ego-instincts, Deleuze says that
masochism is ‘resexualisation’ of the conscience rather than Freudian
desexualisation of libidinal aggression since masochism is characterised not
by guilt feelings but by the desire to be punished. The purpose of masochism
is to resolve guilt and the corresponding anxiety and make sexual gratification
possible. As for the second duality of the life and the death instincts, Deleuze
insists that Freudian explanation does not show how sexual pleasure actually
occurs in association with the physical pain of punishment since the dualism
concerns only with the moral aspect of masochism – or a sense of guilt- not
erotogenicity. According to Deleuze, masochism of the erotogenic type is
primary and no longer derived from sadism.
Throughout his book, Masochism, Deleuze strongly denies the unity
between sadism and masochism, stating that sadism and masochism do not
constitute a single unity, but each is complete in itself. Furthermore, Deleuze
announces that the masochist’s experience is grounded in an alliance between
the son and the oral mother and the sadist’s in the alliance of father and
daughter making the sadist androgynous and the masochist hermaphrodite.
Therefore, in masochism, the father's role in the triangular family relationship
looses its power and this implies what Deleuze says about “anti-Oedipus”. In
other words, a masochist wants to get castration while a sadist is free from the
68 Violence and Perversion in J. G. Ballard’s Crash
_______________________________________________________________
castration complex. This can be supported by some examples of masochists’
perverted behaviour – and what masochists agree to do. In December 2003, a
42-year-old computer engineer (from Kassel, Germany), Armin Meiwes, was
arrested for cannibalism and he confesses that he carried out the killing of the
volunteer, Berlin computer specialist, Bernd Juergen Brandes, whom he found
on the Internet in March 2001 and the reason of the cannibalism is for both the
killer’s and the volunteer’s sexual satisfaction. The first thing Meiwes and
Brandes did was cutting Brandes' penis. Meiwes fried Brandes’s penis and
suggested that Brandes share the cooked penis with him while the volunteer
was still alive. This example literally demonstrates Freud’s idea that the
connection between cruelty and sexual instinct is a relic of cannibalistic
desires. Moreover, Craig Marine depicts one scene of Bob Flanagan’s penile
subincision, which means an alternate form of circumcision that involves
splitting the penis end to end.
In Crash, what is at stake is to understand how violent behaviours are
associated to the technological because characters' abnormal behaviours are
connected to automobiles. The triangular relation of violence, sex and the
technological is amalgamated in a crash. For Vaughan, the death trials with
Elizabeth Taylor mean sexual acts, thus his crash consummates the marriage
between himself and the actress. Vaughan attempts to die from a car crash to
pursue his sexual pleasure; perversion combines with technology. In modern
days, humans tend to develop violent primitivism using the technological such
as cars, aeroplanes (such as in the case of September the 11th) and the on-line
crimes. Mark Seltzer says that serial killing or mass violence is inseparable
from the problem of the body in machine culture. Seltzer demonstrates, in,
Serial Killer, how the modern crime is connected to sexuality through the case
of the Hungarian train wrecker, Sylvestre Matushka who engineered a series
of train crashes to fulfil his sexual desire. At his trial, he explains that he could
only achieve sexual release with spectacular train crashes. Seltzer says that
Matushka’s planned train crashes eroticise the contact between bodies and
technology. Seltzer moves the relation between the individual and the mass
towards the one between humanity and machinery, mentioning that 'serial
killing….is inseparable from the problem of the body in machine culture: an
intimacy with technology that will be set out in terms of the intersecting logics
of seriality, prosthesis, and primary mediation.' Since the technological is used
to practice perversion in the machine culture as we see in the case of Crash,
perversion becomes normalised through media, more technological sex toys
and the Internet.
In his essays such as “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” or “Three
Essays on Sexuality”, Freud shows how closely sexual pleasure is related to
Eunju Hwang 69
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the death drive. Freud regards life as the drive into the end, that is to say,
death. He writes that life-drives produce self-preservation to keep the
organism from danger, and also observes that humans have death drives which
make them enjoy something traditionally regarded as the unpleasurable as we
can see in sadism or masochism. Dorothea Olkowski shows the preservation
drive is the active synthesis, which is related to the reality principle, on the
other hand, the sexual drive is the passive synthesis, which is about the passive
ego, or the narcissistic ego but also becomes the virtual. However, the active
synthesis and the passive synthesis do not exist separately; ultimately, they are
fused together. Olkowski portrays, in Giles Deleuze and the Ruin of
Representation, that both life and death drives are interwoven into one like a
figure of “8”, thus, they are not separate from one another, but they borrow
from one another and enrich one another. Likewise, James, the narrator of
Crash, notices that Vaughan controls people, giving each of them what they
most wanted and most feared, just as the name of Christian Dior’s perfume,
Poison, whose name implies the fatal can be attractive, producing curiosity of
Pandora’s box and providing both olfactory pleasure and the feeling of danger.
Being in accordance with Olkowski, Grosz also suggests that Eros and
Thanatos are both complementary and opposed, functioning and operating
together. Crash is not the literal Freudian death drive, but it is about
amalgamation of life and death. In the film version of Crash, because behind
their dream to die there is another life instinct which wants to remain for ever
by fossilising their car crash. Vaughan mentions that “James Dean broke his
neck and became immortal.” As we remember James Dean with his crash
rather than his films, death can also mean immortal life.
Freud’s idea of the death drive has two main features. First, whereas
Thanatos always is differentiated from Eros, Eros cannot be differentiated
from Thanatos. Second, the death drive is a return to an inorganic state.
Freud’s trial to distinguish Thanatos and Eros is linked to morality in his
theories. In the first assumption, Freud shows his dichotomy of the good and
the bad again. For Freud, the reality principle means self-preservation,
however, he also says that the ego replaces the pleasure principle with the
reality principle, and this is harming the organism as a whole, since he always
holds a strong moral stance; the bad death instincts overwhelms the good life
instincts. As for Freud’s second assumption, Deleuze says that there also
exists no original closed state since there is no such closed identity. Deleuze
objects to the Freudian aim of life which means the return to the original
quiescent state, because, for him, life does not begin from the bounded
organism, but from flows. In Ballard’s Crash, protagonists seem to move from
life to death as the Freudian death drive suggests.
70 Violence and Perversion in J. G. Ballard’s Crash
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Freud does not fully understand the pure pleasure coming from pain as he
mentions that perversion takes place not because of the new sexual aim, but
because of exclusiveness; which means that he believes that people enjoy
being different and abnormal rather than the pain itself. However, Nietzsche
brings a possibility of pure enjoyment of pain and suffering: “if pain and
suffering have any meaning, it must be that they are enjoyable to someone.”
Therefore, What Freud demonstrates in his essay, “Beyond the Pleasure
Principle” is no longer beyond the Pleasure Principle, but perverse pleasure is
already included in the Pleasure Principle in machine culture.

Bibliography
J. G. Ballard, Crash. (London: Vintage, 1995)
David Cronenberg, Crash, (produced with Telefilm Canada and The Movie
Network, 1996), videorecording.
Giles Deleuze
— “Anti-Oedipus”. Literary Anthology. Edited by Julie Rivkin and Michael
Ryan (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1998)
— Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty(New York: Zone Books, 1999)
— “Postscript on the Societies of Control”. October 59, Cambridge, Mass:
Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, (1992)
Sigmund Freud, “Three Essays on Sexuality”, The Essentials of Psycho-
Analysis, (London: Penguin Books, 1991)
Elizabeth Grosz. Space, time and Perversion: Essays on the Politics on Bodies
(London: Routledge, 1995)
Juliet Flower MacCannell, “Perversion in Public Places”, New Formation 35,
Edited by David Glover, London: Lawrence and Wishart (Autumn
1998)
Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics:Feminist Literary Theory, (London:
Routledge, 1988)
Dorothea Olkowski. Giles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation. (Berkeley,
LA and London: University of California Press. 1999)
Renata Salecl, “Cut in the Boby: From Clitoridectomy to Body Art” in New
Formations no. 35, Edited by David Glover, London: Lawrence and
Wishart (Autumn 1998)
Mark Seltzer, Serial Killers, (New York and London: Routledge, 1998)
Being Hit Artistically

Maria José Alcaraz León


Art has focused during the late decades on violence as a topic as
well as a device to produce artistic effects. It has represented violence as well
as enacted it. In so doing, artists have put in the foreground many questions
related to our reaction to daily representations of violence either fictional or
“actual”, have concerned about the way this violence is sublimated, interested
on the goals to which this violence is suppose to be a way to, etc. Arts have
broadened their boundaries enough to accommodate any kind of objects and
performances, and violence has been one of the new habitants of the
contemporary art territory.
The interest on violence is not new if we look back into the pictorial
tradition1 which has taken wars, rapes, murders, etc. as a recurrent topic.
However, there is something new in the way this topic enters into
contemporary art production. The feature that enters into the artistic
elaboration of violence is literalness. Represented violence has been present
in art throughout its history; now literal violence also takes part of it.
Frequently, the artworks where literal violence is an essential component are
performances in which the artists hurt themselves or some of their
collaborators in front of an audience, whose reaction is an important part of
the effect searched for. So a relevant characteristic, I would say
indispensable, of the artworks where literal violence is present is that it is
made with certain acceptance on the participants’ side that the performance
is, in some way, art. Otherwise, these performances will be mere rites or
crimes2. Blood, sacrifice, hurt, pain, closeness to death, etc. are common
elements in the artworks I want to consider here, and they are in a literal way,
so that the hurt is real, the pain actual, the closeness to death imminent.
In this paper, I will try to examine the meaning or, rather, the
function of literalness as a characteristic feature of contemporary art
production, and, specifically, within a specific kind of contemporary art that
brings together the issues of identity and violence.
I will first focus on literalness. This notion belonged initially to a
rather different art context: minimal art. Literal art was firstly a response to a
requirement derived from the modernist project developed and theorized by
Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried. This project set up a self-critical task
for modern art, which was meant to explore its own limits and conditions
within each artistic genre. Modern art was, according to Greenberg’s view, a
self-critical project under which artistic practice was oriented to self-
72 Being Hit Artistically
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definition3. However, neither Greenberg, nor Fried regarded literal art as an
adequate development of this self-critical project. Rather, literal art, in going
too far, broke the very conditions for something to be art. Literalness
embodies simultaneously what modern art looked for and what it tried to
avoid. But, contrary to what minimal art did, literalness was supposed to be
showed artistically and not merely stated4. The mere affirmative gesture of
presenting an object with no artistic conditions governing it was, in Fried’s
view, an anti-modern and anti-artistic gesture. Literalness broke up the
necessary conditions for art’s providing an aesthetic, autonomous experience;
instead it provided an experience closer to everyday experience. Something is
literal when it does not mean anything through its form, when it does not
have a symbolic function, when it is simple existence. Common objects are
literal in this way, for we do not regard them as vehicles of meaning, just as
objects that occupy the space we live in. A literal artwork stands for nothing
but itself. It does not represent a further content, it lacks a vocabulary and a
syntax, and it does not provide a unitary artistic experience.
All these features amounts to an important difference in the kind of
experience each kind of art provides. While modern art, and especially
modern painting, offers us an experience exclusively determined by the
pictorial form, literal art cannot afford such an experience, for in its very way
of being the autonomy proper to modernism is lost. The space of the work is
the same as the viewer’s. This has the odd effect of depriving the artwork of
its autonomy, and the viewer of the corresponding experience. Facing the
minimal work, the viewer and the work are in the same space, and,
consequently, her experience is closer –because of the conditions yielding it-
to the everyday experience of common objects5. This brings us to the last
feature I want to point out. This is related to the aspiration of art to become
life that has accompanied art production throughout its history, and has
reappeared since the avant-garde movements.
Literalness has always manifested a vocation for reality, thus, it has
been an important device for the fulfilment of the program inaugurated by the
avant-garde of dissolving the boundaries between art and reality. Artists
recovered the desire of Pygmalion of turning their work into reality, of
crossing the boundaries of representation and producing reality. Literalness
is, in this vein, strongly effective since, in eliminating meaning, and the
autonomous artistic space searched by the modernist project, it approaches
reality. This pigmalion-like tendency in contemporary art has been theorized
by A. Danto in his article “Disturbation Art”. In it, he recovers the religious
roots of Greek drama, as it was theorized by F. Nietzsche in his The Birth of
Tragedy. According to Nietzsche, art aimed at life in its very beginning. It
Maria Jose Alcaraz León 73
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was a way through which Dyonisos made present to the participants of the
mystic rites. Progressively, art became re-presentation, loosing its former
ability to modify the state of the participants, and to liberate them from the
constraints that everyday life set up on them. When art was still linked to
these renewing practices, the participants were, after the rites, purified,
transformed. But when the rites substituted the Greek drama, the participants
became audience, and the former ritual practices became theatrical
representations. Representations lacked such a powerful effect; they set
audience at a distance which kept the experience within the limits of what is
not real. Art gained rationality and lost spontaneity; it achieved structure and
gave up the deep emotional connection among the participants. This is more
or less the genealogy of art traced by Nietzsche and taken by Danto to
account for the art which aims at transforming the audience as well as the
artist6.
In this light the work of some contemporary artists that take
themselves as the battleground for becoming others can be understood as a
return to this former aim of artistic impulse. And, in this aim, literalness has
played an important role, for it erases the boundaries between art and reality
that the representational conception of art established.
It is likely that this return to the former function of art as
presentation is related to the more frequent use of literal violence in
contemporary art.
Now, an important part of contemporary art production focuses on
violence. Some artists approaches it in a literal way, reproducing, as it were,
the effects that violent events make upon our sensibility7. Others treat
violence in a non-literal way. They represent violent events in order to say
something about them and their relationship to human beings. Sometimes,
these artists have endured violent episodes themselves, and try to reconstruct
that experience or even themselves through their work, as if the work could
exorcise the shadows that constitute violent experiences.
My claim here is that literal violence in art is usually linked to the
ritualistic view of art that characterized it in its very beginning, as well as to
the re-enactment of the Pygmalion myth by some avant-garde movements.
Artists who use literal violence, usually against themselves or other
collaborators, aim at transforming themselves through their work and,
although this is not always achieved, at transforming the audience as well. It
is as if the artist’s own sacrifice would require from the audience something
more than mere contemplation.
74 Being Hit Artistically
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On the other hand, I see in the work of some artists that also refer to
violence, but who do not offer it literally to the audience, a completely
different intention. Some artists, having endured violent events, see their
works as a way to reconstruct what violence destroyed. While the former
employ literal violence as a path to self-transformation, the later use art as a
way of self-reconstruction. The former hit themselves literally to make art
and to become different persons, the later have been hit literally and art
becomes the way through which to recover what one was before enduring the
tragic event.
This double treatment of violence, literal and represented, satisfies
what I see as two different functions of art, both linked to the topic of
identity. When an artist literally hurts herself she is using her own body as a
matter to be transformed. When an artist reconstructs a dramatic event of her
life through art, she tries to recover some missing part of her self-view or
make the event she has gone through intelligible.
Orlan, for example, has endured many surgical operations, all of
them filmed and commented upon, in which her continuously modified
appearance is inseparable from her own identity. Her art has made her
becoming the appearance achieved operation after operation. The artwork
coincides with her body which is in constant transformation. She sacrifices
herself in the sense that her life becomes her own work. For the bodily
changes she endures are literal, and, although they may have a symbolic
function8, they are not at all symbolic for Orlan’s body. Violent
transfiguration is the medium through which Orlan achieves her artistic
results.
It is interesting to contrast, in this light, Orlan’s work with the work
of Cindy Sherman, because, although also interested in identity and its artistic
configuration, Sherman’s works do not manifest the preoccupation with
literalness present in Orlan.
Sherman also takes herself as the transfigured subject of her art. In
her series, she portrays herself in different costumes and poses. In some of
them, she looks like women who have endured a hostile life. In others, she
portrays ingenuity, surprise, or fear embodied in the faces of her characters.
Sometimes, in her stills, the feeling of some menace from outside the shot
seems almost flagrant. Actually, this implicit presence provides the
mysterious ambience that typically characterizes Sherman’s stills. Cindy is
not any of her characters, but she is all of them. She cannot be merely
identified with them, but she gives flesh to all of them. Her look, as Orlan’s,
is the matter to be transfigured, time after time. It is as if Orlan and
Maria Jose Alcaraz León 75
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Sherman’s identity were in fact the sum of their various identities configured
through their respective artistic works.
The difference between their respective treatments of identity is that
while Orlan’s work consists in literally changing her own appearance,
Sherman is exploring the different registers her face and body are able to give
flesh.
It is in part the effect on the public what I want to underlie in the
work of the following artist. She is one of the most famous of women artists
who works on identity and violence. Marina Abramovic (Belgrade, 1946) is
already a consolidated performance artist that has been putting herself under
extreme situations in order to test her bodily and mental limits. Violence is
not always present in her performances but, when it is, is more meant to cause
fear in the audience about the artist’s physical integrity than to say something
about violence itself. Violence in her work is just a way through which
experiencing new sensations never lived before. For the artist endures such
heavy circumstances in order to broaden her own mental and bodily
possibilities in front of an audience that, in viewing her performance, is
supposed to be transformed as well.
I would like just to mention a couple of her most well-known
performances. The first, a performance during which the artist let the
audience to do whatever they wanted to her, and she included among the
things that were in the gallery a live gun. The performance suddenly stopped
when someone from the audience took the gun and meant to shoot Marina.
This was surely expected by the artist who, in a way, prompted the situation
in providing the audience with the weapon. Nevertheless, she is accustomed
to put herself under extreme situations, such as being in a room with a starved
python for four hours. Anyway, it is interesting to see that the reaction against
the spontaneous shooter came from the public, who, as Marina intended, had
engaged in her work as if it were reality; and it was in a way. Her work is
plenty of episodes like the already mentioned. She has been close to death in
more than one occasion, but this instead of being a problem for her,
reinforces her very beliefs about her work’s results.
I pointed out above that a different treatment of violence could be
identified, that is, a non-literal way of dealing with it. This kind of production
is less problematic to account for, since it does not play with the very
boundary between art and non-art as literal works do. I will focus on works
that represent violence as a way to reconstruct, generally, identity. These
works would have a healing effect, as it were.
The idea that art can be a way to reconstruct a painful experience
emerges first, I think, in literature. At least the examples that come to my
76 Being Hit Artistically
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mind belong to this artistic genre. I started asking myself why it was more
likely to find literary works narrating the extreme experience of the
concentrations camps during the II World War than artistic images.
Moreover, I found out that as the reflection about how to represent the
holocaust evolved, a strong debate about the truthfulness of visual
representations began to set up. Images were either too literal to being
afforded, or less trustworthy than words. Maybe words put reality at a
distance that images cannot afford, and this distance was required in order to
assimilate the events that shocked the world in an unexpected way. So,
literature was able to offer a reconstructive device which visual arts, maybe
because of its immediate character, lacked. What was needed in order to
make intelligible what had horrified the world was a representation, not a
mere presentation. Visual arts, unable to provide such representations, turned
to themselves and gave up a task that literature seemed to perform better. I
have in mind specially the trilogy written by Primo Levi. In it, he sometimes
refers to the necessity of narrating and representing something that otherwise
would be left in shadows. They had suffered a terrible experience that had left
indelible traces in them. The only way to become a person again, to recover
the lost humanity, was through representation. In representing the event they
placed themselves also in perspective, at a distance. This distance was
necessary for it was the very condition for starting a new life far away from
the Lager.
These remarks about the visual arts’ impotency to deal with a
representational healing task are meant to show the connexion I am looking
for between representation of violence and identity. For, while it is clear that
Primo Levi partially got his life back through his writings, it is less frequent
to find a painter or photographer who achieved, through her work, the
reconstructing effects literature seemed to provide.
But it is precisely this “getting a life back” what I think certain
artists have achieved through their works where violence is not literal but
represented. My example comes from a woman artist, Nancy Goldin, who has
practice photography since the age of sixteen. Born in 1953, she has lived
mainly in NY and has devoted her work to depict her group of friends and
occasional roommates. Her work is deeply engaged with the subject of AIDS
and drug-addiction, and some of her best photographs are of some of her ill
friends and lovers. She has written some important comments that help to
properly interpret some of her works. I’ll Be your Mirror is both a
retrospective catalogue of her work, and a way of expression of the artist’s
own thoughts, not only about art but also about live, sex, and love. Her
concern about sex and love is salient in her work “The Ballad of Sexual
Maria Jose Alcaraz León 77
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Dependency” (1986), where she depicts with incredible intimacy the key
moments of a history which ends up when Nan is hit by her boyfriend. A
picture taken after a month of the violent episode makes the viewer a silent
witness of a story about love and violence. Nan has said that this picture is
mainly intended as a reminding device. It reminds what she does not want to
live through again. It shows herself with a dignity we do not know whether it
belongs to her in the moment the picture was taken or to the future where the
picture was supposed to be a reminder of past and shameful events. “This is
the way I look, this what I am” seems to be the message projected into the
future, not in order to freeze a moment but in order to serve as a reminder for
not being in that state again.
It is in this sense in which I find Nan’s work a good example of the
artistic representation of violence, violence that was literal for her, as a way
to reconstruct her own identity. We have seen that this is just one of the forms
contemporary art faces the issues of violence and identity. Orlan and Marina
exemplified the use of literal violence in art as a way to self-transformation.
Nan’s art does not change herself as a person in the sense in which Marina
and Orlan transformed themselves through their art. Or maybe she does; for
representations, as mirrors, shows us a part of ourselves that, as Danto says,
otherwise would be hidden for our knowledge; representations show us to
ourselves and to others, offering to us as statements of the form “this is the
way I look to others, so this is what I am”. In this sense, they can change, at
least, our consciousness.

This paper has been possible thanks to the financial help of the project
“La Expresión y Recepción de las Emociones Dolorosas en el Arte”
BHA2001-1479-C04-04

Notes
1
I will mainly focus on visual arts and performance but other artistic genres,
such as literature and cinema can also support the increasing presence of
violence in art.
2
An example would be the genre, if it may be labelled as a genre at all, of
snuff movies.
3
“The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of the characteristic
methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself” Clement Greenberg,
“Modernist Painting” in Art in Theory, 1900-1990. An Anthology of Changing
Ideas, Edited by Charles Harrison & Paul Wood, Blackwell Publishing, 1992,
p. 755.
78 Being Hit Artistically
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4
“it ought to be observed that the literalness isolated and hypostatized in the
work of artists like Donald Judd and Larry Bell is by no means the same
literalness as that acknowledged by advanced painting throughout the past
century: it is not the literalness of the support. Moreover, hypostatization is
not acknowledgment.”, Fried, Michael, Art & Objecthood, The University of
Chicago Press, 1998, p. 88.
5
The experience provided by minimal art may be closer but not identical with
the experience of common objects. After all, the places where these works
were exhibited strongly influenced their reception.
6
The aspiration to reality manifested by art has been also noticed by E. H.
Gombrich, who traced a similar story when he noticed that art began when a
certain necessity to produce substitutes prompted the creation of artifacts to
fulfil such an impulse. As in Nietzsche, art was primarily ‘presentation’ for
only later it became ‘re-presentation’.
7
But usually protected by the artistic context that prevents the audience to
literally protect themselves.
8
A symbolic interpretation of Orlan’s work would be one which explains her
performances as symbolizing the importance in contemporary society of beauty
canons. She, then, according to this contemporary and frenetic impulse, would
bring to an extreme the obsession with the body. A different interpretation,
although related to the previous one, would emphasize Orlan’s art with the
avant-garde aim at collapsing art and reality. These interpretations are possible
ones, and maybe correct ones; however, my interest here on her work is more
related to the literalness with which she transforms her own body.
Gloom and Boom
- Representations of violence in Taiwan and Hong Kong
Gangster Films

Ying Chih Liao


While Hong Kong gangster films are famous for their violence and
dazzling gunfight scenes, Taiwan presents violence in an alienating way
composed of gloomy scenes and long shots. Taiwan and Hong Kong gangster
films provide a sharp contrast in their representation of violence: gloom and
spectacle, doom and boom. An evident analogy between Taiwan and Hong
Kong is that both were ceded by the former Chinese Empire and had been
colonized for a long period, but the colonial experiences form considerable
parts in both cultures of today. Nevertheless, different colonial experiences
and historical influences construct Taiwan and Hong Kong as dissimilar
societies. The differences became evident especially after the Sino-British
Joint Declaration in 1984 that decided Hong Kong’s retrocession to China. In
such context, gangster movies in Taiwan and Hong Kong provide microcosms
of their societies through their representation of violence. Hong Kong director
John Woo’s Hard Boiled (1990) displays the quest of consumerism and its
ambivalence toward the retrocession to China while Taiwanese director Hou
Hsiao-hsien’s Goodbye South Goodbye (1996) keeps the violence and fear in
the dark, through which a haunted sense of suppression is conveyed. My paper
will start with analysis of Hard Boiled and Goodbye South, Goodbye, and then
further investigate the anxieties and social milieu of Taiwan and Hong Kong
through a close look of their representation of violence.
Historically, Hong Kong experienced the same fate as Taiwan in the
fact that both of them were once part of the Chinese Empire but ceded to
another regime that introduced modernity into its society since the late
nineteenth century. What made Hong Kong today is its British colonial
experience while Taiwan was profoundly influenced by Japanese colonization.
Though linked to the formative years of the emergence of modern Chinese
nation (though without participating in it), the Taiwanese and Hong Kong
public is now culturally and politically distinct from Chinese mainlanders.
And this crucial point resulted in prevailing anxieties in both Taiwan and
Hong Kong societies when it comes to the issue of the retrocession to China.
Since the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 took place, Hong Kong’s
anxieties toward 1997 retrocession to China had roared while Taiwan had
faced military threats from the Chinese government along with the
80 Gloom and Boom
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strengthening of independent orientation within the Taiwanese social and
political domain.
Throughout the 1980s, Hong Kong cinemas reflected those anxieties
in many cinematic representations, which include the subgenre of gangster
films. It is well known that Gangster movies, across a range of cinemas
(Hollywood, Japan, HK), stage and play out, in popular form, anxieties and
fantasies informing debates about their national cultures. The Corleone Family
of Coppola’s Godfather Trilogy provides an allegory of 20thC American
corporate history in negative form; Kinji Fukasaku’s Yakuza Papers, similarly,
dramatizes the post-war crisis in Japanese’s traditional values, and the destiny
of paternalism in a cut-throat corporate world of business. In the case of Hong
Kong, John Woo, as the most popular and international acclaimed Hong Kong
action movie director of the gangster genre, conveys the anxieties through his
unique style of violent representation before he made his way in Hollywood.
Similar to John Woo, Taiwanese director Hou Hsiao-hsien has won a
prestigious reputation within the Taiwanese film industry and is also
international acclaimed, though famous in a different realm, the art-house
movie. Hou’s films provide a national allegory informing the identity crisis in
Taiwan while John Woo’s films display the uniqueness of Hong Kong through
hyperkinetic violent representation. My comparative analysis will focus on the
film Hou’s Goodbye South, Goodbye (1996) and Woo’s Hard Boiled (1992) to
investigate how their films representations of violence reflect anxieties
produced by issues related to the threatening presence of China.

1. Goodbye South, Goodbye and Hou Hsiao-hsien


Since the Taiwanese New Wave emerged in 1983, films depicting
mainlanders’ homesickness and conflicted identity have tackled various social
issues happening in Taiwan. Hou Hsiao-hsien is the Taiwanese New Wave’s
most prestigious director, and his Goodbye South, Goodbye deals, in
miniature, with the social and economic impact of China’s emergence as a
major world economic power and the relative decline of the Taiwanese
economy. The narrative unfolds around the second-generation mainlander
protagonist Gao with his trouble-making attendant fellows: Flatty and his
girlfriend Pretzel. While Gao is busy with trivial tasks set for him by the gang
leader Hsi orders, his family also exacts from him lots of effort for trivial
things. In the mean time, Flatty and Pretzel keep making troubles that keep
Gao involved and exhausted. The dream of investing in China drives Gao and
fuels his ambition. However, Gao’s girlfriend wants to emigrate to the US and
eventually ends their long-time relationship. Soon after their break-up, Gao,
Flatty and Pretzel are abducted due to Flatty’s opposition to his police cousin,
Ying Chih Liao 81
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which results in the scramble for a small share of inheritance. After the gang
leader’s negotiation, Gao, Flatty and Pretzel are finally released, but a car
accident renders Gao unconscious and leaves his Chinese dream in ruins.
‘Leaving for China to invest’ is the recurring mantra uttered by Gao
throughout Goodbye South, Goodbye. Echoing to this mantra, the ‘south’ in
the title denotes Taiwan. However, after all, Gao is ironically stuck in the
south of the ‘south’. Through the gangster theme and representation of
violence, this film reveals the complexity behind this phenomenon and the
social milieu. Gao’s wish to invest in China, on the one hand, is to fulfil his
father’s dream to go back. On the other hand, after years of struggling within
Taiwanese gang society without prospects, investing in China provides him a
hope of economic success and another chance to have a secure identity. His
efforts for obtaining a definite identity are evident, although complicated. In
addition to his fluent Taiwanese vernacular language, by which mainlanders
and Taiwanese distinguish each other, his efforts for blending in are also
displayed by the Japanese ‘Yakusa’ tattoos on his arm. Although without
much knowledge of Japanese tattoos, having the inscription of it on his arm
provides him a medium to associate with Taiwanese fellow gangsters and
identify with Taiwanese gang culture. His mainlander identity/Chinese
identity has been concealed and can only be distinguished by his Mandarin
accent and his families. Only by referring to Japan, he can accentuate his
Taiwanese localization. However, his devotion to Taiwanese gang society
does not offer him a better position in the gang. Therefore, the wish of going
to China and leaving his Taiwanese gangsterdom behind offers Gao a hope of
prosperous future.
The sudden end of this film conveys the same sense of loss and
pessimism as those sudden turbulences that at times burst out in the tedious
atmosphere that pervades throughout the film. For instance, in a sequence shot
that features gangster fellows gathering around, chatting and having tea, Flatty
suddenly gets enraged by being called the nickname “Flathead” and abruptly
fights with another gangster. The repetition that chaos interlaces with the
boredom of daily life devitalizes the energy for hanging on to the living. And
the present has to be “proved” by sheer repetitions of trivial life to avoid the
fact of meaninglessness. All that occurs is the violence of pessimism. Violence
bursts out merely for trivial things or bad temper. These protagonists, then, are
rather pathetic and powerless; they are very far from the potent and
glamorous-looking gangsters of other versions of the genre. They are the
antithesis of the slick, sharp-suited protagonists in Hard Boiled. The way Gao
and Flatty behave, in the context of the petty patriarchal hierarchy within
Taiwanese gang society in Goodbye South, Goodbye more closely resembles
82 Gloom and Boom
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those in Kinji Fukasaku’s Yakusa Papers, also titled ‘Battles Without Honour
and Humanity’. As this alternative title suggests, the films representation of
violence is associated with the degradation of Japanese martial or samurai
ethics in the context of gangsterism. However, this nostalgia for the loyalty
and obedience associated with the samurai ethic celebrated in the Japanese
samurai epic genre is absent in the Taiwanese movies. Even the nostalgia has
gone. Flatty’s obedience is sheer routine, and continually disrupted by bouts of
petty disobedience and bad temper. And Gao’s loyalty to his gang leader Hsi
is a form of labour without much reward. It only serves to secure Gao a place
within Taiwanese gang society though without prosperity. Namely, loyalty
and obedience in Goodbye South, Goodbye is merely a means of struggling for
survival and is irrelevant to the ideal of honour. Therefore, instead of staging
bravery as in Yakuza Papers, a sense of loss from a pathetic existence is
conveyed through the trivial lives of Gao, Flatty and Pretzel in Goodbye
South, Goodbye.
As a gangster film, Goodbye South, Goodbye is unusual in its
representation of violence. The action of ‘taking away’ replaces visual
violence at the high point of intense confrontation. It hides the violence behind
the scenes and thus even more emphasizes the scariness of violence that
implies little possibility of survival. The absent violence keeps the audience in
the dark, but leaves a sense of uncertainty and anxiety. On rare occasions, the
representation of violence is perceptible but still obscure. While Flatty gets
beaten by his police cousin Ming, it is a long shot that covers the space from
inside to the open ground outside of a house. The frame has a gloomy
foreground, and keeps the violence under the bright daylight but remote.
Moreover, during the violent conflicts, the door frame that divides the space
into foreground/background, inside/outside, gloom/brightness, shades the
audience’s sight from the action of violence. This representation of violence
cannot be identified clearly, and makes the sense of uncertainty continually
haunting the audience.
The other representation of violence of the two scenes available in
this film is the scene that Flatty gets enraged by another gangster who calls
him the nickname ‘Flathead’ that he loathes. This is the most visible violent
scene appearing in this film without making the violence hidden or shaded.
But there is not any close-up or splashing blood, either. This scene was
conveyed by a sequence shot in a gloomy room without any obvious trace of
artificial light. In addition, the conflict itself is a farce that results from an
entirely insignificant reason, and therefore it soon ends up without much
effort. Hou Hsiao-hsien deals with violence in a reverse way that makes most
visible the farcical nature of the conflict. Even guns that always play a crucial
Ying Chih Liao 83
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role in a wide range of gangster movies are invisible in Goodbye South,
Goodbye. Guns exist only in conversations while Flatty is looking for one. But
his pursuit for a gun fails after all and even incurs Gao, Pretzel and himself
under duress by his foe, his police cousin. The mysterious gun thus implicates
the possession of power. The ones who own guns win the game, and the ones
who fail to have them are doomed to lose. The police on whom guns are
bestowed appear to be the only faction that owns the gun, and this
distinguishes the deplorable and pathetic position of petty gangsters. Power is
never available to those gangsters in Hou Hsiao-hsien’s films, in apparent
sharp contrast to the glamorous and gun-parading representation of those
Hong Kong gangster movies of John Woo.

2. Hard Boiled and John Woo


Various critiques and articles have investigated John Woo’s A Better
Tomorrow (1986) and The Killer (1989), both of which succeeded at the box
office and the later paved the way for his heading to Hollywood in the 1990s.
Since the success of The Killer, Woo started to take the international market
into his concern, and before his departure for Hollywood, Hard Boiled was
released as his final film made in Hong Kong. This farewell work displays the
most obvious anxieties concerning the Chinese issue ever existing in his films,
and it makes the leaving of the protagonist in the end connote overtones
informing the anxieties for the retrocession to China and confusion about a
definite identity.
In the beginning of the film, the protagonist Tequila asks his best
friend and colleague Long whether he thinks about emigrating, and Long
replies, “This is my home. If I’m going to die, I want to be buried here. I
couldn’t get used to living abroad.” This conversation is raised when Tequila
and Long are waiting in disguise to raid an illegal case of Chinese gun
smuggling. It ingeniously links the emigration issue with the invasion of
Chinese illegalities, and thereby implicitly unveils the tension that results from
the forthcoming political upheaval of Hong Kong. A sense of social
degeneration compels its inhabitants seeking alternatives by emigrating under
the uncertain atmosphere. But the affection for one’s homeland stops many
from leaving, and keeps them anxiously at home. The emigration issue
extends further by the other protagonist Tony. Being an undercover cop, Tony
has longed for leaving Hong Kong, in which he exists without a definite
identity. His circumstances implicitly coincide with the fate of Hong Kong
inhabitants before 1997. Standing on the line between British colonization and
Chinese retrocession, lacking confidence in the political environment made
the Hong Kong society at a loss for a certain identity, and effectuate a
84 Gloom and Boom
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significant orientation of emigration.1 Therefore, Hard Boiled’s ending with
Tony’s happy departure on the one hand echoes Woo’s intention to leave
Hong Kong, and on the other, it embodies the emigration trend happening in
Hong Kong during the years before 1997.
Unbreakable male-bonding and dramatic pathos are the hallmarks of
John Woo’s films. In Hard Boiled, the narrative develops surrounding the
gun-smuggling syndicates and the protagonists’ invincible fighting with those
gangsters. The masterful cop Tequila wrathfully vows to put the gangster
leader Johnny Wong into jail in order to avenge his best friend’s death. After
fierce gunfights, Tequila encounters the undercover cop Tony. They start to
cooperate with each other, and through numerous gunfights with the
gangsters, they gradually turn their relation from hostility to mutual reliance
and finally crack down on the extremely ferocious villain Johnny Wong.
The obvious ode for masculinity and male bonding in Hard Boiled
and other John Woo’s action films elicits various analyses on John Woo’s
stylish and sentimental action heroes that distinctively differ from that in the
Western action films. Ho in A Better Tomorrow weeps after quarrels with his
brother Kit. In The Killer, there are moments that Jeffrey listens sentimentally
to love ballads sung by his girlfriend Jenny. The same pathos remains
significant in Hard Boiled. Tony makes paper birds to mourn his killings, and
lots of shots focus on his sentimental pondering and cries out his sorrow. In
addition, love ballads also play an important role in this film. Whenever he
sends a message to the Police chief, Tony uses the tune of a love ballad as a
hint for the passwords to decode his message, and thereby it provides a chance
for Tequila to sing the love ballad to his girlfriend who is in charge of
decoding all the passwords sent from Tony. The pathos culminates in the long-
winded scene of hospital rescue. This scene lasts more than thirty minutes and
is suffused with theatrical caring and fondness for tiny infants.
Moreover, the passionate male bonding among the protagonists intensifies
the pathos of the films. In the case of Hard Boiled, what puts the hospital
rescue scene to the end is the humiliation that Tequila suffers in order to save
Tony’s life. Tequila puts down his gun, kneels down, and even slaps himself
according to the villain Johnny Wong’s order, because Tony is grappled by
him and under the threat of his gun. While Tequila is humiliating himself,
close-ups on his and other main characters’ face emphasize the painful
sacrifice of his suffering for his friend Tony, and glorify the greatness of male
bonding. A similar scene has appeared in The Killer that Sydney suffered from
being tortured to prove his friendship for Jeffrey. Unbreakable male bondage
forms a crucial element of masculinity. By excluding females and replacing
heterosexual intimacy by fraternity, a dramatic narrative exclusive for males
Ying Chih Liao 85
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conveys intense pathos and sentimentality through the suffering and
sacrificing among male characters. In A Better Tomorrow, the intimacy
between Kit and his wife, Jacky, is suppressed by Kit’s emotional struggling
with his brother Ho. Hard Boiled repeats the same pattern. While Tequila
loses his best friend and gets determined to revenge, his relationship with his
girlfriend turns estranged. Before long, another male protagonist Tony turns
up, and then Tequila and Tony gradually become close and the sequential
scenes of fighting villains off are means to prove their mutual reliance and
unchallengeable friendship. In his analysis of masculinity in A Better
Tomorrow and The Killer, Stringer states:

A Better Tomorrow and The Killer sadistically push, lock up and blind
women, while placing centre-stage men who will not just be beaten but
thrashed senseless, not just shot but ripped apart by bullets. The
spectacle being offered here is as much masculinity as masochism as it
is masculinity as active agency.2

Stringer points out the melodramatic scenario, intense male bondage


and the violent spectacles serve for the accentuation of masculinity. Philippa
Gates also elaborates the intense male-bonding that forms the tone of John
Woo’s films. She argues that the features of emotional and visual excesses
around intense male-bonding make John Woo’s films as male melodrama.
Visual excesses display the glory of masculinity, and also embody the
melodramatic male-bonding.

For the protagonist, a second relationship with another man always


succeeds this first disrupted friendship. This friendship is established
during the course of the film, and the loyalty of the two men is tested
in the final battle scene in which one man must demonstrate the
strength of his devotion to the other.3

The flamboyant and hyperkinetic gunfight scenes are to foreground


the code of honour and loyalty between men, and the protagonists have to be
invincible until the last minute in order to prove the strength of the intense
male-bonding. Therefore, the fiercer the battle is, the stronger the male
bondage is; the more dead bodies lie, the more invincible and determined the
protagonist is. Therefore, speed-cutting, slow motion and low-angle shots are
massively applied to emphasize the bravery of the protagonists. All the pathos
and hyperbolic violence are means to emphasize greatness of the male
bondage. A strong aspiration of fraternity is thus revealed. With the ideal of
86 Gloom and Boom
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fraternity, the protagonists can fight for their future, and being honoured,
brave and invincible, no matter how tough the situation is. It displays the
strength and determination to survive the political transit about to happen to
Hong Kong.
Another significant feature of John Woo’s representation of violence
comes from the influences of Chinese Kung Fu. The masterful flying skills
and the strong power that moves objects from a distance are essential for all
the representation of Chinese Kung Fu. John Woo applies these features
exclusive for Kung Fu to the modern gunfight scenes, therefore the brave
fighters can fly while they are ducking, attacking and shooting and the
grandiose explosions and flying objects also form the choreographic gunfight
spectacles. In addition, the hallmark of John Woo’s action films—the pose of
a standoff with the guns pointing to each other resembles the confrontation
between opponents with swords or other weapons during a battle of Chinese
Kung Fu. The remarkable hybridity of these features also exists in the mixed
languages, Cantonese, Mandarin and English, that are spoken throughout this
film. This reflects the reality of Hong Kong that her hybrid culture has made
her a different society from China, and this is where the anxieties rise in
response to the retrocession to China.

4. Gloom and Boom


The visual contrast between the styles of Hou and Woo comes from
their entirely different use of shots. Hou, famous for his long-shots and fixed
camera, claims he has been influenced by the Japanese director Yasujiro Ozu
as well as the distant view in Chinese novels. A sense of distance and
neutrality is thus conveyed through Hou’s lens. On the contrary, Woo
manipulates varied shots with fluid camera and speed-cutting to create
exciting scenes recognised by Hollywood. Woo’s appealing to Hollywood
echoes his emigration to the US from his homeland Hong Kong before the
Chinese retrocession. Threatened by Chinese political power, the ways Taiwan
and Hong Kong reacted are varied. Although, a significant element of
representing violence in both films is masculinity, they are staged with
different emphasis. In the case of John Woo, the unbreakable male bonding
that dominates the process of the finale battle provides an ideal pursuit of
fraternity. It implies that the power of male bonding can remove all the
obstacles and fight it out. An affirmation of men’s power is overwhelming in
every film of John Woo. Before the doomed fate of 1997 Chinese
retrocession, the need for a collective Hong Kong identity is staged by this
celebration of male power. The imaginary potency of these hyper-action
movies, however, is in stark contrast to the position of total passivity and
Ying Chih Liao 87
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impotence of Hong Kong’s position with regard to their fate played out in the
deal struck between China and the UK. Through the fantasy of imaginary
mastery, perhaps, an unconscious wish to overcome this passivity is revealed.
In contrast, the relationship among the protagonists in Hou’s film is
patriarchal in a more hierarchical rather than individualised way. The gang
leaders — or the big brothers— provide protection for his followers and solve
all their problems, like Hsi takes care of Gao and Gao takes care of Flatty in
Goodbye South, Goodbye. The male bondage here is rather a father-and-son
relationship that the leaders patronize and have dominant power over their
followers, and the followers offer their loyalty in return. The loyalty comes
from their wish to stick to the symbolic order. Following a leader provides
those followers a sense of relative security, and thus secures their position in
the symbolic order. Hou discloses this security to be illusory, however, and a
source of humiliation rather than empowerment. They can be spanked and
scolded as long as the illusion of security lasts. However, securing one’s
position in the symbolic order through sticking to the powerful is disclosed as
merely an illusion and doomed to fail. Thus after struggling within the gang
for years, Gao remains limited and has never got a more important position in
the gang. In the end, even though he is rescued by his boss, Gao is still stuck
and lost in the south. His dreams can never come true. A secure identity is
unavailable, and a pessimistic nationalistic allegory of Taiwan is revealed
through the representation of loss and uncertainty. The gloomy and bleak
boredom of Goodbye South, Goodbye embodies the predicament Taiwan is
undergoing.
Representation of violence is not merely the pleasure for
consummation or from the preference of cinema industries. Different forms
of violent representation represent the perception of a director, as an
individual in the society, under a whole set of circumstances. In the case of
Taiwan and Hong Kong, the representation of violence appears to be a set of
contraries: pessimistic/ optimistic, gloomy/ glamorous, hidden/ hyperbolic,
pathetic/brave, depressed/ flamboyant and gloom/ boom. Different historical
experiences and present political situations, the violence in the gangster
movies of Taiwan reflects the pessimism under political uncertainties, while
the presentation of violence in Hong Kong gangster movies displays the
brilliances of Hong Kong to establish a definite identity that becomes an
exigency before the retrocession to China. In sum, both Taiwanese and Hong
Kong gangster films stage the anxieties informing the identity issues through
different presentation of violence. They appeal to a third party to draw
attention on their political predicament resulting from China and thus
88 Gloom and Boom
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accentuate the uniqueness of their identities via varied forms of violence and
cinematic representation.

Notes
1
Robin Porter, 2000, 203.
2
Julian Stringer, 1997, 38.
3
Philippa Gates, 2001, 1.

Bibliography
Porter, Robin. (2000), ‘Towards a Democratic Audit in Hong Kong: Some
Issues and Problems,’ in Robert Ash (ed.) Hong Kong in Transition:
Handover Years. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 187-210.
Stringer, Julian. (1997) ‘Your Tender Smiles Give Me Strength: Paradigms
of Masculinity in John Woo's A Better Tomorrow and The Killer.’
Screen 38.1 (Spring). 25-41.
Gates, Philippa. (2001), ‘The Man’s Film: Woo and the Pleasures of Male
Melodrama.’ Popular Culture 35. 1.
“Thrill-Kill Culture and the Beautiful Wound”

Emily McMehen
Death, in particular violent death, and its representations in the
popular media have long been a source of controversy as we attempt to
identify the role of violence in an ever more civilized and humane society.
There are distinctions to be made, however, between the types of violence we
choose to be exposed to. There is real violence, that is, violation in the flesh,
in which there is an instance of trauma. A wound is opened. Web-like, the
various depictions and extractions of the violent act that formulate our
experience of it extend in every direction from this act of violation. There are
issues of the public and private, the domains transgressed by the violent act
within the body of the individual and within the larger social body. From the
wound extend issues of anxiety, validity and identity; dialogues are initiated
between fact and fiction, man and beast, past and future. Primarily, though,
from the transgressive act of violence, there is one central matter that is
essential in determining the nature of our response, and that is the relationship
between the real and its representation.
It can be assumed that the representational is derived directly from
the real. If this is true, then, logically, the real precedes the representation. It is
not exclusively violence that preoccupies our civilization, but its
representation in relation to the real experience. In terms of popular media,
there are a myriad of means and ways by which to perceive the act of
violence, be it document or directorial image, but, increasingly, our actual
physical experience with death and its indicators is largely limited to
representational subjects. On the other hand, we are bombarded with images
of violence and death from our youth, not just through the telling of basic
morality tales that have morbidly fatalistic undertones, but by image based
media: print, film and television. Removal (of death)-by-representation has
assured that representation provides more sensational visions of how we die,
hyper real and preferred to the actual image or ‘face’ of death, now completely
absent from our daily encounters.
Determining the verity of a perceived violation is essential to the
alleviation or acceleration of public anxiety. Real violence generates anxiety
where representational violence is alleged to have a cathartic effect, alleviating
anxiety and resolving the social tensions created within the individual viewer1.
The cinematic violation is an experience-by-proxy that implicates the standard
of experiential violations, without enabling or igniting the anxieties that
accompany the non-cinematic acts.
90 Thrill-Kill Culture and the Beautiful Wound
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There must be then, some apparatus in place for distinguishing the
real from the fictional. Again, we must remember that the ‘real’ in this context
is not the real experience of violence, but its documentary depiction.
Experience of violence, however varied or far reaching, is being replaced by
image-experience. If we are in search of the ‘real-est’ depiction of violence,
that is real-est as in most real, we look back into our collective multi-media
past and are reminded of the deaths of heroes and villains, of scenes of
greatest tragedy and terror that have evoked a truly emotive response. For
many, these image-experiences stand in for the conspicuously absent
experiential perception of violence or death. This is not to say that we have not
encountered any element of death or violence at all in our (collective)
upbringing, but that the resonance of the image experience, not only for its
directorial mastery, but also for reason of sheer volume, has permeated our
memory, a teaching tool that has guided our responses and engendered our
attitudes not to violence, but to our social surroundings. The sympathetic
substitutes for trauma and traumatic experience as provided by fictional media
allow for varied responses, measured and chosen by the spectator, to be
indulged and enjoyed to whatever extent from a position of veritable ‘safety’2.
Generally, there are a number of hypotheses in circulation
surrounding the crucial conundrum of why we watch. Why we watch scenes
of graphic violence, why we enjoy them, and why we continue to return to the
image of violence in the popular media. One of the theories that is believed to
carry water from a psychological perspective is the catharsis theory3,
suggesting that we engage in the spectatorship of staged and controlled violent
acts in order to experience some form of relief from anxiety. The emotional
outlet provided by the ‘safe’ experience of the violent act serves to expel some
of our fears from within a social or personal context by way of the release of
negative emotions. It is this vicarious practice of coping responses that allows
us to engage with the subject of violence or violation as a means of
confronting or rehearsing our own violation or inevitable death4. It is an
exercise in controlling trauma from a spectatorial standpoint within the image-
experience equation.
Trauma, like madness, escapes all academic or psychoanalytic
attempts to identify it, and is, as such, identified primarily through its elusive
and amorphous qualities. The spectator then, could be said to be experiencing
a type of temporary madness while watching a film. The role of the cinematic
spectator, or the spectator subjected to the image-experience simulation,
becomes an embodiment of transitional space. Suspension of disbelief is
accompanied by the suspension of all applicable moralities or other social
Emily McMehen 91
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constructs, as the ethos of the cinematic experience supplants them for the
duration of the film5.
Establishment of kinship with other spectators in this state of
suspended morality or temporary madness is maintained, and exists
throughout the duration of the controlled traumatic experience, assisting in the
successful navigation of the simulation. The presence of other spectators
assists the individual viewer in affirming his role in relation to the image-
environment and to the others experiencing it6. For example, when visiting a
holocaust museum or watching a disturbing film, the reassurance of distress as
indicated by other spectators helps to validate the response of the individual.
Invariably, finding bonds with other spectators in a transitional state of ethics
or emotional response helps to validate the inherent circumstantial instability.
The documentary or ‘real’ image provides another type of cathartic
outlet for the anxieties surrounding social living. This type of imagery is
jockeyed around all forms of popular media to varying degrees of severity or
reserve. The degree of exposure to violence in this manner, particularly in
relation to television and print media is at times more or less fashionable, but
now, with the inclusion of the internet into the image market, the documentary
face of death has become both a sought after and easily attainable trophy for
the diligent web-surfer. More and more graphic images to supplement the
televised newscasts, more explicit descriptives, and more potential resources
for the communication of the image experience, all made available quite
literally at our fingertips.
The rumour of snuff film, a genre of film alleged to elicit the
exploitation and ‘real’ murder of the actors and actresses on screen sparked a
great deal of public interest in the 1970’s, and the continued rumours of the
underground market for the production and distribution of snuff film pass in
and out of fashion still today. Although the snuff industry has been widely
dismissed as an urban myth, the concept of this merging of directorial and
documentary film-making practices has attracted the fascination of
generations, drawing and repelling audiences from waves of low-budget films
so poor they ‘must be real’ to have hit the screens since the early 70’s. Often
encouraged by real events, the Tate LaBianca murders7, for example, or the
movements of the .44 Calibre Killer, these supposed snuff films, actually low-
budget sex/slasher films were often produced in South America, and used this
exoticism as a hook – proclaiming that these films were absolved of adhering
to Western morality codes, presumably that they were also exempt from
Western law as a result of their foreign production ‘on the sly.’
92 Thrill-Kill Culture and the Beautiful Wound
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Ruggero Deodato makes an interesting commentary in his 1979 film
Cannibal Holocaust, whose narrative structure plays with this constant back-
and-forth between the perception of directorial and documentary relationships
and the anxiety that follows them. The film, ostensibly a film inside a film,
follows a team of sensational documentary filmmakers into the Amazon
jungle in an attempt to establish the events leading up to their deaths. What
follows is an intensely disturbing yet effective criticism of the differentiation
between the real and its representation. Perhaps one of the most effective
critical achievements of the film occurs when footage presented of a series of
executions is dismissed within the context of the film’s narrative development
as ‘fake,’ and that these images have been staged and collected as a part of the
filmmaking team’s attempt to sensationalize their subjects, and that in fact,
these soldiers were paid to “do a bit of acting.” In actual fact, Deodato used
footage taken from genuine newsreels to construct this scene. This sequence,
at the outset of the film, sets the tone for the disquieting series of critical
analogies that is to follow, reordering again and again the real and the
representational in a series of ruthless and inflammatory images.
Similarly, David Cronenberg’s Videodrome addresses the concept of
latent desire to experience violence in the context of the subconscious or
subliminal rendering of the image-experience. In this film, this latent desire
for the sublimated violent experience is treated as a terminal disease, an
impetus for the transformation of the flesh, or human material into something
better suited to its formless nature.
One of the peculiar things about the waves of snuff-hysteria that
affected viewing audiences across the United States and Europe was that these
films arrived at a time when true ‘snuff’ footage was readily available in
varying degrees to the television viewing public. Newsreels depicted graphic
images of war-torn countries from across the globe: students being shot during
protests in Burma, monks famously self-emolliating in Viet Nam, slaughter in
South Africa, gruesome military conflict in Central and South America. But
somehow these grainy images of real human suffering were not as palatable as
the grainy images of blood soaked co-eds filmed on location as sloppy low-
budget re-enactments of murders that, in their original state, possessed a
sustainable shock value.
So, why then do we prefer to be lied to? Why is the dubious promise
of ‘real’ violence in a cinematic sphere more desirable than the available
images of suffering we have made so readily available?
Perhaps the answer lies in the cinema itself. The cinematic image-
experience induces the occlusion of the pragmatic eye by a qualitative desire
to identify conflict, in this case, the conflict created by comparing
Emily McMehen 93
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representations of violence to the real subjects from which they may be
derived. In this case, the spectator is measuring qualitative accounts of the
incongruities between the real and the image, and choosing the representation
for the simple fact of its harmless controversy.
The actual fact of violation, or the truthful ‘publication’ of private
trauma, or private material of another kind, a car wreck for example, is more
effective in demonstrating the intricacies of the human condition within the
public sphere, calling attention to the reciprocal topographies of subject and
place8. So what happens, then when this principle, is applied to the spectator
and the spectacle? The image-experience as perceived in the suspended state
of temporary disjunction of morality and materiality is sublimated and stored
as experience, or experiential information without any direct connection to
real or emotive events or information. The experience and image-experience
relationship forms a doubly mimetic cycle: not simply ‘like becomes like,’ but
distinctly ‘like becomes like becomes like.’ The terminus of the process of
assimilating the simulacrum is this double negative that is the formula for the
analogous relationship between real and representation. False becomes true
becomes false. Mark Seltzer writes of ‘promiscuous substitutions between
bodies and representations,’ and it is of this discourse that the reciprocal
model is activated.
The spectator endeavours to overcome the sympathetic substitute or
to validate/solidify his notion of trauma by experiencing a ‘real’ simulation.
Simulation in the public arena takes the form of film and popular media.
Simulation in another context identifies just that boundary between the private
and the public. A car-wreck, for example, in which real people have been
injured, attracts and equally zealous response but lacks the cathartic quality of
the cinematic image-experience. Similarly, the documentary image of
violation and death as supplied by broadcast media – dubbed by Mary Anne
Douane as a ‘non-corporeal mass witness’ to the affectations of the violent act
in the pathological public sphere, may even serve to reverse this cathartic
process. The transference of thrill-kill ideologies endorsed as cathartic by
proponents of the cinematic image-experience into the sphere of global
politics permits for the permeation or carry-over of xenophobic anxieties and
death ethics curiosity, but generates a type of closed circuit perception in
which violent image and violent act continually reveal and reciprocate the
validity of one other. In this circumstance, the catharsis or relief theory may be
inverted – reaffirming anxieties and their decided validity. The cathartic
quality applied to this transference has itself been transferred to provide relief
from larger global issues rather than the anxieties they cause.
94 Thrill-Kill Culture and the Beautiful Wound
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The rendering ‘open’ of a human body, or other animal – but in
particular the human body as it is itself the subconscious referent to which all
of our perceptions are related back, is the invitation to suddenly witness the
private nature of injury. The wound is the hole in the garden wall that allows
us to perceive the individual nature of another person, or in some cases,
another culture. The wound is the window through which we can look and see
the visceral simplicity of our own mortality. It is this intrigue at the centre of
our morbid curiosity that leads the argument for the beauty of the slaughter as
a defense for our thirst for violent image-experience, and conversely the same
fascination that causes our aversion to any direct experience of violence or
death within the larger social schema. We placate instances of hysterical
recognition of mortality with placebos, substitute hysterias and gradually build
a defense against the perceived violation made possible by the presence of
violence itself– distancing or isolating that one particular element – the violent
atom – within us and analyzing it in the hope of eventually extracting or
amputating it. But violence is an integral part of our development, whether
considered from the viewpoint of evolution, social development or the
development of the individual identity. A forum for questions and curiosities
surrounding the ever more mysterious figure of death – in particular sudden or
violent death – the civilizing process has obscured the face of death, removed
the visible, tangible experience of death to such and extent that we may come
to know it now through representation alone. Many of us may live out our
childhoods, and indeed traverse much of our adult lives without ever
witnessing the death of another human being, should we so choose. To do so
today, to witness the death of another is considered a high trauma, an
experience so shattering as to affect the way we relate to our families, do our
jobs, even function within the anonymous constructs of larger society, where
only a century ago, death was frequently a public transaction9.
To equate the nobility of a creature, human or otherwise, with its
passivity is to negate the character of the beast as it exists in its most basic
form. The solution is not to reject violence or to resist its appeal, but through
its perception begin to understand its role in our character. Bloodsport cannot
be rendered safe any more than war can be rendered decent. To limit our
exposure to violence is only to increase its experiential value in any
circumstance. The risk is the reification of the concept that replaces it – like
becomes like becomes like- and the context it is borne of disintegrates. Any
act becomes violence for violence’ sake, and the context, abolished by
complete displacement of physical acquaintance with the issue, is lost. The
derivative violent experience, arguably manifest in serial killers, is
demonstrative of what happens when the image precedes the experience, and
Emily McMehen 95
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the mimetic cycle is inverted. Violence, along with the various processes of
representation and perception, is not only a relief from social anxiety, nor is it
exclusively a manifestation of the latent aggressive tendencies that the human
animal, to name but one, possesses. It is a process of questioning and mapping
the catastrophic boundaries of our being. To witness violence, or the effects of
violence, is to find insight into the mechanics of human frailty. To experience
violence is to develop a relationship first hand with our physicality. This need
not be violence as enacted from one person to another, although that model
tends to be the preferred case study. The violent act may consist of any
engagement with the wound or wounding of oneself or another, it may consist
of the extraction of the image from the ‘real’ experience, or the reverse, the
extraction of the experience from the image.

Notes
1
Catharsis theory as discussed in Clark McCaulay’s ‘Why Screen Violence is
Not Attractive’ pp 147 demonstrated by a series of experiments in which
viewers of violent images were observed and their responses recorded
2
Goldstein, Jeffrey ‘Why We Watch
3
McCaulay, Clark pp 145
4
Seltzer, Mark pp67
5
Feury, Patrick pp 17
6
McCaulay, Clark pp153
7
Kerkes & Slater pp17
8
Seltzer pp 34
9
Goldberg 39

Bibliography
Goldberg, Vicki ‘Death Takes a Holiday, Sort of’ in Jeffrey H Goldstein ed.,
Why We Watch, New York, London: Oxford University Press 1998
pp 27-5
McCaulay, Clark ‘Why Screen Violence is Not Attractive’ in Jeffrey H
Goldstein ed., Why We Watch, New York, London: Oxford
University Press 1998 pp 144-162
Zillman, Dolf ‘The Psychology of the Appeal of Portrayals of Violence’ in
Jeffrey H Goldstein ed., Why We Watch, New York, London: Oxford
University Press 1998 pp179-211
96 Thrill-Kill Culture and the Beautiful Wound
_______________________________________________________________
Goldstein Jeffrey ‘Why We Watch’ in Jeffrey H Goldstein ed., Why We
Watch, New York, London: Oxford University Press 1998 pp 212-
226
Seltzer, Mark Serial Killers: Death and Life in America’s Wound Culture
London, New York: Routledege 1998
Feury, Patrick Madness and Cinema: Psychoanalysis Spectatorship and
Culture Hampshire, New York: Palgrave McMillan 2004
Simpson, Philip L. Psychopaths: Tracking the Serial Killer Through
Contemporary American Film and Fiction Southern Illinois
University Press 2000
Kerkes, David & David Slater, Killing For Culture: An Illustrated History of
Death Film from Mondo to Snuff. UK: Creation Books 1994.
Visual Expressions of Violence and Symbolic Speech:
Gendered Arts of War

Gary Wheeler
Whether it comes through the conflicted violence of war or through
collisions of contested values of religious practice, institutionalized trauma
dislocates the ordinariness and structures of everyday life. That such trauma
exists anywhere is a blow to our common humanity. That people do survive
and continue to express themselves artistically is a tribute to the enduring
connection between art and survival. One could say that one function of the
artist is the negotiation of cultural peace settlements in the face of continued
conflict. This concrete negotiation provides the enabling and (re)location of
humanity using imagination and creative expression that responds directly to
conflict.
My presentation examines the experience and visual expression of
artists following two intertwined formulations of gendered work in domestic
and public spheres. The linkage is seen as involving Islamic artisans on the
one hand and Western artists and collectors focusing on Islamic themes on the
other. The linkage complicates the long dialogue between the voracious West
and its views of the exotic Middle East and Islam. It suggests a connection,
however conflicted, between the consumerism of Western modernity and the
vibrant expressiveness of Islamic artists.
The first formulation that I will present involves symbolic imagery
used in woven rugs created by artists, most commonly young girls in a
domestic setting, beginning almost immediately after the Soviet Union’s 1979
invasion of Afghanistan and continuing through the invasion by the U.S. more
than twenty years later. The second formulation involves the visible and
symbolic speech of the hijab (head scarf) and burqa (full-body veiling). Even
as the hijab and burqa constitute an essentialized element of female Muslim
identity for many in the West, these elements of clothing have come to
characterize certain political positions as well.
In order to uncover these issues, it is vital to examine the lives and
activities of women. The Iranian-born visual artist, Shirin Neshat, told Ms.
magazine in December 2000, “I find that through the study of women you get
to the heart—the truth—of the culture. That may not be so common elsewhere,
but I think that in places such as Iran, whenever there’s a big change
politically—it’s the women who usually manifest these changes—through the
way they dress, the way they behave” (quoted by Susan Tenaglia, 2002).
Contemporary artists reflect and respond to the environment of
98 Visual Expressions of Violence and Symbolic Speech
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conflict and political discourse through creative products, in the case of this
presentation, incorporating the visual details of war in woven rugs (primarily
created in Afghanistan and Pakistan) and by the element of public expression
through the appropriated symbol of the burqa. The expression is gendered in
several senses: by the expression of creative work by women (rugs) is
followed by its consumption in capitalist art markets controlled largely by
men; by the domestic allegiance to the religious laws of Sharia regarding the
appropriate clothing (and decorum) of women on the one hand and the
appropriation of this image for political speech issues by Western artists,
mostly male, on the other. Additionally, Islamic women artists are reclaiming
and reinterpreting the positioning of the symbolism of veiling through artistic
productions and performances.
My presentation focuses on two elements of expression by artists:
The externalization of war/weapon imagery by tribal women in their weaving
of rugs; and the response to the “idea” and image presented by the “veiling” of
women, especially the whole body veiling of the burqa, by contemporary
artists.

Afghanistan “War Rugs”


The recent history of Afghanistan includes four periods of national
conflict, often involving outside national or guerilla forces fighting within
Afghanistan’s borders. These include the Soviet/Afghan War (1979-89), the
Afghanistan civil war (1993-96), the period of Taliban rule (1996-01), and the
occupation by the American Coalition (2001-?). It is important to note that
“War rugs” have been woven reflecting each of these. The War rugs have
become especially numerous and available in the markets of the West over the
past 10 years.
What are “War rugs”? As recently as 2002, these rugs represented
less than one-percent of the rugs woven in Afghanistan and the refugee areas
of Pakistan. War rugs are a new example of the economic inventiveness of
Afghani tribal culture in the face of devastating dislocation and difficulty in
the aftermath of war. The rugs are marketed to the foreign soldiers and
military bureaucrats as keepsakes and mementoes of having served in
particular ways in the conflicts in the Afghanistan military theatre. The
original war rugs from the time of the Soviet invasion and occupation have
given way to the new and richer market of American military personnel and,
with the September 11, 2001 rugs, collectors who wish to remember that
tragedy in New York. Once primarily sold directly to individuals on the
ground in Afghanistan, the market for the war rugs now extends to eBay, the
Internet, and New York City’s flea markets.
Gary Wheeler 99
_______________________________________________________________
But, while these rugs represent a new source of income, they also
reflect the psycho-social and aesthetic response to military conflict. For
Afghani tribes, rug weaving has always been a domestic activity, aimed at
supplying the family and the domestic market primarily. Carpet making has
long flourished in the region, with tribal weaving giving rise to a vigorous
industry centred in places like Kerman, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Herat. The art of
weaving rugs extends beyond the operational and the functional. According to
the writer and editor of IslamOnline, Hwaa Irfan, “… such art served to
transmit higher forms of knowledge, a time when art was executed according
to certain laws represented in nature, akin to the role of geometry in Islam.
Art was not just an external expression subject to manipulation and
interpretation.” (Irfan, 2003). The relatively small rugs were used for
individuals in a variety of ways, especially for daily prayer rituals. Prayer rugs
often incorporated personal elements and symbols, including directional cues
for facing in the proper direction while kneeling and praying. The rugs
typically incorporated geometric symbols in symmetrical designs (especially
those used for prayer) or stylized images of plants, animals, buildings, and
(less commonly) hands and (even less commonly) people. Some symbols
reflect the pre-Islamic world of Zoroastrianism and the shamanist religion of
Persia with a focus on fertility and individual success.
Along with other observers, Irfan claims to be startled by the
inclusion of war imagery in the domestic production of prayer rugs, but
explains it by noting: “Individual’s coping mechanisms are determined by
cultural resilience and how thorough the occupation force is at denying the
indigenous people the right to be who they are. Different people express these
problems in different ways, often making pathological imbalances appear
socially acceptable, such as in the process of weaving where the abstract
produces a kind of beauty. Tanks, guns, rifles and helicopters—geometrical
weapons of destruction—washed, combed, and spun, stretched and then
attached to loom movements, forward and back, knotting and pulling,
observing, comparing, and cutting. Hardly the kind of activity that one would
expect from people in a war-torn region, but weaving served as a thread from
the past that helped to heal the wounds of Afghanistan when it was under
Russian occupation. Who would have thought that the sounds of destruction
and attempts to annihilate their whole existence could lead to the past
rescuing the present?” (Irfan, 2003)
Who are the weavers? Tribal rugs are woven primarily by young girls
and their mothers (Helman, 2003), (Irfan, 2003). The nomadic families live in
moveable structures that have woolen felt walls supported by collapsible
wooden frames. The women weave using relatively small horizontal looms
100 Visual Expressions of Violence and Symbolic Speech
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producing rugs, blankets, wall hangings, and various pack containers. The
designs used for the woven materials tend to reflect family and tribal
traditions. Beginning their weaving work as young as 5 and 6 years of age,
girls who are known are particularly good weavers are highly prized and seen
as desirable wives. Traditionally, a family would produce 2-3 rugs per year in
excess of what was made for their own use. These would be exchanged for
barter or outright cash sales. With the recent development of a commercial
market for tribal rugs and other woven materials in the last several decades,
the income produced by the girls and their mothers has become a significant
economic driver in tribal culture.
The war rugs are made mostly by tribal groups known collectively as
Baluch. The Baluch of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, a group of related
semi-nomadic tribes, are so renowned for their prayer rugs that many of these
stylish rugs are referred to as Baluchi (Baluch or Balouch) rugs, even when
not created by the Baluch, nor even created in the region common to these
tribes. The type of weave varies: the Baluchi in the south of Afghanistan tend
to use less dyed wool in their flat weaves (primarily for saddlebags and
storage bags) and sometimes include embroidery, while those of eastern
Afghanistan weave rugs that have a more open, less dense weave. In general
the Baluch-style rug has a short pile, a wool and cotton foundation and
average less than 100 knots per square inch. Backgrounds tend to be dark,
usually blue or red, with brighter colours used as accents. Finer examples use
traditional vegetable dyes that have a more subdued palette. The wool is
minimally processed. As it ages, it oxidizes, increasing sheen and softening
colours (Wegner, 1985).
The war rugs break with traditional tribal rugs in several ways. Many
depart from the ever-important symmetry of Islamic rugs, incorporate maps
and other “modern” elements describing landscape space, and include clear
depictions of weaponry. These items show every imaginable piece of military
hardware, from helicopters and airplanes to tanks and trucks, from various
kinds of anti-personnel bombs and ordinance to rifles and missile launchers.
Small items like gun cartridges, land mines, and hand grenades frequently
show up as decorative border elements. Finally, many incorporate some type
of structured narrative and stylized women, all wearing burqas.

Afghanistan Burqa
For whatever historical, social, or psychological reason, the image
constructed by Europeans about the woman of the Middle East has involved
imaginative fantasies, misconstructions, and stereotypes since the medieval
period (Ali, 77). According to the feminist writer, Wijdan Ali, “Orientalist
Gary Wheeler 101
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painters, including Jean-Léon Geröme, John Fredrick Lewis, Jean Lecompte
du Nouy, Eugene Delacroix, Luis Riccardo Falero and Jean Auguste
Dominique Ingres, among scores of others, depicted countless scenes in which
halfnaked Muslim women in harem quarters reclined in a stupor on cushions,
danced voluptuously in royal courts, exhibited erotically in slave-markets, and
slumped against each other in Turkish baths, unclothed, like chunks of fresh
beef in a butcher’s window. Unlike her European sister, the nude Muslim
woman emerged in Orientalist art outside mythology and was placed within a
definite milieu that, in the mind of the artists, gave her a realistic character
that appealed to the bourgeois public. Yet, strangely enough, the women in
those paintings hardly ever looked foreign, and closely conformed to
European standards of beauty: pale skin, lightcoloured eyes and blond or
light chestnut hair” (Ali, 78).
Their confident artwork notwithstanding, most European artists had
never seen a Muslim woman, clothed or naked. Instead, relying on travellers
accounts, a second image of the Muslim woman developed that was anything
but the available seductress depicted in the academic paintings of the 19th
century. This contradictory but equally held view saw the Muslim woman as
“…ignorant and repressed woman whose Islamic culture, based on the
religion, forced her into servitude behind the veil” (Ali, 79). It was largely this
secondary view that has accompanied the development of modernity into
Middle Eastern states, beginning with the outlawing of the wearing of the
hijab under the modernist Turkish leader, Kemal Attaturk in the early 20th
century.
Due to what are believed to be specific instructions within the
Qur’an, many Muslims observe certain clothing restrictions. These restrictions
are said to be due to:

(1) A religious concern for modesty and


appropriate behaviour (Qur’an, 24:31,
24:60, 33:59).

(2) A sense that men are not responsible for


controlling their sexual impulses, women
are.

(3) A belief that women should be evaluated


on their intelligence and not their
appearance.
102 Visual Expressions of Violence and Symbolic Speech
_______________________________________________________________
(4) A desire to make a public display of
religious identity and affiliation.

The term hijab (or curtain) is used in the Qur’an to refer to the
entirety of a woman, how she behaves on a daily basis and how she lives
within the context of her family and religious restrictions. In everyday
language the term, hijab, tends to refer only to the headscarf itself
(covering the head and upper chest). In this sense, the expectation of the
hijab includes speech, actions, and other forms of public expression. One
particular iteration of the hijab is the more restrictive burqa, found mostly
but not exclusively in Afghanistan. The burqa is said by many critics and
supporters of Islamist religious groups to represent four things: (1) Male
control of women (especially the body and public expression of women)
and the female expression of modesty and separation from public; (2) an
emphasis on the restriction of women to the private sphere of family and
the company of other women; (3) a belief that women should not lead a
public life, that women have little or no public identity or public
individuality; and (4) a recognition that women need protection (from men)
while in public. Fadwa El Guindi in her 1999 text, Veil: Modesty, Privacy,
and Resistance, presents a similar kind of typology in noting that the word
“veil” describes at least four different kinds of covering: (1) the material
(clothing and ornament); (2) the spatial (a screen dividing physical spaces);
(3) the communicative (language as concealment and silence as
invisibility); and (4) the religious (seclusion from the world and sexual
intimacy).
For some Muslim women the veiling has returned as a political symbol
of resistance to Western values and an identification with Islamic religious
belief. This is particularly true for the women in the economic upper-classes in
certain Middle Eastern countries and those in European countries, as well as
the United States. Within this desire for the veil is a rejection of modernity and
its emphasis on individuality and universality as well as its embrace of
consumerism. Ibrahim Kaya says that: “By examining the veiled women’s
rejection of modernity I argue that it is wrong to read Islamism as an actual
questioning of modernity. Traditional Islam is not the key element in
understanding the veiled women’s identity; rather, at the core of the issue is
the reproduction of identity under conditions of modernity” (Kaya, 195). Yet
even the movement toward (re)veiling is not without its critics. According to
some critics, to the extent that this movement is taking place within the
fashion industry and marketplace, where it is becoming “fashionable” to wear
the hijab, the fashion of the hijab is seen as an unwelcome and un-Islamist
Gary Wheeler 103
_______________________________________________________________
embrace of consumerism. “Indeed, fashion is not only considered a threat to
Islamic lifestyle in women’s magazines, but also in Islamist literature. There
are plenty of books devoted to this subject such as Abdurrahman Kasapoglu’s
(1994) Kadın, Modernizm ve Örtünme (Women, Modernity and Veiling), Aysel
Zeynep’s (1997) Kadının Tercihi (The Choice of Woman) and famous Islamist
woman author Cihan Aktas’s two-volume study of women’s clothing, titled
Tanzimattan Günümüze Kılık, Kıyafet ve ˙Iktidar (Clothing and Power from
the Tanzimat Reformation to the Present) (1990) and Mahremiyetin Tükenisi
(The Decline of Intimacy) (1995). In this literature, fashion is defined as ‘a
basis for sexual deviance’ (Kasapoglu, 1994: 83); ‘exhibitionism and
consumerism’ (Zeynep, 1997: 45–9); and ‘an indication of a loss of intimacy’
(Aktas, 1995: 12–13). Particularly, Aktas criticizes the fashion for veiling
because it indicates the surrender of the religion and its practices to the
capitalist consumption culture (Aktas, 1995: 194). As a result of the fashion
for veiling, according to Aktas, veiled women are relocated in depoliticized
positions, and gradually become consumers, who act within the ‘system’
(Aktas, 1995: 194)” (Kiliçbay& Binark, 502).
Artistic responses to the burqa have focused attention on its symbolism
of the repressed feminine, the closeted individual, and similar liberty issues.
To comment briefly on several types of artistic imagination in response to the
veiling of the burqa:

(1) The Burqa with a “Western” twist— the artists in this category use
the burqa to explore themes of otherness, shrouding, and alienation,
focusing on the separation of the individual from public view.
Examples include Jean Ulrick Désert’s The Burqa Project: On the
Borders of My Dreams I Encountered My Double’s Ghost (manikins
dressed in burqas fashioned from national flags); Sean Sorensen’s
Politics as Usual with models photographed wearing burqas (with
titles such as “Heartland Burqa,” “McBurqa,” and “Sexy Burqa”);
burqa advertising billboards in France; and the Internet sites
http://www.americanburqa.com/ and
http://www.jillhunter.net/pages/galleries/burqa/index.html

(2) A second category of artists re-enact imagined separation and


alienation (conflicts with modernity?) through performance pieces
that may include religious symbols, stories about feelings of being
silenced and isolated, and themes of the conflict between individual
identity and group identity. Examples include: Parima Moghaddam’s
2002 performance on Veiling; Shekaiba Wakili’s 2003 performances
104 Visual Expressions of Violence and Symbolic Speech
_______________________________________________________________
of Unveiling; and Heather Troy’s (Helen of Troyz) Burqa Rebirth at
the 13 tribes gallery in New York. Not all performance artists
working with burqa themes are women. The New York performance
artist, Robert Galinsky, had a piece where a male rape victim took off
a burqa to symbolize a stripping of layers of captivity [and layers of
appropriation].

(3) In a third category are artists for whom the symbolism of the burqa is
part of a larger image of the presence of women and men in relation
to each other. The most important artist of this category is the much-
acclaimed, Shirin Neshat, with works such as her work, Guns and
Gazes, a series of (mostly) black-and-white photographs with
handwritten calligraphy. Born in Iran but educated in the U.S.,
Neshat began to create images in 1990 that directly respond to the
issues of women and freedom under Islamist restrictions in Iran and
other nearby countries. Neshat produced sensual and elegant, black-
and-white photographs depicting female friends, and often self-
portraits, each dressed in dark-coloured hijabs or burqas. In many of
the photographs the women are shown holding guns, their feminine
presence contrasting with the potential violence and phallic
symbolism of the rifle. Farsi poetry, written by relatively little known
women poets of the early 20th century during a time when women in
the Middle East began to express their identities in public, covers
their faces, hands, and any other exposed body part.

The linkage between the domestic/tribal art of the woven rugs and that
of the burqa is a link that challenges those of us in the West to examine our
fundamental notions of culture and our views of Islamic art. While separated
by cultural boundaries and histories, artists provide clear evidence of a
common humanity and an ability to negotiate connections between the West
and Islam.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abu-Lughod, Lila. Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle
East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Ali, Wijdan. “Muslim Women: Between Cliche and Reality.” Diogenes 50,
no. 3 (2003): 77-87.
Bailey, David, and Gilane Tawadros. Veil: Veiling, Representation, and
Gary Wheeler 105
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Contemporary Art. Boston: MIT Press, 2003.
El Guindi, Fadwa. Veil: Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance. Oxford: Berg,
1999.
Franks, Myfanwy. “Crossing the Borders of Whiteness? White Muslim
Women Who Wear the Hijab in Britain Today.” Ethnic and Racial
Studies 23, no. 5 (2000): 917-29.
Hale, Sondra. “The West and Veiling.” Paper presented at the On Veiling and
the Media, UCLA G.S. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern
Studies, May 20 1998.
Helman, Christopher. Carpet Bombing Forbes Magazine, 2003 [cited
December 22 2003]. Available from http://www.forbes.com.
Hirschmann, Nancy. “Western Feminism, Eastern Veiling, and the Question
of Free Agency.” Constellations 5, no. 3 (1998): 345-68.
Irfan, Hwaa. Weaving between Wars and Returning to the Soul IslamOnline,
2003 [cited December 12 2003]. Available from
http://www.IslamOnline.net.
Jacinto, Leela. Veiled Options ABC News, March 7, 2002 [cited December 30
2003].
Kaya, Ibrahim. “Modernity and Veiled Women.” European Journal of Social
Theory 3, no. 2 (2000): 195-214.
Kılıçbay, Barıs, and Mutlu Binark. “Consumer Culture, Islam, and the Politics
of Lifestyle; Fashion for Veiling in Contemporary Turkey.”
European Journal of Communication 17, no. 4 (2002): 495-511.
Najmabadi, Afsaneh. “(Un)Veiling Feminism.” Social Text 18, no. 3 (2001):
29-45.
Natrajan, Balmurli. “Masking and Veiling Protests: Culture and Ideology in
Representing Globalization.” Cultural Dynamics 15, no. 2: 213-35.
Norton, Anne. “Gender, Sexuality, and the Iraq of Our Imagination.” Middle
East Report (1991): 26-28.
Secor, Anna. “The Veil and Urban Space in Istanbul: Women’s Dress,
Mobility and Islamic Knowledge.” Gender, Place and Culture 9, no.
1 (2002): 5-22.
Tenaglia, Susan. “The Power of the Veil: Shirin Neshat’s Iran.” World&I,
December 2002, 96-98.
Thiel, Tamiko. Veiled Fantasies Sidestreet.org, 2002 [cited December 30
2003].
Vincent, Nora. Veiled Intentions (February 1) Salon.com, 2002 [cited
December 30 2003].
Wegner, Dietrich. “Pile Rugs of the Baluch and Their Neighbors.” Oriental
Rug Review 5, no. 4 (1985).
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Werkmeister, O.K. “From a Better History to a Better Politics.” The Art
Bulletin 77, no. 3 (1995): 387-94.
Zarcone, Thierry. “View from Islam, View from the West.” Diogenes 50, no.
4 (2003): 49-59.
Visual Representations of Violence in the Visual Arts

Pei-ying Wu

This paper is concerned with the visual representations of violence in


three paintings: Paolo Uccello’s The Battle of San Romano (1438-40),
Francisco Goya’s The Execution of the Rebels on 3rd May 1808 (1814), and
Pablo Picasso’s Guernica (1937). The analysis focuses on how the perpetrated
violence on the battlefield is represented in painting.
Images of violence in the past have always been created with specific
aims and functions connected to the representation of power by the artist
employed either by the State, Church or both. Uccello’s The Battle of San
Romano was commissioned by the Bartolini Salimbeni family as a state
bedroom decoration, created mainly for the family to flaunt its victory over its
arch-rival, Siena.
The Battle of San Romano was painted in 1438-40. At that time the
conduct of war was mainly a human affair with the interaction of individual
soldiery with occasional feats of military engineering. The artist was not
present on the battlefield but, six years after the event, Uccello was
commissioned to paint three panels to commemorate the victory. He chose to
do so as if it were a theatrical performance.
The painting is presented as if through a proscenium with a number
of theatrical stage devices, particularly swords and spears placed on the floor
in a grid order. Actors, on the front stage are pretending to fight; it looks as if
they might only be allowed horizontal movement on the stage; they seem to
fight in slow motion for the convenience of the audience. The landscape
backdrop of fighting outside the village is painted scenery – flats and drop
curtains. Although there are many soldiers on the stage (or on the canvas), no
more than five people are viewed in action. This is a typical ‘editorial’
technique when a splendid arrangement of scenery is needed but the stage
space is limited, so the director would call actors to be ‘placed’ on the
periphery of the stage but leave one major pair fighting in the centre of the
stage and the other pairs acting at the rear.
The fighting was painted as a stylised theatrical performance while
the confrontation is depicted in the form of a ritual duel. There are neither real
perpetrators nor real victims.
When machine power such as firearms in the form of muskets and
cannon, began to be introduced in the early fourteenth century, the number of
men who had opposed each other had rapidly grown but the “battle remained
108 Visual Representations of Violence in the Visual Arts
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very much what it had always been: a question of men standing up, at a certain
carefully defined time and space (battles tended to be over in a few hours and
seldom took up more than a few square kilometers), in relatively tight
formations and fighting one another in full view of the other.”1 However, by
the early nineteenth century the state of battle did not alter in a visual way to
any great extent. With the developing technology of warfare and the impact of
industrialization, the State began to develop systems to train civilians as
combatants. With the imperial impulses of sovereign nations, each aware of its
own identity, in the nineteenth century professional armies became more
organized, and needed images to demonstrate their expertise and power.
However, after 1790, a new concentration on the predicament and
feelings of the Individual began to emerge, resulting in a new concept of
human predicament – the Victim. The glory of victory was no longer the only
remembrance of war; certain individuals and power groupings started to
commemorate the death of the ‘anonymous heroes’. This provides a different
understanding of violence in this period and also changed artists’ perspectives
of what was to be painted.
Commissioned by the Spanish monarchy2, The Execution of the
Rebels on 3rd May 1808 (painted in 1814) was created as a protest against the
Napoleonic occupation of Madrid, in which Goya created a visual emphasis
on the dynamics of being a victim represented with understanding and
sensitivity.
In Goya’s painting, the focus is on the white shirted victim, whose
arms signify helplessness, upheld in a posture of a Crucifixion. The image
depicts the appalling moment of being shot by a French firing squad. In the
eyes of the white shirted victim, we cannot see his fear of death or anger or
emotion to the perpetrators. He is transfixed on his feet without motion, while
the surrounding crowd’s gestures indicate that they fear their own deaths.
These victims’ reactions to their imminent death are depicted in detail:
Almost everyone is kneeling down or cannot bear to stand.
One with red trousers coming towards the guns covers his face with
his hands to prevent seeing the action of execution. His reaction is that he
doesn’t want to believe this truth but there is no way to escape.
Behind him is another person wearing white dress who appears as if
he is about to faint.
Further back, behind the person in white, a man is praying. His hand
gestures indicate that he is like a child who hopes that there will be someone
powerful enough to save him from this nightmare.
Pei-Ying Wu 109
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At the front the priest in the green robe looks down with his fist
clenched and seems to be forcing himself to accept the grimness of his
destiny.
A body lies on the ground in a pool of blood. It seems to be a
representation of a relaxed, sleeping man or a man who is tired of pleading.
Another man next to the white shirted victim looks up to the dark sky
with his fist gripped up to the air, searching for the answer of what he is facing
and hoping to see a glimmer of God’s salvation.
Behind him is another, who is so stricken with fear that he hides
behind in sorrow.
One, further back, is retreating on to the hill with both hands
covering his face. These three figures are like the three stages of facing death,
the first one is searching for explanations and trying to find some hope to be
saved, when there is no hope left, another is sad and hopeless, and for the
third, life is no more than a distant shadow.
In contrast to the particularly vivid detailed depiction of the victims,
the portraiture of the perpetrators is in a form of a geometrical firing line.
Their faces are hidden, their guns are in a horizontal position and they are
represented as mechanical killing machines. Are they men or machines?
When the event happened, Goya was in Madrid. He had witnessed
the cruelty and bloody conflagration of violence in war. Goya recorded the
horrors of war and his hatred of violence in his drawings and etchings, which
later were to be published as The Disasters of the War in 1863, almost forty
years after his death. He had deep empathy with the victims, a point of view
exemplified in this painting. Although we see the exercise of power, the
representations of its victims are particularly memorable in his composition.
Now to the last of the three examples. In Pablo Picasso’s Guernica
(1937), the canvas is dedicated to the cause of the victims. There are no
obvious perpetrators in the painting; nor do the bombers and bombs appear in
the composition. Technology not only changed the means of warfare but also
the relationship between perpetrators and victims. The battlefield is
constituted in the implied sound of the victims’ wails and their grief.
Within the twentieth century, a new actuality of the representation of
violence was created through the mass media, depicting a more humanistic
concept of war and its impact. On 26 April 1937, the town of Guernica was
deliberately targeted for aerial bombing practice. The bombing of Guernica
was one of the earliest such events recorded on the cinema newsreels and was
well documented on a daily basis in the world’s press. The world that
witnessed this was horrified.
110 Visual Representations of Violence in the Visual Arts
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Picasso was working in Paris when the event happened. He learnt the
news through the mass media. At that time he had just accepted a commission
from the Spanish Republican government to produce a painting to exhibit in
Spanish Pavilion of the Paris International Exposition of 1937. Being a radical
and a supporter of the Republican government, he wanted to draw attention to
the attempted overthrow of an elected government. Picasso created the
painting Guernica as a political statement whilst many of the motifs already
existed in his previous works. Completed within two months, the mural
immediately became a most successful propaganda image on an international
scale.
Guernica was displayed in the Spanish Pavilion of the Paris
International Exposition of 1937, and thereafter, travelled to Scandinavia,
England, and London. When the Republican government fell in 1939, Picasso
refused to allow this painting to be displayed in Spain until the Spanish people
enjoyed “public liberties and democratic institutions”3. It therefore stayed on
display for many years at the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York
City until 1981. Even the United Nations (UN) has a tapestry copy of
Guernica, donated by the Nelson Rockefeller estate, displayed in the UN
hallway outside its Security Council since 1985. The expression of Picasso’s
“abhorrence of the military caste which has sunk Spain in an ocean of pain
and death”4 has clearly been there as a permanent reminder of civilian
experiences of violence in automated war.
We can see that the impact of these three paintings is clearly
different, viewed from the perspective of the twenty first century. Uccello’s
painting was only viewed by limited people restricted to the Bartolini
Salimbeni family and some associates whereas Goya’s painting would have
been viewed by a select coterie of the Spanish Court among Spanish
aristocrats and other high-ranking citizens in the public domain5. As for
Picasso’s painting, the publicity attached and the reproduction produced in the
critical press and for sale, has epitomized violence visited upon civilians in
modern warfare, and presented through a broad range of media for a
consuming public.
Also it is possible to see the way in which the depiction of violence
has changed within these three paintings: from Uccello’s theatrical stylised
performance where soldiers face soldiers; through Goya’s sympathetic image
of civilians facing armed soldiers; to the twentieth century, with Picasso’s
monochromatic symbolic battlefield where the civilians never see the
perpetrators. The powers of these images are all effective and influential. To
comprehend the reality of violence, one does not need images of blood and
brutality. But these images are not literal depictions of suffering, they define
Pei-Ying Wu 111
_______________________________________________________________
violence through a formalised imagery based upon aesthetic concepts rooted
in their historical origins.

Notes
1
Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought (London:
Cassell & Co, 2000), 125.
2
The Execution of the Rebel on 3rd May 1808 was commissioned by Cardinal
Don Luis María de Borbón, President of the Regency Council, who, in
response to a petition of 24 February 1814, awarded Goya 1,500 reales on 9
March 1814 to ‘perpetutate with his brush the most notable and heroic actions
or events of our glorious insurrection against the tyrant of Europe’.
3
David Walsh, “UN conceals Picasso’s Guernica for Powell’s presentation”,
World’s Socialist Web Site, 08 February 2003, (23 June 2004).
<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/feb2003/guer-f08.shtml>.
4
In May 1937 Picasso made his position clear in a public statement:
"The Spanish struggle is the fight of reaction against the people, against
freedom. My whole life as an artist has been nothing more than a continuous
struggle against reaction and the death of art. How could anybody think for a
moment that I could be in agreement with reaction and death? When the
rebellion began, the legally elected and democratic republican government of
Spain appointed me director of the Prado Museum, a post which I immediately
accepted. In the panel on which I am working which I shall call Guernica, and
in all my recent works of art, I clearly express my abhorrence of the military
caste which has sunk Spain in an ocean of pain and death ...." cited in
Alfred Barr, Picasso: Fifty Years of His Art. (New York: Museum of Modern
Art, 1946), 202.
5
The Execution of the Rebel on 3rd May 1808 had been displayed in the Prado
Palace (now a museum) since 1834, which is the earliest recording date of the
publicly exhibited. The painting was removed from Madrid in 1936 during the
Civil War and sent to Valencia, Barcelona and finally Geneva, suffering some
damage in transit. In 1939 the painting was returned to the Prado in Mardrid.
Part 3:

Scales of Conflict
On Periphery Marginalisation and Conflict in Sudan

Aleksi Ylönen
1. Introduction
Although the conflict in Sudan is often portrayed as a violent affair
between the Arab and Muslim north, and the African, Christian and Animist
south, this view does not explain the roles of political and economic factors
that have contributed to its formation. In order to understand today’s conflict it
is essential to consider the roots of political and social marginalisation that
have led to grievances related to centre-periphery economic inequality in the
country.
The creation of the Sudanese state, based on the colonial experience
of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, reflected Britain’s exodus from its
colonies in Africa. British colonialism formalised a system of exploitation of
the periphery and a social hierarchy that originates in the Egyptian domination
of Sudan in the 19th century. In the 1950s, the colonial authorities then passed
the control of the Sudanese state to the educated, Arabised, Muslim elite in
Khartoum. This was undertaken through political marginalisation of a
periphery that for the most part had never been deeply influenced by the
centralised colonial authority.
During this process of marginalisation and concentration of
centralised power to the northern elite, civil war posed a challenge to the
legitimacy of the perceived minority government by the peripheral groups in
the south. The cessation of hostilities in 1972 as a result of Addis Ababa Peace
Accords, after almost two entire devastating decades of violence, initiated an
eleven-year period of relative peace which was interrupted by the renewed
political exclusion of the south. The violence that followed has characterised
Sudan since that time.
The Collier-Hoeffler framework that explains economic causes
governing the materialisation of insurgencies has gained wide acceptance as a
means of predicting civil conflict formation. However, its emphases on rebel
economic opportunity and finding measures of political, economic and social
grievances of little significance to the formation of civil conflict, have left it
open to criticism. This paper argues that the Collier-Hoeffler framework is not
sufficient to fully explain the occurrence of civil conflict in Sudan. The focus
on rebel economic opportunity, excluding government responsibility and the
inability to effectively interpret some of the other factors that contribute to
emergence of conflict, such as sudden political exclusion, the role of social
hierarchy and the linked horizontal economic inequality are factors that must
116 On Periphery Marginalisation and Conflict in Sudan
_______________________________________________________________
be included in an effective analysis of the conflict onset in Sudan. This piece
attempts to demonstrate that abrupt political marginalisation is intertwined
with a sudden loss of hope for economic development, while durable social
repression is related to horizontal economic inequality. In addition, it sheds
light on the government provocation of violence in Sudan. These factors have
contributed to grievances in the Sudanese periphery. The grievances have then
served as foundation for insurgencies in the southern, eastern and western
peripheries of Sudan, where the government’s repressive cultural assimilation
and national identity building efforts have often met violent resistance.
The paper consists of two sections: the first briefly examines the
Collier-Hoeffler framework and the critique it has received; the second
discusses the case of Sudan and those particularities not effectively covered by
the Collier-Hoeffler framework, and demonstrates how political, economic
and social marginalisation have contributed to the increasing periphery
grievances, and created conditions that may be considered conducive to
violence.

2. Economic Agendas and Civil Conflict Formation


A. Economic Agendas as Causes of Civil War
An increasing emphasis on economic agendas as causes for civil
conflict resulted in a polarisation of the study of internal conflicts along the
lines of greed versus grievance debate. Due to the inability of the prevailing
classical arguments, such as ancient hatreds or failed states, to adequately
address the economic imperatives contributing to civil war formation, a focus
on finding economic explanations for civil conflict emerged in the 1990s.
Although this new focus seems somewhat revolutionary, Charles Tilly has
repeatedly demonstrated the historical importance of economic aspects to wars
and Herschel Grossman has described rebellion as rational behaviour that
generates profits from looting. Due to the importance of economic
characteristics of today’s wars, that for most part tend to be civil wars, the
research of economic agendas and political economy imperatives causing civil
conflicts has emerged as popular within some political science circles.
The foundation for the ‘greed versus grievance’ debate was laid by a
number of influential articles published by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler on
the economic causes of civil conflict. In their first significant study,
interpreting data from 99 countries by using utility theory in probit and tobit
regressions, Collier and Hoeffler conclude that higher per capita income
reduces the risk of civil war due to the high opportunity cost for the rebellion;
and that in low-income states the presence of natural resources together with a
large and dually polarised population increase the risk of civil war. By using
Aleksi Ylönen 117
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econometric analysis of the civil wars from the 1965-1999 period, the
increasingly controversial conclusions of Collier further add that the
arguments founded on grievances lack focus and explanatory power regarding
civil war onset. This is because individual inequality has no significant effect
on civil war formation, political repression gives only confusing results, and
the ethnic and religious distinctions lower the risk for civil war. Therefore, he
concludes that financial viability of rebel organisations through lootable
primary commodities and diaspora funding are the most important
determinants for the emergence of civil wars.1
Due to the controversial nature of an argument whereby
contemporary insurgencies are essentially only founded upon greed, Collier
and Hoeffler have received criticism that has convinced them to modify their
stand. In a paper entitled “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity”, Collier
presents an initial step for moderation with an attempt to complement greed
with grievance as the fuelling force of civil wars:

The political entrepreneurs who instigate rebellions


may seek start-up finance from a constituency that is
indeed willing to pay for vengeance. Hence, greed may
need to incite grievance. Thus, grievance and greed
may be necessary for sustained rebellion: grievance
may enable [a] rebel organization to grow to the point
at which it is viable as a predator; greed may sustain the
organization once it has reached this point.2

Interpreting data of civil wars over the period 1960-1999, the Collier
and Hoeffler argument (published in 2001) evolved from one exclusively
based on greed to one of rebel opportunity, which is weakly related to
evidence that is considered as grievances. According to this study, economic
opportunity is vital to explaining the emergence and sustenance of rebel
organisations, whether seeking or not seeking profit. Nonetheless, the authors
recognise that rebel grievances have a role to play even if they “. . . may be
substantially disconnected from the large social concerns of inequality,
political rights, and ethnic or religious identity”, which they consider the main
indicators of grievances.3
Overall, the Collier-Hoeffler framework presents the civil war
formation as an economic process with grievances having only a minimal or
non-existent role. A response to this analysis has therefore had to re-legitimise
the importance of grievances, such as inequality, political marginalisation, and
118 On Periphery Marginalisation and Conflict in Sudan
_______________________________________________________________
identity factors (including ethnic polarisation and religious distinctions) to the
emergence of civil wars.

B. Responses to the Collier-Hoeffler Framework


The overwhelming volume of responses to the Collier-Hoeffler
framework not only demonstrates its provocative nature but has posed
questions to technical, methodological and interpretational aspects of both its
variables and the conclusions. First, responses have emerged regarding the
dimensions of the definitions, econometric variables, and data sets utilised to
interpret the civil war onset. For instance, the definition of civil conflict is an
ambiguous one and although most commonly identified with 1,000 battle-
related deaths when conducting quantitative analysis, the number is arbitrary
and one may argue that it is possible to come up with distinct results with a
different threshold. In addition, the Collier-Hoeffler data sets are often
incomplete and have at times disregarded the insurgencies occurred against
colonial masters in the 1960s.
Second, the measurement of inequality has been one of the most
debated variables regarding the Collier-Hoeffler methodology. They have
often disregarded the resource distribution patterns and their links to
inequality within states.4 In addition, they measure economic inequality based
on vertical, individual, income and land distribution, while several studies
have later demonstrated that horizontal, or group, inequalities have more
explanatory power regarding civil war onset.5
Third, while the definitions and construction of variables have
received the bulk of the criticism, interpretations of the results obtained have
sometimes been ambiguous as well. For instance, although the Collier-
Hoeffler framework portrays primary commodity dependence as a proxy for
greed, it is also a measure of underdevelopment and could therefore be a
proxy for grievance.6 It is also not certain that diasporas are a cause rather than
a consequence of conflict and therefore a proxy for grievances rather than part
of calculated opportunity.7 Furthermore, the reduction of rebel action into
being driven by greed or opportunity does not demonstrate how identities are
constructed and manipulated by elites in order to gain wealth and power.8
Fourth, another argument responding to the Collier-Hoeffler
framework is its ability to advance neo-liberal economic thought by blaming
the rebels following the economic incentives of their leaders by engaging in
quasi-criminal activities. However, this bias against rebels obscures the
responsibility of the state for equitable distribution of resources and inclusion
of the regional political representation, while diverting attention from the
state’s role in promoting political violence.9
Aleksi Ylönen 119
_______________________________________________________________
Finally, in order to avoid reductionism some authors have pointed out
that it is important to look beyond a ‘greed and grievance’ thesis and view the
relation of social justice to the existing political and intertwined economic
order. For instance, Alesina and Perotti have demonstrated that income
inequality is related to socio-political instability, while Agbonifo links loss of
hope for socio-economic development with political instability and intrastate
violence. These arguments remain absent in the Collier-Hoeffler framework
although violence is known to have arisen out of these circumstances.

3. The Conflict in Sudan


A. History of Marginalising the Periphery
Although the conflict in Sudan is often explained as a violent affair
between the Arab Muslim north and African Christian and Animist south, the
wide spatial extension of contemporary violence suggests that the government
is facing nationwide opposition that includes Muslims from peripheral regions
and a political challenge involving Arab Muslim elite groups deposed from
political power by the current regime. In the case of Sudan, politics and
economics remain intertwined and economic deprivation of the marginalised
groups relates to their lack of access to the centralised political power. In
addition, social hierarchy in Sudan remains to be defined through a dominant
Arab-Muslim identity, adding to the grievances of the peripheral populations
since the Arab Muslim elite that inherited the state authority from the colonial
masters exercises the political power and distribution of state resources mainly
for its own supporters.

1. Turco-Egyptian Dominion and Foundation of the Social Hierarchy


According to Hassan, Turco-Egyptian conquest of Sudan dates back to
the 1820s when Muhammad Ali of Egypt engaged in an expansionist
campaign to extend Egyptian influence southwards. Ali’s ambition was driven
by the myth of abundant riches found in Sudan and his willingness to eradicate
the Mamluks who had established a slave state in Dongola after being exiled
from Egypt.
The Egyptian invasion was conducted through fortified zeriba trading
and military post system, gradually reaching to the heartland of Sudan.10
Hassan claims that although Ali was unable to fulfil his dream of extracting
natural riches, a prosperous slave trading enterprise emerged in Sudan
supplying both Egypt and the Ottoman slave markets. By the 1850s, zeriba
outposts were built in the interior of southern Sudan and slaves were
increasingly seized in order to secure the staff requirements to run the trading
120 On Periphery Marginalisation and Conflict in Sudan
_______________________________________________________________
post system. The term abeed, slave, which still surfaces at times, came to
describe southerners.11
The Jellaba, a group of Arab merchants that now inhabit most parts
of Sudan, spearheaded the penetration of violent commercial exploitation
towards the Equator in the southern periphery.12 As a result they were often
perceived as representatives of foreign oppression. This view was established
in the south of Sudan and is today often manifested in the southerners’
everyday primordialist or socially constructed views of the northern Arabs.13
According to Francis Deng, the violent exploitation of the south has
resulted in social hierarchy and identity differences with central Sudan, where
the identities are shaped through a top-down, state directed gradual
assimilation into Islam and Arabism, while the periphery identities have often
been sculpted by the idea of resistance to external domination. This has not
only been the case in the south but in a number of other peripheral regions
attempting to preserve their culture against the centralised Arab and Muslim
assimilation efforts that they as perceive foreign and other.14 Furthermore,
Deng points out that the northern view of southerners as inferior, and often as
slaves, has created a type of social hierarchy through which the northerners
have often imposed their political and economic superiority on the south.

2. Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and the Emergence of Political and


Economic Marginalisation
After the British conquest (1896-1899), the colonial masters retook
the control of central authority in Sudan. Under the British administration the
peripheral lands, such as the Darfur Sultanate and the Red Sea Mountains,
enjoyed wide autonomy, while the south was encouraged to develop along
indigenous lines in an attempt to stop the spread of Arabism and Islam to sub-
Saharan Africa.15 The British did this by implementing closed-door ordinances
between north and south in the 1920s, while encouraging the Christian
religion and the English language in the south in order for it to be later
annexed to British East Africa. However, the south remained underdeveloped
throughout this Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period.16
The British departure from Sudan was conducted hastily and
deprived the peripheral regions of access to political power. The northern
elite’s critique towards the British Southern Policy crystallised in 1942 when
the Graduate Congress, an elitist society of Gordon Memorial College
graduates from Khartoum, presented a communication to the colonial
authorities demanding abolition of closed door ordinances, halting the
subsidies to the Christian missionary schools in the south, and creating
uniform education policy between the two parts of Sudan.17 In addition, elite
Aleksi Ylönen 121
_______________________________________________________________
political pressure was applied to include the three southern provinces under
the authority of the Sudanese Legislative Assembly that was formed as one of
the initial steps to prepare Sudan for self-rule. As a result, political power was
handed over to the northern elite, which was viewed as the group most capable
of administering Sudan. Consequently, due to their generally higher levels of
education, an influx of northerners filled the administrative positions also in
the south during the British-supervised Sudanisation process.18

B. The First Civil War Onset, 1955


The emergence of the first civil war in Sudan was a result of both
gradual processes and specific events. Of the gradual processes involved,
firstly there was the persistence of southern identities as highly resistance-
focused with respect to the north: this was due to the effective isolation of the
two regions for almost thirty years after several decades of violent
exploitation. Secondly, although what was principally an agriculturally-led
economic development was achieved in the north during the British period,
the south remained underdeveloped: this resulted in economic divergence
between the two regions. Thirdly, the south became politically marginalized
which impeded its access to national resources. This process began during the
1940s and crystallised in the reunification of Sudan without southern consent
and the handing over of political authority to the Khartoum elite.19
The specific short-term effects that led to the emergence of hostilities
and escalation of violence into a level of regional insurgency include the first
parliamentary elections that gave control of the Sudanese government to the
northern elite, the mutiny of southern troops, and the violent government
response. As a result of the parliamentary elections the southerners saw
themselves altogether politically excluded. According to Johnson:

There was thus widespread discontent in the


South as a result of the outcome of the 1954
elections and the Sudanization process. The
rapid increase of Northerners in the South as
administrators, senior officers in the army
and police, teachers in government schools
and as merchants, increased Southern fears
of Northern domination and colonization.20

Under these circumstances, violence erupted in the south in form of a


mutiny of the southern army unit in Torit. This was triggered by rumours of
disarmament or transfer to the north.21 In their efforts to put down the revolt,
122 On Periphery Marginalisation and Conflict in Sudan
_______________________________________________________________
the British jailed and executed some of the perpetrators of violence who were
willing to give up their arms. Those who did not do so were able to avoid
punishment and organised a regional insurgency in the southern periphery.
There is no evidence that the post-colonial conflict in Sudan
materialised exclusively due to rebel economic opportunity. Rather, the
sudden loss of hope for political participation within unified Sudan -and hence
the shattered dream for economic development- together with the resumed
cultural social hierarchy under the reunified Sudan seem vital in explaining the
emergence of civil war. The rebellion emerged in circumstances of poverty
and deprivation, feeding from the perceived differences and sense of
inferiority in relation to the north. This was manifested not only in the
differences in cultural characteristics but also in distinct political and
economic group status. Therefore, the southern insurgency in 1955 was
triggered by deep grievances based on what were viewed as political,
economic and social injustices.

C. The Emergence and Evolution of Second Civil Conflict, 1983-


The onset of the second civil war in Sudan was strongly influenced
by the efforts to sustain political power that were made by the Nimeiri regime.
These efforts were undertaken through renewed political marginalisation of
the south, and served two purposes. The first was to deprive the area
economically e.g. in relation to the legitimate income that could be derived
from taxing the natural resource concessions found in its territory. The second
was to appease the northern conservative Islamist elements that had gained
political influence during the 1970s and 1980s.
The conditions of the Addis Ababa Peace Accords that guaranteed
the south an autonomous position were repeatedly violated, as Nimeiri needed
access to southern oil deposits in order to save his bankrupt and increasingly
unstable regime. The regime tampering with southern rights involved several
suspensions of the southern regional assembly during the late 1970s and early
1980s.22 More importantly, the south lost jurisdiction over its oil fields after
the regime redrew provincial boundaries annexing the oil region to northern
territory as a new Unity Province.23 In order to further weaken the south, in
June 1983, the regime divided the region into its three original provinces with
an attempt to diminish southern solidarity and political power.24 Finally, the
Islamists were appeased by being granted senior administrative positions, a
matter that crystallised in the appointment of Hassan al Turabi to Attorney
General in 1983, and the reinstating of Islamic law nationally.
Hence, due to Nimeiri’s tampering with the Addis Ababa conditions
to benefit the regime at the expense of the south, violence re-emerged.
Aleksi Ylönen 123
_______________________________________________________________
Conflict erupted in 1983, when southern troops in the oil region mutinied
because they were to be disarmed and transferred to the north in order to leave
the south increasingly vulnerable to northern military infiltration and control.25
The central government again reacted violently in order to put down the
revolt. However, Colonel John Garang, who was sent to end the uprising, took
leadership of the rebels and organised them into a military opposition (under
the Southern People’s Liberation Army/Movement [SPLA/M]), promoting
socialism, regional autonomy of the south, and national religious freedom.26
After the conservative National Islamic Front (NIF) deposed Nimeiri
and took over the political leadership of the state in 1989, the second civil war
in Sudan evolved from a regional affair into a national struggle as other
marginalised groups in the periphery mobilised to fight the centrally promoted
Arabisation. For instance, as part of the pan-Sudanese political and military
opposition group, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the Beja people
of the Red Sea Mountains took up arms against Khartoum in order to fight
political and economic marginalisation and preserve their local lifestyle.27
Recently, the most severe violence has taken place in Darfur. The
government has allegedly used Janjaweed militia, drafted among the Baggara,
the Arabic people of Darfur, arming them and promising personal economic
incentives with an attempt to Arabise the region dominated by African
Muslims. There have also been attempts to secure newly found oil deposits in
the southern part of the region.28 A similar proxy war strategy has also
allegedly been used, involving the employment of the Murahaleen militia in
the north-south transitional zone, and securing oil fields by displacing local
African populations.29
Although at the onset of the second civil war the economic agendas
were overtly related to the conflict’s formation, it seems that in the early
1980s the government, rather than the insurgents, used oppressive means to
secure the natural resources located in the legitimately autonomous southern
territory. The revenue from natural resource concessions was then distributed
in the form of public goods through the state apparatus. After the NIF coup,
according to the membership of the Islamic Brotherhood and through religious
and cultural affiliation, peripheral populations that did not identify with Arab-
Muslim identity were neglected.30 Since 1989 the regime has marginalised the
peripheral populations both politically and economically, and gone forward
with its ‘National Salvation Revolution’, a social experiment imposing
Arabism and Islam as the basis of national identity.31 On the other hand, the
responses in the periphery have crystallised in the pan-Sudanese attempt to
gain political acknowledgment and access to national resources in order to
124 On Periphery Marginalisation and Conflict in Sudan
_______________________________________________________________
escape widespread poverty. This has manifested in the resistance to the
government promoted Arabisation and Islamisation.32

4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has demonstrated that the Collier-Hoeffler model does not
adequately explain the civil war onset in Sudan. Although economics tends to
matter in conflict formation, political power provides access to the control of
state resources, therefore making political grievances in Sudan important for
the emergence of rebellion. It has also shown that a sudden political exclusion
leads to a shattered dream of escaping economic deprivation contributing to
the conflict onset, while the prevailing social injustice based on the stratified
social hierarchy adds to the grievances.
The first civil war in Sudan was a result of the political
marginalisation of the south and the shattered dream of political inclusion
within unified Sudan, together with the hopelessness of escaping widespread
poverty related to the prevailing social hierarchy. It was only after the
escalation of war that economic survival for both the regime and the
insurgents became increasingly important.
The second civil war emerged from tampering with southern political
autonomy and taking away its right to manage the revenues of its natural
resources (i.e. for the benefit of the regime). This was complemented by
religious and cultural repression due to the northern conservative elements
increasingly influencing decisions in Khartoum. The loss of political power
and hope for economic development accompanied by cultural repression then
created conditions for the re-emergence of violence.
Therefore, a deep analysis of political, economic and social factors
needs to be undertaken in order to fully understand the emergence of large-
scale violence in Sudan. Finally, according to the analysis above, the
indications for policy to end the large-scale violence in Sudan are principally
related to democratisation guaranteeing nationwide participation in the central
government, wealth distribution providing public goods also to the peripheral
populations, and promoting the social inclusion and equality of the non-Arab
Muslim populations.

Notes
1
Paul Collier, “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in Greed
and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, edited by Mats Berdal and
Aleksi Ylönen 125
_______________________________________________________________
David M. Malone, 91-111, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
2
Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 44 (2000): 839-853.
3
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World
Bank Policy Research Paper, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2001, 17.
4
João Gomes Porto, “Contemporary Conflict Analysis in Perspective,” in
Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts, edited by Jeremy Lind
and Kathryn Sturman (Pretoria: African Centre for Technology Studies and
Institute for Security Studies, 2002), 13.
5
Cramer (2003) makes the case for varying kinds of inequality, while Stewart,
2002a and 2002b, argues for the importance of horizontal inequality
contributing to civil conflict formation.
6
See David Keen, “A Response to Paul Collier’s ‘Doing Well Out of War’
and Other Thoughts,” Presented at the CODEP Conference, June 18-20, 2001,
School of Oriental and African Studies University of London.
7
Macartan Humphreys, “Economics and Violent Conflict,” Harvard
University, August 2002, www.preventconflict.org/portal/economics.
8
James Fearon and David Laitin “Violence and the Social Construction of
Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54 (2000): 845-877; considers
how construction of ethnic identity is related to violence, while Aleksi Ylönen,
“The Shadow of History: Marginalisation, Identity Construction and Conflict
in Sudan,” (to be presented at IBACS Conference, October 7-10, 2004, Iberian
Association for Culture Studies) deals with identity formation and conflict in
Sudan.
9
Humphreys, 4.
10
On the zeriba system see David Sconyers, “British Policy and Mission
Education in the Southern Sudan, 1928-1946”, Unpublished PhD Dissertation,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1978, 11-12.
11
Richard Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1889 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1961), 36.
12
See i.e. Ahmed Ibrahim Hassan, “The Strategy, Responses and Legacy of
the First Imperialist Era in the Sudan 1820-1885,” presented at the Fifth
International Conference of Sudan Studies, University of Durham August 30-
September 1, 2000; and Mohamed Suliman, “Civil War in Sudan: The Impact
of Ecological Degradation,” report, London: Institute For African
Alternatives, 1994.
13
For more on everyday primordialism and constructivist approach to identity,
see Fearon and Laitin, 848-849.
14
Relativeness of identity and the concept of ‘other’ in Sudan are examined
i.e. in Francis Deng, War of Visions: Conflict Identities in the Sudan
126 On Periphery Marginalisation and Conflict in Sudan
_______________________________________________________________
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), Ann Lesch, The Sudan:
Contested National Identities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998),
and Ylönen, 2004.
15
See more in i.e. Sconyers, 1976; and Ylönen, 2004.
16
For detailed accounts on the isolation policy and development in the south
during Anglo-Egyptian Condominium see Sconyers (1976); and David de
Chand, “The Sources of Conflict Between the North and the South in Sudan,”
presented at the Fifth International Conference of Sudan Studies, University of
Durham August 30-September 1, 2000.
17
Numerous accounts deal with this period. See e.g. John Markakis, Resource
Conflict in the Horn of Africa. (London: Sage Publications, 1998), de Chand,
2000; and Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
18
See previous note above.
19
See note 17.
20
Johnson, 2003, 27.
21
Markakis, 112, and ICG, God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War
in Sudan (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002), 9.
22
Markakis, 120.
23
David Melvill, Restoring Peace and Democracy in Sudan: Limited Choices
for African Leadership, Occasional paper no. 34, Institute for Global
Dialogue, 2002, 6.
24
Markakis, p. 120.
25
Douglas H. Johnson and Gerald Prunier, “The Foundation and Expansion of
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army,” in Civil War in the Sudan, edited by
Martin W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (New York, St. Martin’s, 1993),
124.
26
John Garang, John Garang Speaks (London: Kegan Paul, 1987), 23.
27
ICG, “Sudan: Towards Incomplete Peace,” Africa Report No. 73,
International Crisis Group, Brussels, 11 December 2003, 17-19; and Ylönen,
6-7.
28
See i.e. HRW, “Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia
Support,” Briefing Paper, Human Rights Watch, Washington DC, 19 July,
2004, on allegations of the government support to Arab militias. “Oil
Underlies Darfur Tradegy”, in Zaman and Cumali Onal Newspapers, 7 July
2004, http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8991.html, on oil and violence in
Darfur; and Melvill, 2002, and Ylönen, 2004, for Arabisation attempts of the
periphery in Sudan.
29
On Arab militias during north-south hostilities see e.g. Johnson, 2003; and
on the situation in the Shilluk region in the transitional zone see Numa
Aleksi Ylönen 127
_______________________________________________________________
Elbagir, “Sudan’s Shilluk Strife Mirrors Darfur War-U.N.,” in Alertnet News,
17 June2004, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L17262080.htm>.
30
William Reno, “Economies of War and Their Transformation: Sudan and
the Variable Impact of Natural Resources on Conflict,” presented at ‘Money
Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan’,
Brussels: 12-13 June, 2002; and Reno, “The Empirical Challenge to Economic
Analyses of Conflicts,” presented at SSRC-sponsored Conference,
Washington DC: 19-20 April, 2004.
31
Melvill, 8-9.
32
See i.e. Melvill, 2002; and Ylönen, 2004.
128 On Periphery Marginalisation and Conflict in Sudan
_______________________________________________________________
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Agbonifo, John. “Negotiating Political Settlement and Peace in Africa.”
Peace, Conflict and Development 4 (2004).
Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. “Income Distribution, Political
Instability, and Investment.” European Economic Review 40 (1996): 1203-
1228.
Collier, Paul. “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective.” In Greed
and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, edited by Mats Berdal and
David M. Malone, 91-111. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
Collier, Paul. “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 44 (2000): 839-853.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. “On Economic Causes of Civil War.” Oxford
Economic Papers 50 (1998): 563-573.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Policy
Research Paper; Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2001.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (2002): 13-28.
de Chand, David. “The Sources of Conflict Between the North and the South
in Sudan.” Presented at the Fifth International Conference of Sudan Studies,
University of Durham, 30 August – 1 September 2000.
Deng, Francis. War of Visions: Conflict Identities in the Sudan. Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995.
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. “Violence and the Social Construction
of Ethnic Identity.” International Organization 54 (2000): 845-877.
Garang, John. John Garang Speaks. London: Kegan Paul, 1987.
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and Kathryn Sturman. Pretoria: African Centre for Technology Studies and
Institute for Security Studies, 2002.
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Imperialist Era in the Sudan 1820-1885.” Presented at the Fifth International
Conference of Sudan Studies, University of Durham, 30 August - 1 September
2000.
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HRW. “Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support.”
Briefing Paper, Human Rights Watch, Washington DC, July 19, 2004. Online
at www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/19/darfur9096_txt.htm.
Humphreys, Macartan. “Economics and Violent Conflict.” August 2002.
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Crisis Group, Brussels, 11 December 2003. Online at
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2416&l=1.
Johnson, Douglas. The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2003.
Johnson, Douglas H. and Gerald Prunier. “The Foundation and Expansion of
he Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” In Civil War in the Sudan, edited by
Martin W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. New York: St. Martin’s, 1993.
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Other Thoughts.” Presented at the CODEP Conference, School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London, 18-20 June 2001.
Lesch, Ann. The Sudan: Contested National Identities. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1998.
Markakis, John. Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa. London: Sage
Publications, 1998.
Melvill, David. Restoring Peace and Democracy in Sudan: Limited Choices
for African Leadership. Occasional Paper No. 34, Institute for Global
Dialogue, 2002.
Reno, William. “Economies of War and their Transformation: Sudan and the
Variable Impact of Natural Resources on Conflict.” Presented at ‘Money
Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan’,
Brussels, 12-13 June 2002.
Reno, William. “The Empirical Challenge to Economic Analyses of
Conflicts.” Presented at SSRC-sponsored Conference, Washington DC, 19-20
April 2004.
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Construction and Conflict in Sudan.” Paper presented at IBACS
Conference, Burgos, October 7-10, 2004.
Politics, Violence, and Expression: The Role of Memory and
Identity in Guatemala’s War-Torn Past
Patricia A. Seminetta
This paper focuses on a study which aimed to examine the
connection between collective memory and the perpetuating culture of
violence in Guatemala. For the past five centuries divisions have existed
between the various sections of society including: the urban and rural areas,
rich and poor, men and women, educated and illiterate, propertied and
landless, and the Ladino minority and the Maya majority. This, coupled with
the acts that occurred during the gruesome civil war, has left Guatemala in a
state where society is defined by the included and the excluded, violence is
commonplace and there are constant power struggles. The Guatemalan people
are in an environment where they struggle to reconcile the past with the
present. This has resulted in the past remaining undecided and unknown. For
many Guatemalans, art has been the vehicle in which they have expressed
their struggle to search for a unified identity. This situation encompasses a
theme repeatedly revisited throughout Guatemalan history, leaving the people,
particularly the Maya, with a convoluted national identity and an unclear path
for the future.

1. Introduction
Most people fear the past, they don’t want to remember.
We love in a time of uncertainty toward the future. Many
of us fear it. To understand Guatemala is to recognize that
these statements amount to the same thing. 1

What does it mean to be Guatemalan? This question encompasses a


theme that is frequently revisited throughout Guatemalan history, particularly
leaving the Maya people with a convoluted national identity. Divisions exist
between numerous segments of society including, the urban and the rural
areas, rich and poor, men and women, educated and illiterate, and the Ladino
minority and the Maya majority. Guatemala is a society defined by the
included and the excluded. This ultimately leaves Guatemalans in a situation
where they are constantly struggling to reconcile the past with the present,
perpetuating the cycle of violence that has plagued the people and defined
their society for the past five centuries. For many Guatemalans the past
remains undecided and unknown.
Memory and forgetting are integral parts of building an identity, both
at the individual and the collective levels.2 According to Paul Connerton,
132 Politics, Violence and Expression
_______________________________________________________________
social memory can be defined as, “the way in which a community understands
its history, or more precisely conceptualized its experiences though a variety
of means including narrative, ritual dance, customs, bodily practices and other
forms of socially meaningful action”.3 Connerton adds that with social
memory images of the past commonly legitimate a present social order.4 Over
the course of the past five hundred years, the Guatemalan people have had
three “conquests” imposed upon them: the arrival of the Spanish, the results of
the political ideologies developed with Independence, and the state terrorism
associated with the civil war.5 Each of these events represents a period in
Guatemalan history that significantly affects the memory process and how
Guatemalans conceptualize their identities today. Guatemalans have turned to
multiple mediums of expression to reclaim their identity and embrace the
future.

2. A History of the Guatemalan People: The Foundations of


Memory
… when the strangers who came from the East arrived, the
ones who brought Christianity which ended the power in
the East, and made the heavens cry and filled the maize
bread of the Katun with sadness. 6 Chilam Balam

A. The Arrival of the Spanish and Establishing Hegemonic Roots


The arrival of the Spanish was a time defined by violence and
destruction for the Maya people. Initially, Maya communities put up a fierce
resistance against the conquistadors and even managed to defeat the Spaniards
in battle.7 However, due to the factional divisions within Maya communities,
they were not able to continue to defend themselves against the Spanish.8
Slingshots simply could not compete with the gunpowder and the heavy
cavalry of the Spanish. Aiding the conquistadors in their assault was the
spread of infectious disease. The diseases brought by the Spaniards -small
pox, measles and mumps- devastated the indigenous population.9 Although
victory was not an easy accomplishment, in 1524 Pedro de Alvarado
completed the conquest of Guatemala.10 When the Spanish officially took
control that year they were determined to reconfigure the way the Maya
viewed the world.11 According to Antonio Gramsci, a state of hegemony
builds a hierarchy within society where “certain ideas that are beneficial to a
particular group of people are neutralized as the way things ought to be and
the way things have always been”.12 In an attempt to colonize the spirit and
minds of the Maya, the Spanish devised a hierarchical society. This rendered
the Maya invisible while the Spaniards searched for economic profit.
The Spanish employed several different methods to impose their will
Patricia A. Seminetta 133
_______________________________________________________________
on Maya communities. One of these was to alter the setting of the home by
reorganizing the structure of traditional Maya communities.13 Mayas were
forced to relocate from their homes, and to re-establish themselves in towns
located at open valley floors, centred near a church.14 Grouping people
together in centrally located communities allowed the Spanish to control the
population more effectively.15 As a result of this colonial system, an
atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and hatred was created amongst the Maya.16
The Spanish built a hegemonic society in Guatemala by exerting their will
upon the Maya and establishing a new order in the region. The Maya went
from being the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere to a subordinate
culture, terrorized by the Spanish. The roots of Guatemalan collective memory
can largely be defined by what Paul Connerton describes as a condition
resulting from the hierarchy of power.17 Over time, Maya culture and customs
have been transformed into a hybrid form that represents a mixture of their
ancestors and those customs that have been imposed upon them by outsiders.
These conditions have created a new identity, one that is entrenched in fear.
According to Oliver La Farge, the effects of the conquest are alive and
imprinted on the Maya of present-day Guatemala.18
B. After the Spanish Conquest – 19th Century Guatemala
The second “conquest” of the Guatemalan people developed out of
the power struggle between different social classes after independence was
granted.19 Although Guatemala officially received its independence from
Spain in 1821, the unequal structure of society did not disappear as
Guatemalans may have hoped. Once again borrowing from Paul Connerton’s
theories on memory, when attempting to form a new start the past can never
be totally excluded or forgotten.20 The organization of the previous society
will inevitably influence the structure of the newly emerging society and old
practices, traditions, habits and customs may never be truly abandoned.21
Therefore, just because Guatemala received independence, this does not
translate into equality for all classes and sections of society. People generally
develop an order of the way things should be in their mind, even if this is an
unconscious thought.22 When independence was granted, the people did not
forget the former system or the previous structure of society. The
discrimination and inequality that had existed did not simply cease to exist.
Following independence, two dominant political ideologies, Conservatism and
Liberalism, emerged from the colonial system.23 The Conservatives aimed to
preserve traditional Spanish institutions that would incorporate the societal
structure of the colonial system.24 The Liberals aspired to establish a new
social and economic system that would encourage capitalist development and
elevate the status of Guatemala in the international community.25 To create
134 Politics, Violence and Expression
_______________________________________________________________
this progressive, Ladino state (Ladino is the common term for a person of
mixed race or a Spanish-speaking, Indian farmer), liberals wanted the Maya to
assimilate.26
When the Liberals gained control of Guatemala in 1871, President
Rufino Barrios endeavoured to propel Guatemala into the industrialized world
with several capitalist reforms.27 Decrees that were passed required all
communal lands, which were mostly held by the Maya, be divided and
privately titled.28 Most Maya never received this news and ultimately had to
forfeit their land to local Ladinos.29 At the same time, it was realized that
Guatemala had ideal conditions for the cultivation of coffee.30 The
profitability of coffee was tremendous and required more land and a larger
labour force, which would consist mostly of Maya Indians.31 The local
Ladinos placed in charge of managing the coffee fincas created extremely
oppressive working conditions.32 This structure further divided Guatemalan
society and encouraged more inequality between the social classes.33 The
strong class divisions that are visible in Guatemalan society today are rooted
in divisions that were finessed during this period of history.34
C. The Darkest Period in Guatemalan History
Much of Guatemala’s precarious political situation is rooted in its
tragic modern history or the “third conquest.” Contemporary problems
surfaced with the first democratic elections in 1944 when the people
overthrew the right-wing dictator.35 Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo Bermej was elected
to the Presidency and wrote a new constitution, modelled on the U.S.
Constitution, as a part of a new reform policy. The second democratically
elected president, Jacobo Arbenz, continued to pursue the policies of reform
initiated by Bermej. At this time 2.2% of the population owned 70% of the
arable land and approximately 10% of the remaining land was available for
use by 90% of the population.36 Arbenz proposed that the unused land owned
by large landholders, particularly the United Fruit Company (UFCo) which
only cultivated 15% of its holdings, be re-distributed to 100,000 peasant
families for use.37 The UFCo vehemently objected to Arbenz’s agrarian
reform project, and demanded that the United States government reclaim the
land.38 It is noteworthy that many high-level U.S. government officials had
great stake in the affairs of Guatemala. Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, served
on the board of trustees for the United Fruit Company and his brother, John
Foster Dulles, was a lawyer for the UFCo.39 This, coupled with Washington’s
fear of any political, economic, and social force projected by the Arbenz
government, inspired the CIA-sponsored coup d’etat that was code-named
“PBSUCCESS”, and simultaneously sponsored a public relations campaign
against Guatemala claiming it was a communist satellite.40 After the
Patricia A. Seminetta 135
_______________________________________________________________
successful overthrow of the government, the U.S. installed a right-wing
dictator, Castillo Armas, to ensure the interests of the United Fruit Company
in Guatemala and undo many of the reforms started by Arbenz.41
3. The Civil War and its Repercussions
Over the course of the next 36 years, a bloody civil war was fought
between the people and the various military governments. Throughout this
period an all-out war was conducted against the civilians of Guatemala.42 The
army initiated a “scorched-earth” policy to eliminate any social, cultural or
political opposition.43 Between 1980 and 1983, a system was devised by the
army to isolate the guerrillas by conducting a “series of large-scale,
indiscriminate massacres against their [the guerrillas] support base”.44
Authoritarian military governments dominated the country with repressive
policies that terrorized the population, hoping to silence them so that they
would not question the status quo.45 An unidentified civilian stated,
Well the truth is, a feeling powerlessness at that moment
in front of those corpses, because it was overwhelming. And
the people stood there, no one said a word, because there were
vendors there on the sidewalk. Everyone is paralyzed, terrified. 46
In 1982, the military issued an amnesty decree, which allowed them
to take whatever actions they deemed necessary to maintain their oppressive
policies.47 The military had several methods to instil fear in the people.48 For
example, during what is referred to as one of the darkest periods in
Guatemalan history, Army-Chief of Staff General Benedicto Lucas Garcia
was responsible for creating the Civil Self-defense Patrols (PACs).49 The
PACs were a civilian militia used to exude control over the entire population
and systematically eliminate Maya culture.50 The PACs monitored the
population by using the civilians as informants against each other. Citizens
knew that if they did not join the PACs, then they would be accused of being a
guerrilla and subsequently targeted by the military.51 In addition, General
Garcia expanded the use of Death Squads and used them as a vehicle to torture
the population.
The height of human rights abuses was under the regime of General
Efrain Rios Montt, who ruled Guatemala from 1982-1983. During the tenure
of his presidency more than 41,000 people either “disappeared” or were
murdered, tortured or abused.52 By the conclusion of both the Rios Montt and
Garcia regimes, over 440 Mayan villages were destroyed.53 The policies put
into action were designed to leave no survivors and have been classified by the
UN Truth Commission on Guatemala as a campaign of genocide against the
136 Politics, Violence and Expression
_______________________________________________________________
Maya.54 The policies of terror dictated by the military created a sense of
collective amnesia, producing a distorted picture of society where it was
difficult to separate right from wrong.

4. What Does it Mean to be Guatemalan?


They are an introverted people, consumed by internal fires
which they cannot or dare not express, externally chafing
under the yoke of conquest, and never for a moment
forgetting they are a conquered people. 55 Oliver La Farge.

In societies were violence has played a large role in the national


history, there are several ways of confronting the events of the past.56 Some do
not want to acknowledge the past while others prefer to embrace it through
festivals, memorials and other public ceremonies commemorating history.57
Societies emerging from violence and trauma often struggle to find meaning
and truth, resulting in multiple understandings of the past.58 It is a difficult
process for Guatemalans to embrace their history because their collective
memory does not have a common understanding throughout society. The
following examples are a demonstration of Guatemalans attempting to create a
common understanding of the past through various forms of expression.

A. Testimonies
Groups fighting to strengthen civil society have taken great strides to
confront the dreadful past of Guatemala. The Association of the Relatives of
the Detained and Disappeared of Guatemala (FAMDEGUA) is an
organization that was founded by the family members of the detained and
‘disappeared’ persons. Their mission is to discover the whereabouts of people
who were abducted or went missing throughout the course of the civil war,
and to demand a full explanation of what happened to them and who is
responsible.
In an attempt to gain international support, express pain and
suffering, and commemorate lost loved ones, the members of FAMDEGUA
play host to groups from around the world and tell the story of the thousands
of sons and daughters of Guatemala affected by the civil war. Students,
missionaries and aid workers are among the many people that are brought into
their small building to hear their version of the Guatemalan civil war.
Adorning the walls of their office are several rows of 8 x 10 framed black and
white photographs, labelled with the names and years of the disappeared or
deceased.
Patricia A. Seminetta 137
_______________________________________________________________
Members of the organization tell their personal stories including the
powerful emotions experienced throughout those years, and what life is like
today as a result of those experiences. Accounts often include mention of the
last time their son, daughter, husband or other family member was seen alive,
the known details of abductions, and the processes that they have gone
through in order to discover the truth about their loved ones. This process
involves the search for the missing, as well as the battle against and the pain
of accepting the conclusion that they may never know whether their relatives
are dead or alive, whether they were tortured or killed instantly, and where
their bodies lie. Essentially, this organization provides its members with an
outlet for their mourning, yet it also offers opportunities to speak about their
traumatic experiences, and, it is hoped, to come to terms with their suffering.

B. Recovery of Historical Memory Project (REHMI)


The Recovery of Historical Memory Project (REHMI) is an account,
collected by the Archdiocese of the Catholic Church of Guatemala, of the
suffering and the death of the victims of the civil war. It was written and
researched by Guatemalans for other Guatemalans.59 The bishops who
compiled this work aimed to begin the healing and reconciliation process by
seeking-out and presenting the truth.60 The report examines the effects of
violence on the civilian population, the consequences of military action, and
the apparatuses that permitted the atrocities to be committed.
Throughout the civil war and even after the peace accord was signed
the population felt that they were unable to share their experiences.

What if death comes for me after this interview, tomorrow


or the next day? I want to live with my family. That is why
I’m afraid: and I’m concerned about discussion what
Happened during those years. 61

Being forced to repress their memories, the people of Guatemala


experienced increased anxiety, ill health, deep sorrow and an overwhelming
feeling of injustice.62
Terror was used to pacify the population and to warn others not to
“disobey”. To prove this point, the military demonstrated by example such as
conducting public torture sessions. Reinforcing this fear was the fact that there
was no one to protect the people from these heinous acts.

What we have seen has been terrible: burned corpses, women


impaled and buried as if they were animals ready for the spit, all
138 Politics, Violence and Expression
_______________________________________________________________
doubled up, and children massacred and carved up with machetes.
The women too, murdered like Christ.63

Connerton discusses the idea of social memory “as a dimension of


political power or of the unconscious elements in social memory, or both”.64
By exterminating the Maya, the Guatemalan elite was attempting to dictate a
new social identity and provoke a collective amnesia. This served the
government’s purposes during the Cold War when a homogenous society that
did not question the status quo was viewed favourably by some in the
international political arena.
In addition to exterminating the Maya, a component of this new
social identity involved creating the perpetrator. Brutal treatment, compelled
obedience and fear were all used as tools to manipulate the soldiers to enforce
the will of the elite.

They arrived at a firing range and sent us to grab about three


hundred dogs… ‘Okay, this is the meat we are going to eat
today’… They filled a cauldron with blood, like a barrel.
Each one of us had a disposable cup filled with blood and
had to down it. Whoever didn’t drink it was two-faced. They
gave us each a cup of dog blood. They didn’t serve us lunch
that day in order to get us to eat that; our lunch was a cup of
blood. During the meal they gave us dog stew. 65

Memory has an important role to play in ensuring that state-


sponsored terrorism never happens again. REHMI is a venue for the voiceless
victims to find their words and to reassemble a collective memory for all
Guatemalans.66
C. Memorials
Another example of Guatemalans attempting to confront their past
has been to build monuments and memorials where they can go to
commemorate the dead or the missing. In December, 1990, in the town of
Santiago Atitlan, the Guatemalan military massacred eleven men, women and
children. After the massacre, the townspeople demanded a meeting with the
government human rights representative and the President requesting that the
people responsible for this egregious act be punished accordingly and that the
military never be allowed to return to the town.67 Although no one was ever
formally charged for the acts against the people of Santiago Atitlan, the
request that the army never be allowed to return to the town has been upheld.68
A “Peace Park” was built in the place where the massacre occurred. The
Patricia A. Seminetta 139
_______________________________________________________________
memorial is constructed out of stones disassembled from the garrison to
commemorate the martyrs with headstones in the exact location where the
victims fell.69 A copy of the letter from the President, promising to investigate
the incident and forbidding the military to return to the town, stands next to
the park to serve as a reminder to all future governments of the atrocities that
occurred.70
On December 29, 1996, the civil war that ripped apart Guatemala
came to an end and the Peace Accords were signed; however they still remain
to be ratified by the government. In the centre of Guatemala’s Plaza Mayor
stands a monument with a single encased eternal flame and the words, “To the
anonymous heroes of peace” are engraved in the marble. Directly next to the
casing is a plaque with the words of Guatemalan poet, Otto Rene Castillo:
“But is it beautiful to love the world with the eyes of those who have yet to be
born”.71 These two memorials are located in the most public space in
Guatemala and together they represent both the past and the future.72 They
serve as a reminder of the past, so that what happened will never be forgotten;
but they also provide space to learn from that past and to build for the future.

D. Expression as a Means of Healing


Artists are the originators who reflect their native land if
they know how to understand the joys and sorrows in the
soul of its people; if they interpret them in line, colour, stone
or clay, in music or by word. If they feel and comprehend its
landscape, if they internalize it. 73
Artistic forms of expression have an important place in
reconciliation. Since the civil war, artists have increasingly offered their
perspectives on Guatemalan history. The artwork on the front-cover of the
REHMI report titled, “Esclarecimiento”(Clarification) is a combination of
four similar photographs by Guatemalan artist Daniel Hernandez Salazar. The
goal of the four different photographs is to represent the self-imposed
blindness, deafness and silence of the Guatemalan people during the civil
war.74 The fourth photograph was commissioned especially for REMHI, to
signify the opportunity for Guatemalans to share their experiences from the
civil war.75
Salazar first got the idea for the exhibition in 1997 when he was
working to exhume the bodies of nine peasants murdered by the military for
protesting that their salaries were not high enough.76 Salazar stated, “The
testimony of those terrible things are the remains of the victims buried in
clandestine graves, so I decided to include them in my art.”77 The bones,
140 Politics, Violence and Expression
_______________________________________________________________
particularly the scapulae, reminded Salazar of angels wings.78 In honour of the
one-year anniversary of Bishop Juan Gerardi’s death, Salazar displayed
several large posters around Guatemala City.79 For the fifth anniversary of the
Bishop’s death, a very large archangel was hung over the arch of the city’s
Metropolitan Cultural Center.80 According to Salazar, “The thing you have to
face when you consider memory is the responsibility of what happened, but
more of what you can change”.81 “Parallel Stories” is another photograph that
was used to talk about Guatemala’s convoluted identity. Guatemalan artist,
Luis Gonzales Palma, uses several different rows of similar images including
Jesus on the cross, the sea, eyes, flowers and wedding images to convey the
social and cultural contrasts present throughout Guatemalan history.82
According to Cazali, “The artist constantly questions the answers of the
human being in his most trivial acts aiming at denying the pain which can
question the existential conditions in an environment submitted to an external
crisis”.83 The artist is attempting to address the numerous “parallel stories”
that exist in Guatemalan society.
5. The Future of Guatemala
Since we are the outcomes of earlier generations, we are
also the outcome of their aberrations, passions, and errors,
and indeed of their crimes; it is not possible wholly to
free oneself from this chain.84 Friedrich Nietzsche

The future of Guatemala remains to be decided. The Guatemalan


nation is currently in a fragile state. The Peace Accords have yet to be ratified,
corruption defines political life and society remains split between the struggle
for peace and the perpetuation of violence. Connerton claims that the images
of the past commonly legitimate a present social order.85 Furthermore, images
and recollected knowledge of the past are conveyed and sustained by (more or
less) ritual performance.86 In the case of Guatemala, aggression and
uncertainty have defined the past five centuries. Assuming that collective
memory is sustained through ritual performance, then for Guatemalans, it is
repeatedly demonstrated that the practice of violence has become a ritual
performance embedded in their identity. After thirty-six years of violence,
Guatemalan society cannot immediately transform itself. For generations,
children and adults were surrounded by extreme violence. When the civil war
ended these people did not automatically convert and become peacemakers.
Combining this expectation with Guatemala’s history of difficulties in not
openly acknowledging the past, perpetuates the continuous evasion of a
positive peace.
Patricia A. Seminetta 141
_______________________________________________________________
Although memories are personal and specific to each person,
individual memories are partially created by a collection of the many different
situations that affect an entire society. When focusing on collective memory, a
group attempts to tie together different situations to define an identity. The
question, “What does it mean, after so many years of tragedy, to be
Guatemalan?” is not an easy one for most Guatemalans to answer.87 However,
with the conclusion of the civil war, once again Guatemalans find themselves
at unique crossroads. The collective identity of Guatemalans has been imposed
on society by the elite for a long period of time. Nevertheless, the people now
stand in a position from which to reclaim their past by embracing their
memories and proceeding to forge a unified identity which will allow them to
define their future collectively.
The Plaza Mayor or the “public space” of Guatemala offers a
valuable lesson. The dual message in the Plaza signifies that although the past
is filled with unimaginable pain and suffering, it should never be forgotten. As
the many artists and people profiled in this paper have demonstrated,
embracing the past is the key to breaking the culture of violence and fortifying
the foundation for a peaceful future.

Notes
1
Patrick Smith, “Memory without History: Who Owns Guatemala’s Past?,”
The Washington Quarterly, The Center for Strategic and International Studies
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 24, 2 (Spring 2001): 59–72.
<http://www.twq.com/01spring/smith.pdf> (March 28, 2004).
2
Makena Ulfe, Conclusion Lecture, The George Washington University,
April 21, 2004.
3
Jennifer Cole, “Anthropological Approaches to Social Memory Lecture,”
Washington University in St. Louis,
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/JenniferColeLecture.pdf>. (April 8
2004).
4
Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1989, 3.
5
George W. Lovell, “Surviving Conquest: The Maya of Guatemala in
Historical Perspective.” Latin American Research Review 23, 2 (1988): 27.
JSTOR. <http://jstor.org/search> (March 30, 2004).
6
Rigoberta Menchu,, I Rigoberta Menchu: An Indian Woman In
Guatemala. New York: Verson, 1983, 131.
7
Lovell, 29.
142 Politics, Violence and Expression
_______________________________________________________________
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid, 28.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid, 30.
12
Kristina Ross, Collective Memory, (1995),
<http://www.mediahistory.umn.edu/memory.html>. (April 17 2004).
13
Lovell, 30.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid, 34.
16
Ibid, 37.
17
Connerton, 1.
18
Lovell, 25.
19
Ibid.,37
20
Connerton, 6.
21
Ibid
22
Ibid
23
Lovell, 37.
24
Ibid
25
Ibid
26
Ibid
27
Ibid, 38.
28
Ibid
29
Ibid
30
Ibid, 40.
31
Ibid, 38.
32
Ibid, 40.
33
Ibid
34
Ibid
35
Gary Prevost and Harry E. Vanden, Politics of Latin America: The Power
Game. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 256-257.
36
Ibid
37
Ibid
38
P. Landmeier, Banana Republic: The United Fruit Company, (1997)
<http://www.mayaparadise.com/ufc1e.htm>.
39
Prevost and Vanden, 257.
40
Landmeier
41
Ibid
42
Prevost and Vanden, 261.
Patricia A. Seminetta 143
_______________________________________________________________
43
Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala. Guatemala Never
Again! Recovery of Historical Memory Project. Trans. Gretta Tovar
Sieventritt. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999, 133.
44
Ibid
45
Prevost and Vanden , 264.
46
Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, 133.
47
Ibid, 10, 217, 228.
48
School of the Americas Watch.
<http://www.soaw.org/new/article.php?id=100>, (01 October 2003).
49
Ibid
50
Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, 118.
51
Ibid, 120-121.
52
Ibid, 302.
53
Nicole Gamble, “Rios Montt and the Guatemalan Genocide Trials: Ex-
Dictator’s Campaign Threatens Justice,” Counter Punch
<http://www.counterpunch.org/gamble10062003.html,>(October 6, 2003).
54
Religious Task Force on Central America and Mexico, “Demand Justice in
Genocide Case” (28 May 2003,)
<http://www.rtfcam.org/take_action/genocide.htm>.
55
Lovell, 25.
56
Elizabeth Jelin, “The Minefields of Memory,” NACLA Report on the
Americas, XXXII: 2 (Sept/Oct 1998), 23.
57
Ibid, 26.
58
Ibid, 23.
59
Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, xxxiii.
60
Ibid, xv.
61
Ibid, 14.
62
Ibid, xxxi.
63
Ibid, 10.
64
Connerton, 1.
65
Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, 128.
66
Ibid, xxxi.
67
Stephen Blythe, “Santiago Atitlan, Guatemala- a Human Rights
Victory,” 8 Mar. 1997, Travel Health Information and Referral Website,
(05 April 2004),
<http://www.gslis.utexas.edu/~gpasch/tesis/pages/guatemala/otr04/hmnrts.
htm>.
68
Ibid
69
Ibid
70
Ibid
144 Politics, Violence and Expression
_______________________________________________________________
71
Smith, 59.
72
Ibid
73
Lovell
74
Judith Barry, “Death in Guatemala,” Medical Advocates for Social
Justice, (2000)
<http://www.medadvocates.org/resources/masj_pub/death_guatemala.html>.
75
Ibid
76
Ibid
77
Ibid
78
Ibid
79
Celeste Mackenzie, “Angels of Dark Memory” America May/June 2004, 18.
80
Ibid
81
Ibid
82
Rossina Cazali, “Historias Paralelas,” 1995, UOL. (05 April 2004).
<http://www1.uol.com.br/23bienal/paises/ipgt.htm>.
83
Ibid
84
Smith, 6.
85
Connerton, 1.
86
Ibid, 40.
87
Smith, 60.

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(2000)
<http://www.medadvocates.org/resources/masj_pub/death_guatemala.html
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Patricia A. Seminetta 145
_______________________________________________________________
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/JenniferColeLecture.pdf> (April 8,
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<http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/guatemala/history.html> (April
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(May 1, 2004).
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Again! Recovery of Historical Memory Project. Trans. Gretta Tovar
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<http://www.mayaparadise.com/ufc1e.htm> (15 October 2003).
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Historical Perspective.” Latin American Research Review 23, 2 (1988): 27.
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2004).
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Palma, Luis Gonzales. “Historias Paralelas.” 1995,
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146 Politics, Violence and Expression
_______________________________________________________________
Game. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 256-257.
Religious Task Force on Central America and Mexico, “Demand Justice in
Genocide Case,” (May 28, 2003,)
<http://www.rtfcam.org/take_action/genocide.htm>.
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<http://www.mediahistory.umn.edu/memory.html> (April 17, 2004).
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‘You’re old enough to kill, but too young for votin’…’*:
Critically Reflecting the ‘Child Soldier’ Issue

Graeme R Goldsworthy and Frank Faulkner


Perhaps 300,000 i children under 18 are serving in dozens of combat
situations across the world, in what may be euphemistically described as
harrowing conditions. This paper will put forward the proposition that using
children to fight, suffer and die in adult-inspired conflict is an affront to
decency and moral codes of conduct, and flagrantly disregards international
legislation expressly designed to protect the vulnerable. Moreover, using
children as instruments of death and destruction causes problems out of all
proportion to any perceived benefits that may be gained. Therefore, to bring
an end to this particularly repugnant form of warfare, it is suggested that the
use of underage combatants be stigmatised in the way that antipersonnel mines
(APMs) have attracted legislation to bring this about. ii
To place this phenomenon into some kind of legal context, the paper
will initially examine the legal position of children vis-à-vis their status in a
conflictual scenario. Quoting legislative measures on the one hand, and then
translating such findings into the realities of bringing an end to this type of
practice on the other, presents us with certain obstacles regarding
enforcement. Referring to the current status of APMs, the Ottawa
Conventions, whilst being a praiseworthy initiative, appear quite incapable of
stopping, for example, the current round of mine laying in Angola (which is a
signatory to the Ottawa Declaration). iii Nonetheless, despite the seeming
futility of this exercise in the light of these facts, it is still worthwhile
examining possible measures in the earnest hope that a solution can be found.
It is not, however, our purpose to dwell on this matter in depth, but an
overview may shed some light on the complexities of legislation which, citing
the Ottawa deliberations above, may illustrate that more needs to be done in
this area.
The paper will go on to examine the non-legal aspects of ‘child’
soldiering, ostensibly to unearth the realities of underage combatants. It will
also seek to support analysis with an investigation of the problems
encountered in Sierra Leone, which has suffered from aggravated internal
strife in recent years, and has witnessed a significant rupturing of social
cohesion, to the point where large numbers of children find themselves
relatively unprotected. Using this country as a case study will hopefully
highlight the harrowing nature of child soldiery, and act in support of the aims
148 “You’re Old Enough to Kill, But too Young for votin’.”
_______________________________________________________________
of this text – to put forward a case for the eventual elimination of this type of
practice.

1. The International Legal Perspective


In keeping with legislation constructed to ‘civilise’ or at least
regulate the so-called arts of warfare, provision for the protection of non-
combatants should, surely by definition, encompass the rights of children in
conflict. In 1924, as a starting point, the (now defunct) League of Nations
adopted the first declaration on the rights of the child, emphasising the
requirement for special care and attention. iv As well-meaning and necessary as
this legislation was, it clearly did not spare the child from the horrors of World
War Two, Korea, Vietnam and a host of other conflagrations that have
bedevilled civilians in the ensuing decades, despite similar measures in later
years. v What should be self-evident, admittedly with the benefit of hindsight,
is that early efforts to address this and related problems had proved to be
woefully inadequate. The conclusion to be drawn from these deliberations is
that, irrespective of a whole raft of measures drafted by bodies such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Red Crescent, and the
United Nations (UN), children and adult civilians continued to be victimised,
due in large part to a lack of enforcement. This will come as no great surprise
to observers of the international political scene, who will recognise
immediately that a pervasive global political anarchy precludes a reversal of
this state of affairs.

2. More Unenforceable Treaties?


As with the Ottawa treaty, the neo-liberal or ‘western’ response is to
draw up an international treaty that will be signed with great fanfare amid
great publicity and endorsed by the usual raft of concerned celebrities. Perhaps
a Nobel Peace prize will be thrown in. The public conscience will be sold a
solution and then the next big issue will be turned to. If this fails to stop the
use of Child Soldiers, the backstop excuse of ‘step in the right direction’ can
always be run out. Of course, western society has actually been legislating in
regard to the age of participants in combat for generations. We seem to be
stuck in the belief that legislation in regard to the mitigation of the horrors of
war was invented after the cold war. Western armies no longer have 12 year
old drummer boys leading columns into battle before being the first to be
slaughtered by canister and ball. Simply lying about your birth date worked
for many in WW1, but technology prevents that today, rather than effective
legislation. Yet many academics and NGO professionals claiming expertise in
the CS area demonstrate their total misunderstanding of the professional
Graeme G Goldsworthy & Frank Faulkner 149
_______________________________________________________________
military service that is open to seventeen-year-olds (no longer allowed in
combat by for example the UK), by disingenuously attempting to parallel the
conditions of such young men and women with Child Soldiers in the terrible
conditions of, say, Sierra Leone. This political posturing, entirely anti-military
to the core, serves the Child Soldiers and their victims in vulnerable, war-
ravaged communities not one iota and displaces the focus on the central issue
by the simplification of all things military as ‘bad’ and everything non-
military as ‘good’. This is of course too simplistic and is typical of the eclectic
mix of left-leaning academics, aid workers and politicians who continually rail
against military institutions without having taken the time to learn about
military institutions themselves.
Those murderous para-military groups in Sierra Leone, and the LRA
in Uganda are but two among many that simply do not sign international
treaties, and do not adhere to international legal instruments and treaties
already in existence, unless it serves an advantage to them. Legislation against
CS, no matter how laudable in principle will not, as with the 1997 Ottawa
anti-landmines treaty and the proposed legislation to curb small arms use and
proliferation, reduce the recruitment, empressment and deployment of CS in
murderous internecine conflict. It is unlikely that anyone would face
prosecution in an international court (imagine the defence scenario “I didn’t
know he/she was fourteen, where is the documentary evidence?), just as no
one has been prosecuted for laying landmines, especially those states that
actually signed and ratified the Ottawa treaty.
However, to avoid charges of defeatism (frequently levelled at the
author or others), it is accepted that change often comes about through the
efforts of individuals and groups who refuse to accept the status quo, and who
through multilateral channels seek to encourage a search for the political will
that may realise these goals. vi The tradition that wishes to promote, entrench
and safeguard human rights, especially with regard to the subject of this
article, continues as a viable proposition even if implementation continues to
elude us. More recent overtures than those already mentioned suggest that the
invigoration of normative practice in international relations, as it applies in
this scenario at least, is a cumulative process that endeavours to build on
knowledge and experience. International humanitarian law, based on the 1949
Geneva Conventions vii and the subsequent addition of the 1977 Protocols, has
made steps to codify legal obligations incumbent upon States Parties. This is
the crux of the matter; that States should be in observance of what does, and
does not, constitute acceptable behaviour, and that the child has special rights
within law, viii by virtue of their relative powerlessness, both physical and
mental. It is recognised, however, that these rules and obligations are
150 “You’re Old Enough to Kill, But too Young for votin’.”
_______________________________________________________________
primarily instruments of the Nation-State system, and that signatory status
recognises this as prima facie even though much of the problem stems from
the decisions and actions taken by non-state actors.
Taking this a stage further, international humanitarian law accepts the
existence of two types of conflict: that which exists between High Contracting
Parties (whether reciprocally accepted or not); and conflict not international in
nature, but prosecuted within the sovereign territory of one of the above. ix
Irrespective, and despite legal definitions, the matter still returns to bringing
an end to, or at the very least limiting, the effects of war on innocent
populations. What must be addressed is the evolving nature of war, most
notably the rise of internal hostilities in recent decades (for example wars of
‘national liberation’, insurgencies, intrastate conflicts) that suggests a
tendency to eschew legislative niceties in pursuit of perceived ulterior
objectives x . The 1977 Additional Protocols, formulated at the behest of the
ICRC to ‘update’ the law in recognition of changing circumstances, and to
encourage States to accept this fact, had attempted to expand strictures from
the international arena to include conflict of an intrastate complexion. xi These
issues notwithstanding, the Additional Protocols also suffer from a marked
lack of international recognition. As Hamilton and Abu El-Haj explain, xii the
Protocols appear not to carry any real authority due to a lack of ratification. As
they go on to explain, in the Gulf War neither the US, UK, France or Iraq had
ratified Protocol I. Moreover a majority of governments, given a
preoccupation with the maintenance of sovereignty, would be unlikely to
accept that a hostile scenario within their territory amounts to an armed
conflict as per Protocol II. xiii
As should be evident, lacunae exist in the application and
implementation of humanitarian law. Despite the provisions embodied in
Additional Protocols, certainly with regard to the protection of civilians, no
amount of legal architecture has any worth if States do not (or will not) ratify.
This is particularly so for the aims of this study; children continue to be
subjected to the privations of conflict over which they exercise no control, and
to which they continue to be victims, in either a combatant or non-combatant
capacity. As Hamilton and Abu El-Haj comment further, ‘ … Israel
throughout its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza denies the applicability
of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Similarly, India is currently denying that
the situation in Kashmir is a non-international armed conflict’. xiv
A further point to be made in relation to humanitarian law, or, indeed,
the laws of war, irrespective of the philosophies of ius in bello or ius ad
bellum, relates to the reality that whether or not the right to go to war and
conduct therein is legitimate, children continue to be damaged collaterally.
Graeme G Goldsworthy & Frank Faulkner 151
_______________________________________________________________
Despite the seeming righteousness of the Gulf War campaign, Iraqi, Kurdish
and Marsh Arab children would not be expected to have any conception of
sovereignty, ‘fire and forget’ weaponry, stealth technology or the high moral
purpose (if indeed that is what it was) of the Coalition forces. What they will
doubtless have experienced is an unimaginable terror falling from the sky onto
populations who had no argument with anyone. The points to be made here
are that the security of children during hostilities is clearly inadequate, and
that those caught up in war appear powerless to bring about redress. This
impotence of circumstances will extend to the position of children as
combatants, starting with analysis of the military efficacy of the child-as-
soldier.

3. Under the Gun


The employment of children in a country’s armed forces is by no
means a 20th Century phenomenon; history is replete with examples. During
the Middle Ages, young boys were apprenticed as squires to serve knights by
undertaking armouring duties, such as maintaining the knight’s body armour,
performing simple logistical tasks and acting in a general supportive role. xv
(The same source, speculates that children have long been recruited to act as
spies, lookouts, and messengers.) There is also a tradition of young males
fulfilling roles as ‘drummer boys’. Children can also act relatively
inconspicuously in war zones, observing troop deployments, dispositions of
weapons and noting logistical arrangements without attracting undue attention.
This type of activity is not that surprising, considering that military forces,
preoccupied with enemy movement and rapidly-evolving battlefield
conditions, may render children ‘invisible’ – they are there, but of no great
consequence in the grand scheme of local conditions. However, in recent years
the child has moved up the military effectiveness order to take on a more
‘proactive’ profile, and now engages in combat duties alongside (or in front
of) his or her adult colleagues.
The trend towards active-duty roles for under-aged personnel has
been brought about, as much as anything else, by advances in weapons
technology. Until fairly recently, weapon weight and technological
configurations had precluded the employment of children in front-line
positions. The proliferation of simple, light arms such as the M16 and AK-47
assault rifles has meant that they are easily handled and transportable by the
child, xvi and may weigh as little as seven pounds (three kg). xvii Relatively
uncomplicated, with fewer moving parts, these weapons can be stripped and
reassembled by a child of ten. xviii Also, an AK-47 can be bought for as little as
US$6 xix , a key factor in making this the ‘weapon of choice’ for many.
152 “You’re Old Enough to Kill, But too Young for votin’.”
_______________________________________________________________
Children find themselves becoming soldiers for a variety of reasons.
As mentioned earlier, conflict in the new Millennium, in keeping with
developments occurring during the second half of the previous century, shows
that wars are now much more likely to be confined within the borders of a
sovereign state, and to involve sub-state actors or Non-Governmental Entities
(NGEs). Because these conflagrations involve disparate opposition groups, in
which fixed lines and orders of battle are the exception, the fight is highly
likely to take part in community environments. The conclusion to be drawn
from this observation is that conducting military operations in the community
will inevitably target civilians, and a large number will be children. xx It should
not, therefore, be difficult to imagine the concomitant implosion of authority,
law and order, social breakdown, and disregard for human rights that follows
closely on the heels of widespread and extreme violence that intrastate
conflicts represent. Given the fact that children especially need stability, peace
and safety in order to grow and function in an acceptable fashion, it should not
be surprising that dysfunction, psychosocial distress and post-traumatic
disorder are manifest when these pre-requisites are absent.T xxi
Removal of basic necessities and protective mechanisms ensures that
children are particularly vulnerable to all manner of influences, most notably
where the family unit has been fragmented or destroyed completely in the
chaos and confusion of war. In certain instances, the military unit can act in
loco parentis, thereby assuming the traditional position of guidance usually
provided by parents. However, given the exigencies of warfare, this role will
be characterised by violence, brutality, deprivation, death, sexual exploitation,
and callous indifference to others. xxii The end product is a person capable of
gratuitous acts of barbarity, often perpetrated with some enthusiasm, and who
is bereft of normal character traits and, when peace or demobilisation takes
effect, is difficult to rehabilitate for the requirements of normal life. xxiii
The international community identifies all children under arms or in
the category of Child Soldiers as the victims, and surely most are, but our
‘politically correct’ thinking fails to allow us to acknowledge many of these
children as willing and even enthusiastic killers, rapists and plunderers.
Thinking needs to shift beyond the ‘PC’ red line drawn under the parameters
of the argument to acknowledge that many will never be successfully
demobilised and reintegrated into society as valuable human capital. Aside
from their condition, most have no working societies to return to. Many must
remain mobilised, disarmed of course, but kept within structures of hierarchy
they recognise as the only family they have. As is the case with the vulnerable
communities affected by AIDS that these young killers prey upon, the reality
is that while a cure for AIDS still seems remote, the developed societies in the
Graeme G Goldsworthy & Frank Faulkner 153
_______________________________________________________________
north and the overseas aid effort may simply have to accept that millions are
going to die and help them do so with as much dignity as possible. Then they
can prepare such societies for the aftermath – and then help them to rebuild.
Organisations dealing with the Child Soldier problem (and the AIDS issue as
many separately prioritise both in their programming), are donor dependant,
donor led and must for propaganda and PR purposes portray the ‘evil’ nature
of the issue, yet many of their models to tackle the problem are constrained by
their subjectivity, so recognise only a part of the problem. In many cases
development NGOs, choose only to recognise what they can deal with, since
the sheer scale of the Child Soldier problem and related to AIDs is simply
beyond their ken or capacity. Let us be clear: the global aids epidemic has not
yet peaked, and it is estimated that the plague will be with us for around 130
years to come with the impact in the Indian Sub-continent, SE Asia and China
only yet imagined. These countries could well be brought to ruin by AIDS.
Their economies will certainly shrink. Picture China with a dying population,
without enough to cultivate the land to feed the population – a China, that is to
say, armed with nuclear weapons. Hold that thought.
In many developing societies people in distress return to their village
for the succour of the community; consider tthe African saying ‘it takes a
village to raise a child’. Perhaps then it is a dead village that raises child
soldiers. Of course, AIDS has spread like wildfire especially because of this
very traditional coping mechanism.
It is a key theme that the Child Soldier problem is linked to the Aids
related destruction of Sub-Saharan Africa, along with its security regimes and
institutional infrastructures in education and health.

4. Recruitment
The conditions under which children may be recruited, either
voluntarily or by coercive methods, vary from individual to individual.
However, there are certain defining commonalities that occur repeatedly
according to particular circumstances. These include: children with little or no
education; those from the most disadvantaged socio-economic groups;
children separated from families, usually in the fog of conflict; orphans, street
children, refugees, and those internally-displaced; and children from disrupted
backgrounds (e.g. due to divorce or separation). xxiv
Certainly, it is accepted that war really does not always have to be a
pre-condition for recruitment; this can also happen in peacetime, as a way of
escaping poverty, abusive parents, social cleavages, and poor life chances. In
the poorer countries of the world, that is to say the Third World or Global
South, military indenture may indeed be the only way to achieve some quality
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of life, however ersatz that may prove to be. (It is also significant that the
overwhelming majority of the conflicts in which children become ensnared are
to be found in these regions of the world.) xxv The main exemptions from
conscription/enforced enlistment are likely to be the children of Comprador
classes - local elites with the power, wealth and influence to avoid direct
involvement in hostilities.
It is noted that life for disadvantaged children in a peacetime setting,
including in countries where minimal social security structures exist, can be
tough enough. For those caught up in hostile environments the dangers can
increase exponentially, according to the intensity of the conflict. The normal
certainties of life, albeit basic, are surely preferable to an existence that offers
little or no security to people fleeing from aggravated violence and chronic
social disruption, and traumatising removal of civilising constraints that are
manifest during times of civil unrest. The overwhelming imperative for escape
is evidenced by mass population migrations away from conflict zones, either
internally or to cross-border destinations. Demographic displacement has a
profound physical, emotional and developmental impact on children and
exposes the degree of vulnerability in which they find themselves. xxvi
Consequently this paper will offer further examination of the multi-faceted
problematique of the child-as-soldier from the perspective of refugees and
Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs).

5. Wrong Place, Wrong Time


It has been postulated that refugee children are particularly at risk;
this does not apply only to those living in (or near) to a war zone. As Brett
explains, Kurdish children living in Sweden were presumed to have been
abducted by the PKK to fight in Turkey when they failed to attend a summer
camp in 1998. xxvii This is not the only situation in which children find
themselves in uniform. In those parts of the world where famine and extreme
deprivation are the norm during conflict xxviii , it is usual for armed forces to
have supplies of food along with the other accoutrement of war. This, to
starving children, is probably the surest method of obtaining sustenance,
shelter, and weapons for self-protection in a landscape bereft of even the
barest of necessities for survival.
Returning to the issue of refugees and their children, who would
suffer the brutalities of war perhaps to a greater extent than most, life may be
characterised as a prolonged excursion of chronic poverty, insecurity,
deprivation and inhumanity. The lot of refugees as a whole is not a happy one;
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the refugee crisis has assumed new dimensions since the
Graeme G Goldsworthy & Frank Faulkner 155
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late 1980s, as the aggravated displacement of peoples (especially in combat
zones) has reached 50 millions, with new areas of the world beset by the
haemorrhaging of whole groups from conflict regions. Concurrent with this,
(as recent news coverage in the UK informs us xxix ) the attitude of the
international community to the concept (and presumably practice) of asylum
has deteriorated markedly. xxx As the High Commissioner indicates, more than
half of any given refugee population are children, and, as minors, they are
particularly vulnerable. xxxi It is accepted that not all of these children would be
unaccompanied, indeed many will be in the charge of their mothers (as
opposed to fathers, who in some instances will be either rendered hors de
combat or still engaged in active service), but having said that, it is accepted
that adult females will also be a vulnerable group in the absence of protective
mechanisms. Unavoidably, conclusions logically infer that little or no
protection may be afforded to the most vulnerable if the guardians (in this case
women, as traditional carers) are themselves vulnerable. Therefore, the
unprotected are open to any manner of disruptive, violent or uncivilised (in a
value-free sense) conduct that adversely affects a child’s physical and
psychological welfare.
Unaccompanied refugee children will be particularly at risk; denied
even the most basic safety net, they will be exposed to a multiplicity of
dangers in an unremittingly hostile environment. Without the normalising
influences of carers, stable conditions, secure social conditions and protection
from life-threatening situations, it is perhaps not surprising that many children
succumb to a life of (para) military activity, with the arguably dubious benefits
described above. Given the often polarising nature of (especially) intrastate
conflict, communities separated by ethnic, religious or ideological divisions,
particularly over protracted periods, foster a tendency – a ‘folk ethos’ – to
identify with this or that group, frequently romanticising the ‘struggle’ as a
crusade for ‘freedom’, ‘liberation from the oppressor’ vehicle which carries its
own seductive message that appeals to impressionable young minds. xxxii
Children who are internally displaced may find themselves worse off
than refugees, if such an observation can be countenanced. They are denied
the protection provided by bodies overstretched due to the logistical and
humanitarian nightmares associated with de facto refugee status, and suffer
60% higher mortality rates than populations living in more stable
conditions. xxxiii Despite overtures by the UNHCR, ICRC and others, there are
no clear institutional safeguards for the protection and assistance of IDPs.
Therefore, deprived of prophylactic instruments on the ground, children are in
constant peril from hunger, disease, abuse, death and forced recruitment.
Much of the problem stems from a marked lack of education and
156 “You’re Old Enough to Kill, But too Young for votin’.”
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developmental facilities; deprived of natural expressive outlets, it is perhaps
not surprising that refugee and IDP children will end up in uniform for a lack
of anything better to do. If indeed the devil does make work for idle hands,
then children denied basic safeguards for their physical and emotional welfare
are particularly at risk. ‘Sometimes, as in Liberia, they are among the first to
join armed groups; at other times, as in the Palestinian Intifada in the Israeli
occupied territories, they are primary catalysts of violent strife.’ xxxiv
In a perfect world, there would be no refugees and IDPs; nor would
there be a climate of fear, unrest, civil strife or a breakdown in law and order.
However, as Machiavelli would doubtless have agreed, much of the world is a
desolate place from which it is difficult, if not impossible, to escape. This is
certainly so for the most vulnerable, as we have attempted to point out. Thus
far, the text has offered an overview from a global perspective; it has done so
partly to highlight the fact that child soldiers, and the conditions that create
them, are not restricted to one geographical area. More disturbingly, this
problem displays the seeming inability of the international community to bring
an end to this type of practice. To fully appreciate the true nature of this
ongoing tragedy, a case study of one theatre of operations will now be
examined in some detail. As a recent aspect of this phenomenon, we will
analyse the West African country of Sierra Leone, which has experienced (and
continues to do so) the agonies of widespread internal upheaval and the
accompanying collapse of acceptable humanitarian standards.

6. Sierra Leone
It is common knowledge that Africa has been burdened with more
than its fair share of bloodshed, injustice and foment. Largely abandoned to
face a bleak and uncertain future, the continent witnesses chronic despair,
poverty, insecurity and endemic conflict. From South Africa to Algeria, from
Liberia to Somalia, this part of the world had become a byword for ‘failed’
states and human misery. The great paradox is that the land promises a
cornucopia of wealth waiting to be delivered unto the impatient millions, but
remains tantalisingly out of reach for those most in need. Like the thirsty
explorer lost in a harsh and dry desert, the people are seemingly taunted by the
mirage of deliverance that fails to materialise. Why this should be so, and
what measures are required to alleviate Africa’s malaise, have been discussed
at great length by scholars, humanitarian commentators and political decision-
makers alike. The fact remains: when the continent is apparently not being
exploited for its riches, it is being virtually ignored. Moreover, when this type
of scenario is allowed to evolve, it is the powerless and the dispossessed who
Graeme G Goldsworthy & Frank Faulkner 157
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are left to face the consequences. The struggles of Africa are those of Sierra
Leone, to which we will now turn.
Sierra Leone is among the poorest countries on earth. xxxv A former
British colony, it unfortunately has poor soil that obviously impacts on
agriculture, but which is offset by extensive deposits of diamonds, iron ore
and bauxite. xxxvi The country has an approximate population of 4.5 millions,
and an average life span of 40, with over half of that total under 18 years of
age. xxxvii In 1998, there were about 3,000 children under arms, which
represents a welcome and significant reduction from a peak of over 6,000,
during the worst excesses of the civil war in the early to mid 1990s. xxxviii This
current round of unrest, which has its origins at the beginning of the last
decade, saw the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Corporal Foday
Sankoh pitted against Government forces (Republic of Sierra Leone Military
Forces, or RSLMF), who had originally instigated a coup on May 25 1990 to
oust the democratically-elected administration of President Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah. xxxix Thereafter, democracy, the judiciary, and other aspects of
national institutional life effectively ceased to function as legitimate entities. xl
What followed was a catalogue of violence perpetrated by all sides, with little
or no regard for human rights, international law, the status of civilians and the
well being of the country’s children. How, and why, young people found
themselves co-opted into various military or quasi-military factions is a multi-
faceted affair, and one that deserves further scrutiny.
The children of Sierra Leone have endured the brunt of the country’s
long-running insurgency. For over a decade, this conflict has exacted a terrible
social cleavage that saw over 12,000 children separated from their families.
Males and females as young as seven have been kidnapped and forced to
become soldiers in the RUF, young girls have suffered sustained sexual and
psychological abuse, and became the ‘prizes’ given to top RUF commanders.
After the RUF entered Freetown in 1999, 3,000 children were reported
missing. xli Since the mid-1990s, the predominantly child-based rebel army has
engaged in a systematic exercise of rape, murder, abduction and mutilation of
the young and old alike. As a result of sustained and orchestrated brutalisation,
these children have turned into some of the most vicious and inhumane killers
at the disposal of various factions. It is also alleged that many have been
forcibly drugged prior to conducting these atrocities. xlii It is perhaps little
wonder that fragile young minds are numbed in this way, bearing in mind that
they have been forcibly persuaded to take part in the torture and execution of
family members, prior to moving on to perpetrate the same acts in
neighbouring villages. The apparent rationale for this kind of conditioning is
158 “You’re Old Enough to Kill, But too Young for votin’.”
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to produce effective, hardened and conscienceless killers who are able to
despatch their victims with relative impunity. xliii
The net result of dehumanising the children of Sierra Leone, as in
similarly affected countries, is the production of a horde of insensate killers
outlawed by their families, afraid of rehabilitation (i.e. because of reprisals),
and who are effectively forced to stay in the company of armed gangs – a
surrogate ‘family.’ The future for young people trapped in this way is bleak;
with no access to education or the normalising influences of a stable, secure
family setting, they are at the mercy of forces over which they exercise no
control, and from which there appears to be no escape, certainly whilst the
country seems incapable of finding a way towards durable conflict resolution.
Whatever the nature and longevity of Sierra Leone’s travails, the
situation surely cannot continue to deteriorate ad infinitum. At some point, the
warring factions must begin to address the need for some kind of peace and
internal stability. In the event of this coming to pass, there will be a pressing
need for the combatants to reach an accord and only then can the process of
healing and national reconciliation begin in earnest. Rebuilding the lives of
children scarred by conflict will require gargantuan efforts by all concerned,
with input from the international community – it is unlikely that the Sierra
Leonians will accomplish the task unaided. Rehabilitating children
traumatised by extreme violence takes time, care and understanding; they need
care, nurturing and support to re-establish a degree of normality in their lives,
in some cases the care afforded will have to be of a specialised nature.
Peace and security are absolute necessities for the care of disturbed
children. xliv To be able to achieve this, families and carers must be able to
survive and make a living, primarily in order to provide the minimum
requirements of special needs children. This should be broadly in line with
international legislation, stating that ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social
reintegration of a child of … armed conflicts. Such recovery shall take place
in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the
child.’ xlv As laudable as these sentiments are, it should also be recognised that
Sierra Leone will require the assistance of outside authorities, bearing in mind
the destruction of years of internal strife. As matters stand, the burden of
rebuilding a shattered economic, social and political infrastructure will be
daunting enough; tending to the invisible wounds of immature individuals
constitutes a careful and painstaking approach. The national Child Protection
Committee, mindful of the complexities of such an undertaking, has identified
four areas of concern that are viewed as absolute necessities in this regard:
family reunification; ensuring access to education, health and other services
Graeme G Goldsworthy & Frank Faulkner 159
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for all children; supporting the psychological recovery of children in distress;
and, finally, promoting family and community mediation. xlvi
In an ideal world, the preferred medium of support would through the
family. However, in a country where family units have been damaged by war
and enforced separation, this is not always possible. Tracing and reuniting
families can assume the proportions of a logistical nightmare in a state
splintered by large-scale civil upheaval, but nonetheless must be addressed as
a logical and imperative first step. The alternative may be the semi-permanent
institutionalising of orphaned children, not a perfect scenario but one would
imagine that to be better than total isolation. Even so, the second, least
preferable option of the two would have to be supervised by competent and
caring authorities. xlvii
A major problem for war-torn societies in a post-conflictual (or even
during ongoing hostilities) situation is to contemplate the complexities of
national reconstruction. This would entail a massive rebuilding of national
infrastructures, including basic social apparatus. What needs to be addressed is
the fact that when so much of the national wealth has been diverted to a war-
making effort, little seems to be available for essential services. This is
certainly true for states like Sierra Leone, caught up as they are in
destabilising civil unrest, and clearly incapable of providing for those who
need help. From the perspective of children damaged by extreme and
persistent violence, the need is for urgent stability that can be provided by a
happy, stimulating educational environment as recommended by Article Two
of the Convention of the Rights of the Child. Hand in hand with this essential
requirement goes the essential right to an adequate standard of living; that is, a
safe, caring home and the support services capable of managing services
effectively from day to day. All of these matters are naturally dependent upon
the wealth-creation process; be it through agriculture, light industrial activities
and ancillary services. Again, much will depend upon the largesse of the
outside world to help bring about these objectives. xlviii
Attempting to rebuild the lives of psychologically damaged children
presents a quite different set of obstacles to surmount, but they are nonetheless
daunting. Building physical structures, even in a country as economically
denuded as Sierra Leone, can still be done with available skilled workers.
Attending to the disturbed children, however, requires a more subtle,
measured approach. What must be remembered is the exposure of children to
a plethora of war-related violence, including witnessing (and being threatened
with, or subjected to): rape, assault, murder, dismembered bodies, severe
corporeal injuries, and other, equally base acts. xlix In the light of these, and
other acts, the care of disturbed children requires the implementation of a
160 “You’re Old Enough to Kill, But too Young for votin’.”
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national, inter-agency support system with the requisite skills and expertise.
For the time being, as one may suspect, the infrastructural inadequacies that
beset Sierra Leone preclude any meaningful, large-scale remedial activities.
That, clearly, is for some point in the future, if at all. In the interim, carers and
families must make do with available resources. l
Mediation, as any practitioner would freely admit, is something of a
hit-and-miss affair. li As a (now) widespread variant of conflict resolution, the
use of mediation (particularly in a post-conflictual scenario) is dependent upon
the good will of disputant parties, and their willingness to embark on indirect
(shuttle) mediation or the more risky face-to-face type. In a country like Sierra
Leone, where pain is deep and persistent, the capacity for forgiveness may
indeed be oft strained. The obverse side of the coin, however, is to leave
bitterness and enmity untreated, with concomitant effects on society.
Investment in social reintegration would, one imagines, result in a gain for
national reconstruction and reconciliation, which in war-torn states are equal
partners in the search for peace and equilibrium. In this, all sections of Sierra
Leonian society have a stake, and which requires the active participation of ex
military, religious groups, traditional and customary networks, and tribal
leaders. lii No person would claim that the process of national healing in Sierra
Leone will be an easy affair. This paper has dealt primarily with child soldiers,
yet the population as a whole has suffered ruinous war, collateral damage, and
the psychological legacy of a country’s descent into the abyss. Matters would
carry sufficient gravity if Sierra Leone were the singular aberration of conflict
in an otherwise tranquil world, but as daily news broadcasts inform us, many
other (particularly poor, under-developed) regions labour under the same
pernicious yoke. What matters in the long term are the measures taken to
eradicate the scourge of seeing children pressed into active military service
and having their young lives blighted as a result.

7. Conclusions
Despite legislation to limit the effects of warfare, and indeed to curb
the destructive tendencies of new generations of weapons, the incidence of
war-related casualties continues to impact on those societies in which they
take place. It seems that, despite Convention after Convention drawn up to
manage conflict, an ‘anything goes’ mentality pervades the thinking of those
who are involved. If aid workers, peacekeepers, religious mediators, human
rights activists and journalists are now ‘legitimate’ targets, should we really be
surprised that children are similarly victimised? In the advanced industrialised
economies of the North, the notion that children should be taking up arms for
whatever cause is surely difficult to countenance. Nonetheless, and recalling
Graeme G Goldsworthy & Frank Faulkner 161
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Machiavelli’s pronouncement about seeing the world as it really is, and not as
we would prefer it to be, the use of young people in war is an unavoidable
fact.
At this point in our history, and with the dubious benefits of
hindsight, it is far from easy to contain the forces at large in various parts of
the world. We seem to have some kind of consensus on the need to ban
landmines, but deployment of these weapons continues untrammelled in
places like Chechnya and Angola. Perhaps the absence of a universal panacea
precludes the urgency of concerted action on the part of the international
community, arguably in recognition that ‘nothing can be done.’ This is an
abandonment of our responsibility to protect the weak and the powerless, the
young, the old and the poor, from the structural violence that characterises
many impoverished parts of the world, where national security is conspicuous
by its absence. The reasons for this parlous state of affairs are legion; poverty
breeds extremism, desperation and hopelessness, and still the children add to
the casualty statistics on a daily basis. It is also time to stop the postcolonial
sackcloth and ashes routine, breast-beating and embarrassment about coming
from a former colonising country. That won’t help. The AIDS plague is not
about the ills of colonialism. This is a new problem; the Child Soldier issue is
merely another manifestation of this reality.
Of course, this does not mean that we should sit idly by and observe
inhumanity unfolding unabated; as to do so is to invite the forces of violence
and destruction to continue wreaking havoc. As developmental aid agencies,
supranational organisations and children’s charities tell us, a greater effort will
be required to bring a final end to underage soldiery. The prognosis remains
far from positive, as the continuing conflicts scattered across the earth inform
us, with no apparent end in sight. What is shown by legislation currently
viable is that world leaders have the right message, but the lack of political
will still condemns many youngsters to an early grave, chronic psychological
distress and dysfunctional behaviour. It is to be hoped that common sense will
prevail, and remedial action will be taken to spare the young from further
conflict.

Notes

* Barry Maguire ‘Eve of Destruction’ EMI records.


i
Chelala, C. ‘The world-wide tragedy of child soldiers.’ The Seattle Times.
(Seattle) 21 March, 2000.
162 “You’re Old Enough to Kill, But too Young for votin’.”
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ii
See Curley, M., Faulkner, F., and Pettiford, L. ‘Does the Security Debate
have to be Presented Polemically? Landmines and the Case for a Micro-
Security Approach.’ Journal of Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement.
8, 3, Autumn 1999, pp 1-21.
iii
It is noted that, despite (presumably) well-meaning pledges by various
bodies and individuals to help fund the campaign to eradicate APMs from the
face of the earth, especially if donors were to bask in the reflected glory of the
Late Diana, Princess of Wales’ involvement, the pledges have apparently been
reneged on since her death, and now obvious non-participation in the future as
a result. See: Sherwin, A. ‘Rich and powerful renege on landmines.’ The
Times. (London) 2 January, 2001, p 9.
iv
Cohn, I. And Goodwin-Gill, G. Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in
Armed Conflict. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p 55.
v
This includes the 1959 UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child, preceded
of course by the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
1949 Geneva Conventions, which are, naturally, more general in character,
and which will be alluded to in due course.
vi
Analysis of this area of study takes us into the realm of regime theory;
regarding multilateralism as an important aspect of this, see, for example, Cox,
R. ‘Reconsiderations’ in R. Cox. Ed. The New Realism: Perspectives on
Multilateralism and World Order. New York: United Nations University
Press, 1997, pp 253; 258-259. See also Krasner, S. D. ‘Power Politics,
Institutions, and Transnational Relations.’ In Risse-Kappen, T. ed. Bringing
Transnational Relations Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995; Krasner, S. D. ed. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornel University
Press, 1983.
vii
Notably the Fourth Convention on the protection of civilians, albeit
somewhat narrowly defined.
viii
See: preamble to United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
recalling the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stating that childhood is ‘
… entitled to special care and attention.’
ix
Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, op. cit., pp 56-57.
x
Faulkner, F. ‘Anti-Personnel Landmines: A Necessary Evil? in International
Relations, XIII, 4, April 1997, p 44.
xi
See: Art. 1 (4) Additional Protocol I. (Additional Protocol II carries a limited
raft of measures to what may be referred to as civil wars, or perhaps low-
intensity conflicts).
Graeme G Goldsworthy & Frank Faulkner 163
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xii
Hamilton, C. and Abu El-Haj, T. Armed Conflict: the Protection of Children
Under International Law. Research Paper, Children’s Legal Centre,
University of Essex, UK, June 2000.
xiii
Ibid., pp 19-20. Most notably, part III refers to the armed forces of a High
Contracting Party engaged in hostilities with Non-Governmental Entities
(NGEs); and part V, that an NGE exercises control over part of said territory.
xiv
Hamilton and Abu El-Haj, op. cit., p 21.
xv
Friends Committee on National Legislation. ‘Children as Soldiers.’ FCNL
Newsletter, Washington, October 1997, p 1.
xvi
Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, op. cit., p 25.
xvii
Cable Network News. Charity decries the use of children in war. CNN
Internet press article, 31 October, 1996. Found at:
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/96/10/31/child.soldiers/
xviii
UNICEF. Children as Soldiers. Position Paper, June 2000, p1.
xix
Ibid., p 1.
xx
Brett, R. ‘Child soldiers.’ in Amnesty International, In the Firing Line: War
and Children’s Rights. London: AI, 1999, p 59.
xxi
Child Protection Committees of Sierra Leone. Position Paper on
psychosocial interventions for children in need of special protection. CPCSL,
March 1998, p 2.
xxii
Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, op. cit., p 42.
xxiii
Save the Children. Children and War. STC, Fact Sheet. October 1996, pp
1-2.
xxiv
Brett, R. op. cit., p 58.
xxv
For a discussion of these and related matters, notably the effect of APMs
on poor communities, see: Faulkner, F. ‘Anti-Personnel Landmines: A
Modern Day Scourge’ New Zealand International Review. XXII, 5, pp 2-7.
xxvi
Graca Machel. ‘Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.’ in Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of Children. New York: United Nations Department
for Policy Co-ordination and Sustainable Development (UNDPCSD), 26
August 1996, p 16.
xxvii
Brett, R. op. cit., p 60. Quoting from Radda Barnen, Children of War. No.
3/98, Stockholm, September 1998.
xxviii
See: Save the Children USA. Situating Deteriorating in Ethiopia -
Vulnerable Children Hit Hardest by Food Crisis. SCUSA Press release, New
York, 5 April, 2000.
xxix
This alludes to the political football kicked to and fro between the three
main political parties in the United Kingdom; it is notable that this issue, with
its wider pan-European connotations emerges from the political undergrowth
164 “You’re Old Enough to Kill, But too Young for votin’.”
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from time to time, for example in the run-up to the expected 2001 General
election.
xxx
See: UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees, 1997-1998. New York:
UNHCR.
xxxi
UNHCR, ibid.
xxxii
This is a quite wide area of academic enquiry; notable texts include:
Ignatieff, M. 1994. Blood and belonging: journey into the new nationalism.
London: Vintage; Krause, J. and Renwick, N. (eds.). 1996. Identities in
International Relations. Basingstoke: Macmillan; Williams, C. and Kofman,
E. (eds.). 1989. Community conflict: partition and nationalism. London:
Routledge. Looking at the question of identity as a primary aspect of this
debate, the following is suggested as a noteworthy appreciation: Huntington,
S. P. 1998. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order.
London: Touchstone.
xxxiii
Graca Machel, op. cit., p 19.
xxxiv
Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, op. cit., p 23.
xxxv
Cable Network News. Charity decries use of children in war. October 31,
1996, p 1. Found at: http://www.cnn.com./WORLD/9610/31child.soldiers/
xxxvi
The Times. Atlas of the World. London: Times books, 1990, p 32.
xxxvii
Center for defense Intelligence. Child Combatants: The Road to
Recovery. September 10, 1998, p 1. (Originally published in Weekly Defense
Monitor, undated.)
xxxviii
Ibid., p 1.
xxxix
United States Department of State. ‘Sierra Leone.’ In USDS Human
Rights Reports, January 30, 1998, p 1.
xl
Ibid., p 1.
xli
Amnesty International USA. No More Dying for Diamonds: Save the
Children of Sierra Leone. New York: AIUSA, undated, p 1.
xlii
Ibid., p 1.
xliii
United Nations Children’s Fund. ‘Children at both ends of a gun.’
UNICEF: Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. New York: UNICEF, 25
January 2001, p 3.
xliv
Child Protection Committee of Sierra Leone. Position paper on
psychosocial interventions for children in need of special protection. March
1998, p 2.
xlv
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 39.
xlvi
Child Protection Committee of Sierra Leone, op cit., pp 3-6.
xlvii
Ibid., p 4.
xlviii
Ibid., p 4.
Graeme G Goldsworthy & Frank Faulkner 165
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xlix
Beasley, R. ‘Hidden Casualties of Conflict’ in Amnesty International, op.
cit., p 36.
l
Child Protection Committee of Sierra Leone, op. cit., pp 5-6.
li
There are now hundreds (if not thousands) of mediation centres practising
around the world. Whilst mediation has been used in various forms in China
for thousands of years, the use of this form of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) only became widely used in the west in the 1960s. It is not the same as
binding rules offered by litigation and arbitration, being as it is of a voluntary
nature.
lii
Child Protection Committee of Sierra Leone, op. cit., p 6.
Part 4:

Violence and Conceptions of Rights


Animal Rights Activism, Marginalization, and Violence

Elisa Aaltola

Although the history of Western philosophy has tended to


marginalize animal ethics, the individual value and rights of animals have
become a prominent and serious moral issue. With the birth of animal ethics,
animal activism has become influential. The value of animals forces not only
ethical, but also political scrutiny, and the activists seek to ensure that the
value is taken seriously on different levels of the society. However, animal
activism is often greeted with criticism. The criticism may rest on ethical
grounds (“animals cannot have rights”), but more commonly rests on the
claim that activists are fanatics, who use violent means to promote their goals.
Emphasizing violence has led to marginalization of animal activism and even
animal rights. Still, the issue is not as clear as it may seem. It can be argued
that animal activism is misrepresented, and violence exaggerated. Ultimately,
claims of violence are part of the struggle over politics of animal rights. This
paper analyzes the arguments presented both by animal activists and their
critics, and investigates the role of violence in debates over activism.

1. From Exclusion to Value


In the past, animals have usually been studied only in reference to
humans and humanity. In order to find out what the latter concepts include, it
has been considered necessary to define animals and animality.1 In this
process, the meaning and value of animals themselves has often been ignored,
and animals have been left outside moral concern as opposites of, or less than,
human beings. Stereotypes of animals as “less” have become dominant, use of
them understood as “natural”, and questioning these elements even absurd.
Western thought has tended to emphasize the so-called categorical argument
as it comes to the value of other animals: there is a differentiating
characteristic x (rationality, language, moral agency, etc.) that categorically
separates humans from other animals and leads to moral hierarchy.
However, the argument is unfounded. The connection between the
characteristic and moral value is usually circular: x is the criterion for moral
value, for only humans have x, and only human beings can have moral value.
The criterion is not applied universally to human beings: the so-called
“marginal cases” that lack the capacity still have moral value. Also, it is not
noticed that many animals actually meet this criterion: recent cognitive
ethology suggests that rationality, moral agency and language are not outside
the reach of animals. Therefore, the presumed difference between humans and
170 Animal Rights Activism, Marginalisation and Violence
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other animals is not of moral relevance, and actually does not exist. Still, the
categorical argument is commonly used against the moral significance of
animals, and such political concepts such as “animal rights”.2 As a last resort,
the violence of animals is used to justify violence toward animals. It is argued
that since animals live “in a state of nature” (to use the Hobbesian term), they
ought to be treated as such. This argument is not adequate. The violence of
those that cannot evaluate violence does not justify violence from those that
can. Here the distinction in animal ethics to “moral agents” and “moral
patients” becomes important: also those that are not moral beings can have
moral value, and ought to be protected from violence.
Next to Thomas Aquinas and Kant, the likes of Lyotard and Levinas
have criticized the individual moral value of animals. Even those most likely
to emphasize respect for difference and the “other” have excluded animals
from the zone of that respect. The reason is that although traditional
subjectivity has been criticized in relation to humans, it still has paradoxically
been required from animals in order for them to matter morally. Language is
seen as the crucial difference. Since animals lack the capacity to phrase, they
do not express their difference, and hence do not have moral value. As Cary
Wolfe says: “We may not be us, but at least we retain the certainty that the
animal remains the animal”.3 Humanism is not difficult to detect.
According to Derrida, postmodern thinking easily assumes there to
be only one, singular, generic animal, from which humans are differentiated.
However, there is no “animal”, but “animals”, and therefore no one difference,
but many. Furthermore, the differences are not of kind, but of degree (he calls
Darwinism a “trauma” for Westerners). Ultimately, humans share much more
with animals than traditionally presumed, and the similarities ought to lead to
respect. (Derrida points out that humans and other animals share also
“finitude” - we are all imperfect, mortal beings - which leads to compassion
toward other animals.4) On the whole, the postmodern understanding of
animals fails for two reasons. First of all, it tends to respect only the difference
of the animal, not the animal herself. Animals exist as difference - the animals
themselves are ignored. Secondly, this repeats the type of humanistic dualism
that postmodernist understandings have sought to criticize. Animals are so
different that we cannot begin to grasp them – the echo of Descartes’s
mechanistic view on animals, and inherent dualism (humans are essentially
different from other animals), is obvious.5
Since the 19th century, and especially the 1970s onwards, a different
approach has slowly become more prominent, as the issues regarding animals
are investigated in their own merit. That is, the moral value of animals needs
to be understood in order to give due respect to the animal herself, not in order
Elisa Aaltola 171
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to recognize the value of humanity. The change of direction has been a result
of other societal and moral changes. As the general climate in relation to
matters such as equality between different classes, sexes, and later the
environment, has altered, the changes in our views toward animals have been
a somewhat logical extension.6 Although still often marginalized, animal
ethics has become a prominent part of academic philosophy, following
especially the works of Peter Singer and Tom Regan. It has shown that
arguments for the individual moral value of animals can be defended, and that
this has strong implications for our use of animals. What is central is not only
that animals have many of the skills traditionally seen as human-only (ranging
from abstract concepts to third order beliefs), but that instead of a linguistic
capacity to make claims regarding value and treatment, what matters is that we
have such claims, whether or not we make them linguistically. The criterion
for having claims is the capacity to experience - experiencing beings have
needs that are of moral importance. Since many animals are such beings, there
is a strong basis for arguing that they need to be brought into morality. That is,
animals have individual moral value.

2. From Value to Politics


Still, there has been a tendency to ignore the meaning of animals in
the political context. Animal advocacy is not seen as a “serious” form of
resistance, the goal of which is to stop the exploitation of morally valuable
beings, but rather as a “personal” matter. Therefore, the treatment of animals
is voluntary and personal, and respectful treatment an element of a virtuous
character and empathy, not something that one would have a strict obligation
to. Most welfare laws and the common use of animals exemplify this position,
as does the stance in much contemporary philosophy. Even if the value of
animals is gaining more attention and approval, there is still a strong tendency
to dismiss the political importance of such value – i.e. to act upon it.
However, the politics of animals does exist. There are political
demands for a change in their treatment. The most obvious connection
between philosophy of value and politics is the concept of “animal rights”.
Even Derrida, who argues that “rights” is a problematic concept, sees animal
rights nonetheless as an important movement. Something has to be done,
activism is needed, if the treatment of animals is to be changed. This is
especially evident given that, 10 billion animals are killed for food each year
in the US alone, and many are reared in utterly appalling conditions. Violence
towards animals begs action.
In the 19th century the emphasis was on animal welfare, which
concentrated on the idea that although animals may be used, there ought to be
172 Animal Rights Activism, Marginalisation and Violence
_______________________________________________________________
restrictions on the way they were used. Already then, but especially since the
1970s, the animal rights movement has argued for abolition of many types of
use. To use a common saying: it is not enough to build bigger cages, but rather
to get rid of the cages altogether. The interests of the animals have to be taken
into account as a whole, and therefore restrictions on only, say, matters
concerning direct pain, are not adequate. There are obvious disagreements
between these movements. Animal welfare tends to view animal rights as
“extreme”. Animal rights, on the other hand, tends to see animal welfare as
“apologist”, and argues that it actually only helps to stabilize and justify the
use of animals rather than lead to change (it is understood, for instance, that
different agents of animal use gain public support from co-operation with
welfare, enabling them to expand the use of animals). Next to animal welfare
and animal rights, a contemporary form of animal advocacy has been new
animal welfare, which combines the two. Both restrictions and abolition ought
to be used in order to better the welfare of animals.7
Beside moral understandings concerning the goal of animal
advocacy, there is also disagreement of method. So-called direct action has
become a steppingstone for animal rights campaigners. Direct action takes two
forms: legal and illegal. Legal direct actions tends to concentrate on
demonstrations, handing out information leaflets, and different types of public
stunts; the illegal direct actions have mainly consisted of matters such as
spray-painting, trespassing, and occasionally criminal damage such as paint
stripping. Many types of actions fall between these categories, such as phone
blockades and home-demonstrations. Groups with specific targets have
formed around direct actions, such as Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty
(SHAC), and SPEAK, directed against Oxford University’s plan for a new
primate lab. A term “animal liberation” is used to describe actions in which
animals are liberated from institutes, and the “animal liberation front” (ALF)
has received much media attention. The most prevalent form of direct action,
which can take on both legal and illegal formats, is hunt sabotage. Animal
welfarism has separated itself from direct action, and a new divide of activism
has been drawn in animal advocacy. The traditional welfarists fall outside the
term “activist”, as it is largely reserved for animal rights advocates. That is,
animal rights campaigners have become “animal activists”.
The animal rights movement has started to actively question the role
of those institutions that decide upon animal use. The questioning concerns
not only the morality of the use, but also the means by which one is entitled to
act. To question the authority of the institutions has led to a backlash. Animal
rights activists have become labelled “extremists”, “militants”, and lately even
“terrorists”.
Elisa Aaltola 173
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3. The Battle Over Authority: Morals and Violence
Animal rights activism has become entangled in a battle over power
with institutions such as the bio-industry and the government, and the
questioning of the legitimacy and authority of these bodies has led to
significant criticism of animal rights movements. The opposing parties fight
over the 1) authority over morals, and 2) authority over means. The battle
itself takes place in two arenas, personal and public. The personal arena
includes individual direct action on one hand, and legal punishments and
changes in legislation on the other. The public arena is formed mainly by the
media.
Like in most power struggles, conceptual means are an important part
of the public arena. The authority of the other party is undermined by
categorizations that involve both moral and factual competence, and the tactics
that are being used. The animal activists term scientists “animal abusers”, and
“liars”8, misguided in their morals and in their factual knowledge of the
benefits of experimentation. The infiltration of laboratories and acquisition of
video footage are used to prove that the promises of high animal welfare
standards are not adhered to.9 The activists also pay attention to the harsh
tactics used by the police, who are argued to use one-sided, offending and at
times also brutal tactics in tackling activism; harsh sentences for convicted
activists are also seen to be politically motivated.10 Economic and political
reasons are seen as motives for animal use. It is suggested that
experimentation is defended because of the financial gains for the
pharmaceutical industry, and the political connections that it possesses.11
The scientists and government officials label activists as “ignorant”,
“violent”, “fundamentalist” and “fanatic”. At worst, the morality is argued to
be abhorrent, as examples such as the “baby or the puppy” are used in order to
show that animal activists are “bestarians” who dislike humanity, and who are
willing to favour other animals at the expense of human beings. It is argued
that all is done to ensure animal welfare, and that the legislation is “the most
strict” in the world. A very recent example is found in the Home Office report
of July, 2004, “Animal Welfare - Human Rights: Protecting People from
Animal Rights Extremists”. In it, the strictness of regulation is emphasized.
Furthermore, the scientific merit and benefit of experimentation is greatly
underlined, and is espoused as the basis of any medical advances. At the same
time, the arguments of animal activists are dismissed as “myths” and
“propaganda”.12 The battle over the “truth” is obvious, as it is argued that the
government has the “objective and accurate information” concerning
experimentation. Therefore, the institutions claim authority over both morals
and facts.
174 Animal Rights Activism, Marginalisation and Violence
_______________________________________________________________
Animal rights ideals are marginalized as “fundamentalist”, and as
being based on propaganda. More importantly, the means of animal activists
are claimed to be utterly violent. Activism is described by the government as
“extremist”, and as such “despicable”, and it is argued that “explosives” and
“serious assaults” are common-place. The term “terrorism” is used, as it is
claimed the activists are “organized in a quasi-terrorist cellular structure
across the country”, and that activists should not be “surprised to find
themselves treated as terrorists”. Therefore, there is a strong implication that
activists indeed cause severe bodily harm to human beings, and that such harm
is frequent and the goal of action. Activists are even defined as the “main
source of violence” in the U.K.13 When it comes to the motives of behaviour,
the importance of morals is strongly rejected. The moral claims of the
movement are often contested as sentimental and explained through cultural
reasons (such as “distance from nature”), and as such they are pushed outside
the term “morality”. They are also, as the report suggests, defined as
“ideological”, and hence excluded from actual moral debate - activism is
simply explained as “fanatic” and “fundamental”, without going into the moral
arguments it offers.
A significant part of the public struggle is the emphasis on the
welfare movement. For instance, in the government report welfarism is
thanked for its efforts, and the RSPCA is described as a “legitimate and well-
respected group”. A standard method of exclusion is taking place: a tamed,
moderate and non-threatening version is adopted, whilst independent
resistance is marginalized. Supposed violent tactics are used as the reason to
marginalize activists from debate. Claimed violence has led to a situation,
where animal rights are often silenced – “violencing” equals “silencing”. As
Steve Best claims: “All the government has to do to legitimate its crackdown
on dissent is to define an individual or group as ‘terrorist’, and the repression
follows as if a fait accompli”.14 Unfortunately, the media have largely
accepted the stance against animal activists without reflection or criticism, and
the government report has been mainly cited and represented in the press,
rather than analyzed.15 Even in the more analytical pieces, stereotypes of
violence persist, and animal activists are defined as a “handful of thugs”.16 In
effect, morals and facts are placed outside the reach of animal rights, and the
tactics of the movement are described as utterly aggressive. The critical voice,
therefore, is stripped of content, and described as blind resistance or simply
hostile towards society.
However, criticism against animal rights is often weak. Firstly,
regard to animals is not purely sentimental but has a rational basis; human
beings do not “own” given mental capacities, and hence we may point toward
Elisa Aaltola 175
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similarities between humans and other animals without claiming animals to be
“little people”; and moral regard to animals does not lead to hatred or
overlooking of humans, unless a dualistic, either-or perspective (such as
anthropocentrism) is adopted. Secondly, claims of fundamentalism and
ideology distract from the moral debate: “ideology” is used to take away
emphasis from morals, as moral argument becomes mere ideological
blindness. However, ‘animal rights’ is not an ideology in the sense that it
consists of a closed set of basic beliefs. Rather, it is founded upon beliefs that
are argued for, and these are open to debate. Obviously, the arguments are
usually dismissed, as the emphasis lies in the tactics - presumed violence leads
to the overlooking of ethics, which again leads to claims that there are no
ethics, merely ideology.
In the private arena, actions can be quite different from the claims of
the media. The activists rely on much scientific data on experimentation, and
the legitimacy of experimentation as a scientific method has become a target
of skepticism.17 However, the scientific arguments are often over-looked
without debate. Scientists and the government rarely engage in a conversation
about the accuracy of their optimistic claims, even in the face of severe
criticism from respectable scientists.18 Reluctance toward debate has been
strong enough to influence (i.e. hinder) the acquisition of research funding in
order to investigate the efficacy of experimentation,19 and has even led to the
denial of entrance into the U.K. for a prominent scientific critic (an ex-
experimenter himself)20. Matters over the regulation of experiments are
exaggerated. Factual footage gained from laboratories rarely leads to changes,
and is repeatedly ignored, despite the fact that the contents may well show
illegal use of animals.
At the same time, the tactics have not been quite as violent as
claimed. On the illegal side, illegal demonstrations, spray-painting, and certain
types of phone blockades remain the most common methods. Physical assaults
have been extremely rare, and the total of severe bodily harm is zero. In fact,
part of animal rights morality is respect to any individual’s basic welfare
(animal or human). In short, the basic argument in animal activism is that it
seeks to fight violence toward animals by means that are non-violent toward
human beings. The difference is argued to be clear, and to carry strong moral
implications: “Documenting animal torture in a slaughterhouse is terrorism,
but beating and killing them in unspeakably vicious ways is free enterprise…
it is the height of perversity to brand activists rather than animal exploitation
industries as the ethical misfits”.21
In fact, for the institutions in power, tactics may be quite different.
With regard to the police, bullying and even brutality have been recorded.
176 Animal Rights Activism, Marginalisation and Violence
_______________________________________________________________
Activists are frequently stopped, home-searched, arrested, and interrogated on
dubious grounds, and their physical handling by the police may be severe. The
activists also commonly suffer violence from the public in situations such as
demonstrations, and, for instance, by thugs hired by foxhunters.22 Severe
physical disabilities as a result are not uncommon, and there have been
numerous deaths. Police investigations to these matters are not always prompt,
and sentencing can be very lean. In effect, actual bodily violence from
activists is non-existent, while bodily violence towards them is frequent.
However, little attention is given to this, as the public sphere continues to
emphasize the violence of activists. In the year 2000, UK activists organized a
press conference with the title “Violence & the Animal Rights Movement”,
and gained huge attendance from media expecting to hear about activist
violence. When they offered a booklet with detailed descriptions of violence
toward activists, media attention ceased rapidly.
Meanwhile, the government seeks to toughen up legislation on
activism, claiming in its report: “the strategy… is simple: it is to stop the
extremists”. The right to demonstrate will be restricted, and, for instance,
“public assembly” will consist of 2 rather than 20 persons. It will be
recommended that activism be an aggravating factor in sentencing, leading to
even tougher punishments. Placing activists into the category of terrorism, an
act that will require “widening the definition of terrorism” (as the government
admits)23 will provide authority for arrests and sentencing responses that
would otherwise have been impossible. Creating an “anti” gives the
government an opportunity to crack down on moral and factual criticism of
animal use.

4. Marginalization of Violence vs. Democratic Debate


Further marginalization leads to further seclusion. More importantly,
however, the goals of democracy are not adhered to, in two different ways.
Firstly, the new legislation will alter the right to demonstrate and will make
other forms of protest more difficult. Freedom of speech in this situation is
under threat. Secondly, the lack of serious and open public debate means that
the use of animals is decided not by the public, but the institutions that benefit
from such use. The pharmaceutical industry and the government, the parties
financially benefiting from experimentation, claim to be the authorities on
matters such as morality. After offering moral and scientific reasons for acting
against activists in its report, the government briefly mentions a substantial
reason for its views: “Bioscience… makes a massive contribution to our
economy and prosperity. The UK bioscience is the second biggest in the
world… we are the world’s largest exporter of pharmaceuticals - a trade worth
Elisa Aaltola 177
_______________________________________________________________
nearly 12 billion pounds last year”. The connection between the state and the
industry is obvious, as the former lobbies for and protects the latter. With such
high economic motives, there is a temptation to avoid free and open moral
debate, and silence the opposition through public and legislative means.
A dangerous example is to be found in the USA, where legislation
has become increasingly harsh on animal activists (e.g. see new legislation
such as the “Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act” and the “Patriot Act”).
Animal activists are considered “domestic terrorists”, and penalties have
increased greatly. For example, either giving material support or concealing an
activist carries the possibility of ten to fifteen years in prison. Could a
donation to PETA lead to a 15-year prison sentence? Patriot Act II would
enable numerous new death penalty categories for “terrorism”. This is in
addition to providing authorization for secret arrests, the cancellation of
citizenship, and deportation. “Terrorism” is a very loose term, and is used in
some suggestions in relation to simply leafleting a circus, or secretly
photographing the use of animals.24 It is imperative that this situation be
avoided in the UK, and in Europe as a whole. This calls for a broader
discussion and study of: 1) the value and use of animals; and 2) the
relationships between activism, state, legislation, and the pharmaceutical
industry. In the current situation, we ought to be careful to notice exactly what
is being called “extreme” and “terrorist”, and the reasons why.

Notes
1
Paul Clarke & Andrew Linzey, Political Theory and Animal Rights (London:
Pluto Press, 1990); Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing
Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (London: Penguin Books, 1983).
2
Carl Cohen, “In Defence of the Use of Animals,” in The Animal Rights Debate,
eds. Carl Cohen & Tom Regan (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001).
3
Cary Wolfe, “In the Shadow of Wittgenstein’s Lion: Language, Ethics, and
the Question of the Animal”‚ in Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal, ed.
Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 17-19.
4
Jacques Derrida, “And Say the Animal Responded?” in Zoontologies: The
Question of the Animal, ed. Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2003).
5
Elisa Aaltola, “Other Animal Ethics and the Demand for Difference,”
Environmental Values 11 (2002): 193-209.
178 Animal Rights Activism, Marginalisation and Violence
_______________________________________________________________
6
Thomas (note 1); Hilda Kean, Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in
Britain Since 1800 (London: Reaktion Books, 1983).
7
On history, see: Kean (note 6); Andreas-Holger Maehle & Ulrich Tröchler,
“Animal Exprimentation from Antiquity to the End of the Eighteenth Century:
Attitudes and Arguments,” in Vivisection in Historical Perspective, ed.
Nicolaas Rupke (London: Routledge, 1987). On the distinction and politics,
see Gary Francione, Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights
Movement. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996).
8
See, for instance, SHAC at http://www.shac.net/
9
See also BUAV at http://www.buav.org/f_home.html
10
See ALF support group at http://.www.alfsg.org.uk/index2.html. The roles
played by politicians are not forgotten, and Tony Blair is criticized. After
emphasizing in his election campaign that animal welfare would be given
priority and experimentation reviewed, the opposite has happened as the Prime
Minister has taken an active role in endorsing experimentation. The ban on fox
hunting has been prolonged). See the 1997 pre-election manifesto, “New
Labour, New Life for Animals”.
11
See C. Greek & J. Greek J. Scared Cows and Golden Geese: The Human
Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000); Physicians
Committee for Responsible Medicine at http://www.pcrm.org/
12
See also Adrian Morrison, “Understanding the Effects of Animal Rights
Activism on Biomedical Research”, Actas De Fisiologia (2002): 9-22;
Foundation for Biomedical Research at http://www.fbresearch.org/animal-
activism/.
13
Steven Best, “It is War! The Escalating Battle Between Activists and the
Corporate-State Complex”, in Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on
the Liberation of Animals, eds. Steven Best & Anthony J. Nocella (New York:
Lantern Books, 2004), 3. See also Americans for Medical Progress at
http://amprogress.org, which cites FBI statements suggesting that advocacy is
a major terrorist threat; and Guardian 28/01/04, in which a news story, a
column, and an editorial emphasized the violent nature of animal rights
movements; see also Times 28/01/04.
14
Best, 12.
15
For an example, see Owen Bowcott, “Tight rein on animal rights planned,”
Guardian, 31st July 2004.
16
Johann Hari, “How I changed my mind on animal rights: Peter Singer has a
point”, at http://www.johannhari.com/archive/article.php?id=427.
17
See, for instance, Hugh LaFollette & Niall Shanks, Brute Science:
Dilemmas in Animal Experimentation (London: Routledge, 1996); Greek &
Greek [see note 11]; Eric Millstone, “Methods and Practices of Animal
Elisa Aaltola 179
_______________________________________________________________
Experimentation,” in Animal Experimentation: The Consensus Changes, ed.
Gill Langley (London: MacMillan Press, 1989).
18
One recent example is a research paper by prominent scientists which raises
questions about the efficacy of animal experimentation: Pandora Pound, Shah
Ebrahim, Peter Sandercock, Michael B. Bracken, and Ian Roberts, “Where is
the Evidence That Animal Research Benefits Humans?”, British Medical
Journal 328 (2004): 514-517.
19
See, for instance, the difficulties faced by the authors of the previous paper
(note 18).
20
Dr Jerry Vlasak was not let into Britain in July 2004 to take part in an
international animal rights gathering.
21
Best 8, 24. Perhaps rather surprisingly, similar remarks have lately been
made by Jacques Derrida. See Wolfe (note 3).
22
See www.violenceinanimalrights.co.uk
23
On the other hand, in the UK in 2004, violent pro-hunt demonstrators have
not been labelled as “terrorists”. Nor, at times, have they even been described
as violent.
24
Best.
The Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain1

Javier Jordan
Nicola Horsburgh
On 11 March 2004, the detonation of ten bombs on four Cercanias
trains in Madrid claimed the lives of 191 people and injured over 1400.
Initially, most Spanish analysts attributed the attack to ETA. However, it soon
emerged that the attack was the work of a radical Jihadist network linked to Al
Qaeda. This chapter will attempt to provide some understanding of the Jihadist
subculture of terrorism in Spain. Several questions will be addressed. When
and how did Jihadist terrorist networks emerge in Spain? How are they
organised? What relationship, if any, do they share with Islamic communities
in Spain? What are the profiles of members? Moreover, what tasks do they
fulfil? The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will provide
some background to Islamic terrorism in Spain. The second section will
explore the roles and functions of group members. The third section, and focus
of the paper, will analyse the development, structure and members of the
Jihadist subculture in Spain.

1. The Emergence of Jihadist Networks in Spain


There are numerous Islamic networks at play in Spain. Together they
underpin the Jihadist grand network in Spain. This grand network is part of the
global grand network that is Al Qaeda. Networks do not necessarily conduct
overt terrorist activity. Indeed, one could distinguish between ‘terrorist
networks’ and ‘support networks’. The former are engaged actively with the
grand network. The latter abstain from the use of violence. The three main
networks in Spain are Syrian, Algerian and Moroccan. The term grand
network is borrowed from the Spanish experience in the struggle against ETA.
It refers to the grouping of individuals and organisations that undertake
activities to sustain, practise or extend the armed struggle by an extremist
vision of Islam. The term ‘global Jihadism’ (hereafter abbreviated as
Jihadism) implies that the use of violence is sanctioned by religion. Jihadis
consider it a religious duty to defend the community of believers and eradicate
impiety in the world. The term ‘global’ refers to the enormous diffusion and
outreach of radical interpretations of the Jihad, and the existence of
commonality between different groups that practise it.
A. The Syrian Network
In 1994, the information services of the Spanish police were
monitoring radical groups in Madrid denominated originally as the Islamic
182 The Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain
_______________________________________________________________
Alliance and then the Soldiers of Ala. The group was ‘liberated’ by the
Palestinian Anwar Adnan Mohamed Salah, known as the ‘Chej Salah’, and
most members were of Syrian origin. In 1982, the Hafez el-Assad regime
harshly reprimanded Islamists and many sought refuge in Jordan, Afghanistan
and Saudi Arabia. Others relocated to Europe and some settled in Spain.
Radical ideas and links to other ‘brothers’ in the United States, Europe and the
Middle East remained. Chej Salah played a crucial role in grouping together
those that lived in Madrid to carry out activities related to the global Jihad.
Chej Salah also attempted, without much success, to take control of the
Madrid mosque Abu Bakr, controlled by the moderate Syrian Muslim
Brothers. In November 1995, Chej Salah informed his group that he would
make a short visit to Granada, southern Spain. That was not his real plan and
shortly afterwards he resurfaced in Pakistan2. Since 1995, a Syrian known as
Imad Eddin Baraliast Yarkas, alias ‘Abu Dahdah’, was head of the Al Qaeda
network in Spain. In November 2001, Abu Dahdah was arrested together with
ten other members of his group in Madrid and Granada.

B. GSPC network
A second major network in Spain is largely composed of Algerians.
This network is part of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafista
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The GSPC is a division of the GIA
that was promoted by Osama Bin Laden in 1997, and actually represents a
greater security threat to the Algerian regime than the GIA3. The GSPC forms
part of the Al Qaeda alliance. The radical Algerian network became installed
in Spain in the 1990s, particularly in the east. The first interception and
destruction of a network took place in 1997, when police arrested 15 Algerians
related to the GIA in Valencia and Barcelona. Their roles were typical of
support networks: petty crimes provided finance, and arms and dual use
equipment were sent to Algeria4. The GSPC network in Spain cooperated with
the Abu Dahdah network on specific tasks and might also have maintained
relationships with other minority groups present in Spain. However, there is
no evidence of cooperation between the Moroccan network and the Algerian
network in Spain.

C. The Moroccan Network


Radical Moroccans linked to the ideological movement led by Salafia
Yihadia in Morocco and with connections to the Moroccan Combatant Islamic
Group also have a significant presence in Spain. This group prepared and
executed the attacks on Madrid. Several members have been active or
maintained relations with the Abu Dahdah network, but there exists no
Javier Jordan & Nicola Horsburgh 183
_______________________________________________________________
evidence of links to other Jihadist networks in Spain (although this is also
possible). Important members are Serhane Ben Abdelmajid alias ‘the
Tunisian’, head of the terrorist operation; Jamal Zougam, who recruited the
members of the cell and possibly deposited some of the bombs on the trains;
Amer Azizi, apparently a senior figure representing Al Qaeda in Europe; and
Rabei Osman El Sayed Ahmed, alias Mohamed ‘the Egyptian’, considered the
brain behind the attack, arrested in Milan in June 2004.
D. Others
Elements of Ennahda, Hamas and Hizbollah are present in Spain.
They maintain ideological connections with respective groups, but scarce
operational involvement. Abu Dahdah’s network cooperated on a limited basis
with some members of these groups5.

2. Roles and Functions: Processes That Make the Networks Work


A. Propaganda
Al Qaeda’s first activities in Spain were propaganda related. Jihadists
attempted to extend the circle of sympathisers and secure material support.
Posters, magazines, pamphlets and photocopies of communiqués by Bin
Laden were distributed in several mosques around Madrid, without the
consent of the imam. Videos on the Jihad were also shown in small prayer
rooms or in homes6. Propaganda videos strengthen and legitimise the cause by
demonstrating the military superiority of the United States and its allies versus
the suffering of Muslim women and children in scenes of combat filmed by
the Mujahaddin. In a phone conversation intercepted by the police between
members of the Abu Dahdah network, it is recorded that, after the showing of
one of these videos to a group of young people, one commented that it was
worth more than a thousand sermons7.
A key figure in the propaganda endeavour was Abu Omar, alias ‘Abu
Qatada’, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin. A principal visionary of the global
Jihad in Europe, he is author of the infamous “Articles between two
Doctrines”, in which one of the clearest explanations of the global Jihad is
outlined8. Although the British police arrested Abu Qatada in 2002, he
continues to exert important influence among European Jihadists. On the day
of the collective suicide by the seven terrorists that executed the attacks on
Madrid, the head of that cell, ‘the Tunisian’, phoned Abu Qatada for his
approval and blessing of the subsequent action. (They took their lives by
detonating explosives in a flat besieged by police. See 2. E, below.)

B. Logistics and Finance


Logistics have consisted in material support to the Jihad abroad. In this
184 The Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain
_______________________________________________________________
way, Jihadis feel active members of the resistance community. Support comes
in various guises: finance, passport falsification, refuge, dual use equipment
for use in Chechnya and Algeria, links to Jihadist networks outside Spain and
locations for new training camps. The attainment of funds is usually via illicit
means. Abu Dahdah’s network was engaged in robbery in shopping centres
and credit card fraud. For the members of the networks, these illicit activities
are admissible on a religious level if they promote the Jihad cause.

C. Auxiliary Support
The Abu Dahdah network obtained visas for persecuted activists in
other countries and work contracts and residence permits for former
Mujahaddin thanks to a construction company owned by Abu Talha.
Temporary accommodation was also provided for combatants. Occasionally,
GSPC cells sheltered Algerian commandos. The linkage of information, via
frequent visits abroad to other members of the grand network, was another
activity carried out by Jihadists. According to the police, these visits were
used to maintain contact with various points of the network and to interchange
experiences and instructions. Ghasoub Al-Abrash, a member of the Abu
Dahdah network, travelled to the United States in 1997. There he filmed the
World Trade Center in New York, the Golden Gate in San Francisco (paying
particular attention to suspension pillars), the Brooklyn Bridge, the Statue of
Liberty, the Sears Towers in Chicago, and Disneyland and Universal Studios
in California9.

D. Recruitment
The recruitment of volunteers to receive training in Afghanistan or
fight on Jihad fronts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria and Indonesia is another
crucial activity carried out by Jihadists10. The presence of Islamic
communities in Spain is instrumental to recruitment. Police recordings of
conversations between members of the Abu Dahdah network suggest that the
mosque is not only a centre for worship but also a meeting place for some
members and potential recruits11. Serhane ‘the Tunisian’ and Jamal Zougam
also frequented prayer rooms in Madrid searching for candidates. The
recruitment of converts (non Muslims) is practically non-existent. The
Spaniard José Luis Galán, alias ‘Yusuf Galán’, is the most well known
exception. In general, Jihadis are reluctant to trust converts.
In the past two years, the police information services have detected
the presence of wahhabi preachers of Moroccan origin assuming control of
mosques. In Cataluña, fifteen prayer rooms have been identified as having this
orientation12. These preachers motivate followers to isolate themselves in the
Javier Jordan & Nicola Horsburgh 185
_______________________________________________________________
community, immerse themselves in religion and condemn any form of
integration into Spanish society. According to the Association of Moroccan
Immigrant Workers (Asociación de Trabajadores Inmigrantes Marroquíes) in
Spain, a reputable representative of Moroccans, most preachers are
wahhabies13.

E. Terrorist Violence: Attacks on Spain


Prior to Madrid, Jihadist networks in Algeria and Morocco had killed
Spanish citizens. Two Spanish tourists died in Marrakech in 1994, in an attack
by Moroccan networks established in Europe. Four Spanish died in the suicide
attacks of Casablanca. However, the attack in Madrid constitutes an
unprecedented act. Had the trains not been delayed, the explosion would have
taken place inside Atocha train station. This could have provoked the collapse
of its structure and harmed many more people. After the attack, the principle
nucleus of the network remained operational and three weeks later a bomb
was placed on the railway line of the fast train between Madrid and Seville.
Fortunately, it was discovered by a rail worker and did not explode14. The
following day, the police located the integral members of the network in an
apartment in Leganés, a town near Madrid. After a shoot-out and hours under
siege, the terrorists ignited an explosive charge which took their lives and that
of a special operations police agent15. Following the collective suicide, more
explosives were found along with plans for massive attacks against a
commercial centre and a Jewish establishment in Madrid16. Several days later,
some unknown individuals desecrated the tomb of the dead agent. According
to police sources from the Home Office, this could have been an act of
revenge on behalf of radical Islamists17.

3. Profile, Organisation, Hierarchy and the Jihadist subculture


A. Member Profiles and the Organizational Model of Jihadist Networks
One cannot establish a fixed profile of the Jihadist in Spain.
Structurally, within networks there are numerous levels. To aid understanding,
the concept of concentric circles is offered. In the first concentric circle, senior
members can be found; their role is primarily related to coordination among
networks or finance. Membership of this circle is small. These individuals
have an almost exclusive dedication to the Jihadist cause. Some make several
trips abroad and have relationships with other senior level members of Al
Qaeda’s global grand network. The average age (between 30-40 years) of
these participants is greater than that of lower level members. They also have
a higher level of religious instruction and are usually better educated. For
example, Serhane ‘the Tunisian’ obtained a doctorate in Economics at the
186 The Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain
_______________________________________________________________
Autonoma University of Madrid18.
In the second circle we find individuals who are engaged in the cause
but have a lower level of operational involvement. Members at this level
represent the confidants of those in the first circle. Many share old relations
with other members and some have passed through foreign training camps or
were Mujahaddin in Bosnia and Chechnya. These experiences instil a sense of
trust within the network. In Spain, many of these individuals are in
professional (generally non-academic) employment, which provides sufficient
financial means for themselves and their families. Sometimes, these jobs are
of benefit to the network. Most second circle members are married to Spanish
women and have become Spanish citizens. They lead apparently normal lives
and arrest usually comes as a surprise to neighbours19.
In the third concentric circle, members on the periphery of the
network sympathize with the Jihad but maintain an informal relationship with
members more immersed in a network. They lead normal lives and carry out
very specific tasks: the provision of temporary accommodation and residence
papers and the delivery of propaganda or money. Eventually, some are sent
abroad to receive religious and combat training or fight in the Jihad. The level
of education varies. They are usually young (in their twenties) and single20.
Beyond and exterior to the network, but still linked to it, are
individuals that carry out activities of interest to a network like the
falsification of ID and sale of explosives. For ordinary tasks, the network
generally relies on Maghrebian delinquents21. Third level members usually
maintain relationships with those of the second concentric circle. Preachers
could also be included in this external circle, because although they do not
carry out direct propaganda for Al Qaeda, they promote doctrines that favour
the auto-segregation of Muslims and employ the same distinctive anti-western
discourse. This type of sermonising indirectly favours and supports the
capacity of the Jihadist movement to mobilize and prepare terrain for
recruitment.

B. Hierarchy and Decentralisation in the Jihadist Grand Network


Although the grand network is decentralized at the global level,
elements of hierarchy do exist at the sub-level. However, this is not a rigid
hierarchy. There are numerous contacts and agreements between members on
the same level, but they work under the co-ordination of the leader at the sub-
level. For example, in the Syrian network, Abu Dahdah was both spiritual and
organisational leader to his network. Within the network, there were deputies
like Amer Azizi, who co-ordinated the Moroccans, or the Al-Jazeera
journalist, Taysir Alouni, presumably the leader of a group of youngsters in
Javier Jordan & Nicola Horsburgh 187
_______________________________________________________________
Granada22. The Granada group also depended on Abu Dahdah, who lived in
Madrid. Members of the first and second circle maintained relations similar to
other Jihadist networks in Spain and abroad. The proliferation of contacts and
informal links creates the dense spider web that is the global Jihad.
The structural model of the more dormant ‘sleeper’ networks has
both advantages and disadvantages for the Jihadists. An advantage is the
enormous difficulty security agencies face in infiltrating the centre to obtain
quality intelligence. One disadvantage is that exterior circles are vulnerable to
infiltration and detection. From these circles, it is possible to ascertain who
inhabits the inner circles. This explains the relative ease with which the
Jihadist networks in Spain have been disabled. Once the police operation is
underway, a large number of members have been arrested. The vulnerability
of the sleeper networks lies in the fact that they require the network to be open
to the outside and they count on a large exterior circle to carry out their
activities. The more active networks, also called ‘hit squads’, do not have that
requirement, as there are normally sleeper networks to provide them with
minimum contact and support.

C. Value Systems and the ‘Subculture’ in a Jihadist Network


Another important aspect of the organisational dynamic of Al Qaeda is
the construction of a Jihadist subculture. This is used to captivate new recruits
and to maintain members. The concept of a subculture refers to the normative
system of a minority social group. This implies that within a subculture, a
different set of social values exists, but crucially, these are part of a wider
central system of values22. Persons immersed in this subculture contemplate
the world from a different perspective to other social members. This cognitive
dissonance is accepted and justified by the internal coherence of the arguments
and interaction with other members of the group.
The matrix introduced by Marvin Wolfgang to define a subculture
provides insights that are useful here. Group values in a subculture are distant
yet connected to a central value system. If these values were completely
contrary to the system, the culture would become a “counter culture”. It is not
an exaggeration to assert that the Jihadist vision clashes head on with Western
social values and, for this reason, the grand network could be considered a
counterculture. If we avoid comparing the subculture to wider Western
society, but instead compare it to value systems within Islamic communities
and movements, it is possible to assign the category of a subculture (beyond
the acceptance of violence in that value system).
The Jihadist subculture/counterculture feeds on family ties, friendships,
training camp experiences, armed Jihad fighting, propaganda and clandestine
188 The Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain
_______________________________________________________________
operations. Through affective ties and a community of ideas, a spirit of
brotherhood is generated. This brotherhood explains why some individuals
with a residence permit and employment -a good situation for an immigrant-
become radical Islamic militants.
The emergence of this subculture is facilitated by the process of
socialization in radical Islamism that some have experienced since childhood.
The values incorporated by the individual during the process of temporary
socialization later influence the way in which that person judges reality23. It is
therefore interesting to highlight the agents that have intervened in the process
of socialization, thus generating a system of beliefs that can justify the
assassination of innocents24. The classic agents of socialization are the family,
friends, school, religious organisations and the media. Many of these agents
are present in this case study.
Many of the members of the Jihadist network in Spain had already
participated in activities within Islamic circles, some in their country of origin,
others in Spain. This characteristic facilitated the emergence of a subculture.
The Abu Dahdah network was composed by an important number of Syrians
that had already become militants in Talia al-Mukatila, the armed branch of
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood25. Most had been involved with the
Brotherhood since they were adolescents. They lived in accommodation
provided by the organisation and participated in activities organised by the
Brotherhood26.
Once settled in Spain, many married Spanish women. The women
were typically attracted to the Arab world and in most cases, converted to
Islam. This decision often resulted in disassociation from the maternal family.
Usually, children from these marriages are educated in special Arab and
Muslim schools. It is possible that the parents have transmitted their own
radical ideas to their children. In searched homes, police have found Wahhabi
propaganda for children27. The circle of friends is restricted to people with
similar ideas, members of the subculture and moderate Muslims. The
relationship to neighbours and work colleagues is polite but minimal. Within
the network, meetings in mosques and daily telephone conversations are very
common. At the weekends, families usually get together. Apart from
friendships, parental links sometimes exist and marriages to Muslim women
are arranged28.
Propaganda, via video, books, periodicals and the news consulted in
Jihadist web-pages also helped maintain a collective identity within the group
and with other members of the grand network. In his analysis on the “era of
information”, Manuel Castells explains that many individuals witness the
unravelling of traditional identities in the globalized world, where the
Javier Jordan & Nicola Horsburgh 189
_______________________________________________________________
predominant social and economic model is considered to be profoundly
marked by individualism. To protect themselves from these effects, some
individuals are drawn to an identity oasis that is based on ethics, religion,
gender and other non-material values (like the defence of the environment and
solidarity). Castells warns that in some cases these identities can be converted
into “resistance identities”; in other words, identities,

generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions


devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination,
thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the
basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those
permeating the institutions of society” 29.

According to this theory, one could consider a Jihadist network as an identity


oasis, based on a resistance identity rooted in radical Islamic belief.
In concrete cases, the process of socialisation has been even more
intensive. Some received training in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and
Indonesia30. Most came from Bosnia, given the ending of the hostilities there
and the closure of training camps in 1995. That experience profoundly
submerged them into the Jihadist subculture and established a sense of being
‘blood brothers’. Former Mujahaddin maintain this spirit by organising
excursions and weekend breaks outside Madrid. Arab sympathisers also attend
these breaks31.
According to the general value system that is used for reference, it
could be argued that the Jihadist subculture/counterculture facilitates a process
that flows from socialisation: the rationalisation of violence. One could call
this a negative rationalisation. Once wound into and captivated by the
ideological argument described in the first section, the members of the
subculture come to see themselves as combatants in a defensive war. They
come to consider their actions as justifiable and rational. This squaring of self-
image is critical since it placates individual consciousness of any prior
conflicting value system, surrendering the individual to a collective resistance
identity.32 In interviews with members of the Red Brigades and factions of the
Red Army, Donatella de la Porta33 observes that the members of these groups
see themselves as a community of heroes, fighting against evil. Global
Jihadism transmits a similar message to its followers. This image distortion
and value reconstruction also strengthens the religious argument interlinked to
Al Qaeda and the sense of upholding tradition anchored in historic Islamic
roots. For example, the Mujahaddin believe that they share the same identity
as their pious predecessors in the early days of Islam.
190 The Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain
_______________________________________________________________
A final issue related to the emergence of a subculture is the relationship
to the outside. Jerrold Post34 warned of a significant difference between
separatist-nationalist groups and anarchist-ideological terror groups (like left-
wing European groups). While members of the separatist groups were well
known in communities, and made contact with friends and family outside the
group, anti-system groups severed ties with family and friends. These groups
demand full immersion and dissociation from one’s past life. Evidently, the
particular dynamic of the latter group isolates them further into a distinct -and
arguably distorted- reality. Following on from this, what group dynamic
characterises networks in the West?
The Spanish experience is such that these groups adopt a strategy
similar to that of the nationalist-separatist, though there are differences. The
‘support community’ is more restricted and the ‘relation community’ (friends
and family) might not be aware of the clandestine activities of certain
members. This ‘relation community’ is set apart from the rest of society. This
is because of its ethnic character (it is composed mainly of immigrants) and
religious differences (attracting Muslims from different countries). On the
other hand, because most Jihadis in Europe have a profession outside a
network to sustain themselves financially, they also interact with non-
Muslims. However, the level of friendship and confidence shared between
Jihadis and non-Muslims is not the same as between Muslims. As a
consequence, the dynamic grouping of Jihadis leads them to maintain a
relationship with the Muslim micro-society in Spain and maintain weak ties
with the rest of society.
In conclusion, Islamic communities in the West are of great importance
to Jihadists. Radicals instrumentalise the presence of Muslims in order to pass
unnoticed and carry out support activities. It is thus essential that Al Qaeda
does not gain support among moderate Muslims. Those responsible for
Islamic communities have religious authority to spread the idea that Jihadism
violates the basic precepts of Islam.
A crucial lesson learned by the Jihadist grand network in Spain is that
these groups create subcultures to captivate new members and secure the
perseverance of militants. Within these subcultures, all the members are in
close and frequent contact. This dynamic maintains the spirit of the group but
it is also a great weakness. If the intelligence services were able to infiltrate
such a subculture, even the exterior circles, the security of the entire network
could be compromised. Therefore, infiltration via young immigrants
collaborating with the security agencies is a realistic objective and likely to
prove enormously effective.
Public policy and social tolerance towards the integration of
Javier Jordan & Nicola Horsburgh 191
_______________________________________________________________
immigrants is critical. Marginal and isolated Islamic communities favour
frustration and anti-social conduct, attitudes that can be exploited by radical
groups. This process should be avoided via a politics of integration. It should
be noted that first generation immigrants carried out the attacks on Madrid.
The attacks on Madrid thus represent only the beginning of Jihadist terror that
Spain is likely to face should the process of integration fail and a second
generation of terrorists emerge.

Notes
1
This paper is based on a study that is part of a project entitled
Communicative Action and Political Communication in the Terrorist
Phenomenon: Strategies to Reduce Support for the Violent. The project is
financed by the University Institute, “General Gutiérrez Mellado”, in Spain.
2
Interview by one of the authors with members of the Exterior Information
Unit of the National Police, Madrid, Spain, January 2004.
3
Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, (London:
Hurst, 2002), 124.
4
Oficina de Relaciones Informativas y Sociales. Ministerio del Interior
Balance de las Fuerzas de Seguridad del Estado 1997 (Office of Information
and Social Relations. Home Office. Balance of State Security Forces 1997).
<http://www.mir.es/oris/docus/balan97/index.htm>
5
Interview by one of the authors with a Spanish Intelligence official,
December 2003 in Spain.
6
National Audience, Indictment of Al-Qaida Cells in Spain, Summary 35/01,
Central Court of Instruction, Number Five, Madrid, 2003, 59-60
7
Ibid, 585.
8
Reuven Paz, "Middle East Islamism in the European Arena", Middle East
Review of International Affairs, 10 (2002): 65-76.
9
Ibid, 160-163.
10
Oficina de Relaciones Informativas y Sociales del Ministerio del Interior,
Nota de Prensa (Office of Information and Social relations, Home Office,
Press Note), 13 November 2001.
11
Joan Lacomba, El Islam inmigrado. Transformaciones y adaptaciones de
las prácticas culturales y religiosas, (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación,
Cultura y Deporte, 2001), 82.
12
El Periódico, 2 April 2004.
13
El País, 7 April 2004.
14
El País, 3 April 2004.
192 The Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain
_______________________________________________________________
15
Oficina de Relaciones Informativas y Sociales del Ministerio del Interior,
Nota de Prensa (Office of Information and Social relations, Home Office,
Press Note), 3 April 2004.
16
El Mundo, 13 April 2004.
17
El Mundo, 20 April 2004.
18
El Mundo, 11 May 2004.
19
Interview by one of the authors with members of the Exterior Information
Unit of the National Police, Madrid, Spain, January 2004.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
These had fought or passed through training camps in Afghanistan and the
majority were Syrian.
23
Marvin E. Wolfgang & Franco Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence:
Towards an Integrated Theory in Criminology. (London: Tavistock
Publications, 1967), 103.
24
See Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckman. The Social Construction of
Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge. (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1966).
25
See Martha Crenshaw, “Decisions to Use Terrorism: Psychological
Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning”, in Social Movements and Violence:
Participation in Underground Organizations, ed. Donatella Della Porta,
(Greenwich Connecticut: JAI Press, 1992), 29–44; and Bruce Hoffman, “The
Mind of the Terrorist: Perspectives from Social Psychology”, Psychiatric
Annals 29 (1999): 337–340.
26
National Audience, Indictment of Al-Qaida Cells in Spain, Summary 35/01,
Central Court of Instruction, Number Five, Madrid, 2003, 43.
27
Ibid, 448.
28
Ibid, 432.
29
Ibid, 469.
30
Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 8.
31
Oficina de Relaciones Informativas y Sociales del Ministerio del Interior,
Nota de Prensa (Office of Information and Social Relations, Home Office,
Press Note), 13 November 2001 and National Audience, Indictment of Al-
Qaida Cells in Spain, Summary 35/01, Central Court of Instruction, Number
Five, Madrid, 2003, 63-64.
32
National Audience, Indictment of Al-Qaida Cells in Spain, Summary 35/01,
Central Court of Instruction, Number Five, Madrid, 2003, 460.
33
There are interesting parallels in the study of rationality and subcultures
between terrorism and genocide. For more see: Peter Uvin. Aiding Violence:
The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press,
Javier Jordan & Nicola Horsburgh 193
_______________________________________________________________
1998); and Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust. (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2000).
34
Donatella Della Porta, “Political Socialization in Left-Wing Underground
Organizations: Biographies of Italian and German Militants.” In Social
Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations, ed.
Donatella Della Porta, (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1992), 286.
35
Jerrold M. Post, “Group and Organisational Dynamics of Political
Terrorism: Implications for Counterterrorist Policy”, in Contemporary
Research on Terrorism, eds. Paul Wilkinson & Alasdair M. Stewart,
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 307-317.
The Terrorists’ Best Ally: Media Coverage of Terror

Raphael Cohen-Almagor1
1. Preliminaries
In the 19th Century, a terrorist attack in Washington D.C. would have
become known to the people of Tennessee only after a few days. The
evolution of mass communication dramatically changed the scene of terrorism
and the way terrorists conduct their affairs. Today’s terrorists are well aware
of the power of the media and manipulate them to their own advantage and
need. The German terrorist, Michael (Bommi) Baumann wrote in How It All
Began:

We took a great interest in the press. We always immediately


looked how the newspapers, especially in Berlin, reacted
to our actions, and how they explained them, and thereupon
we defined our strategy.2

Terrorism is defined here as the threat or employment of violence


against citizens for political, religious, or ideological purposes by individuals
or groups who are willing to justify all means to achieve their goals. The
underlying assumption is that a zero sum game exists between terrorism and
democracy, i.e., a win for one constitutes a loss for the other. Democracy
needs to provide ample alternatives for citizens to voice their satisfaction as
well as their grievances with regard to social policies. Political groups and
associations have legal avenues to explore in order to achieve their aims.
Terrorism is conceived as inhuman, insensitive to human life, cruel and
arbitrary. To remain morally neutral and objective toward terrorism and to
sympathize with terrorist acts is to betray ethics and morality.3 Terrorists
should be explicitly condemned for their deeds by all who care about the
underlying values of democracy: not harming others, and granting respect to
others. Terrorism, by definition, runs counter to these underlying values. Acts
of terror are newsworthy, but when the media report matters relating to
terrorists, journalists do not have to view themselves as detached observers.
Journalists should not only transmit a truthful account of “what’s out there”,4
they may feel free to make moral judgements.
The media have been accused of being the terrorist’s best friend.
Walter Laqueur explains that if terrorism is propaganda by deed, the success
of a terrorist campaign depends decisively on the amount of publicity it
receives. The terrorist’s act by itself is nothing; publicity is all.5 Dowling goes
196 The Terrorists’ Best Ally
_______________________________________________________________
as far as arguing that terrorists owe their existence to the media in liberal
societies.6 The media are helping terrorists orchestrate a horrifying drama in
which the terrorists and their victims are the main actors, creating a spectacle
of tension and agony. Sometimes the media do not merely report the horror of
terror. They become part of it, adding to the drama.
During the past forty years there have been many instances in which
media coverage of terrorist events was problematic and irresponsible, evoking
public criticism and antagonizing the authorities. Let me shed light on a
number of irresponsible actions of some organs of the media in crisis
situations.

2. Troubling Episodes
A Rand Corporation review of 63 terrorist incidents between 1968
and 1974 showed that terrorists achieved one hundred percent probability of
gaining major publicity.7 Media coverage of some of these episodes was
ethically problematic, helping terrorism or contributing to sustain violent
episodes.

A. Endangering Life
On February 4, 1974, terrorists associated with the Symbionese
Liberation Army (SLA) kidnapped Patty Hearst, daughter of the media tycoon
Randolph Hearst. Later she was coerced to join that violent revolutionary
group. Marilyn Baker, a reporter for KQED television station, became
obsessed with the story. She and her aids played "cops and criminals" with the
SLA, stalked suspects, chased cars, and endangered lives. Baker and news
director Joe Russin tuned into FBI channels and broke a code which then
enabled them to listen in on communications. One night, Baker and two
friends thought they saw SLA member Emily Harris out shopping with her
boyfriend. The couple drove away in their car, and Baker and her friends
began a wild chase that endangered the lives of the couple, their own lives,
and the lives of bystanders. The dangerous chase ended when the couple
stopped at a police station, screaming for help. The fanatical reporter had
made a mistake. The girl was not the suspected SLA member, nor was this her
boyfriend. The couple thought the trio in the chasing car were a group of
murderers who sought to kill them.8 They nearly did. The astonishing thing is
that Marilyn Baker bragged about this, felt no shame, and was completely
unaware of her irresponsible, unprofessional and unethical behaviour. Baker
rushed to publish a book about her direct involvement in the Hearst affair. So
eager was she to publish her story, it was on the shelves a few months after the
Hearst kidnapping, and even before Hearst was arrested (in September 1975).
Raphael Cohen-Almagor 197
_______________________________________________________________
Unsurprisingly, her book is filled with misinformation, misconceptions,
fundamental mistakes (like, for instance, the identity of the SLA leader, and
the reasons that drove Hearst to join the SLA) as well as simple mistakes.
Even the revolutionary names of some of the SLA were misspelled.9
There were other episodes in which victims were actually killed due
to the irresponsible behaviour of the media. For instance, the slaying of a
German businessman in November 1974 in a British Airways plane on its way
from Dubai to Libya, and the murder of Jurgen Schumann, the captain of a
Lufthansa jet in Mogadishu (October 13, 1977). In both cases the hijackers
had learned from the media that their demands had not been met and the
authorities were just playing for time to prepare a rescue mission. The German
captain, killed on October 16, 1977, he had passed on information via the
plane’s radio. The media broadcast the information he had transmitted; the
terrorists heard the broadcast and their leader, Zohair Youssef Akache,
executed him.10
On April 30, 1980 six terrorists, members of Arabistan anti-
Khomeini movement called "The Mahealdin Al-Naser Martyr Group," took
over the Iranian Embassy in London.11 They held 26 people as hostages,
demanding the release of 91 ethnic Arab militants being held in Iran and a
plane to fly themselves and their hostages to an unspecified destination outside
Britain. They threatened to blow up the embassy and kill the hostages if their
demands were not met in 24 hours.12 During the negotiations the authorities
pressurized the terrorists to release some hostages, and they agreed. They were
about to release more hostages when they heard on the radio that the police
changed their mind regarding the number of gunmen inside the embassy.
Earlier reports said there were three gunmen and now they said there were six.
“See what happens when I release hostages”, said the leader of the group to
one of the hostages.13 The released hostage had been promised that nothing of
his statement would be released.14 Still, vital information found its way to the
media. That leak and report could have endangered the prospects of releasing
more hostages and possibly pushed the angered terrorists to harm the hostages.
As opposed to those troubling episodes, I wish to commend the
Washington Post and the New York Times for their conduct in the Unabomber
case. Between May, 1978 and April, 1995 Theodore J. Kaczynski -nicknamed
Unabomber by the FBI because of the targets he picked for his attacks, mainly
university and airlines professionals- had killed three people and injured 23
others in a series of 16 attacks. In June 1995, the Unabomber demanded that
The New York Times and The Washington Post publish a 35,000-word
manifesto calling for an industrial and technological revolution. If the two
newspapers complied, the Unabomber promised to refrain from any further
198 The Terrorists’ Best Ally
_______________________________________________________________
bombings. Publication of three additional annual statements was also
demanded. Federal authorities, including Attorney General Janet Reno,
pleaded with the newspapers to accede to the request for publication. After
weighing the question for nearly three months, the Washington Post and New
York Times agreed to publish the lengthy manuscript. Donald E. Graham, the
Post's publisher, and Arthur O. Sulzberger Jr., publisher of the New York
Times, said they made a joint decision to publish the document "for public
safety reasons".15

B. Hindering Government Activities


During the Patty Hearst kidnapping, John Bryan, publisher of a small
newspaper called The Phoenix, printed a long, rambling letter he claimed was
written by the SLA as an answer to his request to contact him. This was a
hoax. Bryan himself wrote that communiqué. Clearly he was far more
concerned about his selfish journalistic gains than in Patty Hearst's life. He
should have stood trial for harming a police investigation.16 The SLA had
appreciated the recognition and publicity generated by the hoax and later on
they returned Bryan a favour by sending their next communiqué to him.17
Another problematic episode concerned the most extensive media
coverage of the hijacking of TWA 847 to Beirut on June 14-30, 1985. The
United States turned to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
in the first 24 hours after the hijacking to arrange a swap for the passengers
and the prisoners. But because of published and broadcast reports that the U.S.
army had dispatched its Delta force antiterrorist squad to the Middle East, the
terrorists fled Algeria and soon landed in Beirut, where it was far more
difficult for the Americans to carry out a rescue operation.18 Especially
noteworthy was the inappropriate detailed account of the London Times:

The U.S. has reportedly sent a commando unit to the


Mediterranean ready to storm the hijacked plane if
necessary… The unit is said to be part of a crack
anti-terrorist squad of several hundred men…
The commandos, known as the Delta Unit, may have
been sent to the aircraft carrier Enterprise which is
currently in the western Mediterranean.19

C. Glorifying Terrorists
As mentioned, Patricia Hearst was kidnapped by a small terrorist
organization called the Symbionese Liberation Army. They demanded that the
media carry their messages in full and the media agreed; they magnified the
Raphael Cohen-Almagor 199
_______________________________________________________________
case out of proportion and provided sensational mass entertainment that
served the publicity needs of the ephemeral organization. Yonah Alexander
argued that the most disturbing aspect of this case was that the media gave a
small group of criminal misfits a Robin Hood image and transformed it into an
internationally known movement possessing power and posing an
insurmountable problem to the authorities.20
During the hijacking of TWA 847 to Beirut on June 15-30, 1985
some of the hostages bitterly resented the activities of the American media
networks, referring to ABC as the “Amal Broadcasting Corporation” and NBC
as “Nabih Berri Corporation”. Each morning, ABC anchormen called Berri
from New York to negotiate the day's news story, requesting to talk to the
hostages and, if the request was denied, interviewing Berri himself. There was
no good reason to invite Berri to appear regularly on network television,
communicating his demands. Berri undoubtedly understood that public
opinion would create pressure to strike a deal to save the hostages, even if the
price was high. But it was quite unnecessary to do so.21 One American hostage
stated, “Maybe ABC had us hijacked to improve their ratings”.22 The CBS
Evening News devoted nearly two thirds of its air time to the hijacking.23

D. Sensational Coverage
Since the early 1990s Israel has been subjected to many atrocious and
bloody suicide attacks. The phenomenon of suicide murderers started on April
16, 1993, at a restaurant near Mechola in the Jordan Valley. Between April
1993 and February 2004 there were 152 suicide attacks. They resulted in 631
people killed and 4107 people injured.24
In their craving to cover each and every aspect of those events, the
media served as both platform and loudspeaker for the terrorists, magnifying
the impact of their horrifying brutality. The two popular newspapers in Israel,
Yedioth Ahronoth and Ma'ariv, hadn't much experience in covering suicide
bombings and they played into the terrorists' hands, in effect putting their
pages at the service of Israel's enemies. After each and every terror attack, the
pages were full with hair-splitting stories about the victims, and with
horrifying pictures taken immediately after the attacks. The headlines
screamed, "Nation in Fear", and "Nation in Shock", and conveyed notions of
distress and horror. It seems that no senior editor stopped to ponder for a
minute, to ask what purpose a newspaper served when it dedicated the vast
majority of its pages, sometimes even all its news pages, to coverage of brutal
attacks in such a sensational, graphic way. This sort of coverage does not calm
the public, quite the opposite, and it pays little or no respect to the victims. I
am not saying that the media should not report such events. Of course they
200 The Terrorists’ Best Ally
_______________________________________________________________
should, but not in such an exaggerated, possessed manner, with little reflection
and thinking. Standards of magnitude, decency and good taste should be
observed.
Immediately after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the broadcast
media played and replayed the recorded exchanges between victims in the
World Trade Center and emergency police dispatchers. They exploited the
suffering of the people trapped and about to die inside the twin towers, playing
again and again the emotional mayhem of people who were trying to cope
amidst overwhelming horror, disbelief, fear and terror. In pursuit of superior
ratings, the sensationalism of some broadcasters showed very little sensitivity
to the victims.25

E. Irresponsible Terminology
The media amplify and personalize crises. But journalists are
expected to resort to responsible terminology that does not help terrorists in
their attempts to undermine the democratic order. In February 1974, when I
heard of the Patty Hearst kidnapping by the SLA, the first picture that came to
my mind was of an army storming an American city. I was a teenager at that
time and the army's highly-publicized symbol, the seven-headed cobra, made a
great impression on me. I was also impressed with the demand to distribute
food to the poor. The media did not advise that the so-called "army"
comprised only a dozen people. They portrayed them as "soldiers" with heroic
images, and as people who cared for the weak in society. In so doing they
provided a wide platform for the obscure agenda of fighting the establishment
and protecting the rights of "the people". Organs of the media elaborated on
the group's strange name, their agenda and their "operations". Of course, as
both the granddaughter of a legendary newspaper publisher and an abductee
who joined the SLA and participated in a bank robbery, nineteen year-old
Patricia Hearst attracted a lot of attention.
Journalists are required to be conscious of the terminology they
employ in their reports. An ephemeral terrorist organisation is not "an army".
People who kidnap and murder randomly whomever happens to be on the
horrific stage of the so-called "theatre of terror", are not "students" or "saints"
or "soldiers" or "freedom fighters". The killing of innocent civilians travelling
on a bus or a train should not to be described in terms of a "military
operation". A difference exists between covering news and providing terrorists
with an equal platform from which to declare their agenda. To remain
objective in the sense of moral neutrality with regard to terrorism is to betray
ethics and morality. Terrorists deserve no prizes for their brutality.26
Raphael Cohen-Almagor 201
_______________________________________________________________
F. Cooperation with Terrorists and Payment for Interviews
In some cases there have been rumours that reporters have paid
terrorists for granting them interviews. The media reported much of the Shi’ite
leader Nabih Berri’s version of the TWA story, portraying the person who
orchestrated the ordeal as a peacemaker. Berri made an appeal through the
media, urging Americans to write to the President supporting the release of
700 Shi’ite prisoners in Israel. The news media helped Berri’s attempt to
equate the fate of the innocent American hostages with the fate of the Shi’ite
terrorists imprisoned in Israel. Along with other media, ABC News showed
pictures of the hostages of the TWA jet and the Shi’ite prisoners, equating in
the minds of the public these two very different groups. Good Morning
America featured the families of the imprisoned terrorists, drawing an analogy
between them and the families of the hostages. During the crisis, ABC had
obtained an interview with John Testrake, the captain of the hijacked aircraft,
sitting in his cockpit while one of his captures waved a pistol above his head.
Michael O'Neill, President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors,
later described this as staging "an orgy of overkill that exploited the hostages,
their families, and the American people".27 ABC denied that it paid the
terrorists for those interviews.28

G. Irresponsible Mediation
A related episode in this saga involves ABC’s David Hartman, who
effectively took upon the role of mediator as he concluded a live interview
with a spokesman for the Amal militia. Hartman asked: “Mr. Berri, any final
words to President Reagan this morning?”.29 This implied not only that the
President of the United States and the terrorist spokesman were equal and
legitimate partners in a dialogue, but that it was part of the media’s role to
serve as mediators. David Hartman is a capable broadcaster, but his
qualifications as a mediator for such a tenuous situation have to be
questionable. This delicate role, involving human life, surely needs to be left
to those who have the proper expertise. Dan Rather of CBS asked the hostages
questions about what messages they had for Reagan, and "What would you
like President Reagan to do?". The networks were interviewing the hostages as
if they were official U.S. emissaries perfectly free of coercion and able to
speak their minds. This served the terrorists' interests by pressurizing the
government.30

H. Dangerous Speculation
The Hanafi takeover involved reckless media coverage and many
unprofessional actions that could have resulted in the deaths of innocent
202 The Terrorists’ Best Ally
_______________________________________________________________
people. The location was perfect from the terrorists' perspectives and the
hostage-taking immediately became a major media event. Reporters from all
over the country gathered in Washington. TV and radio stations interrupted
their programs to provide their audiences with some live drama during the 39-
hour siege. The conduct of the media was ethically reckless and ran counter to
the best interests of the 134 hostages. The media furnished the twelve
terrorists with direct intelligence by continuing on-site television coverage and
depicting them as kind and merciful. Some members of the media made direct
telephone calls to interview the terrorists and thereby tied up communication
between the police negotiators and the terrorists. One TV report showed a
basket lifted up by rope to the fifth floor where some people who had evaded
the terrorists had barricaded themselves. Until then, the terrorists (who were
holding their prisoners on the eighth floor) had been unaware of this, but they
were then informed by fellow Hanafis who were monitoring the news outside
the captured buildings. Another reporter speculated that boxes of ammunition
were taken into the building in preparation for a police assault when, in fact,
they were boxes of food for the hostages.

I. Lack of Homework and Live Interviews During Crises


As if all the misconduct that took place in this event were not
enough, Khaalis was outraged when a misinformed reporter, Jim Bohannon of
WTOP radio, called him “Black Muslim,” not knowing that the Hanafis were
bitter rivals of the Black Muslim sect, and that members of Khaalis’ family
were murdered by Black Muslims. Khaalis threatened to kill one of the
hostages and "throw him out of the window" if Bohannon did not apologize
publicly. Only after the newscaster issued an apology on radio and television
did Khaalis back down from his threat.31
It is inappropriate for journalists to interview members of groups that
undertake terrorist acts while such acts are under way. Such interviews have
occurred many times during the courses of hijackings, sieges, kidnappings and
other prolonged acts of terror. Interviews under these conditions are a direct
reward for the specific act of terrorism underway, and can interfere with
efforts to resolve the crisis. In addition, such interviews all too often increase
the spectacle of the event, spread fear, impede the negotiations between the
terrorists and the authorities, and provide a contrived platform for the views of
the groups involved.32 Khaalis gave so many interviews that the lines were
jammed and the authorities found it difficult to reach him.33
Raphael Cohen-Almagor 203
_______________________________________________________________
J. Live Coverage
For the prime reason of not endangering lives, the media ought to
refrain from broadcasting live coverage of events. This is especially true when
attempts are made to free hostages. Live media coverage showing special
security forces preparing to enter a building where hostages are held might
risk the entire operation and put the hostages in jeopardy. The terrorists might
be attentive to media coverage and hear and even see the rescue operation
while in progress. Their reaction might be deadly. Furthermore, hostages
might hear about the plans, become alarm and confused, and perhaps even act
in ways that would jeopardize the operation. This is not to suggest that there
should be a complete silencing of the media; rather, I am suggesting delayed
coverage in order to reduce the risks to human lives.
Another sensitive issue concerns the victims and their families. When
the first suicide attacks took place in Israel, television teams were sent to the
scenes and they broadcast unedited footage. As a result, some saw their loved
ones sitting dead inside the exploded buses. Most notorious was the photo of a
dead man sitting inside the blasted No. 5 bus on Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv
(October 19, 1994). Apparently no one at the newspaper considered what kind
of effect this photo could have on the driver's family. After this incident, TV
crews were more careful about airing live pictures from such carnage zones.
Decency and human respect prescribes that the authorities should notify the
families about their losses before mentioning the victims' names on the
airwaves, never mind showing their pictures. A qualified senior editor, with
experience in covering such bloody scenes, should monitor the photos prior to
their broadcasting.

K. Staging Events
The media should not cooperate with the staging of events. A
notorious case was that of Carrickmore in 1979, when a production team from
the BBC received an anonymous phone call, saying that they would see
something interesting in this small village. On reaching Carrickmore, the IRA
staged an event especially for the camera, showing that they control the
village. A few armed men in balaclavas stopped four or five cars, checking the
drivers’ licenses. The IRA stayed in control of Carrickmore for three hours
and pulled out after the Panorama film crew said that they had enough
footage. The BBC was subsequently accused of arranging for IRA gunmen to
take over an Ulster village for an afternoon of stunts, and of treasonable
activity. The Opposition Leader, James Callaghan, said that “it is not the duty
of the media to stage-manage news, but to report it”.34 Finally, the BBC
decided not to show the film.
204 The Terrorists’ Best Ally
_______________________________________________________________
3. Conclusion
This paper highlights the need for the development of a set of
guidelines for the media when covering terrorism. These guidelines should

• The media need to be accountable for the consequences of their


cover the following:

• The media should never jeopardize human life.


coverage.

• The media are advised to cooperate with the government when


human lives are at stake in order to bring a peaceful end to the

• The media should not glorify acts of terror.


terrorist episode.

• The media are advised to refrain from sensational and panicky


headlines, from inflammatory catchwords, and from the needless
presentation of images of bloody scenes, as all of compromise the

• Terrorism should be explicitly condemned for its brutality and


quality of reporting.

• The media must not pay for covering terrorist incidents.


violent, indiscriminate nature.

• The media are advised not to take upon themselves to mediate


between the terrorists and the government. Special qualifications are
required before one assumes such a responsibility. Journalists are

• The media are expected to refrain from engaging in dangerous


there to cover the event, not to become part of it.

speculation about the terrorists' plans, government responses,


hostages' messages and other concerns. Speculation might hinder

• Media professionals are required to have background information


effective crisis management.

about the terrorists they cover. They should prepare homework prior

• The media are advised not to broadcast live terrorist incidents. This is
to coverage.

not to say that the media should not cover such incidents. Rather,
there should be a delay of a few minutes during which an experienced
editor inspects the coverage and authorizes what should be on air and

• The media are advised not to interview terrorists while the incident is
what should not.

still in motion. Lines of communications between the authorities and


the terrorists should be left open. The media should not impede the

• The media are advised not to cooperate with terrorists who stage
processes of negotiation.

events.
Raphael Cohen-Almagor 205
_______________________________________________________________
• The media are required to show sensitivity to the victims and to their
loved ones. This critical guideline should be observed when reporting


incidents and, no less importantly, also after their conclusion.
The media are expected not to report details that might harm victims’


families.
The area in which the incident takes place should not be open for
anybody who testifies that he or she is a journalist. Only senior and
experienced reporters should be allowed in.
206 The Terrorists’ Best Ally
_______________________________________________________________
Notes
1
. D. Phil. (Oxon., 1991) is Assoc. Prof. and Director of the Center for
Democratic Studies, University of Haifa.
2
. Robin P.J.M. Gerrits, "Terrorists' Perspectives: Memoirs," in Terrorism and
the Media, eds. David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid (Newbury Park, CA.:
Sage, 1992), 48.
3
. See R. Cohen-Almagor, “Objective Reporting in the Media: Phantom Rather
Than Panacea,” in Speech, Media, and Ethics: The Limits of Free Expression
(Houndmills and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005), chapter 4.
4
. Stephen D. Reese, “The News Paradigm and the Ideology of Objectivity: A
Socialist at the Wall Street Journal,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication,
7 (1990), 390-409, at 394.
5
. Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1987),
121; idem, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1977); idem, “The
Futility of Terrorism,” Harper’s (March 1976).
6
. Ralph E. Dowling, “Terrorism and the Media: A Rhetorical Genre,” Journal
of Communication, 36, No. 1 (1986), 22.
7
. J.B. Bell, “Terrorist Scripts and Live-Action Spectaculars,” Columbia
Journalism Rev. (May-June 1978), 49.
8
. Marilyn Baker with Sally Brompton, Exclusive! The Inside Story of Patricia
Hearst and the SLA (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 132-134.
9
. Compare Baker's version of the SLA story to Hearst's version in Patricia
Campbell Hearst with Alvin Moscow, Patty Hearst: Her Own Story (New
York: Avon, 1982).
10
. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 126; Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf,
Violence as Communication (London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,
1982), 102-103.
11
. The movement was active in the predominantly ethnically Arab area of Iran
called "Khuzistan" by the Iranian government and "Arabistan" by the
autonomists. See "Rescue 'Made Us Proud to be British'," The Associated
Press (7 May 1980).
12
. "Six Days of Waiting, Then Executions and an Assault," The Associated
Press (6 May 1980); Ed Blanche, "Iraqi Named as Mastermind of Iranian
Embassy Takeover," The Associated Press (14 May 1980).
13
. Chris Cramer and Sim Harris, Hostage (London: John Clare Books, 1982),
96.
14
. Ibid.,104.
Raphael Cohen-Almagor 207
_______________________________________________________________
15
. See Howard Kurtz, "Unabomber Manuscript is Published," Washington
Post, 19 September 1995, A1. Another valuable resource is ABC News
production, The Unibomber, 20/20 (4 May 1998), T980504-01.
16
. Marilyn Baker with Sally Brompton, 141-153.
17
. Patricia Campbell Hearst with Alvin Moscow, 126.
18
. David B. Ottaway, “Early Swap of Hostages Went Awry,” Washington
Post, 20 June 1985, A1.
19
. Michael Binyon “Crack Commando Squad in Position for Action,” London
Times, 17 June 1985, 4.
20
. Yonah Alexander, “The Media and Terrorism,” in Contemporary Terror,
eds. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1981), 53.
21
. Stephen Klaidman, “TV’s Collusive Role,” New York Times, 27 June 1985,
A23.
22
. William J. Brown, “The Persuasive Appeal of Mediated Terrorism: The
Case of the TWA Flight 847 Hijacking,” Western J. Speech Communication,
54 (1990), 228; Tony Atwater, “Network Evening News Coverage of the
TWA Hostage Crisis,” in Media Coverage of Terrorism, eds. A. Odasuo Alali
et al (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991), 63-72; A.P. Schmid, “Terrorism and
the Media: The Ethics of Publicity,” Terrorism & Political Violence, 1, 4
(October 1989), 539-565.
23
. David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of
America's War against Terrorism (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1988), 188.
24
. Cf. http://www.ict.org.il/. I thank Arie Perliger for the updated information
(personal communication on 16 March 2004).
25
. Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism (Oxford: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2002), 53.
26
. As a general rule, the BBC World Service refrains from using the term
"terrorists", which is perceived to be too loaded, and prefers to resort to more
neutral terms, even when the brutality involved in the violent crime against
innocent civilians is obscene.
27
. David C. Martin and John Walcott [note 23], 189-190.
28
. A.P. Schmid, “Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity,”
Terrorism & Political Violence, 1, 4 (October 1989), 550.
29
. Good Morning America (28 June 1985); Tom Shales, "On the Air,"
Washington Post, 29 June 1985, G1; Tom Shales, “TV’s Great Hostage Fest,”
Washington Post, 29 June 1985, G1; Thomas Raynor, Terrorism: Past,
Present, Future (New York: Franklin Watts, 1987), 150-151.
208 The Terrorists’ Best Ally
_______________________________________________________________
30
. Tom Shales, "On the Air," Washington Post, 29 June 1985, G1. See also
John Corry, “The Intrusion of Television in the Hostage Crisis,” New York
Times, 26 June 1985.
31
. Tom Shales and John Carmody, “A Media Race to the Air With a Life and
Death Story,” Washington Post, 10 March 1997, B1; Linda N. Deitch,
“Breaking News: Proposing a Pooling Requirement for Media Coverage of
Live Hostage Situations,” UCLA L. Rev., 47 (1999), 253. See also “Excerpts
from Khaalis Interviews,” New York Times, 11 March 1977, 12.
32
. Robert G. Picard, “News Coverage as the Contagion of Terrorism,” in
Media Coverage of Terrorism, eds. A. Odasuo Alali and Kenoye Kelvin Eke
(Newbury Park, CA.: Sage, 1991), 59.
33
. Cf. Peter Goldman, "The Delicate Art of Handling Terrorists," Newsweek,
21 March 1977, 27; Tom Shales, “The Crisis and the Media,” Washington
Post, 11 March 1977, B1.
34
. Richard Clutterbuck, The Media and Political Violence (London:
Macmillan, 1983), 115-118.
Notes on Contributors

Elisa Aaltola
University of Turku, Finland.

Eli Buchbinder
University of Haifa, Israel.

Stefan Bucher
Tamkang University, Taiwan.

Raphael Cohen-Almagor
University of Haifa, Israel.

Frank Faulkner
School of Law, University of Derby, United Kingdom.

Graeme R Goldsworthy
School of Public Health, Harvard University, USA.

Nicola Horsburgh
King’s College, University of London.

Eunju Hwang
University of Essex, Colchester, UK.

Javier Jordan
University of Granada, Spain.

Dorothy Lenthall
Seton Catholic College, Australia.
210

Maria Jose Alcaraz León


University of Murcia, Spain.

Ying Chih Liao


Lancaster University, UK.

Jonathon E. Lynch
University of London, London, UK.

Emily McMehen
Independent scholar, London, UK.

Patricia Seminetta
George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA.

Michael Staudigl
Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna.

Gary Wheeler
Miami University, USA.

Pei-ying Wu
University of Brighton, UK.

Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz
Emeke Yezreel College, Israel.

Aleksi Ylonen
Universitat Jaume I, Castellon, Spain.

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