

ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM

SECURITY MANUAL

2008


 CONTACT: ssc@actioncontrelafaim.org

1. TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................................................2
2. FOREWORD......................................................................................................................................................8
2.1 AIM OF THIS GUIDE........................................................................................................................................8
2.2 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................8
2.3 A SHORT INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................9
Responsibilities of Action Contre la Faim.......................................................................................................9
Individual responsibility................................................................................................................................10
Risk reduction................................................................................................................................................10
Preparing for dangerous situations...............................................................................................................10
3. INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY................................................................................................................11
3.1 WHAT IS SECURITY?.....................................................................................................................................11
3.2 WHY IS SECURITY NECESSARY?....................................................................................................................11
3.3 RISK, THREAT AND VULNERABILITY.............................................................................................................11
3.4 DEFINITIONS.................................................................................................................................................12
4. RESPONSIBILITY AND CHAIN OF COMMAND.....................................................................................13
4.1 RESPONSIBILITIES.........................................................................................................................................13
Knowing the context......................................................................................................................................13
Security procedures.......................................................................................................................................13
4.2 CHAIN OF COMMAND....................................................................................................................................13
5. BEING PREPARED SECURITY-WISE IN THE FIELD............................................................................15
5.1 ASSESSING SECURITY....................................................................................................................................15
The assessment process.................................................................................................................................15
Threat analysis..............................................................................................................................................15
Evaluating the context: examples of points to consider:...............................................................................16
Assessing the impact......................................................................................................................................17
Vulnerability analysis....................................................................................................................................17
Indicators.......................................................................................................................................................18
Constant assessment......................................................................................................................................18
5.2 AN EXAMPLE OF RISK ANALYSIS..................................................................................................................18
Retroactive threat assessment.......................................................................................................................18
Proactive threat assessment..........................................................................................................................19
Vulnerability analysis for Action Contre la Faim.........................................................................................19
Example of risk assessment schema..............................................................................................................20
5.3 STRATEGIES TO ADOPT.................................................................................................................................20
Acceptance.....................................................................................................................................................21
Protection......................................................................................................................................................21
Deterrence.....................................................................................................................................................22
Other important ideas:..................................................................................................................................22
Choosing a security strategy.........................................................................................................................23
5.4 DRAFTING A SECURITY PLAN........................................................................................................................24
5.5 CONTENTS OF A MISSION'S SECURITY SYSTEM.............................................................................................25
Security Policy...............................................................................................................................................25
Welcome to <Country> or <Base> / Visitor's Document:...........................................................................25
<Country>: general info & strategy:............................................................................................................25
Generic Security guidelines:.........................................................................................................................25
<Country> Security Plan..............................................................................................................................26

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 <Base> Security File....................................................................................................................................26
Ultra confidential documents........................................................................................................................26
Safety & Security Technical Notes................................................................................................................26
5.6 SELECTION OF STAFF....................................................................................................................................26
5.7 TRAINING......................................................................................................................................................27
5.8 BRIEFING.......................................................................................................................................................28
5.9 PERSONAL PREPARATION..............................................................................................................................28
5.10 MEDICAL PREPARATION..............................................................................................................................29
5.11 INFORMATION GATHERING..........................................................................................................................29
5.12 RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION................................................................................................30
5.13 RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS......................................................................................................31
Local Authorities...........................................................................................................................................31
Local security forces......................................................................................................................................31
Other humanitarian organisations................................................................................................................32
Embassies......................................................................................................................................................32
Local partners...............................................................................................................................................32
Security coordination between organisations...............................................................................................33
5.14 REPORTS.....................................................................................................................................................33
5.15 SECURITY ANGLES IN THE DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT OF A PROGRAMME................................................33
6. HUMAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT........................................................................................................35
6.1 TEAM WORK..................................................................................................................................................35
6.2 BEHAVIOUR OF THE STAFF............................................................................................................................35
Introduction...................................................................................................................................................35
Respect of national legislation......................................................................................................................36
Respect of local traditions.............................................................................................................................37
Ethics.............................................................................................................................................................37
Code of personal conduct..............................................................................................................................37
Leadership.....................................................................................................................................................37
Substance abuse.............................................................................................................................................37
6.3 FEMALE STAFF..............................................................................................................................................38
6.4 STRESS..........................................................................................................................................................38
6.5 DISCIPLINARY MEASURES.............................................................................................................................38
6.6 WEAPONS......................................................................................................................................................39
6.7 SPECIFIC RULES FOR EXPATRIATES...............................................................................................................39
General Behaviour........................................................................................................................................39
Use of vehicles...............................................................................................................................................40
Dress code.....................................................................................................................................................40
Travel restrictions.........................................................................................................................................41
Sports.............................................................................................................................................................41
6.8 MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL EMPLOYEES....................................................................................................41
6.9 GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR TRIPS.................................................................................................................42
6.10 HOTELS.......................................................................................................................................................42
7. VEHICLES AND TRIPS..................................................................................................................................43
7.1 VEHICLES......................................................................................................................................................43
7.2 TRIPS.............................................................................................................................................................43
By car.............................................................................................................................................................43
On foot...........................................................................................................................................................44
Public transport.............................................................................................................................................44
7.3 GENERAL RULES FOR USING VEHICLES.........................................................................................................44
7.4 VEHICLE CHECK-UPS.....................................................................................................................................45
7.5 SECURITY OF CONVOYS................................................................................................................................45
8. BUILDING MANAGEMENT.........................................................................................................................47
8.1 SELECTING THE PREMISES.............................................................................................................................47
Selection of the building................................................................................................................................47
Physical security of the building...................................................................................................................47
Local Infrastructure.......................................................................................................................................48
Identity of the owner......................................................................................................................................48

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 8.2 SITE MANAGEMENT.......................................................................................................................................48
8.3 MANAGEMENT OF THE PREMISES IN HIGH-RISK ZONES................................................................................49
8.4 GUARDS........................................................................................................................................................49
Choosing between outsourced security agencies and ACF guards...............................................................49
Armed protection...........................................................................................................................................50
8.5 SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST FIRE AND ELECTRIC SHOCKS.......................................................................51
8.6 LOCKS AND KEYS..........................................................................................................................................51
9. TELECOMMUNICATIONS...........................................................................................................................52
9.1 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS..........................................................................................................................53
Available means of communications.............................................................................................................53
Example of a communication strategy..........................................................................................................54
9.2 PROTECTION OF COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT............................................................................................55
10. INFORMATION SECURITY.......................................................................................................................56
10.1 SECURITY OF DOCUMENTS AND ELECTRONIC FILES...................................................................................57
10.2 ELECTRONIC DATA BACK-UP......................................................................................................................57
10.3 CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT......................................................................................57
11. ETHICAL ANGLES.......................................................................................................................................58
11.1 REJECTION OF CORRUPTION........................................................................................................................58
12. VISITORS’ SECURITY.................................................................................................................................59
12.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES RELATING TO VISITORS...........................................................................................59
12.2 ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM’S PROCEDURES.................................................................................................59
International visitors.....................................................................................................................................59
Nationals visiting Action Contre la Faim’s compound.................................................................................60
12.3 VISITORS TO HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER MISSIONS.................................................................................60
12.4 GUIDELINES FOR VISITORS IN HIGH RISK COUNTRIES.................................................................................60
13. MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY INCIDENTS.........................................................................................61
13.1 DEFINITIONS...............................................................................................................................................61
13.2 PREVENTION AND REACTION......................................................................................................................61
13.3 INCIDENT REPORTS......................................................................................................................................61
13.4 REPORTS ON "CLOSE CALL" INCIDENTS......................................................................................................61
13.5 DEBRIEFING AFTER AN INCIDENT...............................................................................................................62
13.6 INCIDENT ANALYSIS AND ADJUSTMENT TO PROCEDURES...........................................................................62
13.7 CRISIS MANAGEMENT.................................................................................................................................62
Can the mission manage the crisis and proceed with the programme?........................................................62
Crisis management unit.................................................................................................................................63
13.8 COMMUNICATION AFTER AN INCIDENT.......................................................................................................63
14. HEALTH MANAGEMENT..........................................................................................................................64
14.1 MEDICAL PROCEDURES...............................................................................................................................64
14.2 VACCINATIONS...........................................................................................................................................64
14.3 FIRST AID/CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION (CPR) TRAINING.............................................................64
14.4 FIRST AID KITS............................................................................................................................................64
14.5 RESPONSES IN THE EVENT OF A MEDICAL EMERGENCY..............................................................................64
14.6 MEDICAL EVACUATION...............................................................................................................................65
15. CASH MANAGEMENT................................................................................................................................66
15.1 REDUCING THE USE OF CASH......................................................................................................................66
15.2 DISCRETION................................................................................................................................................66
15.3 LIMITING EXPOSURE....................................................................................................................................66
Reducing the amounts....................................................................................................................................66
Reducing the number of transfers..................................................................................................................66
Just-in-time payments....................................................................................................................................67
Transferring the risk......................................................................................................................................67
Spreading the risk..........................................................................................................................................67
15.4 CONSIDERING PREDICTABILITY...................................................................................................................67

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 15.5 REDUCING VULNERABILITY.........................................................................................................................67
16. PROCEDURES: SUSPENSION, HIBERNATION, EVACUATION........................................................69
16.1 GUIDELINES FOR THE SUSPENSION OF ACTIVITIES, HIBERNATION AND EVACUATION................................69
16.2 DECISIONS TO SUSPEND, HIBERNATE, MOVE OR EVACUATE.......................................................................70
16.3 REMOTE CONTROL......................................................................................................................................70
16.4 SUSPENSION OF ACTIVITIES........................................................................................................................71
16.5 DECISION TO EVACUATE.............................................................................................................................71
16.6 PRESERVING THE INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM...............................................................72
16.7 DIFFERENT STAGES OF AN EVACUATION....................................................................................................72
16.8 CHECK-LIST AND CONTENT OF THE EVACUATION PLAN.............................................................................73
16.9 HIBERNATION..............................................................................................................................................74
16.10 EMERGENCY/ EVACUATION STORES..........................................................................................................75
16.11 DEBRIEFING AFTER AN EVACUATION........................................................................................................75
16.12 RETURNING AFTER AN EVACUATION........................................................................................................76
17. LEARNING AND TRAINING......................................................................................................................77
17.1 TRAINING....................................................................................................................................................77
Training of new field workers........................................................................................................................77
Training of field managers............................................................................................................................77
17.2 USE OF EXPERIENCED EMPLOYEES..............................................................................................................77
18. CHECKPOINTS.............................................................................................................................................78
19. PREVENTION: HEALTH AND HYGIENE...............................................................................................80
19.1 HEALTH PRECAUTIONS................................................................................................................................80
Precautionary measures against malaria and dengue fever.........................................................................80
Precautionary measures against HIV/AIDS – see PEP treatment protocol.................................................80
Precautionary measures against the sun.......................................................................................................80
19.2 HYGIENE PRECAUTIONS..............................................................................................................................81
19.3 FIRST AID MEASURES..................................................................................................................................81
20. MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC)...................................................................................................82
21. SECURITY INCIDENTS: REACTION GUIDELINES.............................................................................83
21.1 ACCIDENTS.................................................................................................................................................83
Car accidents.................................................................................................................................................83
When an accident occurs:.............................................................................................................................83
Other types of incidents.................................................................................................................................84
21.2 BOMBINGS, AIR ATTACKS, ETC...................................................................................................................84
21.3 ELECTRIC SHOCKS.......................................................................................................................................85
21.4 MEDICAL EMERGENCIES.............................................................................................................................85
Securing the area...........................................................................................................................................86
Calling for help..............................................................................................................................................86
Gathering equipment.....................................................................................................................................86
Starting first aid.............................................................................................................................................86
21.5 AIR CRASHES..............................................................................................................................................86
21.6 AMBUSHES..................................................................................................................................................87
During ambushes against vehicles................................................................................................................87
Ambushes with no roadblocks.......................................................................................................................88
21.7 GRENADES..................................................................................................................................................88
21.8 ARRESTS OR DETENTION.............................................................................................................................88
21.9 ASSAULTS...................................................................................................................................................89
21.10 CROWDS....................................................................................................................................................90
21.11 EARTHQUAKES..........................................................................................................................................90
21.12 ARMED CONFLICT.....................................................................................................................................91
Shots while you are on foot and unprotected................................................................................................91
Shots while you are in a vehicle....................................................................................................................91
Shots while you are in a building..................................................................................................................92
Explosions while you are on foot and unprotected.......................................................................................92
Explosions while you are in a vehicle...........................................................................................................92

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 Explosions while you are in a building.........................................................................................................92
Immediately after the incident.......................................................................................................................93
21.13 FIRE...........................................................................................................................................................93
21.14 FLOODS.....................................................................................................................................................94
21.15 FRAUD.......................................................................................................................................................94
21.16 CARJACKING.............................................................................................................................................95
Precautionary measures against carjacking.................................................................................................96
If you are stopped while in your vehicle........................................................................................................96
21.17 KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE-TAKING........................................................................................................96
Immediate actions to be taken.......................................................................................................................97
Guidelines for kidnapped people...................................................................................................................97
21.18 LOOTING...................................................................................................................................................99
21.19 MINES, BOOBY-TRAPS AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO).................................................................99
Avoiding mines, booby-traps and UXO.......................................................................................................100
Travelling in contaminated regions.............................................................................................................100
If you discover any mines............................................................................................................................101
21.20 SEXUAL HARASSMENT............................................................................................................................102
21.21 RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE.................................................................................................................103
Immediate reaction......................................................................................................................................104
After an attack.............................................................................................................................................104
21.22 THEFT......................................................................................................................................................105
22. STRESS MANAGEMENT...........................................................................................................................106
22.1 CAUSES OF STRESS....................................................................................................................................106
22.2 STRESS PREVENTION.................................................................................................................................106
22.3 SYMPTOMS OF STRESS..............................................................................................................................107
22.4 TREATMENT OF STRESS.............................................................................................................................107
22.5 TRAUMATIC STRESS..................................................................................................................................108
22.6 EXHAUSTION............................................................................................................................................108
23. AppendiCES....................................................................................................................................................109

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT:

In editing this guide, we were much inspired by the four guides published by ECHO, CARE,
Save the Children and the International Red Cross Committee:

- Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organisations –

Commissioned for ECHO – 2004
- CARE International – Safety and Security Handbook - Robert
Macpherson – 2004
- Save the Children – Safety First – August 2005
- ICRC – Staying alive – June 1999

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 2. FOREWORD

2.1 AIM OF THIS GUIDE

The aim of this guide is to contribute to the security of Action Contre la Faim staff
worldwide. It is essential to us that everyone should understand and integrate its content.
This guide discusses in detail generic security guidelines that can be implemented in most
contexts, and outlines the basic procedures for dealing with them.

It is therefore intended to:

 Help Action Contre la Faim security managers, both at Headquarters and in the field,
to outline their safety1 and security2 strategies as regards safety and security
management,
 Facilitate comprehension of the security plans and rules developed by each mission,
 Provide detailed guidelines on the majority of security issues which can arise on base
or on a mission.

However, this guide should not be considered a replacement for a security plan, but as an aid
for developing such plans. Every staff member in the field must be aware of the security plan
specific to each mission.

We all have a duty to pay attention to security issues at all times.

2.2 INTRODUCTION

Action Contre la Faim frequently works in areas which can be relatively unsafe and expose us
to heightened individual dangers. Therefore, self-protection and risk management are
absolutely necessary.

Risk management entails first of all knowing the context of the intervention, the programmes
and the procedures implemented to limit risks. But most of all, it is a permanent state of mind
in which the "risk factor" is integrated into each action taken, instead of being considered a
nuisance and the sole domain of "security professionals".

The presentation and organisation of this guide are meant to answer the main questions about
security faced by all members of Action Contre la Faim at one point or another. It does not
contain any confidential information, and it is recommended for all expatriates and employees
to read it.

1
Safety: protection against dangers from outside, a guarantee for each person against arrest, imprisonment or arbitrary arrest
2
Security: conditions of protection against injury, accidents and physical, political, emotional and psychological danger of all
kinds

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No guide can predict or provide answers to every possible situation. The following procedures
are examples taken from the experiences of Action Contre la Faim over a long period of time.

The first concern of Action Contre la Faim is for the safety of its employees, both
expatriates and nationals.
La première préoccupation d'Action contre la Faim est la sécurité de ses employés,
This guide is certainly not intended to alarm employees sent into the field, but to make them
aware of the risks they may have to face. The majority of Action Contre la Faim projects do
not take place in zones of open conflict, but in unstable environments or post-crisis contexts:
however, even in a peaceful situation, there are certain security rules to be followed. It is
important to keep in mind that the majority of risks faced by Action Contre la Faim members
are not due to violence: most of them involve industrial or road accidents.

For each mission, the security plan and the chain of command in decision-making must be
respected without fail. The rules and procedures outlined in this guide are valid for every
Action Contre la Faim mission. They are obligatory; any exception must first be approved by
the Director of Operations concerned by the country.

2.3 A SHORT INTRODUCTION

When properly undertaken, humanitarian aid saves lives and alleviates suffering. It is also
often a positive and gratifying experience for those doing this work. At the same time,
humanitarian workers are subject to serious threats in many countries, though the vast
majority carry out their work without ever suffering the least harm.

Difficulties manifest themselves when a crisis situation worsens and tension escalates. One of
the responsibilities of Action Contre la Faim is to analyse the context, identify sources of
danger, implement security measures and, if necessary, change its modus operandi. It is
essential for every member of the team to be aware and involved in this process. Action
Contre la Faim works tirelessly on this issue and security is one of the most important topics
covered in the briefing given to expatriates before departure.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM

Expatriates

Action Contre la Faim is responsible for the security of expatriates taking part in a mission. It
is a permanent responsibility, 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. However security management
is also a responsibility shared by all team members. Everyone is responsible for their own
security and that of their team.

National employees

It is important to remember that national staff may be subject to the same dangers as
expatriates because of their association with an NGO.

While they are working, local employees are under the responsibility of Action Contre la
Faim. Specific responsibilities vary from country to country and are outlined in the mission
staff’s specific Rules and regulations.

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All new employees must be informed of the security rules to be followed. They must be
trained to use all the security management tools they might need (radio, walkie-talkies,
security plans).

Beneficiaries

A programme must not endanger the security of its beneficiaries: Action Contre la Faim must
evaluate the risks run by the recipients of aid when programmes are implemented.

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
Safety is everyone’s responsibility. Humanitarian workers of any level are required to do all
they can to maintain their own safety and that of their colleagues and the other people
involved. Actions taken by one person can influence the safety of his or her colleagues, of the
staff from different organisations, and of the local population.

People at all levels of the hierarchy must ensure the security of their entire team.

RISK REDUCTION
It is impossible to reduce risk, but it is generally possible to reduce our vulnerability to it. A
passenger in a vehicle can minimise his vulnerability by fastening his seat belt and making
sure that the driver is competent, yet the possibility of risk remains. Likewise, humanitarian
workers can take precautions to reduce their vulnerability without ever completely eliminating
risk.

PREPARING FOR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS

Part of humanitarian action means learning how to evaluate both the risks of an environment
and the potential benefits of a mission and weigh them up.

Aid workers about to undertake their first mission in the field can and must prepare
extensively to work in a dangerous situation. Preparation is divided into three main sections:

Training gives you knowledge and teaches you how to put it into practice, until you become
independent.

Briefings give you information, for example on a particular country, culture and situation,
and on your organisation and the humanitarian situation in the field.

Equipment that you will need is provided in order to improve your security.

If you feel that the least aspect of your security preparation has been left out, speak up.

Your comments on this guide are welcome and should be sent to the security department at
Headquarters via your coordination team and the Area Manager of your mission or directly
to ACF’s security unit at ssc@actioncontrelafaim.org.

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3. INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

3.1 WHAT IS SECURITY?

For this guide security management is defined as the protection of human resources and
humanitarian assets against violence and theft. Security management serves as a support for
operations: its only purpose is to facilitate their implementation.

3.2 WHY IS SECURITY NECESSARY?

Severe incidents place humanitarian workers and assets in danger: all employers must take all
reasonable measures to protect the lives of their staff and preserve their assets.

Humanitarian workers who are kept safe are able to work more effectively in terms of
bringing help to those who need it.

3.3 RISK, THREAT AND VULNERABILITY

It is helpful to distinguish between the concepts of risk, threat and vulnerability by defining
them as follows:

Threat: a danger to you, your organisation, or your assets.

Vulnerability: the degree of your exposure to a specific threat.

Risk: the probability of being faced with a threat and its impact.

For example, there may be a threat of theft. Your vulnerability to this threat depends on
various factors, such as the money and valuable assets you possess, whether potential thieves
are aware of them, whether your neighbours warn you of the risk of local theft, whether you
have good quality locks and safes, whether you have sufficiently well-trained guards to
protect you, and so on. The risk of being robbed depends both on the level of the threat and
your degree of exposure to it. This can be expressed by the following equation:

Risk = Threat x Vulnerability

It may be impossible to change the level of ambient threat, but you can probably greatly
reduce the level of your vulnerability to it by:

 Reducing the risk of an incident occurring (e.g. by driving slowly, reinforcing locks,
or setting up a system for collecting information on your surroundings).
 Reducing the impact of incidents (e.g. by wearing seatbelts or limiting the amount of
cash kept in the safe).

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By reducing your vulnerability, you also reduce the risk of a threat becoming a fact and
thus having a significant impact on you. A considerable aspect of effective security
management consists of reducing vulnerability at every possible level.

3.4 DEFINITIONS
For this guide, these terms are defined as follows:

 Security Management: the protection of human resources and humanitarian assets

against violence and theft.
 Security Policy: defines the approach and general principles of the organisation in
matters of security. This is contained in a document called "Institutional Security
Principles", approved by the management and board of directors of a humanitarian
organisation.
 Security Manual: a manual containing generic security procedures to be followed by
all staff, but without any location-specific procedures. This manual may be relatively
long. It is this manual that you are now reading.
 Security Plan: a document containing information and security procedures that are
specific to a certain country (safety regulations, instruction manuals, crisis
management checklists, procedural norms, etc.) or a base (regulations specific to the
base, situational and behavioural guidelines, restrictions on movement) and which do
not appear in the Security Manual. A separate security plan is designed for every
mission and every base.
 Security Incident: an unusual action and/or serious event endangering the teams and
necessitating a rapid response. It is an event with direct or indirect repercussions on
the security management of ACF missions.

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 4. RESPONSIBILITY AND CHAIN OF
COMMAND

4.1 RESPONSIBILITIES
Everyone is responsible for their own security as well as that of their colleagues and the
beneficiaries.

All those managing staff are in charge of the security of their own teams.

KNOWING THE CONTEXT

All members of Action Contre la Faim, whether local or international, must learn to know and
understand the environment in which they work.

Expatriates, in particular, must familiarise themselves with the social, political and cultural
context of the country they are posted to. Inappropriate conduct may affect the security of the
group, interfere with Action Contre la Faim’s programmes and put its staff and those of other
organisations at risk, as well as the local population.

SECURITY PROCEDURES
Every member of Action Contre la Faim must apply all the security policies in force and
decisions taken in terms of security. A lapse in the behaviour of a single person may endanger
the health and well-being of the entire staff.

4.2 CHAIN OF COMMAND

 The Head of Mission (HoM) is the highest authority for the security of all the staff
and programmes in the country he or she oversees. With the help of guidelines laid
down by Headquarters and with the participation of all the staff, the HoM draws up a
security management plan together with procedures relating to all questions of safety
and security. The HoM delegates day-to-day security management to the mission’s
Logistics Coordinator.

 The Logistics Coordinator (LC) directly manages procedures and the planning of
security operations. The primary duties of the Logistics Coordinator may be:

o To identify and assess risk identification

o To set up procedures, rules, prevention policies, etc, so that Action Contre la
Faim is less vulnerable to these dangers

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 The LC is responsible for updating and monitoring security plans, and sending them
to the bases. He or she reports to the HoM.

 The Head of Base (HoB) is the Focal Point for any question involving security on his
or her base. He or she directly manages procedures and the planning of security
operations on base, in collaboration with the Head of Mission and Logistics
Coordinator.

The HoB is responsible for the local security plan, and has full authority on issues of
security.

He or she reports to the LC and/or the HoM.

 The Staff: All staff members of Action Contre la Faim must be familiar with all the
measures and procedures contained in the Security Plan. They also undertake to follow
all the rules indicated in it. All staff members of Action Contre la Faim must maintain
a sufficient level of awareness as regards security and report every incident or piece of
information which they know of to their superior. It is vital for all staff members to
familiarise themselves with the guidelines relative to the safety and security of
programmes, buildings, equipment and people.

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5. BEING PREPARED SECURITY-WISE IN
THE FIELD

5.1 ASSESSING SECURITY

The aim of a security assessment is to achieve a sufficient level of understanding of the

context, environment or situation so that the team can adequately plan its security procedures.
A security assessment generally includes other objectives, such as assessing needs.

Considerations of security management must be integrated at a very early stage in the

activities of Action Contre la Faim. Security management should be planned when the
activities are decided, not only at the stage when they are implemented. At the concept phase
of a new programme, the coordination team must study any additional risks that might be
associated, and how they can be avoided or at least minimised.

Examples of activities involving additional risks: payment for work in cash (Cash for work),
mass food distribution, advocacy and giving testimony.

The mission may be confronted with a situation that makes the direct implementation of
programmes impossible. The mission must then prepare a specific modus operandi to
implement these activities while avoiding risks (remote control, local partnerships, etc.).

THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Staff at all levels must constantly keep up with political, social, economic and military
developments in the zones where Action Contre la Faim works. National staff are often the
most qualified to make assessments of a country or a region.

While all the staff take part in gathering information at their various levels, analysis and
decision-making are the responsibility of the persons in charge of the security for the mission.

THREAT ANALYSIS
The first step of a safety and security assessment consists in analysing the threats that may
face Action Contre la Faim.

Any danger present in the environment may constitute a threat. Identifying them requires a
good understanding of the context, which entails the monitoring and analysis of the physical,
political, economic, cultural, and social factors that might create threats.

Uniqueness of the context: not all factors apply in every context. It is important to focus on
those that are more likely to specifically affect the security and operational capacity of the
mission for which you are working.

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EVALUATING THE CONTEXT: EXAMPLES OF POINTS TO CONSIDER:

 Geography – Are there regions that are conducive to accidents or ambushes? Are
there areas prone to natural disasters?
 Climate – Are there extreme temperatures or rainy seasons which might constitute
health risks? Are there seasons when epidemics are common?
 Political and economic situation – Are the government's policies accepted? Are the
authorities respected? Who has come to the fore or fallen back in the last five to ten
years? What is the unemployment rate?
 Infrastructures – Are the roads in good condition? Is the water supply contaminated?
How are dangerous chemicals transported, stored, and disposed of?
 Traditions, beliefs, customs and religious dynamics – Are there issues that might
cause conflict? What role are women expected to play?
 Social – What are the attitudes towards ACF, other agencies, programmes and
foreigners? Are there specific ethnic tensions?
 Current security practices – Do citizens commonly bear firearms? Do they employ
private security companies? In the event of incidents, do citizens call the police? If
not, why not? How do they solve the problem?
 In the case of emergency responses, it is equally important to fully understand the
nature of the disaster, conflict or complex crisis.

This is a non-exhaustive list.

There are generally three types of threat:

 Crime – committed for malicious, financial or personal reasons. How are these crimes
committed? Are the criminals armed?
 Direct threats – when staff or assets of ACF are the intended targets. Reasons to
target them may be political, economic or military.
o It is important to find out who might want to cause harm. Possible candidates
could be disgruntled workers, employees who have been fired, local soldiers or
members of a guerrilla organisation,
o It is also important to discover why ACF might be targeted. Reasons could
include theft, revenge, riots or a ransom demand.

 Indirect threats – when Action Contre la Faim is not the intended target, but is
caught up involuntarily. This type of situation may include fires, sickness, natural
disasters, explosive devices, battles or bombings. To analyse threats, it is necessary to
examine the location, frequency, and intensity of each threat identified.

o Is the danger limited to a certain part of the city or the region?

o Is the danger always present or does it only surface at certain times of year?
o Are there factors which increase the threat? For example, organised crime or
threats of violence against women may increase during periods of acute
unemployment and lack of opportunities to improve economic status.

16
You will find a checklist for analysing external security in appendix 9: Assessment of Local
Security Checklist – (Source: ECHO).

ASSESSING THE IMPACT

The next step in analysis consists of determining the impact of each threat on staff members
and the implementation of programmes. Is this threat a minor or major inconvenience? Could
it cause a delay in activities, or the closure of Action Contre la Faim’s base?

VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

Generally speaking, everyone in a given zone is exposed to the same threats and Action
Contre la Faim has very little control over this. However, everyone is not equally vulnerable
to these threats.

Vulnerability depends on the level of exposure to a given threat. Action Contre la Faim and its
staff can alter this level of exposure.

The questions to consider when analysing vulnerability are the following:

 Why are staff members and assets vulnerable?

 Have appropriate policies for fire, medical assistance and transport been implemented?
Are staff members aware of these policies and the directives provided? Do they
understand and apply them?
 Is Action Contre la Faim considered a “rich” and “easy” target?
 Do the programmes create tension between those who benefit and those who do not?
Do they affect existing power dynamics?
 Are women more at risk than men? 
 Is there a specific nationality or ethnic group that is more at risk than others?
 Are staff members who perform certain tasks (like logistics) or are in certain positions
(like finance) at greater risk? 
 Are warehouses more vulnerable than offices? Or is the staff and assets that are in
most danger?
 Are some stretches of road more dangerous than others?
 Are staff members who work in distant areas more vulnerable than their counterparts
in urban environments?
 Are there restaurants or bars known for their lack of hygiene, violence or criminal
activities?
 When are staff and assets at greatest risk?
o When they travel by car?
o When they work at night in the office?
o When they transport or distribute wages or aid materials?
o Immediately after payday?

The combination of threat and vulnerability analysis helps to pinpoint the primary threats
facing the staff. This combination then enables the identification of the security measures
needed to protect the staff. It also helps avoid adopting security measures which are
ineffective, or the costs of which are prohibitively high.

17
A checklist of security analyses based on vulnerability to threats can be found in index 10,
Internal Security Assessment Checklist – (source: CARE).

INDICATORS
Some events may indicate changes in the environment. These changes may lead to
modifications in the security measures taken.

It is essential to develop indicators to keep track of epidemics, crime, political instability, anti-
NGO feelings and other threats that concern Action Contre la Faim. All staff members must
be informed of these indicators. Daily observation is usually sufficient to detect any changes.
You should however have it validated by observation over a longer period.

CONSTANT ASSESSMENT
Threats and vulnerability can change frequently. Consequently, continuous analysis of the
environment is extremely important. It is recommended to ask the same employees to follow
this process in order to note changes and trends. Two methods, when used together, facilitate
the continuous assessment of safety and security:

 A periodic review of the questions detailed below.

 The recording of security incidents that affect staff, either of Action Contre la Faim
or of another organisation, and the identification of trends to determine possible
changes. An incident considered on its own may not reveal much, but when compared
with others may indicate a trend.

5.2 AN EXAMPLE OF RISK ANALYSIS

Assessing threats depends on two complementary analyses:

 Retroactive threat assessment (past)

 Proactive threat assessment (future)

RETROACTIVE THREAT ASSESSMENT

This consists of:
 Systematically listening and seeking for existing threats, reading newspapers and
speaking to local employees, other NGOs, especially security officers;
 Setting up a "priority list" according to the frequency of these threats;
 Drafting a trend analysis:
o Has there been a change over time? An increase or decrease, or the recent
appearance of new threats, etc.?

Cartography of incidents

This is the display of listed security incidents in a given zone, not only on a map, but also

18
over a timeframe.

The objective is to identify high-risk areas and times3.

PROACTIVE THREAT ASSESSMENT

Retroactive threat assessment focuses on past events, while proactive threat assessment
centres on what may or will happen.

It is a laborious task, but the following questions may help guide the work (non-exhaustive
list)

 Is an increase or a decrease in the identified threats predicted?

 Can a new potential danger arise?
 Is ACF at risk of becoming a specific target to hamper ACF at the outset, influence
humanitarian decisions or obtain political recognition (symbolically)?

VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS FOR ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM

Keeping in mind previously identified threats (retroactive assessment) as well as new

potential threats (proactive assessment), is Action Contre la Faim vulnerable?

A threat may exist without Action Contre la Faim being vulnerable to it.

For example, armed attacks could take place on a road between two cities. If employees take
the plane, they will no longer be at risk from that specific danger.

3
Source: “Operational Security Management in Violent Environments”, June 2000, Koenraad Van Brabant.

19
EXAMPLE OF RISK ASSESSMENT SCHEMA

Result of threat assessment ACF exposure (0 to 2)

1 Car accidents 35 2 Numerous trips by car
2 Mines 24 0 ACF does not operate in mined areas
3 Seizure of vehicles 19 1 Certain vehicles in conflict zones
4 Armed robbery 16 2 High financial volumes
5 Aerial bombardment 13 0 ACF bases are out of range
6 Kidnappings 3 0 Kidnappers arrested in 1993
(Number of incidents in the country - statistics for a given period)

Assessment of the risk for ACF

1 Car accidents
2 Armed robbery
3 Seizure of vehicles

When the risk analysis is complete, the HoM must have a list resembling the following:

Action Contre la Faim is especially vulnerable to:

Risk #1: ….
Risk #2: ….
Risk #3: ….
Risk #4: ….

5.3 STRATEGIES TO ADOPT

With an acceptance strategy, developed in many zones where we work, one can count on the
goodwill of the local population to guarantee security, at least in part. In other situations,
where a protection strategy needs to be developed, the security of people and property may
require guards and premises protected by fences. With a deterrence strategy, military units
may be brought in to ensure a safe working environment.

The choice of security strategy depends on the context and how it is developing, identified
threats and the vulnerability arising from them, and more generally the level of security. To be
effective, a strategy must be drawn up in accordance with these different parameters and
regularly updated.

20
Generally speaking, there are three types of strategy we refer to for security management:

ACCEPTANCE

If the government, local authorities and population understand clearly and support Action
Contre la Faim’s mission, they will not be a threat but, on the contrary, a help to the
organisation and its staff. This strategy is commonly called “acceptance” since it depends on
ACF being accepted by its environment.

In this respect, the staff need to spend a lot of time listening to local people and explaining its
role to local authorities and communities. This may include negotiating access to the zones of
intervention, explaining the principles underlying humanitarian work, and responding to
rumours or accusations when they surface. It is important to be clear about our modus
operandi and the criteria we use to select beneficiaries. In-depth work is essential to create a
network. It is also vital to communicate transparently with all the armed forces in the region.

The acceptance strategy is generally not enough on its own. Every society contains
individuals who resort to crime and who may well target humanitarian staff and assets. The
most common crime against NGOs is usually theft, since they are a source of funds in a poor
environment. But humanitarian workers may also be open to more serious dangers such as
attacks, rape, kidnapping, or in extreme cases, murder.

Limitations of the acceptance strategy:

 Ineffective against certain threats, particularly criminality.

 Communication is not always understood by all those with whom we are in contact.

PROTECTION

Thus, even when humanitarian organisations benefit from widespread local support, they need
a minimum of protection.

Security measures and preventative procedures may be implemented to ensure protection

from certain dangers.

 Site security: guards, barriers, lighting, alarms, barbed wire, etc.

 Restricted movement: curfews at night, defined perimeters, zones where it is
forbidden to go, etc.
 Procedures: organisation of convoys, radio support, etc.
 Protective equipment: shelter, armoured cars, helmets, etc.

These initiatives reduce the risk (but not the threat) by making staff and assets less vulnerable.
The adoption of a protective strategy will always require additional budget resources.

It is important to ensure that the staff receive training on the security procedures and
equipment to be used. It is also important to pay more attention to stress management, since
this strategy may cause restrictions on day-to-day activities and freedom of movement.

21
Humanitarian organisations can also be open to dangers that do not come from the
surrounding populations and communities they work with at all. Here possible threats include
natural risks like disease, volcanic eruptions and floods. They may also include attacks by
terrorists whose leaders are in a different region or country, and orchestrate violence against
humanitarian organisations and civilians for political reasons. Protective measures should
therefore take these threats into consideration.

Limitations of the protection strategy:

 Adopting a protective strategy leads to a feeling of being shut in: a "bunker mentality".
It makes it difficult to develop relationships with others and, inevitably, reduces their
quantity and quality. It leads to increased dependency on people acting as relays.

DETERRENCE
In exceptional situations, Action Contre la Faim can resort to retaliation, such as suspending
programmes: "If risks are not reduced, we will be forced to withdraw and cease providing aid
to the population," or calling on international institutions for suggestions on retaliation, or
making public declarations to denounce a situation. Mentioning the existence of these
measures may deter the implementation of certain threats.

Under no circumstances must employees of Action Contre la Faim carry firearms or have
arms or munitions in their possession. Those who contravene this rule are liable to instant
dismissal.

Limitations of the deterrence strategy:

 Political, legal or economic sanctions are frequently not an option for NGOs.
 The suspension of activities may be exactly what the armed groups are looking for.
 The suspension of activities increases pressure on populations whose situation is often
precarious already.

To be effective, potential aggressors must be aware of the deterrence; but we must also be
aware that spreading this information may have a negative impact.

OTHER IMPORTANT IDEAS:

Policy of visibility

Visibility concerns the identity of Action Contre la Faim. It is generally part of the protection
and acceptance policies.

In a conflict zone, greater visibility (flags, stickers, meetings, reports on our activities and
movements, etc.) may avoid errors in targeting, provided that the parties in conflict respect
humanitarian principles, and that the work on acceptance has been properly performed at the
outset.

When the situation is tense and aid workers are targeted as such, visibility should be reduced
or even avoided altogether.

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Low input policy

Armed combatants sometimes consider civilians and humanitarian workers as a source of

revenue. This may create a predatory economy that lasts months or even years. Sometimes,
this may be facilitated by a policy of grouping together displaced populations. The volume of
aid distributed, like food rations, shelter, and medicine, risks being diverted or stolen, or may
even encourage the rationalisation and systemisation of a predatory strategy. Generally
speaking, logistics supplies like 4x4s, HF and VHF radios are of considerable interest to
combatants.

In a volatile context where there is constant looting, there is an increased risk of making a
situation worse with humanitarian aid. Action Contre la Faim must consider implementing a
policy of low input within a defined area and for a specific amount of time, backed up by a
modus operandi specific to the context.

Support for programmes is then reduced to a minimum and projects are limited to covering
basic needs.

CHOOSING A SECURITY STRATEGY

Many organisations have an institutional preference for one strategy or another, but these
strategies are not mutually exclusive. The desire to gain acceptance and consent from a
population may be combined with protective measures in areas where crime and banditry are
real threats that even the local authorities or population cannot control.

Establishing rules and procedures

After completing an in-depth assessment of safety and security, while referring to Action
Contre la Faim’s security policy, the HoM, backed up by the Logistics Coordinator, must
define the operational rules and procedures in order to limit the mission’s vulnerability.

Action Contre la Faim missions generally combine two strategies: acceptance and protection.
In cases when it is absolutely necessary, the HoM must also assess whether deterrence should
be used as well.

Setting up an acceptance strategy is the linchpin of any ACF mission's security policy. It
involves constant work in improving ACF’s acceptance, but it also requires appropriate
protection measures to be implemented.

For each risk identified, the Logistics Coordinator needs to work on:

 Prevention: i.e. rules and procedures aimed to reduce Action Contre la Faim’s
vulnerability in relation to each identified threat

 Being prepared for incidents to limit their impact when they occur. Any sufficiently
serious risk must be anticipated, bearing in mind that some risks may concern the
mission as a whole, while others are limited to a base and/or a specific zone.

23
Acceptable risk threshold

For various reasons, it is not always possible to reduce our vulnerability to risk or its effects;
in which case the level of risk is unacceptable. It is at that point when our teams are
considered to be in danger. The risk and the nature of the intervention need to be compared.

Drastic measures intended to eliminate vulnerability may then be taken: completely

forbidding movement in dangerous zones, stopping programmes, evacuation, and so on.

5.4 DRAFTING A SECURITY PLAN

The aim of a security plan is to provide staff with a document that sets out the security rules
and procedures in force in the areas where they work. It must be short (10 to 15 pages) so that
everyone will be able to read it and absorb it.

The Security Plan must set the rules and procedures specific to the context, usually without
including generic security recommendations that would make it excessively long.

Each staff member in charge of security management must have a copy of the Security
Manual (what you hold in your hands), approved by ACF. This document is much longer than
a security plan. It gives detailed advice on a very wide range of security questions. All team
members must become familiar with the pertinent sections, during their security training, for
example, and in any event before they start work.

In addition, the organisation’s general attitude towards security must be described in a

Security Policy. The hierarchy of these documents is thus as follows:

 Security Policy – states the policy and general principles of the organisation
(institutional principles)
 Security Manual – contains the organisation’s generic procedures
 Security Plan – lists in detail the procedures applicable to a specific place.

The objectives of the security plan

The security plan is the major security management tool for the mission, and its objectives
are:

 To provide the procedures for implementing Action Contre la Faim’s security

measures
 To provide the rules to follow in any context
 To provide indicators enabling a situation to be assessed in terms of security
 To predefine general behaviour and the level of activity in accordance with the
security situation
 To centralise key information (maps, radio frequencies, telephone numbers, contacts)
 To draw up the basics of crisis management.

24
Levels of confidentiality

There are several levels of confidentiality regarding information, and it is therefore important
to define a classification system for documents:

 CONFIDENTIAL: documents reserved for managers directly involved in security

management.
 ACF INTERNAL: documents used at meetings for expatriates and local employees
of Action Contre la Faim.
 OPEN: all other documents

Please be aware that a printed document can be stolen and its contents used for
intelligence purposes.

The dissemination of any document outside the organisation must be validated without
fail by the HoM.

5.5 CONTENTS OF A MISSION'S SECURITY SYSTEM

In addition to the above-mentioned documents directly relating to security (Security Manual,
security plan), other documents also form part of the "security dossier" of a mission. These
are more intended to describe the country, the global context and ACF’s intervention strategy
in the country.

A complete security dossier for a country must therefore include the following elements:

SECURITY POLICY
 Confidentiality level: Open
 Contents: this document sets out the foundations of the security management culture
for Action Contre la Faim

WELCOME TO <COUNTRY> OR <BASE> / VISITOR'S DOCUMENT:

 Confidentiality level: Open
 Contents: basic document summarising important information to know when one is
assigned to a country (maps; visitor information: visas, documents, useful information,
administration, recreation; advice on preparing for departure: vaccinations, etc.; a
short guide for visitors to the mission, which includes basic advice: arrival at the
airport, local customs, basic useful telephone numbers, etc.).

<COUNTRY>: GENERAL INFO & STRATEGY:

 Confidentiality level: ACF internal
 Contents: "Country Analysis" style document, from 5 to 10 pages maximum. It
contains a description of the country, its historical background political, its
administrative, and economic systems, its humanitarian problems and ACF's history
and strategy with the country.

GENERIC SECURITY GUIDELINES:

 Confidentiality level: ACF internal

25
  Contents: this is a document of around 45 pages providing recommendations and the
rules to respect regarding most security problems that may arise. This guide is a
generic document based on the Security Manual. It is given to all expatriates at their
basic training (PAD) as well as to all national staff working in the field, at the moment
they are hired. This guide must be accompanied by a second booklet of no more than
15 pages covering the security procedures at the ACF base where the employee is
posted.

<COUNTRY> SECURITY PLAN

 Confidentiality level: Confidential
 Contents: document of around fifteen pages defining the security rules and procedures
applied in the country. The national security plan is adapted to the specific context of
the country. It identifies the principal risks in the country. It defines standard
procedures for communication, movement, and the management of compounds. It also
defines the procedures in case of an incident (road accidents, medical evacuation), as
well as procedures for crisis management. The security plan must be updated
whenever necessary.

<BASE> SECURITY FILE

 Confidentiality level: Confidential
 Contents: document defining the rules and procedures applied on base. This
document must be adapted to the specific local context, keeping in mind the security
situation, the team’s characteristics and the results of the risk assessment. It reiterates
the rules in force on the base (movement times, no-go areas). It describes the context-
specific threats, local actors and risks. It also contains the security levels and
indicators, and defines the duties and responsibilities of the employees on base. It
describes the plans for evacuation and hibernation.

ULTRA CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

 Confidentiality level: HoM, Logistics Coordinator, Financial Coordinator
 Contents: document defining the rules for managing money and secure places. This
document is extremely sensitive and thus highly confidential. Only one copy must be
printed and it must be secured in the mission safe.

SAFETY & SECURITY TECHNICAL NOTES

 Confidentiality level: Open
 Contents: technical files in standardised format. These are guidelines describing
certain themes in detail and giving the appropriate procedures to apply on subjects as
varied as earthquakes, mines, security assessment, first aid, etc.

In appendix 2, you will find Content of the ACF Complete Country Security File: a detailed
explanation of the contents of the various documents listed above.

5.6 SELECTION OF STAFF

The quality and suitability of the staff are decisive factors in the effective security
management of a humanitarian mission. Great care must therefore be taken in the selection
and recruitment of staff.

26
Rigorous verification of all candidates’ references is essential and helps ensure that persons
who have been involved in dishonest dealings or other security problems are rejected.

In accordance with the principle of equal opportunities, the nationality or ethnicity of a

candidate must normally not influence his or her selection for a position. However, if a team
is seen to have an unfairly high proportion of a certain nationality or ethnic group, some
employees and local public opinion may suspect manipulation in the selection process. This
suspicion may in turn affect the safety of the staff. This is an extremely delicate issue which
requires a clear, fair and transparent positioning as regards the Human Resources’ hiring
policy, in line with current labour legislation.
The expedient hiring of staff is often a great challenge to humanitarian organisations.
Vacancies in key positions can cause dissatisfaction, frustration or discontent among other
employees or the local population, because of lack of guidance or accumulated delays in
enacting the programme. Risks run by staff may increase as a result.

A dedicated guide lists Action Contre la Faim’s Human Resource guidelines: National HR
CD, in which recruiting procedures are outlined in detail.

5.7 TRAINING
Together with the recruitment of suitable staff, another crucial factor in security is training.

It is incumbent upon management to ensure that all staff have received the necessary training
for their work. Staff with significant field experience may need less training than those who
are new to unstable situations. Nonetheless, even experienced employees occasionally lack
elements of training that may prove essential in managing situations they may have to face in
their work.

Inexperienced staff who are to work in an unstable situation will ordinarily receive basic
training in the following areas, including but not limited to:

 Understanding the “acceptance approach” as regards security

 Respecting the local culture and customs
 Relations with armed groups (international forces, governmental armies and rebel
troops/militia)
 Identification of the most common security threats
 Fire security and prevention
 Precautions for home and office
 How to drive a 4x4 vehicle; driving precautions
 Adequate responses to common incidents
 Radio handling and procedures
 Health and hygiene in the field
 Stress management, especially in the context of managing a team
 Programme suspension, hibernation, and evacuation
 First aid and medical evacuation

In the context of an emergency situation, training given in the field will be limited. In other
words, it may prove very difficult to devote the time to train the staff recruited in all the above
areas. Team leaders must use their judgment in deciding on the priorities to be dealt with at

27
the time, and ensure that enough time is devoted to giving each person sufficient training for
their job.

More details on training can be found in the Action Contre la Faim Human Resources
Manual. National HR CD.

5.8 BRIEFING
The security briefing should enable the staff to understand the local situation well enough to
live and work in safety.

A security briefing must be given to all employees working in an unstable zone. This briefing
must be as in-depth as possible but also take account of the particularities of their jobs. It must
be accompanied with a minimum of information in writing, summarising various points that
may not have been absorbed during the briefing.

As well as security training, national staff must also receive a complete security briefing
before beginning work.

In some situations – for example, relocation – it may be necessary to plan a security briefing
for the family of the employees, whether in person or via the employee in question.

Reminder to all expatriates during briefing:

When the situation on the field deteriorates to the point of making international headlines,
expatriates must contact their family members to reassure them of their safety.

A technical file outlining the content of the briefings can be found in appendix  6: Security
Briefing.

5.9 PERSONAL PREPARATION

In addition to the training, briefing, and equipment received, all staff must keep the following
in mind:

 You must understand and respect the cultural and political context of the place where
you are going to work. Here you need to do some work yourself: for example, ask
advice from people who have already experienced this situation or arrived with the
mission before yours, or seek out reading matter relative to the context.
 Take every precaution in terms of health, and follow the recommendations given to
you.
 Check that you have all the recommended equipment, and that you are trained in its
use.
 Use your common sense: the first rule in security management is Individual
Responsibility.

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5.10 MEDICAL PREPARATION

Medical preparation is essential. Humanitarian workers are often exposed to serious medical
risks, some of them potentially lethal, but which can in most cases be easily avoided.

All employees must be aware of the recommended local medical infrastructures, as well as
those to be avoided. This entails the assessment of these infrastructures by a qualified person
from ACF or another organisation (medical NGOs, such as Doctors without Borders,
frequently perform this check). See procedures for medical treatment in the field.

Basic health and hygiene precautions greatly reduce the risk of illness. All employees must be
informed of such precautions and if necessary managers must ensure that recommendations
are followed.

Employees are recommended to keep a copy of their basic health record on them, indicating
all specific medical needs, namely:

 Blood type
 Allergies (e.g. antibiotics) and other potential problems
 All current medication
 Vaccinations (certain countries require vaccination certificates before allowing entry )

These details must be noted down both in an international language and in the local language,
if necessary.

A summary of the health and hygiene precautions to be taken is outlined in chapter 19.

5.11 INFORMATION GATHERING

Being properly informed is one of the keys to security. This applies at every level; all
employees must be aware of what is happening around them. Those in charge of security
management must have far more in-depth awareness of the situation than the rest of the team.

Both local and international staff must collect information and transmit it to the team via the
security managers. Local staff are likely to have access to many sources of information not
available to international staff. Regular information-sharing meetings generally take place not
only within the organisation but also as part of the coordination effort with other humanitarian
organisations, when several are operating in the same region.

Managers must regularly inform their colleagues of all information relative to security. One
simple method consists in planning for brief security updates at each base meeting and in each
report format. It is particularly important to keep staff working in distant zones well-informed,
and they must be sure to forward all security information they have acquired themselves.

29
5.12 RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION
Relations with the local population, not only towns and villages but also displaced persons,
make up one of the most important safety factors. A detailed knowledge of the local
population is vital if humanitarian aid is to be appropriate, of high quality and provided in
security conditions acceptable to all concerned. Relations with not only the leaders of all
significant groups but also ordinary people of all sorts will considerably strengthen an
organisation's capacity to respond to humanitarian needs, and to manage it in a way that is
safe for the local population as well as for the humanitarian workers themselves.

Managers and their teams generally need to dedicate a significant amount of time to meetings
and discussions with a representative sample of the local population. There are many ways of
proceeding. The most common include the following:

 Have regular conversations with the staff recruited locally.

 Regularly meet up with the local leaders of all the significant groups.
 Have individual discussions with a sample of the representative leaders.
 Visit homes unannounced, if the local culture permits.
 Visit individuals who live far from the big cities and main roads, because
humanitarians tend to only visit places close to cities and accessible roads rather than
those that are further off the beaten track.
 Visit religious leaders.
 Discuss and share information with other humanitarian aid organisations.
 Read the local press and tune into to local radio stations and television channels.

The pressures that weigh on managers' schedule are such that it is often difficult for them to
visit the inhabitants as often as they ideally should. However, it is essential to ensure a
minimum number of visits and discussions. Otherwise the risks to the quality of the
programme and security are likely to increase.

Local employees represent an essential source of information for determining public opinion
and the views the locals may have on ACF. Their advice should normally be sought for all
significant decisions relating to programmes and security, unless consulting them puts them,
other members of staff, their family or the group with which they live in danger. The opinion
of local employees will probably be insufficient, however, for they will not be able to
interpret or express the wide diversity in points of view held by the various groups in the local
population. Remember that in many situations, NGOs employees represent a privileged class,
and their opinions will not necessarily reflect the views of more vulnerable groups. Their
capacities will depend, for each of them, on:

 Their access to information on security (through friends, family, and other contacts)
 Their ability to analyse this information in order to identify what may be important for
you
 Their desire to share this information with you

Under no circumstances can they be a substitute for the different groups that make up the
local population, or for the parties concerned in the conflict.

30
5.13 RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Action Contre la Faim establishes a contact with the government and other authorities in
regions where it works, notably to:

 Explain the role of the organisation, and ensure that it is understood and that ACF is
seen as separate from any non-humanitarian organisation.
 Clearly explain the humanitarian principles on which the organisation's intervention
and work is based.
 Boost the security of the organisation by generating/strengthening acceptance of its
presence and its activities.
 Obtain all necessary authorisations.
 Establish a relationship based on trust that may be useful if it becomes necessary to
gain support later on.
 Obtain all relevant information about the general situation.

LOCAL SECURITY FORCES

It is often useful to establish contact with the local security forces in the region (army, police),
for the following reasons:

 To explain the role of the organisation and thus avoid any misunderstanding that could
endanger the organisation or population.
 To clearly state the humanitarian principles on which organisation's intervention and
work is based;
 To obtain their contact details in order to reach them in the event of an emergency.
 To establish a relationship based on mutual trust that may be useful later on.
 To obtain all relevant information, particularly on the level and types of insecurity in
the region.
 To avoid the risk of confusion with any other players in the field, or at least try to
minimise it.

Particular attention must be given to the manner in which contacts are made, so that relations
established with the authorities, especially the security forces, do not compromise the real or
perceived independence of ACF.

In cases where the security forces are distrusted or rejected by the local populations, the latter
should have no reason whatsoever to suspect that a humanitarian organisation is collaborating
with these security forces. In such cases, it is generally recommended to avoid frequent, or at
least visible, meetings, or any other activity with the security forces that might cause
misunderstandings.

The humanitarian organisations are bound by the laws of the country in which they work.
Unless there are major reasons to disobey an unjust law, it is important that Action Contre la
Faim should scrupulously abide by the law. It is not only a question of principle, but also a
way of deterring any criticism, and helping to protect the organisation from any problems,
such as arbitrary imprisonment, harassment, assault or expulsion from the country.

31
In some cases, a government or other authorities may commit a crime of such gravity that the
humanitarian organisations will decide to denounce them publicly. Public denunciations may
have major repercussions on the organisation that made them and on the safety of its staff.
They may also just as deeply affect other similar organisations in the region, even those that
choose to remain silent.

OTHER HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS

Good relations with other humanitarian organisations active in the region may contribute to
strengthening security, particularly for the following reasons:

 Sharing of information is an important aspect of effective security management.

 A common position may sometimes be useful where it relates to questions of
principles or practice.

Some organisations may be open to sharing equipment or services that are useful to other
organisations; for example, a radio network, or the help of a security adviser. Others may
have access to influential figures, particularly amongst the authorities, who could be
approached in the interest of all the humanitarian organisations.

While good relations with other organisations can be very useful, it is obvious that each
organisation is responsible for its own security. Any lack of clarity about the nature of this
responsibility may prove to be very dangerous.

EMBASSIES
It is recommended for the international staff of Action Contre la Faim to register at the local
embassy of their country of origin. This is particularly useful when embassies can intervene to
provide protection services to their nationals, or organise an evacuation if the situation
requires it. Embassies sometimes are used as assembly points before the evacuation of their
nationals. Check to see if they are located in a safe neighbourhood, for they could be in a
place propitious for demonstrations and thus be targeted by rioters. The distance
recommended in relations with the authorities and armed groups also applies to diplomatic
presence.

LOCAL PARTNERS
At times, Action Contre la Faim may conclude a partnership agreement with local entities
such as local NGOs or community associations. These organisations are generally in charge
of their own security, for they remain independent while engaged in a partnership. While
negotiating the partnership agreement, both parties must consider their potential involvement
in terms of security.

These security considerations may delay the start of their partnership activities, and tempt
them into making compromises. Emergency programmes must be launched as soon as
possible, but should not be undertaken at the cost of greatly endangering lives and goods.
Managers must show proper judgment in each case.

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SECURITY COORDINATION BETWEEN ORGANISATIONS
Coordination on security with other organisations (humanitarian, United Nations, etc.) is an
important aspect of security management and the set-up of a mechanism appropriate to the
need. The measures adopted by one may have an impact on the security of the others.
Remember that local populations often cannot distinguish between different humanitarian
organisations.

5.14 REPORTS

Good reports allow for informed decisions based on good quality information and pertinent
analyses, particularly in matters relating to security. They also emphasise each person's
responsibilities by providing a written trace of available information and decisions taken. This
can protect both the employees and the managers in the event of an investigation.

The following types of reports are commonly used:

 Situation reports (generally called "sitreps")
 Incident reports

Regular sitreps provide managers with the information they need to do their work. The
frequency of sitreps is determined by the missions, and will depend on the situation: daily
sitreps may prove to be necessary at the outset of a crisis, and then once the situation is
stabilised become weekly or even monthly.

In situations of conflict, it is particularly important to carefully consider the type of

information to be included in the reports, with regard to the document's level of
confidentiality, for example. As a general rule, it is preferable not to include information that
may be incorrectly interpreted by the authorities, that may endanger the staff or the local
population or that could give rise to accusations of spying. When it is essential to transmit
such information, it is better to communicate it face to face, leaving no written trace in the
country in question.

The writing of incident reports is a skill. Managers must ensure that this competence exists
and is maintained with the staff. Training on report writing must be provided if necessary.

5.15 SECURITY ANGLES IN THE DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT OF A PROGRAMME

When developing or managing a programme, you must take into account its various security
angles, making reference to the following questions (including but not limited to):

 How will the programme be developed? Will representatives of the local population
and groups in civil society and/or certain opinion leaders be involved in drawing it up?
(The beneficiaries should normally be included in the emergency aid management
process.)
 How will the population be informed?
 Will the local population be able to make comments during the programme's
implementation?
 Could one or several groups misinterpret the projects and wrongly believe that they
will receive aid? How do you manage such expectations?

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  Is it possible your plans may undermine or strengthen the power base of a particular
individual? Who will come out as a winner or loser once your plans are implemented?
 Will your plans be judged as fair and impartial?
 What are the possibilities in term of fraud or misappropriation of the aid? What
measures can you take to prevent this from happening?
 Will some goods or cash have to be securely deposited or transported?
 Will particular goods or equipment necessary for the project represent an attractive
target for criminals?
 Will the programme affect the security of the beneficiaries or the local population?
 How will other organisations be informed of your projects? Will it be possible for
them to offer comments or recommendations about your plans before they are
finalised? They might be able to highlight a security or other issue you are not aware
of.
 Will the plans need to be coordinated with those of other organisations, as regards the
programme or security angles?

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 6. HUMAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

6.1 TEAM WORK

Every staff member must feel responsible for security and be involved in the set-up and
implementation of security procedures. Discipline and mutual assistance are necessary.
Managers must encourage team spirit and show that they are concerned about safety.

Since the state of security is a constantly changing process, and since teams leave and arrive
frequently, updates must be regularly provided to the staff. Managers must consult with their
teams whenever they re-assess the security situation and consider modifying the procedures.

According to the circumstances, it is often advised to practise certain procedures as a team

(role playing). Particularly:

 Reacting to an armed robbery attempt

 Going through a checkpoint
 Writing an incident report
 First aid procedures
 Fire drills

6.2 BEHAVIOUR OF THE STAFF

INTRODUCTION
The behaviour of the staff of Action Contre la Faim, both during and outside working hours,
sends important signals to the local population. Staff who demonstrate constant consideration,
humility and caring will, by their attitude, encourage the acceptance of the organisation by the
local population. If they appear rude, arrogant, vulgar or immoral in respect of local customs
and culture, or if they take sides with one of the parties involved in the conflict, acceptance of
the organisation and thus its security will be substantially diminished.

Managers must explain these issues to the staff as often as necessary. They must also
supervise the behaviour of employees, and if necessary correct it.

The staff must understand and apply the following precepts:

 Be friendly, respectful and diplomatic. Learn the proper ways to greet and converse
with the local people. Learn their language: a few words of welcome in their language
can make a big difference.
 Dress in an appropriate manner without ever forgetting the local culture. NB: disguises
are useless!
 Develop good relations with the inhabitants, and be careful not to show a preference
for any one group.
 Methodically respect the security procedures. When facing an unexpected situation,
use initiative and good sense.

35
  Be aware of your surroundings and stay vigilant. Beware of anything that seems
unusual.
 Keep all communication equipment in good working condition and within reach.
 Keep changing the route you take to and from your work place, and the times you
travel.
 Depending on the context, lock the outer doors of your residence at nightfall (except in
zones with frequent seismic activities.)
 Keep your belongings with you and within sight at all times.
 When you wear a backpack, keep it held close to your body and lock it.
 Beware of scuffles, and don’t be distracted by an individual while his accomplice tries
to empty your pockets.
 Never accept a ride with someone you don’t know.
 Avoid walking at night, in dark alleys and closed places. Take only well-frequented
routes.
 If the driver of a vehicle asks you the way, keep your distance. In certain situations, an
ordinary criminal technique involves asking a potential victim to come closer to read a
map.
 If you think you are being followed, cross over the road. If the person follows you,
cross it again. If you are still worried, go immediately to a place where there are a lot
of people, and tell someone what is happening. Contact the mission security manager
if necessary.
 In a hotel, choose a room on an upper floor if the ground floor windows are accessible
from the outside. Keep windows and balcony doors locked. Do not leave your key
where someone could see your room number.
 Avoid inappropriate sexual conduct (e.g. use of prostitutes, behaviour that runs
counter to local customs).
 Ne aware that criminals may lace your drink with a drug. In a bar or at a party, never
let your drink out of your sight, even to go to the toilet. If need be, ask a friend to keep
an eye on your drink. Never accept a drink from a person you do not completely trust.
Remember that non-alcoholic drinks, such as coffee and tea, can also be targeted.
 Respect local laws and rules.
 Do not ask for or accept any personal favour from suppliers.
 Take all recommended health precautions.

RESPECT OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION

The fact that Action Contre la Faim is an NGO does not place it above the law of the country;
the existence of a mission is generally endorsed by the authorities through the signing of an
agreement with the government and/or the local authorities.

This document defines firstly the legal status of the organisation in the country and the terms
of the cooperation, and secondly, the rights and duties of the organisation. This generally
facilitates its work by granting it certain privileges (exemption from tax and import taxes, the
use of radio equipment, etc.) and regulates this collaboration through various obligations:
registration of expatriates, reports to the ministries in charge, and the signing of agreements
concerning new activities.

Action Contre la Faim missions must respect the national legislation of the countries where
they operate.

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RESPECT OF LOCAL TRADITIONS
Besides the official legislation, the teams of Action Contre la Faim may be confronted with
certain traditions and unofficial authorities. In some areas, traditional rules and chieftainships
constitute the sole social regulations.

The introduction of activities must be done in line with tradition. At local level, resolving a
dispute may require negotiations/discussions with traditional chieftainships.

ETHICS
Respect of the principles laid down in the Action Contre la Faim Charter forms the basis of
acceptance. Independence, neutrality, non-discrimination, professionalism and transparency
are the principles that govern our action in the field and enable its acceptance by well-
intentioned people. These are indispensable conditions for security, although unfortunately
not sufficient.

Behaviour such as corruption, theft, drug use, abuse of power and harassment are
unacceptable, as they go against the ethics and values of Action Contre la Faim. They also
have a disastrous impact its image and acceptance.

CODE OF PERSONAL CONDUCT

The staff of Action Contre la Faim must not behave in any way that jeopardises the image of
Action Contre la Faim, or that could be considered by the various partners, backers,
beneficiaries, suppliers or visitors as disrespectful. The staff of Action Contre la Faim must
avoid any conduct that could make them a victim of a security incident. They should avoid
any behaviour that may alter their judgement and their capacity to react appropriately in the
event of a security incident.

LEADERSHIP
Leadership, team cohesion and in-depth preparation can ensure more security than locks or
reinforced fences. Staff members in each in charge of their own security and should not
hesitate to take the initiative if they ever notice something abnormal. Action Contre la Faim
staff in positions of responsibility should encourage the careful implementation of all the
security policies and procedures in force on their base. A member of the staff on the base
should be assigned the duty of assessing the security conditions and the application of security
standards and policies.

SUBSTANCE ABUSE
The use, presence, sale, distribution, production or possession of illegal substances and/or
medication are prohibited to all those on the premises of Action Contre la Faim (offices,
residences, warehouses and also its vehicles) or travelling around on behalf of ACF. In many
countries, the possession or use of illegal substances, even in minuscule quantities, may lead
to immediate imprisonment. The legal system does not give the accused the right to be
released on bail, or to communicate with anyone, and preventive detention may last many
months. Any pharmaceutical product prescribed by a qualified doctor must be kept in its
original container with the names of the patient and doctor clearly identified.

In all cases, an arrest for the use or possession of drugs will have serious consequences for the
image of Action Contre la Faim and its work in the country.

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6.3 FEMALE STAFF
In numerous situations, women are subject to different or greater threats than men. Some
specific rules could be particularly useful to them, although they can also apply to all
employees. You should use your judgment to determine whether they apply to your particular
situation. Here are some suggestions:

 Know where you are going. Looking confident, even if you don't feel it, will make you
seem less vulnerable.
 In public, dress and behave discreetly, and keep in mind the social culture and the role
of each gender. This does not necessarily mean that international staff should adopt
local dress or behaviour, but that they must act in a manner acceptable to the local
culture, while at the same time be considerate of the culture of the expatriates and
restrictions relating to their work. Compromise may be hard to find.
 If you have to meet someone you do not know very well, advise a colleague of your
project. Consider meeting him/her in a public place where there will be other people.
 During a meeting, if there is the slightest risk of misunderstanding, express yourself
and state your wishes clearly.
 Follow your instinct. If you have any doubts about a place or a person, leave instantly.
 Do not take taxis unless the driver and/or the taxi company are known and trusted.
Agree on the fare before the ride.
 In many situations, it is not recommended to walk or drive alone, especially at night.

6.4 STRESS
Employees should be aware of the dangers linked to excessive or prolonged stress, and watch
out for symptoms of this in their colleagues. People suffering from stress tend to manage their
security less efficiently, and could increase risk for themselves and their colleagues. Managers
must try to prevent excessive stress, and be on the look out to identify it early on in any
colleague that may be affected.

It is also vital for you to monitor your own stress level and be prepared to recognise excessive
stress. This is important not only for you, but also for your colleagues, who may be relying on
you in order to do their work correctly.

Employees may show different signs of stress depending on their culture or personality. Their
families may also be affected. Their work and private life should be organised so as to
minimise stress and its effects.

In chapter 22, Stress Management, you will find a detailed explanation on the subject and the
best ways to prevent and treat it.

6.5 DISCIPLINARY MEASURES

It may be sometimes necessary to take disciplinary action against a staff member for security
reasons. If an employee infringes a security rule or persists in behaving recklessly after a
warning, a formal disciplinary measure is the most efficient way to correct his/her behaviour
and protect the team. Managers must immediately inform the base’s
Logistician/Administrator, or the mission’s Logistics Coordinator or Human Resources
Manager (or if need be the Administrator) of any breach of the rules. They report the facts of
the case and present a request for disciplinary action that may include dismissal if the

38
situation requires it. The HR Manager, in agreement with the Logistics Coordinator and the
HoM, will validate the request for sanctions as quickly as possible.

In some cases, disciplining the staff – through dismissal or suspension, for example – may
bring about new threats, with an increased probability of such threats being acted out,
depending on the context. This leads to an increased risk of insecurity. Disciplinary measures
should thus be meticulously planned and executed, taking this additional risk factor into
account.

All threats against the staff and/or activities of Action Contre la Faim must be taken
seriously.

6.6 WEAPONS
The staff of Action Contre la Faim should not bear arms. This damages the credibility of the
organisation as a neutral and humanitarian entity, and may also increase the risk of violence,
since an armed person may be considered by armed groups or individuals as a threat and thus
a justifiable target. A weapon can also be taken from you by force and turned against you.

Remember that clubs, machetes and sticks are all weapons.

Staff should never handle a weapon, even if someone asks them to just hold it for a few
seconds. Fire arms, mines, grenades, etc. of all kinds may be set off or explode if they are not
correctly handled by a trained person. Some may even be booby-trapped.
Warning: it is strictly prohibited to photograph armed men (whoever they may be!), or
military installations or equipment. Remember that taking a picture in an airport where there
are military activities could land you or your organisation in serious difficulties.

6.7 SPECIFIC RULES FOR EXPATRIATES

GENERAL BEHAVIOUR
All expatriates are either managers or technical experts. Their behaviour will have a direct
impact on the perception of Action Contre la Faim by civilians and the authorities. There is no
difference between work hours and after-work hours: an expatriate's behaviour is perceived as
representative of Action Contre la Faim at all times.

Expatriates must adapt to the environment: they are the guests of the country and the
government. Do not "lord it over them", as any arrogant attitude will annoy the population
and the authorities. In addition, such behaviour will contradict the principles of solidarity and
humanity embodied by Action Contre la Faim.

Personal feelings are irrelevant when weighed against the objectives of the mission.
Ostentation and egocentrism are counter-productive for the entire team and the mission.
Modesty, respect, patience and courtesy are much more efficient.

Any public statement (coordination meetings with other players, interviews in a ministry)
must comply with Action Contre la Faim's position on the issue. If an expatriate does not feel
comfortable with a subject or the organisation's position, it is best to reserve his/her response
for a later meeting, rather than express a personal or uncalled-for opinion.

39
USE OF VEHICLES

Working hours:
Action Contre la Faim uses professional drivers who know the conditions of the roads and the
driving regulations. They are responsible for driving and maintaining the vehicles.

During working hours, expatriates are not allowed to drive Action Contre la Faim’s vehicles.
They must follow the logistics procedures for their travel needs.

After working hours:

Action Contre la Faim will authorise the use of its light vehicles (4x4s and 2x4s) for private
use. The Logistics Coordinator and the Head of Mission will define the conditions for their
use: in all cases, the use of the vehicles must comply with the laws of the country.

When security conditions permit, expatriates may drive vehicles into cities or within a pre-
defined perimeter. They must:

 Have a valid driver’s licence and be in order with the formalities of the country where
the mission is operating.
 Receive training on how to do basic mechanical inspections and on the specificities of
certain vehicles, like 4x4s
 Know the local traffic rules
 Not drive under the influence of drugs or alcohol
 Check that the insurance (and possibly the rental contract) authorises several drivers.
 Pass a driving test with the Logistics Coordinator or the Head of Base.

When traffic conditions are extreme, Action Contre la Faim will hire at least one driver for
non-professional trips.

Expatriates are not authorised to drive motorcycles

DRESS CODE
The style and condition of clothes must be adapted to both the climate and local customs.
Remember that clothes play a major role in the first impression their wearer makes on the
local population. Expatriates must respect the local dress code. There are usually more
constraints for women in this respect.

In countries where the dress code is lesser important, expatriates must still dress decently out
of respect for their humanitarian duties and the organisation they represent, especially when
they are invited to religious ceremonies or official meetings.

When a representative of the authorities requests to meet with an Action Contre la Faim
representative, the latter must choose an outfit appropriate to the other's position.

As a general recommendation, it is best to avoid wearing clothes with the slightest hint of the
colonial or military (e.g. camouflage). Such dress can be a source of problems at checkpoints
and airports, and can generate confusion in everyday life.

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TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS
Professional trips are normally under the responsibility and supervision of the following
persons:

 The Logistician/Administrator, for trips around the base

 The Logistics Coordinator, for trips between bases
 The Head of Mission, for international trips

The Head of Mission is solely responsible for authorising travel outside the cities for non-
professional reasons. Expatriates must be aware that the same journey may be allowed for
professional reasons, but prohibited for a non-professional purpose.

The argument "It's my life, I can do what I want" is not only immature, but also dangerous.
Action Contre la Faim is responsible at all times for expatriates working on a mission. Thus
the security manager on the base must always know where expatriates are and be able to
contact them.

SPORTS
There is a list of high-risk activities that may not be practised during a mission, or during
breaks, because of the difficulties of medical treatment abroad or the resulting absence of the
expatriate, which could potentially disrupt the programmes.

Expatriates are not insured for such activities and would therefore be forced to reimburse all
medical and repatriation expenses to Action Contre la Faim. If expatriates want to practise a
dangerous activity during their breaks, they will be asked to purchase insurance to cover them
in case of an accident.

6.8 MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL EMPLOYEES

The mission is the employer of all national employees. ACF’s responsibilities towards them,
including any compensation due to them in the event of an accident, are specified in the staff
regulations. These regulations are based on the local labour laws. In countries where there are
no labour laws, Action Contre la Faim will establish minimum standards.

It is essential to specify that, should an employee be the victim of a road accident or an

incident caused by collateral or direct damage or armed conflict during working hours and
while he/she is on duty, he/she is deemed to be the victim of an industrial accident.

The medical evacuation and security policies of the mission must be defined then explained to
national employees.

Normally, Action Contre la Faim:

 Is responsible for the evacuation of national employees either relocated to or on a

temporary mission at the base.
 Is not responsible for the evacuation of national employees hired at the work site, but
may facilitate their evacuation if the means (vehicles or planes) are available.
The mission must ensure the means for evacuation. If there is not enough room for all the
eligible employees, the Logistics Coordinator must immediately alert the Head of Mission and
the Administrator.

41
If a mission does not have a specific Human Resources Manager, it is the Administrator’s
responsibility to deal with all issues relating to the management of national employees.
However either one may help you relay your questions or concerns to the National Human
Resources department at Headquarters.

6.9 GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR TRIPS

 Take the time to plan your activities. Try to know your precise route before you set
out.
 Use security measures based on common sense. Get acquainted with the environment
and trust your instincts during the trip.
 In public areas or public transport, sit beside other people and keep your personal
belongings with you.
 Avoid isolated public toilets.
 Be careful if you take a taxi in areas where taxi drivers are known to be involved in
criminal activities. Take authorised taxis and agree on a fare BEFORE the ride. I need
be, write down the address of your destination in the spoken language of the country
and show it to the driver.
 Avoid tourist areas, which are often popular with criminals
 Do not wear jewellery, or display money, keys or other valuable objects in public.

6.10 HOTELS

 Make sure you are staying at a hotel approved by the mission.

 Check whether there are people loitering in front of the hotel or the reception desk.
Avoid hotels frequented by criminals.
 Make sure you are not followed to your room.
 Tell your colleagues where you are staying; give them the address of the hotel, your
room number and the hotel phone number.
 Note the evacuation procedures in case of a fire or other emergency. Keep a pocket
lamp by your bed in case of an emergency evacuation.
 Always lock the door of your hotel room from the inside and use the security chain
(except in zones with strong seismic activity).
 Examine the room, including the cupboards, toilet, bathroom, beds and windows, to
make sure there is nothing suspicious.
 If the room has a telephone, make sure it works.
 Draw the curtains when it is dark outside.
 Use the hotel’s safety deposit box, if available. Do not leave valuable objects or
sensitive documents in the room.

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 7. VEHICLES AND TRIPS

7.1 VEHICLES
In most situations, vehicles are a valuable aid to security management. Their management is
therefore essential.

Whenever possible, the vehicles must be of a type and colour that cannot be confused with
those of the army, police or government. They must be clearly identified as the property of a
humanitarian mission except if, in a specific context, it is deemed safer for the vehicle to
blend in and resemble an ordinary civilian vehicle.

Armoured vehicles are only used in extreme situations. They are expensive, heavy, and
require special training for their drivers. Most armoured civilian vehicles can only protect
against a limited range of threats. In most cases, such vehicles are not necessary, and if they
are, it may be preferable to stop working in that region altogether.

7.2 TRIPS

BY CAR
In many situations, the majority of incidents happen while travelling. Some of the risks
associated with trips are:

 Accidents
 Ambushes
 Theft
 Aggressive behaviour at check points from armed staff.

All employees must be briefed in order to minimise the risks while on a trip. In some cases,
an authorisation procedure should ensure whether the trip is really justified.

All means of transportation used, including planes and boats, must be in good working order
and in the hands of qualified staff. Drivers must carry out daily inspections of their vehicles.
They must demonstrate a sufficient basic knowledge of mechanics at their recruitment.

Road accidents are one of the major causes of serious injury for humanitarian staff. All
managers and employees must adopt a safe and prudent way of driving. Disciplinary
measures must be taken against drivers who do not respect the driving rules laid down.

Where travel permits are issued by the authorities, it is imperative to comply with them and
ensure that each staff member travelling has all the necessary documents. In particular,
authorisations for flying, crossing front lines and travelling through unstable zones must be
rigorously checked by a manager before the trip. In some cases, humanitarian staff have been
attacked simply because they did not possess the proper travel permits, because of a
misunderstanding or because the local authorities or army were not advised of their travel.

43
ON FOOT
In some regions you can walk safely to and from work, or when going shopping. When the
situation permits travel on foot, staff are advised to adopt the following precautions:

 If you do not know the area, ask for reliable advice about which roads are safe to walk
on. Check a road map before you leave and take it with you.
 Avoid walking at night. This is not advisable in most situations.
 Avoid groups of people loitering in the area, demonstrations, altercations and all street
fights.
 When you carry a back-pack, keep it close to your body and hold on to it firmly. Do
not carry valuable objects.
 It is a good idea to carry little money and wear a cheap watch that you can hand over
if you are threatened.
 If a driver approaches you to ask the way, stay away from his vehicle. A common
criminal technique involves asking a victim to come to the vehicle to look at a map.
 If you notice someone suspicious, cross over the road or change direction to get away
from him. If necessary, cross the road in both directions several times. If the person
following you becomes threatening, use every means you can to attract other people’s
attention.

PUBLIC TRANSPORT

 Do not ask for or accept a ride from someone you do not know.
 Avoid travelling alone.
 In regions where criminals commonly use public transport, consider taking a taxi
instead.
 If you cannot avoid travelling in a bus at night, sit near the driver. Avoid getting onto
empty buses or trains.
 If you cannot avoid taking a night train, make sure you are not the only passenger, and
take a window seat. This will give you a quick emergency exit if there is an accident.
 Get out of any public vehicle where you feel uncomfortable or threatened. Once you
are out, make sure no one is following you.

7.3 GENERAL RULES FOR USING VEHICLES

Only designated drivers and, or rare occasions, authorised employees or expatriates, can drive
Action Contre la Faim vehicles.

Vehicles must always be clean inside and out, because they represent the public image of
Action Contre la Faim. Stickers and flags in particular must be regularly changed, because
they wear out quickly.

There are very few countries where it is better to drive a dirty car to avoid attracting the
attention of robbers. Thus this argument cannot be an excuse for negligence.

The driver must:

 Respect national legislation, particularly speed limits

 Adapt the speed of the car to the state of the road and the density of the population

44
  Keep the vehicle in a safe place, ready to start, and ensure its surveillance.

Employees and expatriates driving vehicles belonging to Action Contre la Faim are strictly
prohibited from using those vehicles to race or compete.

It is prohibited to take passengers in the back of a pick-up truck

However, a dispensation may be granted for the transport of teams over distances of less than
5 km, at a reduced speed (no more than 25 km/h).

Drivers and passengers must wear seat belts.

All vehicles keys must be labelled and hung up on an identified panel located in the Logistics
offices and in the compound. Spare keys of all vehicles, including hired vehicles, must be
kept in the safe.

In the event of an emergency, the Head of Mission is authorised to allow trips outside
authorised hours and/or going to normally prohibited areas.

For exploratory missions in dangerous areas, it is imperative to travel in a convoy of at least

two vehicles. The vehicles must abide by the rules for travel in convoy and must be in
constant radio contact.

7.4 VEHICLE CHECK-UPS

Vehicles must be serviced regularly and inspected daily; this prevents a large number of
breakdowns. The maintenance schedule (dates and mileage) and an inspection control list
must be placed in the log book of each vehicle.

A schedule of your trip must be made before departure. Submitting a travel plan is advised
when undertaking a long-distance trip, or for trips to remote or unsafe areas. A travel plan has
two objectives: it obliges the traveller to think about the trip before setting out, and provides a
written record of the planned route. Thus we can keep track of the journey, and take
appropriate measures in case a problem occurs.

In appendix 17 you will find a list of the basic controls for vehicle drivers.

7.5 SECURITY OF CONVOYS

Travelling in a convoy of two or more vehicles is often the safest way to travel in conflict
zones or regions where crime is endemic. The presence of many vehicles may prevent an
attack or provide readily available help in the event of a breakdown. Trips may be coordinated
with other humanitarian organisations working in the area in order to form convoys or
accompany convoys already scheduled. Each Mission must draw up security procedures
relative to travelling in convoy. In addition to the basic security directives on travel mentioned
in other sections, people travelling in convoy are advised to consider the following points:

45
  Appoint a person in charge of each vehicle, and a team leader you can refer to
concerning security.
 Use a route planned in advance, but also prepare an alternative route and ask the local
authorities for information about the advisability of each. Make sure lodging is
available on your route in case of delays in the planned schedule.
 Leave a description of the primary route and the alternative routes at the office, and an
estimate of arrival times.
 Stay in constant communication between vehicles, preferably through radio contact,
and particularly with the vehicles immediately before and behind you. Agree on hand
signals you can use in case of a radio breakdown.
 Do not transmit the route or destination by radio. Use code names instead.
 Maintain an agreed speed with the other vehicles, within the legal speed limits.
 When necessary, advise the local authorities of any journeys you make, to reduce the
potential for suspicion.
 Follow the vehicle before you while keeping a safe distance equal to two or three
vehicles between you. The vehicle right behind you must always be within sight.
 If you have to turn back, start with the last vehicle and drive in reverse until it is safe
for all the vehicles to turn round.

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 8. BUILDING MANAGEMENT

Action Contre la Faim will often have to occupy different types of buildings (offices,
compounds and warehouses) to meet its professional obligations. These premises must be
selected and managed so as to reduce the risk of injury to staff and damage to equipment. Site
security is ensured through a series of simple and practical restrictions. It is also ensured by
reducing vulnerability to fire and other accidents.

You can greatly improve the security of your premises by being attentive to a number of
important details. No building is entirely secure, and most missions would not want to live or
work in fortified premises, except in extreme circumstances. It is often preferable to blend in
with the local community, while taking discreet measures to secure your premises as much as
possible. Each situation is different.

8.1 SELECTING THE PREMISES

The most efficient way to select premises is by carrying out a thorough security assessment
first. The main issues to consider when selecting the location of a site are the following:

SELECTION OF THE BUILDING

 Choose a location close to a main road.

 Ensure rapid access via at least two entrances, especially it if consists of a residence or
office. Access to a landing strip should also be considered, in case evacuation is
necessary. In general, access to our premises must be considered in relation to a
possible evacuation.
 Ensure there are specific, identified emergency exits in case of fire or earthquakes.
The use of bars on windows, grills or locks may complicate exits and it can be even
more important to indicate the emergency exit routes clearly.
 Avoid locations close to market areas and police or military stations.
 Select a location close to embassies or United Nations offices.
 Select a location where there are other NGOs, if possible.
 Ensure that there is the possibility for a car park guaranteeing sufficient security.
 Do not be tempted by a cheap lease for a site that may compromise the security of the
staff.
 For temporary lodgings (hotel), ensure that the building is secure and complies with
minimum safety standards.

PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE BUILDING

 Are the walls strong enough to resist potential threats?
 Are there bars on the windows?
 Does the building have solid doors? Check locks, hinges and bars.

47
  Is there a surrounding wall? Is it easy to get over? Is there barbed wire on it? Does it
need barbed wire or would that send the wrong signals to the local people? Is it closed
by a solid gate? Can a guard look through the gate without opening it?
 Is the roof easily accessible from the outside?
 Is the internal and external lighting sufficient?
 Is there a suitable place for a safe? Does it have a space to store valuable items?
 Does it have a suitable shelter in case of armed robberies, assault or battles in the
neighbourhood? A shelter should preferably be located behind thick walls and out of
sight of any window. Central rooms or interior corridors are sometimes suitable.
 Are the fire protection means sufficient? Is the wiring in good shape?
 Is the car park large enough and will vehicles be safe there?
 How many guards will you need? Will they have a shelter? Will you put a sign on the
building to show it is housing a humanitarian organisation, and if so, what size should
it be?

LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE
 What is the state of the roads leading to the building?
 Is the power supply reliable? If not, how big a generator will you need?
 Do you have a reliable water supply? If not, will you need to install your own system?

IDENTITY OF THE OWNER

 Who is the owner? Is he/she trustworthy, with a good reputation? Does he/she have
relationships you should be aware of?

8.2 SITE MANAGEMENT

All work spaces and residences will be equipped appropriately in compliance with safety and
security standards. Site management directives for all offices, whatever the risk level, must
include:

 The installation of adequate security lighting to discourage intruders and help to

prevent domestic accidents at night.
 Detailed procedures to be followed, indicating who has access to what, when and
under what circumstances. Staff as well as visitors should abide by these regulations,
both during and after working hours.
 The familiarity of the entire staff with evacuation procedures in the event of an
emergency, including knowing where the assembly points are.
 Fire alarms and other fire prevention equipment installed in easily accessible places on
the premises, and checked for reliability every year. Every staff member must learn to
use a fire extinguisher, and in general be trained in fire fighting and the use of
equipment.
 The provision of a first aid kit, stored carefully in an accessible place.
 A daily check of windows, doors, exits and entrances, especially when the premises
are closed during the day. A daily routine must be established for locking the
premises, and an employee designated to be responsible for the daily checks.

48
  The storage of sensitive documents in a secure location. In particular, any material
relating to policies or security must be stored away from other documents, with
restricted access and be kept either in a password-protected document on the computer
or in a safe.
 The display of all emergency phone numbers where they can be seen by all staff.

8.3 MANAGEMENT OF THE PREMISES IN HIGH-RISK ZONES

In high-risk countries, we can take the following additional precautions to ensure the security
of the premises:

 Ensure that the site is self-sufficient and has large stocks of fuel, food and water. If
possible, select premises that have alternative sources of energy and water.
 Install a back-up generator, if need be, and ensure that it is regularly checked and
serviced.
 Ensure the safe storage of fuel. Any fuel, oil or other flammable substances stored
inside a building must be placed in remote areas and below ground level if possible.
 Protect radio equipment by storing it in the main premises.
 As far as possible, build a double fence around all the buildings with alternative
entrances and exits, and increase exterior lighting.
 Protect the water tanks by placing them inside the building and locking their covers if
possible.

8.4 GUARDS
If we need to hire guards, we must give them clear instructions and define the limits of their
authority. All new arrivals must be given a systematic briefing, and their training carefully
monitored.

Procedures must be implemented to ensure that the buildings are never left without
surveillance.

Under certain circumstances and after the validation of the HoM and the Desk Officer, it may
be appropriate to use private security agencies. They have the advantage of reducing the
administrative and management burden, and guarantee continuous protection.

CHOOSING BETWEEN OUTSOURCED SECURITY AGENCIES AND ACF GUARDS

Action Contre la Faim sometimes employs private security firms or professional guards to
watch over its sites. In the capitals, both options are generally available but on bases, private
firms are rare.

Working with private surveillance firms has some advantages for Action Contre la Faim:

 No additional Human Resources management

 The company has to reimburse any losses in the event of failure
 The private firm's network improves security
The problem with surveillance companies is often an ethical one: the Logistician needs to
check that the firm’s employees have a decent salary and proper working conditions. It also
raises a number of institutional issues that will not be dealt with here, but in the ACF
Institutional Principles (risk transfer, responsibilities).

49
 Employing guards also has advantages for Action Contre la Faim:

 ACF can recruit and train its own teams.

 ACF-trained teams will be more loyal to the mission than those from private firms.

Guards assigned to the offices, warehouses and compounds are supervised by the Logistician.
Coordinators must agree on the supervision of the guards employed on projects in the field.

In all cases, the Base Logistician must define the entrance and exit rules for each site:

In an office, all visitors must report to reception. If the office is located in an enclosed site,
only ACF vehicles can go through; visitors must leave their vehicles outside, unless they have
an authorisation from the Base Logistician.

In warehouses, guards keep a log of entries and exits. This indicates the date, entry and exit
times, the vehicle’s registration number and the driver’s name. Vehicles belonging to the
mission can enter the precinct without restriction, but other vehicles must be authorised by the
warehouse manager.

All compound visitors (expatriates or local staff) must be authorised by a resident; only the
house staff can enter the premises without this authorisation.

Guard equipment:
 Surveillance: torches, angle mirrors, video camera, movement detectors, videophones.
 Communication: Interphone, UHF/VHF radio, cell phone
 Emergency: Alarms, whistle, lighting system
 Procedures: What to do in the event of an incident. 

ARMED PROTECTION
The usual operating process of Action Contre la Faim does not require armed protection.
Questions, contradictions, paradoxes and limits relative to armed protection are already well
known, such as:

 If there is a need for armed protection, the risks are probably already too high for
Action Contre la Faim
 Are the projects and presence of Action Contre la Faim worth the effort of setting up
armed protection?
 Is using armed protection compatible with humanitarian principles?
 Is paying for protection service really a service, or just agreeing to a racket?
 Is it possible to find a neutral and morally acceptable escort (which may also be a
target)?
 Who will command the armed protection teams, and what should be done do if the
escort refuses to go somewhere?
 How do we proceed to discontinue the armed protection service?
If there is no alternative to armed protection, the mission must request prior authorisation
from the Headquarters. The decision will have to be debated at length.

Employees and expatriates working for Action contre la Faim are forbidden to carry weapons.

50
8.5 SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST FIRE AND ELECTRIC SHOCKS
Basic procedures are often underestimated in offices and residences. Simple improvements in
terms of security against fire and electric shocks, training and first aid procedures can help
protect all staff and should constitute the first stage of any mission's security plan. Individual
staff, even when travelling, must take all sensible precautions to prevent fire and electric
shocks, and put into practice the training provided locally or in their mission.

The general directives include at least the following:

 Extinguishers: Install and regularly inspect extinguishers for all types of fire, in all
vehicles, offices and residences. Know the location of the extinguishers in the
compound and offices.
 Emergency exits: All office and compounds must have primary and secondary
emergency exits. Plan in advance how to leave a residence, office or hotel during a
fire.
 Electric security: The electric wiring in many offices and residences may be
defective, with overcharged circuits, insufficient maintenance and low-quality wire.
This can increase the risk of electric shocks or fire. The following measures are
recommended to improve safety:
o Regularly inspect all rooms in residences and offices and immediately repair
any wiring problem you encounter.
o Locate and identify every electric switch in the offices and residences. Their
access should be unobstructed, they should never be placed in a locked space,
and all staff should know where they are located.

In chapter 21.3: Electric Shocks and 21.13: Fires, you will find a description of the security
measures to be taken in the event of fire or electric shocks.

8.6 LOCKS AND KEYS

Secure locks and proper key management are essential to the concept of physical security.
Cheap locks can easily be forced, and secure locks are useless if their keys are not safe from
unauthorised access. Here are some directives in this respect:

 You must have as few keys for each lock as possible, and strictly control their access.
Never leave your home keys and car keys in the same place.
 Be careful when you give your keys to the house staff.
 Do not let spare keys be made without your permission and note which people have
spares.
 If you lose a key in suspicious circumstances, change the lock.
 Never leave your keys under your mattress or in other obvious hiding places.

If there are known risks of violent assault when robbers steal money or vehicles, make sure
that the car and safe keys are easily accessible. Nothing is worth losing one’s life.

For the same reasons, it is strongly recommended to lock safes with keys, not codes, to
prevent the consequences of panic in a violent attack.

A key kept in a sealed envelope must always be available where the safe is located. The
hiding place of the key must be known to all members of the expatriate staff.

51
9. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Communication equipment does not guarantee security, but when properly used, it contributes
to ensuring it. Managers need to carefully assess the communication needs of their teams to
ensure that all the vital equipment is available as soon as they are deployed in the field.

In unstable situations, it is recommended to provide employees with two independent means

of communication (e.g. radio and satellite phone), so that if one fails, communication is still
possible. Avoid relying on cell phones alone. In the event of a crisis, a cell phone network is
particularly prone to overloading, or may be destroyed or disabled by one of the parties in the
conflict.

The equipment may include the following elements:

 Radios:
o handsets
o for vehicles
o for the base station
 E-mail accounts and accessories, including the software
 Telephones:
o land line
o cell phones (mobiles)
o satellite phones
 All essential accessories, including battery chargers

From a security angle, it is imperative to resolve the following questions:

 Who has to contact whom, and with what degree of trust?

 Is it necessary to employ one or several radio operators, or to ensure that someone is
tuned in to the radio at the base at all times or specific times?
 Who will be "on duty", and will it be at all times or only during emergencies?
 Do you need communication equipment that will allow for an immediate response?
 What means of communication do other NGOs in the region use? Do you need to be
in contact with them?
 Will some communication equipment be considered suspicious or threatening by a
local group? If so, how do we reduce or dissipate these suspicions?

The responses to these questions depend on the threat assessed. In most situations, it is not
deemed useful for all members of a team to be in permanent contact by mobile phone or
radio, but if it turns out to be necessary, it needs to be possible. The manager will have to take
a decision based on the probable threat to each employee, whether he/she is local or
international.

Communication equipment is valuable and transportable, therefore of interest to thieves. This

must be taken into account when storing the equipment. Employees usually sign an
acknowledgement of receipt in exchange for communication equipment, and are responsible
for keeping it safe.

52
Employees must be trained to use all types of communication equipment they might need.
Remember that in a crisis, the staff most qualified to use this equipment may not be available.

9.1 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

An efficient communication system may be as simple as the use of two types of phone, or
combining communication methods such as radio, phone and e-mail. Each Mission generally
needs a specific communication system, installed in keeping with a specific operational
environment.

In general, an efficient communication system should guarantee:

 Reliable communication between the Mission and any remote or travelling staff
member.
 The ability to control activities in remote sites and to transmit information about
security incidents or deteriorating security conditions at all times.
 The coordination of responses in emergency situations, especially medical solutions
and evacuations.
 Contact between staff members, and between the Mission and other people outside the
country, during a crisis.

In a crisis, it is better to communicate as clearly as possible without using codes, to avoid any
misunderstanding between the parties transmitting and those receiving the information. The
risk of aggravating the situation through communication in this type of situation is minor
compared with the need to transmit information efficiently.

The Logistics Coordinator must implement a communication strategy designed to ensure daily
communication operations at a reasonable cost. In a violent environment, the Logistics
Coordinator must also ensure crisis communications between:

 The Headquarters and the Capital

 The Capital and the bases

AVAILABLE MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS

Action Contre la Faim missions use several communication methods:

Method Independent Use

/
dependent
on
Radio Independent Handsets: In urban areas, especially to track the movements
VHF/UH of expatriates accurately. In sensitive areas, can be used as a
F (Voice) link between field teams and vehicles.
Mobile: Optimises the use of vehicles; expands the range of
activity in VHF covered areas.
Base: Central point for handsets and mobiles; relay with other
organisations.

53
HF Radio Independent Mobile: Tracking the movements of vehicles in the field.
(Voice) Base: Link between all mission bases.
Portable HF Radio (possible use): autonomous and gives
good results if correctly used.
HF Radio Independent For data transmissions. This system is relatively confidential
Telex and above all, free. Its known problems are: slow transmission
(Data) speed; potentially limited accessibility to other agencies;
extensive training required.
Land line Dependent For phone communications: great ease of use.
telephone on the If Internet access is available, the mission can easily send data.
(Voice national
and data) network
Mobile Dependent If available, a valuable tool for contact with other
phone on the organisations. Simplifies security management, but networks
(Voice) national are often disrupted or overloaded in crisis situations.
network
Satellite Dependent Certainly the easiest, fastest and most reliable of
phone on the communication systems, but also the most expensive.
(Voice national Choice of the network linked to the operation zone.
and data) network Action Contre la Faim does not classify VSAT terminals
among independent means: support is necessary for the
installation and maintenance of the system.
Fax transmission and reception require a land line or Inmarsat M system.

Basic principle: Crisis communication must be carried out only using independent
means or international networks

EXAMPLE OF A COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

CAPITAL Base 1 Base 2 Base 3

Land line HF base & mob Land line Land line
Communication Mobile VHF base, HS, HF base & HF base &
means available at Satellite mob mob mob
the base E-mail Satellite voice & E-mail VHF
HF base & mob data
VHF base, HS,
mob
Headquarter CAPITAL Base 1 Base 2 Base 3
s
Land line
Headquarter Mobile Satellite No comm. No comm.
s HF Base
Satellite
E-mail
HF Land line Land line
Capital VHF base, HF base & HF base &
mob mob mob

54
 Satellite E-mail
voice & data

Base 1 HF base & HF base &

mob mob

Base 2 Land line

HF base &
mob

Coloured text: communication methods in crisis situations

The second table shows the communication means usable between bases, VHF being the
typical example: two bases may have the equipment and be inaccessible. In this example, the
communication strategy is correct: all the bases can communicate with the capital, and
communications are guaranteed in situations of crises.

9.2 PROTECTION OF COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT

Communication equipment such as computers and cell phones is a popular target for theft.

Protect the communication equipment using simple precautions such as:

 Avoid carrying or putting laptops in a case designed for the purpose. Purchase padding
to protect the laptop and place it in a backpack or an ordinary bag.
 Car radio thefts are frequent. Before buying radios for the vehicles, you should find
out whether they may become a target and/or increase security risks for the staff.
 Avoid being seen using communication equipment. Discreet use limits thefts.
 When storing portable communication equipment (GPS, laptops, etc.) in the office,
you must ensure you do it in a location that is really safe. Their presence must be
checked regularly.
 Set up an efficient procedure to ensure the verification and tracking of any collective
equipment.

55
 10. INFORMATION SECURITY

On all its missions, Action Contre la Faim has to store and/or send confidential information,
such as:

 Accounting books and documents.

 Money transfer requests
 Information on persecuted individuals or groups
 Proofs of human rights violations or war crimes
 Staff travel plans in unstable regions
 Assessments of the political situation or security
 Staff files

Confidential information must only be stored or transmitted in the event of necessity. Keeping
or sending superfluous confidential information may put Action Contre la Faim in great
danger. In some cases, humanitarians have been imprisoned for long periods of time because
they were found in possession of information relating to military movements or other issues
deemed incompatible with a humanitarian mandate.

Transmitting confidential information increases the risk that the information may fall into the
wrong hands. In many humanitarian crises, it would be surprising if communications were not
monitored by the authorities. Some organisations consider these risks so high that any
communication must be authorised verbally or in writing by the base manager or team leader
before it is sent out. This additional precaution does not absolve the organisation from the
need for high quality training and briefing for all employees. Whatever procedure is adopted,
all employees must understand that no communication system is totally secure and that they
need to be disciplined in following the procedures.

The most sensitive messages must, in some cases, be delivered during a face-to-face meeting,
and not be sent by e-mail, fax, phone, radio or post.

Under normal circumstances, confidential information should only be divulged to staff on a

need-to-know basis. In other words, confidential information is only communicated to those
employees who need to know it. The other staff members will thus be protected and the risk
of leaks is reduced.

Files or computers containing confidential information must be stored in rooms that cannot be
accessed by visitors. All computers must be password-protected. Travelling staff are
instructed to keep the computers with them at all times, and never to entrust them to anyone
else. All employees need to know that erasing computer files does not necessarily delete them
from the hard disk.

Clear storage and transmission procedures for confidential information must be

communicated to all the employees concerned.

Finally, avoid using passwords to protect documents: they are inefficient and help to increase
suspicion.

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10.1 SECURITY OF DOCUMENTS AND ELECTRONIC FILES
The staff register files should be kept in a secure place and their access must be restricted.
Financial and staff files must be destroyed before being discarded.

10.2 ELECTRONIC DATA BACK-UP

The routine back-up of computer files prevents the loss of important historical data, if the
computer is damaged by fire or stolen. Backing up the data and storing the back-up files away
from the offices ensure that the important files are available to reconstruct the operations if
the computers are lost.

Routine back-ups must be an automatic process, usually executed at the end of each week.
One or two staff members should be assigned to keep the back-up files when the offices are
closed.

10.3 CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Security management is confidential in nature. It is an internal issue.

Some security procedures implemented by Action Contre la Faim to avoid dangers could
provide criminals with precious information.

Knowledge of the information may be a risk in itself, for the sources as well as for the
recipients. Paper copies and printed documents (situation assessments, reports, etc.) may be
stolen and used to the detriment of Action Contre la Faim. They must be kept in a safe place.

Some documents in the security plan must be classified “CONFIDENTIAL” and only be
accessible to the expatriates and managerial staff involved in security management. A security
plan distribution list must be recorded and respected by the Logistics Coordinator.

Staff should not become paranoid, but must be aware that most communication methods are
not secure. Keep in mind that:
 HF and VHF radio communications are always monitored
 Land lines and mobiles are easily tapped
 Satellite transmissions can easily be listened to.

Information relating to the immediate security of Action Contre la Faim must not be discussed
through insecure means of communication.

Regular e-mails may be intercepted. Password-protected files are sufficient for normal use.

NB: the use of cryptographic software (using RSA or PGP algorithms) is prohibited in certain
countries. The use of such software may attract attention to Action Contre la Faim far more
than the “confidential” information itself.
Confidential or not?
To give an opinion on the tactics and aims of an armed group is a mistake, as Action Contre la
Faim could be accused of spying. But mentioning that armed combats are currently taking
place 10 km from the office is an objective fact. Such information can be considered non-
confidential, and vital for Action Contre la Faim to manage the security of its teams.

57
 11. ETHICAL ANGLES

11.1 REJECTION OF CORRUPTION

The security of Action Contre la Faim and all humanitarian organisations can be threatened
by corruption. Paying a bribe may generate a threat if, for example, such payment is refused
for the same or another favour later on. However, if civil servants are not paid any wages,
reasonable remuneration for their services is sometimes deemed to be legitimate revenue. The
Heads of Mission must take the local situation into account in order to decide (in coordination
with the entire humanitarian community) whether some fees are justifiable for a courtesy
service or in a commercial context.

All employees must be aware of the importance of avoiding corruption, whether as a potential
corrupter or as a corrupted person. Any employee involved in an attempt at corruption must
be immediately sanctioned. All staff who could be concerned by the problem need to know
what measures to take to avoid being involved in corruption practices.

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12. VISITORS’ SECURITY

Lack of knowledge of a culture specific to an area, the security procedures in force or a

language may be a source of difficulty for visitors.

12.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES RELATING TO VISITORS

Missions must develop and regularly update guidelines, procedures and restrictions
concerning visits inside a country. The Heads of Mission determine if the visits are relevant
and useful, and if it is the case, they will also define the conditions of the trip, including
accommodation and travel for visitors. General guidelines relating to the security of visitors
include:
 Controlling the number of visitors inside a country and the location at which they are
staying.
 Lodging visitors in the same hotel or in different hotels in the same area, if they cannot
be housed in one of the organisation's residences. Hotels must be approved by the
Head of Mission and the Logistics Coordinator must assess them beforehand.
 Providing visitors with a document containing information to be used in emergencies,
including emergency numbers for the police, ambulances and key staff members. This
document must also contain information relative to security, information on secure
transportation means, areas to avoid and other precautions to be taken:

You will find the minimum content of this document in Appendix 2: Content of the security
file of a mission

If need be, the use of the organisation's vehicles to transport visitors.
Ensuring visitors are able to keep in touch with the office when they visit project sites.
They must be given radios or mobile phones if necessary
When visitors arrive, they must be briefed by an authorised person – HoM, Logistics
Coordinator, or a member of the managerial staff.

12.2 ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM’S PROCEDURES

INTERNATIONAL VISITORS
Action Contre la Faim does not encourage personal visits to expatriate staff during a mission.
However, any expatriates who insist on inviting visitors and plan to accommodate them on
Action Contre la Faim premises may only do so with the official approval of both the Head of
Mission and Headquarters. These visits must not under any circumstances jeopardise the
mission. You are strongly recommended to ask the advice of other expatriates living in the
same compound.

 Visitors must pay for their travel, stay, vaccinations and medical and repatriation
insurance.
 The visitor may not hold Action Contre la Faim responsible as regards security or a
medical evacuation.
 The visitor will not be authorised to use the vehicles or communication equipment of
Action Contre la Faim.
 No ACF identification card will be issued to visitors.

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NATIONALS VISITING ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM’S COMPOUND
Expatriates may receive visitors in their compounds as long as it does not inconvenience the
others occupants and these visits respect the organisation's code of ethics.

Under specific circumstances, a Head of Mission may have to restrict access to the ACF
compound to expatriates alone or require a prior authorisation for an overnight stay. This rule
must be explicitly mentioned in the security plan.

12.3 VISITORS TO HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER MISSIONS

All persons (employees at Headquarters, journalists, experts, etc.) on a business-related visit
for Action Contre la Faim are deemed to be expatriate staff in terms of security management.

 The Mission’s Desk Officer must give the visitor the same instructions as those given
to all expatriates before their departure
 The visitor must accept and respect the mission’s rules and security procedures
 When they arrive, visitors must be briefed by an authorised person – the HoM,
Logistics Coordinator or a member of the managerial staff.

For national employees travelling in another country, the mission’s Administrator must
review and check their visas and repatriation insurance.

12.4 GUIDELINES FOR VISITORS IN HIGH RISK COUNTRIES

Here is a list of recommendations or guidelines for visitors to countries or areas where the
lack of security may pose a high risk:

 Travellers should carry a radio or a cell phone and establish a monitoring routine for
when they are out of the office.
 They should only travel during the day. Night journeys are not recommended. Avoid
travelling alone.
 Ensure that visitors receive detailed instructions about security measures, alarm and
communication systems, and procedures relative to guards and the evacuation plan.
 Ask visitors to vary their schedules and daily routes.
 Non-official visitors are forbidden to travel in high-risk countries.

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 13. MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY
INCIDENTS
A security incident generally lasts a short time, often a few minutes, or a few hours on rare
occasions. This is particularly the case during an assault, an armed attack, etc. The duration of
crises triggered by security incidents may, however, be much longer: days, months, or years
in the case of a kidnapping. A crisis may also include a number of incidents.

13.1 DEFINITIONS
An incident is an unusual fact and /or a serious event that has endangered or is endangering
the teams: it requires rapid decision-making and implementation. It is an event with direct or
indirect repercussions on the security management of ACF missions.

A victim is defined as an individual who has, or may have been, physically or psychologically
affected, whether or not seriously, by the incident in question. For example, a direct witness to
an incident may be considered a victim.

13.2 PREVENTION AND REACTION

Managers must ensure their staff are adequately prepared, to both minimise risks and react
rapidly to incidents.

13.3 INCIDENT REPORTS

The incident report consists of:

 A first part, to be sent within the first four hours following the incident. It describes
the objective facts, providing Headquarters with rapid information and enabling it to
quickly take appropriate measures in response to the incident.
 A second part, to be sent within the first 72 hours following the incident, describing
the measures taken and giving an initial analysis enabling a readjustment of the
security measures if need be.

It is recommended that each base creates an electronic “Security Incidents” file. All security
incident reports will be stored in this file, in order to provide an instant overview of cases that
occurred within a given period. The same system must be implemented for the entire mission.

A typical example along with details of report procedures in the event of incidents is found in
Appendix 7: Incident Report

13.4 REPORTS ON "CLOSE CALL" INCIDENTS

Close call incidents must also be reported. Such cases mean a security incident that was about
to happen. They indicate vulnerability in security procedures and provide new information on
new threats or already existing ones. Security measures will then be reviewed accordingly.

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13.5 DEBRIEFING AFTER AN INCIDENT
Following a security incident, a debriefing must be organised for all employees involved in
the incident. This enables confirmation of the facts, discussions on how to appropriately
change or adapt the security measures. It also improves the team’s morale. The Head of
Mission will designate the staff in charge of debriefing, according to the nature and the
seriousness of the incident.

An individual debriefing is usually also necessary for any staff members directly involved in
an incident, and has the same objectives as a group debriefing. It will also give the individual
concerned an opportunity to describe his/her reactions to the incident. If any affected
employees request counselling or medical attention, or if the manager considers that either is
necessary, professional advice must be sought.

Managers must be attentive to any sign of stress amongst their staff, keeping in mind the
possibility that some may suffer Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or other stress-related
illnesses. If they suspect this to be the case, they must seek professional advice; a stress
debriefing conducted by an unqualified person may do more harm than good.

13.6 INCIDENT ANALYSIS AND ADJUSTMENT TO PROCEDURES

After an incident, security managers within a mission must analyse the event and see what
lessons can be learned from it. For example: should the staff be better briefed? Should the
procedures be reviewed and/or adapted? Should a particular route be avoided? Should
coordination with the police be improved? Should disciplinary measures be taken against a
staff member?

Managers must consult the staff concerned when analysing what can be learned from an
incident, to ensure that all possible lessons are learned and the staff are in agreement with the
conclusions drawn.

It is vital to communicate incident reports to other humanitarian organisations whose values

we share, in order for them to benefit from better knowledge of the context and the level of
security.

13.7 CRISIS MANAGEMENT

In a crisis situation, such as a kidnapping or a problematic evacuation of a base, the mission
must go into crisis management mode.

CAN THE MISSION MANAGE THE CRISIS AND PROCEED WITH THE PROGRAMME?
If the answer to this question is no, all non-vital activities for the beneficiaries must be
suspended and travel between bases must stop until further notice. The objective of this
measure is to prevent another incident from happening as the result of lack of supervision, and
to channel all the mission's energy into managing the crisis.

If the mission has enough staff to continue the programmes while managing the crisis, the
mission sets up a crisis management unit. Even with a crisis management unit, travel between
bases and one-off activities (enquiries, assessments, etc.) may be postponed.

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT UNIT
A unit should ideally consist of the Head of Mission, the Logistics Coordinator and a
competent national employee. A temporary Assistant Head of Mission may be appointed to
supervise issues unrelated to crisis management.

The crisis management unit should work in a calm environment; therefore a screening system
must be set up. In the event of a kidnapping, the authorities and embassies will probably
immediately offer their assistance, while the media and other organisations try to obtain
information.

The crisis management unit will only handle the following issues:

 Resolving a crisis
 Contact with Headquarters about the crisis
 Contact in the field about the crisis
 Contact with the families of local employees

Note: International contacts must systematically go through the Headquarters. For incidents
involving expatriates, the Human Resources department at Headquarters will establish daily
contact with the families.

See ACF crisis management document appended to the security policy .

13.8 COMMUNICATION AFTER AN INCIDENT

Any official communication by Action Contre la Faim must be carefully and calmly prepared;
it may not be distributed without the prior validation of the Desk Officer. The Head of
Mission’s priority is to organise the debriefing of any person involved in the incident (directly
or within the framework of managing the crisis) and to relay important information to the
Headquarters for an immediate decision to be made.

For the time being, the reaction must remain a strictly internal issue. If need be, official
declarations will be discussed by the team and must be approved by the Headquarters.

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 14. HEALTH MANAGEMENT

14.1 MEDICAL PROCEDURES

In many areas where Action Contre la Faim operates, national medical assistance and
emergency response infrastructures are not adequately developed. The implementation of
basic preventive measures and appropriate training may prevent minor health problems from
becoming serious security incidents.

14.2 VACCINATIONS
Missions must have a vaccination policy for their staff, whether national or international, and
for members of their families. This is particularly useful in remote regions where evacuation
may pose a problem, and where medical assistance is unavailable.

14.3 FIRST AID/CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION (CPR) TRAINING

Training on dealing with medical emergencies, including first aid and cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, is a cost-efficient method to increase the overall security level. First aid training
must be a priority for the mission. In many cases, the local Red Cross or Red Crescent offices
can provide this training. The French Headquarters of Action Contre la Faim can provide a
First aid Practical Training Guide, which must be used along with basic first aid and CPR
courses.

A technical data-sheet describing First aid techniques is found in appendix 29.

This data-sheet may be used by a competent and accredited educator to provide a basic first
aid training course, and may also be used later as a checklist for staff members who have
received the training. However, it cannot under any circumstances replace the training.

In order to reduce the possibility of a medical emergency, international staff must undergo a
complete medical check-up before being appointed to a foreign post. They must therefore
receive all necessary vaccinations against the diseases prevalent in the country they are to
work in.

14.4 FIRST AID KITS

All Action Contre la Faim offices, vehicles and residences must be equipped with a suitable
first aid kit. These kits, combined with an appropriate training on their use, and provided they
are properly maintained, may help lessen the effect of medical incidents. These kits must be
sealed, clearly identified and stored in a central location known to everyone. Each base must
assign an employee to regularly inspect them and ensure their maintenance.

14.5 RESPONSES IN THE EVENT OF A MEDICAL EMERGENCY

All employees must be familiar with the response procedures in the event of a medical
emergency, serious illness or unexpected injury. These procedures must be recorded in a

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dedicated plan and be regularly updated. The plan must include at least the following
information:

 Medical establishments that have been inspected and approved.

 Procedures to follow for urgently contacting the people in charge.
 Procedures to follow if cash payment is required for medical treatment (access to
medical emergency funds; insurance information; etc.).
 Medical evacuation procedures and information on the people to contact.
 The location of and access to the Personal Information Register, including the
notification of family members.

14.6 MEDICAL EVACUATION

Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) is used in the event of illness or injury occurring in a zone
where emergency care is impossible. This measure is appropriate when the life of a patient
may be in danger or when the absence of treatment could lead to serious complications. The
mission must set up a MEDEVAC procedure concerning evacuation not only within the
country (from a base to the capital, from the field to a base, or even from the field to the
capital) but also to a third country, referring to the procedures already planned for this
purpose (a contract with Europ Assistance at the time this manual goes to press). Regularly
updated information and a contact list of private medical service providers must also be
available at each base.

See the detailed section in chapter 20.

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 15. CASH MANAGEMENT

This chapter is concerned with theft and armed robbery by persons external to ACF.
However, local factors may play an important role, and it is likely that in the event of theft or
assault, the offenders will have received information from one of the ACF staff. The
following are therefore only general tips that should be adapted to the actual situation.

15.1 REDUCING THE USE OF CASH

In order to reduce the use of cash, you should foster the use of the following:

 Credit cards
 Payments by bank transfer

In a number of places where we work there is no operational banking system. Under these
circumstances, traders and money changers sometimes create a network to minimise cash
transfers and the associated risks. These networks can be used by ACF, from time to time.

15.2 DISCRETION
If you have to ask for, move or keep cash, communication about it should be highly discreet:
the less people know, the less they can give away, intentionally or unintentionally.
Communication by telephone and above all radio should be coded.

If you withdraw money from the bank, be sure to organise this with the bank in advance and
be discreet about the transaction. If large sums are involved, e.g. when paying a supplier, do
the same. Paying wages in very high denomination notes creates difficulties, so you will need
to think about that aspect. If there is no solution for the volume of money transported, reduce
the visibility of the money transfer.

15.3 LIMITING EXPOSURE

REDUCING THE AMOUNTS

The practice of putting a ceiling on amounts that can be withdrawn, transferred or kept in the
safe may mean that you may have to make more transfers. Your ‘vulnerability’ level will drop
but the 'risk frequency' level will increase.

From the security angle, it is also important to keep a minimum amount of money in the safe,
in order to organise an evacuation in good conditions, or be able to pay wages even if there is
a transfer problem.

REDUCING THE NUMBER OF TRANSFERS

Risk is higher during a cash transfer than when the cash is in the office safe: you may want to
reduce the risk by moving larger amounts of money but less frequently. In this case, make use
of any opportunities that turn up – for example, in a helicopter, plane or a convoy of vehicles.

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JUST-IN-TIME PAYMENTS
If the highest risk is when money is in the office, you should organise your transfers in such a
way that the period the money is in the office is kept to the absolute minimum.

TRANSFERRING THE RISK

You could reduce your own movements of cash by making your contractors, suppliers and
service providers come to your office to be paid. Staff in the field could collect their wages
during a staff meeting, for example. To help you think through these different scenarios you
could work on a diagram showing the money transfers and various storage points at your
headquarters through to the final payment to someone outside the organisation. Assess the
respective risks and risk-reduction measures to be taken throughout the chain.

SPREADING THE RISK

If burglary, armed attack and robbery are risk factors then it is advisable to spread the risk: do
not keep all your money in one place. You could keep part of it in an agreed and obvious
place, to serve as bait for robbers. If they are in a hurry, they may be quickly satisfied with
money that is easily accessible and will not harm you in order to find out where it is.

15.4 CONSIDERING PREDICTABILITY

Routine increases risk. Some of the most predictable ‘concentrations of money’ are:

 The monthly payroll

 Payment during an evacuation
 The office administrator's journey from the office to the bank, often with the same
route and around the same time of the month.

You could take extra security precautions to reduce risk and alter the predictability factor.
For example:

 Use an unmarked rented or local vehicle and/or a back route to go to the bank
 Keep changing wage transfer and payment times for employees
 From time to time, authorise other staff members to oversee movements of cash.

15.5 REDUCING VULNERABILITY

Ideally, the safe will be anchored to the floor so that it cannot be removed. Good practice
suggests that you should have two keys held by different people to open it. However, there is
the risk that armed robbers will use physical violence against staff if the safe is not opened or
its opening is delayed. One alternative is to keep the money in a cash box to which only the
administrator has the key. In this scenario the key(s) to the safe itself is/are accessible
somewhere in the office or residence. For example, an emergency key could be kept behind a
glass window that can be easily broken, but the procedures for checking and opening the safe
remain the same.

When it comes to transporting cash, the most common method is by car. At least two people,
and if possible two cars, should be involved. However, the problem here is that after a certain
amount of time, this system could be easily identified. An alternative option may be for

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trusted local staff to carry out such transfers in an ordinary vehicle. But there is no real answer
to the eternal question on the best way to manage risk: high profile or low profile?

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 16. PROCEDURES: SUSPENSION,
HIBERNATION, EVACUATION

16.1 GUIDELINES FOR THE SUSPENSION OF ACTIVITIES, HIBERNATION AND EVACUATION

An evacuation means the physical removal of expatriate teams and relocated staff at a base or
mission, in situations of imminent and unacceptable danger to Action Contre la Faim. Teams
will be moved to another base or city within the country, or leave the country altogether. If
their return becomes impossible after a few weeks, expatriates will be repatriated to
Headquarters, and from there to their countries of origin.

Action Contre la Faim does not usually evacuate its local employees, except for relocated
staff or those on a temporary mission. In both cases, Action Contre la Faim will send the local
employees back to the place where they were hired or recruited.

The decision to evacuate must be approved by the Head of Mission in coordination with
Headquarters. The decision to evacuate taken by Headquarters or a Head of Mission takes
precedence over the decision of a base not to evacuate.

 Action Contre la Faim is an operational organisation. There is a time to discuss and

debate, and a time to act. Once a decision is made – unanimously or by an executive
decision – it is final.
 If Action Contre la Faim decides on a partial or total evacuation, the expatriates (and
possibly the local employees) concerned must abide by the decision.

Refusal to evacuate will be considered as a resignation with immediate effect

There are two types of evacuations:

 Total evacuation: all the members of a base or mission are evacuated.

 Partial evacuation: in order to limit risks, “non-essential” staff are evacuated from
the base or the mission.

Evacuation is not an insignificant action within the context of a crisis; it may also be an
exacerbating factor. For the local population, a withdrawal from a city or a region may be a
further indicator of the seriousness of a situation, and may accelerate or provoke population
movements or even an exodus.

In some cases, Action Contre la Faim is the sole international witness and may be considered
by vulnerable local populations as a shield. When Action Contre la Faim leaves, this
protection is lost.

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An evacuation may be temporary. When the security situation improves, the Action Contre la
Faim teams can return.

Expatriates need to understand that relations with the authorities, programme beneficiaries
and local population will suffer from this situation. It may become difficult, or even
impossible, to re-establish the same kind of relations after an evacuation.

16.2 DECISIONS TO SUSPEND, HIBERNATE, MOVE OR EVACUATE

If the situation becomes too dangerous for humanitarian operations, all activities must be
suspended. Depending on the circumstances, the suspension may be temporary or final.

The decision to suspend, hibernate, evacuate or move is not easily made. There is no well-
tried formula to resolve the issue, and only the people in charge of security (the Head of
Mission, Logistics Coordinator and Head of Base) can make the decision, on the basis of the
information they have to hand and their experience. Be aware that an evacuation can also put
the staff in danger, and a modus operandi must be established to reduce the risk. An
evacuation is necessary when the situation becomes untenable, or when the staff is already in
hibernation and the situation is about to deteriorate.

The fundamental question is: “Are the potential risks of continuing to work higher than the
probable advantages”. If the answer is yes, then activities must stop. Otherwise they should
probably resume.

Secondary questions also need to be considered:

 What have other humanitarian organisations planned? Will they decide to suspend
their activities, hibernate, evacuate or continue their work? Will they adopt new
security measures? What is their point of view regarding the balance between risks
and advantages? You must be aware that measures taken by other organisations may
increase your own risks.
 How is the situation likely to develop in the near future?
 How are needs likely to develop in the near future?
 What other security measures could you consider taking that would allow you to carry
on with your work?
 Instead of suspending activities, could you consider reducing the staff, or journeys, or
modifying procedures to decrease the risks?
 Do you need more information to make a decision?

Any staff member may choose to leave an unstable location, and such a decision will always
be respected.

If a Head of Mission orders an evacuation from an unstable zone, staff must obey this order.

16.3 REMOTE CONTROL

Following an evacuation, activities will be:

 terminated
 suspended
 entrusted to local employees or major partners remaining in the area.

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The process consisting of setting up or continuing programmes using national or local
employees without the direct intervention of expatriate teams is referred to as “remote
control”. This is only possible with qualified and competent staff of great integrity. When
remote control is possible, the evacuation plan must provide for a transfer of responsibilities.

16.4 SUSPENSION OF ACTIVITIES

It may be necessary to suspend a programme’s activities to avoid a recently discovered threat,
and have time to think about the development of the situation. It could also be used to send a
signal to the local authorities or other groups.

A suspension will probably be more effective if all the humanitarian organisations decide to
do it simultaneously, and for the same reasons.

16.5 DECISION TO EVACUATE

When the situation proves too dangerous for humanitarian staff to remain in the region,
evacuation is necessary. An evacuation usually involves moving staff. The decision to
evacuate should not be made lightly, for its consequences may have a wide impact, including:

 Increased threats toward your humanitarian organisation or another,

 An increased workload for other humanitarian organisations remaining in the area
 Misunderstandings with the local population
 Increased needs among the local population after the closure of the humanitarian
programme
 Job losses for many employees
 Loss of property and equipment if the evacuation is followed by looting or robbery
 Problems if returning to work in a zone, re-establishing a programme or setting up
new ones

An evacuation will probably include most or all of the following phases:

 Consulting managers; consulting Headquarters

 Deciding to evacuate
 Informing the whole staff
 Informing the embassies concerned, if need be
 Planning the evacuation (the broad outlines of the evacuation plan should already
figure in the security plan; they will then have to be adapted and fine-tuned)
 Identifying which staff are to leave and which to stay, if need be
 Identifying which equipment should be removed and which left behind; hiding the
valuable equipment if possible
 Giving instructions to the staff that are staying
 Paying wages and other necessary funds to the remaining staff
 Informing the local authorities of the evacuation, if appropriate
 Informing Headquarters of the evacuation plan in detail
 Starting and completing the evacuation
 Informing Headquarters when the evacuation is complete
 Informing the embassies concerned when the evacuation is complete
 Debriefing the staff after the evacuation and offering counselling if necessary

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  Preparing a post-evacuation report, including with a detailed review of the situation of
the entire staff, property, equipment, money, and any questions still unresolved
 Keeping in touch with the remaining staff, if need be
 Planning the return, if appropriate

In most cases, evacuation does not involve employees recruited on site. The reasons behind
this policy are mainly:

 The physical impossibility in evacuating and later providing for the needs of numerous
employees recruited on site.
 Local employees generally have families in the region and do not wish to leave them.

In exceptional circumstances, when their lives are threatened, the decision to evacuate certain
employees and their families can be taken on an individual basis. There may be no legal
obligation for an organisation to evacuate them (although the duty to protect may imply a
legal requirement to evacuate staff in particular circumstances), but in some cases, a moral
obligation may compel the organisation to protect staff in great danger.

In other cases, employees recruited on site could stay to manage the programme, or a
modified version adapted to the context, during the absence of the international staff. This is
possible when the risks to local staff are significantly lower than those to international staff.
In such a case, clear procedures and good communications with Headquarters and the
Coordinating team are essential.

16.6 PRESERVING THE INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM

Action Contre la Faim is part of the humanitarian community and it coordinates and shares
the information with other IOs and NGOs. Action Contre la Faim however, is independent
from the United Nations, from any coordination bodies, and of course, from embassies.

The decision to evacuate is the sole responsibility of Action Contre la Faim. In order to
guarantee this independence, Action Contre la Faim’s missions must have their own means of
evacuation.

If the evacuation plan of a mission (or a base) relies only upon the emergency plans of the UN
or embassies, Action Contre la Faim will have no autonomy of decision regarding the
evacuation or its schedule.

Action Contre la Faim’s missions may be integrated into an evacuation plan shared with other
organisations, but must possess a viable alternative enabling it to remain independent.

16.7 DIFFERENT STAGES OF AN EVACUATION

The following stages illustrate the general organisation of a partial evacuation of expatriate
staff from their base.

Stage 1: The team at the base contacts the Logistics Coordinator to inform him/her of the
gravity of the situation in terms of security.

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Stage 2: The Logistics Coordinator informs the Head of Mission, and both gather the
information from other sources needed to confirm the seriousness of the situation.
Headquarters are informed of the possibility of an evacuation.

This information is essential for a more objective assessment of the context. A base may often
overestimate the seriousness of local incidents or, on the other hand, underestimate the impact
of national events.

Stage 3: Decision: after consultation with the base, the Head of Mission, the Logistics
Coordinator and Headquarters, a decision to evacuate may be taken.

The evacuation process must be clearly established:

 Total or partial (in this case, a detailed list of who leaves and who stays)
 Destination
 Departure time
 Timing and method of evacuation
 Transfer of responsibilities to local employees

Stage 4: The evacuation process is implemented.

As of this moment, and until the teams have reached a safe location, the Head of Mission will
keep Headquarters continually informed on how the operation is going.

The Human Resources department at Headquarters will inform the families of the evacuation.

You will find a detailed procedure for the development of your evacuation plan in appendix
15.

16.8 CHECK-LIST AND CONTENT OF THE EVACUATION PLAN

An evacuation rarely happens as planned; numerous external factors may interfere and force
the initial plan to be changed. However, it is vital to draw up an evacuation plan to ensure the
readiness of the teams, and enable the identification of needs and the planning of an
alternative solution for the evacuation.

Here are the points the Logistics Coordinator must specify and plan for:

 Responsibilities in the decision-making process: Head of Mission (final decision);

Logistics Coordinator; Logistician/Administrator, etc.
 Precise list of people to evacuate: there must be no ambiguity at the time of the
evacuation:
o Expatriates (essential, non-essential)
o Nationals
 Responsibility: who will organise and oversee the evacuation
 Remote control organisation (if need be): which employees are to manage activities
and support
 Destination: pre-defined for the evacuation and relocation
 Definition of the assembly point: when the evacuation is coordinated by other parties
 Means of evacuation:

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 o Routes: exact route, vehicles to be used, communication equipment
o Planes: charter companies’ phone numbers, GPS location of the nearest
airfield
o Boats
 Preparation of the personal effects of the evacuees:
o During emergency evacuations with small planes, the baggage limit is
generally 5 kg/person. On a commercial flight, the maximum is 20 kg/person
(taxes must be paid for any excess baggage)
 Equipment to evacuate or hide:
o The Logistic Coordinator prepares a list of the equipment to evacuate.
Priorities are generally: 1. laptops, 2. satellite equipment and 3. radio
equipment. It is often impossible to take all the equipment, therefore anything
that remains must be hidden on the site or entrusted to local employees, but
only if they are really aware of the risks and agree to take them.
- Vehicles are moved to the most secure location and their essential
components are removed (batteries, carburettors, fuel injectors, fuel
filters, etc.).
- Administrative documents: the Administrator must prepare his/her
own check list of sensitive documents to be taken away, and organise
the payment of employees and suppliers.
 The communication plan must be approved by the Head of Mission. Communication
passed on may be different depending on whether it is meant for:
o Local and national employees
o Local or national authorities
o Partners, contracting parties and other NGOs

16.9 HIBERNATION
Hibernation is the confinement of expatriate and relocated teams within a site precinct
(generally the offices or residences) for security reasons. Local employees will usually return
and to their homes, but when they cannot, they must stay with the hibernating teams.

Hibernation will be decided on:

 As a preventive measure in order to avoid becoming a victim of uncontrolled crowd

movements or terrorist acts: emotionally charged commemorations, demonstrations,
symbolic dates, etc.
 When an evacuation is not possible
 Right before an evacuation, to gather everybody together in the same location

It is imperative to stay in touch with either the Capital or Headquarters during hibernation. If
the team loses all ability to organise an evacuation because of a very critical situation, Action
Contre la Faim may try to plan an exfiltration operation. Communication is essential for the
coordination and the assessment of the situation.

All the equipment necessary for hibernation must be gathered in a designated room,
preferably a shelter, to ensure:

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Essential needs: water, food, ventilation, hygiene, first aid, power supply, bedding

Psychological comfort: communication equipment, radio, music, TV, books, games

In extreme situations, the teams may need to take refuge in a shelter. This room must be proof
against intrusion.

16.10 EMERGENCY/ EVACUATION STORES

Emergency stores are located in the compound and must cover the needs of expatriates and
national employees staying in this building (caretaker, drivers, radio operators, etc.). The
minimum required by Action Contre la Faim is a stock of provisions to last a whole week:

 Water: 20 litres per person per day + several water filters

 Food: 2,100 kcal per person per day

Do not forget cigarettes for smokers, and some alcohol. NB: you must be very vigilant with
alcohol, because it dulls the reflexes and impairs judgment. Hygiene products (soap, toilet
paper, etc.) and small equipment (candles, batteries) must be included in the emergency
stores.

In some countries where offices are located far from the compound, offices must be equipped
with their own emergency stores.

In cold countries, the teams will also need enough fuel reserves (wood, oil, coal) for several
weeks.

Evacuation stores: If the team has to evacuate by road in a hostile environment, the
emergency stores are packed in metal boxes and loaded onto the vehicles. The metal boxes
must be available and stored with the emergency stores. Do not forget to stock up on
drinking water.

16.11 DEBRIEFING AFTER AN EVACUATION

After the evacuation, the managers concerned must debrief the staff to ensure that any
pending problems are resolved as far as possible. These may include:

 Needs of the population left behind: can we meet them once the programme has been
terminated, suspended or modified?
 Will the programme be re-established? If so, when and under what conditions?
 Should the staff stay under contract to restart the programme as soon as possible?
 End or renewal of contracts; reallocation to other tasks
 Maintaining contact with staff whose contracts have recently been terminated
 Management of the remaining staff
 Feelings of loss or disappointment
 Wages; compensation for loss of property
 Stress
 Medical treatment for employees who need it
 Future plans for teams and individuals
 Expressions of appreciation for managers and individuals for the work done by the
team: consider organising a ceremony to thank everyone, or a farewell party

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16.12 RETURNING AFTER AN EVACUATION
If it is possible to go back to the region after an evacuation, it will be necessary to reassess the
security situation, as significant aspects of the security conditions will have probably changed.
Local relations will need to be re-established and it may take time before enough trust is built
up to restart the programmes.

If employees recruited on the site have continued with the programme during the entire
evacuation period, it is very important for team unity to recognise the work they have
accomplished. The international staff in particular should be careful not to give the impression
that everything came to a stop after their departure.

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 17. LEARNING AND TRAINING

17.1 TRAINING

TRAINING OF NEW FIELD WORKERS

Action Contre la Faim has a duty to evince great caution in deploying its staff. It must ensure
that employees working in unstable situations for the first time have at least basic knowledge
of how to ensure their security.

Missions will determine what constitutes responsible security management training for the
new staff, and the way to best organise it.

TRAINING OF FIELD MANAGERS

Field managers are in charge of ensuring the security of their teams. A mixture of training and
briefing will probably be needed to guarantee that they have the required knowledge and
skills to assume this role. The angles to address are the following:

 Assessment of the threats to the organisation

 Knowledge of trends affecting the security of humanitarian organisations
 The ability to assess the potential risks and advantages of a programme
 The management of serious incidents, which may receive media coverage
(kidnappings)
 Media management during an incident
 Kidnapping negotiations
 Reactions to heavy losses
 Sharing of security knowledge and good practices with other organisations

Exercises or drills may be necessary in order to prepare them for some of the above-
mentioned tasks. Other tasks can be covered during training and briefings.

17.2 USE OF EXPERIENCED EMPLOYEES

Experienced fieldworkers are a precious resource: they can be used to train and brief both
future and current fieldworkers. They can be called on to:

 Brief on situations they are familiar with or have had recent knowledge of
 Advise on security policies and procedures
 Assess the security management
 Take part in security-related assessments or other tasks of this nature

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 18. CHECKPOINTS

In numerous countries, checkpoints are widespread. Many have a legitimate purpose, e.g. to
prevent arms entering the region. For some, it seems that the sole purpose is harassment.
Others are used as cover (e.g. for criminals or rebel soldiers), or for ambushes, taxation, theft
or violence.

Staff must be trained and briefed on the best ways to behave at checkpoints. The best
approach may vary from one situation to the other. The following advice may be helpful:

 Notify the base by radio upon approaching or leaving a checkpoint. Do it discreetly,

far enough away from the checkpoint to avoid being seen using the radio.
 Observe the checkpoint from a distance, without stopping, in order to figure out what
is happening there. Does everything seem normal? Or are there signs indicating there
may be a problem?
 If you suspect any risk of violence or other serious problems, turn around and get
away without stopping, insofar as doing so does not endanger you.
 All passengers must take off their sunglasses before reaching a checkpoint. Hide any
valuable objects, though it is preferable not to travel with valuable objects if possible.
 At night, turn off your headlights, keeping your sidelights on, and turn on the interior
light so that the checkpoint can see the vehicle’s occupants.
 Approach the checkpoint slowly and stop well before the barrier.
 Stay in the vehicle unless you are ordered to get out.
 Avoid sudden movements. Just moving your hand to unbuckle the seat belt may
sometimes be interpreted as an attempt to reach for a weapon; inform them first of
your intention, then do it slowly.
 If someone is taken some way from the vehicle, to an office for example, for an
identity check, see if it may be safer for another person to accompany him/her.
 Be ready to answer questions about the passengers, your route, the vehicle and its
contents.
 One person should be designated to speak for all the passengers, unless the questions
are directed at them specifically.

Your attitude is very important: stay courteous and friendly without being overly familiar. A
soldier’s job is boring and they will probably be less recalcitrant if you show an interest in
them. If it seems right, talk to them a little, perhaps about their families. If they ask you for
something improper (such as a gift), politely but firmly refuse, maybe resorting to a little
good-natured humour.

Be ready to show all appropriate documents, particularly the vehicle’s papers, authorisations,
and copies of passports and identity cards. If possible, do not show your actual passport, to
prevent it from being confiscated. However, in some cases, the original may be required. It
could be useful to keep your ID card on a chain around your neck, so that you can show it
without handing it over.

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If you suspect the checkpoint of hostile intentions, it may be prudent, according to the
circumstances, to lock all the doors, including the boot, and to almost completely raise the
windows. In some cases however, this could irritate the soldiers or the police. Use your
judgement to determine the best attitude to adopt.

If they insist, let them search the vehicle.

Some organisations have to use sensitive documents for their work. Do not carry any sensitive
documents if you can avoid it. If you must carry them, and you are searched, you can attempt
to deny them access to them. However if they threaten you, you should give up. Keep the
documents out of sight, in order not to attract attention.

If you are threatened with a weapon, calmly obey their orders.

When leaving the checkpoint, turn up the volume of the radio and inform the base that you
have crossed the checkpoint.

If they refuse you passage, return to your point of departure and report it to your manager.
He/she may be able to negotiate a safe passage in the region with the competent authorities,
depending on the circumstances.

You must adopt a clear policy regarding passengers not belonging to the organisation.
Humanitarians are often approached to drive soldiers, whether armed or not, to control points.
Action Contre la Faim formally prohibits taking any military personnel aboard its vehicles.
You must ensure that every staff member knows how to react in such situations, including
cases where soldiers are injured and need medical assistance.

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 19. PREVENTION: HEALTH AND
HYGIENE

It is essential for the humanitarian staff to take good care of their health and to implement
strict hygiene measures. Common diseases among humanitarian staff include potentially
deadly infections such as malaria or dengue fever.

All employees must undergo a medical check-up both before signing their contract, and once
the contract has ended. This will ensure that any medical problem is treated, and will also help
to protect the organisation from any false accusations regarding work-related medical
problems. Incidentally, this procedure may also enable reduced insurance premiums.

19.1 HEALTH PRECAUTIONS

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AGAINST MALARIA AND DENGUE FEVER

It is essential to take preventative measures against malaria and dengue fever in regions where
these diseases are endemic. Malaria can and often does kill. Make sure you avoid mosquito
bites. Preventative measures against malaria include:

 Wearing long sleeves, trousers and socks at the end of the afternoon and at night
 Applying insect repellent on uncovered areas of the body
 Using a mosquito net when sleeping
 Fitting windows and doors with mosquito screens
 Taking adequate prophylactic measures against malaria, on the advice of a doctor
 Getting vaccinations against serious illnesses. Some countries will not allow
foreigners to enter without the relevant vaccination certificates.
 Checking the quality and capability of the local medical infrastructures. Ensure that all
employees know the reliable medical infrastructures and their locations. A medical
NGO may be able to offer emergency cover.

First aid kits must be provided in every building and vehicle. It is important for their content
to be adapted to each situation, and for them to be regularly maintained by a qualified person.

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AGAINST HIV/AIDS – SEE PEP TREATMENT PROTOCOL

Particularly:

 Availability of clean needles and syringes suitable for medical use

 Appropriate and responsible sexual behaviour

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AGAINST THE SUN

 Wear a hat, long sleeves, long skirts or trousers, and use sunscreen
 Avoid dehydration: drink a sufficient amount. Take a bottle of water with you on trips.

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19.2 HYGIENE PRECAUTIONS
Keep a clean water reserve. If the quality of the water is not guaranteed, you must filter then
boil it for 15 minutes to make it drinkable.

 Keep a stock of water in reserve in case of water shortages

 Keep a stock of water-purifying tablets
 Ensure that the food is bought from safe sources and properly prepared
 Wash your hands frequently and always before meals
 Ensure that cooks wash their hands frequently while preparing meals
 Ensure that kitchens, bathrooms and latrines are kept clean
 Properly dispose of refuse
 Avoid eating fruit or vegetables that have not been thoroughly washed in clean water

19.3 FIRST AID MEASURES

It is recommended for Action Contre la Faim managers to implement a first aid policy,
pinpointing the following:

 The level of first aid training required for teams in the field.
 Which employees should be given first aid training.
 What types of first aid kits should correspond to the standard procedures for:
o Lodgings
o Offices
o Warehouses
o Vehicles

A technical data-sheet relating to first-aid can be found in appendix 29.

For further advice on health, hygiene, first aid or any other medical issue, it is best to consult
a doctor.

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20. MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC)

The security plan must detail the procedure for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). There are
some particularly important points to remember:

 The doctor who examined the patient must sign a certificate establishing that a
MEDEVAC is necessary. This certificate must be faxed to the insurance company.
 All staff members must learn the proper procedures to contact the company in charge
of the medical evacuation, particularly its current phone and fax numbers and if
necessary, the certificate numbers.
 It must be clearly established which staff members are entitled to a MEDEVAC, and
what medical arrangements are used for the others.
 It is advisable to contact the company in charge of the medical evacuation as soon as
the procedure is drawn up, to make sure you have their correct phone number and to
ensure that they recognise you as one of their clients.
 The routes used for a MEDEVAC must be checked. Will the roads you intend to use
be open if the situation deteriorates? What are the other alternative routes? Will the
local airfield or airport be open, accessible and safe? What are the alternative
solutions?

A medical NGO active in the same region may be able to help you during medical
emergencies. Discuss this option with them before any emergency arises.

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 21. SECURITY INCIDENTS: REACTION
GUIDELINES

The previous chapters offer guidelines to avoid or prevent most security and safety incidents.
This chapter provides general directives on managing the most commonly-encountered
security and safety incidents.

Even the most experienced and best-trained person may be the victim of an unpredictable
incident. By getting acquainted with the principles described in this chapter, you increase your
survival chances in the event that your life is threatened. You will also find a framework
procedure that will help you react in the right way.
Action Contre la Faim’s security managers must make sure their teams are adequately
prepared, in order to both minimise security risks and enable them to react appropriately to
incidents.

You will find below some suggestions that will help you reduce the risks of various types of
incidents, and show you how to react if they happen. They certainly do not apply to every
situation, but can serve as a base for adapting to the context. The best reaction to an incident
will depend on its specific circumstances.

21.1 ACCIDENTS

CAR ACCIDENTS
In many cases, driving is the most dangerous activity for humanitarian staff. While accidents
do not really constitute a security issue, they are included in the present guide because of the
great number of humanitarian workers killed or injured in car accidents. Considerable effort
must be put into promoting safe driving behaviour and the proper maintenance of vehicles, in
order to avoid accidents as far as possible.

WHEN AN ACCIDENT OCCURS:

Stop quickly and safely. Get off the road if it is safe to do so.

Note: In some regions, it is dangerous to stop after being involved in a vehicle accident, for
bystanders may eventually attempt to beat up, or even kill, the occupants of a vehicle they
deem responsible for the accident. In such a case, it is normal to keep driving, even if there
are victims, and to call the police, or any other responsible authority, for help. In other
cultures however, it is imperative to stop immediately, or face criminal charges. This
highlights the importance of good knowledge of the local context, and of briefing new
employees accordingly.
 Anticipate other dangers. After an accident, it is essential to protect passengers,
bystanders and other road users from any other dangers. This can involve:
o Getting all passengers in imminent danger out of the car.
o Extinguishing or preventing a fire (e.g. in the event of spilled fuel).

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 o Re-directing traffic if need be.
o Giving first aid to any injured person who needs it.
o Taking appropriate measures to get victims to the nearest emergency service,
using your own vehicle, if need be.
o Exchanging contact details with all others involved in the accident.
o If you have a camera, taking a picture of the vehicles’ positions after the
accident and any other useful details, as long as this does not upset the
bystanders.
o When the police arrive, giving them your full cooperation.
o Preparing a detailed report after the incident.
o Identifying the lessons to be learned, and ensuring that any necessary changes
are made to the procedures.
o If a disciplinary measure is required, seeing that it is taken quickly and fairly.
o Recording the incident in the appropriate log.

OTHER TYPES OF INCIDENTS

There are various dangers for the humanitarian staff that do not necessarily involve vehicles.
These include:
 Electric shocks
 Natural disasters: landslides, floods or earthquakes
 Falling or slipping
 Drowning
 Burns

Managers must seek to reduce the staff’s exposure to such dangers, and take all appropriate
measures to limit their impact or accelerate recovery afterwards.

It is advised to keep an accident log for recording all accidents. “Close call” accidents must
also be listed.

21.2 BOMBINGS, AIR ATTACKS, ETC.

As with any other risk, it is essential to assess the threat of air attacks. In particular:

 Is there an air attack likely?

 What are the likely targets of an air attack? Are they close by?
 What is the likely type of possible air attack?

Depending on the answers to these questions, what security measures should you implement?
What type of shelter do you need? If the risk of an air attack is high, should you reconsider
your presence in the region?

In case of an air attack, the appropriate reaction depends on the type of attack and on your
location. The following procedures may be appropriate according to the circumstances:

 Immediately lie face down on the ground and stay there.

 If you can roll or crawl into a ditch, inside a building or behind a wall without
exposing yourself further, do so. You will probably be better protected. Otherwise,

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 stay immobile. Blasts and shrapnel are usually propelled upwards from the explosion
centre, in the shape of a cone; your best defence is thus to stay as low as possible.
 Observe what is happening.
 Do not move until you are sure the attack is over. Beware: a second wave may be
about to start. Give yourself enough time to allow for this possibility.
 If you are in a building, throw yourself on the floor and stay away from windows.
Many injuries are caused by broken glass. If you can do it without risk, go to a pre-
designated shelter, without attracting attention.
 As in any other incident, do not use the radio unless absolutely necessary. Do not call
your colleagues to inquire about their safety; if they need help, they will call you.
Leave the radio channels free for the use of those in an emergency situation.
 Duly report the incident.

21.3 ELECTRIC SHOCKS

As with fires, we can usually avoid an electric shock by taking preventative and protective
measures. Most electric shocks are caused by worn installations and equipment, overcharged
circuits or modification of the system by non-professionals. One can avoid or minimise
electric shocks by doing regular inspections, repairing problems as soon as they are identified,
and ensuring that all the staff know where to find the right switch.

If an electric shock occurs, immediately take action as follows:

 Call for help, and give the alarm.

 Cut off the power source, either using the switch/meter, or by unplugging the
appliance.
 Do not go near, or touch, a person who has received an electric shock. The electricity
will flow from that person to any other who comes near.
 Use a rope, a broomstick, or any non-metallic object that has no conductive properties,
to move the victim away from the power source.
 Once in a safe location, where the person is no longer in contact with the power
source, start helping the victim.
 Take rapid action to prevent any fire from starting.
 Provide first aid, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) if necessary, and
continue until help arrives.

For more details on preventive measures, see the chapter on Building Management.

21.4 MEDICAL EMERGENCIES

Each Action Contre la Faim mission must draw up clear procedures to enable its staff to react
appropriately in the event of a medical emergency. In some cases, procedures will be different
for national and international staff, because they include the possibility that international staff
will be evacuated to another country for medical treatment.

By providing first aid training to the entire staff and their family members, we can
considerably reduce the effects of an illness or unexpected injury, particularly in regions
where medical emergency facilities are unavailable.

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When you respond to any medical emergency, take the following measures:

SECURING THE AREA

It is important to remember that it does not help the victim if the person going to their rescue
becomes a victim in turn. So do not rush to provide help in an emergency situation before
making sure that it is safe to do so. Try to determine the cause of the accident, and anything
that may injure a person going to the rescue of the victim.

If there are other people present, observe the following guidelines:

 Under no circumstances enter a zone where there are known to be explosive devices.
 In the event of an electric shock, ensure that the power source is disconnected before
touching the victim.
 In the event of a vehicle accident, move away from the accident site and get well off
the road (if possible) to avoid any subsequent accident or injury.
 Pay careful attention to the reaction of the bystanders, and make sure they understand
the intentions of the first aid worker.
 Ask for an interpreter if necessary.
 Be very aware that an incident may be linked to a criminal activity, and that accidents
may be staged in order to rob potential victims.
 Remember that in cases of drowning, there often are two victims: the original victim
and the person who comes to his/her aid without taking the appropriate precautions.

CALLING FOR HELP

Call for help or ask witnesses to get help, and make sure they understand your request
correctly. Call the base, any other staff member, or the appropriate authorities.
In remote areas, you may have to wait for hours before anyone shows up. You should
therefore notify someone before you start helping the victim.

GATHERING EQUIPMENT
Is there a first aid kit in the vehicle? Can you quickly get a blanket, material to make a
bandage, or any other equipment needed? If so, it means you can start applying first aid
without wasting time in getting the necessary material together.

STARTING FIRST AID

In most countries, emergency medical care is the responsibility of the first person who comes
to the rescue of a victim until more qualified aid (an ambulance or doctor) arrives. The
mission must ensure that all staff members are aware of the obligations and legal standards
relative to the management of emergency responses in the area. Once first aid is begun, it
must be continued until the victim is taken to a medical centre or treated by qualified staff.

For more details on medical management, refer to the chapter devoted to this subject.

Refer also to the data-sheets and chapters devoted to medical evacuations and to various
major risks: AIDS, bird flu, and to the data-sheet on first aid.

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21.5 AIR CRASHES
Although air crashes are generally classified as more of a health than a security issue, these
last few years they have caused a significant number of deaths among humanitarian workers.
This is why we have included the subject in the present guide.
Managers of humanitarian missions can reduce the risks of an air crash in some respects,
particularly by:

 Carefully selecting the airline

 Avoiding high risk routes
 Keeping up to date about the security levels at departure and arrival points, and all
along the route taken.

In the event of an air crash involving a staff member, the local authorities will probably
organise a search and rescue operation. Staff managers must inform the employee’s
immediate family at once, and keep them updated on developments in the situation.

21.6 AMBUSHES
The best defence against ambushes is to avoid them! A good assessment of the security
situation, along with mature and informed consideration of the matter, should result in a
decision not to travel through areas where ambushes are likely.

While it is possible to reduce the risk of falling into an ambush, it is difficult to eliminate all
the odds of it happening without giving up travel altogether. In some circumstances, avoiding
any journey, at least temporarily, may be the best decision. In others, the humanitarian
managers may decide that, if the risk of an ambush is very low, and travelling is essential to
save many lives, the journey is justified. The decision must be taken on a case by case basis,
respecting the mission's chain of command in terms of security management.

The best reaction depends on many factors, including the nature of the road, the terrain,
whether the staff are on foot or in a vehicle, the number of persons travelling, their level of
training, the goal of the aggressors and their level of training, the types of weapons used, etc.
The ability to make the right decisions depends on the quality of the information received.

Here are some procedures on how to react to certain types of ambushes. They may be
advisable in some circumstances, but inadequate or even dangerous in others. Good
judgement and training are vital for making the right decision at the critical time. These
procedures are provided to staff to help them consider all possible responses beforehand. It is
essential that the following procedures be selected and adapted to the situation in hand.

DURING AMBUSHES AGAINST VEHICLES

If possible, keep driving cautiously and as fast as you can. It is difficult to hit a moving target;
the faster it moves, the more difficult it is to reach.

If the shots come from ahead, try going left or right into a side road (in cities or on country
roads) but always stay on a “good” road. It is not recommended to drive in reverse or do a U-
turn: slow-moving vehicles are an easier target.

If the driver is shot or the vehicle immobilised, start by getting out of the car, remaining
behind it (away from the source of the shots) to protect and conceal yourself better. Then as

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soon as you can, move to the first available shelter, and consider moving again to a better
shelter if there is one close by. Shelters like ditches, rocks or buildings offer the best
protection.

AMBUSHES WITH NO ROADBLOCKS

While driving a car, you hear a shot nearby. It may hit the vehicle. On the other hand, you
may not be sure whether you were the intended target, and its origin may be difficult to
pinpoint.

Drive faster if you can do so without risk, go past the site of the ambush (assume it is an
ambush and do not waste time checking). Do not drive so fast that you lose control of the
vehicle. Do not steer a zigzag course or you risk overturning the vehicle. Keep up a safe speed
even if you are shot at. Your passengers should lie down during the manoeuvre and be as little
conspicuous as possible.

It is difficult to take good decisions in the middle of an ambush. It is a little easier if the staff
are competent, well-trained, well-informed and experienced.

It is essential that employees who have just experienced an ambush send an incident report
immediately. This is important for their own security and to warn other road users about this
route.

21.7 GRENADES
If a grenade is thrown at you, or rolls very close to you, you only have a few seconds to react.

NEVER TRY TO PICK UP, THROW OR KICK A GRENADE!

Do no attempt to run to a shelter. A grenade’s fuse burns out in only a few seconds and the
grenade can explode within a radius of 30 metres in all directions. It is therefore useless to
run. People who lie down on the ground have less chance of being injured than those standing
or running.

Immediately take the following measures:

 Raise the alarm, turn away from the grenade and take one step away from it.
 Lie down face to the ground, and cross your legs, keeping them straight, with your feet
pointing toward the grenade. Keep your arms very straight along your body. Do not
look backwards towards the grenade.

If the grenade does not explode within 30 seconds, stay down, crawl towards a safe location,
then inform the appropriate authorities. Do not return to the area where the grenade was
thrown, and prevent other people from doing so.

21.8 ARRESTS OR DETENTION

Humanitarian staff are sometimes arrested or detained. To significantly reduce the risks of
this happening, we can take the following measures:

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  Maintain good relations with authorities and local groups
 Adopt appropriate behaviour during and outside working hours
 Abide by the laws and local customs
 Ensure that all legal documents are up to date and are carried by employees and
vehicles whenever necessary
 Train and brief staff before they take up their duties

If a staff member is arrested or detained, his/her manager needs to react quickly. The most
effective responses will depend on the circumstances, but can involve:

 Visiting the employee as soon as possible to reassure him/her and establish the facts.
 Meeting with an official representative of the entity that arrested your colleague.
Depending on the circumstances, you might request the employee’s release, or
challenge his/her detention and insist on his/her release.
 Obtaining legal assistance if necessary.
 Informing other humanitarian organisations. If they consider it an arbitrary detention,
they can coordinate their responses to convince the authorities to release the person
concerned.
 Informing the ICRC and asking for their advice.
 Informing consular authorities, if the employee is a foreign national.
 Informing the employee’s immediate family if he/she is not quickly released.

In numerous cases, the simple fact of knowing that other humanitarian organisations have
been informed of the detention is enough to convince the authorities to release the detainee.

In other cases, detention may be justified if the employee has committed an offence, or if
there are reasonable grounds to believe he/she has committed one. In this case, it is important
to respect the authorities' mandate which consists of monitoring respect of the legal
procedures. Your lawyer must advise you on the best approach to adopt.

A detention may also conceal a kidnapping. It may not be obvious at the start, but can become
clearer when a ransom or other conditions are demanded for the release. In this case, refer to
the section on kidnapping in the Appendix to this document for more information on how to
handle the situation.

21.9 ASSAULTS
Courteous and respectful behaviour during an assault can prevent it from escalating, and in
some cases, even calm a hostile individual. Armed aggressors are more prone to shoot if they
feel their own safety threatened.

In the event of robberies, threats or confrontations, abide by the following guidelines:

 Do not attempt to intimidate your aggressor, or be aggressive yourself. Stay polite,

open and confidant, and try to hide your fear and anger.
 Speak calmly and clearly.
 Let them see your hands at all times, and move slowly, with measured movements.
 Answer questions or requests, but offer nothing you are not specifically asked for.
 Never take any physical risks to defend property or money.

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 No material property is worth endangering the life of Action Contre la Faim staff

When someone asks you to give him/her something that belongs to ACF, such as a vehicle or
a laptop, do not oppose resistance:

 If you are in a group, do not confer too much with each other, especially in a language
your aggressors do not understand.
 Theoretically, do not attempt to escape.

Further to the usual precautions to avoid confrontation, if a risk of assault is established, it is

advisable to teach staff members the basic methods to defend themselves and/or escape.

21.10 CROWDS
Crowds are in most cases totally peaceful. They can, however, present certain risks, such as
theft and violence. Remember that a crowd that is peaceful in principle can very quickly turn
into a violent riot.

It is important to know when a crowd could potentially assemble (such as during festivals or
political demonstrations) and for what purpose:

 If you have reasons to believe it could become violent, stay away from it.
 If you are already in a crowd and think it may turn violent, do not bring attention to
yourself, blend into the group as much as possible then try to get away from it as soon
as you can.
 Never encourage the gathering of a crowd (e.g. by planning food distribution) unless
you are sure you can meet all its expectations in time.

21.11 EARTHQUAKES
If you are working in a region prone to earthquakes, you must take adequate precautions.
Consult any experts who are available locally.

The aspects to take into consideration include:

 Assessing the risks of working in a region prone to earthquakes.

 Finding an earthquake-resistant building to work/live in (this may turn out to be
difficult, even impossible, in certain circumstances).
 Being prepared for earthquakes, for example by:
o Anchoring equipment and furniture to the walls to prevent it from falling on
people;
o Anchoring and reinforcing gas and fuel tanks;
o Securing office computers and other devices, for example with Velcro strips;
o Placing safety locks on drawers and cupboard doors;
o Keeping an emergency stock of food and water etc.;
o Learning to recognise the signs of a tremor or earthquake.

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Comprehensive guidelines for working in countries with strong seismic activities are available
at the missions and Action Contre la Faim Headquarters.

A technical data-sheet on the subject of Earthquakes can be found later on in this guide.

21.12 ARMED CONFLICT

Action Contre la Faim staff must endeavour to avoid armed battle grounds, unless their
presence is vital, meaning that the potential advantages of their work outweigh the risks. Even
in such cases, any employees working in a conflict zone must understand the risks and remain
in the area only if it is their deliberate choice. In certain cases, battles may be relatively
harmless for staff or humanitarian programmes. The advantages of staying will therefore
outweigh the relatively small risks.

With proper information about the local situation, managers and employees should be able to
determine when tension mounts and the point at which this could degenerate into an armed
conflict. They must adapt their plans accordingly, in order to avoid being exposed to the
fighting, if and when it breaks out. In some cases this can involve evacuating the area. In
others, it will mean taking shelter during a battle while remaining in the zone.

There are no substitutes for training staff on the proper ways to react to the breakout of armed
conflict. Merely reading a manual can in no way prepare them to react adequately. Teaching
them a few practical skills, and training them to apply those skills until they master them, will
increase their chances of reacting more appropriately to a real event.

However, the few guidelines provided in this guide will still be helpful to you. If you are not
under cover when shots or explosions occur (such as mortar shells or artillery fire), the
appropriate reaction will depend on several factors, such as the type of battle and your
position. The following procedures may be appropriate according to the circumstances:

SHOTS WHILE YOU ARE ON FOOT AND UNPROTECTED

 Try to remain calm. Do not panic, and do not run.
 Immediately lie on the ground, flat and face down.
 Determine the direction from which the shots are coming, the target they are
aimed at and its location.
 If possible, crawl to a nearby shelter, such as a ditch, a hole or inside a
building.
 Observe the reactions of other people in the area and react accordingly.
 Leave the area only when you are in a safe zone or when the shooting has
completely stopped.
 Immediately call the appropriate authorities and/or your base.

SHOTS WHILE YOU ARE IN A VEHICLE

 Leave the windows slightly open and turn the radio volume down; inform the base.
 If the shots come from ahead, but are not aimed at your vehicle (as in an ambush):
o Immediately stop.

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 o Turn the car around and drive to a safe location, staying on tarmacked roads, or
drive in reverse on the same road.
 If the shots do not come from directly ahead of you, or if you cannot determine their
direction:
o Immediately stop and:
 Take shelter outside the vehicle (except in mined/booby-trapped areas).
 Take the car keys and communication equipment with you.
 If possible, crawl towards a nearby protected area. Never take shelter
under a vehicle.

SHOTS WHILE YOU ARE IN A BUILDING

 Immediately lie down on the floor.
 If you can, crawl without being noticed towards a pre-designated shelter, or an interior
room or corridor that offers better protection against stray bullets.
 Stay away from windows: broken glass is one of the major causes of injury.

EXPLOSIONS WHILE YOU ARE ON FOOT AND UNPROTECTED

 Immediately lie down on the ground.
 Keep still.

If possible, roll or crawl towards a ditch or building or behind a wall, without being noticed.
You will probably be better protected.

If not, stay face down. Blasts and shrapnel are usually propelled upwards from the explosion
centre in the shape of a cone; your best defence is to stay as low as possible.

Take the local situation into account. In some circumstances, grenade attacks are followed by
indiscriminate, sustained artillery fire. In other cases, small bombs are used to attract the
crowd and a larger bomb is programmed to explode 5 to 30 minutes after the smaller blasts, in
order to inflict as much human damage as possible. It is probably preferable to leave the area
as quickly as possible after an explosion.

EXPLOSIONS WHILE YOU ARE IN A VEHICLE

If you consider that you are not the intended target:

 Stop the vehicle

 Get out quickly and lie on the ground, a good way from the vehicle, or in a ditch if one
is accessible and safe.

If, however, you believe you may be the target of the explosion and that it would be more
dangerous to stop than remain in the vehicle, it would probably be better to drive away as
quickly as you can.

As always, any decision you take should be based on your judgment, i.e. your ability to assess
the situation.

EXPLOSIONS WHILE YOU ARE IN A BUILDING

If you are in a building:

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  Lie down quickly on the floor.
 Stay away from windows.
 If it doesn’t involve taking additional risks, go to a pre-designated shelter (without
attracting attention) or to an interior room, or corridor, that offers better protection
against shrapnel and broken glass.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INCIDENT

If you are not the target of the attack, do not move unless you are confident that it is over, and
another attack is not about to start. If a security manager is available, he/she may be able to
notify you by radio of the end of the alert, although this is not always possible. You may have
to wait a good while before you can assume with any certainty that the attack is really over.

As with any other incident, do not use the radio unless absolutely necessary. Do not call your
colleagues to inquire about their safety; if they need help, they will call you. Leave the radio
channels free for the use of those in an emergency situation.

Report the incident, bearing in mind that radio channels must be left free to permit the
broadcast of urgent messages.

21.13 FIRE
All staff members must know the fire drill. Here are some simple instructions, applicable to a
large number of circumstances:

 If you discover an incipient fire, give the alarm by yelling.

 Use an extinguisher or a blanket to put out the fire, without taking unwarranted risks
or endangering your life or that of others.
 Leave the building as quickly as possible. Walk rather than run, to avoid accidents. Go
to the pre-designated assembly point in the event of a fire.
 Close the doors behind you when leaving, to help contain the fire.
 Remember that smoke can kill. In heavy smoke, get down and keep your mouth under
the smoke level.
 Seal the bottom of the doors with blankets and clothes to prevent smoke from getting
in. Wetting materials when possible offers better protection.
 If possible, wet blankets, coats or other non-synthetic fabrics for later use.
 Crouch under an open window and keep calling for help.
 If the fire spreads to your room, wrap yourself up if possible in two or more layers of
blankets or materials, with the top layer wet.

A designated person must check that the building is empty. In a large building, fire procedures
must include a team of fire monitors responsible for ensuring that all the premises are vacated.
At the assembly point, a roll call must be made to ensure all occupants are accounted for.

Call the fire brigade if there is one. Otherwise, alert the neighbouring buildings and try to put
out the fire.

Do not return to the building until a qualified person informs you that it is safe to do so.

See also the chapter on risk prevention: building management.

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21.14 FLOODS
If there are flood risks, they must be identified within the security assessment, and adequate
measures must be taken. It is preferable to avoid using buildings in flood-prone areas. It is
equally advisable to avoid using roads when they are likely to be flooded.

Nevertheless, if there is a risk of flood, the following simple precautionary measures may be
helpful:

 Build barriers to divert the water and protect the buildings.

 Store any critical equipment that may be damaged by a flood above the level the water
may reach.
 Consider staying on upper floors out of reach of the water.
 Keep a stock of food, water, cooking utensils and appliances above the potential high
water mark.
 Keep a stock of medicines.
 Ensure you have toilets, even improvised ones, above the potential high water mark.
 Store the communication equipment above the high water mark. Ensure that batteries
are charged at all times. If possible, keep a small generator above the potential high
water mark to recharge batteries and meet other priority needs.

If necessary, arrange for a boat for travel during floods. It must only be used by a qualified
person. Other security equipment may be necessary, such as lifejackets.

More details are available in the data-sheet: Floods

21.15 FRAUD
Fraud is defined as a deliberate, illegal act resulting in financial loss to the organisation. It
includes the theft of merchandise or property, the falsification of accounts and the destruction
of documents to conceal an unlawful act. Fraud does not include accounting errors or acts
condoned by established practices.

Possible irregularities include non-authorised activities for personal gain, such as “borrowing”
from the till, and the abusive use of vehicles, phones or other equipment.

Fraud inevitably has a detrimental impact on the organisation. Not only does it deprive the
beneficiaries of resources, it can also damage the organisation’s efficiency, morale, credibility
and last but not least, its funding and even its survival.

Cases of fraud and illegal actions require careful responses to minimise their long-term
impact. It is important to be ready to react to fraud or financial irregularities by having a
written procedure that covers the various stages in the process. Ideally of course, fraud should
be prevented through the implementation of sound financial procedures, rather than the
organisation having to react to it.

If you discover a fraud or suspect a fraudulent act, the following measures may be useful,
according to the circumstances:

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  Do not overlook a proven or suspected fraud. Take appropriate measures.
 If documents or papers provide evidence of the fraud, put them in a safe place before
you share any suspicions with the staff.
 Notify the staff of the opening of an investigation. This must be carried out by a
competent party, independent of anyone who might be involved in the fraud. When
fraud is suspected but not yet substantiated, an alternative solution is to inform the
staff that a financial audit, possibly required by Headquarters, will be conducted.

The investigation should conclude with a written report addressed to the Head of Mission and
must include:

 Confirmation of the fraud.

 The amount of the loss involved.
 If known, the identity of the person(s) who appear to have been involved in the fraud.
 The identification of any breach of procedures or dereliction of duty on the part of the
staff, which may have enabled or facilitated the fraud.
 The identity of any employee(s) who need to be disciplined
 Recommendations on the lessons learned and the adaptation of any procedures to
prevent future fraud.

The Head of Mission, or another responsible person, must ensure the prompt enforcement of
any disciplinary or other measures.

21.16 CARJACKING
Carjacking can happen anywhere, but is more common at checkpoints and road intersections.

Action Contre la Faim employees who work in areas where vehicles are often hijacked should
be trained on how to avoid potential trouble zones, and on the immediate measures they must
take if they are threatened. A meticulous security assessment must be made before vehicles
are driven in high-risk zones.

Carjacking may have different purposes, particularly the following:

 Stealing the car and the property it contains

 Using the occupants as hostages
 Using the vehicle to commit other crimes, perhaps with the vehicle’s identity as a
cover
 Provoking a political reaction, such as demonstrating that the local security forces do
not completely control the region

Because of the risks involved, it is important to take all the necessary measures to avoid any
carjacking. But while it is possible to reduce the risk, it is difficult to eliminate all the odds of
it happening without giving up all travel. In some circumstances, cancelling a journey, at least
temporarily, may be the best decision. In others, managers may decide that travelling is
justified, if the risks of carjacking are very low, and undertaking the journey is essential to
save many lives. Decisions must be taken on a case by case basis.

There are many ways a carjacking may be attempted. The most common include:

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  A road block or checkpoint to stop the vehicle.
 Surrounding a vehicle that has stopped at a traffic light or is stuck in traffic.
 Using another vehicle to block the road or crash into the car to force it to stop.
 Simulating an accident or breakdown to get you to stop and offer help. The aggressors,
pretending to be either victims or witnesses, then attack you. If you consider that this
is a significant risk in your region, all drivers must be instructed never to stop at the
scene of an accident or vehicle breakdown, but to keep driving, in case it is a
carjacking in disguise.

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AGAINST CARJACKING

 Vary your routes and the periods when you travel. Avoid routine, and do not inform
anyone who does not belong to Action Contre la Faim or is not a member of your
family about your travel plans.
 Avoid areas known for their criminality or likelihood of assault. If possible, avoid
"points of confrontation" and other vulnerable zones.
 When possible, try to contact other agencies working in the same area to get reliable
advice on the road network. If you can, travel in convoy with another agency.
 When you get to a suspicious area, stop the vehicle and observe the vehicles
circulating within the zone. This can be really useful in case of unofficial check-
points.
 Identify your vehicle in accordance with the geographical zone. In most cases, clearly
visible Action Contre la Faim flags or stickers can be an advantage.

IF YOU ARE STOPPED WHILE IN YOUR VEHICLE

 Stop the vehicle. Put on the hand brake, but leave the car in neutral.
 Stay calm. Try not to show your fear or anger. Don’t be aggressive.
 Let them see your hands and do not make any sudden movements. When you obey an
order, move slowly and tell your aggressors what you intend to do before doing it.
 Get out of the vehicle only if you are asked to do so. If you get out of the vehicle,
leave the door open.
 Avoid looking your aggressors in the eye, but if you can, discreetly examine their
features, clothes, etc. to help to identify them. This is information that will then
probably be included in a subsequent report to the authorities concerned.
 Obey orders and stay calm.
 Let the aggressors leave with the vehicle without interfering.

21.17 KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE-TAKING

Kidnappers and hostage takers almost always choose their targets after meticulous
surveillance. Potential targets are people who ostentatiously display their possessions or have
a clear affiliation with a certain group. In many countries, humanitarian organisations are
perceived as having considerable financial resources. This is the reason why some groups
consider them a source of revenue, and may attempt to kidnap their employees to exchange
them for a ransom.

The principal authority in the event of a kidnapping or hostage-taking is the Head of Mission,
who should immediately be informed. Action Contre la Faim will not pay ransoms or hand

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over anything under pressure, but will use the appropriate means to ensure the release of a
hostage. Action Contre la Faim will also offer all the support it can to the families of hostages.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN

In the event of a kidnapping, the mission and Headquarters must immediately set up a crisis
management team. It may be advisable to set up a similar team at the local office where the
kidnapped employee works. A crisis manager must be clearly and immediately appointed, and
must consider which measures should be taken, according to the circumstances and his/her
assessment of the best possible reaction.
In the case of a staff member who is local, the crisis manager must also make sure that the
person's immediate family members are informed.

Although it is normal to wish for a prompt and safe resolution of the incident, negotiations
with kidnappers may sometimes last months, or even years. While the crisis management
team must be prepared for this eventuality, they must also be encouraged to stay positive.

Strict confidentiality from the outset is essential for managing the crisis. Information should
only be released on a need-to-know basis. It may thus be necessary to bypass the usual chain
of command – for example, the crisis management team members may be exempt from
making reports on the crisis to their managers.

GUIDELINES FOR KIDNAPPED PEOPLE

At the moment of the kidnapping

 Your one and only duty is to survive.

 When you are kidnapped, do not attempt to resist. The most dangerous stages are the
kidnapping itself and the ensuing moments. Do not play hero or tough guy and do not
react.
 Your kidnappers may blindfold or drug you.
 Stay calm, silent and cooperative. Do not make any sudden movements.
 Do not switch clothes with your kidnappers: in case of a rescue attempt, you may be
mistaken for one of them and attacked.
 Fear is a normal reaction. Try to relax, clear your mind, breathe deeply and accept the
situation. Concentrate your thoughts on people you like, and on pleasant events and
memories.
 It is recommended to speak to your kidnappers, unless it makes them more aggressive.
 You should not attempt to escape, except in very rare circumstances. Escape attempts
may cause injuries to or the death of other hostages.

During captivity

 When the situation becomes more stable, keep a low profile.

 Cooperate, but do not be subservient or hostile. Follow your abductors’ instructions.
 Be cautious when it comes to making suggestions. You may be held responsible if
something goes wrong.
 Do not beg and try not to cry. It is normal to feel humiliated, but do whatever you can
to maintain your dignity.

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  Do not threaten your kidnappers and do not tell them you will testify against them.
Avoid being noticed observing them, but if you can, discreetly examine their features,
clothes and hierarchy in the group, as this could help the authorities track them down
once you are released.
 Be a good listener. Do not argue. Remain polite.
 Try to gain your abductors’ respect and to develop a relationship with them. Families
and children are an excellent topic of conversation.
 Stress that, as a humanitarian, you are neutral and not involved in politics.
 Encourage your abductors to inform the authorities about your condition and your
whereabouts.

Health during captivity

 Under all circumstances, you must make a conscious effort to stay physically and
mentally healthy. Eat what is offered to you, and try to exercise regularly if possible.
 You can maintain your mental health by identifying a system of personal values and
clinging to it. It is healthy to concentrate your mental activity on the future and your
freedom. Mentally prepare yourself to cope with extreme isolation. Ask for writing
material or books if available.
 In order to counter the effects of the immediate environment and enforced inactivity, it
is essential to maintain personal discipline. You should establish and observe a routine
and maintain hygiene standards. If possible, gradually increase your requests for
personal hygiene items, books and writing materials.
 Take care of yourself and adopt a daily routine: exercise, stay clean, and sleep
whenever you can.
 Eat and drink even when you are not hungry or thirsty.
 Politely point out what you want or need, such as food, water, medicine, the use of the
toilets, books or writing material.
 Be patient and prepare yourself psychologically for a long captivity.
 Do not believe everything you are told.
 Do not despair. Your chances of being released increase with time.
 Do not attempt to escape, unless you are certain you will succeed.
 If a rescue attempt by force (or any other attack) is launched, throw yourself to the
ground, hands on your head. When the situation is stable again or when the rescuers
ask you, identify yourself.
 If they decide to release you voluntarily, this is also a dangerous moment. Promptly
obey their instructions. Do not make any sudden movements. Stay alert. Prepare
yourself for delays and disappointments.

As far as possible, keep the following points in mind:

 Stay calm. If capture is unavoidable, accept it and obey orders. Your only duty is to
survive.
 Accept captivity as a fact and mentally acknowledge the change of status and
circumstances.
 Give the abductors details on any medical treatment you may require.
 Accept and eat the food they give you, even if it is unappealing.

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  Prepare yourself mentally to wait a long time, perhaps months, until you regain your
freedom.
 Be discreetly sceptical of any information provided by your abductors.
 Plan a daily schedule of activities, including physical exercise, and stick to it.
 Try to always know what time it is.
 Take advantage of any comforts or privileges offered by your abductors, such as
books, newspapers or access to the radio. If they are not offered, you can request them.
 Stay as clean as the circumstances allow. Ask for adequate facilities to wash and use
the toilet.
 If possible, develop good relations with your abductors, and try to win their respect. It
may be useful to inform them about Action Contre la Faim's work in the region.
 After being released, a victim needs time and space to recover, and will probably need
medical or psychological assistance. Complete medical and psychological check-ups
should be organised, as well as support when necessary. The needs of the victim’s
family should also be met.

21.18 LOOTING
Looting is a common problem in situations of unrest and conflict. It can happen anywhere,
including shops, warehouses, and homes. If looting cannot be avoided, remember that life is
more precious than any material possessions: do not risk being injured by looters to protect
your property or that of Action Contre la Faim.

The risk of looting can be reduced by taking simple precautionary measures, such as:

 Keeping reduced stocks in the warehouses.

 Making copies of papers and key documents, and storing them elsewhere.
 Anchoring safes to the wall or floor, and reducing the amount of cash they contain.
 Distributing goods and property between several sites.
 Reinforcing doors and windows, and carefully locking them.
 Removing logos and all forms of the organisation's identity from vehicles so that
looters are not mistaken for humanitarian drivers or staff.
 Keeping a record of the serial numbers of vehicles and any other valuable equipment,
to help track them down later on.
 Storing the valuable equipment in containers with welded covers; placing containers
holding valuable equipment above other containers to prevent them from being easily
accessed from ground level.
 Blocking the warehouse doors using filled containers with welded covers.
 Distributing the valuable equipment amongst trustworthy employees (in particular
those who may be able to secure them in rural zones), as long as this does not
endanger them.
 Keeping valuable equipment, such as vehicles, out of sight. Consider immobilising
vehicles, for example by removing their wheels. However, if you may need the vehicle
for an emergency evacuation or any other urgent journey, do not immobilise it:
restoring it to use will take some time.

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21.19 MINES, BOOBY-TRAPS AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)
Mines, booby-traps or unexploded ordnance (UXO) represent widespread risks. UXO consists
of unexploded munitions such as bombs, grenades, rockets, mortar shells or bullets. They are
sometimes called “explosive war debris”.

Any location where battles have occurred can be contaminated with explosive devices or
UXO. This is particularly true for level ground in front of mountainous defensive positions;
bases and military buildings. Other probable contaminated sites are approach roads, bridges,
areas along railroads, landing strips, main intersections, frontiers, water sources, low-lying
ground and ditches. Guidelines containing detailed information on threats and procedures
relating to explosive devices are available from the Action Contre la Faim Security Unit.

Before going to a potentially contaminated site, all employees must be duly informed of the
dangers of mines.

In areas where mines, booby-traps or UXO may be found, it is essential for all staff members
to be fully aware of the threat, trained on how to avoid it and how to react to an emergency,
and adequately equipped. Ensure that all staff members know what to do, and whom to call
for help, if they come up against a mine and/or UXO.

AVOIDING MINES, BOOBY-TRAPS AND UXO

If you work in a region where mines, booby-traps or UXO have posed a problem recently,
familiarise yourself with how they look. There are different types of devices: all can kill or
seriously maim. You should also know the local techniques used to manufacture mines, for
they may differ from international standards, and recognising them will thus be more difficult.

Avoid going anywhere if you are not sure that it has been cleared of mines. You must
therefore have accurate information on all locations that have not yet been completely cleared.
Information sources (though not always reliable) may include:

 The local police, the local military troops and the local civilian authorities.
 Hospitals and health centres
 The international police or military forces (if present).
 The United Nations security officer; mine clearing organisations (if present).
 The local population.
 Other humanitarian organisations.

TRAVELLING IN CONTAMINATED REGIONS

Do not go to a location if you have any suspicions that it is contaminated.

The following guidelines are designed to remind the staff of Action Contre la Faim of what
they should keep in mind when travelling to regions containing mines or UXO. However,
these suggestions cannot replace the dedicated training required for all staff working in
regions suspected of being contaminated with booby-traps or UXO.

 Never travel to high-risk areas without a valid reason. Ensure that all those who travel
there have received appropriate training.

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  Inform the office of the route, dates, and times planned throughout the trip. Take only
approved roads and do not deviate from the planned route.
 Whenever possible, stay on tarmacked roads, even if it means taking a long way
round.
 Take an up-to-date map, and check information with people who know the region as
you go along. Whenever possible, travel with someone who knows the route you are
taking.
 Take added precautions when you travel during or after heavy rain. Explosive devices
may be shifted or uncovered by the rain.
 Under no pretext should you leave the road. Never drive around the roadblocks of
former military posts. Never leave the road to overtake another vehicle, bypass an
obstacle or turn back. If the road is not wide enough, back the car until you can safely
turn around.
 Do not drive your vehicle over anything that lies on the road. A paper bag, a piece of
fabric, a wooden plank or a pothole can all conceal an explosive device.
 Always ask local people to inform you on the location of explosive devices, and heed
their warnings!
 Never walk in areas covered with weed. Use sidewalks and well-worn paths.
 Walk in single file and keep a distance of 20 metres between each person.
 Do not enter abandoned buildings.
 Do not touch anything, especially unexploded devices. Do not hunt out objects.

Staff members must avoid touching or going near any object that could be a mine, an
explosive device or a UXO. Being close to mines and UXO is always dangerous and must be
avoided. You should also avoid going near objects that seem to have already exploded. They
may remain deadly, particularly for the following reasons:

 They may not have completely exploded.

 They can contain noxious substances.
 They can be used as bait for a booby-trap.
 People are sometimes tempted to pick up fragments of exploded munitions, or even
whole unexploded ones, as a souvenir. Never do this, not only because of the above-
mentioned dangers, but also because it may look suspicious if you are found with such
items in your possession.

The following are some of the recommendations to follow in places suspected of containing
mines, booby-traps or UXO:
 Always tell your colleagues where you are going, even when you are off-duty
and at weekends.
 Stay within radio contact.
 Carry a first aid kit with you. Ensure all staff members have taken first aid
training.
 Travel with a well-informed local guide.
 Use only roads and paths used recently by others.
 Remember that mines may have been laid recently, so that even a well-
travelled path can conceal new threats. Leave after the morning rush hour to allow
local traffic to use the roads before you.
 Do not drive or walk on the verges of roads: stay on the tarmac, or if there is
none, on the used surface of the road.

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  Do not go near suspicious objects. Mines and booby-traps take sometimes the
shape of interesting or eye-catching objects, such as toys, lighters, etc.

IF YOU DISCOVER ANY MINES

Even with reliable information, you may find yourself in a mined area. Many trainers in this
field recommend that employees should not try to locate mines: they advise them to wait for
help if they ever find themselves in a minefield.

As soon as you are able to do it safely, report the incident to your manager and to the local
authorities in charge. Remember that it can be dangerous to use a radio, a mobile or cell
phone where mines, explosive devices and UXO are located, for radio signals may trigger an
explosion.

Professional mine clearers are still debating whether inexperienced people should mark the
location of any mines, booby-traps or UXO they find. It is true that this could warn and
protect other people, but they could also trigger the device accidentally while trying to mark
its location. Whatever the policy adopted by the organisation, staff must receive clear
instructions on this subject.

On this subject see: Mines, Booby Traps, IED & UXO

21.20 SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Sexual behaviour varies greatly from one culture to the other. What may be considered
harassment in one society may be seen as the norm in another.

Sexual harassment can be a very great problem. If it is not thwarted, it may lead to sexual
violence. Even when it does not lead to violence, it is a serious issue in itself, and can cause
both psychological and physical problems. It may be the act of a man or a woman, and can
take different forms, such as:

 Constant invitations for a drink, dinner or a meeting.

 Suggestive comments.
 Close physical contact.
 Suggestive glances.
 Surprise visits to the home or hotel room.
 Pressure to start a sexual relationship.
 Threats or actual aggression.

If you are the victim of sexual harassment, take the time to consider how you should react.
Your options can include:

 To ignore the advances. In some cases, this can be enough to discourage the harasser.
 To confront the person harassing you. If you politely ask: “Are you talking to me?”
he/she can feel embarrassed and give up.
 To directly tell the person harassing you that you do not appreciate his/her behaviour,
preferably in the presence of a witness.

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  To seek the help of a friend, a trusted colleague, or your manager.

It is totally understandable that one would rather not have to report harassment, but it is useful
to immediately inform a manager about it. If the person harassing you is a manager, you must
report it to a person at the next level of hierarchy. This manager must then take immediate
measures to give a warning to the harasser, and protect the victim. If the harasser is a staff
member, disciplinary measures may be appropriate. It may be useful to inform the police if a
crime has been or could be committed. Support and counselling must be offered if necessary.

It is often useful to keep a written trace of the incidents, particularly of dates, the content of
conversations and witnesses. Because of their sensitive nature, do not leave any working notes
of this kind lying around, and keep them in a place you can lock.

21.21 RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE

As part of their training, all staff members must receive instructions on Action Contre la
Faim’s policy against sexual harassment, and the procedures to be followed in the event of
sexual assault. These policies and procedures must be regularly reviewed.

Basic information that should be provided to the staff on the subject of sexual assault:

 Each person is a potential victim of a sexual attack. It is a crime that uses violence and
control, and anyone can be a victim, regardless of age, race or social position.
 Sexual assault is the least reported violent crime.
 Victims are usually pre-selected, and the perpetrator is usually someone they know.

Preventive measures may reduce the likelihood of becoming a chance target, since the
aggressor will usually wait until the potential victim is in a vulnerable position or isolated.
Sexual violence has such a profound impact on its victims that great consideration must be
given to minimise any risk of it happening. The way to reduce risks will depend on the
context, but can include:

 Avoiding walking or driving alone, particularly at night.

 Avoiding isolated, dangerous or badly lit areas.
 Avoiding bars or clubs known to attract criminals.
 Trusting your instinct: if your gut feeling says you should go, leave immediately.
 Avoiding drugs and alcohol abuse.
 Carrying a radio or mobile phone.
 Ensuring that your drinks have not been laced with dangerous substances.
 Dressing discreetly, keeping the local culture in mind.
 Wearing comfortable shoes.
 When in public, staying with groups.
 Sharing your lodgings rather than live alone.

Although the great majority of sexual assaults are against women, some will target men. Rape
victims need concern and confidentiality, and usually counselling and/or medical treatment
too.

In the event of a rape, a compassionate person of the same gender must immediately be
assigned to comfort the victim. A doctor, if possible of the same gender, must examine the
victim as soon as possible in case emergency medical treatment is required. This can include

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treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, particularly AIDS, pregnancy prevention or
tending to injuries.

The name of the victim must remain confidential. The police must be informed, if the victim
agrees, in order to investigate the crime. The support of a specialist may be necessary: ask the
advice of a medical professional, and consult the victim on this subject.

It may probably be necessary for the victim to take some time off to recover. A victim may
wish to leave the region definitively or put an end to his/her contract. A manager should
ensure that the victim is given full support, and that an adequate agreement is reached
regarding his/her immediate future.

Sexual attacks and their repercussions can be an appalling experience. Victims often react
with a mixture of fear, anger, shame, and find it difficult to talk about it or seek help.

IMMEDIATE REACTION
There is no right way to react when confronted with the threat of a sexual attack. As for
possible reactions, consider the following options:

 Passive resistance: Try to talk the aggressor out of attacking you, or to turn him/her
off sexually. Say a few words in his/her language for example. Urinating, defecating
or vomiting may repulse the aggressor and discourage a sexual assault.
 Active resistance: Use physical force to confront the aggressor. Yell, scream, call for
help, run away or defend yourself.
 Submission: If you have no means of escape and you feel your life in danger, your
only thought should be to stay alive.

AFTER AN ATTACK
A sexual attack and its repercussions are a terrifying experience. Victims often react with a
mixture of fear, anger, shame, and find it difficult to talk about it or seek help.

Victims should not feel that they are alone. They deserve substantial and confidential
assistance, because sexual assault is a horrifying crime.

It is up to the victim to decide whether or not to report the crime. Although it may be difficult,
the attack should be reported to the appropriate authorities. The Head of Mission must ensure
procedures are implemented to preserve the confidentiality and legal and human rights of the
victim, and to respect his/her privacy and dignity.

A medical examination is strongly recommended, before taking a bath or a shower. It should

include screening for sexually transmitted diseases, and treatment of injuries.

The Head of Mission should ask to accompany and support the victim when the latter reports
the crime and undergoes the medical examination.

Action Contre la Faim will recommend and facilitate access to counselling for all victims of
sexual assault.

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While taking all necessary measures to protect the confidentiality of the victim, the Head of
Mission should fill in an Incident Report form provided by ACF.

Witnesses of any rape or sexual attack, as well as victims’ colleagues, will also be affected
and in need of appropriate support.

21.22 THEFT
Theft may or may not be accompanied by violence. It can be a very frightening experience.
When someone is robbed far from their home or workplace, it can be assimilated to an attack.

The staff must take precautions to avoid robberies, such as:

 Staying in low-risk areas.

 Avoiding isolated or badly lit areas at night.
 Avoiding going out alone.
 Carrying a radio.

In case of a theft attempt, try to call for help by:

 Using the radio: a single word can be enough to alert your colleagues if you do not
have time to say more.
 Yelling or screaming.

If you can safely assume that you can escape by entering someone’s house, or by running to
shake off your attackers, do so. Otherwise, calmly cooperate with them, and give them
whatever they demand. Do not make any sudden movements. Do not risk injury to protect
material possessions.

As soon as the assault is over, go to a safe place at once and report the incident. Try to
remember in detail what your aggressors looked like in order to help the police identify them.

It may be useful to distribute your money in several different places, such as two pockets and
a wallet or purse, in addition to a money belt. This will allow you to give your aggressors the
contents of just one pocket and the wallet, for example, if they do not notice the other hiding
places. It is best to limit the amount of cash you carry.

Thefts can happen at home or your workplace. In such a case, if it is possible, and as long as it
does not endanger you, lock the door before the robbers can break in. Call for help and trigger
the alarm, if it is not dangerous to do so.

If robbers break into the building, it is better to cooperate and give them whatever they
demand. Do not make any sudden movements. After their departure, lock the premises and go
to a safe location, then report the incident as soon as you can.

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 22. STRESS MANAGEMENT

Stress is both a health and security risk factor. Managers and staff must endeavour to prevent
it and watch out for tell-tale signs among their teams. It affects individuals in very different
ways, according to their cultures. The following aspects are only suggestions and must be
carefully selected and adapted according to the situation and culture involved.

22.1 CAUSES OF STRESS

A number of factors can cause stress, such as:

 Personal loss
 Overwork or excessive pressure from work
 Conflicting professional requirements
 A large number of supervisors
 Poorly-defined responsibilities and expectations
 Professional insecurity
 Trauma
 Failure of a mission
 Feeling overwhelmed by the magnitude of requirements
 Human error
 Misunderstandings
 Illness
 Difficulties in personal relationships
 Antagonism from the authorities or local population

22.2 STRESS PREVENTION

Stress can often be prevented by taking simple precautionary measures, such as:

 Organising realistic work plans and schedules;

 Giving clear briefings;
 Taking account of signs of stress in your colleagues to ensure efficient management;
 Listening carefully to the staff, especially when they are under pressure;
 Keeping the staff really well informed;
 Encouraging the staff and praising them for their work;
 Settling any complaints or grievances as soon as possible;
 Ensuring adequate rest: at least one day a week off is vital, except in cases of extreme
emergency. Periods of rest and relaxation are mandatory in times of intense pressure;
 Allowing staff to visits their families and/or call home;
 Efficient mail facilities and private access to personal e-mail, if possible;
 Respecting the privacy of their lodgings;
 Little luxuries such as books, magazines, videos, good quality soap;
 Healthy food and varied menus;
 Encouraging team spirit and an atmosphere of comradeship;
 Encouraging regular physical exercise;
 Recognising work well done and rewarding it if appropriate;

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  Ensuring adequate wages;
 Ensuring secure accommodation.

22.3 SYMPTOMS OF STRESS

Managers and staff must pay attention to signs of stress affecting them or their colleagues.
The most common signs are:

 Unusual or unpredictable behaviour

 Oral expression: talking much more or much less than usual
 Irritability or outbursts of anger
 Headaches
 Depression or anxiety
 Apathy
 Unexplained aches and pains
 Skin problems
 Disregard of security and risky behaviour
 Indecision and incoherence
 Reduced efficiency at work; being overworked
 Difficulty in concentrating
 Frequent absences from work
 Recurring minor illnesses
 Disillusionment regarding work
 Chronic fatigue
 Troubled or excessive sleep
 Loss or excess of appetite;
 Excessive alcohol consumption or substance abuse

22.4 TREATMENT OF STRESS

A doctor or other qualified person will recommend a treatment for stress. A debriefing should
be carried out by a qualified person, if possible. In the absence of qualified staff, the following
advice is often useful, but the appropriate solution may vary depending on the individual and
his/her culture.

 Take the time to talk and listen to those suffering from stress. Encourage them to
express their feelings. Reassure them. Comfort them or help them resolve their
problems. Determine whether a change of work routine could be beneficial. Do they
need additional help in their tasks? Are there other factors affecting their morale, such
as bad news from home?
 Encourage those suffering from stress to distance themselves from a stressful work
environment, but not to stop working altogether. Suggest useful tasks they can
undertake that would not be stressful. They will then feel useful and valued.
 Give them access to recreational or religious infrastructures; offer them counselling if
they want it.
 Encourage them to take good care of themselves: eat a healthy diet, exercise, take
frequent rests, etc.
 Talk to them regularly or ensure that a compassionate colleague does.

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  After a given time, according to the circumstances, it is often possible for them to
resume a normal work schedule. Resuming work, after a significant break and with no
work overload, can help them recover.
 Keep monitoring and listening to them to see how they are doing.

If they do not react or are unable to resume their duties, seek medical advice.

22.5 TRAUMATIC STRESS

Any significantly painful event that goes beyond the scope of ordinary human experience can
cause traumatic stress. This can lead to intense reactions, particularly to fear and/or a feeling
of helplessness, which can overwhelm the person's resistance mechanisms. Such a response is
a normal reaction to an abnormal situation. It does not necessarily indicate that a person has
developed a mental disorder. It may, however, lead to post-traumatic stress disorder.

Traumatic stress is caused when a person is confronted with an event that severely
compromises his or her emotional well-being, or with a so-called critical incident. The event
may be either sudden and unexpected or on-going in nature.

Some employees may suffer a so-called indirect trauma, after witnessing a traumatic or
violent event, or after being associated with a tragic event, such as an intensive intervention
following a disaster. Others can exhibit “compassion fatigue” induced by being exposed to
human suffering, or tragic situations of a more chronic and lasting nature. In numerous cases,
symptoms of indirect trauma or compassion fatigue resemble those of direct trauma.
Individuals with a significant history of traumatic experiences, instability in their current lives
or other areas of vulnerability may run a higher risk.

Whatever its source, traumatic stress can prove to be one of the most serious work-related
risks for the staff, both in the field and at Headquarters. Treatment of traumatic stress is the
responsibility of a competent specialist and requires professional care.

22.6 EXHAUSTION
Some signs of exhaustion are similar to those of stress, although they may be more noticeable.
Signs of exhaustion amongst a team can include a high staff turn-over, a lack of unity within
the team, a culture of recrimination, lack of initiative, frequent sick leave and loss of
efficiency. Managers should pay attention to these signs, and take appropriate measures. The
best approach is to set up working habits that will prevent the emergence of stress and
exhaustion.

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 23. APPENDICES
23.1 ACF SECURITY POLICY
23.2 CONTENTS OF ACF COUNTRY SECURITY FILE
23.3 WELCOME TO <COUNTRY>
23.4 <COUNTRY> GENERAL INFO
23.5 <COUNTRY> SECURITY PLAN
23.6 <BASE> SECURITY FILE
23.7 SECURITY BRIEFING
23.8 INCIDENT REPORT
23.9 CHECK-LIST :ASSESSMENT OF THE LOCAL SECURITY – (SOURCE ECHO)
23.10 CHECK-LIST :ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY – (SOURCE: CARE)
23.12 MINES, BOOBY TRAPS, IED AND UXO
23.13 SHELTERS
23.14 FIRE PROTECTION
23.15 INDIVIDUAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT
23.16 DESIGN AND EVACUATION PLAN
23.17 FAMILIES: PROCEDURES TO INFORM THEM
23.18 DRIVERS: CHECK-LIST
23.19 CULTURAL AWARENESS
23.20 THREATS: GRAPHIC IMPACT
23.21 HUMANITARIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW
23.22 FINANCIAL SECURITY
23.23 SECURITY AND INVENTORY CONTROLS
23.24 FLOODS AND FLASH FLOODS – ACF SECURITY GUIDELINES
23.25 ACF EARTHQUAKE SECURITY GUIDELINES (FROM USGS INFORMATION)
23.26 TSUNAMI - ACF SECURITY GUIDELINES (FROM USGS INFORMATION)
23.27 ANIMAL-BORNE HAZARDS
23.28 HIV-AIDS PROCEDURES
23.29 BIRD FLU (SOURCE: INVS).
23.30 FIRST AID GUIDELINES

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